Malvinas: A Study Case (2/3)

Malvinas: A Study Case
Comes from Part 1 - follows with Part 3
Part 2/3
By
Harry Train,
Admiral USN 

Critical analysis of the Malvinas Conflict. It covers chronologically from the previous incidents to the end of the battle for Puerto Argentino. Strategically, it includes the levels of general, military and operational strategy. The analysis considers the concepts of the operation from the perspective of each side.

Argentine Directives for Action

The Argentine directives for action stemmed from the Junta's erroneous hope of achieving a diplomatic solution. The directive for the recapture of the Malvinas on April 2 established, "do not spill British blood or damage British property." Between April 2 and April 30, the directives were "fire only if attacked." When operational commanders were observed by the Junta for issuing orders that violated this directive, such orders were annulled. One example was the Junta's revocation of the naval operations commander’s order for the ARA Drummond and ARA Granville to intercept the Endurance if it evacuated workers from South Georgia. Another example was the withdrawal of authorization for the ARA San Luis submarine to use its weapons when ordered to enter the exclusion zone. The ARA San Luis patrolled the exclusion zone from April 20 to April 30 without authorization to use its weapons.

The authorization to use weapons was granted to Argentine forces on April 30. At that time, Argentine forces were informed that any ship in the exclusion zone should be considered British. This order did not account for the fact that Russian fishing vessels were present in the exclusion zone. Decision-making authority over directives for action was as tightly held at the highest political levels in Argentina as it was in the United Kingdom.

British Directives for Action - Political Structure in London

The War Cabinet created a Directives Committee comprised of officers tasked with making forecasts and providing commanders with the directives they needed, in a manner that could be perfectly understood. This committee met daily at 1800 hours and addressed questions such as what authorizations were to be granted when the Task Force crossed the equator or what prior approval long-range maritime patrol aircraft required if encountering Argentine forces. The committee’s decisions were always approved because they anticipated events.

The maritime exclusion zone defined an area where British ship commanders and pilots could attack. It was an area where the Argentine command knew their units would be attacked. This zone was intended, or so it was thought, to provide British commanders with a sufficiently deep buffer area to avoid tactical surprises for the Task Force ships, which lacked tactical reconnaissance aircraft and high-performance planes.

The next step in the evolution of directives for action and the maritime exclusion zone was the declaration of a Total Exclusion Zone on April 30. A complication arose on April 23 when the order for free use of weapons was issued. This applied everywhere, against any force deemed a threat. A warning that this order had been issued was broadcast at the time. The maritime exclusion zone remained unchanged.

In the conflict theater, British directives for action contained a numbered list of rules covering foreseeable situations, target descriptions, and the zones where the rules applied. These rules—of which there were many—were implemented selectively in time and place according to political and military advice. The fundamental purpose of the directives for action was to provide political and military information to commanders in the theater of operations, with established rules when a policy of maintaining the status quo, de-escalation, or escalation was required. The numbered directives still carried ambiguities and frequently required interpretation via satellite communications. The definition of "hostile intent," given the existence of weapons requiring rapid reaction—such as the Exocet—created problems ultimately resolved by defining "hostile intent" as the mere physical presence of an Argentine platform.

The British also amended directives for action to authorize attacks on any unconfirmed submarine contact operating near their own forces. Crucial to the structure and execution of directives for action were the 200-nautical-mile exclusion zones declared by the British around the Malvinas, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands. Within these zones, there were very few restrictions. Structuring and altering directives for action were tightly and centrally controlled from Whitehall. Changes normally required coordination between land, sea, and air forces and ministerial approval. However, expedited procedures were in place for urgent changes, such as the one that allowed the attack on the ARA Belgrano outside the exclusion zone.

The War at Sea

The Malvinas conflict included the first true naval confrontation since the Pacific campaign of World War II. The toll on the Royal Navy inflicted by the Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation during the war at sea included the British destroyers HMS Sheffield and Coventry, the frigates HMS Ardent and Antelope, the landing ship HMS Sir Galahad, and the merchant ship Atlantic Conveyor. Additionally, two British destroyers, fourteen frigates, and two landing ships were damaged during the conflict, primarily by Argentine air attacks using bombs, missiles, rockets, and cannons, except for the destroyer Glamorgan, which was hit by an Exocet missile launched from land. Thirty-seven British aircraft were lost due to various causes.

The fourteen unexploded bombs embedded in British ships' hulls could have easily doubled the losses if their fuzes had been properly calibrated. The British Task Force deployed virtually all existing submarine weapons against false submarine contacts. The Task Force lacked in-depth defense. They did not have the kind of support that the deck of a large aircraft carrier could provide with embarked tactical reconnaissance and early warning aircraft. They were forced to rely on small, inexpensive combat ships whose inferior armament made them more vulnerable than large, well-armored ships, whose only disadvantage was their high cost.

We tend to think of the Malvinas naval campaign only in terms of unit losses and the impact these had on the final outcome. However, for a nation closely observing the facts, there is an additional discussion. The Malvinas naval war also included:

• The first use of modern cruise missiles against ships of a first-rate navy.
• The first sustained aerial attacks against a naval force since World War II.
• The first combat use of nuclear-powered submarines.
• The first known combat use of vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft.
• A small force of Argentine diesel-electric submarines caused enormous concern to British naval authorities and influenced naval operations as much as the air threat, prompting the use of significant amounts of anti-submarine weaponry.
• A similarly small force of British attack nuclear submarines shaped Argentine naval commanders’ decisions and kept Argentine surface units in protected waters. It also influenced some of the first political decisions made at the onset of hostilities.

Selection of the Landing Site

From the departure of the fleet toward the Malvinas, one of the primary decisions faced by planners was determining the location for the initial assault. British thinking on the site and timing of the campaign’s first landing was guided by many considerations. Some of the most important were:

• Political convenience: The British government’s perception of the need to engage with Argentine forces to appease British public opinion eager for action.
• Proximity of the southern hemisphere winter, with its accompanying environmental challenges.
• Effects on morale, training, and the general physical condition of ground forces subjected to prolonged stays ashore in harsh climatic conditions.
• Logistical challenges of maintaining a large ground force in operations for an extended period.
• Transport difficulties in moving a large ground force and its support across the rugged terrain of the Malvinas.
• Lack of intelligence on the morale and training of Argentine soldiers in the Malvinas.
• Lastly, British staff had to choose between two diametrically opposed concepts for the initial assault on the Malvinas: conducting a mass landing through an audacious operation at or near Port Stanley, close enough to immediately target the campaign’s main objective, or conducting a more administrative landing at an undefended site far enough from Port Stanley to make it difficult for Argentine ground forces, mostly concentrated in Port Stanley, to attack the fragile beachhead.

The sites considered by the British as potentially suitable for the initial assault were:

• Stevely Bay, Soledad Island: The farthest from the objective and the least vulnerable to potential Argentine counterattacks by ground forces. At one point, the possibility of constructing an airstrip there to replace the aircraft carriers was analyzed.
• San Carlos, Soledad Island: Closer to the objective and still in a location that made an Argentine counterattack difficult.
• Bluff Cove, Soledad Island: Even closer, but also more vulnerable to an Argentine counterattack.
• Berkeley Sound, Soledad Island: Closer still to Port Stanley, but so close that an Argentine ground counterattack was almost certain.
• Puerto Argentino, Soledad Island: Rejected almost immediately due to the inherent risks.

Initially, it was agreed to conduct the landing at a site where no initial resistance was expected. The plan under Brigadier General Julian Thompson consisted of consolidating the beachhead while awaiting reinforcements arriving from the UK. Once these reinforcements arrived, the command of all land operations would be assumed by Major General Jeremy Moore.

