Showing posts with label South Georgias. Show all posts
Showing posts with label South Georgias. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 4, 2025

Malvinas: Operation Georgias

Operation Georgias 




Satellite Image of South Georgia Islands Taken by NASA

Date: 3 April 1982
Location: Grytviken, South Georgia Islands
Outcome: Argentina takes control of Leith Harbour and Grytviken

Belligerents:
Argentina vs. United Kingdom

Commanders:
Captain Carlos Trombetta vs. Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills

Forces Engaged:
Argentina: 40 marines and the destroyer ARA Guerrico
United Kingdom: 22 Royal Marines and HMS Endurance

Casualties:
Argentina: 3 killed, 9 wounded, 1 corvette damaged, 1 helicopter shot down
United Kingdom: 1 wounded, 22 taken prisoner

Operation Georgias was the codename used by the Argentine Armed Forces for the operation to occupy the South Georgia Islands at the start of the Malvinas/Falklands War in 1982.
The invasion of South Georgia took place on 3 April 1982, when Argentine naval forces took control of South Georgia Island (renamed Isla San Pedro) after forcing the surrender of a small contingent of British Royal Marines in Grytviken. The Argentine intervention began on 19 March 1982, when a group of civilian workers arrived at Leith Harbour aboard the transport vessel ARA Bahía Buen Suceso (B-4), raising the Argentine flag. Some Argentine marines had infiltrated the group, posing as civilian scientists.




Polar Ship HMS Endurance in Mar del Plata, February 1982, shortly before its involvement in South Georgia

Argentine Workers in South Georgia

The Davidoff Contracts

In September 1979, Argentine businessman Constantino Davidoff, director of the company Georgia del Sur S.A. and a scrap metal dealer, signed a contract with the Edinburgh-based firm Christian Salvesen Co. The agreement granted him the right to remove the remains of the abandoned whaling stations at Leith, Stromness, and Husvik on the South Georgia Islands.
Davidoff approached the British Embassy in Buenos Aires requesting the use of the polar ship HMS Endurance to transport personnel and equipment necessary for dismantling the facilities. When the British authorities refused permission to use HMS Endurance, in August 1981 Davidoff sought approval from the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Navy to book passage aboard Antarctic transport vessels.
Aware of the British government's decision to withdraw HMS Endurance from service in the South Atlantic and anticipating a possible evacuation of Grytviken, the Argentine Navy signed an agreement with Davidoff that allowed him to travel to the islands at least twice a year.

Project and Operation Alfa

In September 1981, the Argentine Navy developed a plan to use Davidoff's salvage operations in South Georgia as a cover for establishing a covert base in the disputed territory. This initiative was given the codename Project Alfa. The plan involved infiltrating military personnel among the workers, posing as scientists. Once HMS Endurance had left the South Atlantic (from April onwards), they would be joined by 14 marines aboard a ship assigned to Antarctic base support, who would then establish a permanent military outpost on South Georgia. The base would benefit from the onset of winter, which would hinder any British attempt to remove it.

Parallel to this project, in October 1981, the commander of Antarctic naval operations received an order from the Chief of Operations of the Navy General Staff to study the possibility of establishing a scientific base on one of the disputed islands with the United Kingdom. It was expected that the base would be set up during the 1981–1982 Antarctic campaign. This operation was designated Operation Alfa.
In early December, a decision was made that the base would be manned by military personnel rather than civilians, due to the need for secrecy. The Amphibious Commando Group was ordered to assign 1 officer and 6 NCOs. The same instruction applied to an equal number of tactical divers.

On 29 January 1981, training began for the selected commandos and divers, under the command of Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz. The team included Lieutenant Carrilaff, 1 diver NCO, 1 medic NCO, 5 diver corporals, and 5 amphibious commando corporals. On 28 February, they boarded the Antarctic campaign vessel ARA Bahía Paraíso in Ushuaia.
To avoid interfering with planned operations in the Malvinas, the Military Committee cancelled Operation Alfa on 16 March. However, the commandos remained onboard as a precaution and departed on 18 March towards the South Orkney Islands, accompanying the vessel’s Antarctic campaign.



ARA Almirante Irízar

Davidoff’s Journeys

The Argentine businessman informed the British Embassy of his trip but did not request permission to travel aboard the icebreaker. On 16 December 1981, he set sail for South Georgia aboard the icebreaker ARA Almirante Irízar (Q-5) to carry out an inventory of the facilities to be dismantled at Stromness Bay. He arrived there on the 21st and departed a few days later.
On 23 December, the British magistrate in South Georgia discovered evidence of Argentine presence at Leith Harbour and reported it to Rex Hunt, Governor of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, who relayed the information to London on 31 December. The British government instructed its embassy to issue a formal note of protest against the unauthorised landing, considered a breach of sovereignty. However, Argentina’s Foreign Minister claimed ignorance of the incident. A second formal protest was issued on 9 February but was rejected by the Argentine Foreign Ministry on 18 February.

Another Argentine trip to the islands occurred in February 1982, when a commercial rival of Davidoff, bank employee Adrián Marchessi, made an unplanned visit to Leith Harbour. Marchessi arrived at the site aboard the Caimán, a yacht registered in Panama, having sailed from Mar del Plata. He reported in at Grytviken, claiming to be part of Davidoff’s team, and provided the local British authorities with details of Davidoff’s December inspection as well as information on previous Argentine visits to the area during the 1970s.

Raising of the Argentine Flag

On 18 March 1982, the transport ship ARA Bahía Buen Suceso arrived at Leith Harbour, disembarking Davidoff’s workers and their equipment without first reporting at Grytviken, as required by the British government. At that time, the only British presence at Leith Harbour was a team from the British Antarctic Survey (BAS).
On 19 March, four BAS members en route to Carlita Bay discovered the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso unloading equipment at Leith Harbour, with the Argentine flag flying. Around 100 people had disembarked and occupied a BAS shelter. The BAS team leader, Trevor Edwards, approached Captain Briatore to inform him that their presence was unauthorised and that they were required to report at Grytviken. Edwards then informed the British magistrate at King Edward Point.
The BAS commander in Grytviken, Steve Martin, sent a message to Governor Rex Hunt, who consulted with London. The British authorities demanded the removal of the Argentine flag and the re-embarkation of the workers. Captain Briatore responded that the mission had the approval of the British Embassy in Buenos Aires and ordered the flag lowered, but he still did not comply with the order to report at Grytviken.

