Malvinas: Lions in Darwin

The Lions of the "Aliaga" Section

A pause in the attack

After opening fire on the advancing British section, the British troops paused their manoeuvre in an attempt to reorganise their failed advance through the depression. Clearly, the rounded hill held by Second Lieutenant Aliaga's section dominated the small valley, and remaining within range of weapons from that position was extremely dangerous.

However, not everything was in favour of the small Argentine force: several of its shooters had been poorly positioned for the land attack, as their foxholes had been designed to face a beach landing and did not allow them to fire at the British without exposing themselves. As a result, some had to lie prone on the slope to return fire, which was a highly risky move.

From the command post—a dugout located near the top of the rise—Aliaga assessed the situation and assumed they might be able to hold out until nightfall, provided the engagement continued as it had. Then they could withdraw under cover of darkness. Alternatively, if the situation worsened, they might attempt to retreat to the nearby settlement at any point during the day. Yet even in daylight, such a manoeuvre would be far from simple: it would take place under enemy fire and, if successful, might still result in being mistakenly fired upon by their own troops, as there was no communication system to warn of the movement.

At that moment, two or three Pucará aircraft flew northwards but did not release their weapons against the British forces engaging the Argentine position. The British, however, took full advantage of the opportunity and greeted the flyover with a barrage of automatic weapons fire.

A tense calm settled over the trenches. During that lull, Sergeant Maldonado crawled over to the machine-gun crew and urged them to keep doing exactly what they were doing—telling them: “Keep it up, you're tearing the gringos to pieces.” Without a doubt, the success of the defence would rest heavily on the firepower of the lone MAG machine gun.

Also in that trench was Private Ramón Monje, who, having used up the last of the 88.9mm rocket launcher ammunition on the hedge line, moved over to the other conscripts for support. However, he had no rifle and was unable to fight.

Two foxholes to the right of the MAG, another pair of soldiers waited for the battle to resume. Hugo Castro watched the small valley below, barely blinking, expecting to see the enemy infantry appear at any moment. But it was not from the front; instead, off to the right, they spotted a small unit—no more than 15 men—moving in single file about 800 metres away, descending southwards along the gentle slopes that, in the opposite direction, overlook Darwin Bay.

Unable to establish proper contact or determine whether the group were friend or foe—since their shouts of “¡Viva la Patria!” received no reply—the soldiers of Regiment 8 decided not to open fire. Shortly afterwards, the group disappeared into the next hollow in their path. (This was First Corporal Quintana's group from the Reconnaissance Section of Regiment 12, who, after fighting on Darwin Ridge, had managed to retreat to Goose Green.)

Under Fire Once More

Suddenly, the British resumed their assault on the hill, and from that point onward, the gunfire would continue almost uninterrupted until the battle’s end.

Second Lieutenant Aliaga, firing single shots with his rifle due to it not cycling correctly, was growing concerned—his right flank was the most exposed, and he feared the British might attempt to encircle them from that side.

At that moment, Private Guillermo Marini reached the dugout with urgent news:
– “Sir, Corporal Bossetti’s been hit!”

Corporal Bossetti, who had remained in his tent due to poor health, had been wounded in the arm. A bullet had entered near the top of one shoulder and exited through the forearm. The section now had its first casualty. (Corporal Bossetti had even coughed up blood and was in a severely weakened state due to malnutrition, yet he had refused to abandon his unit.)

Aliaga then instructed Marini to crawl over to one of the alternate positions on the right side, which had been designated for contingency use when the section was first deployed there. Armed with his FAL rifle, the conscript was to act as a lookout and raise the alarm if he saw any British troops advancing from that direction.

However, Marini had barely covered a few metres before he was struck twice in one leg and once in the abdomen, collapsing and unable to move.
– “Sir, Marini’s hit!” someone shouted, which Aliaga heard.

Without hesitation—and knowing that the young man was completely exposed—Aliaga crawled out to him and tried to cover the abdominal wound, which was bleeding heavily. Looking to his side, he saw two other soldiers, Naif Anis Hassanie and Luis Cepeda, had followed him. (These conscripts were risking their lives for their officer, who was barely older than themselves.)

The four of them were surrounded by dozens of impacts kicking up dirt all around. With immense effort, Aliaga managed to drag Marini back until they fell into the relative safety of the command post trench.

