British Sailors Death in Argentine Service

Colonel Eusebio Mollinedo, who was with him that fateful day, wrote in his accounts:
“...Seriously wounded in the spine by a gunshot from an enemy patrol, and after enduring excruciating pain with the fortitude forged by the hardships of war, we reached the post at La Lagunilla... There he was assisted and could rest.”
“...At the spot known as La Higuera, four leagues southeast of the starting point, he was extremely weak due to blood loss...”
Revista Cumbres
Special collaboration: Esteban Ocampo
On the bicentennial of the impressive crossing of the Andes led by the great American strategist, a review of the planning and logistics devised to overcome the great obstacle.
San Martín designed the campaign dividing the Army into six columns on a front of 800 km from the south of La Rioja to the south of Mendoza, where the southernmost group crossed.
Two of these passes were main ones through which the bulk of the Army of 2,500 men circulated. The other passes were auxiliary ones with columns that were not very numerous and with the intention of distracting and dispersing the enemy forces in specific missions -already in Chile- so that they would not have all their power at their disposal in the battle of Chacabuco.
A main column advanced along the Uspallata route under the orders of Colonel Gregorio de Las Heras together with the artillery under the command of Fray Luis Beltrán. The pass, accessible and low, was very used for trade at the time.
The other important column went through San Juan, the Los Patos route through Valle Hermoso which was divided into Ojo de Agua and Paso de Ortiz, where part of the advance party passed, and the Yaretas pass, where San Martín actually crossed.
The secondary routes were Comecaballos in La Rioja with Lt. Col. Zelada; Guana, north of San Juan under orders of Lt. Col. Cabot; Portillo-Piuquenes, through the Tunuyán valley from the Fort of San Carlos under the orders of Captain Lemos; and Planchón, south of Mendoza through the area of the Peteroa volcano in charge of Lt. Col. Freyre.
Each column on its march itinerary had a detailed description of each day: the points they had to join, the length in leagues, the availability of water, grass and firewood, the type of terrain and forest. This information was useful for the guides to regulate the march and thus reach the planned points.
The instructions began with the following text: “You will advance according to prudence, your experience and the intelligence you have to comply with these orders.”
Communications through messengers were also very important. It is known that San Martín sent constant messages to Las Heras to speed up or slow down the march depending on the tactics. In the diary of Bernardo O’Higgins, the vanguard of the Los Patos route, these communications are recorded, which he sent to San Martín in the rearguard.
The central concept of the plan to cross the Andes was to minimize any problem, error or imponderable when facing the mountain. In 1816, the Great General confessed in a letter to Tomás Guido that what kept him awake at night was not the opposition, what the enemy might be preparing on the other side, but being able to cross this mountain range with 5,000 men and then give battle.
The precise and coordinated arrival of the columns on February 8, 1817, to Santa Rosa de los Andes was the result of precision in communications and efficiency in planning. This made the achievement possible and led to the military triumph of Chacabuco. Crossing the mountain range having fulfilled the objectives designed was half the battle won.

"This expedition was the only maritime activity that the Argentines carried out in the Pacific, and to tell the truth, it had magnificent results. As Worcester points out, since the arrival of Brown, Spanish maritime trade was halted. Marco del Pont not only feared the attack through the Cordillera, but he was convinced that another patriot division would attack him by sea. San Martín, for his part, circulated rumors that an expedition was being prepared in Buenos Aires that would attack Concepción and San Vicente with the aim of later invading Chile." (5)

The "Constitución" was a medium schooner, similar to the one in the image. It was American-made, but its owner was an Italian living in Chile (Andres Barrios or Andrea Bario), who leased it to the United Provinces when the campaign against Montevideo ended. On the basis of this small ship, preparations for the Pacific Expedition began. Unfortunately, the ship was wrecked in Antarctica and there were no survivors.

