Malvinas: The Rasit radar at Wireless Ridge

Rasit Radar at Wireless Ridge

At Mount Longdon was exclusively operated by First Sargeant Nista 


The plotting table is an accessory that is like a plasma where the cartography of the area of operations is represented, and when the radar detects the target and the operator tracks it, the route of the target is automatically drawn on this cartography. As reported in another email, this Accessory was not provided so the operator must manually track it, making it difficult to transmit data (coordinates) to the support and fire elements who, ultimately, are the ones that would take advantage of that data. to make the shot more effective. Regarding the identification (type) of the detected target, this depends on the skill and experience of the operator. As I also explained previously, the operation of the radar is based on the Doppler effect, for which the radar has a device that compares the "frequency" of the "electromagnetic pulse" of the radar emission when it leaves and when it enters. This pulse, when it collides with a moving element, suffers a distortion in frequency and when compared by the radar, produces a "noise" that is characteristic of each element. For example, the engine of a wheeled vehicle has a particular sound, the tracks of armored vehicles have another. People or pedestrians also have a distinctive noise. That's why I tell you that depending on the skill of the operator, the targets can be conveniently identified. It takes thousands of hours of practice for an operator to tell them apart. Both operators (Nista and I) had taken the course and had a few hours of practice operating it.

While you were in your first position (in Wireless), do you suppose/do you claim that every time it was turned on it was detected and bombed, or do you think it was "linked" like the entire position?

The position that they occupied along with the rest of the Command Company was quite concentrated, so that it could not be ensured that each time they were hit by naval or field artillery fire, it was due exclusively to the radar emission. In any case, during the stay in Wireless the radar was put into operation exclusively at night and effectively, they were the target of the bombing.
The Rasit was initially in the Communications Company Position (-) NW of the RI 7 (Infantry Regiment 7) device that is in front of Furze Bush Pass near Murrell, changing position on June 9 together with the operators NW of Longdon with Company B (+), including Forward Observer Lt. Ramos

Regarding operation, the following must be taken into account, the enemy dominated the electromagnetic spectrum very well, with interference to Communications and/or denial thereof. Rasit Operator 1st Sergeant Nista could never have confused troops with "branches" as was intentionally mismentioned, since although it may have been difficult to appreciate what the radar represented (if you talk to other operators they can confirm it) even the most ignorant Not only did I know that there were no trees that could interfere, but it was also noticeable with the naked eye.

Argentine Radars in Malvinas

The mine explosion that hit Cape Milne was heard from the Command Post at Wireless Ridge.

Regarding the explosion of the mine, it is worth clarifying that there was no field or strip of mines, in all cases they were lines of mines, that is, a row, one next to the other, nothing more. It would have been very different in another case.

When movements are detected, two fundamental problems arise: Battery C/GA3 was no longer in position and (I must confirm) another movement may have been expected from the NW like the previous one, when the enemy had already crossed the starting line and was in the middle of the assault on Position 1/B where he killed Ramos, blinding the Artillery Support that "perhaps" could have been given. Yes, Wireless' 105mm recoilless cannons did it instead, but blindly (9 km) and it could be verified that they hit a Milan ATGM team with its operators.

The attack on Longdon was not with preparatory fires from A.

Regarding the guards, from the arrival until the last day the never modified order of 20% rest, 80% watch was maintained. This was due to the permanent alerts.

From the night of June 11 to June 14, the three 105 mm cannons fired about 250 fragmentation and incendiary projectiles at the enemy troops, the latter to regulate the firing since there was an order not to use the 120 mm mortars on the enemy troops. hill due to its own troops being scattered mixed with the enemy. That was only modified as of June 12.

It was shot at a distance of 6250 meters and a shooting angle of 36.5º.