Goose Green: A Harrowing Account

Jones: A Harrowing Account

Particularly for the British, owing to the devastating loss of Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones and almost his entire team within mere minutes of combat.

“The first land battle in the Malvinas was initiated at Colonel Jones’s request. At first, everything seemed likely to proceed smoothly, but the fighting proved ferocious. The 2 PARA, exhausted after nearly a full day’s march, was forced to attack across open ground, in broad daylight, and with inadequate fire support. They lost their commander, his aides-de-camp, and almost the entire staff — and with them, very nearly the action itself...”

Captain David Wood, a close friend of H. Jones, was known for his humour and knack for lifting the men’s spirits at just the right moment. According to the plans and training carried out in Kenya in 1981, Wood was not meant to accompany Jones during reconnaissance, as his role was to remain at the command post. But swept up in Jones’s enthusiasm, Wood moved to the front line. During the assault on the Argentine trench, he shouted to his comrades: “Remember Arnhem!” — a reference to the largest airborne operation ever undertaken by the Parachute Regiment, and their greatest loss at the hands of the Germans, depicted in the film A Bridge Too Far.

David Wood ran forward, but an Argentine bullet killed him instantly, along with two other soldiers. Jones witnessed the scene, unaware that his fallen friend was among the dead. At his side, Captain Chris Dent was ordered by Jones to recover the radio equipment used by the fallen men. Dent prepared to move, but another soldier warned him of the danger of venturing into the open under Argentine fire. Dent went anyway and was shot dead on the spot.

Jones was shaken; he could see almost his entire team being cut down by enemy fire. He decided to take the nearest trench, hurling a grenade, when from a slightly offset position an Argentine machine-gun, about fifty metres away, opened fire. The first burst hit him. Another officer nearby, Farrar-Hockley, tried to help him, as Jones was bleeding heavily and making faint movements, but the intense Argentine fire made it impossible. Corporal Michael Melia of the Royal Engineers attempted to reach Jones’s body, only to be killed by several shots. Another burst struck Jones again, and this time he no longer moved.

Jones was mortally wounded. A young soldier named Tuffen tried to rescue him but was shot in the head. Another paratrooper, Worrell, was badly wounded in the same action. Corporal Stephen Prior attempted to reach the bodies but was killed by Argentine fire; his comrade Albols lay prone and motionless, unable to act. Tuffen was thought dead, but several hours later medics found him in the field, covered with a sheet of metal, still alive.

Corporal Hardman, who had been watching the events unfold, tried to reach them at a run but was killed by multiple Argentine shots, one of which completely destroyed his head. His comrades, lying prone, used Hardman’s body as cover.

Only Corporal Todd remained. Seeing that his entire team and commanding officers were gone, he requested permission to withdraw to the starting point.

The posthumous decoration awarded to H. Jones was heavily questioned within the British Armed Forces, notably by 2 PARA officer and military theorist Spencer Fitz-Gibbon, who wrote in 1995 that, despite his undoubted bravery, Herbert Jones did more to hinder his unit’s victory than to secure it. According to his analysis, Jones lost sight of the broader picture of the battle and prevented his sub-unit commanders from exercising mission command, in favour of attempting his “own feat of heroism.”

 

Mount Longdon: The Real British Casualties Commented by the Bad Guys

Malvinas: Blood Over The Murrell River

Blood on the Murrell River: The Commandos Who Fought in the "Death Zone" and Escaped an Ambush

"They're going to kill us all," muttered the Army and Gendarmerie men as they faced off against British paratroopers in the Falklands. They were trapped in the strip of land where a soldier’s chances of survival are nearly nonexistent—but they fought back. The bullets shattering the rocks, the shrapnel that tore into them, and how they ultimately forced the British to retreat when all seemed lost.
Nicolás Kasanzew || Infobae




Captain Figueroa (center), Lieutenant Anadón (right) y First Lieutenant García Pinasco (back), planifying the mission, June 6th, 1982 (Photo: Nicolás Kasanzew)


Through freezing cold and sleet, they navigated a sector battered by naval gunfire and riddled with their own minefields. Leading them was Lieutenant Marcelo Anadón, who knew the terrain well. Advancing cautiously along the riverbank, spaced about fifty meters apart, they suddenly found themselves bathed in the glow of a massive, radiant moon.

