Argentina-Chile: On the Historical Mistrust

Rivalry and Mistrust Between Argentina and Chile

Argentina and Chile's historical rivalry and mutual distrust can be traced back to several key moments and events that have shaped their relationship over the centuries. This essay will explore the origins of their conflict, highlighting significant dates and events that contributed to the tension, leading up to the contemporary period.

Early Conflicts and Colonial Legacies

The roots of the Argentine-Chilean rivalry can be traced back to the colonial period when both regions were part of the Spanish Empire. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the Spanish Crown established the Viceroyalty of Peru, which included both modern-day Argentina and Chile. However, administrative divisions within the viceroyalty created early distinctions between the two regions.

In 1776, the Spanish Crown established the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, which included the territory of present-day Argentina. This administrative change heightened the sense of separation and competition between Buenos Aires and Santiago, the respective capitals of the new and old viceroyalties. The different economic and political priorities of these regions sowed the seeds of future conflicts.

The Independence Wars (1810-1826)

The wars of independence from Spanish rule, which began in the early 19th century, further strained relations between Argentina and Chile. Both countries achieved independence around the same time, with Argentina declaring independence in 1816 and Chile in 1818. However, their paths to independence were intertwined with mutual suspicions and differing regional interests.

One of the pivotal moments was the crossing of the Andes by the Argentine general José de San Martín in 1817. San Martín's Army of the Andes, composed of Argentine and Chilean patriots, defeated the Spanish royalists in Chile, leading to the country's independence. Despite this shared struggle, the differing political ambitions and visions for the future of the region created underlying tensions.

The War of the Confederation (1836-1839)

A significant early conflict that exemplified the rivalry was the War of the Confederation. In the 1830s, Andrés de Santa Cruz, the President of Bolivia, formed the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, which Argentina saw as a threat to regional balance. Chile, fearing the confederation's expansionist aims, allied with Argentina against it.

The war culminated in the Battle of Yungay in 1839, where the Chilean-Argentine alliance defeated the confederation's forces. This conflict underscored the precarious balance of power in the region and established a precedent for future cooperation against common threats, but it also deepened mutual suspicions as both countries sought to expand their influence.

Border Disputes and the Boundary Treaty of 1881

Territorial disputes have been a recurring theme in the Argentine-Chilean rivalry. The most significant of these disputes arose from the unclear demarcation of borders following their independence from Spain. The Andes Mountains, which form the natural boundary between the two countries, became a focal point of contention.

In 1881, Argentina and Chile signed the Boundary Treaty, which aimed to resolve these disputes by defining the border along the highest peaks of the Andes. Despite this agreement, ambiguities in the treaty's language led to further conflicts, particularly over the Patagonian region and the Beagle Channel, areas rich in natural resources and strategically important.

The Beagle Channel Conflict (1978)

One of the most critical flashpoints in the 20th century was the Beagle Channel conflict. The Beagle Channel, a narrow strait in the southern tip of South America, became the center of a territorial dispute in the 1970s. Both Argentina and Chile claimed sovereignty over several islands in the channel, leading to a severe diplomatic and military standoff.

In 1978, the conflict nearly escalated into full-scale war. Both countries mobilized their armed forces, and a naval confrontation seemed imminent. However, intervention by Pope John Paul II, who mediated the conflict, led to the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1984. The treaty, which awarded most of the disputed islands to Chile, averted war but left lingering resentment in Argentina.

The Malvinas War (1982)

The Malvinas War between Argentina and the United Kingdom indirectly influenced Argentine-Chilean relations. During the war, Chile provided intelligence and logistical support to the British, further straining its relationship with Argentina. This support was motivated by Chile's desire to counterbalance Argentina's military strength and protect its own territorial claims in the region.

The aftermath of the Malvinas War saw Argentina's military regime weakened and its international standing diminished. The war's outcome also reinforced Chile's strategic calculations and its distrust of Argentina, leading to increased military readiness along their shared border.

