Beagle Crisis: Naval Fennecs Doing Airbase Attack over Chabunco

Naval Aviation School in Operation Tronador

On the last week of August, 2024, news broke of a scramble (a priority emergency takeoff of an interceptor fighter to respond to an immediate threat) involving two FACh F-5E Tiger III aircraft to identify an "unknown threat" at the mouth of the Strait of Magellan. The jets found nothing, but they had taken off from Chabunco Air Base (Presidente Carlos Ibáñez International Airport) in Punta Arenas. In 1978, during the Beagle crisis, this airport would have been a target in an operation aimed at neutralizing the main Chilean aircraft operating in the area: the Hawker Hunters. This daring mission was assigned to a fleet of T-28 Fennec aircraft, rugged, radial-engine, two-seat trainers and light attack planes from the Argentine Navy's Aviation Command. Hidden at a dispersal airstrip 50 km from Río Grande, these aircraft were tasked with supporting the helicopter-borne landing on the disputed islands and sinking small vessels. Their most daring mission: attacking the Hunters as they were preparing to land. Let's delve into this fascinating story.

The Naval Aviation School Goes to War

At the end of 1977, the Naval Aviation School had a small number of only nine T-28 aircraft in service, out of a total of 20 assigned. During that period, the last navigation of these aircraft between Punta Indio and Ushuaia was planned, called "Operation Austral," which involved the transfer of the nine operational aircraft at that time.


T-28P 0628/3-A-208. B.A Ushuaia, August 11. Pilot Midshipman Goñi, and Second Warrant Officer Ruiz.


1.2km dispersal runway at Estancia La Sara where the T-28 Fennec operated

Initially conceived as the farewell of these aircraft, the mission unintentionally became the prelude to Operation Tronador for the School. Given the growing tension in the Austral Zone, the Naval Aviation Command (COAN) was instructed to increase the level of readiness due to the possible occurrence of an armed conflict. As part of these measures, the deactivation of the T-28s was suspended.


T-28F 0581/1-A-250 during a stopover at Tandil Air Base on the way to Rio Grande Air Station.

In early 1978, a four-plane division from the Naval Aviation School was deployed to the Río Grande Naval Air Base, where it remained for the entire year, with the planes being replaced periodically.

As tensions increased in November, the Naval Aviation School Squadron reached a total of 19 T-28s in operational condition, with the number of available pilots also increasing. Lieutenant Hugo Ortiz was put in charge of the group, which consisted of several officers.


B-80 used as support of the Fennec deployment

In the framework of Operation Tronador, the T-28 Squadron was assigned close air support missions, attacks on smaller vessels in Bahía Inútil, and the risky task of attacking Chilean Air Force Hunter aircraft during their landing phase in Punta Arenas. Shooting practice, rocket attacks, and 30º bombings were carried out, usually in cooperation with troops from the 5th Marine Infantry Battalion (BIM-5). A forward operating base was established on the runway of the "La Sara" ranch, where a division of T-28s was kept on permanent readiness, while the rest were concentrated in Río Grande.



Photo taken by Frigate Lieutenant Urberti to Midshipman Goñi on board T-28P 0588/3-A-203. The small painted feature on the camouflaged T-28s can be seen. Estancia La Sara, Dec. 1978.

During this period, reconnaissance flights were carried out, including over Chilean airspace. On one of these flights, on August 13, 1978, a section of T-28s discovered a field airfield with troops and a C-47 of the Chilean Air Force, just 15 miles northwest of the "La Sara" ranch.



Dispersal airstrips of the FACH and the COAN in the northern area of ​​Tierra del Fuego

Finally, shortly before December 22, the readiness was completed and the squadron awaited attack orders, which never came. The T-28 squadron was one of the last to withdraw, doing so on January 27, 1979, flying from La Sara to Punta Indio. Despite the precarious operating conditions and the wear and tear of the aircraft, no major inconveniences were recorded. In June 1979, the last T-28Fs were decommissioned and scrapped.


