Argentine: Defense Politics From Independence to the Desert Campaign

Argentine Defense: From Independence to the Desert Campaign

Encina Moreno and company. Colección del Servicio Histórico del Ejército.

Throughout Argentine history, national defense has suffered from not being treated as a state policy that transcends the ideologies and administrations of the ruling governments. This analysis, in three parts, examines the successes, failures, and outstanding issues in the evolution of Argentine defense.

 

Politics, Diplomacy, and War

In 1811, Paraguay declared its independence and outlined its territorial borders. However, these territorial claims conflicted with Brazil's, sparking a long period of tensions between the two countries, which eventually affected Argentina as well.

Over time, Paraguay also had commercial disputes with the Argentine government, leading to a tacit alliance between Argentina and Brazil, both of whom sought to protect their respective territorial and economic interests. Paraguay also faced difficulties trading in Uruguay, which led to tensions with Montevideo. By the end of 1864, Paraguay sent troops to Uruguay to support the Partido Blanco, which was fighting against the Partido Colorado, backed by Brazil.

Paraguay requested permission from Argentine President Bartolomé Mitre to move its troops through the Argentine Mesopotamia region on their way to Uruguay. This request was denied, but in April 1865, Paraguayan forces entered Argentina and occupied the city of Corrientes, forcing Argentina to join Brazil and Uruguay in war against Paraguay, a conflict later known as the War of the Triple Alliance.

This bloody conflict ended in 1870 with Paraguay’s surrender, causing severe territorial losses and demographic devastation, as nearly half of the Paraguayan population and about 90% of its men died.

The Paraguayan occupation of Corrientes could have been avoided if Argentina had better-equipped and strategically deployed armed forces.

Armed Forces and Sovereignty in Patagonia

After the independence of Argentina and Chile, both countries entered a period of rising tensions over their territorial claims in southern Patagonia. These tensions were further complicated by the rugged geography of the Andes Mountains, which made it difficult to accurately demarcate borders, and by the frequent raids carried out by the Mapuche tribes, who originated from the Chilean side of the Andes and often attacked Argentine settlements.

The Mapuches had gained territory in Patagonia and the southern Pampa region, displacing or exterminating local tribes, which increased Chilean influence in the area. Historians suggest that the loot from Mapuche raids—mostly stolen livestock—was sold in Chile with the tacit approval of local authorities.

Argentina, still embroiled in internal conflicts for nearly half a century since its independence, had not made significant advances in securing sovereignty over Patagonia. By the early 1870s, tensions between Argentina and Chile escalated, with both nations reaffirming their territorial claims. In 1872, Chilean authorities interfered with Argentine commercial activities in Santa Cruz, prompting the Argentine government to establish a military garrison in the region and explore the territory.

Sea Fleet Supporting the Desert Campaign. Foto: Archivo DEF.

Tensions further escalated when, in 1876, Chile sent the corvette Magallanes to the port of Santa Cruz to seize a French ship that had been authorized by Argentina to extract guano. In response, the Argentine government dispatched a fleet under the command of Commodore Luis Py to Patagonia in 1878, with the mission of asserting Argentina’s sovereign rights over the region.

Given these tensions, President Nicolás Avellaneda informed Congress that, in legitimate defense, he had ordered Argentine warships to be stationed at the mouth of the Santa Cruz River and to fortify the area with artillery and troops. However, had there been a conflict, Argentina’s military forces would likely have been unable to defeat the Chilean fleet, which was simultaneously engaged in conflicts with Bolivia and Peru in the north.

The Desert Campaign and Affirmation of Sovereignty

In this context, with the nation’s territorial integrity at risk, General Julio Argentino Roca, then Minister of War and Navy, proposed to President Avellaneda the launch of a military campaign known as the Conquest of the Desert. The strategic objective was for the Argentine Army to advance southward to occupy Patagonia and reaffirm Argentine sovereignty over a region that, until then, had been under Mapuche control.

The Argentine government supported these military operations by establishing naval sub-delegations in Carmen de Patagones, Puerto Deseado, Río Gallegos, Isla de los Estados, and Ushuaia, which led to the settlement of the first Argentine communities in these regions, thus helping to consolidate national sovereignty in the south.

At the same time, the Argentine Army began to receive modern weapons (rifles, cannons, etc.) and the Navy acquired new warships (battleships and cruisers), positioning Argentina’s fleet as one of the most powerful in the world. These advancements allowed Argentina to reach a diplomatic resolution with Chile, culminating in the signing of the 1881 Boundary Treaty, which secured Argentine sovereignty over Patagonia.