Sergeant Guillén, scanning the far side of the Murrell, noticed a faint glimmer. At first, he assumed it was just the moonlight reflecting off the water. Only later would he realize—it had been the sheen of a plastic poncho worn by a British soldier.


"They shredded my hood and the back of my jacket, but I kept firing. The medic, Moyano, pulled a bunch of shrapnel out of my arm and back."

As they reached the bridge—a simple wooden structure with no railings—Anadón and his men prepared to cross. That was when the British opened fire.

Figueroa, along with Non-Commissioned Officers Poggi and Tunini, was making his way back from the far side of the river, where they had gone to set up a post-ambush blockade. Just then, an explosion ripped through the air, followed by gunfire. Instinctively, all the commandos flattened themselves against the ground.

The British were about 80 meters away, positioned on a rocky high ground across the river.

"We're exposed. They're going to kill all three of us," Figueroa thought. In trying to set an ambush, they had walked straight into one. Without hesitation, he opened fire toward the flashes of enemy gunfire. His blood felt like it was bubbling in his veins, and his nostrils were flooded with the sharp scent of adrenaline.

The Argentine commandos had landed in what soldiers call the "death zone"—a stretch of battlefield where survival is almost impossible.


Figueroa: "We're Exposed. They're Going to Kill All Three of Us."

The British fired both in single shots and rapid bursts. Figueroa saw streaks of red and orange whipping through the darkness, writhing toward him like demonic ribbons, hunting for his life. They were tracer rounds—illuminated bullets the British loaded every five shots to guide their fire in the night.

"It was the most magnificent sight I’ve ever witnessed in my life," he tells me.

Bullets slammed into the nearby rocks, shattering them into a storm of dust and shrapnel. The acrid scent of gunpowder filled his lungs, leaving him lightheaded, almost intoxicated. The fear of death dulled, swallowed by

• "Captain, I'm hit!"
• "Where did they get you?"
• "In the leg, but I can crawl back."
• "Fall back, we’ll get to you soon."

"I'll help him and pull back with him," Tunini interjected.

The round had pierced Poggi’s calf, passing clean through without hitting bone.

Figueroa kept firing until his rifle jammed. Fortunately, his comrades—especially Sergeant Guillén—were scattered beyond the bridge, taking cover behind the rocks. Their relentless fire on the hill forced the British machine guns and rifles to divide their attention, shifting some of the incoming fire away from Figueroa.

Guillén recalls: "They shredded my hood and the back of my jacket, but I kept firing. The medic, Moyano, pulled a bunch of shrapnel out of my arm and back."

"Cheto" (Handsome) Anadón asked García Pinasco for permission to charge the British, but the section leader held him back, telling him to wait until daylight.

As Figueroa fell back, he heard several explosions—then silence. The British machine guns had gone quiet. It was the fearless Anadón, standard-bearer of Commando 601, who, with deadly precision, had launched FAL-mounted PDF grenades directly into the enemy’s position. Only their riflemen were still firing now.

Once again, "Cheto" Anadón asked García Pinasco for permission to attack. Again, the lieutenant denied him, insisting they wait. But as Figueroa reached their position, he roared, "Let’s go get these bastards!" The adrenaline and fury coursing through him made it impossible to hold back.

Despite his reservations, García Pinasco relented. Figueroa took command, and the unit stormed across the bridge to launch their assault. Anadón quickly organized his men into a staggered formation: Vergara, Suárez, Quinteros, and two gendarmes from the elite Alacrán group—Natalio Figueredo and Miguel Puentes.

A faint light was beginning to creep over the battlefield. The attack was about to begin.

"The objective was to sprint forward, surround them from both sides of the ridge, and wipe them out—leave no one behind," recalls Captain Figueroa.

Once everything was set, he raised his right arm and gave the order: "Charge, damn it! Let’s wipe these bastards out!"

The commandos stormed ahead, firing from the hip in fully automatic bursts, mimicking the cadence of a machine gun. Their shouts and insults tore through the night, meant to unnerve the British troops.

The first to reach the enemy position was the fearless Lieutenant Anadón. But as he scanned the area, he realized the British paratroopers had already fled in haste, dragging their wounded with them.