Democratic Transitions and Modern Relations

Both Argentina and Chile transitioned to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, which led to a gradual thawing of relations. Diplomatic efforts focused on resolving remaining territorial disputes and fostering economic cooperation. The establishment of democratic governments in both countries provided a framework for dialogue and conflict resolution.

The signing of the 1998 Ushuaia Protocol, which declared the region a zone of peace and cooperation, marked a significant step toward normalization. Joint commissions were established to address border issues, and bilateral trade agreements were signed, promoting economic integration.

Contemporary Dynamics

In recent years, Argentina and Chile have continued to work on improving their relationship, though underlying tensions persist. Both countries have engaged in regional organizations such as Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, seeking to enhance economic ties and political cooperation.

However, issues such as competing claims in Antarctica and the ongoing need for resource management in shared territories require ongoing diplomatic efforts. The construction of the Binational Tunnel of Agua Negra, aimed at improving connectivity between the two countries, exemplifies the potential for collaboration despite historical rivalries.

Conclusion

The historical rivalry and mutual distrust between Argentina and Chile are rooted in colonial legacies, independence wars, territorial disputes, and geopolitical conflicts. Key moments such as the War of the Confederation, the Beagle Channel conflict, and the Falklands War have shaped their relationship, creating a complex dynamic of competition and cooperation. While democratic transitions and modern diplomatic efforts have improved relations, underlying tensions continue to influence their interactions. Understanding this history is crucial for appreciating the nuanced and evolving nature of Argentine-Chilean relations in the contemporary period.

 

Malvinas: The Diplomatic Efforts of April

The diplomatic efforts of April

April 3: - The United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 502, which demanded Argentine withdrawal and the initiation of negotiations. Voting in favor of the resolution against Argentina were: USA, France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Togo, Uganda, Zaire and Great Britain. The Soviet Union, China, Poland and Spain abstained. Only Panama voted against. General Mario Benjamín Menéndez was appointed Military Governor of the Malvinas Islands and an extraordinary session of the OAS was requested.
April 5: - The Argentine action caused the resignation of the English chancellor, Lord Carrington. The British Task Force left Portsmouth. The European Economic Community supported the English decision to apply economic sanctions to Argentina and Peru defined its determined support in favor of Argentina.