Wrecks of the T-28F of the ESAN (Naval Aviation School)

The region covered by history can be seen on this map below. From the improvised runway at Estancia La Sara, a direct route of 185 km was to be flown to carry out an attack on the Chabunco air base and a 100 km route to patrol and harass ships in Bahía Inútil. The runway is located about 50 km NNW of Río Grande, where another section of ESAN T-28 Fennecs operated. Finally, from the runway to Ushuaia there are only 155 km.

Conclusions

In the vast expanse of southern Argentina, amidst the frigid and desolate region of Tierra del Fuego, the brave pilots and instructors of the Naval Aviation School prepared for the unimaginable. Aboard their sturdy and rugged T-28 Fennecs—aircraft considered obsolete by many—these men not only faced the challenge of operating under the most extreme conditions, but did so with a boldness that continues to inspire admiration to this day.

As the tension of the Beagle crisis reached its peak, these pilots were entrusted with a mission that seemed straight out of an epic tale: to strike the formidable Chilean Hawker Hunters just as they were landing in Punta Arenas. Imagine the courage required to confront a more modern and better-armed enemy, knowing the odds were against them. Yet, from a camouflaged dispersal airstrip at Estancia La Sara, these men stood ready, the roar of their radial engines their only companion in the tense wait for orders that ultimately never came.

The spirit of these Argentine pilots, capable of defying the impossible with ingenuity and determination, is a legacy of courage and dedication that transcends time. Following in the same footsteps as Owen Crippa in the Malvinas four years later, these pilots were prepared to attack a well-defended target and the enemy's most valuable assets with training aircraft. It wasn’t just about the machines, but about the men who, in their T-28 Fennecs, showed the world that the true strength of a nation lies in the bravery of its defenders. Today, their example is a beacon of pride for all Argentines, a reminder that when the nation calls, its people respond with unwavering valor.

Sources: North American T-28 Fennec, Aeronaval Series No. 28.

Beagle Crisis: The Scenario of Tierra del Fuego Battleground

Beagle Crisis: Analysis of the Scenario of Local Response

 

Updated Analysis of Scenario: Argentina Took the Islands and Chile Responded in the Area

Given the updated information about the deployment and conditions of the forces involved, we can refine the analysis of the conflict scenario where Argentina seizes Picton, Lennox, and Nueva islands, and Chile responds directly in the area.

Initial Argentine Assault on the Islands

Argentine Forces Deployment:

• Naval Forces: The Argentine navy would use its surface fleet, including the Veinticinco de Mayo air carrier destroyers, frigates, and corvettes, to establish naval superiority in the Beagle Channel.
• Naval Aviation: Argentine aircraft such as the T-28 Fennec, Turbo Mentors, and Aermacchi MB 326 light-attack trainers, based at the Rio Grande naval station, would provide air support for the operation.
• Ground Forces: Amphibious forces, including marine infantry, would be deployed to assault the islands. The objective would be to quickly secure the islands, especially Nueva island, where Chilean marines are fortified.

Updated Operational Plan

1. Naval Bombardment and Blockade:

   • Argentine naval forces would begin with a coordinated bombardment of Chilean positions on Nueva island to soften defenses.
   • Surface ships would establish a blockade around the islands to prevent Chilean reinforcements from arriving by sea.

2. Air Superiority and Support:

   • Argentine T-28 Fennecs, Turbo Mentors, and Aermacchi MB 326s would conduct air strikes on Chilean fortifications and provide close air support for the landing forces.
   • A-4Q Skyhawk were deployed in the Veinticinco de Mayo air carrier.
     
   • Efforts would focus on maintaining air superiority over the channel, leveraging the compromised state of Chilean submarines and the absence of significant Chilean air assets in the immediate area.

3. Amphibious Assault:

   • Argentine marine infantry would land on Picton and Lennox islands first, securing them quickly due to the lack of significant Chilean presence.
   • The main effort would then focus on Nueva island, where 150 Chilean marines are entrenched. The initial bombardment and air strikes would aim to weaken Chilean defenses, followed by a multi-pronged amphibious assault to overwhelm the defenders.

