Strategy, Actions and Investment to Recover the Malvinas
✍️ Opinion piece by José Javier Díaz
On 3 September, President Javier Milei announced the implementation of a series of measures aimed at preventing the illegal exploitation of oil in Argentine territory occupied by the United Kingdom. We examine the proposals that have been announced and the role that the Argentine Navy should play in the surveillance and control of our jurisdictional areas and areas of interest in the South Atlantic.
🔹 From Claims to Action
The Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands were unlawfully seized in 1833 and have since remained de facto under British administration, with the exception of the 74 days between 2 April and 14 June 1982, when they were recovered by the Argentine Armed Forces.
In almost two centuries, Argentine diplomacy has failed to recover that part of our territory unlawfully occupied by an extra-continental power which has progressively expanded its area of influence and military projection in the South Atlantic and Antarctica, where the sector claimed by Argentina is also claimed, in whole or in part, by the United Kingdom and Chile.
During the 1960s and 1970s, Argentina conducted diplomatic negotiations with the United Kingdom with the aim of recovering the full exercise of our sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and their surrounding maritime areas.
Unfortunately, economic interests — principally those of the monopolistic Falkland Islands Company — together with military and political interests within the Argentine and British governments, escalated into a crisis and subsequently an armed conflict, derailing the preliminary agreement intended to bring about the return of the islands to the Argentine Republic.
No serious State can assert sovereign rights and demand respect for its interests solely through words, while pursuing actions — or omissions — that preserve the status quo or even improve conditions for the occupying country.
From the 1982 war until last week, successive Argentine governments pursued essentially the same implicit strategy regarding the Malvinas, one contrary to the Nation’s vital interests: limiting themselves to ever more speeches and diplomatic claims whilst reducing investment in Defence to a minimum.
For 193 years, Argentines have asserted our sovereignty through hundreds of letters and speeches, resolutions adopted by multilateral organisations (UN, OAS, UNASUR, etc.), services (air connectivity, postal services, healthcare, etc.) and infrastructure (including a paved runway) intended to improve the quality of life of the inhabitants of the Malvinas — commonly known as “Kelpers” — even including the delivery of Winnie-the-Pooh teddy bears, among other initiatives.
Against this backdrop, over the past 40 years the Argentine Armed Forces have lost strategic military capabilities essential to the defence of a bicontinental country with a land area of 3,761,274 km² and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 3,146,345 km²; a population of almost 50 million; the capacity to produce food for 400 million people; a GDP of nearly US$700 billion and exports worth US$100 billion; as well as substantial reserves of fresh water, minerals (gold, lithium, copper, silver, etc.), rare earths, oil and gas, among other resources.
For these reasons, it is essential that the noble “Malvinas cause” — one of the few issues on which all Argentines agree — receive the explicit backing of the entire political spectrum. Through a National Law, political leaders should establish a National Strategy and Action Plan aimed at recovering Argentine sovereignty over the southern archipelagos and their surrounding maritime areas, strengthening our Antarctic projection and securing control of the South Atlantic. The ability to control that oceanic space, or deny its use to foreign powers, will be crucial to safeguarding the independence and territorial integrity of the Argentine Republic.
🔹 Actions to Be Implemented
During the nationwide broadcast on Thursday, 3 September, and through Official Communiqués Nos. 157 and 160 issued by the Office of President Javier Milei, the following measures were announced:
• The National Sovereignty Defence Bill will be submitted to Congress. It will establish a National Security Council responsible for defining a national security policy to be implemented across all areas of government. This will lead to the formulation and implementation of a coordinated strategy for the defence of national sovereignty and territory, with the objective of recovering the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. “We will ask Congress to grant the Council the necessary powers so that the State can respond with economic and diplomatic tools to State or non-State actors that threaten our national security,” the President stated.
• A critical infrastructure protection regime, together with an aerospace and maritime protection framework, will be established to strengthen protection against potential attacks of any kind upon our country’s territorial integrity.