April 6: - Designated by President Reagan as mediator, General Alexander Haig conferred with the Argentine Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Méndez, in Washington.
April 7: - Haig traveled to London. The English ordered a naval blockade of the Falklands. Argentina called up its reserves and Costa Méndez returned to Buenos Aires.
April 8: - Alexander Haig met with the intransigent Margaret Thatcher. Argentina began the airlift to reinforce and supply the troops in Puerto Argentino. The English naval force was already sailing off the Azores Islands. Via the Swiss embassy in Buenos Aires, the United Kingdom reported that, as of 04:00 a.m. GMT on April 12, in a circle of 200 NM, a maritime exclusion zone would be established around the Islands. The novelty came at a time when General Menéndez took office as governor of the Malvinas. Squares, streets, public buildings and numerous private homes in practically the entire country had been flagged with the light blue and white emblem.
April 10: - President Galtieri held a meeting with Haig, recently arrived from London. Meanwhile, another popular demonstration in support of the recovery of the Malvinas Islands was taking place. Galtieri, from the balconies of the Casa Rosada, addressed the protesters.
April 11: - While it was announced that the talks were bogged down, John Paul II urged both countries to abandon extreme attitudes. General Haig returned to London. Dr. Costa Méndez affirmed that the dialogue continued.
April 12: - Haig informed Costa Méndez by telephone, from London, that Great Britain is irreducible. That morning, the Task Force ships had blocked the islands, while the Argentine Sea Fleet remained in its stations.
April 14: - Galtieri informed Reagan by telephone that there was a willingness to find a peaceful solution, Haig returned to Buenos Aires from London. Thatcher's action had received the support of the House of Commons.
April 16: - Haig spoke with Argentine authorities. As if to discourage this second round of talks, the United Kingdom communicated that any ship or aircraft that affected the Task Force, whether civil, commercial or military, would be considered hostile and attacked.
April 17: - In Buenos Aires, Secretary of State Haig emphasized to Argentines that they should trust that the US would achieve a satisfactory solution to national aspirations. He insisted on maintaining an ambiguous political framework that made it clear that the final intention would be the return of the islands to Argentina. General Haig gave the impression of being truthful and sincere, although events conspired against his good intentions.
April 19: - Dr. Costa Méndez requested the application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) before the OAS and General Haig returned to the United States.
April 20: - By 17 votes in favor, none against and four abstentions (USA, Colombia, Trinidad Tobago and Chile), Argentina managed to convene the XX Consultation Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 21 signatory nations of the Treaty of Rio, set for April 26. Meanwhile, the Argentine Air Force planes detected the Task Force entering the TIAR area adopting favorable positions for the battle.
April 22: - General Galtieri inspected the troops stationed in Malvinas. Chile, meanwhile, at the request of the British ambassador in Santiago, agreed to deploy military forces in the south of the country and dispatch its Navy in radio silence to sea, in particular its two Oberon-class submarines. These events worried the Argentine military commanders and affected, to a certain extent, the allocation of forces. Added to this was the collaboration in intelligence and the operation from Chilean territory of Canberra PR-9 photographic reconnaissance aircraft and two C-130 SIGINT communications intelligence aircraft. The Argentine government promulgated Decree No. 757 by which the capital of the Malvinas Islands was designated "Argentine Port."
April 25: - Great Britain declared a total exclusion zone around the Task Force, already in the TIAR area, and attacked the Argentine garrison on San Pedro Island. Argentina firmly protested both attacks before the Security Council.
April 26: - The Military Junta reported that the Argentine forces were ready for combat, up to the last defensive capacity. On this day, five MK-62 Canberra aircraft from Paraná Bombing Group 1 flew from their deployment base, Trelew, to Río Grande on the island of Tierra del Fuego before the start of hostilities. From there, with the callsign “Libra”, they set out for Georgia to repel the British frigates that were attacking the Argentine marines. The squadron was formed by: the B-105, crewed by Major Ramón Vivas and Aldo Escudero; the B-
108, first lieutenants Ricardo Papavero and Hugo Moreno; and B-109, first lieutenants Mario Baeza and Jorge Cardo; all, supported by a KC-130 and a Boeing 707 from El Palomar Transport Group 1, as relays and mission control respectively. This risky operation at the limit of the Canberra's range of action reached the outskirts of Cumberland Bay. At that point, the Control Officer traveling on the B-707 decided to suspend it when he verified, due to the change in the vessels' device, that they had been detected and lost their surprise.

April 30: - Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced the definitive failure of the negotiations. Argentina presented a note to the UN informing that it would make use of the right of self-defense if attacked and, shortly afterwards, President Reagan publicly declared US support for Great Britain in the conflict, followed by the dramatic imposition of an embargo on arms exports and credit operations to the Argentine Republic. Simultaneously, the Chilean Armed Forces completed a deployment in the Southern Zone of the country with similar - or even greater - characteristics than in 1978, when both nations were on the brink of war over the issue of the Beagle Channel. The war was about to begin and no one had seriously tried to prevent it. Late on the southern night of April 30, a Vulcan bomber, registration to Puerto Argentino.

Argentina: Relations with Chile around 1880

Argentine and Chilean perceptions regarding the border conflict

Argentine public opinion became increasingly polarized around the border dispute. Chile was perceived as an aggressor state by the expanding "internationalist" faction. The "internationalists" included in their ranks distinguished personalities such as Roque Sáenz Peña, who had served in the Peruvian army during the Pacific War, Indalecio Gómez and Estanislao Zeballos. The last two advocated the adoption of a hard line towards Chile (1). Another faction, opposed to the previous one, was made up of former president Bartolomé Mitre, Carlos Pellegrini and other sectors closely linked to the export-import economy. These men perceived that a war against Chile could slow Argentina's economic progress and affect its foreign trade (2). For these men, Argentina's path to greatness was written in an economic key. As the years passed, Argentina would grow and become richer and more powerful each year, until the trans-Andean nation would no longer be a problem.