In their retreat, the enemy had left behind a trove of abandoned equipment—firearms, radios, rucksacks, tents, communication codes, berets, gloves, a camera, and even a small Union Jack. That flag would soon be displayed as a trophy at the Commando 601 headquarters in Puerto Argentino/Stanley.

García Pinasco had been ordered to strike the enemy with a swift raid and set up an ambush.

The sheer speed of the assault forced the British paratroopers into a chaotic retreat. In their haste, they left behind an active radio—still transmitting—used to communicate with their high command. Bloodstains pooled on the ground, grim evidence of their casualties.

Later, the Argentine troops intercepted enemy radio chatter: urgent requests for helicopters to evacuate the wounded. Not long after, about four kilometers away, they spotted a flare piercing the sky—followed by the descent of a Sea King helicopter, marked with the white insignia of a medical evacuation unit.

After the battle, Guillén helped Indio Poggi to his feet. Poggi looked at him and said, "Wash my wound."

Guillén reached into his pack and pulled out a Margaret River triangle-shaped bottle. He raised it to his lips, pretending to take a swig.

"You bastard!" Poggi roared. "Don’t drink my medicine!"

Spoils of Battle: British Paratroopers’ Abandoned Gear – June 7, 1982 (Photo: Nicolás Kasanzew)

Needless to say, the commandos eagerly devoured the gourmet rations abandoned by the men of the 3rd Parachute Battalion—dried apple compote, chocolate, nuts, biscuits, and raisins.

A bitter blow for the Brits; a feast fit for kings for the Argies.

But not all rewards were sweet. The Gendarmerie generously decorated its two men for their role in the battle. The Army, however, completely ignored the commandos of 601—the very unit that had handed them victory at the Murrell River.

Goose Green Next to Waterloo: The 20 Greatest Battles in British History

The 20 greatest battles in British history

The Telegraph reports that the British National Army Museum has published its shortlist of the greatest battles in British history. The public will vote, either online or at the museum, on which one is the greatest.

The battles, in chronological order:

Battle of Blenheim, August 13, 1704, at Blenheim, Bavaria (War of the Spanish Succession)

Battle of Culloden, April 16, 1746, at Drumossie Moor in Scotland (Jacobite Rebellion)

Battle of Plassey, June 23, 1757, at Plassey in West Bengal, India (Seven Years War

Battle of Quebec, June 13, 1759, outside of Quebec City in Canada (Seven Years War)

Battle of Lexington, April 19, 1775, at Lexington, Massachusetts (American Revolution)

Battle of Salamanca, July 22, 1812, at Salamanca, Spain (Peninsular War/Napoleonic Wars)

Battle of Waterloo, June 18, 1815, at Waterloo, Belgium (Napoleonic Wars)

Battle of Aliwal, January 28, 1846, at Aliwai in Punjab, India (First Sikh War)

Battle of Balaklava, October 25, 1854, at Balaklava, Ukraine (Crimean War)

Battle of Rorke's Drift, January 22-23, at Rorke's Drift, South Africa (Zulu War)

Gallipoli Campaign, April 25, 1915 to January 9, 1916, on the Gallipoli Peninsula in Turkey (World War I)

Battle of the Somme, July 1 to November 18, 1916, on the Somme River in France (World War I)

Battle of Megiddo, September 19 to October 31, 1918, in Israel/Palestine, Jordan, and Syria (World War I)

Battle of El Alamein, October 23 to November 4, 1942, near El Alamein, Egypt (World War II)

Normandy Campaign, June 6 to August 25, 1944, in Normandy, France (World War II)

Imphal/Kohima Campaign, March 8 to July 3, 1944, around Manipur and Nagaland, India (World War II)

Battle of the Imjin River, April 22-25, 1951, on the Imjin River in Korea (Korean War)

Battle of Goose Green, May 28-29, 1982, on East Falkland (Falklands War)

Battle of Musa Qala, July 17 to September 12, 2006, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (War in Afghanistan)


History News Network

Malvinas: Landing in San Carlos

Combat at San Carlos (1982)

 
Camp of the 3rd British Parachute Battalion in Puerto San Carlos shortly after the landing

The San Carlos combat was a confrontation between the British landing forces and a small group of Argentine infantry soldiers, which occurred on May 21, 1982 during the Falklands War in the context of Operation Sutton. The scene of this combat was the western coast of Soledad Island, in the area of Puerto San Carlos, on the strait of the same name (Falkland Sound).

