Showing posts with label Mount Longdon. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mount Longdon. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 27, 2025

Mount Longdon: Corporal Second Class Colemil and His Conscripts

Corporal Second Class Colemil and His Conscripts



The Marines of the 12.7 mm Machine Gun Company, attached to the 7th Infantry Regiment (RI-7) on Mount Longdon, prepared the defence of their position as they were accustomed to: deep works with shelters, crawl trenches, ammunition depots, and so on—always working to perfect them. It was the best way to pass the time before going into combat, for they were convinced they would have to fight, and constant work was the best way to endure the wait, according to Marine Corps tradition. When the British assault came, they saw the wisdom of that attitude. Those who had not done so suffered needless casualties and could not fight effectively. 



Two days before the attack, Corporal Second Class Colemil went to the Marine Corps Combat Support Service, where Lieutenant Scotto told him: “Vizcacha” (another of Colemil’s nicknames), “here you have the night sights that have just arrived—take these for the rifles and for the machine guns.” Colemil took three rifle sights, giving one to his commanding officer, Lieutenant Dachary, another to Chief Corporal Lamas, and keeping the third for himself. He also carried six Litton sights for the machine guns and five or six head-mounted night vision devices, which turned out to be of little use. The following day, the Marines spent time training with the night sights. 



The Night of 11 June 1982

Carlos Rafael Colemil, in charge of a 12.7 mm machine gun (the westernmost on Mount Longdon), had escorted conscript Leiva—who was feeling unwell—to the aid post. Once checked and treated, Leiva was authorised to return to his position. On the way back, they passed Corporal Lamas’s machine gun, where Lamas warned Colemil: “Stay very alert. Don’t let your guard down; they could attack tonight.”

They carried on walking. When they reached the rest shelter, Colemil woke the relief shift, and with the two conscripts who had already completed their watch on the 12.7, began his nightly patrol. They paused briefly at the Army’s Racit radar (an infantry radar used to detect the enemy) and exchanged a few words with the sergeant operating it.

“Get into the dugout; they’re going to start firing,” the sergeant warned.

The radar—capable of detecting enemy infantry movements—was switched off at 8 p.m., as British ships had detected it and subjected it to naval gunfire from the south, an action that facilitated the infiltration of British paratroopers. About a company’s worth of these paratroopers made their way through the minefields without triggering any devices. Silently, they infiltrated the sector occupied by 2nd Lieutenant Juan D. Baldini’s section of the Bravo Company, RI-7, whose frontage faced west on Mount Longdon.

Colemil and the two conscripts continued moving among the rocks until he stopped and looked west through his FAL rifle’s night sight. To his surprise, he saw a diffuse shape moving not far away. Uncertain, he aimed the FAL at the spot and fired a shot. In response, he heard the unmistakable chatter of a Sterling submachine gun. There was no mistake—it was the enemy, and they were close. At that moment, a paratrooper stepped on a mine; the scream and the explosion alerted all of Mount Longdon.

Once he had located the enemy, Colemil ran to the rest shelter and phoned Lieutenant Dachary’s command post.
—“Cobra, this is Araucano. Cobra, this is Araucano.”
—“Go ahead, Araucano.”
—“Attention, guns— we’re under attack, we’re under attack.”
—“Received.”

(The machine guns were connected to Lieutenant Dachary’s command post and also interlinked with each other.)

While Colemil was alerting his commander, the fighting spread. Thanks to the advantage of surprise, the British managed to gain a foothold at the western end of the mount, advancing with machine guns, rifles, and 66 mm and 84 mm rockets. The atmosphere was hellish. Colemil marked targets with tracer rounds from his rifle, aided by the night sight.

Suddenly—air raid alarm. The Argentine infantrymen dived into their foxholes, and as soon as the artillery fire ceased, they emerged to continue firing. Then more rounds came crashing in.