On 20 March, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was informed of the events. As the Argentines had failed to follow proper diplomatic procedures, the British government decided to respond with a limited intervention. The Foreign Office ordered HMS Endurance to sail to the area to ensure the removal of the Argentine flag and prevent any further landings. The ship had departed from Port Stanley on 16 March, carrying 22 Royal Marines.
On 21 March, the British Embassy in Buenos Aires issued a diplomatic protest, requesting that the Argentine government withdraw the workers.
Argentina’s Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Méndez, responded by appearing to de-escalate the crisis, assuring that the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso would soon depart the islands and that the incident had no official backing.

On the morning of 22 March, the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso left Leith Harbour. However, later that day, a BAS observation post detected the continued presence of Argentine personnel and relayed the information to London. As a result, the Foreign Office ordered HMS Endurance to evacuate any remaining Argentine personnel in South Georgia.



 

Operation Georgias

On 23 March, the Commander of the Antarctic Naval Group, Captain César Trombetta, aboard ARA Bahía Paraíso (B-1) and stationed in the South Orkney Islands, received orders from the Argentine Naval General Staff to proceed at full speed to the South Georgia Islands. His mission was to prevent HMS Endurance—which had departed from the Malvinas—from removing Davidoff’s Argentine workers from Leith Harbour.

In response to British movements, Argentina deployed several countermeasures. The corvettes ARA Drummond (P-31) and ARA Granville (P-33) were positioned between the Malvinas and South Georgia, ready to intercept HMS Endurance and recover any Argentine personnel on board.

On 24 March, the Argentine government publicly confirmed the presence of the workers on South Georgia. That same day, Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz received orders to “disembark at Leith Harbour at 00:15 on 25 March to protect the Argentine workers.”
That night, ARA Bahía Paraíso arrived at Leith and disembarked 14 armed military personnel (Group Alfa) under Astiz’s command, using weapons supplied by the ship. The vessel remained in the area, patrolling with its helicopters. News from the region reported unusual Argentine naval activity in the South Atlantic.

When HMS Endurance reached Leith Harbour, it found ARA Bahía Paraíso anchored there. The two ships then shadowed each other around the islands until they lost contact on 31 March.

In anticipation of a possible armed clash, the British Foreign Office attempted to negotiate a compromise. Lord Carrington proposed to Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Méndez that the workers at Leith Harbour be granted amnesty and provided with documentation—possibly temporary entry permits instead of passports, a significant concession to the Argentine position.
However, Argentina insisted that the arrival of its nationals in South Georgia should be governed by the 1971 Communications Agreement. Governor Rex Hunt strongly rejected extending that agreement—valid only for the Malvinas—to South Georgia and expressed his concerns to London.

The British plan was that BAS commander Steve Martin would remain in control until Argentine forces displayed hostile intent, at which point Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills would assume command.

On 28 March 1982, at 10:57, the destroyer ARA Santísima Trinidad (D-2) set sail as flagship of Task Force 40, carrying both the Task Force Commander and the Malvinas Theatre Commander, Major General Osvaldo García. This marked the beginning of Operation Rosario, which would lead to the surrender of the British governor in the Malvinas on 2 April.

That same day, 40 marines under Lieutenant Guillermo Luna boarded the corvette ARA Guerrico (P-2, now P-32) at Puerto Belgrano, bound for South Georgia. The journey was harsh and overcrowded, as the vessel was not suited for troop transport and faced poor weather during the four-day voyage.

On 30 March, with the invasion clearly imminent, the British government ordered the destroyer HMS Antrim, followed by two other surface vessels and three nuclear submarines, to proceed to South Georgia to reinforce HMS Endurance. The rest of the Royal Navy was placed on four-hour alert.

On 1 April, the Argentine Naval General Staff issued Operational Order No. 1/82 “S”, instructing forces to “occupy Grytviken and hold Leith to secure control of the South Georgia Islands.”
Missile corvette ARA Guerrico, under Commander Carlos Alfonso, was ordered to rendezvous with ARA Bahía Paraíso, which was equipped with two helicopters (a Puma from the Argentine Army and an Alouette from the Navy Air Command). The 40 marines under Luna’s command joined Astiz’s troops already stationed at Leith.

Up to that date, South Georgia had not been included in the Malvinas Theatre of Operations.



Insignia of Alfredo Astiz at the Imperial War Museum in London

With the available units, Task Group 60.1 was formed under the command of Captain César Trombetta. The group was composed of the following elements:[22]

  • 60.1.1. Polar ship ARA Bahía Paraíso, commanded by Frigate Captain Ismael J. García

  • 60.1.2. Corvette ARA Guerrico, commanded by Frigate Captain Carlos Alfonso

  • 60.1.3. A detachment from Marine Infantry Battalion No. 4 (BIM 4), consisting of 40 marines under the command of Lieutenant Guillermo Luna

  • 60.1.4. Two helicopters from the Antarctic Group: one Puma (Argentine Army) and one Alouette (Naval Aviation Command of the Argentine Navy)

  • 60.1.5. A group of tactical divers and amphibious commandos (14 men), commanded by Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz

In response to these developments, a series of high-level meetings and diplomatic discussions took place in an attempt to prevent an Argentine invasion. On the night of 1 April, U.S. President Ronald Reagan pledged to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that he would speak directly with the Argentine Junta to avert an attack.

However, Reagan's phone conversation with Leopoldo Galtieri proved unsuccessful.[23]

British Resistance



Cumberland Bay, including King Edward Cove and the Grytviken Peninsula

2 April

On 2 April, Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz informed the Argentine personnel at Leith Harbour that Argentina had recovered the Malvinas, and he received the order to execute Operational Order No. 1/82 “S”.

Upon learning of the fall of Puerto Argentino (Port Stanley), British Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills acted quickly. His men fortified the beach at King Edward Point, near the entrance to the bay, using barbed wire and landmines, and set up defensive positions around the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) buildings. HMS Endurance, positioned a few miles offshore, maintained communications between the small British detachment and London. Mills was authorised to open fire in self-defence after issuing a warning. A subsequent statement from the British government instructed the Royal Marines “not to resist beyond the point where lives would be needlessly lost.”[24]

Due to severe weather, the ARA Guerrico only entered Cumberland Bay at 17:00 on 2 April. As a result, Argentina’s planned operations in South Georgia had to be postponed by Commander César Trombetta to the following day. The original plan had called for Astiz’s special forces to land at Hope Point, near Grytviken, to secure the arrival zone for the main ground troops, who would be flown in by helicopter. ARA Guerrico was to provide naval gunfire support from outside the bay, but her delayed arrival due to the storm forced a revised plan for 3 April.

Under the new plan:

  • The first landing would be carried out by an Alouette helicopter from ARA Guerrico.