Background

The conflict in mid-May
Around mid-May in 1982, the intensity of military operations in the Malvinas archipelago had diminished. While diplomatic negotiations were ongoing, both sides were gearing up for the next phase of the campaign. The British aimed to land troops and remove the Argentine forces, yet they lacked information about when or where this operation would occur. The Argentine strategy focused on defending Puerto Argentino (Stanley), assuming it was the primary target of the British. Consequently, most of the Argentine ground forces were concentrated in that area.

Despite the British not rushing into action, they initiated the first combat actions using their aircraft carrier group, consisting of HMS "Hermes" and "Invincible" and their escort ships. Air strikes and naval bombardments began targeting Puerto Argentino on May 1. Meanwhile, British special forces like the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) conducted covert reconnaissance missions across the archipelago. Argentina had withdrawn its Sea Fleet to port following the sinking of the cruiser ARA General Belgrano, leaving only its aviation (Southern Air Force Command) capable of engaging the Royal Navy.

On May 18, 1982, the Amphibious Task Group, responsible for the landing operation under the codename "Operation Sutton," joined forces with the Aircraft Carrier Group. All available resources were dedicated to this critical phase of the campaign.

San Carlos, the scene


British landing on Soledad Island and subsequent fighting (May 21, 1982). 

The selected location was the western region of Soledad Island, situated along the San Carlos Strait near its northern tip. At this location, two waterways extended inland, offering shallow waters and soft beaches conducive to a landing operation. To the north of the water entrance lay San Carlos Port, and to the south was the San Carlos Establishment. These places were sparsely populated, with only a few houses, and Puerto San Carlos even had a school. To the northwest of Puerto San Carlos, on the Fanning Head peninsula, stood a small elevated landmass known as "Height 234." East of Establecimiento San Carlos, there were other elevated areas, while to the south lay the Sussex Heights, obstructing the road to Darwin.

The British selected this site after a thorough analysis and after discarding other options. In the first half of May, they dispatched special units to conduct reconnaissance in the area and reported the absence of defenders. However, despite the absence of a permanent Argentine garrison in San Carlos, their patrols discovered evidence of British incursions, prompting them to deploy a Combat Team to the Puerto San Carlos and Fanning Head region on May 15th. The British only became aware of the presence of these troops upon their own landing.

Conflicting plans

British landing plan
The choice of location, as already mentioned, was due to the consideration of several factors.

• The place was not defended (even though the British did not expect to find any Argentine soldiers there, there was no garrison capable of preventing a landing)
• The series of heights that surrounded the place offered the possibility of setting up a defense line and would prevent Argentine aviation from using the Exocet missiles. At the same time, the fighter-bombers would be forced to gain altitude before attacking, thus exposing themselves to anti-aircraft fire.
• Argentina's chances of rejecting the landing were complicated if it took place in San Carlos. This was very far from the main garrison in Puerto Argentino (80 kilometers), which would delay the intervention of a heliborne counterattack force. * Darwin's garrison was 35 kilometers away and if an advance against the beachhead was attempted, it could be stopped by naval fire from the Strait and by positions established on the Sussex heights.
• Complete control of the sea and air cover could protect the landing, while the large number of helicopters available could speed up the transfer of troops to land.
  

 

Argentine Defense Plan
Argentine planning for the defense of the Malvinas archipelago postulated as a basis the defense of a strong position in the island capital (Puerto Argentino Army Group), where the enemy landing was expected. As for the rest of the islands, garrisons of different strengths were installed, but it was impossible to keep the entire coastal perimeter of the Malvinas defended. The Argentine commanders anticipated several possible points for a British landing, but they could not cover them all. British control of the sea gave them the initiative, which is why they were granted the ability to feign diversionary maneuvers in one place and make the main effort in another.
The movement of troops by land to reject a landing carried out far from Puerto Argentino was ruled out for the following reasons:1 

• This movement would be detected by the English and they would suffer heavy losses due to their air and naval fire.
• There was no possibility that the Southern Air Force would achieve the air coverage necessary to execute said maneuver.
• The Malvinas soil did not allow the march of armor or the transport of artillery and heavy equipment. A soldier could only cover 2 kilometers per hour marching by day in such terrain, and one kilometer per hour marching at night.
• The time spent on the march would fatigue the troops, who would arrive tired, not to mention giving the enemy enough time to prepare their defenses.
• Carrying out a helicopter movement to the site was also considered very risky, given the British's dominance of the air.
• The number of helicopters available made it impossible to concentrate the force necessary for combat on the beachhead in a short time.

