Malvinas: The 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun Company B.I.C.O. in Mount Longdon

The 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun Company B.I.C.O. is sent to the Malvinas

Part 5

Narrated by then-Lieutenant of the Navy Sergio Dachary

Paratrooper Company B, which was attempting to penetrate through the centre of Mount Longdon, encountered tenacious resistance and had to divert around the North, that is, to one side. In that way, they approached from behind the machine gun of Corporal Second Class José Roldán, commander of the 1st 12.7mm group composed of three machines and their respective teams of four conscripts. Roldán, with Machine No. 2, was with soldiers Scarano, Bogado and Almirón. It was 22:00 hours when Bogado, who was on guard with Almirón, approached Roldán and warned him: "Corporal, there are people advancing. I saw them with the scope."



At the same time, an Army corporal who was manning a machine gun about fifteen metres to the left and below Roldán, sent one of his conscripts to warn him that the English were approaching from the north and the rear. Illumination rounds had begun to fall, and despite the fog, the first British troops could be observed advancing in a line.

"We shall receive them properly!" exclaimed Roldán, and the 12.7 began to spit out its deadly ammunition. For a good while, the machine gun held the enemy at bay, who, lying on the ground about 150 metres away, had to halt their advance. At the same time, the three machines remaining to Lieutenant Dachary were already in position, firing towards that sector.

Corporal Roldán’s 12.7 began receiving intense fire, likely due to the emission of the night scope. For a moment they ceased firing, but suddenly, the light of a flare allowed them to observe about forty paratroopers advancing towards them, shouting. Roldán turned the machine gun slightly to the right and began sweeping fire, until the weapon jammed. Nonetheless, they saw some English troops fall and others retreat.

A sergeant from the Army’s 120mm mortars, who was retreating while wounded, approached Roldán and said:

— "We’re holding them back. They cannot get closer than 150 metres."
— "Yes, we no longer have the machine gun, but we’ll keep firing with rifles."
— "Be careful, there may be enemies dressed in friendly uniforms."

The British increased the activity of their two field batteries. The fire was infernal, with remarkable accuracy, as they were firing just fifty metres beyond their front line, demonstrating perfect training for that type of fire. Still, they made no progress. The effectiveness of the 12.7s was demonstrated at every moment. Additionally, the rifles and MAG machine guns of RI-7 (7th Infantry Regiment) formed a barrier difficult to break.

Major Carrizo decided to launch two counterattacks on both flanks of the hill, towards the West: one led by First Lieutenant Enrique E. Neirotti on the South side; the other, with an Engineer Section under Lieutenant Hugo A. Quiroga, from the North. Both attempts advanced, recovering some ground, but failed to dislodge the English from the hill, despite the heroism of the men, due to the impassable British supporting fire.

Dachary understood that it was necessary to remove the British from the positions they had taken to the West of Longdon, in order to recover the other slope without difficulty, which, being very steep, offered few options for scaling, especially while under fire from the crest.

As the British pressed harder and managed to advance slowly, Carrizo contacted the RI-7 commander and requested a reinforcement company and artillery fire on the North and West to soften them up. The direct support battery, located East of Longdon, began firing two guns on the North and four on the West.

Instead of a company, Lieutenant Colonel Jiménez sent only a section, which arrived with casualties as they had to cross one kilometre of open terrain under artillery salvos. These men, under Second Lieutenant Raúl Castañeda, were guided by a messenger soldier who knew the mountain paths from daily patrols.

Castañeda’s section began its counterattack, flanked by the Engineer group from the West and another section from the South. The Army infantry advanced shouting and firing continuously, supported by the 12.7s and an 81mm mortar, which fired until all ammunition was exhausted.

In this way, they managed to recover part of the lost ground, surprising the paratroopers (the first aid post established by the British was nearly overrun by this assault). Castañeda’s section had to repel several counterattacks. These men held out until dawn, and with no reinforcements, they withdrew along the same path they had advanced (a sheep trail unknown to the British). This section suffered almost 50% casualties.

