Demolition of the Fitz Roy Bridge by Explosion
2 June 1982 holds a very special significance for the members of the Argentine Army’s Corps of Engineers.
On that day, First Lieutenant Horacio Darío Blanco, of the 601st Combat Engineer Company, detonated the charges placed on the Fitz Roy Bridge. This combat action directly contributed to what the British themselves would later refer to as “the Bluff Cove Disaster”, or in some versions, “the Disaster of Fitz Roy.”
In the book Historias de Soldados, Lieutenant Blanco provides his account of the events that led to this crucial moment. On 18 May 1982, while leading his section in laying a minefield south of Puerto Argentino, he received orders from Captain Dunn (the company’s second-in-command) to report to him. Together, they proceeded to the Company Command Post, where they were informed that the personnel guarding the bridge near the Fitz Roy settlement were withdrawing towards Puerto Argentino.
The bridge, located in an estuary southwest of Puerto Argentino, was a 100-metre-long structure with a wooden deck and thick concrete pilings. It spanned a deep estuary and linked the rural area of Fitz Roy with the capital. The withdrawing troops had been unable to detonate the previously installed charges. Given the strategic importance of the bridge —through which enemy vessels could land troops and shorten the route to Puerto Argentino— the engineers were tasked with its demolition.
Lieutenant Blanco selected personnel, prepared weapons, and loaded the only available explosive —approximately 40 kg of TNT. He, two NCOs, and ten soldiers were airlifted to the area. Upon arrival, they confirmed that the original charges had failed due to damp fuses, affected by the weather. The engineers proceeded to install new charges: a rapid demolition setup with TNT placed on the abutment on the near bank and on the first two bridge supports.
It was difficult to establish adequate security. The lack of vegetation forced them to set up their bivouac in a hollow about 300 metres from the bridge. Night-time radio communications with the Company HQ in Puerto Argentino were unreliable. During the day, one soldier guarded the bridge and another the bivouac. At night, three sentry posts covered the area in 360 degrees. Every three days, the electric detonators were removed, test-fired, and replaced to maintain readiness. Provisions were not lacking —as Blanco recalls, “the diet varied when an unsuspecting sheep wandered too close.”
But the apparent calm was nearing its end. On 30 May, British forces occupied Mount Kent, bypassing the engineers' position from the northwest. Between 30 May and 1 June, British helicopters began to operate around the Fitz Roy Bridge area. To complicate matters, the radio operator, Corporal Luis Ernesto Fernández, triggered a booby trap and suffered shrapnel wounds to the leg.
On 2 June, the Company Commander informed the detachment by radio that, due to enemy air superiority, helicopter evacuation was no longer an option. They would have to return to Puerto Argentino on foot. At 11:00 hours, a vehicle transporting a group of Navy Tactical Divers —heading to Puerto Argentino— became the last to cross the bridge.
The situation worsened. At 14:30 hours on 2 June 1982, Lieutenant Blanco detonated the charges, almost completely destroying the bridge. The demolition equipment was disabled, and the group began their march on foot toward Puerto Argentino, about 25 km away. The journey was arduous and dangerous. Corporal Fernández could barely walk, and after several hours they came under intense naval bombardment near a ridge close to Infantry Regiment 4 positions. At dawn, after enduring what was essentially an odyssey, they found the path to Puerto Argentino and were transported by vehicle to the Malvinas capital.
The consequences of the Fitz Roy Bridge demolition were disastrous for the British.
Two Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships —HMS Sir Galahad and HMS Sir Tristram— had entered the estuary carrying a regiment of Welsh Guards. Unable to disembark due to the destroyed bridge, they were forced to wait. In that vulnerable position, on 8 June 1982, they were attacked by Argentine Air Force aircraft.
The result: nearly fifty British soldiers killed, over one hundred wounded, and both vessels put out of action. The British would remember the event bitterly, referring to it as “the Bluff Cove Disaster” or “the Disaster of Fitz Roy”. On the Argentine side, the action became known as “the English debacle at Bahia Agradable.”
Revista Soldados 7 (2012)