4. Defensive Preparations:

   • Once the islands are secured, Argentine forces would establish fortified positions and prepare for a potential Chilean counteroffensive.
   • The Argentine navy would maintain the blockade and continue patrolling the area to detect and deter any Chilean naval movements.

Río Grande Naval Station (BARG) (SAWE)

Chilean Response in the Area

Chilean Forces Deployment:

• Naval Forces: With the submarine Simpson compromised, Chile's surface fleet would have to engage the Argentine navy directly. This includes deploying destroyers and frigates to challenge the blockade and attempt to retake the islands.
• Air Force: With F-5Es concentrated in Santiago, Chile's immediate air response would be limited. They would need to mobilize whatever air assets were available in the south, possibly using older aircraft or redeploying F-5Es, though this would take time.
• Ground Forces: Chilean marines on Nueva island would be the first line of defense. Any reinforcements would likely come from nearby bases but would face significant logistical challenges due to the Argentine blockade.

Potential Course of Action and Engagements

Chilean Naval Response:

• Immediate Naval Engagement: Chile would mobilize its surface fleet to engage the Argentine navy in the Beagle Channel. The objective would be to break the blockade and provide support for the marines on Nueva island.
• Tactical Challenges: The compromised state of the submarine Simpson would limit Chile's underwater capabilities, making the naval engagement primarily a surface battle. Argentine submarines Santiago del Estero and Salta, aware of Simpson's issues, would likely play a significant role in disrupting Chilean naval movements.

Air Engagements:

• Initial Air Strikes: Argentine air assets would continue to provide close air support and target any Chilean reinforcements attempting to reach the islands.
• Chilean Air Mobilization: Chile might redeploy F-5Es from Santiago, but this would take time. In the short term, they would rely on whatever air assets are available in the region, potentially utilizing older aircraft for immediate support.

Ground Counteroffensive:

• Defense of Nueva Island: The 150 Chilean marines on Nueva island would mount a determined defense. However, they would face overwhelming Argentine firepower from both naval and air strikes.
• Reinforcement Efforts: Chile would attempt to send reinforcements by sea, but the Argentine blockade and naval presence would make this difficult. Small-scale infiltration and supply missions might be attempted, but larger reinforcements would be unlikely to succeed without breaking the blockade.

A-4Qs participated in Operation "Defense and Affirmation of Sovereignty" in 1978, during the border conflict with Chile over the Lennox, Picton, and Nueva Islands (Beagle Channel crisis) deployed aboard the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, from where they carried out air patrols of armed combat, intercepting Chilean aircraft.

Outcome and Strategic Implications

Short-Term Outcome:

• Argentine Success: Given the overwhelming firepower and logistical advantages, Argentina is likely to succeed in securing the islands initially. The compromised state of Chilean submarine assets and the limited immediate air response from Chile would contribute to this success.
• High Casualties: The battle for Nueva island, in particular, would be intense and result in high casualties on both sides, especially among the entrenched Chilean marines.

Long-Term Strategic Implications:

• Prolonged Conflict: Even if Argentina secures the islands, the conflict would not necessarily end there. Chile would likely continue to seek ways to retake the islands or open new fronts elsewhere.
• Regional Tensions: The conflict would significantly heighten regional tensions, drawing in international attention and potentially involving other countries diplomatically or militarily.
• Military Readiness: Both nations would continue to mobilize and prepare for extended engagements, potentially escalating the conflict into a broader war involving multiple fronts.

In conclusion, the updated scenario analysis indicates that Argentina, leveraging its superior naval and air power and the compromised state of Chilean submarine assets, would likely succeed in its initial objective of securing the islands. However, the conflict would likely escalate, leading to prolonged engagements and heightened regional tensions. Two aspects to be taken into account: Argentine developed a complex military industry, so ammunition and small arms can be guaranteed to be provided to troops jointly with food and clothes. Chile, empoverished through decades of economical mismanagement especially during Allende's administration, was far to even compared to its neighbor.