The pros and cons analyzed by planners when selecting San Carlos as the initial landing site included:

• The protection offered by the restricted waters of the anchorage against submarines.
• The natural protection provided by the surrounding high ground for landing ships against air attacks, and its excellent potential for positioning Rapier missile anti-aircraft batteries.
• Intelligence reports indicating the absence of enemy presence in the area, except for infrequent patrols.
• Reports from the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) confirming the absence of mines on the beaches and no evidence of mining activity in the adjacent sea.
• The anticipated delay in an Argentine response due to the distance—approximately fifty miles of rugged terrain—from Port Stanley.
• The distance and rugged terrain between the landing site and the main objective, Port Stanley, which ground forces would have to cross in some manner.
• The proximity of a strong Argentine garrison at Goose Green, thirteen miles south of the site.
• The lack of suitable beaches for landing large numbers of troops and equipment.
• The proximity of high ground in the surrounding area that could be used advantageously by the enemy to repel and dislodge the landing forces.
• Although not verified by SBS patrols, the possibility that the Argentines had mined or intended to mine the maritime approaches to the site, given its obvious suitability for a landing. (At least in the minds of British planners, this was obvious. We now know that Argentine planners, in a pre-conflict study, deemed the site unsuitable for a successful amphibious landing.)
  
  

General Argentine Land Strategy

The Argentine land strategy was explained after the conflict by the commander in charge of the Malvinas, stating:

• The first and main military objective was Puerto Argentino. It was the campaign’s linchpin, as it was the seat of political power, home to the majority of the population, and housed the main port and airfield.
• The initial operational concept was to defend Port Stanley from direct attacks using the airfield and aircraft.
• The second phase involved building defenses to repel a direct amphibious assault. Three battalions were deployed to counter attacks from the south and another three to defend the north and west.
• Regarding attacks from the west, the defensive perimeter was determined not only by the terrain but also by the difficulty of maintaining distant troop positions due to limited mobility resources.
• There were high points dominating the inner part of the perimeter that had to be occupied and defended, but there were even better high points further out. However, the ground force commanders judged that they lacked the necessary mobility to occupy and maintain those more distant positions with the personnel and means available.
• This plan probably discouraged the British from attempting a heliborne assault on Port Stanley and may have similarly deterred plans for a direct amphibious assault. This allowed Argentine ground forces to reinforce and adjust their defenses while the British sought another landing site.

The time gained by this arrangement of forces in Port Stanley was not utilized effectively because political leaders in Buenos Aires failed to achieve a political solution to avoid the war. Ground force commanders believed this arrangement gave the political leadership an additional fifteen days to find a diplomatic solution. However, the negative aspect was that the Junta, despite the events involving the ARA Belgrano and HMS Sheffield, continued to focus primarily on a negotiated resolution rather than advancing a military strategy. Military commanders viewed the sinking of the ARA Belgrano and HMS Sheffield as the point of no return for the war, while political leaders saw the "exchange of blood" as an opportunity to reopen negotiations.

The Army believed that this mindset of the Junta restricted action and deprived ground forces of their main weapons, particularly air power. British naval forces surrounded the islands and waged a war of attrition against Argentine ground forces while preparing for their landing. They landed with their landing forces intact. Army commanders believed this occurred because political authorities in Buenos Aires restrained the Air Force and Navy from acting to their full capacity. The Army believed that if the Navy and Air Force had persisted in their attacks on naval transports and aircraft carriers by May 30, the outcome could have been different. However, the attack came far too late. The beachhead had been established, and British troops were advancing freely.

When the British landed, the Army began to consider modifying its defensive positions, reinforcing those protecting Port Stanley from attacks from the west. This realignment of forces began five days late. Western positions were reinforced with weapons, but moving them further west was impossible due to mobility and distance limitations. Efforts were made to cover the distance between Port Stanley and San Carlos with commando patrols, but by the time this decision was made, the British had already occupied the outer high positions. The commandos fought efficiently on several occasions but could not significantly slow the pace of the advance.

The Argentine Sector

The Argentine invasion plan had been entirely conceived as a short and peaceful occupation of the Malvinas by a relatively small force, not as sustained operations by a large force preparing for and ultimately engaging in combat. Operation Rosario was planned and initially executed as a "diplomatic invasion," intended as a nudge to the stalled negotiations with the British over the sovereignty of the islands. The operation was never intended as a combat operation.

The British reaction to the invasion, which consisted of the rapid assembly and deployment of a large naval task force, including amphibious assault units, was initially unforeseen by the Argentines. Argentina’s response to the realization that combat with the British in the Malvinas would be inevitable was a large-scale reinforcement of the islands—an alternative not foreseen in the original plan. This created a logistical nightmare for the Argentine supply system, which likely would have struggled to sustain even the far more limited original operation.

The logistical situation worsened further due to the Military Committee's decision not to use ships for reinforcement or resupply after April 10, following the British declaration of a maritime exclusion zone starting April 12. This decision forced Argentina to rely entirely on air transport and, where possible, fishing vessels.

Border with Chile

Even with the logistical challenges mentioned above, the Argentine force assembled and tasked with the defense of the Malvinas could have been composed of better-trained and equipped troops had Argentina not retained many of its most effective troops on the mainland. This decision was explained as militarily prudent, preserving these forces in reserve against a potential attack by Chile.

The Argentine force assembled under the original plan and used in the initial phase of the conflict was sufficient for a short-term "diplomatic invasion." With no immediate British military threat present in the theater, the basic Argentine concept appeared to be putting enough uniformed bodies on the islands to demonstrate that the territory was under Argentine control, thereby forcing the stalled diplomatic process to resume. Unfortunately for Argentina, when the British threat materialized, their thinking did not adapt, and their efforts to reinforce the islands were simply extensions of the original concept: for example, sending more personnel to reinforce the illusion of control and push for a diplomatic resolution to the situation.

Argentines later admitted that at no point during the planning of the Malvinas retaken did they believe they could win if the British decided to fight for the islands. Unfortunately, this preconception prevailed throughout the conflict, influencing decisions and weakening Argentina’s overall military capability.


Static Defense

The basic Argentine concept for the defense of the Malvinas appears to reflect this preconception. The plan did not foresee an aggressive ground campaign to fight and repel British invasion forces, regardless of where they landed. Instead, Argentina’s defense of the Malvinas relied on a series of static strongpoints around Port Stanley, which were expected to appear so formidable that the British would be deterred from invading. If they did invade, they would supposedly avoid landing near Port Stanley, and if the British landed elsewhere, it was assumed they would opt for a diplomatic resolution before attempting to attack the town.

Following this defensive concept, the Argentines concentrated nearly all their ground forces around Port Stanley throughout the conflict and simply waited for the British attack to arrive. There was never any serious attempt by Argentina to leave their entrenched positions and seize the initiative in the ground war against the enemy.

The Ground War – The British Perspective

The British also faced challenges and made some difficult decisions before the actual Malvinas invasion at San Carlos.

Although the deterioration of the South Atlantic situation had been closely monitored by the British, the Argentine invasion of the Malvinas came as a genuine surprise. There is no doubt, however, that the British demonstrated great ingenuity and determination by assembling a task force of thirty-six ships and setting sail for the Malvinas just two days after the invasion. However, due to the hasty departure, the ships of the landing force were not tactically loaded in the UK, meaning that the equipment and supplies could not be unloaded in the order required by the landing force once they were ashore. This situation was partially rectified during the delay at Ascension Island, where additional equipment was loaded, and an inventory of existing stores was conducted. This period was also used to reorganize cargo holds to facilitate unloading in the combat area. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the unloading of the ships delayed the supply of equipment to the San Carlos landing area.

The Landing at San Carlos

Despite all the doubts about the choice of landing site and concerns over the multitude of things that could go wrong, the British landing at San Carlos was completely uneventful in terms of troop transport ashore. The British amphibious task force approached and arrived at the target area undetected, aided by the cover of darkness, poor weather conditions, and diversionary operations conducted at Goose Green, Fanning Head, and other locations on East Falkland.

