Malvinas: Why Didn’t the Bombs Explode? (2/8)

Why Didn’t the Bombs Explode?

Part 1 || Part 2 || Part 3 || Part 4 || Part 5 || Part 6 || Part 7 || Part 8

Guilherme Poggio || Poder Aereo




 

 
Thirty-five years ago, Argentines and Britons clashed in the frigid waters of the South Atlantic, fighting over the possession of the Malvinas Islands (Falklands, as the British call them). It was during this conflict that the Argentine Air Force (FAA – Fuerza Aérea Argentina) entered combat for the first time against an external enemy. The baptism of fire took place on May 1, 1982. The Air Power blog publishes an exclusive article in parts, covering the vectors, weapons, and tactics used by the FAA to attack and destroy the ships of the British Task Force. To read the previous parts, click the links below.

Vectors and Armaments

Faced with the challenge of confronting one of the best-equipped and prepared navies in the world, the FAA had limited options. The most suitable vectors for the mission were the IAI Dagger, an Israeli version of the Mirage 5, and the McDonnell Douglas A-4B/C Skyhawk. The latter were very similar to the A-4Q model of the Argentine Naval Aviation, which was also used in naval attacks against the British.
Dagger M-5 C-401 stationed at Río Grande configured for an attack mission, where two Spanish BR-250 bombs can be seen in the central hangar (“Nafgan”) and two 1700-liter fuel tanks (in “Hotel” configuration). This aircraft was used in the mission on June 8. The attack ultimately damaged the HMS Plymouth frigate.FOTO: Museo de Aviación Naval

The issue of armaments was more delicate. The only guided weapon available was the Martín Pescador air-to-surface missile. This missile, still not fully operational at the time, was tested by the FAA in April 1982, using an IA-58 Pucará aircraft as the vector. Due to its radio guidance system and the firing distance, the aircraft was too exposed to anti-aircraft fire. For these reasons, the possibility of using this missile in the war was abandoned.

Lacking guided weapons, the FAA evaluated the use of free-fall bombs. The FAA had essentially four types of general-purpose free-fall bombs available for combat. The first were 454 kg (1000 lb) bombs of British origin. The Argentines called these bombs MK-17. Although they were identical to those used by the British, the latter referred to them as MK 13/15. These were high-resistance bombs that could be equipped with either a smooth tail or a parachute brake. The MK-17 bombs had been acquired by the Argentines 12 years before the conflict as part of the weapons package for their English Electric Canberra B.62/T.64 bombers.


A British-made MK-17 bomb next to an FAA Canberra bomber. These bombs were acquired along with the bomber 12 years before the 1982 conflict. FOTO: FAA

Newer than the MK-17 bombs were the Spanish bombs produced by Expal (Explosivos Alaveses SA). These were low-drag bombs based on the American MK 80 series. There were two models: one weighing 250 kg and another weighing 125 kg. The 250 kg model could be fitted with either a smooth tail or a parachute-brake tail, while the 125 kg bombs only had a smooth tail. They were acquired in 1978 due to the threat of a border conflict with Chile. There is information that high-drag 500 kg Spanish bombs were also part of the FAA’s inventory in 1982.

 
The FAA A-4B with registration C-235 was already in the final stages of the conflict. In the foreground, three Spanish BP-250 smooth-tail bombs are arranged in a single cluster. They were loaded onto the central pylon, beneath the fuselage (station 3).FOTO: FAA
Malvinas 35 Years: Why Didn’t the Bombs Explode?

The third option was the Brazilian-made low-drag BR-BK 125 kg bombs. These were produced by the Armament Factory in the Argentine city of Córdoba. These bombs were exclusively assigned to the IA-58 Pucará, which operated from the Malvinas (and thus did not participate in naval operations). The reasons why the Argentines chose not to use this bomb in naval attacks will be discussed later.

Another option that was evaluated but not used during the conflict was the Israeli IMI Mod. 4 bomb, weighing 130 kg, which had been acquired along with the IAI Dagger a few years before the conflict (details about this case will also be discussed later).

