Commandos in Malvinas: Lack of Technique and Doctrine in Reconnaissance Missions

Reconnaissance Patrols Without Technique or Doctrine

Reconnaissance Patrols Without Technique or Doctrine

Excerpt taken from the book "Comandos en Malvinas - The Other Story," chapter "Analysis of Operations." The book is available in print and e-book format on Amazon.

Without a doubt, it can be said that within the Argentine Army (EA), the Argentine Navy (ARA), and the Argentine Air Force (FAA), there was no clear doctrine regarding the use of commando units for reconnaissance tasks. Incredibly, reconnaissance missions were considered secondary and even looked down upon within the different units and in the commando training course itself. In this course, barely any time was devoted to such missions, when, as we all know, any technique is mastered by precisely dedicating time to it and practicing it repeatedly.

The problem in the Argentine case was that many of these techniques were simply unknown. A reflection of the perception of reconnaissance operations within Argentine units can be seen in comments made by Major Rico in several interviews. The commander of the 602 Commando Company stated that his men were wasted on reconnaissance missions when they should have been used for raids against high-value targets. According to Rico's exact words, exploration missions were not worth the effort and could be carried out by other units.

This outdated mindset among the Argentines regarding reconnaissance patrols, along with its resulting consequences, was in complete contrast to the practices followed at the time by units in countries with experience and ongoing conflicts, such as Israel, South Africa, and NATO nations. In these countries, reconnaissance missions occupied a large portion of training hours and unit resources, and they were valued by general headquarters as force multipliers and a high-value resource for the development of subsequent operations.

NATO countries had even established an international training school for deep reconnaissance patrols in 1979 in Weingarten, Germany. This center aimed to improve procedures, standardize protocols, and reduce training costs. The Soviet Union also placed great importance on reconnaissance patrols.

After the Malvinas conflict, the operations carried out by Argentine commandos were studied in many training centers and military schools worldwide, serving as a model of "what not to do." For example, at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) at Fort Bragg, U.S.A., the errors committed by Argentine patrols were part of the curriculum from 1984 until at least 1992. But it was especially at Weingarten, thanks in part to British instructors assigned there, that the serious mistakes of Argentine commando units were widely disseminated and known at the international level. From then on, these errors were used in commando schools and training courses in many countries as examples of the mistakes to avoid.

An old military adage says, "Time spent on reconnaissance is never wasted time," a principle that the Argentine Armed Forces and their commando units did not seem to have internalized — and had to learn the hard way.

Beagle Crisis: The Beagle/Cape Horne Air Naval Battle

Beagle Crisis: The Fleets Face Off in the Southern Sea

By Esteban McLaren for FDRA

On December 22, 1978, D-Day, coordinated military actions along the borders with Chile would have commenced as part of Operation Sovereignty. It is difficult to determine with certainty which of the planned actions would have officially initiated the war, but it is clear that a simultaneous assault on at least four fronts would have taken place. The primary front would have been the naval battle and landing in the Beagle Channel, where the Argentine Navy's Marine Corps (IMARA) would have deployed troops to the Lennox, Nueva (already occupied by Chilean Marine Corps, CIM), and Picton Islands.

The purpose of this article is to explore an alternative history scenario. The war never took place, but what would have happened if Argentina had not accepted papal mediation?

In December 1978, tensions between Argentina and Chile over the sovereignty of the Picton, Lennox, and Nueva islands in the Beagle Channel reached a critical point. Diplomacy had failed, and both countries were preparing for armed confrontation. The Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR), with its powerful combination of aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, was preparing to face the Chilean Navy (ACh), a well-equipped force but at a numerical and technological disadvantage. Chilean authors speculate that in terms of infantry, Argentine forces roughly doubled the Chileans in size; in terms of armored vehicles, the ratio was 5:1; for aircraft, 3:1; and in naval strength, Argentina was slightly superior in some aspects (surface combatants), decisively superior in others (submarines operating in the area), and qualitatively unmatched in yet another (aircraft carriers).

Order of Battle as of December 20, 1978

Chilean Navy (ACh)

• Main Ships:

  • Tre Kronor-class light cruiser: Almirante Latorre.
  • Brooklyn-class light cruiser: Capitán Prat.
  • Almirante-class destroyers: Almirante Riveros, Blanco Encalada, and Cochrane.
  • Leander-class frigates: Almirante Williams, Almirante Condell, and Almirante Lynch.
  • Fletcher-class destroyers: Blanco Encalada (DD-14) and Cochrane (DD-15).
  • Allen M. Sumner-class destroyer: Ministro Portales.

• Submarines:

  • SS Simpson, the only operational submarine, as the Oberon-class submarines were undergoing major maintenance.

• Naval Aviation:

  • AS-332 Super Puma helicopters.

Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR)

• Main Ships:

  • Aircraft carrier: ARA Veinticinco de Mayo.
  • Brooklyn-class cruiser: ARA General Belgrano.
  • Type 42 destroyer: ARA Hércules.
  • Gearing-class destroyer: ARA Py.
  • Allen M. Sumner-class destroyers: ARA Comodoro Seguí, ARA Bouchard, and ARA Piedrabuena.
  • Fletcher-class destroyers: ARA Rosales (D-22), ARA Almirante Domecq García (D-23), and ARA Almirante Storni (D-24).
  • A69-class corvettes: ARA Drummond and ARA Guerrico.

• Submarines:

  • ARA Santiago del Estero, ARA Salta, ARA San Luis, and ARA Santa Fe.

• Naval Aviation:

  • 8 A-4Q Skyhawk aircraft aboard the carrier, with one on 24/7 interceptor alert on the flight deck. The interceptor on deck intercepted a CASA 212 maritime patrol aircraft stationed at Puerto Williams twice.
  • SH-3 Sea King helicopters.

2. Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Both Fleets

Chilean Navy (ACh)

• Qualitative:

  • High defensive capability with frigates equipped with Exocet missiles.
  • Limited submarine capacity, with only one operational submarine.
  • Good coordination between surface and air units.

• Quantitative:

  • 2 light cruiser
  • 3 frigates
  • 6 destroyers
  • 1 operational submarine

Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR)

• Qualitative:

  • Air superiority with the aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo.
  • Greater submarine capacity with 4 operational submarines.
  • High force projection capability with modern destroyers and frigates.

• Quantitative:

  • 1 air carrier
  • 1 light cruiser
  • 8 destroyers
  • 2 missile corvettes
  • 4 submarines

 

Conflict Escalation

The conflict did not de-escalate; on the contrary, it worsened. The Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR) decided to launch an attack on the Chilean Navy, which quickly set sail from Valparaíso heading south toward the Beagle Channel. The last detected position of FLOMAR was 120 miles (some sources cite 193 miles) southwest of Cape Horn, preparing to support Operation Sovereignty, whose primary objective was the amphibious landing and capture of the Picton, Lennox, and Nueva islands.

 

Capabilities Analysis

Chilean Navy (ACh)
The ACh possessed a light cruiser, destroyers, and frigates, all equipped with anti-air and anti-submarine defense capabilities. However, operational issues with the SS Simpson left the fleet without effective submarine coverage, a critical disadvantage in modern naval warfare.

Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR)
FLOMAR, on the other hand, had the advantage of the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, which provided air superiority with its A-4Q Skyhawks. The modern destroyers and multiple operational submarines gave FLOMAR a robust capacity for both defense and attack.

