The Error of Errors

In the photo, commandos of the 601 operating in the San Carlos area in broad daylight.

Excerpt taken from the book "Comandos en Malvinas - La otra historia," chapter "Analysis of Operations." The book is available in print and e-book format on Amazon.

We have all read countless times that the great mistake made by the Argentine commandos at Top Malo was entering the house to spend the night. But what would have happened if no one had seen them enter?

...However, if the commandos of the 602 Company committed a mistake worthy of going down in history — one that stands out above all others — it was their decision to start marching immediately after being dropped off by helicopters, in broad daylight, no less. Once on the ground, the grave mistake of flying in during the morning was already irreparable, but to immediately begin moving toward the summit of Mount Simon was, without a doubt, an almost suicidal act. It was certainly a reckless move, and it makes it abundantly clear that these men had no idea what they were doing.

The terrain of the Malvinas, consisting primarily of hills and vegetationless plains, facilitated long-distance observation. This allowed British observers, hidden in advantageous positions within their observation posts (OPs) and equipped with telescopes, to monitor the terrain for many kilometers around them.

Once on the ground, an alternative course of action that Vercesi could have chosen, as a lesser evil, would have been to remain motionless. The men could have hidden as best they could, waiting for nightfall, hoping their infiltration had gone unnoticed or trusting that, if they had been detected, the British would not have time to react.

But moving during daylight? On terrain like the Malvinas? And, on top of that, climbing a height? It was a completely irrational decision that true commandos would never have made, especially in a situation where British dominance was already well established.

But one didn’t need to be a commando to know that. A simple conscript soldier doing his military service, if he had paid attention to his theoretical lessons, would know that you don’t do that. One doesn’t even need to be a soldier. It’s just common sense. An eight-year-old child who regularly plays hide-and-seek would understand that if you don’t want to be seen in an open, well-lit area, you simply don’t move.

To a British observer hidden among the rocks of a hill, scanning the terrain intently, a man loaded with equipment moving across the Malvinas peat bogs, no matter what camouflage he wore, would stand out like a black dot against the predominantly soft hues of the peatlands.

If the distance was too great, the observer wasn’t paying attention, or he was already tired, there was a slim chance the man might not be detected. But if that one man carrying equipment is accompanied by twelve more, and, on top of that, they are made to ascend a mountain or hill — or descend from it — and, to make it even worse, do so over snow, as they did on the 30th, then the march of the commandos of the 1st Section of the 602 became something akin to lighting a match in a dark room. It was as if they were shouting, “Hey guuuuys, we’re heeere!”

This reckless practice was common among the patrols of the GOE, the 601, the 602, the APCA, and the APBT.

Ayuda a que Argentina sepa la verdad y comparte esta publicación.