In 1884, the Argentine Navy, under the command of Commodore Augusto Lasserre, deployed a fleet of six warships to Tierra del Fuego and Isla de los Estados. During this mission, Lasserre encountered a British mission in Ushuaia. After a brief conversation, on October 12, 1884, the British flag was lowered and the Argentine flag was raised, reaffirming Argentina's sovereignty over the southernmost part of its continental territory, a date now considered the official founding of Ushuaia.


The Desert Campaign. Colección Servicio Histórico del Ejército.

Conclusion

Argentina's ability to defend its sovereignty in the south was heavily dependent on strengthening its armed forces. The development of a modern navy and a diplomacy backed by military strength were crucial in securing Argentine control over Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego. The Desert Campaign, though controversial, was fundamental in consolidating Argentine control over vast southern territories, preventing territorial conflicts with Chile, and laying the groundwork for national defense in the late 19th century.

Argentine Navy: Sarmiento Squadron

Sarmiento Squadron

The "Sarmiento Squadron" is called a set of river warships incorporated during the presidency of Domingo Faustino Sarmiento with the aim of modernizing the Argentine Navy and providing it with a minimum operational capacity against the naval power of the Brazilian Empire.

Background

The importance of the navy of the Brazilian Empire during the Paraguayan War was a lesson for the Argentine Republic and contributed to awakening naval awareness in some of its main leaders.


Domingo Faustino Sarmiento.

When Domingo Faustino Sarmiento assumed the presidency in 1868, he found a complex international situation and few possibilities for maneuver, limited mainly by the lack of a minimum naval power.
Still in campaign, Sarmiento's Minister of War and Navy, Colonel Martín de Gainza, communicated in his memory the state of the navy, stating "I am sorry to have to fulfill the painful duty of informing VVHH that we absolutely lack a squadron. Some ships in bad condition state and some chiefs and officers, although very worthy, do not constitute a squad.
The Paraguayan war ended but tensions began over the demarcation of boundaries with Brazil, Paraguay and Bolivia. Without armed support, Argentine diplomacy headed by Mariano Adrián Varela Cané faced an idealistic negotiation, acting "evangelically" in the words of Estanislao Zeballos, proposing a resolution of the border issue on an equal footing with the defeated. The "Varela Doctrine", synthesized in the phrase "victory does not give rights to the allied nations to declare for themselves, their limits that the treaty indicated" was rejected by Brazil, adopting an aggressive position, supported by a strong occupation army. and a powerful squadron that even occupied the Argentine island of Cerrito (or Atajo) at the confluence of the Paraguay and Paraná rivers.
Sarmiento, determined to break with the diplomacy of his predecessor Bartolomé Miter in his relations with the countries of the region, characterized by his pro-Brazilian attitude, his indifference towards the Pacific countries and his neglect to ensure military balance in the region1 resolved in August In 1870, Varela was replaced by Carlos Tejedor, who harshly demanded that Brazil respect the clauses stipulated in the Triple Alliance treaty.



However, Brazil agreed with the government of Cirilo Rivarola in separate protocols of December 15, 1870 and January 14, 1871, the willingness to reach an exclusive boundary treaty between Brazil and Paraguay, ignoring the Argentine government in clear violation of article 6 of the treaty of the Triple Alliance of May 1, 1865. Brazil also unilaterally decided its borders with Paraguay and even those of Argentina, since it retained the disputed territories for itself and agreed without permission from Buenos Aires that the Argentine limit did not would pass from Pilcomayo.
On January 9, 1872, by the Cotegipe-Lóizaga treaty, the Empire of Brazil kept a third of Paraguay and maintained the occupation armies for five years. Sarmiento considered that the treaty "...will leave Paraguay a Brazilian province, to which the Banda Oriental will be added by the same means, and that of Entre Ríos and Corrientes will soon follow" and that "in a few years we will be part of the Empire, or such a diminished republic that it is not worth claiming even the name."
The growing and serious conflict caused the Brazilian government to encourage the territorial claims of Bolivia and Chile. Between 1872 and 1873, the Chilean Foreign Minister Adolfo Ibáñez y Gutiérrez maintained, with the acquiescence of Brazil, his claims on the Patagonian territory south of the Río Negro (Argentina) and "on the other side of the Andes, especially at the height of Talca and Chillán."


Photo of Minister Manuel Rafael García Aguirre.