Esteban McLaren compilation

Argentine Naval Aviation: Analysis of An F-16 Figthing Falcon for Long-range Maritime Attack

A proposal for the COAN: An F-16 for long-range maritime attack

Introduction

The Argentine Air Force (FAA) has acquired 24 F-16 MLU from Denmark. The Argentine Naval Aviation (COAN) is evaluating what to do with its 16 AMD Super Etendard in inventory (including the 11 older Super Etendard and the 5 newer Super Etendard Modernizé). However, since the FAA will acquire the F-16, a proposal could be thought of to the COAN so that, instead of insisting on continuing with the Super Etendard, why not try to buy some new F-16 B50/52+ well-profiled with full and long-range anti-ship attack capability? It results in an aircraft with enormous attack capacity, with extended range, compatible in many aspects with the aircraft that the Air Force will have in inventory, among many benefits. Let's explore this idea. The line of reasoning follows the following assumptions:

•  The Super Etendard only operates from ground bases, limiting its ability to approach the target autonomously unless it is refueled in flight by KC-130s, as was the case during the attack on HMS Invincible.
•  The actual costs to obtain spare parts and perform maintenance in the future tend to be extremely high if not impossible.
•  The F-16, already acquired by the Argentine Air Force (FAA) and expected to complete more squadrons in the future, will help standardize maintenance and training between both forces, similar to what happened previously with the A-4 Skyhawks.
•  The F-16, equipped with conformal fuel tanks (CFT), can control much of the Argentine Sea, as currently recognized by the UN (see details below).
•  The costs of acquiring a squadron of F-16s, speculatively, average around $1 billion through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program (see details below).

 

F-16s as Naval Attackers

Several countries use the F-16 platform in roles that include air-sea attack capabilities, utilizing laser-guided bombs (LGBs) and anti-ship missiles (AShMs) as part of their standard armament. Here are some notable examples:

1. United States

• Weapons: The U.S. Air Force uses F-16s capable of carrying LGBs and various AShMs like the AGM-84 Harpoon.
• Role: While primarily used in multi-role capacities, including air superiority and ground attack, the F-16s are equipped and trained for maritime strike missions.

2. Israel

• Weapons: The Israeli Air Force equips its F-16s with a variety of precision-guided munitions, including LGBs and indigenous anti-ship missiles like the Gabriel.
• Role: Israel uses F-16s in a multi-role capacity, including significant emphasis on maritime strike due to the strategic importance of the Mediterranean Sea.

3. Turkey

• Weapons: Turkish F-16s are equipped with LGBs and Harpoon missiles for maritime operations.
• Role: Turkey uses F-16s for a range of missions, including maritime strike, given its extensive coastline and strategic maritime interests in the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas.

4. Greece

• Weapons: Greek F-16s can carry LGBs and Harpoon missiles, emphasizing their capability to conduct maritime strike missions.
• Role: Greece’s F-16 fleet is tasked with various roles, including maritime interdiction and defense, due to the country’s geographical layout with numerous islands and significant maritime borders.

5. Singapore

• Weapons: The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) equips its F-16s with LGBs and Harpoon missiles.
• Role: Singapore, as a small island nation with significant maritime interests, uses F-16s for both air defense and maritime strike missions to protect its waters and shipping lanes.

6. South Korea

• Weapons: The Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) uses F-16s with LGBs and Harpoon missiles for maritime strike roles.
• Role: South Korea's strategic position and maritime threats from neighboring North Korea necessitate a robust maritime strike capability.

7. Egypt

• Weapons: Egyptian F-16s are equipped with LGBs and Harpoon missiles for maritime strike missions.
• Role: Egypt uses F-16s for various roles, including defending its extensive coastlines along the Mediterranean and Red Seas.

8. Taiwan

• Weapons: Taiwanese F-16s are equipped with LGBs and Harpoon missiles for maritime strike missions.
• Role: Taiwan uses F-16s for various roles, including defending its extensive coastlines along the Taiwan Strait and the recurrent Chinese incursions.

These countries have integrated their F-16 platforms with a range of weaponry that allows them to perform maritime strike missions effectively. The flexibility and adaptability of the F-16 platform make it suitable for a variety of roles, including those requiring precision engagement of sea-based targets.