  • This would be followed by three waves of marine infantry aboard a Puma helicopter from ARA Bahía Paraíso.

  • A radio message demanding British surrender would be sent before any landing.

  • After the warning, ARA Guerrico would move toward Caleta Capitán Vago (where Grytviken’s port is located), opposite King Edward Point.

The corvette was only authorised to fire upon request from the ground forces. Astiz’s troops were to remain in reserve aboard Bahía Paraíso, and all units were instructed to avoid enemy casualties as long as possible.[25]

Historian Lawrence Freedman believes that Trombetta’s assumption of minimal resistance was based on the belief that only BAS personnel were present. This was apparently due to the absence of HMS Endurance, which led Trombetta to underestimate the British military presence.
Trombetta ordered ARA Guerrico to approach the shore, dispatch the Alouette for reconnaissance, and use the Puma to transport the first marine detachment.[26]

During the night, both Argentine ships made contact and remained in nearby waters, with ARA Guerrico anchored in Stromness Bay.

3 April

At 05:00 on 3 April, Lieutenant Guillermo Luna received a naval message indicating that HMS Endurance was in Grytviken with 22 Royal Marines. However, Commander Trombetta believed that the landing zone would be clear, with any British personnel remaining aboard the polar ship.

At 07:35, with improved weather, ARA Guerrico arrived at Leith Harbour, where it transferred the marines to ARA Bahía Paraíso. Astiz’s commandos were re-embarked, and the workers left ashore under protection of forces from Bahía Paraíso, led by Lieutenant Cortez.

At 11:10, a surrender demand was transmitted from ARA Bahía Paraíso in English, and repeated three minutes later. The message falsely claimed that Governor Rex Hunt had surrendered not only in the Malvinas but also in all dependencies, including South Georgia.[13]
Lieutenant Mills received the message and relayed it to HMS Endurance to buy time. He also advised BAS personnel to take shelter in the local church. The British soldiers refused to surrender.

Meanwhile, the Alouette helicopter was flying over Grytviken, reporting no signs of visible resistance. ARA Guerrico began entering the inlet.
According to Argentine Admiral Rubén Oscar Mayorga, the corvette’s commander, Captain Carlos Alfonso, hesitated to bring the ship into such confined waters. Mayorga supports Freedman’s view that Trombetta’s assumptions about British military presence were incorrect. He cites an official report indicating that Trombetta underestimated the situation, also expressing concerns about ARA Guerrico’s readiness for combat.[28] The ship had only recently returned to active service after being in dry dock until just days before departing from Puerto Belgrano.[29]

 


Wreckage of the Argentine Puma Helicopter

Helicopter Downing

At 11:25, the Argentine command ordered the personnel at Grytviken to move into the open, announcing that a landing by marine infantry would take place. Ten minutes later, the ARA Guerrico reported the presence of armed personnel on the ground.

At 11:41, the first wave of 15 Argentine marines, including Lieutenant Luna, was deployed by a Puma helicopter at King Edward Point, opposite Shackleton House, where the British Royal Marines were entrenched. By then, the crew aboard Guerrico had confirmed that the British were positioned along the northern shore of the inlet.

A second wave of marines departed ARA Bahía Paraíso at 11:47, on the Puma, carrying Lieutenant Giusti, 14 marines, and a machine gun. However, Lieutenant Luna, already on the ground, had requested via Guerrico—as he had no direct communication with Bahía Paraíso—that the second wave be delayed and replaced with a third group carrying 60mm mortars. But the second wave was already airborne.

The landing took place east of Luna's position and in full view of the British defenders. The Puma came within effective range of British automatic weapons. It was immediately hit by heavy fire, but the pilot managed to cross the bay and conduct an emergency landing on the southern shore, opposite King Edward Point (known in Argentina as Punta Coronel Zelaya).

Two Argentine conscripts, Mario Almonacid and Jorge Néstor Águila, were killed. Four others were wounded, and the rest were left disorganised and out of combat position. Despite the setback, the marines opened fire with their machine gun on the hospital building, wounding one British marine in the arm.

At the same time, Luna’s troops began to advance toward Shackleton House, but after the Puma was downed, the British responded with heavy fire.[13] In response, Luna requested fire support from ARA Guerrico.

Attack on ARA Guerrico

At 11:55, Guerrico began its second approach to the inlet and opened fire. However, her 20mm guns jammed after the first shot. The 40mm cannons managed only six bursts, and the 100mm main gun became inoperable after a single round. Now fully exposed, the corvette had no choice but to turn within the cove and fire with weapons mounted on the opposite side.

At 11:59, British forces opened fire on the ship. The corvette was struck by small arms and a Carl Gustav 84mm anti-tank rocket launcher.[31] According to Mills, his men fired from a distance of approximately 550 metres.

The attack killed Petty Officer Patricio Guanca, wounded five sailors, and damaged multiple systems: electrical cables, one 40mm gun, an Exocet missile launcher, and the 100mm turret mount. As Guerrico passed again in front of the British position to retreat, she was hit by another intense wave of fire.
Argentine sources acknowledged that the vessel sustained over 200 hits during the engagement.[32]

Meanwhile, the Alouette helicopter—a reconnaissance aircraft—was used to transport the remaining 10 marines, landing them outside the range of British weapons.[13]

As the damaged Guerrico withdrew from the bay, the Argentine ground troops resumed small arms exchanges with Mills’ Royal Marines.[13] Once beyond the range of British weapons—near Hobart RockGuerrico resumed firing with her repaired 40mm guns.[33] This convinced Lieutenant Mills that the situation was untenable. He ordered his men to cease fire at 12:48, according to Admiral Mayorga.[33]

At 13:00, Mills approached the Argentine lines waving a white flag and surrendered. He was instructed to have his men surrender one by one. Mills and his marines were taken into custody by Astiz’s group, which had remained in reserve during the battle.[13]
At 13:35, the British flag was reported lowered.

HMS Endurance dispatched one of its Wasp helicopters to Cumberland Bay. The aircraft detected the Argentine corvette and the transport vessel in the cove but observed no signs of combat. HMS Endurance remained in South Georgia waters until 5 April.[34]

That afternoon, 13 BAS civilian personnel who had been scattered in the surrounding area were captured. At 23:00, Group Alfa replaced Lieutenant Cortez and his men in securing the workers at Leith Harbour.