Sarmiento Squadron

The evident need for a navy prompted the Argentine Congress to sanction Law No. 498 of May 27, 1872 (on Naval Armament) which authorized the purchase of "three armored warships of the most advanced system and maars suitable for service in waters." of the Republic". To this end, President Domingo Faustino Sarmiento ordered the immediate transfer of his friend Manuel Rafael García Aguirre (until then head of the Argentine legation in Washington) on commission to London in order to make the purchase of the aforementioned ships and supervise their construction. Despite being completely layman in naval matters, García Aguirre approached the task with the greatest zeal and consulted with two former Confederate officers of the United States Civil War, Captains Thomas Jefferson Page3 and Hunter Davidson.
García Aguirre's commitment to the task was such that he did not hesitate to consult with several officers of the British Admiralty, of whom he informed Sarmiento:

"Those in the artillery department could not have treated me better (...) Read the attached strips about battleships; no large, heavily armored ships. They recommend small ships with large cannons that serve as floating batteries and are easy to move from one point to another."

As a result of the experience gained and thanks to the advice received, García Aguirre signed two contracts that culminated in the acquisition of the Los Andes and El Plata Monitors, four 400-ton bombers (Pilcomayo, Bermejo, Constitución and República) and two gunboats (Paraná and Uruguay) of 600 tons.
Finally, the ships that made up the squadron were:


Monitor Los Andes.

Monitors El Plata and Los Andes, 56.68 m long, 13.40 m wide, 3.35 m deep, an average draft of 3.50 m and 1,677 tons of displacement. They had an iron hull with a bow spur and armor of 160 mm of steel,6 255 mm in the main artillery turret, which was powered by steam.
They carried two steam engines (port and starboard) of 750 HP each, with two propellers that allowed them to maintain a cruising speed of 9.5 knots. It transported 120 tons of coal. The tower was mounted with 2 200-pound Armstrong muzzle-loading cannons, two 47 mm light cannons in a covered barbette and 4 37 mm Hotchkiss rapid-firing cannons. Purchased for £85,000 each at the Cammell Laird shipyard in Birkenhead, England, they were incorporated in 1875 under the command of Bartolomé Cordero and Ceferino Ramírez respectively.

 
Gunship Paraná.


Gunship ARA Uruguay in 1874.

 
Gunship Pilcomayo (or its twin Bermejo)

Paraná and Uruguay gunboats, 46.36 m long, 7.63 m wide, 5.40 m deep, with an average draft of 3.5 m and a displacement of 550 tons, with sails (corvette rig) and a 475 HP steam engine, which moved a propeller that allowed them to reach a cruising speed of 10 knots and a maximum of 11. They transported 90 tons of coal that allowed them a range of 1,500 miles. The iron hull was completely lined with teak wood. They mounted 4 7" Vavasseur cannons on iron carriages, one in front of the funnel, one behind and the rest on each side. Acquired for £32,000 each at the Cammell Laird shipyards, they were incorporated into the squadron in 1874 under the command of Ceferino Ramírez and Erasmo Obligado respectively.
Constitution and Republic bombards, modified Rendell class, with 32.33 m in length, 9.19 in beam, 4.50 in depth, 3.20 in medium draft and a displacement of 416 tons.
Mixed ships, with iron hulls, had a single mast rig and used a 400 HP steam engine that drove two twin propellers reaching a cruising speed of 9 knots. They transported 45 tons of coal. They mounted a 240 mm muzzle-loading Armstrong cannon, mounted on a fixed gun carriage on the bow, so it could only fire along the keel line and had to be aimed with rudder strokes. They carried two 80 mm light guns on deck, one on each side. Purchased for £13,678 each at the Cammell Laird shipyard, they joined the squadron in 1876 under the command of Juan Cabassa and Daniel de Solier respectively.
Bombards Pilcomayo and Bermejo, similar to the previous ones, with small differences (a smaller draft, they transported 62 tons of coal that ensured greater autonomy, deck modifications) were incorporated in 1875 under the command of Jorge Hobson Lowry and Francisco de la Cruz, respectively. Both were built at the Rennie&Co shipyard, Greenwich, England (subcontracted by Cammell Laird).
Steam Workshop and Depot for torpedoes and mines Fulminante, with 55 m in length, 9 in beam, 5 in depth, an average draft of 2.28 and a displacement of 620 tons. A mixed vessel, it had a two-masted schooner rig and a Compound-type steam engine with a propeller that reached a speed of 10 knots. It carried 80 tons of coal as fuel. It joined in 1875, remaining stationary under the command of Hunter Davidson. A flotilla of 4 torpedo boats was also incorporated, 2 of them assigned to the Fulminante, the first of the Argentine Navy. The torpedoes were bronze loaded with 65 pounds of dynamite. They were called "boalón" because for use they were placed on the tip of an 8-meter-long iron boom.
Steamers Notices Resguardo and Vigilante, 30 m long, 5.5 m wide, 3.0 m deep, with an average draft of 1.20 m and 100 tons of displacement, carried two 92 HP steam engines that drove two propellers reaching a speed of 7 knots. It transported 16 tons of coal that gave it an autonomy of 6 days. Mixed vessel, it was rigged as a 2-masted paileboat. His helmet was made of iron and he had a strong wooden belt for defense. It mounted a 6-inch Armstrong gun. Acquired for £5,000 from Cammell Laird, they joined the Port Captaincy under the command of the pilot Cándido Chaneton and the pilot Juan Rubaclo, respectively.

