A Mission for the Brave – Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Marcelo “Parrot” Márquez
12 June. It was a cold autumn day at the “Almirante Quijada” Naval Air Station in Río Grande. It was raining, and the mechanics of the Third Naval Fighter and Attack Squadron (EA33) already had the A-4Q Skyhawk aircraft ready for the first combat mission during the South Atlantic conflict.
One of them was A-4Q number 3-A-314, which carried on its ventral station four 500-pound (230 kg) MK-82 “Snake-eye” bombs. Its pilot, Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Marcelo “Parrot” Márquez, carried out a meticulous visual inspection, checking every detail of the old aircraft as if it were his legendary Ford A, to which he had a special attachment.
During the pre-flight briefing, they had defined the mission’s objective and the tactics to be used. The weather was unfavourable: medium and low clouds, showers, and reduced visibility. Under these conditions, they had to fly in tight formation and rely on the section leader, Corvette Captain Alberto “Mingo” Philippi.
The three aircraft started up and began their coordinated taxi to runway 25. The aircraft did not respond as usual due to being close to maximum take-off weight; it felt slow and heavy. Not all the aircraft had a VLF-Omega navigation system—although imprecise, it was better than relying solely on time, speed, and heading from visual references. They selected their armament without switching on the master arm.
At 14:10 on 21 May, after a long run along the 2,000-metre concrete runway, 3-A-314 began its climb to join the leader on the right wing. At 30,000 feet (10,000 m) and with a good tailwind, they headed towards the islands. At 100 miles from the target, they descended to avoid detection and preserve the element of surprise.
Under strict radio silence, communicating only with visual signals, the leader gave brief orders. They armed the master switch and began a low-level flight along the west side of East Falkland. The weather had worsened—cloud ceiling down to just 500 feet (150 m), showers, and visibility of only 1,000 metres. They maintained tight formation, searching for a valuable target.
The three aircraft turned left to cross the southern mouth of San Carlos Water. The water was dark in colour. Reaching the coast of East Falkland at 50 feet (15 m) altitude and 450 knots, with improved weather, they continued towards Port San Carlos. They sighted a ship to the north—the 2,750-tonne Type 21 frigate HMS Ardent—and manoeuvred gently to the right to attack westward from the port quarter. The aim was to surprise from different angles.
The wingmen switched positions and began the attack run. The leader attempted to fire his 20 mm cannons, but they jammed. Passing over the ship, he released his bombs—one struck the stern. The ship had begun firing its anti-aircraft guns and missiles in a desperate defence. The right wingman, Lieutenant José César “Cacha” Arca, flew through a curtain of shells and shrapnel from the leader’s bomb, made his release, and flew through a cloud of black smoke. Another bomb hit the stern. Finally, 3-A-314, focused on the target, released its bombs and then escaped that hell.
The three aircraft fled at wave-top height. Seconds later, the voice of “Parrot” came over the radio, tense and urgent: “Harrier to the left!” Immediately, they jettisoned their external tanks and began evasive manoeuvres, heading for the south of the strait and the cover of cloud.
At that moment, a Sea Harrier fired its 30 mm cannons twice at 3-A-314, and the engine exploded into pieces. In a fraction of a second, we lost Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Marcelo “Parrot” Márquez—and gained a hero. Simply, a HERO.
Lieutenant (Posthumous) Marcelo Gustavo “Parrot” Márquez was a man always distinguished by his composure, professionalism, and humility. A sailor respected by superiors and admired by subordinates. An exceptional human being, with a rebellious and passionate spirit, an excellent professional, cheerful, witty, humble, and generous.
The extraordinary history of the Naval Air Antisubmarine Squadron
Obtained from a note made to the current Captain VGM Naval Aviator (RE) Daniel Alberto Marinsalta
. Exploration missions, little-known stories, but no less dangerous for
that reason. Operating from the aircraft carrier (V-2) ARA 25 DE MAYO
first and then from continental bases, in marginal conditions, with slow
aircraft, lacking defensive weapons and dangerously close to the enemy.
History of the air-naval battle that could not be.