ARA Guerrico

Consequences

Following the engagement at Grytviken, the corvette ARA Guerrico, which had lost approximately 50% of its firepower due to battle damage, departed Grytviken alongside ARA Bahía Paraíso at 03:15 on 4 April, bound for Río Grande.[35]

The ARA Bahía Paraíso transported the captured British Royal Marines to Río Grande, from where they were flown to Montevideo. They returned to the United Kingdom on 20 April.[13]

The Argentine forces chose not to attack the BAS station on Bird Island, where 15 British BAS personnel remained out of Argentine control. These individuals also remained active in other areas such as Schlieper Bay, the Lyell Glacier, and Saint Andrews Bay, avoiding capture until the islands were retaken by British forces.

The Argentine Navy left behind a garrison of 55 marines on the islands, along with 39 civilian scrap workers who remained stationed at Leith Harbour.[34]

The South Georgia Islands were retaken by British forces on 25 April 1982 during Operation Paraquat.[36]

Medals

  • Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC).

  • Captain Nick Barker of HMS Endurance received the title of Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE).[13]

  • Chief Gunner Francisco Solano Páez was awarded the Argentine Medal for Valour in Combat (La Nación Argentina al Valor en Combate).[37]


Bibliography

-Freedman, Lawrence: The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: The origins of the Falklands war. Routledge, 2005. ISBN 0-7146-5206-7 
-Freedman, Lawrence and Gamba, Virginia: Señales de Guerra. Javier Vergara Editor, 1992. ISBN 950-15-1112-X 
-Insight Team Sunday Times (1982). War in the Falklands: the Full Story. The Sunday Times. 
-Contraalmirante Horacio A. Mayorga: No Vencidos. Ed. Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1998. ISBN 950-742-976-X 
-The Argentine Invasion of South Georgias 

Referencias


1. "They infiltrated aboard, posing as scientists, but were in fact members of an Argentine naval special forces unit". Nick van der Bijl, Nine Battles to Stanley, London, Leo Cooper P.8 as reported in Lawrence Freemdman, The Official History of the Falklands Camapign: Vol I The Origins of the Falklands War
2. "Bahia Buen Suceso set sail for South Georgia on 11 March carrying Argentine Marines" Rowland White, Vulcan 607, London, Bantam Press, p30.
3. Freedman-Gamba, p. 74.
4. El Proyecto Alfa
5. Freedman-Gamba, p. 75
6. Freedman-Gamba, p. 76
7. The first visit of Davidoff
8. Insight Team Sunday Times, p. 67
9. Freedman, p. 172
10. Freedman-Gamba, p. 81
11. Segunda visita de Davidoff
12. Freedman-Gamba, p. 85
13. Britain Small Wars
14. Freedman-Gamba, p. 86
15. Freedman-Gamba, pp. 87-88
16. At that time, the Antarctic Naval Group was concluding the 1981/1982 summer campaign. By the second half of March 1982, the icebreaker ARA Almirante Irízar had returned to its home port at the Naval Station of Buenos Aires (Apostadero Naval de Buenos Aires). Meanwhile, the polar transport ship ARA Bahía Paraíso (B-1), under the command of Frigate Captain Ismael J. García, departed from the Naval Base Ushuaia bound for Base Esperanza in Antarctica, transporting the families who would be overwintering there. Following this mission, the ship continued to the South Orkney Islands, where it embarked the personnel of the Naval Construction Battalion, who had just completed construction of a new building for the local Antarctic detachment.
17. La perla austral, cronología
18. Freedman, pp. 183 and 184
19. Freedman-Gamba, pp. 98-99
20. Freedman, p.187
21. Héroes Salteños Caidos en la Guerra de las Malvinas
22. Mayorga, p. 94
23. Cf. Jonh O'Sullivan, op. cit., págs. 229-230.
24. Freedman, pp. 11-13
25. Mayorga, p. 97
26. Freedman, p. 13
27. Freedman, pp. 13-14
28. Mayorga, p. 98
29. Mayorga, p. 48
30. Mayorga, pp. 99-100
31. Mayorga, p. 100
32. Malvinas: Georgias del Sur
33. Mayorga, p. 101
34. Freedman, p. 14
35. Mayorga, p. 102
36. Freedman, p. 222
37. www.armada.mil.ar


Wikipedia.es

Monday, October 20, 2025

Malvinas: NCO in Combat

In Front of my Group of Twelve Soldiers

Malvinas: Historias de Coraje

Account of Second Corporal of the Marine Infantry "VGM" Conrado Augusto Olmos Matar


 


Since I was a young boy, I felt a calling to pursue a career in the armed forces — I wanted to become a policeman or a soldier. While I was in secondary school, a friend from my neighbourhood, Petty Officer Carlos Sequeira of the Navy, encouraged me to continue my studies in the Naval Forces. Some time later, personnel from the institution came to the province to promote the enrolment of people from Santiago into the Force. I didn’t let the opportunity pass and quickly submitted my application. After meeting the entry requirements, I joined the School for Marine Infantry Non-Commissioned Officers located in Punta Mogotes.

The first months were tough — like many from Santiago, I missed home, its customs, my loved ones and friends. Everything was new, everything was different. I felt alone among so many recruits from different parts of the country.



The training was so demanding that many of my comrades requested discharge; out of the initial group, only seventy-four of us graduated. More than once, I was on the verge of quitting, but thanks to the encouragement and support of a lieutenant named Alemán, I managed to persevere and graduated as a Second Corporal in 1980.

My first posting was to the 1st Marine Infantry Battalion in Puerto Belgrano, where I was welcomed by the Second-in-Command, Captain Giachino, and the Company Commander, Lieutenant Damore. From that point on, I began my first steps as an NCO, which mainly involved instructing a group of soldiers while continuing to develop my professional knowledge.

In 1981, I was placed in charge of preparing the Rocket Launcher Group, which consisted of twelve soldiers, including two from Santiago — Coronel and Gutiérrez. At the beginning of 1982, my group was assigned to Company "C" (Charlie), under a Non-Commissioned Officer named Gigena. I clearly remember being struck by the fact that, by that time of the year, the conscripts from the 1962 class had not yet been discharged and that training and exercises were still ongoing. Normally, during that period, operational activities decrease and are replaced by maintenance tasks.

On a warm morning in March, all staff NCOs were gathered on the unit’s parade ground, where Captain Giachino informed us that we were to prepare for embarkation in order to head to some islands to recover an Argentine vessel that had been seized by the British. All I could think was: we’re going to war. One joins the armed forces, and perhaps never gets called to fight — but for us, it was happening. I mentally reviewed all I had learned.



From that moment, we began our preparatory tasks, which mainly involved resupplying, organising field equipment, and stocking ammunition. We also practised shooting at the range daily and carried out final checks on our weapons. This preparation continued until we, the roughly one thousand men of the Marine Infantry Brigade, boarded the vessel Comandante Trizar.