• Through Decree of Necessity and Urgency (DNU) 867/2026, the Executive Branch amended budgetary allocations, providing an additional AR$217.959 billion (approximately US$142 million) for the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), an additional AR$30.519 billion for Intelligence (SIDE), and a further AR$117.275 billion for the National Space Activities Commission (CONAE).
• According to President Milei, the increased MINDEF budget will have “the priority objective of building an integrated naval base in Tierra del Fuego and increasing our telecommunications capabilities. This base will turn us into the most important logistics hub in the South Atlantic and will be fundamental to Argentina’s geopolitical projection in a region of strategic importance to the country’s future.” Efforts will also be made to increase capabilities through the recovery and modernisation of existing assets and the incorporation of new equipment for the Armed Forces, as well as completing the Petrel Joint Antarctic Base, which comes under the Armed Forces Joint Staff (EMCO).
President Milei also stated: “This very evening I will sign a decree to expedite the sanctioning procedures established under Law 26,659 against those participating in oil-extraction initiatives in Argentine territory under British occupation.” The companies involved will be prohibited from operating on Argentine soil.
🔹 Other Actions That Should Be Undertaken
Although the President’s decision to announce the aforementioned measures represents a significant step, they are not sufficiently comprehensive in themselves to exert decisive pressure upon an extra-continental actor of the United Kingdom’s stature: an economic and military power possessing nuclear weapons and a veto on the United Nations Security Council.
In order to increase political and diplomatic pressure and make the United Kingdom’s unlawful occupation and exploitation of renewable and non-renewable natural resources in the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and their surrounding maritime areas more difficult and costly, the Argentine Government should undertake the following measures:
• Formally request the Governments of the United States and Israel to exercise their good offices so that Argentina and the United Kingdom resume negotiations concerning the sovereignty dispute.
• Request that all South American countries prohibit the use of their civilian and military airports and ports by British aircraft and vessels — or aircraft and vessels flying other flags — travelling to or from the Argentine islands.
• Reach an agreement with the Chilean Government on cooperation in Antarctic science and logistics, complementing the civilian and military resources and capabilities of both countries and acting in a coordinated and synergistic manner in response to the British claim, which encompasses the entirety of the Argentine Antarctic Sector and part of the sector claimed by Chile.
• Extend the application of commercial, economic, tax and judicial sanctions against companies and individuals exploiting any resources — oil, gas, fisheries, livestock, tourism, etc. — in the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and their surrounding maritime areas.
• Build the Ushuaia Integrated Naval Base (BNIU) for the Argentine Navy (ARA) as a matter of utmost urgency; complete the construction and equipment of the Petrel Joint Antarctic Base (BAC); and modernise the facilities of the Marambio Joint Antarctic Base, thereby establishing a multimodal Antarctic logistics system. This would strengthen Argentine sovereignty in Antarctica, improve surveillance and control of the South Atlantic, and allow services — maintenance, supplies, training, etc. — to be offered to companies and governments that recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and their maritime areas.
• Redesignate the current BNIU project as a Joint Base and expand its facilities to accommodate units from all three Armed Forces. Its strength should be comparable to, or greater than, that of an Argentine Army (EA) brigade — approximately 3,000 to 4,000 personnel with their weapons, vehicles, support weapons, engineering assets, etc. It should also accommodate supersonic combat aircraft; vessels including the icebreaker ARA Almirante Irízar, auxiliary vessels, tugs, fast craft and patrol vessels; transport and maritime-patrol aircraft; medium- and long-range drones for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and strike missions; Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopters; and other assets. The capabilities and assets of the Argentine Armed Forces in Ushuaia should provide two or three times the combat power of the British military base in the Malvinas.
• Relocate the Joint Antarctic Command (COCOANTAR), the Argentine Antarctic Institute (IAA) and the Permanent Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty from their present headquarters in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (CABA) to new facilities in Ushuaia.
• Begin construction as soon as possible at the TANDANOR/Río Santiago shipyards of a self-docking floating dock, providing the Ushuaia Integrated Naval Base with major maintenance facilities for Argentine Navy vessels and those of other domestic and foreign users.