 

Key Points of Advance and Refuge Locations for the Chilean Navy (ACh)

To reach the Beagle Channel, the Chilean fleet would advance southward from Valparaíso, passing through Puerto Montt, the Chacao Channel, the Gulf of Penas, Bahía Inútil, and the Strait of Magellan, before heading toward the Beagle Channel. If refuge were needed, Chilean fjords such as the Última Esperanza Fjord, Quintupeu Fjord, Aysén Fjord, or Comau Fjord would serve as strategic locations to hide and launch counterattacks.

Quintupeu and Comau Fjords

 
Última Esperanza Fjord or Sound

Final Approach to the Beagle Channel (or Cape Horn)

The upper map shows the route of the Chilean fleet according to official Chilean and Argentine bibliographies.

Note that the Chilean fleet’s course passed over the position of the ARA Santa Fé submarine because it had detected them precisely days before December 21. In other words, the enemy fleet had already been detected and followed by a submarine of the Argentine Submarine Force (CFS). The fleet was heading south of Cape Horn to combat stations, with two ships anchored side by side, awaiting orders to attack. The ships were arranged in this manner to allow for personnel exchange and social interaction while waiting (Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano, 2017). We will return to this point later.

Detection and Engagement Strategies

The Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR) would employ its S-2 Tracker and P-2 Neptune aircraft for reconnaissance missions (as they would successfully do four years later in the Malvinas), and the A-4Q Skyhawks for attacks, while Argentine submarines would ambush Chilean ships at critical points in the Strait of Magellan and the Drake Passage. FLOMAR’s destroyers and frigates would provide fire support and anti-aircraft defense to protect amphibious and heliborne assault operations.

Once again, it is enlightening to refer to the "official" account of the Chilean fleet’s movements (Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano, 2017). In this text, it is detailed how Chilean officers trained on a land-based simulator (this is not a joke) called Redifon, which consisted of interconnected cubicles simulating ships, and practiced maneuvers in the basement of the Tactical Training Center of the Naval War Academy in Valparaíso. Merino and López, practicing on this analog simulator, tried various attack combinations on the FLOMAR and concluded that they had to achieve "control of the sea," aiming for a decisive naval battle in the style of Mahan. The outcome of these exercises determined an optimal attack formation where "all missile-equipped ships would go ahead, with gunnery ships behind" (p. 86). I don’t understand why the Redifon was even required for something that seems like common sense. Or was there perhaps some logic to sending the gunships first (Prat, Latorre) and the missile ships behind (Almirante-class, Leander-class)?

FLOMAR, on the other hand, "lacked" such a simulator simply because the crews spent most of the naval year on board, maneuvering with real ships in real time and facing real problems. Approximately two-thirds of the year, the crews remained on board—a fact anyone with relatives in the Argentine Navy at that time can corroborate. Many sailors during this golden era of the Argentine Navy only met their children when they were 8 or 9 months old, as their life at sea prevented earlier visits. The distance between both fleets, beyond the geographic one, was astronomical.

 

Analysis of the Clash of Forces

Within the framework of the 1978 Beagle Crisis, tensions between Argentina and Chile reached a critical point, bringing both nations to the brink of armed conflict. Operation Sovereignty, planned by Argentina, had as its primary objective the amphibious landing and capture of the Picton, Lennox, and Nueva islands, located in the Beagle Channel. This operation was to be conducted under strong naval and air cover provided by the Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR).

Preparations and Force Composition

By late December 1978, FLOMAR was fully equipped and ready for action. It had at its disposal the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, a crucial asset that carried A-4Q Skyhawks and S-2 Trackers, providing both air interception and maritime patrol capabilities. The fleet also included several modern destroyers, such as the ARA Hércules (the only one equipped with medium range naval SAM like the Sea Dart), as well as frigates like the ARA Piedrabuena and ARA Espora. Additionally, Argentina possessed a significant submarine force with the ARA Santiago del Estero, ARA Salta, ARA Santa Fe, and ARA San Luis submarines.

The Chilean Navy (ACh), although smaller in number, maintained a robust defensive force. Its primary asset was the light cruiser CL-02 Capitán Prat and the still formidable Almirante Latorre, accompanied by frigates and destroyers equipped with MM-38 Exocet missiles. The Chilean fleet also included the submarine SS-21 Simpson, the only operational submarine at the time, as the other Oberon-class submarines were undergoing major maintenance.

 

Operation Development

The landing operation planned by Argentina focused on Isla Nueva, where it was known that around 150 Chilean marines were entrenched. The Argentine strategy was to land on the southern coast of the island, avoiding Chilean defenses in the north. To execute this, the amphibious transport ARA Cabo San Antonio would be employed, escorted by destroyers and frigates providing fire support and protection.

The Chileans anticipated a conventional landing on the islands, when in fact, the most likely scenario was that the occupation would be carried out via vertical assault using helicopters.

The final phase of FLOMAR’s approach was established with the Argentine fleet advancing from its last detected position, 120 miles south of Cape Horn, moving eastward toward the Beagle Channel. Meanwhile, the Chilean Navy (ACh) mobilized from Puerto Williams, heading toward the channel to intercept the Argentine forces. Here, two simultaneous courses of action can be evaluated: first, the main fleet moved toward the Drake Passage to engage FLOMAR in open waters; second, the smaller torpedo boats (Quidora, Fresia, Tegualda, and Guacolda) would confront the landing force.

Submarine Warfare

The book La Escuadra en Acción by Arancibia Clavel and Bulnes Serrano recounts the military and political activity during the conflict, with a focus on the Chilean Navy. Although the text is not highly technical regarding the means employed, it provides an interesting general description of the operations of the Chilean fleet in the south.

In this account, it is mentioned that the Chilean Submarine Force was composed of the Balao-class submarine Simpson (SS-21) and the modern, for the time, British Oberon-class submarines named Hyatt (SS-23) and O'Brien (SS-22).

According to this source, the O'Brien was in dry dock during the conflict, and the Hyatt had to interrupt its transit south and return to its base in Talcahuano due to a mechanical failure. The other Balao-class submarine, the Thomson (SS-20), is not even mentioned, possibly because it had already been decommissioned due to its age. In fact, both Brazil and Argentina had retired their submarines of this class in the early 1970s, after receiving the Guppy class.

Although the Simpson was technologically outdated for the circumstances, it managed to fulfill its mission. The old submarine had to surface frequently to recharge its batteries, dangerously exposing itself to Argentine radars and periscopes. It was photographed at least twice by Argentine submarines while on the surface. Due to its wear, it is not surprising that this operation had to be performed more frequently than usual. The Simpson was detected twice by Argentine submarines, which chose not to fire their torpedoes. Nonetheless, it is possible that its commander, Rubén Scheihing, attempted to attack despite his technological disadvantage.

Patrol Areas Assigned to the Argentine Submarines

Although the exact dates cannot be confirmed, the Guppy-class submarines were very close to engaging in combat, although fortunately, their commanders interpreted their orders with sound judgment. In mid-December, the Santa Fe submarine was patrolling the entrance to Bahía Cook at a depth of 50 meters. The sonar operators detected the sound of approaching warship propellers. The commander of the S-21 raised the combat alarm, the crew took their positions, and all torpedo tubes were prepared for launch. The propeller sounds grew in number, eventually forming what appeared to be "a fleet." The Chilean squadron sailed above the S-21, heading into the open waters of the South Pacific.