British troops landed in the early hours of May 21, encountered no resistance from Argentine ground forces, and moved quickly to their planned defensive positions around the area. As time passed, the anticipated Argentine threat to the landing failed to materialize. The military battle fought at San Carlos became one between the Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation and the ships of the British amphibious task force.

To their frustration, British ground forces found themselves relegated to the role of spectators in these actions while waiting for orders to advance. Meanwhile, the primary challenges faced by the ground assault forces were the environment, poor logistical support, and boredom.

Although not directly involved in the air-sea battle taking place at San Carlos, the ground forces were nonetheless affected by the outcome of this action.

On the first day of the assault on San Carlos, the British lost a frigate and sustained damage to four others due to Argentine air attacks. In the days following the landing, British naval losses continued at an alarming rate. Confronted with the Argentine air threat, the British were forced to alter their Basic Logistical Plan for supporting the ground forces, shifting from a concept based on afloat depots to one focused on the massive offloading of equipment onto land.

This change in plans was tied to the necessity of restricting ship movements to nighttime and a significant miscalculation regarding the number of helicopters needed to transport equipment, resulting in painfully slow logistical growth on land. A near-fatal setback for the progress of the ground campaign occurred on May 25 with the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor, which had been carrying three Chinook helicopters whose high load capacity was vital for the timely execution of logistical and operational plans. This loss placed an even heavier burden on the remaining helicopters, which were subsequently almost entirely dedicated to equipment transport for the remainder of the conflict.

British Maneuver Plan

Notably absent in the planning for the San Carlos landing was consideration or discussion of what the ground force should do once ashore.

The operation was a landing plan, not a ground campaign. As someone humorously remarked, it was assumed that, once on land, the forces would simply advance and win.

Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the British, either consciously or unconsciously, expected the Argentines to quickly react and oppose the landing with ground forces. In this scenario, the use of British ground forces would, to some extent, be guided—at least in the short term—by the actions and defensive reactions required during this confrontation.

When the anticipated Argentine opposition to the landing failed to materialize, the British found themselves somewhat at a loss regarding what to do with their ground forces.

Boletin del Centro Naval 748 (1987)

Malvinas: A Critical View of "The Mistake of Marching in Broad Daylight"

Critics to "The Error of Errors"

In the photo, commandos of the 601 operating in the San Carlos area in broad daylight.

Excerpt taken from the book "Comandos en Malvinas - La otra historia," chapter "Analysis of Operations." written by some Manuel De Remiro Oyón.

We have all read countless times that the great mistake made by the Argentine commandos at Top Malo was entering the house to spend the night. But what would have happened if no one had seen them enter?

...However, if the commandos of the 602 Company committed a mistake worthy of going down in history — one that stands out above all others — it was their decision to start marching immediately after being dropped off by helicopters, in broad daylight, no less. Once on the ground, the grave mistake of flying in during the morning was already irreparable, but to immediately begin moving toward the summit of Mount Simon was, without a doubt, an almost suicidal act. It was certainly a reckless move, and it makes it abundantly clear that these men had no idea what they were doing.

The terrain of the Malvinas, consisting primarily of hills and vegetationless plains, facilitated long-distance observation. This allowed British observers, hidden in advantageous positions within their observation posts (OPs) and equipped with telescopes, to monitor the terrain for many kilometers around them.

Once on the ground, an alternative course of action that Vercesi could have chosen, as a lesser evil, would have been to remain motionless. The men could have hidden as best they could, waiting for nightfall, hoping their infiltration had gone unnoticed or trusting that, if they had been detected, the British would not have time to react.

But moving during daylight? On terrain like the Malvinas? And, on top of that, climbing a height? It was a completely irrational decision that true commandos would never have made, especially in a situation where British dominance was already well established.

But one didn’t need to be a commando to know that. A simple conscript soldier doing his military service, if he had paid attention to his theoretical lessons, would know that you don’t do that. One doesn’t even need to be a soldier. It’s just common sense. An eight-year-old child who regularly plays hide-and-seek would understand that if you don’t want to be seen in an open, well-lit area, you simply don’t move.

To a British observer hidden among the rocks of a hill, scanning the terrain intently, a man loaded with equipment moving across the Malvinas peat bogs, no matter what camouflage he wore, would stand out like a black dot against the predominantly soft hues of the peatlands.

If the distance was too great, the observer wasn’t paying attention, or he was already tired, there was a slim chance the man might not be detected. But if that one man carrying equipment is accompanied by twelve more, and, on top of that, they are made to ascend a mountain or hill — or descend from it — and, to make it even worse, do so over snow, as they did on the 30th, then the march of the commandos of the 1st Section of the 602 became something akin to lighting a match in a dark room. It was as if they were shouting, “Hey guuuuys, we’re heeere!”

This reckless practice was common among the patrols of the GOE, the 601, the 602, the APCA, and the APBT.

Critics to the above story

The presented text attempts to analyze the performance of the Argentine commandos at Top Malo during the Falklands War, but it does so with an excessively emotional approach, rife with oversimplifications and a notable lack of historical or strategic rigor. Instead of offering a balanced and well-founded analysis, it resorts to disproportionate criticism and absurd comparisons, disregarding the complexity of the events.

To begin with, the tone is blatantly scathing, almost offensive, and focuses more on disparaging the Argentine soldiers than on examining the real conditions of their mission. Phrases like "almost suicidal act" or "they had no idea what they were doing" are not only unnecessary but also demonstrate an absolute ignorance of the operational circumstances. It is evident that the decisions made at Top Malo were constrained by external factors: superior orders, time constraints, logistical pressure, and an environment where the British had clear technological and tactical advantages. Criticizing these decisions without considering these limitations reveals a misunderstanding of how war operates in real scenarios.

The author points out that moving during the day was an "irrational" mistake and compares it to something that "even an eight-year-old child playing hide and seek would understand." Such statements are not only insulting but also simplistic. Military operations are not reduced to children's games or basic logic dictated by intuition. Missions are carried out under specific constraints, and in the case of Top Malo, it is likely that the Argentine commandos had no other choice but to advance. Remaining stationary in an exposed terrain, where the British already had advanced observers equipped with telescopes, also did not guarantee success. The text avoids exploring these options and limits itself to ridicule, reflecting a lack of depth in the analysis.

Another serious issue is the historical decontextualization. The author criticizes the Argentine commandos as if they were expected to operate under the standards of British or modern special forces, ignoring that resources, training, and experience were significantly different. It is true that the British had technological, aerial, and logistical superiority, but placing exclusive blame on the Argentine soldiers for questionable decisions in such an unequal environment is unfair and reveals an evident bias.

The terrain of the Falklands, described as "plains without vegetation," is also not as simple as the author portrays. Although the terrain was largely open, it also featured undulations and low-lying areas that could offer limited concealment. The text fails to consider whether the commandos attempted to take advantage of these features or whether the daytime movement was an operational necessity rather than an imprudent choice.

Although the author is correct in pointing out that moving during the day in exposed terrain is extremely risky, the criticism loses strength by failing to analyze why this decision might have been made. It is easy to criticize with the benefit of historical hindsight and the absence of pressure, but in the battlefield, decisions are made with limited information, under extreme stress, and with deadlines that do not always allow for the ideal choice.

Finally, the text not only exaggerates in its criticism of the Argentine commandos but also makes unfounded generalizations. It claims that such practices were "common" among all units, from the GOE to the 602, without providing concrete evidence to support this accusation. Additionally, the use of metaphors like "lighting a match in a dark room" may be striking, but it adds nothing to the tactical understanding of what occurred.