• Establish, by law or DNU, a National Maritime Surveillance and Control System (SINVYCEM), designating the Argentine Navy as the implementing authority and funding the system through a multi-year budget for 2027–2030. This would support the development or licensed production of coastal and over-the-horizon radars; coastal towers and buoys equipped with electro-optical sensors, SIGINT (Signals Intelligence), AIS/LRIT ship-identification systems; satellites; medium- and long-range aerial drones; unmanned surface and underwater systems; telecommunications; command-and-control systems; and other capabilities.
• Seek an agreement whereby France supports Argentina’s sovereignty claim as a prerequisite for signing a contract to re-equip the Submarine Force Command (COFS) with three new submarines — with an option for six, since three would be a very limited number given the size and wealth of Argentina’s coastline — as well as H145 helicopters and other equipment.
• Pursue the acquisition from Italy, Denmark and Norway of between four and eight second-hand frigates to replace the obsolete MEKO 360 destroyers commissioned between 1983 and 1985 — three remain in service and one has been decommissioned — and modernise, in Argentine shipyards, the sensors and weapons of at least four of the Argentine Navy’s six MEKO 140 corvettes.
• Negotiate with Italy for the gradual transfer of its three San Giorgio-class amphibious assault ships, providing the Argentine Navy’s Marine Corps Command (COIM) and Argentine Army units with strategic mobility and force-projection capabilities, particularly to secure communications between the provinces of Tierra del Fuego and Santa Cruz.
• Restore strategic capabilities to the Argentine Navy’s Naval Aviation Command (COAN) by incorporating at least one squadron of 12 to 18 F/A-18C/D Hornet fighters and eight to twelve SH-60 Seahawk anti-submarine warfare helicopters. AGM-84J-1 Harpoon Block II+ anti-ship missiles should be acquired for the three P-3C Orion aircraft purchased by Naval Aviation and for the F/A-18C/D Hornets that the Argentine Navy should acquire.
• Strengthen Río Grande Naval Air Station, which comes under COAN, through the permanent deployment of manned and unmanned aircraft for ISR, SAR, ASW and ASuW missions, as well as helicopters. Owing to its geographical location, the base has considerable geostrategic value, as it is the Argentine air base closest to the Malvinas.
• Complete and modernise the combat and mobility capabilities — by sea, air and land — of Marine Infantry Battalions (BIM) Nos. 4 and 5, permanently based in Ushuaia and Río Grande respectively.
• Amend specific-service and joint military doctrine so that the Argentine Air Force (FAA) is capable of attacking surface targets at sea. This would require appropriate personnel training and the acquisition of the same anti-ship missiles operated by COAN.
• Increase the National Defence budget to a minimum floor of 1 to 1.5% of GDP. To put these figures into perspective, in 2025 Argentina allocated only 0.56% of GDP to its Armed Forces, compared with a South American average of 1.25% and a global average of approximately 2.5%, according to SIPRI data. With defence expenditure at only 0.56% of GDP, a substantial proportion of Argentine military personnel earn less than the cost of the basic household basket; instruction and training remain at minimal levels, with personnel completing fewer flying hours, days at sea and field-training days each year; the readiness of ships, aircraft, tanks and other equipment falls below desirable minimum levels; and the age of the principal weapons systems of all three Armed Forces has rendered many of them obsolete owing to insufficient modernisation and/or replacement with safer and more capable systems.
• The Argentine Navy, under the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), and the Argentine Naval Prefecture (PNA), under the Ministry of National Security (MINSEG), should make optimal, synergistic and complementary use of their personnel, assets and capabilities. With the exception of the United States, other countries in the Americas generally integrate their coastguard services into the organisational structure of their respective navies. The PNA could transfer assets and responsibilities beyond the territorial sea — outside the 12-nautical-mile limit measured from Argentina’s coastal baselines — to the Argentine Navy, whilst retaining responsibility for security in ports, waterways, binational lakes and other relevant areas.