The sonar operators counted three, four, six... up to 13 ships. Some had "heavy" propellers, like cruisers, while most had "light" propellers, similar to those of destroyers.

However, the Chilean fleet was sailing without emitting signals, meaning they were not using active sonar on the escort ships. A fleet commander's decision to sail without emitting can have several justifications, such as not actively searching for submarines or preferring to be more discreet, as sonar emissions propagate over great distances and can be detected by submarine countermeasure equipment, revealing their course or trajectory.

It is not difficult to imagine the immense tension experienced by the crew of the Santa Fe. Suspended in silence dozens of meters below the Pacific, they awaited the Chilean fleet's actions, with weapons ready to launch if the right moment came to strike from a tactically advantageous position.

Ultimately, the Chilean fleet entered open waters, moving away from the S-21. Following his orders, the commander of the Santa Fe did not interpret the Chilean fleet's maneuver as a hostile act, especially at a time when there was no formal declaration of war.

This situation clearly shows that the ARA Santa Fe was aware of the Chilean fleet's position and, in the event of war, it would have been the first to launch torpedoes against the Chilean fleet.

Meeting and Engagement Point

The meeting point of the fleets would be near the Beagle Channel. FLOMAR had to face the threat of the ACh's MM-38 Exocet missiles, with a range of 35-40 km. There is a recurring narrative in dialogues, discussions, and exchanges with trans-Andean experts and novices alike that suggests a certain accounting of Exocets, leading to the assumption that a potential naval battle would "clearly" tip in favor of the ACh. At that time, Chile was thought to have 4 to 8 more missile launchers than the ARA. This is the denial of the evident Argentine advantage, as these opinion shapers tend to overlook the key assets of the ARA: its aircraft carrier and its four operational submarines. For greater clarity, the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo provided Argentina with a significant advantage, enabling attacks from distances of over 200 miles (370 km). Another key factor, when compared with the experience in the Malvinas, is that the Argentine Naval Aviation had full experience in anti-ship attacks, and the bomb fuses would have been correctly adjusted to detonate on impact with the ships. Once the Chilean fleet was detected by the S-2 Tracker and P-3 Neptune aircraft, its position would be relayed to FAA airbases and the CFS submarines, and it would only be a matter of time to see who would arrive first to the hunt.

Landing and Engagement Scenarios

1. Chilean Fleet’s Approach to Stop the Landing
   The Chilean Navy (ACh) would rapidly advance from Puerto Williams toward the Beagle Channel, deploying its frigates and destroyers to intercept and attack the Argentine landing forces. Fast attack craft would also be used to disrupt the landings and support vessels. The Chileans would launch Exocet missiles and use naval artillery to harass the landing craft. Additionally, they would coordinate air strikes from Punta Arenas using Hawker Hunter and A-37 Dragonfly aircraft. Entering the Beagle Channel is a losing strategy for either fleet due to restricted movement, sensor disruption caused by terrain clutter, and the consequent degradation in weapon performance.

2. FLOMAR’s Response to This Movement
   In response to the Chilean approach, FLOMAR would deploy its A-4Q Skyhawks and S-2 Trackers from the aircraft carrier to conduct preemptive strikes against ACh units. Argentine submarines would patrol strategic areas to intercept Chilean ships. FLOMAR would use its air defense systems to intercept approaching aircraft and launch its own anti-ship missiles to neutralize key threats. Unlike the Chilean fleet, the Argentine Navy had an external attack element in the form of carrier-based aviation. The confined space of the channel would facilitate an air-naval attack and would have been ideal for a sequence of attacks followed by rearming to restart the cycle.

3. ACh Focuses on Seeking Out FLOMAR for Direct Defeat
   Based on the cited literature, this was the path chosen by the Chilean Navy. If the ACh had decided to seek out and directly confront FLOMAR, they would have circled Navarino Island or approached via the Drake Passage toward Cape Horn (southeast route). They would coordinate with the Simpson submarine and aerial patrols to locate the Argentine fleet, launching missiles and naval artillery strikes as soon as they detected it. According to the same literature, the ARA Santa Fe was positioned beneath the fleet when it entered open waters, meaning the target was detected first. Again, in this scenario, the Argentine naval aviation would have encountered them halfway, in any case, forcing them to endure several waves of A-4Q Skyhawk attacks. What remained of these waves would be what could confront an intact FLOMAR. Checkmate.

4. FLOMAR Focuses on Seeking Out ACh for Direct Defeat
   If FLOMAR decided to seek out and directly confront ACh, it would advance from its position south of Cape Horn toward the northeast. They would use their carrier-based aircraft for reconnaissance and attack, first launching repeated air strikes to sink or disable the main surface assets, followed by attacks to sink or damage various ships. They would then move closer to launch anti-ship missiles from their destroyers and frigates, coordinating strikes with their submarines.

   Here we recall the ACh's "combat station" formation: the ships were anchored side by side to share the wait with social interaction and the exchange of supplies. If the ARA had launched its A-4Q Skyhawks while this formation was still in place, it would have greatly facilitated the effectiveness of the bombs. A single bombing run by three aircraft with three 450-kilogram bombs could have impacted two ships at a time, doubling their efficiency. Checkmate.

Roles of Naval and Military Aviation

• Argentine Carrier-Based Naval Aviation:

  • A-4Q Skyhawk: These aircraft would conduct interception and air superiority missions, as well as attacks on enemy ships to protect the landing forces. A total of 8 units were carrier-based.
  • S-2 Tracker: These aircraft would perform maritime patrols, submarine detection, and coordination of anti-submarine and anti-ship attacks. 2 units were carrier-based.
  • P-3 Neptune: Operating from land bases, these long-range aircraft had highly trained crews who conducted year-round missions in the Argentine Sea.

• Naval Aviation Based in Río Grande:

  • T-28 Fennec: These aircraft would perform close air support missions and ground attacks to cover the landing forces (deployed in Río Grande and Estancia La Sara). A total of 19 units.
  • MB-326 Aermacchi: These aircraft would carry out interdiction and ground attack missions to support amphibious and land operations (Río Grande). The exact number of units is undetermined.
  • T-34C Turbo Mentor: These aircraft would undertake light attack missions, logistical support, and supply transport. More than 12 units.

• Chilean Military Aviation in Chabunco:

  • Hawker Hunter: These aircraft would perform interception and air combat, ship attacks, and provide support to ground forces (6 units).
  • A-37 Dragonfly: These aircraft would conduct ground attacks, close support, interdiction, and harassment of Argentine landing forces (12 units).

• Argentine Military Aviation in Río Gallegos:

  • A-4B/C/P Skyhawk: These aircraft would carry out attacks on ships and provide support to ground forces, as well as interception and air combat when necessary (12 units).
  • Mirage IIIEA/Mirage 5 Dagger/IAI Nesher: More than 30 units of the three models combined.
  • F-86 Sabre: These were pure interception fighters, deployed to engage the Hawker Hunters due to experience gained during the Indo-Pakistani wars. The exact number is unclear, but pilot reports suggest there were more than 4 units and less than 14.
  • Their objectives were first to initiate bombings against military targets in the cities of Punta Arenas (Chabunco airbase) and Puerto Williams (Zañartú airfield) and to destroy the Chilean Air Force, using a technique very similar to that employed by Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967. The same approach would be implemented across all active fronts.