In conclusion, this text is neither a serious nor objective analysis of the events at Top Malo, but rather a critique laden with prejudice and superficiality. It ignores the context, omits operational constraints, and relies more on disdain than on solid strategic analysis. While it raises some valid ideas, such as the importance of avoiding movement in exposed terrain during daylight, these are buried under a torrent of sarcasm and generalizations that trivialize the complexity of war and the sacrifice of the soldiers involved. A true analysis would require empathy, rigor, and a deeper understanding of the facts—something this text, unfortunately, fails to achieve.

Commandos in Malvinas: Lack of Technique and Doctrine in Reconnaissance Missions

Reconnaissance Patrols Without Technique or Doctrine

Reconnaissance Patrols Without Technique or Doctrine

Excerpt taken from the book "Comandos en Malvinas - The Other Story," chapter "Analysis of Operations." The book is available in print and e-book format on Amazon.

Without a doubt, it can be said that within the Argentine Army (EA), the Argentine Navy (ARA), and the Argentine Air Force (FAA), there was no clear doctrine regarding the use of commando units for reconnaissance tasks. Incredibly, reconnaissance missions were considered secondary and even looked down upon within the different units and in the commando training course itself. In this course, barely any time was devoted to such missions, when, as we all know, any technique is mastered by precisely dedicating time to it and practicing it repeatedly.

The problem in the Argentine case was that many of these techniques were simply unknown. A reflection of the perception of reconnaissance operations within Argentine units can be seen in comments made by Major Rico in several interviews. The commander of the 602 Commando Company stated that his men were wasted on reconnaissance missions when they should have been used for raids against high-value targets. According to Rico's exact words, exploration missions were not worth the effort and could be carried out by other units.

This outdated mindset among the Argentines regarding reconnaissance patrols, along with its resulting consequences, was in complete contrast to the practices followed at the time by units in countries with experience and ongoing conflicts, such as Israel, South Africa, and NATO nations. In these countries, reconnaissance missions occupied a large portion of training hours and unit resources, and they were valued by general headquarters as force multipliers and a high-value resource for the development of subsequent operations.

NATO countries had even established an international training school for deep reconnaissance patrols in 1979 in Weingarten, Germany. This center aimed to improve procedures, standardize protocols, and reduce training costs. The Soviet Union also placed great importance on reconnaissance patrols.

After the Malvinas conflict, the operations carried out by Argentine commandos were studied in many training centers and military schools worldwide, serving as a model of "what not to do." For example, at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) at Fort Bragg, U.S.A., the errors committed by Argentine patrols were part of the curriculum from 1984 until at least 1992. But it was especially at Weingarten, thanks in part to British instructors assigned there, that the serious mistakes of Argentine commando units were widely disseminated and known at the international level. From then on, these errors were used in commando schools and training courses in many countries as examples of the mistakes to avoid.

An old military adage says, "Time spent on reconnaissance is never wasted time," a principle that the Argentine Armed Forces and their commando units did not seem to have internalized — and had to learn the hard way.

Beagle Crisis: The Beagle/Cape Horne Air Naval Battle

Beagle Crisis: The Fleets Face Off in the Southern Sea

By Esteban McLaren for FDRA

On December 22, 1978, D-Day, coordinated military actions along the borders with Chile would have commenced as part of Operation Sovereignty. It is difficult to determine with certainty which of the planned actions would have officially initiated the war, but it is clear that a simultaneous assault on at least four fronts would have taken place. The primary front would have been the naval battle and landing in the Beagle Channel, where the Argentine Navy's Marine Corps (IMARA) would have deployed troops to the Lennox, Nueva (already occupied by Chilean Marine Corps, CIM), and Picton Islands.

The purpose of this article is to explore an alternative history scenario. The war never took place, but what would have happened if Argentina had not accepted papal mediation?

In December 1978, tensions between Argentina and Chile over the sovereignty of the Picton, Lennox, and Nueva islands in the Beagle Channel reached a critical point. Diplomacy had failed, and both countries were preparing for armed confrontation. The Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR), with its powerful combination of aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, was preparing to face the Chilean Navy (ACh), a well-equipped force but at a numerical and technological disadvantage. Chilean authors speculate that in terms of infantry, Argentine forces roughly doubled the Chileans in size; in terms of armored vehicles, the ratio was 5:1; for aircraft, 3:1; and in naval strength, Argentina was slightly superior in some aspects (surface combatants), decisively superior in others (submarines operating in the area), and qualitatively unmatched in yet another (aircraft carriers).

Order of Battle as of December 20, 1978

Chilean Navy (ACh)

• Main Ships:

  • Tre Kronor-class light cruiser: Almirante Latorre.
  • Brooklyn-class light cruiser: Capitán Prat.
  • Almirante-class destroyers: Almirante Riveros, Blanco Encalada, and Cochrane.
  • Leander-class frigates: Almirante Williams, Almirante Condell, and Almirante Lynch.
  • Fletcher-class destroyers: Blanco Encalada (DD-14) and Cochrane (DD-15).
  • Allen M. Sumner-class destroyer: Ministro Portales.

• Submarines:

  • SS Simpson, the only operational submarine, as the Oberon-class submarines were undergoing major maintenance.

• Naval Aviation:

  • AS-332 Super Puma helicopters.

Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR)

• Main Ships:

  • Aircraft carrier: ARA Veinticinco de Mayo.
  • Brooklyn-class cruiser: ARA General Belgrano.
  • Type 42 destroyer: ARA Hércules.
  • Gearing-class destroyer: ARA Py.
  • Allen M. Sumner-class destroyers: ARA Comodoro Seguí, ARA Bouchard, and ARA Piedrabuena.
  • Fletcher-class destroyers: ARA Rosales (D-22), ARA Almirante Domecq García (D-23), and ARA Almirante Storni (D-24).
  • A69-class corvettes: ARA Drummond and ARA Guerrico.

• Submarines:

  • ARA Santiago del Estero, ARA Salta, ARA San Luis, and ARA Santa Fe.

• Naval Aviation:

  • 8 A-4Q Skyhawk aircraft aboard the carrier, with one on 24/7 interceptor alert on the flight deck. The interceptor on deck intercepted a CASA 212 maritime patrol aircraft stationed at Puerto Williams twice.
  • SH-3 Sea King helicopters.

2. Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Both Fleets

Chilean Navy (ACh)

• Qualitative:

  • High defensive capability with frigates equipped with Exocet missiles.
  • Limited submarine capacity, with only one operational submarine.
  • Good coordination between surface and air units.

• Quantitative:

  • 2 light cruiser
  • 3 frigates
  • 6 destroyers
  • 1 operational submarine

Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR)

• Qualitative:

  • Air superiority with the aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo.
  • Greater submarine capacity with 4 operational submarines.
  • High force projection capability with modern destroyers and frigates.

• Quantitative:

  • 1 air carrier
  • 1 light cruiser
  • 8 destroyers
  • 2 missile corvettes
  • 4 submarines

 

Conflict Escalation

The conflict did not de-escalate; on the contrary, it worsened. The Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR) decided to launch an attack on the Chilean Navy, which quickly set sail from Valparaíso heading south toward the Beagle Channel. The last detected position of FLOMAR was 120 miles (some sources cite 193 miles) southwest of Cape Horn, preparing to support Operation Sovereignty, whose primary objective was the amphibious landing and capture of the Picton, Lennox, and Nueva islands.

 

Capabilities Analysis

Chilean Navy (ACh)
The ACh possessed a light cruiser, destroyers, and frigates, all equipped with anti-air and anti-submarine defense capabilities. However, operational issues with the SS Simpson left the fleet without effective submarine coverage, a critical disadvantage in modern naval warfare.

Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR)
FLOMAR, on the other hand, had the advantage of the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, which provided air superiority with its A-4Q Skyhawks. The modern destroyers and multiple operational submarines gave FLOMAR a robust capacity for both defense and attack.