Although we had all necessary comforts, the first few days were difficult due to the rough seas — even with our prior sailing experience, nearly all on board suffered the effects of seasickness.

Once we were at sea, all officers and NCOs were assembled to receive the operational orders. In general terms, our mission was to land and take the Falkland Islands, with the main objective of subduing the forces defending the Governor’s residence and removing its authorities. This mission would be carried out by the amphibious commandos, with support from us, the Marine Infantry. It was no easy task — we knew we would be facing professional soldiers with war experience from a global power. But the hardest part was the requirement to overcome the enemy without causing casualties — a very difficult objective, but one which, in the end, was achieved.

During the night of 1–2 April, we completed our final preparations, readying personnel and equipment for the landing. At that moment, I didn’t reflect on the historic significance of the mission we were about to carry out — my focus was solely on leading my men. I was absorbed by thoughts of how the operation would unfold, how I would respond to different scenarios, how my subordinates would react… So many questions, all waiting for the decisive moment of battle.

At first light, the operation began with an airborne landing via helicopters. My group’s objective was to head directly to the airport, participate in the assault, and then move towards Government House. We went in with clenched jaws, ready to fight.

When we arrived, there was no resistance — some British personnel had already been captured by forces that had landed before us. Although the situation in that area was under control, we still had to be extremely cautious due to the large number of mines and booby traps laid by the enemy.

While we waited at the airport for the rest of the battalion, we heard bursts of machine gun fire and explosions across different parts of the island. It was then I fully realised that the operation was underway and that we were in the midst of a serious armed conflict.

I remember, with great sadness, that while we were at the airport awaiting orders, a helicopter approached carrying the body of our Second-in-Command, Captain Giachino. He had fought heroically at the head of his troops during the most significant action on the island so far. The news deeply saddened us, but also filled us with fury — an Argentine had been killed, and it was someone from our own battalion.

Once our forces were fully assembled, we advanced on Government House to support the Amphibious Commandos. We surrounded the area to ensure none of the enemy — who had surrendered — could escape.



My next mission was to guard and later transport the prisoners back to the mainland, alongside my group and other personnel.

Back in Argentina, we began preparations for a new mission — reinforcing the defences in Tierra del Fuego. I was deployed there with other military units and remained until the war ended.

Although I spent only a short time in the Falklands, I feel immense pride at having participated in the recovery operations, leading a group of twelve soldiers, including my fellow countrymen Coronel and Gutiérrez, with whom I still share a warm friendship.

"As a Non-Commissioned Officer of the Navy, I had the honour of serving in the 1st Marine Infantry Battalion and being under the command of Captain Giachino — a true example of military virtue."

Saturday, July 12, 2025

Argentine Navy: Submarine ARA Santa Fé

 

Submarine A.R.A. Santa Fe

The submarine ARA Santa Fe (S-21) hoisted her Argentine flag on 2 July 1971. At the end of 1978, as a result of the disagreement over sovereignty of the three islands, Lennox and Nueva in the Beagle Channel, tensions rose between Argentina and Chile.

On 22 December 1978, Argentina launched Operation Sovereignty to militarily occupy the islands. When conflict seemed inevitable, the timely intervention of Pope John Paul II prevented the start of hostilities. On 30 March 1982, she was incorporated into Task Force 40, Task Group 40.4, carrying on board part of the landing force of Operation Rosario. From her, the tactical divers departed who enabled the landing of Argentine forces that recapture the Malvinas Islands. She was assigned a new mission for which she was resupplied with fuel and provisions to transport a detachment of marines towards South Georgia Islands. She managed to evade the British blockade and entered San Pedro Island, penetrating Captain Vago Cove in National Guard Bay (Grytviken), disembarking personnel and materials. At 05:50 hours (local time), she departed to return to her assigned patrol zone, but was detected and attacked by a Wessex helicopter. The vessel returned to Grytviken. Resistance was offered by firing at the enemy helicopters from the sail, led by Corporal Héctor O. Feldman. At 07:30 she moored, listing to port and with the stern submerged. Faced with British superiority in troop numbers, the Argentine garrison surrendered along with the submariners. On 27 April, an attempt was made to change her position; during the manoeuvre, Petty Officer First Class Félix O. Artuso was fatally wounded when a British marine shot him, indicating that he had made movements that led him to believe he was about to operate a valve to scuttle the vessel. During the austral summer of 1984/1985, the United Kingdom ordered the salvage of the former ARA Santa Fe (S-21) in order to remove her from the anchorage at Vago Cove, to free the pier for use by active vessels. The S-21 began to be towed to deeper waters. Finally, the veteran vessel sank definitively in the South Atlantic, settling on the seabed at 196 metres depth.

Class: Balao Class (modified to GUPPY II) Diesel-electric attack submarine.

Launched:
19 November 1944 – Shipyard: Electric Boat Company (Groton, Connecticut, USA).

Power:
3 General Motors 278A 16-cylinder diesel engines
2 General Electric electric motors
2 main Exide batteries of 126 cells • 2 propellers.
Surface speed: 20–25 knots – 37.5 KM/Hour.
Submerged speed: 8.75 knots – 16 KM/Hour.

Armament:
10 Torpedo tubes of 533 mm (21 in) (6 forward, 4 aft, 24 torpedoes)
1 deck gun of 127 mm/25 calibre (5 in)
1 20 mm AA gun
2 12.7 mm (0.5") machine guns
1 40 mm AA gun

The elements for constructing the model parts are entirely made with recyclable materials respecting the measurements according to plans.
SCALE: 1/100 – Model built in 2008 by LEANDRO CISNEROS.



Submarine A.R.A. Santa Fe


Force Navy 
Length 95 mts.
Beam 8.31 mts.
Draught  4.65 mts.
Crew 80 – 85 personnel


Tuesday, April 2, 2024

Operation South Georgias

Operation Georgias





Satellite image of South Georgia Islands taken by NASA

Date April 3, 1982
Place
Grytviken , South Georgia Islands
Result
Argentina takes control of Port Leith and Grytviken
Belligerents
Argentina vs. United Kingdom
Commanders
Captain Carlos Trombetta vs. Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills
Forces in combat
Argentina:
40 marines and the destroyer ARA Guerrico
UK:
22 Marines and HMS Endurance
Casualties
Argentina:
3 dead, 9 injured, 1 corvette damaged, 1 helicopter shot down
UK:
1 injured, 22 prisoners

Operation Georgias was the code name used by the Argentine Armed Forces to designate the occupation operations of the South Georgia Islands at the beginning of the Falklands War in 1982.
The invasion of South Georgia took place on April 3, 1982, when Argentine naval forces took control of South Georgia Island (renamed San Pedro Island) after surrendering a small group of United Kingdom Marines. in Grytviken. The Argentine intervention began on March 19, 1982 when a group of civilian workers arrived in Port Leith aboard the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso transport (B-4), raising the Argentine flag. Some Argentine marines had infiltrated among the workers, presenting themselves as civilian scientists.