Due to these factors, the Argentine strategy involved continuous coastal monitoring. If an enemy landing was detected as the primary offensive, the aviation forces were assigned the crucial task of obstructing the establishment of a secure beachhead.

The region around Puerto San Carlos fell under the jurisdiction of the Litoral Army Group. They made the decision to dispatch portions of the Darwin garrison to this area with a specific mission: to "alert and prepare for a counterattack." 2

Conflicting forces


Argentine soldiers in an event, before the English landing. Lieutenant Esteban marches next to the flag bearer.

Argentine Forces
The Litoral Army Group defended the western part of Soledad Island and also Gran Malvina Island. Its main garrisons were Darwin, Howard and Bahía Fox. Precisely from the Darwin garrison, a group of soldiers belonging to the 12th and 25th Infantry Regiments were drawn. The troop was organized as follows:

• Equipo de Combate Güemes (Lieutenant Esteban): 42 strong (riflemen). Located at Puerto San Carlos. 
• Support Section (Second Lieutenant Reyes): 20 strong, 2 mortairs 81 mm y 2 105 mm recoilless guns. Located in Fanning Head (Height 234). 

British Forces
The British forces possessed a significantly larger contingent, which was commensurate with the scale of the operation. The 3rd Commando Brigade of the Royal Marines, bolstered by additional paratroopers from the British Army, had the primary objective of securing the beaches to facilitate the arrival of other units. The naval vessels were responsible for delivering artillery support, while the helicopter squadrons played a crucial role in the landing process. Simultaneously, the Sea Harrier fighters were deployed to provide aerial protection. All these components worked together in a coordinated effort for the operation.

• 3ª Commandos Brigade, Brigadier Julian Thompson 
• Comando 40 Royal Marines (Lieutenant colonel Hunt) 
• Comando 42º Royal Marines (Lieutenant colonel Vaux) 
• Comando 45º Royal Marines (Lieutenant colonel Whitehead) 

Additional Units Assigned

• 2 Para (Lieutenant colonel Jones) 
• 3 Para (Lieutenant colonel Pike) 
• Special Air Service 22 Regiment (Lieutenant colonel Rose) 
• 3ª Commando Brigade Air Squadron (Major Cameron) 

The order of battle arranged for the landing was as follows:

• Primera oleada: 2º Batallón de Paracaidistas y 40 Comando de Marines en San Carlos (Playa Azul).El 2º de Paracaidistas debía ocupar las montañas Sussex, al sur, para bloquear un eventual avance argentino desde Darwin. 
• Segunda oleada: 45º Comando de Marines en Ajax Bay (Playa Roja) y 3º Batallón de Paracaidistas en Puerto San Carlos (Playa Verde) 
• Reserva: 42º Comando de Marines (a bordo del buque Canberra) 

Landing Preparations

The Fanning Head Engagement
On Thursday night the British Amphibious Group entered the San Carlos Strait to begin the landing operation.
The first action was against the Argentine faction under the command of Second Lieutenant Reyes, located in Fanning Head.
At dawn (2:30) an Argentine patrol sent heard noises and voices from the Strait to the beach, perceiving at the same time the silhouette of the English ships. The Argentines then launched flares and fired their heavy weapons against the canal area, although without being able to appreciate the results due to darkness. The English ships opened fire, guided by the glare of the Argentine guns firing. This exchange of fire lasts several hours.
SBS men were sent in helicopters from the destroyer HMS Antrim. These forces landed east of Fanning Head, cutting off this Argentine faction from their comrades at Puerto San Carlos. Immediately afterwards (around 5:00) infantry combat began. In the following fight the British declared that they had killed several Argentines and captured others; while the Argentine report of the action denies fatal casualties although it confirms the loss of several men who were captured; It also says that three seriously wounded people were left behind with a non-commissioned medical officer, being treated and saved by the British.
However, the majority of the Argentine soldiers, led by Reyes, managed to break the British encirclement and retreat, although they did not join Lieutenant Esteban's faction. It is not clear where this force was located, but the Argentine version says that the Reyes Support Section remained there without being discovered throughout May 21.
The capture of Fanning Head assured the British possession of a sensitive area to cover the northern flank of the landing. While the Fanning Head fight was happening, the horrible Team Güemes remained in their positions.