A pair of Israeli IMI Mod. 4 bombs, weighing 130 kg, mounted on an M-5 Dagger fighter. There are no records of this weapon being used during the 1982 conflict. FOTO: FAA

There are reports that the FAA also possessed some American-made AN-M65A1 1,000-pound bombs at the time of the conflict, which had come with the Avro Lincoln bombers. In statements to “The History Channel,” Brigadier Sergio Mayor (V Air Brigade – A-4B) mentioned that AN-M65A1 bombs were used in Malvinas. However, there are no other documents to confirm this version, and it is possible that the general confused the American bombs with the MK-17 bombs.

Another unconventional possibility was the use of incendiary bombs against the British fleet. According to then Vice Commodore (Lieutenant Colonel) Arturo Pereyra, head of the Operations Department of FAS (Southern Air Force – activated to coordinate resources in combat missions), these were not used for "humanitarian reasons."

The option of using incendiary bombs against Royal Navy ships was dismissed for "humanitarian reasons." However, several Napalm bombs were sent to the Malvinas airfields, where the IA Pucará operated in strictly land-based actions. FOTO: archivo

The use of air-launched torpedoes was also evaluated. Argentina had some units of the old American Mk 13 torpedo, previously used by the PBY Catalina. Shortly after the conflict began, a torpedo testing program was initiated, using a modified IA Pucará as the delivery platform. The final test was scheduled for June 14, but with the end of hostilities, the program was suspended.



A modified Pucará prepared for flight tests, armed with an American Mk-13 torpedo in the central hangar. The tests were conducted shortly before the end of the conflict.. FOTO: FAA

Finally, it is worth noting that the FAA tested 454 kg free-fall bombs of French origin and Soviet cluster bombs, both supplied by the Peruvian Air Force. However, there are no known actual attacks using these devices.

The following table, created exclusively for this article, summarizes the general-purpose bombs available to the FAA at the time of the conflict.

Bombs Available in the FAA Inventory in 1982 for Use Against Royal Navy Ships

Malvinas: Why didn't the bombs explode? (1/8)

Why Didn't the Bombs Explode? (Part 1)

Guillermo Poggio || Poder Aéreo

Parte 1 || Parte 2 || Parte 3 || Parte 4 || Parte 5 || Parte 6 || Parte 7 || Parte 8



 



Thirty-five years ago, Argentines and Britons clashed in the frigid waters of the South Atlantic, fighting over the possession of the Malvinas Islands (known as "Falklands" to the British). It was during this conflict that the Argentine Air Force (FAA – Fuerza Aérea Argentina) entered combat for the first time against an external enemy. The baptism of fire took place on May 1, 1982. The following text recounts the story of what was the FAA's most important mission: to attack and destroy the ships of the British Task Force. Taken by surprise, the FAA carried out its missions despite lacking proper training, adequate vectors, and the right armament for the task. This is a story of overcoming challenges, rapid adaptation, and ingenuity. In the end, the results went far beyond what was initially expected.

Introduction

In early June 1944, the Allies were rushing to launch Operation Overlord, the amphibious landing in Normandy, which promised to change the course of World War II. Off the coast of Lyme Bay in the English Channel, HMS Boadicea (H65), a veteran B-class destroyer launched in 1930, was escorting a convoy of merchant ships. On June 13, the convoy fell victim to German aviation. Two torpedoes launched by Junkers Ju-88 bombers struck Boadicea. With the explosion of the ammunition magazine, the British ship quickly sank.

Boadicea was the last Royal Navy ship lost to enemy air action in that conflict. However, considering the use of free-fall devices ("dumb bombs"), the last British loss to enemy aviation was the HMS Panther, a P-class destroyer. The ship was hit by bombs dropped by German Junkers Ju. 87 “Stuka” dive bombers during the Dodecanese campaign in the Aegean Sea on October 9, 1943.


The British cruiser HMS Gloucester being attacked by German Ju-87 'Stuka' aircraft in the Mediterranean Sea on May 22, 1941. The ship would sink that same day after being hit directly by at least four 250 kg bombs. The photo was taken by one of the German aircraft at mid-altitude. If the Argentines were to use this same attack profile, the chances of success would be very small.FOTO: archivo

Since then, naval aviation warfare has undergone profound changes. Forty years later, using aircraft to drop free-fall bombs against escorts equipped with aerial surveillance systems and guided missiles was no longer considered a viable option for naval air attacks, unless the system of the targeted ship was overwhelmed. In 1982, the Argentines demonstrated that old weapons and new tactics could be combined to surprise the Royal Navy, and once again warships would be lost to free-fall bombs.