On the other side of the Andes, Chileans perceived their neighbor with varied emotions, which ran the entire possible spectrum, from envy to contempt and from smug complacency to fear (3). According to Encina, the majority of Chilean intellectuals - with the express exception of Miguel Amunátegui, Adolfo Ibáñez, Vicente Pérez Rosales and a few others - openly or covertly fought the Chilean government's efforts to defend their rights in Patagonia. In this sense, the cases of José Victorino Lastarria or Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna are evident. The latter developed a tenacious campaign against Chilean titles in the Patagonian region for more than ten years, which culminated with his great speech in the Senate, and with his book titled precisely "La Patagonia." Among bankers, capitalists and landowners, the idea of a break with Argentina for Patagonia was perceived as irrational. As for public opinion, initially it was indifferent to the issue, only to years later be captured by the arguments in favor of confrontation between the two countries (4).
In Rauch's opinion, Chile's victory over the Andean nations in the Pacific War inflamed the nationalist spirit of Chilean public opinion. If before 1879, Chile's economic progress led its inhabitants to perceive themselves as "the England of South America," their victory over the Andean nations led Chileans to believe that they had earned the nickname "the Prussia of South America" (5). Many of those who visualized their nation in the role of Prussia in 1870, in turn perceived Argentina in the role of South American France, corrupt and motivated by commercial greed, and that could be overwhelmed by Chilean power. There were also those Chileans who believed their country was superior to Argentina in virtue and power and who wanted to go to war to prove it (6). The results obtained in the Pacific War had certainly accentuated the perception of self-importance. Thus, Chilean diplomats adopted positions characterized by their rudeness, rooted in the idea that their army, the best after that of Prussia, and their navy, the second after the British, could easily defeat the Argentine forces (7).
For their part, Argentines reviewed their own perceptions regarding Chile. His admiration for the neighboring nation's past progress was replaced by a feeling of growing suspicion, particularly after the incidents with the Jeanne Amélie and Devonshire ships. By 1890, Argentina had achieved institutional stability, a prerequisite for economic development (8). According to Rauch, Argentina did not fear Chile's military power, as Chilean historians suggest (9). As the most basic rules of prudence advised vigilance over the aggressive neighbor to the west, the Argentine government began to be governed by an old proverb, si vix pacem para bellum.

NOTES

1. Gustavo Ferrari, Conflicto y paz con Chile: 1898-1903, Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1968, pp. 29-30, 46-47, citado en George Victor Rauch, The Argentine-Chilean Boundary Dispute and the Development of the Argentine Armed Forces: 1870-1902, Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1989, p. 323.
2. G. Ferrari, op. cit., pp. 65-66, cit. en ibid., pp. 323-324.
3. Ibid., p. 324.
4. Francisco A. Encina, La cuestión de límites entre Chile y la Argentina desde la Independencia hasta el tratado de 1881, Santiago de Chile, Nascimento, 1959, p. 104.
5. Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States, 1880-1962: The Emergence of Chile's Social Crisis and the Challenge to United States Diplomacy, University of Notre Dame Press, 1963, p. 34, cit. en G.V. Rauch, op. cit., p. 326.
6. Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and the Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, Cambridge and London, Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 137, cit. en ibid., p. 326.
7. Vicente Quesada, La política chilena en El Plata, Bueno Aires, Moen, 1895, pp. 72-73, cit. en ibid., p. 327.
8. Oscar E. Cornblitt, Ezequiel Gallo y Alfredo A. O'Connell, "La generación del 80 y su proyecto: antecedentes y consecuencias", en Torcuato S. Di Tella (ed.), Argentina, sociedad de masas, Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1965, pp. 48-49, cit. en ibid., p. 328.
9. Ver, por ejemplo, los casos de Mario Barros, Historia diplomática de Chile, Barcelona, Ariel, 1971, 322-323, 353-355; Oscar Espinosa Moraga, La postguerra del Pacífico y la Puna de Atacama, Santiago, Andrés Bello, 1958, p. 180, cit. en ibid., p. 329.