 

A-4Q Launched from the Aircraft Carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo Strikes the ACh APD-29 Uribe

 

The offensive against Chile would follow the following sequence: (Wikipedia):

• Starting at 20:00 hours (H-2) on D-Day, December 22, 1978, FLOMAR and the Marine Infantry — Battalion No. 5 — would occupy the Freycinet, Hershell, Wollaston, Deceit, and Hornos islands (see map below).
• At 22:00 hours, the designated H-Hour, FLOMAR and marines — Battalions No. 3 and No. 4 — would occupy the Picton, Nueva, and Lennox islands, also gaining control of the Beagle Channel (see map below).
• The ground offensive would begin at 24:00 hours (H+2). The V Army Corps would launch an attack from the Santa Cruz area, aiming to conquer as much Chilean territory as possible in the Patagonian region. Simultaneously, the Argentine Air Force would begin strategic bombings.
• At 06:00 hours (H+8) on December 23, 1978 (23.06:00.DEC.978), the destruction of the Chilean Air Force on the ground would commence.

 

The naval confrontation between Argentina and Chile in 1978 would have been a complex, multidimensional operation, involving naval, air, and ground forces in a challenging geographical environment. Argentina's air and submarine superiority gave it a significant advantage, though Chile's coastal defenses and tactical coordination offered formidable resistance. The outcome would have depended on numerous tactical and strategic factors, as well as the effectiveness in executing the planned operations by both nations.

In this specific scenario, it should be noted that the Argentine armed forces had three air bases on the front: one mobile (the ARA Veinticinco de Mayo) and two air bases in Río Grande and Río Gallegos, which would prove to be highly operational four years later in the Malvinas. In contrast, only the Chabunco air base in Punta Arenas would bear the burden of attempting to stop the landing operations, conduct anti-ship missions against FLOMAR, combat air attacks from the northeast (Río Gallegos air base) and from the east-northeast (Río Grande naval air base), and then plan ABA (Airbase Attack) operations against these same bases. Is that not too many objectives for a single runway?

For its part, the Argentine Naval Aviation (COAN) would focus exclusively on anti-ship strikes or very close air support, while the Argentine Air Force (FAA) would support the advance of the armored assault on Punta Arenas, conduct an ABA against the Chabunco air base, and ensure air superiority over Punta Arenas. Additionally, at the request of the Argentine Navy (ARA), the FAA would provide air support to the landing operations.

Probabilities of Success

Argentine Forces: With air superiority provided by the aircraft carrier and a modern surface fleet and submarines, Argentine forces had a significant advantage. The joint air-sea-submarine operations of FLOMAR would increase their chances of success.

Comparative Strength Between ACh (Left) and FLOMAR (Right)

The pink bands indicate the range of their main weapons (MM38 Exocet, 20 miles or 35-42 km). The aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo is represented by an A-4Q fully loaded with bombs and fuel, with a range of 350 km. These are the vital areas to cover before considering a real threat to the adversary. As an analyst, I find it difficult to even see a glimpse of equality between both forces.

Before analyzing the Chilean case, let us review the probability the Chilean Squadron had of repelling an air attack, which would have been the primary weapon of the Argentine Navy (ARA). Some Chilean destroyers (Almirante-class) were equipped with the British Short Seacat system. This is a small subsonic missile, powered by a two-stage solid-fuel rocket motor. In flight, it is guided by four cruciform wings and stabilized by four small tail fins. It is guided by command line-of-sight (CLOS) through a radio link, meaning flight commands are transmitted by a remote operator with both the missile and target in sight. The same system was installed on the Argentine carrier Veinticinco de Mayo and, in its land-based version (Tigercat), was deployed in Tierra del Fuego (IMARA) and Río Gallegos (Army). The missile proved highly inaccurate in the Malvinas conflict due to its lack of autonomy and reliance on the operator’s coordination of pulse and vision, with the inherent human eye difficulties in accurately perceiving depth and distance in space. Therefore, perhaps the best-equipped Chilean ship for self-defense against air attacks was likely the cruiser Almirante Latorre or Prat, with up to 14 Bofors 40mm pom-pom guns. These would have been the most difficult targets to approach and attack, and, if communications had allowed, the task might have been delegated to submarines.

Another intellectual exercise that no one has conducted, to my knowledge, is the following:

Chilean ships would approach at 21/28 knots (cruising speed/full speed) towards the Argentine naval forces (assuming that the CASA-212 aircraft correctly located them, as Chile had no other "eyes" available; there is a myth about electronic interception that is mentioned below). The distance to be covered was estimated to be between 140/193 miles according to various Chilean reports. This would take the Chilean fleet just over 5/8 hours of sailing to get within 20 miles of the Argentine ships (20 miles being the first point where they could attempt to strike the fleet, as that was the range of the MM38 Exocet missile, Chile’s only decisive weapon).

During those 5/8 hours, the ships would not be able to fire or damage the enemy. Meanwhile, during this period, the aircraft carrier ARA 25 de Mayo could launch and recover 3 to 5 combat sorties from its air group. Assuming each attack group flew at 400 knots round trip, landed, and took 25 minutes to reload bombs and refuel before taking off again, each A-4Q Skyhawk would take off with 3 bombs of 450kg on the central pylon, equipped with fuzes adapted to hit ships.

In the first pass alone, 24 bombs would be dropped on the "Squadron". Assuming no losses for the Argentine planes, by the fourth or fifth pass, between 96 and 120 bombs would have been dropped on the ships. Even if an Argentine plane was shot down in each pass, resulting in up to 4 losses, the worst-case scenario would still see up to 36 bombs launched against the "Squadron". In other words, before the Chilean fleet could close the gap between them and the enemy, they would have been hit by between 36 and 120 bombs (see the table below).

All of this would happen before any Chilean combat station operator could even press the launch button for a single Exocet missile. Do you understand how serious this plan was for the Chilean command? What were they thinking? Perhaps the worst part is that at the end of this death corridor, a fleet almost identical to the Chilean one in terms of surface combatants and Exocet launch capability, but completely intact, was waiting for them. Those who managed to survive would be met by a volley of French missiles.

Approximation times to 20 miles, passes, and number of bombs considering losses

Chilean Forces: The Chilean fleet in open waters was at the mercy of naval aviation first, and Argentine submarines later. As mentioned above, the distance between both fleets worked in favor of the FLOMAR. If the Chilean Navy had been detected at 190 miles, the bomb runs carried out by the Skyhawks would have left little afloat, even considering shoot-downs. It is almost sad to imagine a fleet speeding up to strike the enemy while being progressively bombarded over and over again with absolutely no help. Possibility of success: Zero.

Jorge Martínez Bush, a Chilean officer, stated the following in the book Soldados de Mar en Acción (Sánchez Urra, 2020), a compilation of the activities of the CIM.

"From what could have been the 'Naval Battle of Drake', then-Commander Jorge Martínez Bush, the second-in-command of the cruiser 'Prat', points out that 'we were about to enter combat, and we were prepared. In naval tactics, the position was in our favor because the sea and the wind worked for us, putting the Argentinians in a very complicated position' (p. 196)."