 

Key Points of Advance and Refuge Locations for the Chilean Navy (ACh)

To reach the Beagle Channel, the Chilean fleet would advance southward from Valparaíso, passing through Puerto Montt, the Chacao Channel, the Gulf of Penas, Bahía Inútil, and the Strait of Magellan, before heading toward the Beagle Channel. If refuge were needed, Chilean fjords such as the Última Esperanza Fjord, Quintupeu Fjord, Aysén Fjord, or Comau Fjord would serve as strategic locations to hide and launch counterattacks.

Quintupeu and Comau Fjords

 
Última Esperanza Fjord or Sound

Final Approach to the Beagle Channel (or Cape Horn)

The upper map shows the route of the Chilean fleet according to official Chilean and Argentine bibliographies.

Note that the Chilean fleet’s course passed over the position of the ARA Santa Fé submarine because it had detected them precisely days before December 21. In other words, the enemy fleet had already been detected and followed by a submarine of the Argentine Submarine Force (CFS). The fleet was heading south of Cape Horn to combat stations, with two ships anchored side by side, awaiting orders to attack. The ships were arranged in this manner to allow for personnel exchange and social interaction while waiting (Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano, 2017). We will return to this point later.

Detection and Engagement Strategies

The Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR) would employ its S-2 Tracker and P-2 Neptune aircraft for reconnaissance missions (as they would successfully do four years later in the Malvinas), and the A-4Q Skyhawks for attacks, while Argentine submarines would ambush Chilean ships at critical points in the Strait of Magellan and the Drake Passage. FLOMAR’s destroyers and frigates would provide fire support and anti-aircraft defense to protect amphibious and heliborne assault operations.

Once again, it is enlightening to refer to the "official" account of the Chilean fleet’s movements (Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano, 2017). In this text, it is detailed how Chilean officers trained on a land-based simulator (this is not a joke) called Redifon, which consisted of interconnected cubicles simulating ships, and practiced maneuvers in the basement of the Tactical Training Center of the Naval War Academy in Valparaíso. Merino and López, practicing on this analog simulator, tried various attack combinations on the FLOMAR and concluded that they had to achieve "control of the sea," aiming for a decisive naval battle in the style of Mahan. The outcome of these exercises determined an optimal attack formation where "all missile-equipped ships would go ahead, with gunnery ships behind" (p. 86). I don’t understand why the Redifon was even required for something that seems like common sense. Or was there perhaps some logic to sending the gunships first (Prat, Latorre) and the missile ships behind (Almirante-class, Leander-class)?

FLOMAR, on the other hand, "lacked" such a simulator simply because the crews spent most of the naval year on board, maneuvering with real ships in real time and facing real problems. Approximately two-thirds of the year, the crews remained on board—a fact anyone with relatives in the Argentine Navy at that time can corroborate. Many sailors during this golden era of the Argentine Navy only met their children when they were 8 or 9 months old, as their life at sea prevented earlier visits. The distance between both fleets, beyond the geographic one, was astronomical.

 

Analysis of the Clash of Forces

Within the framework of the 1978 Beagle Crisis, tensions between Argentina and Chile reached a critical point, bringing both nations to the brink of armed conflict. Operation Sovereignty, planned by Argentina, had as its primary objective the amphibious landing and capture of the Picton, Lennox, and Nueva islands, located in the Beagle Channel. This operation was to be conducted under strong naval and air cover provided by the Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR).

Preparations and Force Composition

By late December 1978, FLOMAR was fully equipped and ready for action. It had at its disposal the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, a crucial asset that carried A-4Q Skyhawks and S-2 Trackers, providing both air interception and maritime patrol capabilities. The fleet also included several modern destroyers, such as the ARA Hércules (the only one equipped with medium range naval SAM like the Sea Dart), as well as frigates like the ARA Piedrabuena and ARA Espora. Additionally, Argentina possessed a significant submarine force with the ARA Santiago del Estero, ARA Salta, ARA Santa Fe, and ARA San Luis submarines.

The Chilean Navy (ACh), although smaller in number, maintained a robust defensive force. Its primary asset was the light cruiser CL-02 Capitán Prat and the still formidable Almirante Latorre, accompanied by frigates and destroyers equipped with MM-38 Exocet missiles. The Chilean fleet also included the submarine SS-21 Simpson, the only operational submarine at the time, as the other Oberon-class submarines were undergoing major maintenance.

 

Operation Development

The landing operation planned by Argentina focused on Isla Nueva, where it was known that around 150 Chilean marines were entrenched. The Argentine strategy was to land on the southern coast of the island, avoiding Chilean defenses in the north. To execute this, the amphibious transport ARA Cabo San Antonio would be employed, escorted by destroyers and frigates providing fire support and protection.

The Chileans anticipated a conventional landing on the islands, when in fact, the most likely scenario was that the occupation would be carried out via vertical assault using helicopters.

The final phase of FLOMAR’s approach was established with the Argentine fleet advancing from its last detected position, 120 miles south of Cape Horn, moving eastward toward the Beagle Channel. Meanwhile, the Chilean Navy (ACh) mobilized from Puerto Williams, heading toward the channel to intercept the Argentine forces. Here, two simultaneous courses of action can be evaluated: first, the main fleet moved toward the Drake Passage to engage FLOMAR in open waters; second, the smaller torpedo boats (Quidora, Fresia, Tegualda, and Guacolda) would confront the landing force.

Submarine Warfare

The book La Escuadra en Acción by Arancibia Clavel and Bulnes Serrano recounts the military and political activity during the conflict, with a focus on the Chilean Navy. Although the text is not highly technical regarding the means employed, it provides an interesting general description of the operations of the Chilean fleet in the south.

In this account, it is mentioned that the Chilean Submarine Force was composed of the Balao-class submarine Simpson (SS-21) and the modern, for the time, British Oberon-class submarines named Hyatt (SS-23) and O'Brien (SS-22).

According to this source, the O'Brien was in dry dock during the conflict, and the Hyatt had to interrupt its transit south and return to its base in Talcahuano due to a mechanical failure. The other Balao-class submarine, the Thomson (SS-20), is not even mentioned, possibly because it had already been decommissioned due to its age. In fact, both Brazil and Argentina had retired their submarines of this class in the early 1970s, after receiving the Guppy class.

Although the Simpson was technologically outdated for the circumstances, it managed to fulfill its mission. The old submarine had to surface frequently to recharge its batteries, dangerously exposing itself to Argentine radars and periscopes. It was photographed at least twice by Argentine submarines while on the surface. Due to its wear, it is not surprising that this operation had to be performed more frequently than usual. The Simpson was detected twice by Argentine submarines, which chose not to fire their torpedoes. Nonetheless, it is possible that its commander, Rubén Scheihing, attempted to attack despite his technological disadvantage.

Patrol Areas Assigned to the Argentine Submarines

Although the exact dates cannot be confirmed, the Guppy-class submarines were very close to engaging in combat, although fortunately, their commanders interpreted their orders with sound judgment. In mid-December, the Santa Fe submarine was patrolling the entrance to Bahía Cook at a depth of 50 meters. The sonar operators detected the sound of approaching warship propellers. The commander of the S-21 raised the combat alarm, the crew took their positions, and all torpedo tubes were prepared for launch. The propeller sounds grew in number, eventually forming what appeared to be "a fleet." The Chilean squadron sailed above the S-21, heading into the open waters of the South Pacific.

The sonar operators counted three, four, six... up to 13 ships. Some had "heavy" propellers, like cruisers, while most had "light" propellers, similar to those of destroyers.

However, the Chilean fleet was sailing without emitting signals, meaning they were not using active sonar on the escort ships. A fleet commander's decision to sail without emitting can have several justifications, such as not actively searching for submarines or preferring to be more discreet, as sonar emissions propagate over great distances and can be detected by submarine countermeasure equipment, revealing their course or trajectory.