By: (*) Oscar Filippi – For: OHF Press
THE CATAPULT:
South
Atlantic, May 1, 1982, aboard the aircraft carrier “ARA 25 DE MAYO”
(PAL V-2) at 8:30 p.m., Lieutenant Commander Emilio Goitía (pilot),
Frigate Lieutenant Daniel Marinsalta (co-pilot ), along with Second
Petty Officer Rodolfo Lencina and First Corporal Néstor Conde, walk on
the deck of the aircraft carrier towards their “bird”, an S-2E TRACKER,
registration (2-AS-26). The mission of this flight is to confirm the
position of the British Task Force located NE (Northeast) of Malvinas by
the two previous exploration flights (2-AS-23 and 2-AS-24) aircraft
also belonging to the Naval Air Squadron. Anti-submarine, which because
of its shield (an owl in flight throwing balls at a submarine) is known
and respected as “THE OWLS”.
It was the last flight of that long and tense day, everything was
activity on the deck, the crew carried out the visual inspection of the
device in the middle of the cold and wind characteristic of that area of the Argentine Sea. Located in their respective seats, the naval
pilots prepare to start the twin-engine that will take them to “sweep”
the surface of the sea. A characteristic flight of anti-surface
exploration and MAE, but this time, on a war mission.
The Grumman S-2E Tracker on the ARA «25 de Mayo» catapult.
“… – TOCO (control tower) , this is DOS ALFA SIERRA DOS SAIS, authorization to launch.”
“… – TWO SAIS, authorized.”
Quickly, the two engines are running, the systems are thoroughly
verified and especially the navigation system on which the accuracy of
the information obtained about the enemy will depend. The “radar alert”
system is verified, a spectrum analyzer and a “laboratory” oscilloscope
that, with Argentine ingenuity and the help of the Technicians of the
Aeronaval Arsenal No. 2, had been recently adapted and was the only
“survival” element. that would allow them to receive emissions from
English radars, letting them know if they were detected.
Shield of the Naval Antisubmarine Squadron of the Argentine Navy.
“…– TOCO, this is TWO SAIS, ready to catapult.”
“…– TWO SAIS, authorized to catapult.”
The
rolling of the aircraft carrier is permanent, it is already facing the
wind. With the wings spread and the engine test complete, the TRACKER
begins taxiing, carefully the legs gently press the wheelhouse, stick
behind, nose lightened. They precisely align with the axis of the
catapult.
The mechanical chocks in front of the main landing gear wheels are
raised, the throttles are reduced and a group of six men jumps on the
plane to check various elements. They secure the plane to the deck of
the aircraft carrier (tail hold) using a fuse that is cut by giving
steam pressure to the catapult.
Captain VGM (RE) Daniel Alberto Marinsalta, as president of the Aeronaval Institute.
With everything secured, the mechanical chocks are lowered. Full
throttle (full throttle) on both engines. Everything trembles and
shakes, the control systems and instruments are verified and checked,
with everything in order, by signs, they give the OK to the deck
officer. The crew tenses in their seats, the momentum of the catapult
will immediately put them into flight.
The two R-1820-82C radial engines roar and the plane shakes even more,
still clinging to the deck..., the tail fuse is cut and the takeoff run
begins, approximately 30 meters that are covered in just over a second,
obtained The takeoff speed of the TRACKER is dependent on the 3,050 HP
of its two “fans”. It was exactly 9:00 p.m. of that historic May 1st.
IN FLIGHT:
The
reference of this story is the current Captain AN (RE) Daniel
MARINSALTA, co-pilot in this mission that he tells us aboard the TRACKER
registration 2-AS-26. An “OWL” from the NAVAL AIR flying in its element, at night and over the sea.
The
Grumman S-2E Tracker aircraft aft of the ARA «25 de Mayo» aircraft
carrier along with the A-4Q «Skyhawk» aircraft of the Third Naval Air
Fighter and Attack Squadron (EA33).