Caught by Surprise

All the military planning for the recapture of the Malvinas Islands was carried out confidentially by the high command of the Argentine Navy, with Admiral Anaya, the commander of the force, as the mastermind. By the end of 1981, the Argentine military government considered the possibility of retaking the Malvinas Islands through military action if diplomatic negotiations failed. This option was discussed with President Leopoldo Galtieri.

 
The military junta that ruled Argentina in 1982. In the center, President Galtieri. To his left is Anaya, the architect of the Malvinas recapture, and to his left is the FAA commander, Brigadier Lami Dozo. Dozo learned of the plan to retake the islands shortly before the new year. Most of his subordinates only became aware of the events on April 2, 1982, the date of the Argentine landing on the islands. Dozo passed away two months ago at the age of 88. FOTO: archivo

It turns out that at the same time, the Strategic Air Command (CAE) of the Argentine Air Force (FAA) had completed an update to the strategic planning of the Force, which did not include military actions against the British to retake the Malvinas Islands. The commander of the Argentine Air Force, Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo, was the last of the three commanders to learn about the existence of the military plan, being informed of it two days before the end of 1981.

The strategists of the Argentine Air Force had never considered the possibility of getting involved in a conflict with the United Kingdom over the Malvinas Islands. There were two major reasons for this, one legal and the other geopolitical.

From a legal standpoint, Resolution 1/69, issued by the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Argentine Armed Forces, helped resolve some disputes between the three branches and better defined each of their roles. Based on this resolution, by the end of 1969, Law No. 18.416 was enacted, which established the specific responsibilities of each branch.

In this way, the Navy had specific responsibilities over Argentina's territorial waters and coastline. It was tasked with acquiring all necessary assets, including naval and maritime resources, whether onboard ships or not. Regarding naval operations, the FAA was only required to provide indirect support without the need to acquire specialized assets different from those used in air operations.

Therefore, by April 1982, the FAA lacked the necessary assets and doctrines to engage in naval air warfare. None of the FAA pilots had ever dropped a single device into the sea. Most of them did it for the first time in combat.

From a geopolitical standpoint, the FAA was configured to face a continental enemy in the Southern Cone. Its assets, tactics, and training were all oriented towards a potential border conflict, particularly with Chile, with whom Argentina almost went to war in 1978. Even the Argentine deployment airfields had been defined based on a hypothetical battle against the Andean neighbor.

Argentine Naval Aviation: Analysis of An F-16 Figthing Falcon for Long-range Maritime Attack

A proposal for the COAN: An F-16 for long-range maritime attack

Introduction

The Argentine Air Force (FAA) has acquired 24 F-16 MLU from Denmark. The Argentine Naval Aviation (COAN) is evaluating what to do with its 16 AMD Super Etendard in inventory (including the 11 older Super Etendard and the 5 newer Super Etendard Modernizé). However, since the FAA will acquire the F-16, a proposal could be thought of to the COAN so that, instead of insisting on continuing with the Super Etendard, why not try to buy some new F-16 B50/52+ well-profiled with full and long-range anti-ship attack capability? It results in an aircraft with enormous attack capacity, with extended range, compatible in many aspects with the aircraft that the Air Force will have in inventory, among many benefits. Let's explore this idea. The line of reasoning follows the following assumptions:

•  The Super Etendard only operates from ground bases, limiting its ability to approach the target autonomously unless it is refueled in flight by KC-130s, as was the case during the attack on HMS Invincible.
•  The actual costs to obtain spare parts and perform maintenance in the future tend to be extremely high if not impossible.
•  The F-16, already acquired by the Argentine Air Force (FAA) and expected to complete more squadrons in the future, will help standardize maintenance and training between both forces, similar to what happened previously with the A-4 Skyhawks.
•  The F-16, equipped with conformal fuel tanks (CFT), can control much of the Argentine Sea, as currently recognized by the UN (see details below).
•  The costs of acquiring a squadron of F-16s, speculatively, average around $1 billion through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program (see details below).

 

F-16s as Naval Attackers

Several countries use the F-16 platform in roles that include air-sea attack capabilities, utilizing laser-guided bombs (LGBs) and anti-ship missiles (AShMs) as part of their standard armament. Here are some notable examples:

1. United States

• Weapons: The U.S. Air Force uses F-16s capable of carrying LGBs and various AShMs like the AGM-84 Harpoon.
• Role: While primarily used in multi-role capacities, including air superiority and ground attack, the F-16s are equipped and trained for maritime strike missions.