This officer accuses Vice Admiral López Silva of trusting the sea and the wind to defeat Argentine naval aviation. Did he take a pencil and paper and make a basic diagram to see if his statements had any foundation? What does Martínez Bush think about the air group (GAE) of the 25 de Mayo? Or did it not exist? If he is reading this, he could clarify this matter to the Chilean public. By the way, Sánchez Urra's account of the FLOMAR is suspiciously incomplete (he omits 2 Argentine submarines and speaks of "Chilean submarines" in the plural, portraying the Simpson as fully operational, on par with the Argentinians), which casts doubt on many other descriptions and lists presented throughout his work.

The other alternative was to hide in the fjords, which would have offered better chances of survival. However, with more than 100 enemy planes flying over their position and planning an attack, it was only a matter of time. The Chilean Navy was a serious opponent but completely lacked decisive weapons: neither aviation to disturb the two-dimensional plane nor operational submarines to attack from the complete stealth of the depths. Had the situation dragged on for only a week, it’s not unreasonable to think that the entire Chilean fleet would have ended up sunk or, for all practical purposes, out of combat. Possibility of success: Zero.

Defeat Scenario and Seeking Refuge in the Chilean Fjords

If the ACh suffered a defeat, a likely outcome would have involved the sinking or disabling of its main assets. In terms of naval target value, without a doubt, the Leander-class frigates would have been the primary focus of the attack, followed by the light cruisers Prat and Latorre, given their gunfire capability to affect landing operations. The remaining targets would have been defined by circumstance.

It’s worth adding here a piece of information that Admiral López Silva (theoretically the most prepared in naval-air warfare) of the ACh did not possess: Four years later, Argentine aircraft demonstrated that a fleet confined in a channel (like the San Carlos Strait) or very close to the coast (such as the southern islands of Cape Horn) was a perfectly reachable target for low-flying jet aircraft. The Royal Navy, equipped with much better air defense missiles than the ACh, only achieved a few isolated shootdowns, and only the failure of the fuses on bombs dropped by the FAA prevented its complete neutralization as a surface combat force before the end of the conflict. The attackers of the ACh would have been A-4 Skyhawks, both in their B and P variants, and Israeli Mirage fighters of the FAA, as well as the well-known A-4Qs of the COAN—all of which proved to be lethal in attacking a fleet. Did the Chilean fleet really expect a different outcome in their case?

If the ACh were to pass through the channel, it would ensure its demise. The fleet would be trapped in the Beagle Channel or advancing close to the southern coast of the islands, facilitating the approach of aircraft outside radar detection. The attack, as would later happen in the Malvinas, would take full advantage of the geography, just as it was in the San Carlos Strait. We now know that the likelihood of the main ACh units escaping an air attack was almost nil. Once the main units were disabled, the rest of the Chilean fleet would be attacked by Argentine destroyers and corvettes with their Exocets. This would not be the defeat chosen, according to the book by Arancibia Clavel and Serrano Bulnes.

The ACh would be forced to rely on air support from the Chilean Air Force (FACh), based at Chabunco airbase. At 6 AM on December 21, this base would be the primary target of a preemptive strike from all air assets stationed at BAM Río Gallegos. To make matters worse, if the Chilean fighters managed to take off, the COAN was lying in wait less than 200 km from Chabunco with a dozen T-28 Fennecs, ready to attack the Chilean fighters with machine guns and rockets as they landed.

Even so, if we consider that some units remained afloat after a defeat in the Fuegian channels, they would retreat to fjords such as Última Esperanza, Quintupeu, or Comau. With Argentine air superiority, Chilean forces would have little chance of success, as FLOMAR could carry out precise and sustained attacks. Without air superiority, Chilean forces would have a better chance of defending themselves, but they would still face a significant threat due to FLOMAR’s ability to coordinate attacks from both air and sea.

I want to add two final details before the conclusions. First, Chilean literature, whether academic or journalistic, as well as television media reports, engage in a repeated act of pretending ignorance. It is almost impossible to find books endorsed by the Chilean Navy (ACh) or other military forces, let alone by journalistic outlets, that mention the key word "A-4Q Skyhawk." Apparently, this weapon never existed in the theater of operations. And if it did, it was never a threat. In fact, they probably didn’t even fly. Oh, and the Argentine sailors got seasick due to rough seas. The books from the CIM or the “Squadron” pretend ignorance, as they reflect at all times, and absolutely without deviation, that what was going to take place was a naval battle, in the style of Jutland/Latakia. Two large fleets, now without cannons but with missiles, would come into firing range, each firing their volleys, and the better one would win. It almost seems as if the Argentine aircraft carrier was going to stay in the rear watching the scene, like a spectator in the stands.

This scenario is a complete disrespect to the informed reader. It is truly shameful that professional Chilean naval officers avoid addressing the clear impending air-naval battle and lie to their public by speaking of courage and patriotism to cover up what was entirely and fundamentally a technical issue. Sadly, Chilean "technical" literature is filled with this appeal to bravery rather than focusing on tools or tactics.

Finally, that same literature claims a level of information about Argentine forces' movements that surpasses what would be available today, even with two British AWACS donated as part of the collaboration during the Falklands War. Apparently, they had information on troop movements, aircraft movements, the position of the Argentine fleet, the order of operations of various units, and who knows what else. Moreover, this information was updated hourly. Not even with their own satellites would they have had such an instantaneous real-time picture. Apparently, Argentine communications had been "decoded," similar to Japan’s Purple Code. This is mentioned by anonymous authors using the mysterious term "electronic interception or tracking." Well, that was not the case. Argentine encrypted communications were not decoded. What naval intelligence actually did was maintain open channels to broadcast the information they wanted to be accessible to Chilean listening posts (counterintelligence). Argentine communications were indeed intercepted, but that happened in 1982, by NATO intelligence agencies, specifically from a station in Norway. But let’s never confuse NATO with Chile under any circumstances. In the previous statement, Martínez Smith himself comments that the Argentine fleet was an hour's sailing distance from the Chilean border, knowing this only through intercepted communications. Dear reader, in air-naval warfare, one does not order an attack on a fleet whose location has not been confirmed by one’s own sensors (an observer or radar providing the position). If FLOMAR was going to be attacked based on "intercepted" information, it was probably an ambush planned by the Argentine naval command.

The TransAndean Squadron, such as it was detected by the ARA Santa Fe submarine
 

In summary, the technological and operational superiority of FLOMAR granted the Argentine forces a considerable advantage in a direct confrontation with the ACh. The geography of the Chilean fjords would provide a natural refuge, but Chilean forces would still face significant challenges without the ability to counter Argentine air and naval superiority.

Retreat to the Fjords, Perhaps the Best Outcome for the ACh...

This report does not diminish the performance or the planning executed by the ACh. They did the best they could with what they had. That said, it wasn’t enough. The stars aligned to leave them without sufficient submarine capability (the SS-21 Simpson was detected and photographed twice before December 21, while their best submarines were undergoing major maintenance). Air support was going to be limited because they lacked a naval attack aviation force, and the FACh's air assets were going to receive their baptism of fire that same morning, meaning they would be fighting for their own survival. According to the plan, by the afternoon of December 21, Chabunco was expected to be inoperable—whether by FAA A-4 and Mirage strikes in the early morning or by T-28 Fennec/MB326 attacks throughout the rest of the day.