 

Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs) on F-16s

The use of Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs) on F-16s for the air-sea attack role varies by country and specific mission requirements. CFTs increase the aircraft's fuel capacity without occupying underwing hardpoints, which can be used for additional weapons and sensors. Here is an overview of how some of these countries utilize CFTs for maritime strike roles:

1. United States

• CFT Usage: U.S. F-16s are generally not equipped with CFTs, as the primary users (Air National Guard units and Active Duty squadrons) prioritize flexibility and performance over extended range. However, some specialized roles might consider CFTs if extended range is crucial.
• Role: The primary mission sets are generally accomplished without CFTs, relying on external fuel tanks if needed for extended operations.

2. Israel

• CFT Usage: Israeli F-16I "Sufa" fighters are equipped with CFTs. The IAF uses CFTs to extend the operational range of their F-16s, which is crucial for missions over the Mediterranean and potential operations beyond their immediate borders.
• Role: CFTs allow Israeli F-16s to carry more weapons and sensors by freeing up underwing hardpoints, which is advantageous for extended maritime strike missions.

3. Turkey

• CFT Usage: Turkish F-16s do not commonly use CFTs. They typically rely on external fuel tanks for extended range.
• Role: While Turkey has significant maritime interests, the flexibility and performance advantages without CFTs are often preferred.

4. Greece

• CFT Usage: Greek F-16s, specifically the F-16 Block 52+ and Block 70/72 Viper, are equipped with CFTs.
• Role: CFTs are used to extend the range and endurance of Greek F-16s, which is beneficial for maritime patrol and strike missions across the Aegean Sea and beyond.

5. Singapore

• CFT Usage: The Republic of Singapore Air Force equips its F-16s with CFTs to enhance their range and payload capacity.
• Role: CFTs are particularly useful for Singapore's F-16s due to the need for extended range operations in the region, enhancing their maritime strike capabilities.

6. South Korea

• CFT Usage: South Korean F-16s, particularly the F-16 Block 52 and Block 70/72, can be equipped with CFTs.
• Role: The use of CFTs extends the operational range and endurance of ROKAF F-16s, which is critical given the maritime threats and the need for extensive patrol and strike capabilities around the Korean Peninsula.

7. Egypt

• CFT Usage: Egyptian F-16 Block 52s are equipped with CFTs.
• Role: The CFTs provide extended range and endurance, allowing Egyptian F-16s to perform long-duration maritime strike missions over the Mediterranean and Red Seas.

The use of CFTs on F-16s for maritime strike roles is more prevalent among countries that require extended range and endurance for their operations. CFTs allow these aircraft to carry additional fuel without sacrificing weapon capacity, making them well-suited for long-range missions over water. Countries like Israel, Greece, Singapore, South Korea, and Egypt leverage the benefits of CFTs to enhance their maritime operational capabilities.

Which Batches Can Use CFT?

Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs) were introduced with the F-16 Block 50/52 and later variants. Here is a more detailed breakdown:

F-16 Blocks Capable of Using CFTs

1. F-16 Block 50/52+

   • Introduction: These blocks introduced the capability to carry CFTs.
   • Features: These variants come with improved avionics, radar systems (such as the AN/APG-68(V)9 radar), and the option to mount CFTs.
   • Users: Countries like Greece and Turkey have F-16 Block 50/52+ aircraft with CFTs.

2. F-16 Block 60

   • Introduction: This advanced variant, developed for the United Arab Emirates, includes CFTs as part of its standard configuration.
   • Features: The Block 60 includes an AN/APG-80 AESA radar, advanced avionics, and other enhancements.

3. F-16 Block 70/72 (Viper)

   • Introduction: The newest and most advanced version of the F-16, also known as the F-16V (Viper), includes CFT capability.
   • Features: This variant features an AN/APG-83 AESA radar, upgraded avionics, and is optimized for modern warfare requirements.
   • Users: Countries like Bahrain, Bulgaria, and Slovakia are acquiring or have acquired F-16 Block 70/72 aircraft.

CFTs became an option starting with the F-16 Block 50/52+ and have been included in subsequent advanced blocks such as the Block 60 and Block 70/72. These blocks enhance the F-16's range and payload capabilities, making them suitable for extended missions, including maritime strike roles.