The convention of 1888 and the Zeballos-Matta declaration of 1889. The divergence between the criteria of the "high peaks" and the "divortium aquarum"

As a consequence of mutual fears (both countries curiously perceived that the 1881 treaty implied territorial losses), until 1888 a convention on demarcation and experts was not reached to delimit on the ground what was agreed in the treaty. This convention was signed on August 20, 1888 in Santiago de Chile by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Demetrio Lastarria, and the Argentine extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary minister, José Evaristo Uriburu (1).
It established the procedure for the appointment of the two experts referred to in articles 1 and 4 of the boundary treaty of 1881. Each of these experts could have an advisory commission with the same number of members, and they had to execute in the ground the demarcation of the lines indicated in articles 1, 2 and 3 of the boundary treaty. If they did not reach an agreement, they had to communicate it to their respective governments, so that they could proceed to appoint the third expert, who would have to resolve the controversy.
The Lastarria-Uriburu convention was ratified by law No. 2488, and the exchange of its ratifications became effective on January 11, 1890. Consequently, the Argentine government appointed engineer Octavio Pico as an expert and the Chilean government appointed Diego Barros. Spider.
However, each small advance in the bilateral relationship had to be faced with new obstacles. By virtue of the offer of shares by a company in London for the acquisition of twenty-four leagues of land on the railway from Chubut to Bahía Blanca, the Chilean government ordered its representative in Buenos Aires, Guillermo Matta, to claim for what it perceived as a Argentine advance in contentious territory. To overcome this obstacle, the Argentine chancellor Estanislao Zeballos and the Chilean minister Matta formulated a reciprocal declaration in 1889, which established that any act of one or another government that extended its jurisdiction to the part of the mountain range of dubious ownership, because it had not been drawn its limit, would not affect the results of the demarcation that was going to be carried out. This declaration was general in nature, applicable to the entire border in dispute with Chile from Bolivia to Navarino Island. According to Carrasco Domínguez, it was intended "to establish a status quo in the undefined border region, detracting from the acts of the parties executed prior to the definitive demarcation, but after the corresponding boundary arrangements" (2).
In accordance with the provisions of the 1881 treaty and the 1888 convention, in 1892 the Argentine and Chilean experts met, but they were unable to reach an agreement. The Chilean expert, Diego Barros Arana, formulated, in January 1892, the theory of divortium aquarum, that is, the separation between the rivers that go to the Atlantic and those that flow into the Pacific, and sought to impose it on his Argentine colleague, Octavio Pico. , as a criterion prior to beginning the demarcation task. For his part, Pico remained firm in his position of defending the line of the highest peaks as a criterion, regardless of its continuity as a watershed. Pico maintained that the Andes mountain range was the natural barrier between the two countries. The essential divergence regarding the criteria to be used in the demarcation work caused the suspension of negotiations between both experts.
On the other hand, the tension between Buenos Aires and Santiago had been stimulated by the media. A report from the Chilean minister in Buenos Aires, at the end of 1887, detailed the support of the Argentine press for an expedition sent to Patagonia, which had supposedly discovered three rivers, whose origin was in Argentine territory and which flowed into the Pacific, and which therefore granted Argentina ports on said ocean. Although he did not believe in the existence of these rivers, the Chilean representative was convinced that the Argentine media supported the idea of ports in the Pacific, to pressure the Casa Rosada authorities to make a decision in that regard (3 ). This pressure paid off, as the Argentine authorities rejected the Chilean criterion of divortium aquarum, in order not to give up potential access to the Pacific (4).