After the disaster of Rancagua and the fall of Chile into the hands of
the royalists, many patriots from Santiago emigrated to Mendoza, capital
of the Cuyo governorate in Argentina, the last emancipated territory.
Among them was the priest Julián Uribe, member of the Governing Board
and ally of the Carrera brothers.
José Miguel Carrera's attitude
forced General José de San Martín, who already governed Cuyo and was
working on the formation of the army of the Andes, to disarm his
followers and send them to the city of Buenos Aires, Uribe among them.
Upon his arrival, they were helped by Carlos María de Alvear, who
shortly assumed the position of Supreme Director of the United
Provinces. While Carrera was gaining support to be recognized as the
government of Chile and obtaining resources to mount an expedition to
Coquimbo and thus restart the fight, the priest Julián Uribe proposed a
plan to attack the Spanish in Chile, harassing Spanish navigation and
commerce along the way. throughout Valparaíso, Coquimbo, Atacama,
Arequipa, El Callao and Guayaquil.
The project had been outlined
by Andrés Barrios. After Brown's successful 1814 Naval Campaign on
Montevideo, Barrios transported 200 soldiers with the Constitution free
of charge from that plaza to Buenos Aires. Subsequently, Barrios lent
the Constitution to the state on the condition that he be given only
$4,000 despite the fact that its value was $6,200, of which Brown
recorded: "this individual [Barrios] donated his ship and personal
services for an incident so interesting to the country, for a tiny
amount". Since of the $4,000, "he had only received $1,950 with the
guarantee of Miguel de Irigoyen," Barrios returned the money and
recovered the ship.
The schooner or ketch Constitución was of
North American origin, displaced 235 tons and was 28 m long, 8.75 m
wide, 5.60 m deep and 2.90 m medium draft. It belonged to the patriot
Andrés Barrios (Andrea Bari), originally from Pisa, who after residing
in Concepción had settled in Buenos Aires. Barrios was also the
shipowner and captain of the Carmen, with which he had been trading for
at least fifteen years between Chile and Buenos Aires.
After
seeing the sale of the Constitution to the state frustrated, in mid-1815
Barrios offered it to be used for privateering, a proposal that was
accepted on May 23. Finally, Uribe raised among his compatriots the
necessary funds to join Barrios in the ownership of the ship and
requested the support of the commander of the Argentine squadron,
Guillermo Brown, who agreed to join with the frigate Hércules (which had
been gifted to him for his services. ) and convinced the authorities to
provide the brig Trinidad.
In order to adapt it for the campaign
and according to its owner Commander Andrés Barrios, "its winery has
been subdivided into several parts and various other works have been
carried out." The recruited crew numbered a hundred men, mainly Chileans
but also Irish, North Americans, Swedes, Italians and English.
After
the fall of Alvear, while José Miguel Carrera left for the United
States, Uribe, with the support of Brown, continued with his project. On
September 20, 1815, Andrés Barrios received from the government the
corresponding Patent of Marquee of the PURP No. 27, with guarantee from
Miguel de Irigoyen. Initially, Barrios was listed as commander, but he
was replaced at the last minute by Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliverio
Russell, Brown's right-hand man at the Battle of Montevideo.
The
government provided the necessary weapons and supplies for the
privateering campaign, but also to recruit and arm a patriot army in
Chile. The List of the artillery, sets of weapons, ammunition and other
war supplies that by Superior Order have been delivered to the Commander
of the Constitución Andrés Barrios detailed, among other things, the
provision of 1 bronze cannon of 16, 2 iron cannons of 8 and 4 cannons of
4, 210 jars of shrapnel, 100 bullets of 16, 200 of 8, 400 of 4, 30
crowbars of 16, 12 quintals of gunpowder, 2 quintals of match rope, 1000
cartridges of rifle, 100 flintlock stones for pistol, 50 rifle stones,
etc. The quantity and weight of what was loaded was so considerable that
it caused great difficulties for the ship during its journey and
probably influenced its tragic end.
To give Uribe freedom of
action, the instructions were broad: harass, seize or set fire to any
ship flying the Spanish flag, blockade Spanish places in the Pacific,
acquire information about the general situation in Chile and Peru and
about the land and naval forces there. possessed by the royalists and
patriots, to know the opinion of the insurgents and to encourage and
support their activities and operations, to clandestinely introduce
revolutionary proclamations and writings, etc.
In a few months
the fleet was ready. It was made up of the frigate Hércules, commanded
by Brown's brother-in-law Walter Dawes Chitty, the brig or Sumaca
Trinidad under the command of Miguel Brown, and the brig Halcón,
commanded by Captain Hipólito Bouchard, whose chief of arms was the
future head of state of Chile, Ramón Freire. and the schooner
Constitución, also known as Uribe, commanded by Oliver Russell.
We
already saw the rest. The Constitution sank near the Shetland Islands
when she sought to access the Pacific in the midst of a fierce storm.
Uribe, Rusell, Barrios and the entire crew died.
El Corsario del Plata
General Gregorio Aráoz de Lamadrid was a brave man who was said to have more wounds on his body than holes in an English lace.
On May 20, 1817, he was marching on Charcas with the intention of seizing the city, when a patrol intercepted a message from the Governor of Potosí to President Vivero, informing him that he was sending a reinforcement of 300 men.
Shortly after, when going up the Cachimayo slope, Captain Lugones, head of the patriot vanguard, warned that a large party of horsemen was advancing along the same path, but in the opposite direction to the one they were taking.

General Araoz de Lamadrid
Aware of the case, the then sergeant major Lamadrid called a halt and went ahead to meet the captain, who upon arrival told him:
—There is no doubt, my elder, they are Goths (Spaniards).
-Better. Do you see, captain, that force? Well, know that in a few minutes it will be ours without costing us a shot or a drop of blood,” he told her, as he continued walking.
And he kept advancing until very close to the royalists to whom he shouted:
"Hey, comrades! We are the help sent by the Governor of Potosí."
Convinced, the Spanish officers advanced about 100 meters from their troops to where the Argentines were and one of them approached the famous Tucuman smiling, saying:
— How are you doing, Ostria? It's been ages since I last saw you!
"I am not Ostria," replied Lamadrid.
—Excuse me, but the resemblance is so great!
"Who is your commander?" Colonel López, head of the royalists, then intervened. Lamadrid, seeing that the Captain
Lugones and his men surrounded the king's officers, he answered:
—The commander is Gregorio Aráoz de Lamadrid here, and you are talking to him, but keep talking calmly, because your life is at stake.
As the Spaniards saw that they were in the power of the audacious Argentine, they continued the march in the midst of their captors followed by the troops that, moments later, found themselves surrounded by the bulk of Lamadrid's forces.




| The officers belonging to the Pardos and Morenos Patricios companies from that particular capital city have not only conducted themselves with the customary honor displayed in such situations during the action, but they have also subsequently exhibited a profound demonstration of their resilience in the face of adversity. Their unwavering subordination, dedication to duty, and evident commitment to serving their country have been undeniable. It is my duty to strongly commend Your Excellency to acknowledge their virtues as an act of justice and as a gesture of gratitude that they rightfully merit. Letter to the Junta, de Antonio González Balcarce, July 31th, 1811. |


Second Campaign to Alto Perú (1812-1813). The triangles represent the battles: blue for the independence victories (Exodus from Jujuy, Tucumán and Salta) and red for the royalist victories (Vilcapugio and Ayohuma).
Third Campaign to Upper Peru (1815). The red triangle represents the only important battle of it, the royalist victory at Sipe-Sipe.