F-16s Naval Attacker with CFT in Argentina: Extended Capabilities

Estimating the increment in range for F-16s equipped with Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs) involves several factors, including mission profile, payload, and fuel capacity. Here’s a general overview:

Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs)

• Capacity: Each CFT on an F-16 can hold approximately 450 gallons (1,700 liters) of fuel, adding a total of 900 gallons (3,400 liters) when both tanks are used.
• Increment in Range: The additional fuel provided by CFTs typically increases the range by about 20-30%, depending on the aircraft's configuration and mission profile.

Baseline Range Estimates

• Without CFTs: The baseline combat radius of an F-16 without CFTs, carrying a typical load of weapons and fuel, is approximately 500 nautical miles (nm) for a strike mission.
• With CFTs: Adding CFTs increases this radius by 20-30%, resulting in an estimated range of 600-650 nm for a strike mission.

Scenario Analysis

Fully Loaded with Weapons (Strike Mission)

• Assumptions: The F-16 is carrying a full load of air-to-sea weapons, including AShMs and LGBs.
• Range: With CFTs, the strike radius would be approximately 600-650 nm from the base.

Filled Only with Fuel (Reconnaissance Mission)

• Assumptions: The F-16 is configured for a reconnaissance mission, carrying minimal external stores and maximizing internal and CFT fuel capacity.
• Range: The maximum ferry range for an F-16 with CFTs and external drop tanks can exceed 2,000 nm. For a typical reconnaissance mission with some reserve fuel, an estimated operational radius would be around 1,000 nm.

Operating Bases and Potential Reach

1. Puerto Belgrano Naval Base

   • Strike Mission: 600-650 nm
     • Potential reach: Across the central and northern Argentine coast, reaching the southern parts of Brazil and the open South Atlantic.
   • Reconnaissance Mission: Up to 1,000 nm
     • Potential reach: Much of the South Atlantic, including far into the Southern Ocean.

2. Almirante Zar Naval Base

   • Strike Mission: 600-650 nm
     • Potential reach: Covering a significant portion of the Patagonian coast, including the Falkland Islands.
   • Reconnaissance Mission: Up to 1,000 nm
     • Potential reach: Extending deep into the South Atlantic and covering the entirety of the Falkland Islands and beyond.

3. Rio Grande Base

   • Strike Mission: 600-650 nm
     • Potential reach: Covering the southern Patagonian coast, the Falkland Islands, and reaching towards the Antarctic Peninsula.
   • Reconnaissance Mission: Up to 1,000 nm
     • Potential reach: Extending far into the South Atlantic, covering the entire Falkland Islands region, and towards the Antarctic convergence zone.

With CFTs, the F-16’s range and operational flexibility are significantly enhanced, making it a formidable platform for both strike and reconnaissance missions from Argentina’s key naval bases. This extended range allows for greater coverage of the South Atlantic, critical maritime zones, and even potential operations near the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.

If you have specific operational parameters or need more detailed calculations, such as fuel consumption rates or specific payload configurations, I can provide more precise estimates.

Proposal for Argentine Naval Aviation: Transition to F-16 Block 50/52+ for Enhanced Maritime Capabilities

Objective: To present a strategic, operational, and financial rationale for the Argentine Naval Aviation (ANA) to transition from the aging AMD Super Étendard fleet to the modern F-16 Block 50/52+ platform with Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs), emphasizing the superior air-sea attack capabilities and extended operational range.

Strategic Benefits

1. Enhanced Capabilities:

   • Modern Avionics and Systems: The F-16 Block 50/52+ is equipped with advanced avionics, radar systems (AN/APG-68(V)9), and electronic warfare suites, providing superior situational awareness and combat effectiveness.
   • Multi-role Flexibility: Unlike the Super Étendard, the F-16 can seamlessly transition between air-to-air, air-to-ground, and air-sea missions, enhancing operational flexibility.

2. Longer Operational Range:

   • Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs): CFTs significantly extend the operational range of the F-16 without occupying underwing hardpoints, allowing the aircraft to carry additional weapons and sensors essential for long-range maritime strike missions.