• Argentina should develop a national capability to place nano- and microsatellites into orbit for observation, telecommunications and geopositioning. Operating a satellite constellation equipped with passive sensors (cameras) and active sensors (L- and X-band radars) would provide greater situational awareness across Argentine territory and maritime areas.
• Connectivity between Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego should be ensured without the need to cross Chilean territory. As a priority, the feasibility of constructing a bridge, an undersea tunnel and/or establishing a ferry system for the transport of people, cargo and vehicles should be assessed.
• A strategic industries promotion regime — covering aerospace, shipbuilding, nuclear technology, AI, Defence, Security and other sovereignty-related sectors — should be implemented. This should include reductions in tax and employer contributions, preferential access to public tenders for Argentine SMEs, and incentives for multinational companies establishing production and/or maintenance facilities in Argentina.
🔹 Conclusions
As President Milei stated during his nationwide address: “National security is not merely the physical defence of our territory. It also means protecting our strategic resources, our economy, our critical infrastructure and our ability to decide our own future.” He emphasised that the areas of “Defence, Security, Intelligence, Foreign Affairs and the Economy must act in a coordinated manner”. Finally, the President concluded: “A prosperous Argentina, politically relevant and militarily respected, is in a stronger position to defend its territory, its resources and its sovereignty.”
Following the end of the 1982 war, the Malvinas question returned to the international agenda on 31 August, when President Donald Trump was asked in the Oval Office whether the United States might reconsider its position of neutrality in the sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom. The US President replied that he reviews all his positions every day and that this was “just one of many”. His remarks came against the backdrop of disagreements between Washington and London over the previous two years concerning the lack of British support for Israel and the war against Iran over its nuclear programme and maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
Factors favouring Argentina include the close personal relationship between Presidents Trump and Milei; Argentina’s strategic alignment with the United States and Israel; the United Kingdom’s growing economic, military and geopolitical difficulties; calls from Ireland, Scotland and Wales for full independence — which, according to this argument, would result in four independent countries, with Great Britain remaining the only one unwilling to rejoin the European Union — and the precedent of the recent agreement under which Britain returned sovereignty over the Chagos Islands to Mauritius. Among other developments, these factors suggest that the recovery of our Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and their surrounding maritime areas may be closer than we might imagine.
Nevertheless, it is essential to bear in mind President Milei’s statement that: “It is therefore not enough simply to maintain the claim: the Argentine State has an obligation to use every diplomatic, economic, judicial and legal instrument available to defend our sovereignty and our resources. That requires appropriate laws, coordinated State institutions and effective tools to advance an objective that transcends any individual government.”
Referring to the contribution that Defence can make to foreign policy, Defence Minister Lieutenant General Carlos Presti stated: “President Javier Milei’s decision to strengthen Argentina’s presence, capabilities and strategic projection sets a clear direction for National Defence. We have a unique opportunity to build a stronger, more sovereign and more secure country.”
In this column, we endorse General Presti’s words regarding the need to “…turn that vision into the concrete capabilities Argentina needs to defend its strategic interests, exercise its sovereignty and rise to the challenges ahead.” He added: “Argentina has everything it needs to achieve this. And Defence is ready to play its part. The Malvinas are Argentine.”
From the President of the Nation to the last Argentine citizen, we must set aside our ideologies and personal interests and unite behind the constitutional mandate to recover sovereignty over our Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and their surrounding maritime areas.
By right, by history, by geography, and in honour of and gratitude to the 649 heroes who fell in combat and the Veterans of the Malvinas War, let us do everything we can and everything we must so that the Argentine flag may once again fly proudly over our islands.
May it be so.
Photo: MINDEF
The author serves as Director in Argentina of Colombia’s Aerospace Sector Scientific Corporation and as a consultant to companies and government agencies. He is a former Argentine Navy officer and served as an adviser to the Ministers of Industry, Trade and Technology of Córdoba, and to Argentina’s Ministers of Defence and Security.