2. Israel

• Weapons: The Israeli Air Force equips its F-16s with a variety of precision-guided munitions, including LGBs and indigenous anti-ship missiles like the Gabriel.
• Role: Israel uses F-16s in a multi-role capacity, including significant emphasis on maritime strike due to the strategic importance of the Mediterranean Sea.

3. Turkey

• Weapons: Turkish F-16s are equipped with LGBs and Harpoon missiles for maritime operations.
• Role: Turkey uses F-16s for a range of missions, including maritime strike, given its extensive coastline and strategic maritime interests in the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas.

4. Greece

• Weapons: Greek F-16s can carry LGBs and Harpoon missiles, emphasizing their capability to conduct maritime strike missions.
• Role: Greece’s F-16 fleet is tasked with various roles, including maritime interdiction and defense, due to the country’s geographical layout with numerous islands and significant maritime borders.

5. Singapore

• Weapons: The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) equips its F-16s with LGBs and Harpoon missiles.
• Role: Singapore, as a small island nation with significant maritime interests, uses F-16s for both air defense and maritime strike missions to protect its waters and shipping lanes.

6. South Korea

• Weapons: The Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) uses F-16s with LGBs and Harpoon missiles for maritime strike roles.
• Role: South Korea's strategic position and maritime threats from neighboring North Korea necessitate a robust maritime strike capability.

7. Egypt

• Weapons: Egyptian F-16s are equipped with LGBs and Harpoon missiles for maritime strike missions.
• Role: Egypt uses F-16s for various roles, including defending its extensive coastlines along the Mediterranean and Red Seas.

8. Taiwan

• Weapons: Taiwanese F-16s are equipped with LGBs and Harpoon missiles for maritime strike missions.
• Role: Taiwan uses F-16s for various roles, including defending its extensive coastlines along the Taiwan Strait and the recurrent Chinese incursions.

These countries have integrated their F-16 platforms with a range of weaponry that allows them to perform maritime strike missions effectively. The flexibility and adaptability of the F-16 platform make it suitable for a variety of roles, including those requiring precision engagement of sea-based targets.

 

Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs) on F-16s

The use of Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs) on F-16s for the air-sea attack role varies by country and specific mission requirements. CFTs increase the aircraft's fuel capacity without occupying underwing hardpoints, which can be used for additional weapons and sensors. Here is an overview of how some of these countries utilize CFTs for maritime strike roles:

1. United States

• CFT Usage: U.S. F-16s are generally not equipped with CFTs, as the primary users (Air National Guard units and Active Duty squadrons) prioritize flexibility and performance over extended range. However, some specialized roles might consider CFTs if extended range is crucial.
• Role: The primary mission sets are generally accomplished without CFTs, relying on external fuel tanks if needed for extended operations.

2. Israel

• CFT Usage: Israeli F-16I "Sufa" fighters are equipped with CFTs. The IAF uses CFTs to extend the operational range of their F-16s, which is crucial for missions over the Mediterranean and potential operations beyond their immediate borders.
• Role: CFTs allow Israeli F-16s to carry more weapons and sensors by freeing up underwing hardpoints, which is advantageous for extended maritime strike missions.

3. Turkey

• CFT Usage: Turkish F-16s do not commonly use CFTs. They typically rely on external fuel tanks for extended range.
• Role: While Turkey has significant maritime interests, the flexibility and performance advantages without CFTs are often preferred.

4. Greece

• CFT Usage: Greek F-16s, specifically the F-16 Block 52+ and Block 70/72 Viper, are equipped with CFTs.
• Role: CFTs are used to extend the range and endurance of Greek F-16s, which is beneficial for maritime patrol and strike missions across the Aegean Sea and beyond.

5. Singapore

• CFT Usage: The Republic of Singapore Air Force equips its F-16s with CFTs to enhance their range and payload capacity.
• Role: CFTs are particularly useful for Singapore's F-16s due to the need for extended range operations in the region, enhancing their maritime strike capabilities.

6. South Korea

• CFT Usage: South Korean F-16s, particularly the F-16 Block 52 and Block 70/72, can be equipped with CFTs.
• Role: The use of CFTs extends the operational range and endurance of ROKAF F-16s, which is critical given the maritime threats and the need for extensive patrol and strike capabilities around the Korean Peninsula.