Polar ship HMS Endurance in Mar del Plata in February 1982, shortly before its intervention in the Georgias.

Argentine workers in South Georgia


Davidoff contracts
In September 1979, the Argentine businessman Constantino Davidoff, director of the company Georgia del Sur S.A. and specialized in scrap metal business, signed a contract with the Christian Salvensen Co. of Edinburgh, by which it acquired the right to remove the remains of the old abandoned whaling facilities in the ports: Leith, Stromness and Husvik, on the Georgian islands. from the south.
Davidoff managed the service of the polar ship HMS Endurance at the British embassy in Buenos Aires in order to transport the personnel and equipment necessary to dismantle the facilities to the islands. As the British did not accept the request to use the HMS Endurance, in August 1981 Davidoff requested permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Argentine Navy to hire passage on the Antarctic transport ships. Knowing of the British government's decision to withdraw HMS Endurance from service in the South Atlantic and anticipating the possible evacuation of Grytviken, the Navy signed an agreement with Davidoff that allowed it to arrive at the islands at least twice a year.

Proyecto y Operación Alfa

In September 1981 the Navy conceived a plan to take advantage of Davidoff's business in South Georgia and thus establish a secret base in that disputed territory. This action was code-named Project Alpha.5 The plan consisted of infiltrating the military among the workers, with the excuse that they were scientists. Once HMS Endurance had withdrawn from the South Atlantic, starting in April it would be joined by 14 marines embarked on a ship destined to reestablish Argentine Antarctic bases, which would establish a permanent military base in South Georgia. That base would have the help of winter, which would prevent the measures that the British could take for its removal.
Parallel to the project, in October 1981 the Antarctic naval commander received the order from the chief of operations of the General Staff of the Navy to study a possible establishment of a scientific base on one of the islands in dispute with the United Kingdom. It was expected that the base could be installed in the 1981-1982 Antarctic campaign. That operation was called Operation Alpha. At the beginning of December it was decided that the base would be occupied by the military and not by civilians as had been planned, due to the need to keep it secret. The Amphibious Commando Group was ordered to enlist 1 officer and 6 non-commissioned officers. The same measure was taken with the same number of tactical divers.
On January 29, 1981, the training of the commandos and designated divers began, with Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz as their leader. The rest were Lieutenant Carrilaff, 1 diving non-commissioned officer, 1 nursing non-commissioned officer, 5 diving corporals and 5 amphibious commando corporals. On February 28 they were embarked in Ushuaia on the Antarctic campaign ship ARA Bahía Paraíso. So that it would not interfere with their plans for the Falklands, on March 16 the Military Committee canceled Operation Alpha, but the commandos remained on board preventively and left on March 18 for the South Orkneys accompanying the ship's Antarctic campaign.


ARA Almirante Irízar. 

Davidoff Travels

The businessman informed the British embassy of his trip, without requesting permission to do so on the icebreaker, and on December 16, 1981, he set sail for South Georgia aboard the icebreaker ARA Almirante Irízar (Q-5), to carry out a inventory of facilities to be dismantled in Stromness Bay. He arrived there on the 21st and left a few days later.6 On December 23, the British magistrate of South Georgia discovered traces of the Argentine presence in Port Leith and reported it to the governor of the Falkland Islands Rex Hunt, who relayed it to London. December 31st. The British government ordered its embassy to present a note of protest for the violation of its sovereignty by the unauthorized landing, but the Foreign Minister claimed to be unaware of the incident and on February 9 there was a new formal protest that was rejected by the Argentine Foreign Ministry on the 18th.
Another Argentine trip to the islands occurred in February 1982, when a business rival of Davidoff, bank employee Adrián Marchessi, made an unscheduled visit to Port Leith. Marchessi arrived at the Port Leith facility aboard the Caiman, a Panama-registered yacht, with which he had sailed from Mar del Plata.8 He reported to Grytviken, saying he was part of Davidoff's scheme and gave British authorities local details from the inspection made by Davidoff in December and even from other Argentine trips in the 1970s.

The raising of the Argentine flag

On March 18, 1982, the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso arrived at Port Leith, disembarking Davidoff's workers and his equipment, without passing through Grytviken as required by the British government. On that date, the only British presence in Port Leith was a team from the British Antarctic Survey (BAS). On March 19, 4 members of the BAS heading to Bahía Carlita discovered the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso unloading equipment in Puerto Leith, with the Argentine flag flying. About 100 people were disembarked and had occupied a BAS shelter. The leader of the BAS team, Trevor Edwards, addressed Captain Briatore to inform him that his presence was illegal and that they must pass through Grytviken, then notified the British magistrate at King Edward Point. The senior BAS commander in Grytviken, Steve Martin, sent a message to Governor Hunt, who consulted with London. The commander demanded the removal of the Argentine flag and the reembarkation of the workers. The commander of the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso responded that the mission had the approval of the British embassy in Buenos Aires and ordered the flag to be lowered, but it did not appear in Grytviken as the British demanded.
On March 20, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was informed of what happened. As the Argentines had not complied with the diplomatic formalities, the British government decided to intervene on a small scale and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom (Foreign Office) ordered the sending of the HMS Endurance with the aim of forcing the operators to lower the flag. and prevent the disembarkation of personnel. The ship departed Port Stanley on 16 March with a complement of 22 marines.
On March 21, the British embassy held a diplomatic protest in Buenos Aires, requesting the Argentine government to evict the workers. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Nicanor Costa Méndez, responded by appearing to clear up the crisis, assuring that the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso would soon depart the islands and that the incident had no official consent.
On the morning of March 22, the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso departed from Port Leith. However, in the afternoon, a BAS observation post detected the presence of Argentine personnel and passed the information to London. Consequently, the Foreign Office ordered HMS Endurance to evacuate any Argentine personnel remaining on South Georgia.