“…– Already in flight heading east, we headed towards the last verified
point of presence of the enemy naval units, the tactic used was simple
and dangerous. Flying low, in the middle of the dark night and over an
even blacker sea. We rose and turned on the search radar, just two turns
of the antenna, thus trying to prevent the British ships from picking
up our broadcast. The first two times it swam, we watched the screen and
stuck to the water again. We continue firmly towards the East (E), the
third time was the charm. Around 11:00 p.m. we ascended, two turns of
the antenna and obtained a large contact and three medium ones at
latitude 50º00'(S), longitude 56º25'(W), simultaneously obtaining a MAE
signal, distance to the contact, only 38 nautical miles ( NM), about
68.4 kilometers. A chill ran through all of us, we knew that they had
detected us, we dived back into the water, at ground level we began to
carry out evasive maneuvers. The pilot was flying instruments and I was
looking out, the water was splashing on the windshield, that's how low
we were flying. The silence was total, like the adrenaline in our
bodies.”
“… – We stayed like this for about fifteen minutes, thinking that we
had evaded, we rose to 1,500 feet (ft) about 450 meters, we turned on
the radar in search of our fleet, the radio silence had to be absolute,
we had to find the aircraft carrier and deliver vital information. We
detected the presence of a large fleet of Russian and Polish fishing
vessels, then our radar screen began to receive interference (cart
wheel), we could no longer do radar search and our fleet continued on
its course. We decided to contact the “Air Controller” of the aircraft
carrier. Twice and nothing, on the third attempt the “Air Controller”
only limited himself to saying: …”
British Aerospace Sea Harrier FRS.1 aircraft like the one that chased the Grumman S-2E Tracker 2-AS-26.
“…
– You have two Lobos (enemy aircraft) on the tail, continue heading
west (W)”. Again we pointed the nose of the TRACKER at the water and we
stuck level again.”
“…
– Obviously, the British Task Force had intercepted our radar emission
and decided to investigate, they had sent a section (2 planes) of “SEA
HARRIER” that, under the command of Captain Mórtimer, took off from the
aircraft carrier “HMS INVINCIBLE” shortly after the midnight from May
1st to May 2nd.”
“The two “SEA HARRIER” were approaching us at 450 knots (Kts), about
810 kilometers per hour, we could barely get away at 135 Kts, about 243
kilometers per hour. Fortunately, the “Wolves” were emitting on a radar
frequency very close to ours and we both suffered the same interference.
We change the radio frequency to listen to our fleet's communications.
The anti-aircraft radar of the Destroyer (D-2) “ARA SANTISIMA TRINIDAD”
had detected and “illuminated” the two “Wolves”, consequently on our
radio we heard that the Destroyer requested “Free Birds” (authorization
to launch the SEA anti-aircraft missiles). DART). Praying that they
wouldn't get the wrong white, we stuck even closer to the water,
everything outside appeared even blacker."
The
Flt. Lt. (captain) Mortimer, the British protagonist of this chase, was
shot down in combat on 06/06/82 by the impact of a SAM ROLAND missile
on his “SEA HARRIER” FRS-1, individual registration XZ-456.
“But Captain Mortimer, seeing himself illuminated and knowing that it
came from Radar 909 of the Type 42 destroyers, did not risk entering
within shooting range and put his “wings on the ground.” “We could
return to the aircraft carrier, but the English had also detected us.”
The
Flt. Lt. (captain) Mortimer, the British protagonist of this chase, was
shot down in combat on 06/06/82 by the impact of a SAM ROLAND missile
on his “SEA HARRIER” FRS-1, individual registration XZ-456. Our respect
goes to a fallen warrior. (N of R).
THE HOOK:
Captain Marinsalta continues :
“We had been flying for some time with both low fuel lights on, under
the stress of a prolonged night flight and in contact with the enemy, we
were facing the last challenge of this long day, the final of
Attachment to the aircraft carrier, it was 01:10 am. from May 2nd. We
could not fail, we had to deliver the precious information.”
“We had fewer visual references, the deck lights were
minimized, communications had to be minimal, already on the final
approach, we made a brief flash with the landing beacon to indicate to
the aircraft carrier's “signalman” that we had the reference in sight.
visual, “ball” at the center of the mirror (light that materializes the
slope of approach to the deck).
Returning to the aircraft carrier ARA «25 de Mayo».