7. Egypt

• CFT Usage: Egyptian F-16 Block 52s are equipped with CFTs.
• Role: The CFTs provide extended range and endurance, allowing Egyptian F-16s to perform long-duration maritime strike missions over the Mediterranean and Red Seas.

The use of CFTs on F-16s for maritime strike roles is more prevalent among countries that require extended range and endurance for their operations. CFTs allow these aircraft to carry additional fuel without sacrificing weapon capacity, making them well-suited for long-range missions over water. Countries like Israel, Greece, Singapore, South Korea, and Egypt leverage the benefits of CFTs to enhance their maritime operational capabilities.

Which Batches Can Use CFT?

Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs) were introduced with the F-16 Block 50/52 and later variants. Here is a more detailed breakdown:

F-16 Blocks Capable of Using CFTs

1. F-16 Block 50/52+

   • Introduction: These blocks introduced the capability to carry CFTs.
   • Features: These variants come with improved avionics, radar systems (such as the AN/APG-68(V)9 radar), and the option to mount CFTs.
   • Users: Countries like Greece and Turkey have F-16 Block 50/52+ aircraft with CFTs.

2. F-16 Block 60

   • Introduction: This advanced variant, developed for the United Arab Emirates, includes CFTs as part of its standard configuration.
   • Features: The Block 60 includes an AN/APG-80 AESA radar, advanced avionics, and other enhancements.

3. F-16 Block 70/72 (Viper)

   • Introduction: The newest and most advanced version of the F-16, also known as the F-16V (Viper), includes CFT capability.
   • Features: This variant features an AN/APG-83 AESA radar, upgraded avionics, and is optimized for modern warfare requirements.
   • Users: Countries like Bahrain, Bulgaria, and Slovakia are acquiring or have acquired F-16 Block 70/72 aircraft.

CFTs became an option starting with the F-16 Block 50/52+ and have been included in subsequent advanced blocks such as the Block 60 and Block 70/72. These blocks enhance the F-16's range and payload capabilities, making them suitable for extended missions, including maritime strike roles.

F-16s Naval Attacker with CFT in Argentina: Extended Capabilities

Estimating the increment in range for F-16s equipped with Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs) involves several factors, including mission profile, payload, and fuel capacity. Here’s a general overview:

Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs)

• Capacity: Each CFT on an F-16 can hold approximately 450 gallons (1,700 liters) of fuel, adding a total of 900 gallons (3,400 liters) when both tanks are used.
• Increment in Range: The additional fuel provided by CFTs typically increases the range by about 20-30%, depending on the aircraft's configuration and mission profile.

Baseline Range Estimates

• Without CFTs: The baseline combat radius of an F-16 without CFTs, carrying a typical load of weapons and fuel, is approximately 500 nautical miles (nm) for a strike mission.
• With CFTs: Adding CFTs increases this radius by 20-30%, resulting in an estimated range of 600-650 nm for a strike mission.

Scenario Analysis

Fully Loaded with Weapons (Strike Mission)

• Assumptions: The F-16 is carrying a full load of air-to-sea weapons, including AShMs and LGBs.
• Range: With CFTs, the strike radius would be approximately 600-650 nm from the base.

Filled Only with Fuel (Reconnaissance Mission)

• Assumptions: The F-16 is configured for a reconnaissance mission, carrying minimal external stores and maximizing internal and CFT fuel capacity.
• Range: The maximum ferry range for an F-16 with CFTs and external drop tanks can exceed 2,000 nm. For a typical reconnaissance mission with some reserve fuel, an estimated operational radius would be around 1,000 nm.

Operating Bases and Potential Reach

1. Puerto Belgrano Naval Base

   • Strike Mission: 600-650 nm
     • Potential reach: Across the central and northern Argentine coast, reaching the southern parts of Brazil and the open South Atlantic.
   • Reconnaissance Mission: Up to 1,000 nm
     • Potential reach: Much of the South Atlantic, including far into the Southern Ocean.

2. Almirante Zar Naval Base

   • Strike Mission: 600-650 nm
     • Potential reach: Covering a significant portion of the Patagonian coast, including the Falkland Islands.
   • Reconnaissance Mission: Up to 1,000 nm
     • Potential reach: Extending deep into the South Atlantic and covering the entirety of the Falkland Islands and beyond.