3. Standardization with the Air Force:

   • Interoperability: Acquiring F-16s for both the AAF and ANA ensures interoperability, facilitating joint operations, shared maintenance infrastructure, training programs, and logistics support.
   • Common Training and Tactics: Pilots and ground crews can benefit from a unified training program, enhancing proficiency and reducing the time and cost associated with training on different platforms.

Operational Advantages

1. Superior Maritime Strike Capability:

   • Advanced Weapons Integration: The F-16 Block 50/52+ can carry a wide array of modern anti-ship missiles (AShMs) such as the AGM-84 Harpoon, as well as laser-guided bombs (LGBs) for precision strikes against maritime targets.
   • Survivability and Effectiveness: Equipped with cutting-edge countermeasure systems and stealth capabilities, the F-16 offers greater survivability in contested environments compared to the Super Étendard.

2. Increased Payload Capacity:

   • Armament Flexibility: With more hardpoints and greater payload capacity, the F-16 can carry a combination of missiles, bombs, and fuel tanks, providing mission planners with more options and capabilities for complex operations.

3. Maintenance and Reliability:

   • Proven Track Record: The F-16 platform has a proven track record of reliability and ease of maintenance, supported by a global supply chain and extensive user base, ensuring sustained operational readiness.

 

Financial and Logistical Considerations

1. Cost-Effectiveness:

   • Reduced Training and Maintenance Costs: Standardizing the fleet with the AAF's F-16s can lead to significant savings in training, maintenance, and logistics by leveraging economies of scale.
   • Modernization and Lifecycle: Investing in new F-16 Block 50/52+ aircraft provides a longer operational lifecycle and future-proofing against obsolescence, reducing the need for frequent upgrades and overhauls.

2. Economic and Strategic Partnerships:

   • Foreign Military Sales (FMS): Acquiring F-16s through the U.S. FMS program can provide favorable financing terms, access to the latest technology, and long-term support agreements.
   • Regional Influence: Modernizing the ANA with F-16s enhances Argentina's regional defense posture and demonstrates a commitment to maintaining a capable and modern naval aviation force.

Transitioning to the F-16 Block 50/52+ represents a strategic, operational, and financially sound decision for the Argentine Naval Aviation. The advanced capabilities, extended range, and interoperability with the Air Force provide a comprehensive solution to enhance Argentina's maritime defense capabilities. By adopting the F-16 platform, the ANA will not only modernize its fleet but also ensure long-term operational effectiveness and readiness in a rapidly evolving strategic environment.

Next Steps:

1. Detailed Feasibility Study: Conduct a comprehensive study on the feasibility and costs associated with transitioning to the F-16 Block 50/52+.
2. Stakeholder Engagement: Engage with key stakeholders, including the Ministry of Defense, to discuss the strategic advantages and secure the necessary approvals and funding.
3. Partnership Negotiations: Initiate discussions with the U.S. government and Lockheed Martin for potential purchase agreements, training programs, and support packages.

By presenting this proposal, the Argentine Naval Aviation can take a significant step towards achieving a modern, capable, and flexible maritime strike force.

Acquisition Costs

Acquiring a squadron of F-16 Block 50/52+ aircraft with full air-sea attack capabilities, including Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs), involves multiple cost considerations. Here's a comprehensive assessment of the costs:

1. Aircraft Acquisition Costs

The unit cost of an F-16 Block 50/52+ varies based on configuration, additional equipment, and market conditions. However, an average unit cost can be estimated as follows:

• Unit Cost: Approximately $50-60 million per aircraft, including airframe, engines, avionics, and standard equipment.

For a squadron (typically 12 aircraft):

• Total Aircraft Cost: $50 million x 12 = $600 million (lower end)
• Total Aircraft Cost: $60 million x 12 = $720 million (upper end)

2. Weapon Systems and Equipment

Equipping the aircraft with necessary weapons and systems for air-sea attack capabilities:

• Air-to-Sea Missiles (e.g., AGM-84 Harpoon): $1.2 million per missile.
• Laser-Guided Bombs (LGBs): Approximately $100,000 per bomb.
• Electronic Warfare and Countermeasure Systems: Approximately $5 million per aircraft.