Secondary Actions
The British report reports a blocking action carried out by Squadron D of the Special Air Service (SAS) in the Darwin-Goose Green area, to prevent the Argentine troops located there from moving north to repel the landing. . This blocking action was supported by naval fire from the frigate HMS “Ardent” from the waters of the Strait.
On the other hand, Royal Air Force Harrier planes carried out attacks at various points: an English fighter was shot down over Howard, while other planes managed to destroy three Argentine helicopters in the Monte Kent area, 20 kilometers from Puerto Argentino. This last coup pursued the objective of denying aeromobility to the Argentines to prevent them from transferring counterattack forces to San Carlos.

Landing
The first wave of landings reached the beach without opposition in the early morning hours. The frigate HMS Plymouth provided close cover, and four Scimitar and Scorpion light tanks reached the beach in the first wave, to provide firepower. It was the first British landing in war since the Suez Crisis in 1956.
Fulfilling the planned plan, the 2nd Battalion occupied the Sussex Heights, while the 40th Commando did the same with the Green Mountains. The southern flank, facing Darwin's Argentine position, was secured. The barges then returned to the canal to pick up and transport the second wave.
Meanwhile, the Güemes Combat Team observed the English movement in the canal. Communications with the Support Section had been cut during the early morning, but the Argentines in Puerto San Carlos could hear the noise of the combat taking place at Fanning Head. Lieutenant Esteban transmitted the information about the situation to his immediate boss in Darwin, who relayed it to Puerto Argentino.
At dawn the barges with the second wave of landings were arriving at the beach in the assigned sectors. The 45th Command took positions in a refrigerator in Ajax Bay (western sector of the landing) and the 3rd Parachute Battalion landed near Puerto San Carlos, in the vicinity of the main Argentine position.

San Carlos Frays

Argentine Perspective

By then the Argentines had occupied new positions to the east of Puerto San Carlos, from where they opened fire on the paratroopers. The San Carlos combat then took place, when the soldiers of the Güemes Team damaged a “Sea King”3 helicopter with the fire of their portable weapons (7.62 mm FAL assault rifles), which withdrew smoking from the area. The combat continued and a second helicopter arrived to attack the Argentine position with rockets, but was shot down with the same rifle fire by the defenders. The machine fell into the water in the canal, but then a third helicopter opened fire on Esteban's troop and they, with the same tactic, shot him down. The device fell to the ground and the Argentines verified that the three crew members had died. A fourth helicopter was damaged by rifle fire and managed to withdraw. According to Esteban, this combat lasted an hour, while the disembarked enemy fired mortar fire uninterruptedly. Furthermore, he verified that the Falkland Islands civilians, through signs, indicated to the English soldiers the position of the Argentine forces.



British Perspective
When the other beachheads had already been established, the amphibious ships entered the San Carlos channel and disembarked the 3rd Parachute Battalion. But the rush to establish anti-aircraft defenses led the English to move along the beach head without it being definitively secured. In such circumstances, a Sea King helicopter was maneuvering east of Puerto San Carlos without realizing that the vanguard elements of the 3rd Parachute Battalion were still west of the position. Under these circumstances he was hit by Argentine fire but was able to escape, but his escort, a Gazelle helicopter from the 3rd Commando Brigade, was shot down and fell into the water, killing one crew member. A few minutes later another Gazelle was hit and fell to the ground, killing its two crew members.



The British version does not mention infantry combat in the positions east of Puerto San Carlos and suggests that the helicopters were not intended to attack the Argentine troops, but rather fell into enemy fire due to carelessness and had to open fire to defend themselves. He also says that the helicopters hit by the Argentines were three and not four, although he agrees that two of them were destroyed.