3. Rio Grande Base

   • Strike Mission: 600-650 nm
     • Potential reach: Covering the southern Patagonian coast, the Falkland Islands, and reaching towards the Antarctic Peninsula.
   • Reconnaissance Mission: Up to 1,000 nm
     • Potential reach: Extending far into the South Atlantic, covering the entire Falkland Islands region, and towards the Antarctic convergence zone.

With CFTs, the F-16’s range and operational flexibility are significantly enhanced, making it a formidable platform for both strike and reconnaissance missions from Argentina’s key naval bases. This extended range allows for greater coverage of the South Atlantic, critical maritime zones, and even potential operations near the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.

If you have specific operational parameters or need more detailed calculations, such as fuel consumption rates or specific payload configurations, I can provide more precise estimates.

Proposal for Argentine Naval Aviation: Transition to F-16 Block 50/52+ for Enhanced Maritime Capabilities

Objective: To present a strategic, operational, and financial rationale for the Argentine Naval Aviation (ANA) to transition from the aging AMD Super Étendard fleet to the modern F-16 Block 50/52+ platform with Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs), emphasizing the superior air-sea attack capabilities and extended operational range.

Strategic Benefits

1. Enhanced Capabilities:

   • Modern Avionics and Systems: The F-16 Block 50/52+ is equipped with advanced avionics, radar systems (AN/APG-68(V)9), and electronic warfare suites, providing superior situational awareness and combat effectiveness.
   • Multi-role Flexibility: Unlike the Super Étendard, the F-16 can seamlessly transition between air-to-air, air-to-ground, and air-sea missions, enhancing operational flexibility.

2. Longer Operational Range:

   • Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs): CFTs significantly extend the operational range of the F-16 without occupying underwing hardpoints, allowing the aircraft to carry additional weapons and sensors essential for long-range maritime strike missions.

3. Standardization with the Air Force:

   • Interoperability: Acquiring F-16s for both the AAF and ANA ensures interoperability, facilitating joint operations, shared maintenance infrastructure, training programs, and logistics support.
   • Common Training and Tactics: Pilots and ground crews can benefit from a unified training program, enhancing proficiency and reducing the time and cost associated with training on different platforms.

Operational Advantages

1. Superior Maritime Strike Capability:

   • Advanced Weapons Integration: The F-16 Block 50/52+ can carry a wide array of modern anti-ship missiles (AShMs) such as the AGM-84 Harpoon, as well as laser-guided bombs (LGBs) for precision strikes against maritime targets.
   • Survivability and Effectiveness: Equipped with cutting-edge countermeasure systems and stealth capabilities, the F-16 offers greater survivability in contested environments compared to the Super Étendard.

2. Increased Payload Capacity:

   • Armament Flexibility: With more hardpoints and greater payload capacity, the F-16 can carry a combination of missiles, bombs, and fuel tanks, providing mission planners with more options and capabilities for complex operations.

3. Maintenance and Reliability:

   • Proven Track Record: The F-16 platform has a proven track record of reliability and ease of maintenance, supported by a global supply chain and extensive user base, ensuring sustained operational readiness.

 

Financial and Logistical Considerations

1. Cost-Effectiveness:

   • Reduced Training and Maintenance Costs: Standardizing the fleet with the AAF's F-16s can lead to significant savings in training, maintenance, and logistics by leveraging economies of scale.
   • Modernization and Lifecycle: Investing in new F-16 Block 50/52+ aircraft provides a longer operational lifecycle and future-proofing against obsolescence, reducing the need for frequent upgrades and overhauls.

2. Economic and Strategic Partnerships:

   • Foreign Military Sales (FMS): Acquiring F-16s through the U.S. FMS program can provide favorable financing terms, access to the latest technology, and long-term support agreements.
   • Regional Influence: Modernizing the ANA with F-16s enhances Argentina's regional defense posture and demonstrates a commitment to maintaining a capable and modern naval aviation force.

Transitioning to the F-16 Block 50/52+ represents a strategic, operational, and financially sound decision for the Argentine Naval Aviation. The advanced capabilities, extended range, and interoperability with the Air Force provide a comprehensive solution to enhance Argentina's maritime defense capabilities. By adopting the F-16 platform, the ANA will not only modernize its fleet but also ensure long-term operational effectiveness and readiness in a rapidly evolving strategic environment.