Operation Georgias


On March 23, the Commander of the Antarctic Naval Group, 16 Captain César Trombetta, in command of the ARA Bahía Paraíso (B-1) that was in South Orkney, received orders from the General Naval Staff to head to maximum speed to the South Georgia Islands, with the mission of preventing the eviction of Davidoff's group of Argentine workers by the HMS Endurance, left for this purpose from the Malvinas Islands.
The British movements were met with a series of Argentine countermeasures: the corvettes ARA Drummond (P-31) and ARA Granville (P-33) were deployed between the Falklands and South Georgia, being in position to intercept HMS Endurance and rescue any Argentine personnel he had on board.
On March 24, the Argentine government informed the press of the workers' presence in South Georgia, while Astiz received the order to "disembark on March 25 at 00:15 in Port Leith in order to protect Argentine workers. "
The ARA Bahía Paraíso arrived at Port Leith on the night of March 24 and disembarked the group of 14 soldiers commanded by Astiz (Grupo Alfa), with individual weapons belonging to the ship. The ARA Bahía Paraíso remained in the area and patrolled the area with its helicopters during the following hours. News from the south reported an unusual movement of Argentine Navy warships in the South Atlantic Ocean. Upon arriving at Port Leith, HMS Endurance found the ARA Bahía Paraíso anchored, then both ships were chasing each other and hiding around the islands until they lost contact with each other on March 31.
Faced with the prospect of possible military conflict, the Foreign Office sought to achieve some form of compromise. Lord Carrington proposed to his counterpart Costa Méndez that he pardon the workers present at Port Leith and give them the appropriate documentation, which could include the stamping of temporary permits instead of passports, which was a crucial concession for the Argentine position. Argentina's claim, however, was that the arrival of any of its citizens to South Georgia should follow the procedures agreed in the 1971 communications treaty. Governor Rex Hunt strongly rejected this extension of the agreement, valid only for the Falkland Islands, and conveyed his concern to the British government.
The British plan was that BAS commander Martin would be responsible until the Argentine forces demonstrated any hostile intent, if that occurred Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills would take command.
On March 28, 1982, at 10:57, the destroyer ARA Santísima Trinidad (D-2) set sail as the flagship of the commander of Task Force 40, embarking its commander and the commander of the Malvinas Theater of Operations, General of division Osvaldo García, starting Operation Rosario that concluded with the surrender of the British governor of the Malvinas on April 2. That same day, 40 marines under the command of Lieutenant Guillermo Luna were embarked in Puerto Belgrano heading to the South Georgia, in the corvette ARA Guerrico (P-2) (currently P-32), traveling precariously and overcrowded for 4 days as it is not a ship with the capacity to transport troops and due to the weather conditions.
On 30 March, when it became obvious that invasion was imminent, the British government ordered the destroyer HMS Antrim, followed by two other surface ships and three nuclear submarines, to South Georgia to support HMS Endurance. . The rest of the British naval units were placed on four-hour alert.
On April 1, the General Naval Staff received Operations Order No. 1/82 "S" to "occupy Grytviken and hold Leith in order to ensure control of the Georgia Islands", for which it ordered the missile corvette ARA Guerrico , under the command of frigate captain Carlos Alfonso, join the ARA Bahía Paraíso, equipped with two helicopters from the Antarctic Group (1 Puma from the Argentine Army, 1 Alouette (from the Naval Aviation Command of the Argentine Navy) and a group of 40 infantrymen of marines under the command of Lieutenant Guillermo Luna who joined Astiz's forces in Puerto Leith. Until that date, South Georgia had not been included in the Malvinas Theater of Operations.




Badges of Alfredo Astiz at the Imperial War Museum in London.

With the available units, Task Group 60.1 was formed, with César Trombetta as commander, made up of the units:
60.1.1. Polar ship ARA Bahía Paraíso, commanded by frigate captain Ismael J. García.
60.1.2. ARA Guerrico corvette, commanded by frigate captain Carlos Alfonso.
60.1.3. Fraction of the Marine Infantry Battalion No. 4 (BIM 4) with 40 men, commanded by Lieutenant Guillermo Luna.
60.1.4. Two helicopters from the Antarctic Group: 1 Puma from the Army and 1 Alouette from the Navy's Naval Aviation Command.
60.1.5. Group of tactical divers and amphibious commandos (14 men), under the command of Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz.

As a consequence of the above, a series of high-level meetings and conversations took place in order to prevent the Argentine invasion. On the night of April 1, the president of the United States, Ronald Reagan, promised Thatcher to speak with the military junta to prevent the attack. However, his telephone conversation with Leopoldo Galtieri was fruitless.

British resistance



Cumberland Bay with King Edward Peninsula and Inlet and Grytviken.

The 2nd of April

On April 2, Astiz announced to the Argentines who were in Port Leith that his country had recovered the Malvinas.[13] Receiving the order to execute Operations Order No. 1/82 "S".
After learning of the fall of Port Stanley, Mills took urgent action: his men fortified the beach at King Edward Point, near the entrance to the bay, with wire and landmines and prepared defenses around the BAS buildings. HMS Endurance, which was a few miles offshore, provided communication between the small British detachment and London. Mills was authorized to open fire in self-defense after issuing a warning. A later statement from the British government instructed the marines "not to resist beyond the point where lives might be needlessly lost."
Due to inclement weather, the ARA Guerrico only entered Cumberland Bay at 17:00 on April 2, so the plans of the Argentine forces for that day in South Georgia were frustrated and Trombetta postponed them until on April 3. These plans consisted of the landing of Astiz's special forces at Hope Point, near Grytviken, to ensure the arrival of the ground forces teams, transported by helicopter. The ARA Guerrico was to provide naval fire outside the bay, but the corvette's arrival was delayed by a storm, so a new course of action was decided for the next day. According to the new plan, the first landing was to be made by the Alouette helicopter from the ARA Guerrico, followed by three waves of marines in the Puma from the ARA Bahía Paraíso. After sending a radio message demanding the surrender of the British, Trombetta had to order the ARA Guerrico to make an advance on the Capitán Vago cove where the port of Grytviken is located, just opposite King Edward Point. The corvette was only authorized to use its firearms at the request of ground forces. Astiz's men had to remain in the rearguard aboard the ARA Bahía Paraíso. All forces involved had to avoid enemy deaths for as long as possible. Freedman believes Trombetta made those provisions thinking he would meet only the BAS team. Apparently, the oversight at that point was due to the absence of HMS Endurance, which made him think that he would only deal with the BAS people, Trombetta ordered the corvette ARA Guerrico to approach the coast, send the Alouette helicopter on reconnaissance, and transport the first group of Marines in the other helicopter, a Puma.
During the night, the two Argentine ships established contact and remained in nearby waters, with the corvette in Stromness Bay.