It is not difficult to imagine the immense tension experienced by the crew of the Santa Fe. Suspended in silence dozens of meters below the Pacific, they awaited the Chilean fleet's actions, with weapons ready to launch if the right moment came to strike from a tactically advantageous position.

Ultimately, the Chilean fleet entered open waters, moving away from the S-21. Following his orders, the commander of the Santa Fe did not interpret the Chilean fleet's maneuver as a hostile act, especially at a time when there was no formal declaration of war.

This situation clearly shows that the ARA Santa Fe was aware of the Chilean fleet's position and, in the event of war, it would have been the first to launch torpedoes against the Chilean fleet.

Meeting and Engagement Point

The meeting point of the fleets would be near the Beagle Channel. FLOMAR had to face the threat of the ACh's MM-38 Exocet missiles, with a range of 35-40 km. There is a recurring narrative in dialogues, discussions, and exchanges with trans-Andean experts and novices alike that suggests a certain accounting of Exocets, leading to the assumption that a potential naval battle would "clearly" tip in favor of the ACh. At that time, Chile was thought to have 4 to 8 more missile launchers than the ARA. This is the denial of the evident Argentine advantage, as these opinion shapers tend to overlook the key assets of the ARA: its aircraft carrier and its four operational submarines. For greater clarity, the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo provided Argentina with a significant advantage, enabling attacks from distances of over 200 miles (370 km). Another key factor, when compared with the experience in the Malvinas, is that the Argentine Naval Aviation had full experience in anti-ship attacks, and the bomb fuses would have been correctly adjusted to detonate on impact with the ships. Once the Chilean fleet was detected by the S-2 Tracker and P-3 Neptune aircraft, its position would be relayed to FAA airbases and the CFS submarines, and it would only be a matter of time to see who would arrive first to the hunt.

Landing and Engagement Scenarios

1. Chilean Fleet’s Approach to Stop the Landing
   The Chilean Navy (ACh) would rapidly advance from Puerto Williams toward the Beagle Channel, deploying its frigates and destroyers to intercept and attack the Argentine landing forces. Fast attack craft would also be used to disrupt the landings and support vessels. The Chileans would launch Exocet missiles and use naval artillery to harass the landing craft. Additionally, they would coordinate air strikes from Punta Arenas using Hawker Hunter and A-37 Dragonfly aircraft. Entering the Beagle Channel is a losing strategy for either fleet due to restricted movement, sensor disruption caused by terrain clutter, and the consequent degradation in weapon performance.

2. FLOMAR’s Response to This Movement
   In response to the Chilean approach, FLOMAR would deploy its A-4Q Skyhawks and S-2 Trackers from the aircraft carrier to conduct preemptive strikes against ACh units. Argentine submarines would patrol strategic areas to intercept Chilean ships. FLOMAR would use its air defense systems to intercept approaching aircraft and launch its own anti-ship missiles to neutralize key threats. Unlike the Chilean fleet, the Argentine Navy had an external attack element in the form of carrier-based aviation. The confined space of the channel would facilitate an air-naval attack and would have been ideal for a sequence of attacks followed by rearming to restart the cycle.

3. ACh Focuses on Seeking Out FLOMAR for Direct Defeat
   Based on the cited literature, this was the path chosen by the Chilean Navy. If the ACh had decided to seek out and directly confront FLOMAR, they would have circled Navarino Island or approached via the Drake Passage toward Cape Horn (southeast route). They would coordinate with the Simpson submarine and aerial patrols to locate the Argentine fleet, launching missiles and naval artillery strikes as soon as they detected it. According to the same literature, the ARA Santa Fe was positioned beneath the fleet when it entered open waters, meaning the target was detected first. Again, in this scenario, the Argentine naval aviation would have encountered them halfway, in any case, forcing them to endure several waves of A-4Q Skyhawk attacks. What remained of these waves would be what could confront an intact FLOMAR. Checkmate.

4. FLOMAR Focuses on Seeking Out ACh for Direct Defeat
   If FLOMAR decided to seek out and directly confront ACh, it would advance from its position south of Cape Horn toward the northeast. They would use their carrier-based aircraft for reconnaissance and attack, first launching repeated air strikes to sink or disable the main surface assets, followed by attacks to sink or damage various ships. They would then move closer to launch anti-ship missiles from their destroyers and frigates, coordinating strikes with their submarines.

   Here we recall the ACh's "combat station" formation: the ships were anchored side by side to share the wait with social interaction and the exchange of supplies. If the ARA had launched its A-4Q Skyhawks while this formation was still in place, it would have greatly facilitated the effectiveness of the bombs. A single bombing run by three aircraft with three 450-kilogram bombs could have impacted two ships at a time, doubling their efficiency. Checkmate.

Roles of Naval and Military Aviation

• Argentine Carrier-Based Naval Aviation:

  • A-4Q Skyhawk: These aircraft would conduct interception and air superiority missions, as well as attacks on enemy ships to protect the landing forces. A total of 8 units were carrier-based.
  • S-2 Tracker: These aircraft would perform maritime patrols, submarine detection, and coordination of anti-submarine and anti-ship attacks. 2 units were carrier-based.
  • P-3 Neptune: Operating from land bases, these long-range aircraft had highly trained crews who conducted year-round missions in the Argentine Sea.

• Naval Aviation Based in Río Grande:

  • T-28 Fennec: These aircraft would perform close air support missions and ground attacks to cover the landing forces (deployed in Río Grande and Estancia La Sara). A total of 19 units.
  • MB-326 Aermacchi: These aircraft would carry out interdiction and ground attack missions to support amphibious and land operations (Río Grande). The exact number of units is undetermined.
  • T-34C Turbo Mentor: These aircraft would undertake light attack missions, logistical support, and supply transport. More than 12 units.

• Chilean Military Aviation in Chabunco:

  • Hawker Hunter: These aircraft would perform interception and air combat, ship attacks, and provide support to ground forces (6 units).
  • A-37 Dragonfly: These aircraft would conduct ground attacks, close support, interdiction, and harassment of Argentine landing forces (12 units).

• Argentine Military Aviation in Río Gallegos:

  • A-4B/C/P Skyhawk: These aircraft would carry out attacks on ships and provide support to ground forces, as well as interception and air combat when necessary (12 units).
  • Mirage IIIEA/Mirage 5 Dagger/IAI Nesher: More than 30 units of the three models combined.
  • F-86 Sabre: These were pure interception fighters, deployed to engage the Hawker Hunters due to experience gained during the Indo-Pakistani wars. The exact number is unclear, but pilot reports suggest there were more than 4 units and less than 14.
  • Their objectives were first to initiate bombings against military targets in the cities of Punta Arenas (Chabunco airbase) and Puerto Williams (Zañartú airfield) and to destroy the Chilean Air Force, using a technique very similar to that employed by Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967. The same approach would be implemented across all active fronts.

 

A-4Q Launched from the Aircraft Carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo Strikes the ACh APD-29 Uribe

 

The offensive against Chile would follow the following sequence: (Wikipedia):

• Starting at 20:00 hours (H-2) on D-Day, December 22, 1978, FLOMAR and the Marine Infantry — Battalion No. 5 — would occupy the Freycinet, Hershell, Wollaston, Deceit, and Hornos islands (see map below).
• At 22:00 hours, the designated H-Hour, FLOMAR and marines — Battalions No. 3 and No. 4 — would occupy the Picton, Nueva, and Lennox islands, also gaining control of the Beagle Channel (see map below).
• The ground offensive would begin at 24:00 hours (H+2). The V Army Corps would launch an attack from the Santa Cruz area, aiming to conquer as much Chilean territory as possible in the Patagonian region. Simultaneously, the Argentine Air Force would begin strategic bombings.
• At 06:00 hours (H+8) on December 23, 1978 (23.06:00.DEC.978), the destruction of the Chilean Air Force on the ground would commence.