A criticism that can be leveled against López Silva’s plan is that he adhered to a Mahanian philosophy of seeking a decisive large-scale naval battle. He was committing the entire fleet ("all-in") in a maneuver where it would suffer many losses before even seeing the enemy on their radar screens. Once the events were set in motion, the fate of the Chilean fleet would be sealed for the rest of the conflict. This invites reflection on alternatives: when a smaller fleet faces a larger one, it should better rely on naval guerrilla tactics or small attrition battles. The Argentine Navy was born this way—facing much larger fleets, such as the Spanish and the Brazilian Imperial Navy, dragging them into small battles that favored minor but exhausting victories against the enemy. The fjords are an ideal setting for such a task: hiding ships to later conduct coordinated attacks. Even with enemy air superiority, this tactic can still be effective, as the Germans demonstrated during WWII by sheltering ships in protected fjords with dense layers of air defense and achieving success. This alternative would likely be more reasonable than facing a fully equipped aircraft carrier in open waters, without air superiority, and with an impaired submarine force. And here, the term "larger fleet" is more qualitative than quantitative—the Chilean "squadron" was going solo, with very little support from the depths and no air support, against naval pilots who trained intensively every year on how to sink ships and were highly skilled.

Did López Silva think that the ARA would bring its main naval assets within the range of Chilean Exocets for a gentleman’s duel? Was López Silva expecting a Jutland or a Latakia while heading into a Midway? Could it be that the Chilean naval command believed that the ARA would not exploit its submarine and naval air superiority by deploying its submarines and carrier-based fighters before they could even detect FLOMAR on their radars? Did López Silva think the A-4Q Skyhawks would not be launched against his ships? Long before a Chilean sailor would get the chance to press the launch button on an Exocet, the Chilean fleet would encounter the COAN and the CFS—either sequentially or simultaneously.

Sources

• Arancibia Clavel, Patricia y Bulnes Serrano, Francisco. La escuadra en acción. 1978: el conflicto Chile-Argentina visto a través de sus protagonistas, Santiago, Chile: Catalonia, 2017 (ISBN: 978-956-324-298-0)
• Burzaco, Ricardo. La Fuerza de Submarinos de la Armada Argentina en la crisis de 1978. DeySeg
  

Malvinas: Why Didn’t the Bombs Explode? (2/8)

Why Didn’t the Bombs Explode?

Part 1 || Part 2 || Part 3 || Part 4 || Part 5 || Part 6 || Part 7 || Part 8

Guilherme Poggio || Poder Aereo




 

 
Thirty-five years ago, Argentines and Britons clashed in the frigid waters of the South Atlantic, fighting over the possession of the Malvinas Islands (Falklands, as the British call them). It was during this conflict that the Argentine Air Force (FAA – Fuerza Aérea Argentina) entered combat for the first time against an external enemy. The baptism of fire took place on May 1, 1982. The Air Power blog publishes an exclusive article in parts, covering the vectors, weapons, and tactics used by the FAA to attack and destroy the ships of the British Task Force. To read the previous parts, click the links below.

Vectors and Armaments

Faced with the challenge of confronting one of the best-equipped and prepared navies in the world, the FAA had limited options. The most suitable vectors for the mission were the IAI Dagger, an Israeli version of the Mirage 5, and the McDonnell Douglas A-4B/C Skyhawk. The latter were very similar to the A-4Q model of the Argentine Naval Aviation, which was also used in naval attacks against the British.
Dagger M-5 C-401 stationed at Río Grande configured for an attack mission, where two Spanish BR-250 bombs can be seen in the central hangar (“Nafgan”) and two 1700-liter fuel tanks (in “Hotel” configuration). This aircraft was used in the mission on June 8. The attack ultimately damaged the HMS Plymouth frigate.FOTO: Museo de Aviación Naval

The issue of armaments was more delicate. The only guided weapon available was the Martín Pescador air-to-surface missile. This missile, still not fully operational at the time, was tested by the FAA in April 1982, using an IA-58 Pucará aircraft as the vector. Due to its radio guidance system and the firing distance, the aircraft was too exposed to anti-aircraft fire. For these reasons, the possibility of using this missile in the war was abandoned.

Lacking guided weapons, the FAA evaluated the use of free-fall bombs. The FAA had essentially four types of general-purpose free-fall bombs available for combat. The first were 454 kg (1000 lb) bombs of British origin. The Argentines called these bombs MK-17. Although they were identical to those used by the British, the latter referred to them as MK 13/15. These were high-resistance bombs that could be equipped with either a smooth tail or a parachute brake. The MK-17 bombs had been acquired by the Argentines 12 years before the conflict as part of the weapons package for their English Electric Canberra B.62/T.64 bombers.


A British-made MK-17 bomb next to an FAA Canberra bomber. These bombs were acquired along with the bomber 12 years before the 1982 conflict. FOTO: FAA

Newer than the MK-17 bombs were the Spanish bombs produced by Expal (Explosivos Alaveses SA). These were low-drag bombs based on the American MK 80 series. There were two models: one weighing 250 kg and another weighing 125 kg. The 250 kg model could be fitted with either a smooth tail or a parachute-brake tail, while the 125 kg bombs only had a smooth tail. They were acquired in 1978 due to the threat of a border conflict with Chile. There is information that high-drag 500 kg Spanish bombs were also part of the FAA’s inventory in 1982.

 
The FAA A-4B with registration C-235 was already in the final stages of the conflict. In the foreground, three Spanish BP-250 smooth-tail bombs are arranged in a single cluster. They were loaded onto the central pylon, beneath the fuselage (station 3).FOTO: FAA
Malvinas 35 Years: Why Didn’t the Bombs Explode?

The third option was the Brazilian-made low-drag BR-BK 125 kg bombs. These were produced by the Armament Factory in the Argentine city of Córdoba. These bombs were exclusively assigned to the IA-58 Pucará, which operated from the Malvinas (and thus did not participate in naval operations). The reasons why the Argentines chose not to use this bomb in naval attacks will be discussed later.

Another option that was evaluated but not used during the conflict was the Israeli IMI Mod. 4 bomb, weighing 130 kg, which had been acquired along with the IAI Dagger a few years before the conflict (details about this case will also be discussed later).

A pair of Israeli IMI Mod. 4 bombs, weighing 130 kg, mounted on an M-5 Dagger fighter. There are no records of this weapon being used during the 1982 conflict. FOTO: FAA

There are reports that the FAA also possessed some American-made AN-M65A1 1,000-pound bombs at the time of the conflict, which had come with the Avro Lincoln bombers. In statements to “The History Channel,” Brigadier Sergio Mayor (V Air Brigade – A-4B) mentioned that AN-M65A1 bombs were used in Malvinas. However, there are no other documents to confirm this version, and it is possible that the general confused the American bombs with the MK-17 bombs.

Another unconventional possibility was the use of incendiary bombs against the British fleet. According to then Vice Commodore (Lieutenant Colonel) Arturo Pereyra, head of the Operations Department of FAS (Southern Air Force – activated to coordinate resources in combat missions), these were not used for "humanitarian reasons."

The option of using incendiary bombs against Royal Navy ships was dismissed for "humanitarian reasons." However, several Napalm bombs were sent to the Malvinas airfields, where the IA Pucará operated in strictly land-based actions. FOTO: archivo

The use of air-launched torpedoes was also evaluated. Argentina had some units of the old American Mk 13 torpedo, previously used by the PBY Catalina. Shortly after the conflict began, a torpedo testing program was initiated, using a modified IA Pucará as the delivery platform. The final test was scheduled for June 14, but with the end of hostilities, the program was suspended.