“Gear
down… flaps down… hook down…, everything down and locked. Lieutenant
Commander Emilio Goitía flew with absolute precision the 18 seconds that
took us to see the line of green lights that indicate, reduce the
accelerators to minimum to hook into one of the four arresting cables on
the deck. The pressure of the safety harnesses on the torso, the helmet
that seems to push on the back of our neck, everything indicates
that... WE ARE HOOKED! We were back home. When we checked the tanks, the
remaining fuel was not enough for another approach attempt.”
Lieutenant Commander Emilio Goitía (pilot on the right), Frigate Lieutenant Daniel Marinsalta (co-pilot on the left)
WINDLESS DAWN: Captain Marinsalta ends his story: “Unfortunately,
at dawn, when the six A-4Q SKYHAWK aircraft of the 3rd. Naval Air
Hunting and Attack Squadron were loaded with three 500 lb bombs. (250
Kg.) each, ready to launch on the British fleet, unusually for the time,
the absence of wind was total. The enemy fleet was less than 150 NM
(270 km), but the wind component (sum of the relative wind speeds and
the aircraft carrier's navigation speed) was not enough to make the
launch safe with
a full war load. The attack was given up, as were the British. The
air-naval battle that perhaps would have changed the course of events in
the conflict could not take place.”
It should be noted that the Naval Aviation during the conflict, totaled
1,000 hours of exploration flight of the Argentine Sea in search of the
enemy, making contact on 180 occasions, allowing the subsequent action
of the attack aircraft and in others certifying their absence and
facilitating security. of flights and logistics navigation. No aircraft
were lost on these missions.
Regarding the Aeronaval Antisubmarine Squadron “LOS BUHOS” , during the conflict it was made up of 79 men, of which 18 were pilots and only 12 system operators. There were four “S-2E TRACKER” aircraft embarked on the aircraft carrier (V-2) ARA “25 DE MAYO” , 2-AS-22, 23, 24 and 26, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Héctor SKARE.
More than 3,900 personnel from the Army, Navy and Air Force participated, who contributed materials such as planes, helicopters, warships, tanks and armored vehicles.
From October 21 to 26, the Argentine Air Force (FAA) participated together with the Army and Navy in the training exercise called UNIDEF (United for Defense), carried out at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base, near the city of Bahía Blanca.
At UNIDEF 2012, the operational doctrine used was applied to combat situations in air, sea and land. Its objective was to evaluate the level of joint training and improve the operational capabilities of the Armed Forces for the execution of maneuvers within the framework of territorial defense.
The purpose of the maneuver was to carry out an amphibious incursion to conquer terrain and block the advance of the enemy who had invaded their own terrain, until the arrival of the land component that allowed the counterattack.
For this, procedures such as disembarkations and reembarkations were carried out; refueling of aircraft in flight; infiltrating and exfiltrating of divers; naval, air and ground fire; heliborne operations; parachute drops and armored counterattacks.
Weapon systems and deployed assets
To participate, the Air Force provided IA-58 Pucará aircraft from the III Reconquista Air Brigade; A-4AR fighter-bombers of the V Villa Reynolds San Luis Air Brigade; Mirage III aircraft of the VI Tandil Air Brigade; an MI 17 helicopter and a Bell 212; a TPS 43 radar and an Aerospace Operations Center.
The following tasks were executed such as: air superiority offensive, close air fire support, active direct aerospace defense, attack on naval targets, special operations, search and rescue, air assault, surveillance and control of airspace.
The purpose of UNIDEF was to evaluate the level of joint training, particularly in those activities that involved the execution of different tactical procedures, and to increase joint operational capabilities for the execution of operations within the framework of the dynamics of a territorial defense.
The final stage
On the last day of operations, UNIDEF was observed by the Secretary of Strategy and Military Affairs, Oscar Cuattromo; the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, Brigadier General Jorge Chevalier and the operational commander of the Armed Forces, Brigadier Major Humberto Trisano. In addition, the head of the Army, Lieutenant General Luis Pozzi, the head of the Air Force, Brigadier General Normando Costantino, the deputy head of the Navy, Rear Admiral Gastón Erice, and national legislators belonging to the Defense Commission of the National Congress were present.
The delegation was able to learn about the activities planned for that day. The Air Force, to close the exercise, participated with simulated attacks on vessels with the IA-58 Pucará, Mirage III and V, and shooting practice with the A-4 AR.
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