Estimated cost for a squadron:

• Missiles: 24 missiles x $1.2 million = $28.8 million
• LGBs: 48 bombs x $100,000 = $4.8 million
• EW Systems: 12 x $5 million = $60 million

3. Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs)

CFTs add to the overall cost but are crucial for extended range missions:

• Cost per aircraft: Approximately $2-3 million.
• Total CFT Cost for 12 Aircraft: 12 x $2.5 million (average) = $30 million

4. Training and Infrastructure

Training pilots and ground crews, as well as setting up necessary infrastructure:

• Pilot Training: Approximately $1-2 million per pilot.
• Ground Crew Training: Approximately $0.5 million per technician.
• Infrastructure and Simulators: $50 million
• Comandante Espora Naval Station: $ 30 million (Minimum)
  

For a squadron:

• Pilot Training (24 pilots): 24 x $1.5 million (average) = $36 million
• Ground Crew Training (36 technicians): 36 x $0.5 million = $18 million
• Infrastructure: $50 million

5. Maintenance and Support

Initial maintenance setup and spares:

• Initial Spares and Logistics Support: Approximately $50-100 million.
• Maintenance Contracts (first few years): $20 million per year.

6. Miscellaneous Costs

Additional costs that might arise include logistics, transportation, and administrative expenses:

• Estimated Miscellaneous Costs: $20-30 million.

Summary of Estimated Costs

• Aircraft Acquisition: $600-720 million
• Weapons and Equipment: $93.6 million
• CFTs: $30 million
• Training and Infrastructure: $134 million
• Maintenance and Support: $70-100 million (first few years)
• Miscellaneous Costs: $20-30 million

Total Estimated Cost:

• Lower End: $947.6 million
• Upper End: $1.077 billion

Acquiring a squadron of F-16 Block 50/52+ aircraft with full air-to-sea attack capability and CFT for the Argentine Naval Aviation is a significant investment, estimated at approximately $917.6 million to $1.047 billion. This investment covers the aircraft, weaponry, training, infrastructure, initial maintenance, and other associated costs. This estimate provides a comprehensive understanding for decision-makers to assess the feasibility and strategic benefits of such an acquisition.

Obviously, the geostrategic implications of such a purchase, in the context of its necessary approval by the U.S. Congress, are not being discussed. That is a much more complex discussion, beyond the scope of this contribution.

A more realistic analysis should consider the use of armed variants of the P-3 Orion as more economical and natural options for naval warfare environments. With expanded budgets, the best option worldwide for this role is the P-8 Poseidon.

Creation of the Naval Air Search and Rescue Squadron

Creation of the Naval Air Search and Rescue Squadron (Naval Aviation)

 

On June 24, 1963, the Naval Air Search and Rescue Squadron was founded with the incorporation of the first three Grumman Albatros UH-16B aircraft, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Julio O. Caravaglia. This squadron was part of the Aeronaval Squadron No. 3 from 1963 to 1965, and later joined the Aeronaval Squadron No. 4, both based at the Punta Indio Aeronaval Base. On August 9, 1977, the squadron was placed in reserve at the BAPI due to the deprogramming of its aircraft, which were not replaced.



It is interesting to know some details about the incorporation of the Albatross into Naval Aviation. The Argentine Air Force made the original purchase of the three aircraft, out of a total of six, with the apparent purpose of forming an anti-submarine group and at the same time for Search and Rescue missions. A disagreement over the mission and tasks assigned to these aircraft (acquired from the USAF and reconditioned) ended with a presidential decision by Dr. Arturo Frondizi, who determined that three of the devices not equipped for anti-submarine missions would be for the Argentine Air Force, using them for Search and Rescue missions, and the remaining three would be assigned to the Navy. In 1970, a fourth HU-16B Albatros aircraft was added.



Source: History of Argentine Naval Aviation Volume I. Pablo E. Arguindeguy.

Aviones Argentinos