 

The naval confrontation between Argentina and Chile in 1978 would have been a complex, multidimensional operation, involving naval, air, and ground forces in a challenging geographical environment. Argentina's air and submarine superiority gave it a significant advantage, though Chile's coastal defenses and tactical coordination offered formidable resistance. The outcome would have depended on numerous tactical and strategic factors, as well as the effectiveness in executing the planned operations by both nations.

In this specific scenario, it should be noted that the Argentine armed forces had three air bases on the front: one mobile (the ARA Veinticinco de Mayo) and two air bases in Río Grande and Río Gallegos, which would prove to be highly operational four years later in the Malvinas. In contrast, only the Chabunco air base in Punta Arenas would bear the burden of attempting to stop the landing operations, conduct anti-ship missions against FLOMAR, combat air attacks from the northeast (Río Gallegos air base) and from the east-northeast (Río Grande naval air base), and then plan ABA (Airbase Attack) operations against these same bases. Is that not too many objectives for a single runway?

For its part, the Argentine Naval Aviation (COAN) would focus exclusively on anti-ship strikes or very close air support, while the Argentine Air Force (FAA) would support the advance of the armored assault on Punta Arenas, conduct an ABA against the Chabunco air base, and ensure air superiority over Punta Arenas. Additionally, at the request of the Argentine Navy (ARA), the FAA would provide air support to the landing operations.

Probabilities of Success

Argentine Forces: With air superiority provided by the aircraft carrier and a modern surface fleet and submarines, Argentine forces had a significant advantage. The joint air-sea-submarine operations of FLOMAR would increase their chances of success.

Comparative Strength Between ACh (Left) and FLOMAR (Right)

The pink bands indicate the range of their main weapons (MM38 Exocet, 20 miles or 35-42 km). The aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo is represented by an A-4Q fully loaded with bombs and fuel, with a range of 350 km. These are the vital areas to cover before considering a real threat to the adversary. As an analyst, I find it difficult to even see a glimpse of equality between both forces.

Before analyzing the Chilean case, let us review the probability the Chilean Squadron had of repelling an air attack, which would have been the primary weapon of the Argentine Navy (ARA). Some Chilean destroyers (Almirante-class) were equipped with the British Short Seacat system. This is a small subsonic missile, powered by a two-stage solid-fuel rocket motor. In flight, it is guided by four cruciform wings and stabilized by four small tail fins. It is guided by command line-of-sight (CLOS) through a radio link, meaning flight commands are transmitted by a remote operator with both the missile and target in sight. The same system was installed on the Argentine carrier Veinticinco de Mayo and, in its land-based version (Tigercat), was deployed in Tierra del Fuego (IMARA) and Río Gallegos (Army). The missile proved highly inaccurate in the Malvinas conflict due to its lack of autonomy and reliance on the operator’s coordination of pulse and vision, with the inherent human eye difficulties in accurately perceiving depth and distance in space. Therefore, perhaps the best-equipped Chilean ship for self-defense against air attacks was likely the cruiser Almirante Latorre or Prat, with up to 14 Bofors 40mm pom-pom guns. These would have been the most difficult targets to approach and attack, and, if communications had allowed, the task might have been delegated to submarines.

Another intellectual exercise that no one has conducted, to my knowledge, is the following:

Chilean ships would approach at 21/28 knots (cruising speed/full speed) towards the Argentine naval forces (assuming that the CASA-212 aircraft correctly located them, as Chile had no other "eyes" available; there is a myth about electronic interception that is mentioned below). The distance to be covered was estimated to be between 140/193 miles according to various Chilean reports. This would take the Chilean fleet just over 5/8 hours of sailing to get within 20 miles of the Argentine ships (20 miles being the first point where they could attempt to strike the fleet, as that was the range of the MM38 Exocet missile, Chile’s only decisive weapon).

During those 5/8 hours, the ships would not be able to fire or damage the enemy. Meanwhile, during this period, the aircraft carrier ARA 25 de Mayo could launch and recover 3 to 5 combat sorties from its air group. Assuming each attack group flew at 400 knots round trip, landed, and took 25 minutes to reload bombs and refuel before taking off again, each A-4Q Skyhawk would take off with 3 bombs of 450kg on the central pylon, equipped with fuzes adapted to hit ships.

In the first pass alone, 24 bombs would be dropped on the "Squadron". Assuming no losses for the Argentine planes, by the fourth or fifth pass, between 96 and 120 bombs would have been dropped on the ships. Even if an Argentine plane was shot down in each pass, resulting in up to 4 losses, the worst-case scenario would still see up to 36 bombs launched against the "Squadron". In other words, before the Chilean fleet could close the gap between them and the enemy, they would have been hit by between 36 and 120 bombs (see the table below).

All of this would happen before any Chilean combat station operator could even press the launch button for a single Exocet missile. Do you understand how serious this plan was for the Chilean command? What were they thinking? Perhaps the worst part is that at the end of this death corridor, a fleet almost identical to the Chilean one in terms of surface combatants and Exocet launch capability, but completely intact, was waiting for them. Those who managed to survive would be met by a volley of French missiles.

Approximation times to 20 miles, passes, and number of bombs considering losses

Chilean Forces: The Chilean fleet in open waters was at the mercy of naval aviation first, and Argentine submarines later. As mentioned above, the distance between both fleets worked in favor of the FLOMAR. If the Chilean Navy had been detected at 190 miles, the bomb runs carried out by the Skyhawks would have left little afloat, even considering shoot-downs. It is almost sad to imagine a fleet speeding up to strike the enemy while being progressively bombarded over and over again with absolutely no help. Possibility of success: Zero.

Jorge Martínez Bush, a Chilean officer, stated the following in the book Soldados de Mar en Acción (Sánchez Urra, 2020), a compilation of the activities of the CIM.

"From what could have been the 'Naval Battle of Drake', then-Commander Jorge Martínez Bush, the second-in-command of the cruiser 'Prat', points out that 'we were about to enter combat, and we were prepared. In naval tactics, the position was in our favor because the sea and the wind worked for us, putting the Argentinians in a very complicated position' (p. 196)."

This officer accuses Vice Admiral López Silva of trusting the sea and the wind to defeat Argentine naval aviation. Did he take a pencil and paper and make a basic diagram to see if his statements had any foundation? What does Martínez Bush think about the air group (GAE) of the 25 de Mayo? Or did it not exist? If he is reading this, he could clarify this matter to the Chilean public. By the way, Sánchez Urra's account of the FLOMAR is suspiciously incomplete (he omits 2 Argentine submarines and speaks of "Chilean submarines" in the plural, portraying the Simpson as fully operational, on par with the Argentinians), which casts doubt on many other descriptions and lists presented throughout his work.

The other alternative was to hide in the fjords, which would have offered better chances of survival. However, with more than 100 enemy planes flying over their position and planning an attack, it was only a matter of time. The Chilean Navy was a serious opponent but completely lacked decisive weapons: neither aviation to disturb the two-dimensional plane nor operational submarines to attack from the complete stealth of the depths. Had the situation dragged on for only a week, it’s not unreasonable to think that the entire Chilean fleet would have ended up sunk or, for all practical purposes, out of combat. Possibility of success: Zero.

Defeat Scenario and Seeking Refuge in the Chilean Fjords

If the ACh suffered a defeat, a likely outcome would have involved the sinking or disabling of its main assets. In terms of naval target value, without a doubt, the Leander-class frigates would have been the primary focus of the attack, followed by the light cruisers Prat and Latorre, given their gunfire capability to affect landing operations. The remaining targets would have been defined by circumstance.