 
Armed Transport Steamer Pampa.

Armed transport steamer Pampa, (former Parminghan), acquired in 1870 from Miguel Soler & Cía for $f 50,000.
With a length of 69.44 m, a beam of 7.44, a depth of 3.41, an average draft of 2.00 m and a displacement of 409 tons, it had a mild steel hull, two-masted paileboat rigging, a steam engine of 260 HP with 2 cylinders and 4 boilers, which drove side wheels reaching a maximum speed of 13 knots and 8 knots cruising. She was initially armed with 2 75 mm Krupp cannons.
Some smaller ships: steamship Sirena, tugboat Puerto de Buenos Aires, transport Santa Fe, whaleboat Guarda Costa, boat Talita and Pontón Vanguardia

Complementary measures

On the other hand, despite protests from Brazil, Sarmiento decided to heavily artillery Martín García Island with heavy Rodman coastal cannons that, although they were already outdated (muzzle-loading and smoothbore), due to their high caliber (381 mm, 500 pounds). They were capable of damaging the armor of Imperial monitors and covering the access channels to the interior rivers.
For the purposes of establishing logistical bases and workshops for the ships that were purchased, in October 1873 he obtained funds from Congress for the construction of an arsenal and marine depot in Zárate, which he created in December of that year.
Finally, Sarmiento created the Naval School on October 5, 1872, which initially operated aboard the steamship General Brown under the command of Sergeant Major Clodomiro Urtubey, and which in the first stage was maintained until its dissolution in 1877 as a result of the "rebellion of the capes", being reorganized shortly after in the corvette Uruguay in charge of Martín Guerrico.

All these measures contributed to stopping the estuary from being visited by foreign squadrons in a permanent attitude of pressure and probably facilitated the resolution of the boundary issue in 1875.
However, although the units acquired represented the best that the mixed technology of the time (sail and steam) could offer and even when they operated both in Argentine rivers and on the high seas, even in Antarctic waters, they were in all cases vessels rivers.
On the other hand, the incorporation of the main ships, the monitors, immediately caused Brazil to acquire two more monitors to its squadron, the Javary and the Solimões of 3700 tons, 4 cannons of 250 mm and 2 of 37, incorporated in 1875, while Chile added the Cochrane and the Blanco Encalada, of 4,500 tons, 13 knots and 4 9-inch guns, which would soon be decisive in the war with Peru and Bolivia. Thus, the improvement in the relationship of forces in a short time was again uneven, which would be revealed in 1878 on the occasion of the Py Expedition.

References

1. Gustavo Ferrari, Argentina and its neighbors, in Argentina from the Eighties to the Centennial, Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 1980, page 671.
2. Manuel Gálvez, Life of Sarmiento.
3. (1808-1902) He was linked to the country before his participation in the Civil War through his exploration trips to the Bermejo and Salado rivers. He actively collaborated in the design and construction of the Los Andes and El Plata monitors
4. Ratto, Héctor: "The first naval commissions abroad", Bulletin of the Naval Center, Volume 58, year page 19.
5. Captain Page once again advised the minister on the construction of which
6. At the height of the belt, a band that surrounds the hull of the boat to protect it.

Bibliography

• Teodoro Caillet-Bois, Historia Naval Argentina, 1944, Imprenta López, Buenos Aires 
• Arguindeguy, Pablo E. CL, y Rodríguez, Horacio CL; "Buques de la Armada Argentina 1852-1899 sus comandos y operaciones", Buenos Aires, Instituto Nacional Browniano, 1999. 
• Héctor Raúl Ratto, José Craviotto, Humberto F. Burzio, Sarmiento y la marina de guerra, Secretaria de Estado de Marina, 1963 
• Carlos López Urrutia, Historia de la Marina de Chile, Andres Bello, 1969. 
• Departamento de Estudios Históricos Navales, Historia marítima argentina, Cuántica Editora, 1982.

External links

• Maniobras y términos navales 
• Sitio oficial de la Armada de la República Argentina (ARA) 
• Escuadra de Sarmiento, en Historia y Arqueologia Marítima 
• Sitio oficial de la Armada del Brasil, in Portuguese. 
• Navíos de Guerra, en naval.com.br , in Portuguese. 
• Las relaciones con los demás países americanos durante las presidencias de Mitre y Sarmiento 
• Los efectos del tratado Cotegipe-Lóizaga en la política interna argentina.

Wikipedia