Showing posts with label military strategy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label military strategy. Show all posts

Friday, September 5, 2025

Malvinas: The Remains of the Day

 “Galtieri put the problem on the table”

Interview with Guillermo Suárez Mason

In its edition of 23 June 1982, the magazine Siete Días published an interview by journalist César M. Sorkin with General Guillermo Suárez Mason, then former Chief of the Army General Staff. On that occasion, General Suárez Mason gave his views on different aspects of the war, some passages of which are of particular interest, especially those concerning the circumstances that led to the final outcome:

“The battle, unpleasant as the results may have been, was fought through to the end. Our troops fought as best they could with what they had, and they were overcome. There was no one unwilling to face the alternative… We could talk about the very small fractions still left to General Menéndez, but they were so minimal that they don’t really count. Our troops were genuinely overpowered in the field, after an effort in which they used everything they had. It is quite simple to understand: if you have troops on the ground and they are crushed by fire, and when you still can’t move them much they land a helicopter-borne battalion behind your troops… well then, they’ve passed you, they’ve left you behind, completely cut off. That is much more practical than pushing through the same battlefield, through minefields, across barbed wire and under fire… They destroyed the most important objectives with fire and then went over the top. They are respectable. When I speak of the respect I have for them, I refer strictly and solely to their professionalism.”

On the morale of the Argentine forces he stated:

“It was very good, and this is confirmed in the final act signed between General Menéndez and General Moore, whose first point highlights the courage shown by our men.”

Towards the end of the interview, the dialogue was as follows:

“I refer exclusively to the actions of the Army. I do not speak about the Navy’s lack of action in the area, and that is because it would have been impossible for them to do anything; despite the pain their absence caused, I understand why they were not there. It would have been suicide. Just as I understand that General Menéndez halted the actions at a certain point… Collective suicide makes no sense, militarily speaking. When things are already lost, the human worth of command must weigh more than supposedly heroic attitudes, terrible in their finality of death. That is not the purpose of military operations. Military operations are carried out to subdue the enemy.”

Journalist: – Will the future course of action unfold politically or militarily?
Suárez Mason: – Politically. That is my impression. I am not recommending anything. I am speaking of the ceasefire.
Q: – Does the adverse outcome of this action prevent trying again in the future?
SM: – No, on the contrary. I believe that one merit of the operation, failed as it may be, is that it brought the problem to a level of priority that Britain had not previously accorded it. This is what history will one day acknowledge in Lieutenant General Galtieri; he put the problem on the table, in full view, despite all the setbacks. Things did not turn out well, but even so they have their value.

Source: excerpt from an interview by César M. Sorkin.
Documentary Chronicle of the Malvinas. Hugo Gambini.
“Redacción” Library.

Saturday, August 31, 2024

Beagle Crisis: The Advices of Sun Tzu

Sun Tzu Leading the Soberania Operation

 

 

Imagine 1978, the Beagle crisis between Argentina and Chile. Put yourself on the Argentine side. If Sun Tzu were in the Argentine High Command... what would he recommend as a course of action on December, 22nd, D-Day for the Argentine invasion of Chile?

If Sun Tzu were advising the Argentine High Command on December 22, 1978, the D-Day for the planned Argentine invasion of Chile during the Beagle Crisis, his recommendations would likely emphasize strategic deception, psychological warfare, and leveraging strengths against weaknesses to achieve victory with minimal conflict. Here’s a detailed hypothetical course of action he might suggest:

1. Strategic Deception

"All warfare is based on deception."

  • Disinformation Campaign: Spread false information about the timing, location, and scale of the invasion to confuse and mislead Chilean forces. This could involve feints and dummy troop movements.
  • Camouflage and Concealment: Use terrain and weather conditions to conceal the true positions and movements of Argentine forces.

2. Psychological Warfare

"The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting."

  • Propaganda: Disseminate propaganda aimed at lowering Chilean morale, possibly through leaflets, radio broadcasts, and other means.
  • Diplomatic Pressure: Continue diplomatic efforts to isolate Chile internationally, gaining support or at least neutrality from neighboring countries and major powers.

3. Exploiting Terrain and Weather

"Know the terrain and the weather."

  • Terrain Analysis: Utilize knowledge of the local terrain to launch surprise attacks where Chilean defenses are weak or unprepared.
  • Weather Utilization: Plan operations to take advantage of favorable weather conditions, such as fog or rain, which can obscure movements and hinder Chilean defenses.

4. Economy of Force

"He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious."

  • Selective Engagement: Focus on key objectives and avoid unnecessary engagements. Concentrate forces on vital targets like command centers, supply depots, and key communication hubs.
  • Avoid Prolonged Engagements: Ensure that engagements are quick and decisive, minimizing the risk of a prolonged conflict which could drain resources and morale.


5. Surprise and Speed

"Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected."

  • Surprise Attacks: Plan initial assaults to catch the Chilean forces off-guard, targeting weak points in their defenses.
  • Rapid Mobilization: Ensure that Argentine forces can move swiftly to exploit any breakthroughs and maintain momentum.

6. Logistics and Supply Lines

"The line between disorder and order lies in logistics."

  • Secured Supply Lines: Ensure that supply lines are secure and capable of supporting sustained operations.
  • Reserves and Reinforcements: Maintain reserves to exploit successes or reinforce threatened sectors.

7. Alliances and Intelligence

"Know your enemy and know yourself."

  • Intelligence Gathering: Invest in intelligence to understand Chilean plans, troop dispositions, and weaknesses.
  • Alliances and Support: Strengthen alliances and seek external support to apply pressure on Chile diplomatically and economically.

8. Post-Conflict Strategy

"Build your opponent a golden bridge to retreat across."

  • Clear Objectives: Define clear political and military objectives to avoid mission creep.
  • Negotiated Settlement: Be prepared to offer terms that allow for a negotiated settlement to prevent prolonged conflict and facilitate a stable post-war environment.

 

At the World's End

Sun Tzu’s approach would focus on achieving Argentine objectives through a combination of deception, speed, psychological operations, and targeted engagements. The goal would be to minimize direct confrontation and maximize the strategic impact of each move, ultimately seeking a swift and decisive resolution to the conflict.