April 3

On April 3 at 5:00 Luna received a naval message stating that HMS Endurance was in Grytviken with 22 marines. However, Trombetta thought that the landing area would be free of enemies, which they would find on the polar ship. At 7:35, with better weather conditions, the corvette arrived at Puerto Leith and transferred the marines to the ARA Bahía Paraíso, while the Astiz commandos were reembarked, leaving the workers protected on land by men from the ARA Bahía Paraíso under the orders of Lieutenant Cortez.
At 11:10 from the ARA Bahía Paraíso the surrender of Grytviken was demanded with a message in English, repeated 3 minutes later. The message stated that Rex Hunt had surrendered, not only in the Falklands, but also in his quarters, which was false.13 Lieutenant Mills received and then relayed the message to HMS Endurance, with the intention of buying time. . At the same time, he invited the BAS personnel to take cover inside the church premises. The British soldiers did not accept the surrender. By then, the Alouette was flying over Grytviken reporting that no possible resistance was observed and the ARA Guerrico made its first entry into the inlet. According to Mayorga, Captain Carlos Alfonso, commander of the corvette, was hesitant to expose it to such narrow waters. Mayorga also validates Freedman's speculation about Trombetta's incorrect assumptions regarding British military presence around the port, citing an official report. Trombetta also had some reservations about the corvette's adequate combat readiness, since she had been in dry dock until just a few days before leaving her home base in Puerto Belgrano.


Remains of the Argentine Puma helicopter.

Helicopter shoot down

At 11:25 Grytviken was ordered for the base personnel to go out to a visible place, warning that there would be a marine infantry landing and 10 minutes later from the corvette they noticed the presence of armed personnel.
The Puma grounded the first group of 15 Argentine marines (including Lt. Luna) with a machine gun at 11:41 at King Edward Point, opposite Shackleton House, where the Royal Marines were entrenched. . By then, the corvette knew that the Marines' deployment area was on the north shore of the mouth of the inlet. The second wave of marines left from the ARA Bahía Paraíso aboard the Puma at 11:47, formed by Lieutenant Giusti with 14 other marines and a machine gun. The commander of the Argentine group already on the ground, Lieutenant Luna, requested via the ARA Guerrico - he did not have direct communication with the ARA Bahía Paraíso - that the second wave be the one that should arrive third equipped with 60 mm mortars, but the Marines were already in flight. The landing took place to the east of Luna's position, well within sight of the British detachment.30 The helicopter was within gun range of Mills and his men at that time. The aircraft was hailed by intense fire from automatic weapons, but the pilot was able to cross the bay and made an emergency landing on the southern coast of the bay, on the shore opposite King Edward Point (or Punta Coronel Zelaya). The conscripts Mario Almonacid and Jorge Néstor Águila died and four others were wounded, the rest were out of combat position, but machine gun fire was opened on the hospital, wounding a marine in the arm. At the same time, Luna's troops began their march towards the Shackleton house, but once the helicopter was shot down, the British fired heavy fire on them. In view of that, Luna requested fire support from the ARA Guerrico.

Attack on the ARA Guerrico

The corvette then made its second advance on the inlet and at 11:55 opened fire. To his commander's disappointment, the 20mm guns jammed after his first shot, and with the 40mm he could only fire six volleys. The 100 mm cannon was disabled after the first shot. Completely exposed, the ship had no other option but to move away and turned into the cove, opening fire with its weapons located on the other side of it. The British directed their fire on the ship at 11:59. The corvette was hit by small arms fire and by a Carl Gustav 84 mm anti-tank rocket launcher. According to Mills, his men opened fire from a distance of 550 m. The attack killed Lance Corporal Patricio Guanca and wounded five other sailors, damaging power lines, a 40 mm cannon, an Exocet rocket launcher, and the 100 mm gun mount. When the corvette passed in front of the enemy position again to move away, it again received intense fire. Argentine sources acknowledge that more than 200 projectiles hit the corvette.
Meanwhile, the Alouette had been transporting the other 10 marines, out of range of British guns, even though it was a reconnaissance helicopter and not a troop transport.13 As the damaged ARA Guerrico headed out of the bay , the Argentine troops resumed the exchange of fire with Mills' marines. Once out of range of the British guns, from the vicinity of Hobart Rock, the corvette resumed fire with its 40-millimeter guns, repaired and back in service.33 This convinced Mills that everything was finished and ordered his marines to cease fire. This happened at 12:48, according to Mayorga. At 1:00 p.m. Mills approached the Argentine positions waving a white cape and surrendered, receiving the order to have his subordinates leave individually. Mills and his men were taken into custody by Astiz's group, who had remained in reserve during the battle. At 1:35 p.m. it was reported that the British flag had been lowered. HMS Endurance dispatched one of her Wasp helicopters to Cumberland Bay. The helicopter landed there and detected the Argentine corvette and the transport ship in the inlet, but found no signs of combat. HMS Endurance remained in the waters off South Georgia until 5 April. In the afternoon, 13 BAS civilians who were scattered in the vicinity were arrested. At 11 p.m., Grupo Alfa replaced Lieutenant Cortez and his men in protecting the workers in Port Leith.


ARA Guerrico.

Consequences

The corvette ARA Guerrico, with a loss of 50% of its firepower due to combat, departed Grytviken together with the ARA Bahía Paraíso at 3:15 on April 4, heading for Río Grande.35 The latter transported British marines to Río Grande, from where they were sent by plane to Montevideo,13 arriving in the United Kingdom on April 20. The Argentine forces desisted from attacking the BAS base on Bird Island, remaining there and in Schlieper Bay, Lyell Glacier and Saint Andrews Bay, 15 British BAS who remained outside Argentine control until the British recovery of the islands. . The Argentine Navy left a detachment of 55 marines on the islands, along with the 39 scrap metal dismantling workers who remained in Port Leith.34 South Georgia was retaken by British forces on April 25, 1982, in the course of Operation Paraquat.

Awards
  • Lieutenant Mills received the Distinguished Service Cross.
  • Captain Nick Barker of HMS Endurance was awarded the Order of the British Empire in the rank of Commander.
  • The main artillery corporal Francisco Solano Páez was awarded the Argentine Nation medal for Valor in Combat.

Bibliography

-Freedman, Lawrence: The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: The origins of the Falklands war. Routledge, 2005. ISBN 0-7146-5206-7 
-Freedman, Lawrence and Gamba, Virginia: Señales de Guerra. Javier Vergara Editor, 1992. ISBN 950-15-1112-X 
-Insight Team Sunday Times (1982). War in the Falklands: the Full Story. The Sunday Times. 
-Contraalmirante Horacio A. Mayorga: No Vencidos. Ed. Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1998. ISBN 950-742-976-X 
-The Argentine Invasion of South Georgias 

 

Wikipedia.es