 

Outnumbered but Still Fighting

The paratroopers took advantage of the moments when their enemies were in the foxholes to advance, overrunning Colemil’s position, leaving him cut off and unable to contact Lieutenant Dachary’s men. Far from discouraged, Colemil kept firing the 12.7 mm, but before long the weapon jammed and was put out of action.

From then on, it was a long night for “the Araucano” Colemil—a brilliant corporal who, through determination and courage, caused the British many headaches and inflicted numerous casualties.

“Well, we’ve got rifles and plenty of ammunition,” he told conscripts Ferrandiz and Leiva, who had stayed with him. “Let’s blast them.”

“Corporal, there are hundreds of them,” said Ferrandiz.
“All right—we’ll let them pass and then hit them from behind.”

Suddenly, Colemil saw some British troops trying to set up a mortar. “These ones aren’t getting away,” he thought aloud and began firing at them, wounding one and forcing the rest to withdraw.

“Behind you, corporal!” shouted Leiva as three paratroopers charged towards them. Colemil spun round and fired a burst of about fifteen rounds. One Briton fell, and the other two, wounded, withdrew, shouting.

Lying prone, the corporal searched for enemies through the rifle sight. Whenever one came into view, he put him out of action. Alone, he caused havoc among those trying to take the Argentine positions in that sector of Longdon, while his conscripts supported him with their rifles. 



At one point, he saw the enemy attempting to recover a recoilless rifle that was near his position. He opened fire, saw one Briton fall, and then came under heavy retaliatory fire. “If I don’t fight, I’m dead,” he thought. He began crawling from position to position, opening fire whenever he spotted an enemy. He saw a Briton standing on a parapet with a bipod-fitted rifle, shot him down instantly, and then fired at his comrades trying to approach—likely to recover the weapon.

In an attempt to peer out for more targets, Colemil was hit— the bullet struck the front of his helmet, pierced it, entered his scalp, and stopped at the nape of his neck. A paratrooper, barely twenty metres away, had thrown a grenade which exploded nearby, but a rock had stopped the shrapnel. As Colemil rose to seek him through the sight, the same man fired at him, the projectile grazing his head.

(Because the wound ran from his forehead to the nape, Colemil earned the nickname “Piggy Bank.”)

He immediately felt something hot running down his face. Dazed, he tried to stand, but managed to recover the rifle in time. As soon as his attacker appeared from behind a rock, he aimed at his chest and fired. The Briton let out a cry of pain and fell heavily on his back, arms spread.

“Corporal, let’s bandage your head,” said Ferrandiz.
“Yes, but quickly—we can’t stop firing.”
“We’re cut off. We can’t hold out much longer.”

By 3 a.m., they were also under friendly artillery fire, their own side believing the position had been taken by the British.

“Corporal, why don’t we surrender?” both conscripts said at once.
“No way. I won’t be taken prisoner. I’ve no wish to have my throat cut.”
“But, corporal—”
“I’d rather shoot myself than be taken prisoner.”
“Then let’s withdraw,” insisted the conscripts.

“All right, let’s go. We’ll link up with Corporal Lamas.”
“I’ll get you a helmet, corporal.”
“No, forget the helmet. Let’s move.”

Crouching low, they tried to leave the position, covering a few metres before being forced back by rifle fire. Colemil had put up a fierce resistance; it was clear they had his position pinpointed.

At around 03:00 hours, Corporal Colemil decided to fall back to the Bravo Company, RI-7 command post, seizing a momentary lull. The three men took the opportunity to move out, but again came under fire. The two conscripts escaped, but Colemil was shot in the leg. He tried to crawl away, but after a few metres, he lost consciousness.

When the British advanced, they left him where he was, assuming him dead. Corporal Second Class Colemil was taken prisoner and only regained consciousness aboard the British hospital ship Uganda, where surgeons fitted a platinum plate to his skull.

That night of 11 June 1982, he expended all five FAL rifle magazines and reloaded twice. British publications mention a “sniper” who caused them many casualties—very likely Corporal Carlos Rafael Colemil himself.