Mount Longdon: The Real British Casualties Commented by the Bad Guys

Malvinas: The Rasit radar at Wireless Ridge

Rasit Radar at Wireless Ridge

At Mount Longdon was exclusively operated by First Sargeant Nista 


The plotting table is an accessory that is like a plasma where the cartography of the area of operations is represented, and when the radar detects the target and the operator tracks it, the route of the target is automatically drawn on this cartography. As reported in another email, this Accessory was not provided so the operator must manually track it, making it difficult to transmit data (coordinates) to the support and fire elements who, ultimately, are the ones that would take advantage of that data. to make the shot more effective. Regarding the identification (type) of the detected target, this depends on the skill and experience of the operator. As I also explained previously, the operation of the radar is based on the Doppler effect, for which the radar has a device that compares the "frequency" of the "electromagnetic pulse" of the radar emission when it leaves and when it enters. This pulse, when it collides with a moving element, suffers a distortion in frequency and when compared by the radar, produces a "noise" that is characteristic of each element. For example, the engine of a wheeled vehicle has a particular sound, the tracks of armored vehicles have another. People or pedestrians also have a distinctive noise. That's why I tell you that depending on the skill of the operator, the targets can be conveniently identified. It takes thousands of hours of practice for an operator to tell them apart. Both operators (Nista and I) had taken the course and had a few hours of practice operating it.

While you were in your first position (in Wireless), do you suppose/do you claim that every time it was turned on it was detected and bombed, or do you think it was "linked" like the entire position?

The position that they occupied along with the rest of the Command Company was quite concentrated, so that it could not be ensured that each time they were hit by naval or field artillery fire, it was due exclusively to the radar emission. In any case, during the stay in Wireless the radar was put into operation exclusively at night and effectively, they were the target of the bombing.
The Rasit was initially in the Communications Company Position (-) NW of the RI 7 (Infantry Regiment 7) device that is in front of Furze Bush Pass near Murrell, changing position on June 9 together with the operators NW of Longdon with Company B (+), including Forward Observer Lt. Ramos

Regarding operation, the following must be taken into account, the enemy dominated the electromagnetic spectrum very well, with interference to Communications and/or denial thereof. Rasit Operator 1st Sergeant Nista could never have confused troops with "branches" as was intentionally mismentioned, since although it may have been difficult to appreciate what the radar represented (if you talk to other operators they can confirm it) even the most ignorant Not only did I know that there were no trees that could interfere, but it was also noticeable with the naked eye.

Argentine Radars in Malvinas

The mine explosion that hit Cape Milne was heard from the Command Post at Wireless Ridge.

Regarding the explosion of the mine, it is worth clarifying that there was no field or strip of mines, in all cases they were lines of mines, that is, a row, one next to the other, nothing more. It would have been very different in another case.

When movements are detected, two fundamental problems arise: Battery C/GA3 was no longer in position and (I must confirm) another movement may have been expected from the NW like the previous one, when the enemy had already crossed the starting line and was in the middle of the assault on Position 1/B where he killed Ramos, blinding the Artillery Support that "perhaps" could have been given. Yes, Wireless' 105mm recoilless cannons did it instead, but blindly (9 km) and it could be verified that they hit a Milan ATGM team with its operators.

The attack on Longdon was not with preparatory fires from A.

Regarding the guards, from the arrival until the last day the never modified order of 20% rest, 80% watch was maintained. This was due to the permanent alerts.

From the night of June 11 to June 14, the three 105 mm cannons fired about 250 fragmentation and incendiary projectiles at the enemy troops, the latter to regulate the firing since there was an order not to use the 120 mm mortars on the enemy troops. hill due to its own troops being scattered mixed with the enemy. That was only modified as of June 12.

It was shot at a distance of 6250 meters and a shooting angle of 36.5º.