To Dawn

The Landing Continous

The English landed the reserve (42nd Command) in Puerto San Carlos to reinforce the 3rd Battalion. Meanwhile, the other light tanks and field artillery were disembarked, along with the anti-aircraft defenses.
The two Argentine factions remained in their positions, without their presence being able to prevent the British landing. Esteban's report mentions continuous naval and mortar fire on his position, but the basic objective of his mission was accomplished, since he had raised the alarm about the enemy's landing operation.
As a result of this alarm, the Argentines sent an Aermacchi MB-339 fighter plane from Puerto Argentino on a reconnaissance mission, which (around 10:00) confirmed the magnitude of the British landing and carried out a daring attack against the frigate “HMS Argonaut”. which caused some damage. The Argentine pilot, Lieutenant Crippa, was decorated for this reconnaissance and attack mission.
Once the information about the landing was confirmed by Crippa, the Argentine aviation launched all its available potential against the beach head, but this is part of what is known as the Battle of the Strait of San Carlos.
Meanwhile, the landing perimeter had its first victory by shooting down an Argentine Pucará attack plane. This had been sent from Darwin and was shot down by SAS D Squadron over the Sussex Mountains in the morning.


Situation at the end of the day (May 21, 1982)

Consolidation

The two Argentine factions, cut off from each other, remained in the area until the hours of darkness, when it would be easier for them to break contact with the enemy. Esteban's men left Puerto San Carlos marching through Cerro Bombilla and arrived at Douglas Paddock on May 24. There they managed to reestablish communication with Puerto Argentino, from where helicopters were sent to pick them up. They were then sent back into combat at Darwin-Goose Green, where they were taken prisoner when the garrison capitulated.
As for the Support Section, a group of 11 soldiers managed to evade the British encirclement, while the rest were captured. Those who managed to leave the area marched through the northern part of Soledad Island, avoiding British airmobile patrols and also contact with the islanders. On June 14, this faction, under the command of Reyes, learned the news of the Argentine capitulation in the archipelago and came out into the open, surrendering to the British.
Thompson ordered the general landing to continue at a sustained pace, and a field hospital was established and the Rapier anti-aircraft missile batteries were deployed. The landing continued even after the Argentine air attacks began, and the English marines and paratroopers did not stop patrolling and reinforcing their perimeter. At the end of the day some 3,000 English soldiers were already on the ground.

 

Aftermath

The British forces commanded by Brigadier Thompson managed to establish a firm beachhead to prevent Argentine ground counterattacks, but these did not occur. The Argentine strategy of rejecting the landing with aviation transferred the fight to the air-naval level, allowing the English troops to be permanently reinforced.
The San Carlos combat was small in magnitude and significance. The Argentines had no means to defend the beach or prevent the landing, but instead presented a determined but formal resistance, in accordance with their main mission, which was to raise the alarm if an enemy landing occurred. The casualties caused to the British meant an extra moral victory, but did not affect the landing operation; However, the combat that occurred showed the English that the defenders could be tenacious, and convinced them of the need to reinforce the perimeter because an Argentine ground operation was not ruled out. The British decided not to underestimate the enemy.
The English landing in San Carlos was carried out with great precision and organization, even when combat was ongoing east of Puerto San Carlos and also when the air attacks began. The losses of helicopters during this action affected their mobility to a certain extent, but overall the casualties suffered in combat were not significant.
The British beachhead at San Carlos was consolidated and on May 26 the 2nd Parachute Battalion began the breakout to the south, leading against the Argentine garrison of Darwin-Goose Green. From there San Carlos stopped being a beachhead.

Notes 

1. These considerations were presented by the head of the Puerto Argentino Group, General Oscar Jofre, in his book “Malvinas, the defense of Puerto Argentino”, Editorial Sudamericana 1987
2. Cited in Kasanzew's book "Mavinas a Blood and Fire" (see bibliography).
3. In a combat situation it was normal for soldiers to confuse aircraft. On the other hand, Argentine troops had become accustomed to identifying all British helicopters with the Sea King and Sea Lynx models.

References

• Gambini, Hugo: Crónica Documental de las Malvinas, (incluye muchos documentos sobre la visión inglesa del conflicto). Editorial Redacción, Buenos Aires 1982. 
• Kasanzew, Nicolás: Malvinas a Sangre y Fuego. Editorial Abril, Buenos Aires 1982. 
• Jofre, Oscar: La defensa de Puerto Argentino (cita fuentes británicas en el relato de las acciones). Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires 1987. 
• Burden, Royden et al: Malvinas, la guerra aérea (edición argentina). Ediciones Open, Buenos Aires 1989. 

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