A modified Pucará prepared for flight tests, armed with an American Mk-13 torpedo in the central hangar. The tests were conducted shortly before the end of the conflict.. FOTO: FAA

Finally, it is worth noting that the FAA tested 454 kg free-fall bombs of French origin and Soviet cluster bombs, both supplied by the Peruvian Air Force. However, there are no known actual attacks using these devices.

The following table, created exclusively for this article, summarizes the general-purpose bombs available to the FAA at the time of the conflict.

Bombs Available in the FAA Inventory in 1982 for Use Against Royal Navy Ships

Malvinas: Why didn't the bombs explode? (1/8)

Why Didn't the Bombs Explode? (Part 1)

Guillermo Poggio || Poder Aéreo

Parte 1 || Parte 2 || Parte 3 || Parte 4 || Parte 5 || Parte 6 || Parte 7 || Parte 8



 



Thirty-five years ago, Argentines and Britons clashed in the frigid waters of the South Atlantic, fighting over the possession of the Malvinas Islands (known as "Falklands" to the British). It was during this conflict that the Argentine Air Force (FAA – Fuerza Aérea Argentina) entered combat for the first time against an external enemy. The baptism of fire took place on May 1, 1982. The following text recounts the story of what was the FAA's most important mission: to attack and destroy the ships of the British Task Force. Taken by surprise, the FAA carried out its missions despite lacking proper training, adequate vectors, and the right armament for the task. This is a story of overcoming challenges, rapid adaptation, and ingenuity. In the end, the results went far beyond what was initially expected.

Introduction

In early June 1944, the Allies were rushing to launch Operation Overlord, the amphibious landing in Normandy, which promised to change the course of World War II. Off the coast of Lyme Bay in the English Channel, HMS Boadicea (H65), a veteran B-class destroyer launched in 1930, was escorting a convoy of merchant ships. On June 13, the convoy fell victim to German aviation. Two torpedoes launched by Junkers Ju-88 bombers struck Boadicea. With the explosion of the ammunition magazine, the British ship quickly sank.

Boadicea was the last Royal Navy ship lost to enemy air action in that conflict. However, considering the use of free-fall devices ("dumb bombs"), the last British loss to enemy aviation was the HMS Panther, a P-class destroyer. The ship was hit by bombs dropped by German Junkers Ju. 87 “Stuka” dive bombers during the Dodecanese campaign in the Aegean Sea on October 9, 1943.


The British cruiser HMS Gloucester being attacked by German Ju-87 'Stuka' aircraft in the Mediterranean Sea on May 22, 1941. The ship would sink that same day after being hit directly by at least four 250 kg bombs. The photo was taken by one of the German aircraft at mid-altitude. If the Argentines were to use this same attack profile, the chances of success would be very small.FOTO: archivo

Since then, naval aviation warfare has undergone profound changes. Forty years later, using aircraft to drop free-fall bombs against escorts equipped with aerial surveillance systems and guided missiles was no longer considered a viable option for naval air attacks, unless the system of the targeted ship was overwhelmed. In 1982, the Argentines demonstrated that old weapons and new tactics could be combined to surprise the Royal Navy, and once again warships would be lost to free-fall bombs.

Caught by Surprise

All the military planning for the recapture of the Malvinas Islands was carried out confidentially by the high command of the Argentine Navy, with Admiral Anaya, the commander of the force, as the mastermind. By the end of 1981, the Argentine military government considered the possibility of retaking the Malvinas Islands through military action if diplomatic negotiations failed. This option was discussed with President Leopoldo Galtieri.

 
The military junta that ruled Argentina in 1982. In the center, President Galtieri. To his left is Anaya, the architect of the Malvinas recapture, and to his left is the FAA commander, Brigadier Lami Dozo. Dozo learned of the plan to retake the islands shortly before the new year. Most of his subordinates only became aware of the events on April 2, 1982, the date of the Argentine landing on the islands. Dozo passed away two months ago at the age of 88. FOTO: archivo

It turns out that at the same time, the Strategic Air Command (CAE) of the Argentine Air Force (FAA) had completed an update to the strategic planning of the Force, which did not include military actions against the British to retake the Malvinas Islands. The commander of the Argentine Air Force, Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo, was the last of the three commanders to learn about the existence of the military plan, being informed of it two days before the end of 1981.

The strategists of the Argentine Air Force had never considered the possibility of getting involved in a conflict with the United Kingdom over the Malvinas Islands. There were two major reasons for this, one legal and the other geopolitical.

From a legal standpoint, Resolution 1/69, issued by the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Argentine Armed Forces, helped resolve some disputes between the three branches and better defined each of their roles. Based on this resolution, by the end of 1969, Law No. 18.416 was enacted, which established the specific responsibilities of each branch.

In this way, the Navy had specific responsibilities over Argentina's territorial waters and coastline. It was tasked with acquiring all necessary assets, including naval and maritime resources, whether onboard ships or not. Regarding naval operations, the FAA was only required to provide indirect support without the need to acquire specialized assets different from those used in air operations.

Therefore, by April 1982, the FAA lacked the necessary assets and doctrines to engage in naval air warfare. None of the FAA pilots had ever dropped a single device into the sea. Most of them did it for the first time in combat.

From a geopolitical standpoint, the FAA was configured to face a continental enemy in the Southern Cone. Its assets, tactics, and training were all oriented towards a potential border conflict, particularly with Chile, with whom Argentina almost went to war in 1978. Even the Argentine deployment airfields had been defined based on a hypothetical battle against the Andean neighbor.

Malvinas: Captain Azcueta and the ARA San Luis Performance

“I am ready”: the Captain’s Courage the Day the Firing Computer of the ARA San Luis Submarine Broke Down in Malvinas

The recovery of the Malvinas Islands on April 2, 1982 took the commanders of the submarine force by surprise, as they had not been informed of Operation Rosario. Nevertheless, they prepared as best they could a submarine with serious technical deficiencies and sailed with it within the exclusion zone. The decision of Frigate Captain Fernando María Azcueta and his inexperienced crew. And the order to destroy the enemy with the only possibility of firing torpedoes manually.

By Mariano Sciaroni || Infobae

The drumbeat of war on April 2, 1982 surprised the ARA San Luis (S-32) and all its crew, including its commander, Frigate Captain Fernando María Azcueta, 40 years old and son of one of the first submariners of the Argentine Navy. It was docked at a pier at the Mar del Plata Naval Base (BNMP), base of operations for the Navy's small submarine force.

ARA San Luis departs from Mar del Plata Naval Base

The surprise was due to the fact that the high naval command, in order to maintain the secrecy of the operation carried out that day, chose not to inform the commanders of the various units not directly involved about Operation Rosario: the capture of the Malvinas.

Therefore, the San Luis did not receive the order to prepare for a combat patrol until 24 hours after the assault on the islands. At that time, the recently completed crew began to prepare the ship, in order to make it fit for war in the shortest possible time.

The initial state of the submarine was not satisfactory and it greatly needed to enter dry dock, something that would have to be done at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base, the main base of the Navy, since Mar de Plata lacked such facilities.

The hull, propeller and internal cooling pipes of the San Luis had accumulations of small parasitic crustaceans, which affected its performance, increased its noise level and limited its speed. However, as there was not enough time to travel to Puerto Belgrano, the clean-up was carried out in Mar del Plata by divers (students from the Diving School) who worked 24 hours a day, equipped with manual scrapers, for almost a week.