It’s worth adding here a piece of information that Admiral López Silva (theoretically the most prepared in naval-air warfare) of the ACh did not possess: Four years later, Argentine aircraft demonstrated that a fleet confined in a channel (like the San Carlos Strait) or very close to the coast (such as the southern islands of Cape Horn) was a perfectly reachable target for low-flying jet aircraft. The Royal Navy, equipped with much better air defense missiles than the ACh, only achieved a few isolated shootdowns, and only the failure of the fuses on bombs dropped by the FAA prevented its complete neutralization as a surface combat force before the end of the conflict. The attackers of the ACh would have been A-4 Skyhawks, both in their B and P variants, and Israeli Mirage fighters of the FAA, as well as the well-known A-4Qs of the COAN—all of which proved to be lethal in attacking a fleet. Did the Chilean fleet really expect a different outcome in their case?

If the ACh were to pass through the channel, it would ensure its demise. The fleet would be trapped in the Beagle Channel or advancing close to the southern coast of the islands, facilitating the approach of aircraft outside radar detection. The attack, as would later happen in the Malvinas, would take full advantage of the geography, just as it was in the San Carlos Strait. We now know that the likelihood of the main ACh units escaping an air attack was almost nil. Once the main units were disabled, the rest of the Chilean fleet would be attacked by Argentine destroyers and corvettes with their Exocets. This would not be the defeat chosen, according to the book by Arancibia Clavel and Serrano Bulnes.

The ACh would be forced to rely on air support from the Chilean Air Force (FACh), based at Chabunco airbase. At 6 AM on December 21, this base would be the primary target of a preemptive strike from all air assets stationed at BAM Río Gallegos. To make matters worse, if the Chilean fighters managed to take off, the COAN was lying in wait less than 200 km from Chabunco with a dozen T-28 Fennecs, ready to attack the Chilean fighters with machine guns and rockets as they landed.

Even so, if we consider that some units remained afloat after a defeat in the Fuegian channels, they would retreat to fjords such as Última Esperanza, Quintupeu, or Comau. With Argentine air superiority, Chilean forces would have little chance of success, as FLOMAR could carry out precise and sustained attacks. Without air superiority, Chilean forces would have a better chance of defending themselves, but they would still face a significant threat due to FLOMAR’s ability to coordinate attacks from both air and sea.

I want to add two final details before the conclusions. First, Chilean literature, whether academic or journalistic, as well as television media reports, engage in a repeated act of pretending ignorance. It is almost impossible to find books endorsed by the Chilean Navy (ACh) or other military forces, let alone by journalistic outlets, that mention the key word "A-4Q Skyhawk." Apparently, this weapon never existed in the theater of operations. And if it did, it was never a threat. In fact, they probably didn’t even fly. Oh, and the Argentine sailors got seasick due to rough seas. The books from the CIM or the “Squadron” pretend ignorance, as they reflect at all times, and absolutely without deviation, that what was going to take place was a naval battle, in the style of Jutland/Latakia. Two large fleets, now without cannons but with missiles, would come into firing range, each firing their volleys, and the better one would win. It almost seems as if the Argentine aircraft carrier was going to stay in the rear watching the scene, like a spectator in the stands.

This scenario is a complete disrespect to the informed reader. It is truly shameful that professional Chilean naval officers avoid addressing the clear impending air-naval battle and lie to their public by speaking of courage and patriotism to cover up what was entirely and fundamentally a technical issue. Sadly, Chilean "technical" literature is filled with this appeal to bravery rather than focusing on tools or tactics.

Finally, that same literature claims a level of information about Argentine forces' movements that surpasses what would be available today, even with two British AWACS donated as part of the collaboration during the Falklands War. Apparently, they had information on troop movements, aircraft movements, the position of the Argentine fleet, the order of operations of various units, and who knows what else. Moreover, this information was updated hourly. Not even with their own satellites would they have had such an instantaneous real-time picture. Apparently, Argentine communications had been "decoded," similar to Japan’s Purple Code. This is mentioned by anonymous authors using the mysterious term "electronic interception or tracking." Well, that was not the case. Argentine encrypted communications were not decoded. What naval intelligence actually did was maintain open channels to broadcast the information they wanted to be accessible to Chilean listening posts (counterintelligence). Argentine communications were indeed intercepted, but that happened in 1982, by NATO intelligence agencies, specifically from a station in Norway. But let’s never confuse NATO with Chile under any circumstances. In the previous statement, Martínez Smith himself comments that the Argentine fleet was an hour's sailing distance from the Chilean border, knowing this only through intercepted communications. Dear reader, in air-naval warfare, one does not order an attack on a fleet whose location has not been confirmed by one’s own sensors (an observer or radar providing the position). If FLOMAR was going to be attacked based on "intercepted" information, it was probably an ambush planned by the Argentine naval command.

The TransAndean Squadron, such as it was detected by the ARA Santa Fe submarine
 

In summary, the technological and operational superiority of FLOMAR granted the Argentine forces a considerable advantage in a direct confrontation with the ACh. The geography of the Chilean fjords would provide a natural refuge, but Chilean forces would still face significant challenges without the ability to counter Argentine air and naval superiority.

Retreat to the Fjords, Perhaps the Best Outcome for the ACh...

This report does not diminish the performance or the planning executed by the ACh. They did the best they could with what they had. That said, it wasn’t enough. The stars aligned to leave them without sufficient submarine capability (the SS-21 Simpson was detected and photographed twice before December 21, while their best submarines were undergoing major maintenance). Air support was going to be limited because they lacked a naval attack aviation force, and the FACh's air assets were going to receive their baptism of fire that same morning, meaning they would be fighting for their own survival. According to the plan, by the afternoon of December 21, Chabunco was expected to be inoperable—whether by FAA A-4 and Mirage strikes in the early morning or by T-28 Fennec/MB326 attacks throughout the rest of the day.

A criticism that can be leveled against López Silva’s plan is that he adhered to a Mahanian philosophy of seeking a decisive large-scale naval battle. He was committing the entire fleet ("all-in") in a maneuver where it would suffer many losses before even seeing the enemy on their radar screens. Once the events were set in motion, the fate of the Chilean fleet would be sealed for the rest of the conflict. This invites reflection on alternatives: when a smaller fleet faces a larger one, it should better rely on naval guerrilla tactics or small attrition battles. The Argentine Navy was born this way—facing much larger fleets, such as the Spanish and the Brazilian Imperial Navy, dragging them into small battles that favored minor but exhausting victories against the enemy. The fjords are an ideal setting for such a task: hiding ships to later conduct coordinated attacks. Even with enemy air superiority, this tactic can still be effective, as the Germans demonstrated during WWII by sheltering ships in protected fjords with dense layers of air defense and achieving success. This alternative would likely be more reasonable than facing a fully equipped aircraft carrier in open waters, without air superiority, and with an impaired submarine force. And here, the term "larger fleet" is more qualitative than quantitative—the Chilean "squadron" was going solo, with very little support from the depths and no air support, against naval pilots who trained intensively every year on how to sink ships and were highly skilled.

Did López Silva think that the ARA would bring its main naval assets within the range of Chilean Exocets for a gentleman’s duel? Was López Silva expecting a Jutland or a Latakia while heading into a Midway? Could it be that the Chilean naval command believed that the ARA would not exploit its submarine and naval air superiority by deploying its submarines and carrier-based fighters before they could even detect FLOMAR on their radars? Did López Silva think the A-4Q Skyhawks would not be launched against his ships? Long before a Chilean sailor would get the chance to press the launch button on an Exocet, the Chilean fleet would encounter the COAN and the CFS—either sequentially or simultaneously.

Sources

• Arancibia Clavel, Patricia y Bulnes Serrano, Francisco. La escuadra en acción. 1978: el conflicto Chile-Argentina visto a través de sus protagonistas, Santiago, Chile: Catalonia, 2017 (ISBN: 978-956-324-298-0)
• Burzaco, Ricardo. La Fuerza de Submarinos de la Armada Argentina en la crisis de 1978. DeySeg