NOTES

1. The text of the convention is the following:
        The governments of the Republic of Chile and the Argentine Republic, animated by the common desire to implement what was established in the treaty signed by both on July 23, 1881, in accordance with the demarcation of the territorial limits between one country and the other , have appointed their respective plenipotentiaries, namely:
   
        His Excellency the President of the Republic of Chile, Mr. Demetrio Lastarria, Minister of Foreign Affairs. And His Excellency the President of the Argentine Republic, Dr. José E. Uriburu, his extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary minister in Chile.
        Those who, duly authorized for this purpose, have agreed to the stipulations contained in the following clauses:
        I. The appointment of the two experts referred to in articles 1 and 4 of the boundary treaty of 1881 will be made by the signatory governments within a period of two months, counted from the exchange of the ratifications of this agreement.
        II. To assist the experts in the performance of their functions, each of the governments will also appoint five assistants within the same period.
        The number of these may be increased in identical proportion by both parties, provided that the experts request it by mutual agreement.
        III. The experts MUST carry out, on the FIELD, the demarcation of the lines indicated in articles 1, 2 and 3 of the boundary treaty.
        IV. However, experts may entrust the execution of the work to commissions of assistants.
        These assistants will be appointed in equal numbers for each party.
        The commissions will adjust their procedures to the instructions that the experts will give them, by common agreement and in writing.
        V. The experts must meet in the city of Concepción, Chile, forty days after their appointment, to appoint themselves in agreement on the starting point or points of their work, and on any others that may be necessary.
        They will prepare duplicate minutes of all the agreements and determinations they make at that meeting, and in the course of their operations.
        SAW. Whenever the experts do not reach agreement on any point of the establishment of limits or on any other issue, they will respectively communicate this to their governments, so that they can proceed to designate the third party that must resolve the controversy, according to the boundary treaty. 1881.
        VII. The experts may have, at the will of the respective government, the necessary personnel for their particular service, such as healthcare or any other; and when they deem it convenient for their safety, they may request a troop party from each of the two governments, or only from that of the nation in whose territory they are located; In the first case, the escort must consist of an equal number of seats for each party.
        VIII. The experts will set the times of work in the field, and will set up their office in the city they determine, being able, however, by common agreement, to move it from one point to another, whenever the needs of the service so advise.
        Each government will provide the expert it appoints and its assistants with the necessary elements and resources for their work; Both will jointly pay the expenses incurred by the offices and the marking of the boundaries.
        IX. Whenever any of the positions of expert or assistant become vacant, the respective government must appoint the replacement within a period of two months.
        X. This convention will be ratified, and the exchange of ratifications will be made in the city of Santiago or Buenos Aires, in the shortest possible time. (...).
        Text of the Lastarria-Uriburu convention, Santiago de Chile, August 20, 1888, in Ernesto Quesada, Chilean politics in El Plata, Buenos Aires, Arnoldo Moen, 1895, pp. 348-349.

1. Germán Carrasco Domínguez, El arbitraje británico de 1899-1903. Sus aspectos procesales, Santiago, Andrés Bello, 1968, p. 168, n. 43; Isidoro Ruiz Moreno, Historia de las relaciones exteriores argentinas (1810-1955), Buenos Aires, Perrot, 1961, p. 231.
2. Guillermo Matta al ministro de relaciones exteriores de Chile, Buenos Aires, 11 de octubre de 1887, Legación de Chile en el Plata, 1887-1888, cit. en Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force. Chile and the Balance of Power in South America, 1830-1905, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967, p. 185.
3. Memorándum quoted in Luis Vicente Varela, La República Argentina y Chile: historia de la demarcación de sus fronteras (desde 1843 hasta 1899). Obra escrita con motivo del arbitraje pendiente ante su majestad británica, apoyada en los documentos inéditos del Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina, 2 vols., Buenos Aires, 1899, I, pp. 256-258, n. 115, fuente a su vez citada en R.N. Burr, op. cit., p. 186..

Historia de las Relaciones Internacionales Argentinas (c)