Frigate Captain Fernando María Azcueta speaks to his crew during the 1982 war patrol. The beard indicates that they had already been at sea for quite a few days

Despite intense efforts before departure, several critical issues with the unit remained unresolved. One diesel engine had been out of service since 1976 due to a broken engine block, and the other three suffered from cooling problems that limited their power. Additionally, the snorkel frequently allowed seawater into the submarine, and the bilge pumps were unreliable. The DUUX system, a passive acoustic rangefinder, was deemed inaccurate and out of service.

Survival equipment also posed significant concerns. The life raft ejection system was non-operational, hydrogen burners were outdated, and the oxygen meter was being repaired on land. Gas measurement capsules, crucial for safety, had expired in 1976. This was particularly concerning given that the submarine was considered modern, having been incorporated in 1974.

The crew’s training level was compromised by the Argentine Navy’s personnel rotation policy, which resulted in many new and inexperienced crew members aboard. Key positions, including those in fire control systems, were held by junior non-commissioned officers, as the most experienced submariners were in West Germany overseeing the construction of new TR 1700-class submarines.

Lieutenant Luis Seghezzi, an exceptionally young Chief of Navigation, had just graduated from the Submarine School in late 1981. He reflected on the high turnover among the crew, acknowledging that most had only been on board for three months and that this was his first experience with the submarine's weapon systems. He noted that while high turnover allowed for more personnel to be trained in new technologies, it did not necessarily ensure better responses in unprecedented situations, such as those faced during the mission.

 

ARA San Luis's trajectory from the "Enriqueta" area to the exclusion zone, finally entering the "María" patrol area, within the Exclusion Zone
 

While the senior officers of the San Luis had extensive experience with submarines, neither Captain Azcueta nor his second-in-command had any with Type 209 submarines like the San Luis. Azcueta himself had only spent 16 days at sea as commander before the war began, having taken command on December 19, 1981.

On April 11, late in the afternoon, the submarine, fully loaded with water, provisions, 10 SST-4 guided torpedoes, and 14 Mk 37 Mod 3 torpedoes, set sail from Mar del Plata with its 35 crew members. Second Corporal Eduardo Lavarello recalls the departure on that Easter Sunday as a cold, foggy evening, which was ideal for remaining undetected as they headed out to sea.

By April 13, Captain Azcueta reported the results of engine tests to his superiors, confirming that the engines operated acceptably up to 1200 amps, achieving a maximum submerged speed of 20 knots. Despite the numerous challenges—limited experience with the Type 209, an inexperienced crew, mechanical issues, and unreliable weapons—Azcueta's message concluded with the resolute words, “I am ready.” This declaration, made in the face of daunting odds and the prospect of confronting the world’s leading navy in anti-submarine warfare, encapsulates the captain’s bravery and determination.

On April 17, 1982, after an uneventful transit during which the captain continued to train his crew and address mechanical issues, the submarine received a coded message. They were ordered to proceed to a waiting area designated as “Enriqueta,” located southeast of Golfo Nuevo, near the Argentine mainland and just north of the British-established Exclusion Zone.

The VM-8/24 computer is out of service

Initially, due to ongoing diplomatic negotiations, there were strict Rules of Engagement that limited the use of weapons, similar to those imposed on British forces. Weapons could only be used within the Maritime Exclusion Zone and after positively identifying a target, except in cases of submerged contacts, which were presumed to be enemy vessels.

Two days later, the VM-8/24 fire control computer on the ARA San Luis failed completely, despite the crew's efforts to repair it. Captain Azcueta later explained that the computer lost its display and the target panels became unresponsive to sensor commands. The crew attempted multiple troubleshooting steps, including checking power supplies and adjusting voltage levels, but the computer remained largely nonfunctional, though it could still operate in a limited emergency mode.

The fire control computer is critical for a modern attack submarine, as it processes sensor data, calculates firing solutions, and controls torpedo guidance. The VM-8/24 system on the San Luis could track and prepare solutions for up to three targets simultaneously, integrating sonar, radar, and periscope data to determine positions and vectors.

The computer’s failure was a severe blow, leaving the submarine unable to use its automatic fire control system. This limitation meant that the San Luis could only fire a single torpedo at a time, which had to be manually guided by the crew, significantly reducing the submarine’s combat effectiveness.

With the breakdown of the computer, according to the post-war report, there was:

• Loss of the ability to automatically and instantly update the positions of the submarine, target and torpedo.
• Loss of the ability to accurately calculate the Aiming Angle (Torpedo Course) and its instant update.
• Poor precision of the manual guidance system dial (graduations every 5° by design)
• Practical impossibility of estimating the position of the torpedo and, as a consequence, serious difficulty in introducing effective corrections.

The seriousness of the breakdown led Azcueta to break the traditional radio silence with which submarines move and inform his superiors. The Commander of the Submarine Force (COFUERSUB) recognized the problem, but decided not to withdraw the ARA San Luis from the waiting area, after assessing the convenience of having at least one submarine patrolling despite the limitations it faced.

According to doctrine, the failure of the computer implies a “low probability of impact” and, therefore, the use of torpedoes is “in case of defensive launches and if no other weapon is available”. Therefore, it was considered that the failure of the computer implied “that the fulfillment of the unit's mission would be practically unfeasible”.


Inside the San Luis, however, and despite knowing the new limitations with which they would go to war, they were somewhat optimistic. As Lieutenant Ricardo Alessandrini, the submarine's Chief of Armament, recalls: “The firing control computer was not operational and left us short of capacity in the waiting area. This limited the number of torpedo shots that could be controlled from the submarine. However, in the submarine force we often practiced the old-fashioned method of firing torpedoes using manual calculations and it was entirely possible to carry out a successful attack with good information about our target.”

That is, the S-32 crew would launch torpedoes using plottings and abacuses, in the same way that straight-running torpedoes were launched at short distances until the beginning of World War II.

Captain Azcueta also narrates: “As has been said, during the stay in the Enriqueta area, we took advantage of the stoppage to intensify the training in the different roles and to adjust ship values ​​that we had not updated. Among them the so-called “cavitation threshold”. In a submarine, the speed at which its propellers cavitate (a fluid phenomenon that produces an undesirable and significant noise of its own), depends on the depth and increases with it. That is, if I increase the immersion plane, I can apply more speed without cavitating. With resignation we verified that, whatever the depth, up to 150 meters, we cavitated at 6 knots. This circumstance led me to be very cautious with the speed in the patrol area. It became evident that, despite the great effort of the student divers of the Diving School, the propeller had not been sufficiently cleaned. There was nothing to be done.

By April 26, the negotiations on the fate of the islands were practically closed. COFUERSUB (Command of the Submarine Force) decided to send the San Luis to the “María” patrol zone, located north of the islands. It arrived there on the 28th, not without danger.

In the afternoon of the same day, with the deterioration of the military and political situation, the S-32 received the order to destroy any enemy target if it found it within the Exclusion Zone around the islands: “From COFUERSUB to San Luis. I cancel restrictions on the use of weapons. All contact is enemy.”

Even with all the problems mentioned and a broken firing computer (the brain of the submarine), the San Luis would cover itself in glory in the days to come. Admiral Brown would have been proud of this brave Navy lad.