In 1982, he was awarded the “Honour to Valour in Combat” decoration.

Wednesday, July 23, 2025

Malvinas: The 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun Company B.I.C.O. in Mount Longdon

The 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun Company B.I.C.O. is sent to the Malvinas

Part 5

Narrated by then-Lieutenant of the Navy Sergio Dachary

Paratrooper Company B, which was attempting to penetrate through the centre of Mount Longdon, encountered tenacious resistance and had to divert around the North, that is, to one side. In that way, they approached from behind the machine gun of Corporal Second Class José Roldán, commander of the 1st 12.7mm group composed of three machines and their respective teams of four conscripts. Roldán, with Machine No. 2, was with soldiers Scarano, Bogado and Almirón. It was 22:00 hours when Bogado, who was on guard with Almirón, approached Roldán and warned him: "Corporal, there are people advancing. I saw them with the scope."



At the same time, an Army corporal who was manning a machine gun about fifteen metres to the left and below Roldán, sent one of his conscripts to warn him that the English were approaching from the north and the rear. Illumination rounds had begun to fall, and despite the fog, the first British troops could be observed advancing in a line.

"We shall receive them properly!" exclaimed Roldán, and the 12.7 began to spit out its deadly ammunition. For a good while, the machine gun held the enemy at bay, who, lying on the ground about 150 metres away, had to halt their advance. At the same time, the three machines remaining to Lieutenant Dachary were already in position, firing towards that sector.

Corporal Roldán’s 12.7 began receiving intense fire, likely due to the emission of the night scope. For a moment they ceased firing, but suddenly, the light of a flare allowed them to observe about forty paratroopers advancing towards them, shouting. Roldán turned the machine gun slightly to the right and began sweeping fire, until the weapon jammed. Nonetheless, they saw some English troops fall and others retreat.

A sergeant from the Army’s 120mm mortars, who was retreating while wounded, approached Roldán and said:

— "We’re holding them back. They cannot get closer than 150 metres."
— "Yes, we no longer have the machine gun, but we’ll keep firing with rifles."
— "Be careful, there may be enemies dressed in friendly uniforms."

The British increased the activity of their two field batteries. The fire was infernal, with remarkable accuracy, as they were firing just fifty metres beyond their front line, demonstrating perfect training for that type of fire. Still, they made no progress. The effectiveness of the 12.7s was demonstrated at every moment. Additionally, the rifles and MAG machine guns of RI-7 (7th Infantry Regiment) formed a barrier difficult to break.

Major Carrizo decided to launch two counterattacks on both flanks of the hill, towards the West: one led by First Lieutenant Enrique E. Neirotti on the South side; the other, with an Engineer Section under Lieutenant Hugo A. Quiroga, from the North. Both attempts advanced, recovering some ground, but failed to dislodge the English from the hill, despite the heroism of the men, due to the impassable British supporting fire.

Dachary understood that it was necessary to remove the British from the positions they had taken to the West of Longdon, in order to recover the other slope without difficulty, which, being very steep, offered few options for scaling, especially while under fire from the crest.

As the British pressed harder and managed to advance slowly, Carrizo contacted the RI-7 commander and requested a reinforcement company and artillery fire on the North and West to soften them up. The direct support battery, located East of Longdon, began firing two guns on the North and four on the West.

Instead of a company, Lieutenant Colonel Jiménez sent only a section, which arrived with casualties as they had to cross one kilometre of open terrain under artillery salvos. These men, under Second Lieutenant Raúl Castañeda, were guided by a messenger soldier who knew the mountain paths from daily patrols.

Castañeda’s section began its counterattack, flanked by the Engineer group from the West and another section from the South. The Army infantry advanced shouting and firing continuously, supported by the 12.7s and an 81mm mortar, which fired until all ammunition was exhausted.