Next Steps:

1. Detailed Feasibility Study: Conduct a comprehensive study on the feasibility and costs associated with transitioning to the F-16 Block 50/52+.
2. Stakeholder Engagement: Engage with key stakeholders, including the Ministry of Defense, to discuss the strategic advantages and secure the necessary approvals and funding.
3. Partnership Negotiations: Initiate discussions with the U.S. government and Lockheed Martin for potential purchase agreements, training programs, and support packages.

By presenting this proposal, the Argentine Naval Aviation can take a significant step towards achieving a modern, capable, and flexible maritime strike force.

Acquisition Costs

Acquiring a squadron of F-16 Block 50/52+ aircraft with full air-sea attack capabilities, including Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs), involves multiple cost considerations. Here's a comprehensive assessment of the costs:

1. Aircraft Acquisition Costs

The unit cost of an F-16 Block 50/52+ varies based on configuration, additional equipment, and market conditions. However, an average unit cost can be estimated as follows:

• Unit Cost: Approximately $50-60 million per aircraft, including airframe, engines, avionics, and standard equipment.

For a squadron (typically 12 aircraft):

• Total Aircraft Cost: $50 million x 12 = $600 million (lower end)
• Total Aircraft Cost: $60 million x 12 = $720 million (upper end)

2. Weapon Systems and Equipment

Equipping the aircraft with necessary weapons and systems for air-sea attack capabilities:

• Air-to-Sea Missiles (e.g., AGM-84 Harpoon): $1.2 million per missile.
• Laser-Guided Bombs (LGBs): Approximately $100,000 per bomb.
• Electronic Warfare and Countermeasure Systems: Approximately $5 million per aircraft.

Estimated cost for a squadron:

• Missiles: 24 missiles x $1.2 million = $28.8 million
• LGBs: 48 bombs x $100,000 = $4.8 million
• EW Systems: 12 x $5 million = $60 million

3. Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs)

CFTs add to the overall cost but are crucial for extended range missions:

• Cost per aircraft: Approximately $2-3 million.
• Total CFT Cost for 12 Aircraft: 12 x $2.5 million (average) = $30 million

4. Training and Infrastructure

Training pilots and ground crews, as well as setting up necessary infrastructure:

• Pilot Training: Approximately $1-2 million per pilot.
• Ground Crew Training: Approximately $0.5 million per technician.
• Infrastructure and Simulators: $50 million
• Comandante Espora Naval Station: $ 30 million (Minimum)
  

For a squadron:

• Pilot Training (24 pilots): 24 x $1.5 million (average) = $36 million
• Ground Crew Training (36 technicians): 36 x $0.5 million = $18 million
• Infrastructure: $50 million

5. Maintenance and Support

Initial maintenance setup and spares:

• Initial Spares and Logistics Support: Approximately $50-100 million.
• Maintenance Contracts (first few years): $20 million per year.

6. Miscellaneous Costs

Additional costs that might arise include logistics, transportation, and administrative expenses:

• Estimated Miscellaneous Costs: $20-30 million.

Summary of Estimated Costs

• Aircraft Acquisition: $600-720 million
• Weapons and Equipment: $93.6 million
• CFTs: $30 million
• Training and Infrastructure: $134 million
• Maintenance and Support: $70-100 million (first few years)
• Miscellaneous Costs: $20-30 million

Total Estimated Cost:

• Lower End: $947.6 million
• Upper End: $1.077 billion

Acquiring a squadron of F-16 Block 50/52+ aircraft with full air-to-sea attack capability and CFT for the Argentine Naval Aviation is a significant investment, estimated at approximately $917.6 million to $1.047 billion. This investment covers the aircraft, weaponry, training, infrastructure, initial maintenance, and other associated costs. This estimate provides a comprehensive understanding for decision-makers to assess the feasibility and strategic benefits of such an acquisition.

Obviously, the geostrategic implications of such a purchase, in the context of its necessary approval by the U.S. Congress, are not being discussed. That is a much more complex discussion, beyond the scope of this contribution.

A more realistic analysis should consider the use of armed variants of the P-3 Orion as more economical and natural options for naval warfare environments. With expanded budgets, the best option worldwide for this role is the P-8 Poseidon.