In this way, they managed to recover part of the lost ground, surprising the paratroopers (the first aid post established by the British was nearly overrun by this assault). Castañeda’s section had to repel several counterattacks. These men held out until dawn, and with no reinforcements, they withdrew along the same path they had advanced (a sheep trail unknown to the British). This section suffered almost 50% casualties.

Wednesday, October 11, 2023

Malvinas: The Rasit radar at Wireless Ridge

Rasit Radar at Wireless Ridge




At Mount Longdon was exclusively operated by First Sargeant Nista 


The plotting table is an accessory that is like a plasma where the cartography of the area of operations is represented, and when the radar detects the target and the operator tracks it, the route of the target is automatically drawn on this cartography. As reported in another email, this Accessory was not provided so the operator must manually track it, making it difficult to transmit data (coordinates) to the support and fire elements who, ultimately, are the ones that would take advantage of that data. to make the shot more effective. Regarding the identification (type) of the detected target, this depends on the skill and experience of the operator. As I also explained previously, the operation of the radar is based on the Doppler effect, for which the radar has a device that compares the "frequency" of the "electromagnetic pulse" of the radar emission when it leaves and when it enters. This pulse, when it collides with a moving element, suffers a distortion in frequency and when compared by the radar, produces a "noise" that is characteristic of each element. For example, the engine of a wheeled vehicle has a particular sound, the tracks of armored vehicles have another. People or pedestrians also have a distinctive noise. That's why I tell you that depending on the skill of the operator, the targets can be conveniently identified. It takes thousands of hours of practice for an operator to tell them apart. Both operators (Nista and I) had taken the course and had a few hours of practice operating it.




While you were in your first position (in Wireless), do you suppose/do you claim that every time it was turned on it was detected and bombed, or do you think it was "linked" like the entire position?

The position that they occupied along with the rest of the Command Company was quite concentrated, so that it could not be ensured that each time they were hit by naval or field artillery fire, it was due exclusively to the radar emission. In any case, during the stay in Wireless the radar was put into operation exclusively at night and effectively, they were the target of the bombing.
The Rasit was initially in the Communications Company Position (-) NW of the RI 7 (Infantry Regiment 7) device that is in front of Furze Bush Pass near Murrell, changing position on June 9 together with the operators NW of Longdon with Company B (+), including Forward Observer Lt. Ramos


Regarding operation, the following must be taken into account, the enemy dominated the electromagnetic spectrum very well, with interference to Communications and/or denial thereof. Rasit Operator 1st Sergeant Nista could never have confused troops with "branches" as was intentionally mismentioned, since although it may have been difficult to appreciate what the radar represented (if you talk to other operators they can confirm it) even the most ignorant Not only did I know that there were no trees that could interfere, but it was also noticeable with the naked eye.

Argentine Radars in Malvinas

The mine explosion that hit Cape Milne was heard from the Command Post at Wireless Ridge.

Regarding the explosion of the mine, it is worth clarifying that there was no field or strip of mines, in all cases they were lines of mines, that is, a row, one next to the other, nothing more. It would have been very different in another case.

When movements are detected, two fundamental problems arise: Battery C/GA3 was no longer in position and (I must confirm) another movement may have been expected from the NW like the previous one, when the enemy had already crossed the starting line and was in the middle of the assault on Position 1/B where he killed Ramos, blinding the Artillery Support that "perhaps" could have been given. Yes, Wireless' 105mm recoilless cannons did it instead, but blindly (9 km) and it could be verified that they hit a Milan ATGM team with its operators.

The attack on Longdon was not with preparatory fires from A.

Regarding the guards, from the arrival until the last day the never modified order of 20% rest, 80% watch was maintained. This was due to the permanent alerts.

From the night of June 11 to June 14, the three 105 mm cannons fired about 250 fragmentation and incendiary projectiles at the enemy troops, the latter to regulate the firing since there was an order not to use the 120 mm mortars on the enemy troops. hill due to its own troops being scattered mixed with the enemy. That was only modified as of June 12.

It was shot at a distance of 6250 meters and a shooting angle of 36.5º.