Malvinas: Why didn't the bombs explode? (1/8)

Why Didn't the Bombs Explode? (Part 1)

Guillermo Poggio || Poder Aéreo

Parte 1 || Parte 2 || Parte 3 || Parte 4 || Parte 5 || Parte 6 || Parte 7 || Parte 8



 



Thirty-five years ago, Argentines and Britons clashed in the frigid waters of the South Atlantic, fighting over the possession of the Malvinas Islands (known as "Falklands" to the British). It was during this conflict that the Argentine Air Force (FAA – Fuerza Aérea Argentina) entered combat for the first time against an external enemy. The baptism of fire took place on May 1, 1982. The following text recounts the story of what was the FAA's most important mission: to attack and destroy the ships of the British Task Force. Taken by surprise, the FAA carried out its missions despite lacking proper training, adequate vectors, and the right armament for the task. This is a story of overcoming challenges, rapid adaptation, and ingenuity. In the end, the results went far beyond what was initially expected.

Introduction

In early June 1944, the Allies were rushing to launch Operation Overlord, the amphibious landing in Normandy, which promised to change the course of World War II. Off the coast of Lyme Bay in the English Channel, HMS Boadicea (H65), a veteran B-class destroyer launched in 1930, was escorting a convoy of merchant ships. On June 13, the convoy fell victim to German aviation. Two torpedoes launched by Junkers Ju-88 bombers struck Boadicea. With the explosion of the ammunition magazine, the British ship quickly sank.

Boadicea was the last Royal Navy ship lost to enemy air action in that conflict. However, considering the use of free-fall devices ("dumb bombs"), the last British loss to enemy aviation was the HMS Panther, a P-class destroyer. The ship was hit by bombs dropped by German Junkers Ju. 87 “Stuka” dive bombers during the Dodecanese campaign in the Aegean Sea on October 9, 1943.


The British cruiser HMS Gloucester being attacked by German Ju-87 'Stuka' aircraft in the Mediterranean Sea on May 22, 1941. The ship would sink that same day after being hit directly by at least four 250 kg bombs. The photo was taken by one of the German aircraft at mid-altitude. If the Argentines were to use this same attack profile, the chances of success would be very small.FOTO: archivo

Since then, naval aviation warfare has undergone profound changes. Forty years later, using aircraft to drop free-fall bombs against escorts equipped with aerial surveillance systems and guided missiles was no longer considered a viable option for naval air attacks, unless the system of the targeted ship was overwhelmed. In 1982, the Argentines demonstrated that old weapons and new tactics could be combined to surprise the Royal Navy, and once again warships would be lost to free-fall bombs.

Caught by Surprise

All the military planning for the recapture of the Malvinas Islands was carried out confidentially by the high command of the Argentine Navy, with Admiral Anaya, the commander of the force, as the mastermind. By the end of 1981, the Argentine military government considered the possibility of retaking the Malvinas Islands through military action if diplomatic negotiations failed. This option was discussed with President Leopoldo Galtieri.

 
The military junta that ruled Argentina in 1982. In the center, President Galtieri. To his left is Anaya, the architect of the Malvinas recapture, and to his left is the FAA commander, Brigadier Lami Dozo. Dozo learned of the plan to retake the islands shortly before the new year. Most of his subordinates only became aware of the events on April 2, 1982, the date of the Argentine landing on the islands. Dozo passed away two months ago at the age of 88. FOTO: archivo

It turns out that at the same time, the Strategic Air Command (CAE) of the Argentine Air Force (FAA) had completed an update to the strategic planning of the Force, which did not include military actions against the British to retake the Malvinas Islands. The commander of the Argentine Air Force, Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo, was the last of the three commanders to learn about the existence of the military plan, being informed of it two days before the end of 1981.

The strategists of the Argentine Air Force had never considered the possibility of getting involved in a conflict with the United Kingdom over the Malvinas Islands. There were two major reasons for this, one legal and the other geopolitical.

From a legal standpoint, Resolution 1/69, issued by the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Argentine Armed Forces, helped resolve some disputes between the three branches and better defined each of their roles. Based on this resolution, by the end of 1969, Law No. 18.416 was enacted, which established the specific responsibilities of each branch.

In this way, the Navy had specific responsibilities over Argentina's territorial waters and coastline. It was tasked with acquiring all necessary assets, including naval and maritime resources, whether onboard ships or not. Regarding naval operations, the FAA was only required to provide indirect support without the need to acquire specialized assets different from those used in air operations.

Therefore, by April 1982, the FAA lacked the necessary assets and doctrines to engage in naval air warfare. None of the FAA pilots had ever dropped a single device into the sea. Most of them did it for the first time in combat.

From a geopolitical standpoint, the FAA was configured to face a continental enemy in the Southern Cone. Its assets, tactics, and training were all oriented towards a potential border conflict, particularly with Chile, with whom Argentina almost went to war in 1978. Even the Argentine deployment airfields had been defined based on a hypothetical battle against the Andean neighbor.

Argentine Army: Sherman Firefly on Parade

Sherman Firefly on the May, the 25th 1960 Parade

Foto de la 2da Sección con Vehículos Blindados Combate Sherman M4A4 Firefly del Escuadrón de Caballería del Colegio Militar de la Nación, con cañón largo de Cal 76,2 mm, durante el desfile del 150° Aniversario de la Revolución de Mayo, por la Avenida del Libertador en la Capital Federal (actual de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires) - Año: 25 de mayo de 1960.
(Créditos a Marcos Zambrana)

Reviews
The "Sherman Firefly" was a medium tank used by the United Kingdom during World War II. It was based on the American M4 Sherman but was equipped with the powerful British 17-pounder anti-tank gun as its main armament, with a caliber of 76.2 mm. Although originally intended as a temporary solution until future British tank designs could enter service, the Sherman Firefly became the most common vehicle to use the 17-pounder gun during the war.

Specifications of the Sherman M4A4 Tanks:

• Weight: 35.3 tons
• Length: 5.89 meters
• Width: 2.64 meters
• Height: 2.74 meters
• Crew: 4 (commander, gunner, loader/radio operator, driver)
• Armor: 89 mm (turret mantlet)

Primary Weapon

• 76.5 mm cannon (with 77 rounds)

Secondary Weapons

• 1 M2HB .50 caliber machine gun (with 300 rounds)
• 1 Browning M1919A4 coaxial .30 caliber machine gun (with 5,000 rounds)

Engine: Chrysler A57 Multibank 6-cylinder engine, or 21-liter radial engine, 425 HP.

Maximum Speed

• 32 km/h (sustained)
• 40 km/h (in emergencies)

Argentine: Defense Politics From Independence to the Desert Campaign

Argentine Defense: From Independence to the Desert Campaign

Encina Moreno and company. Colección del Servicio Histórico del Ejército.

Throughout Argentine history, national defense has suffered from not being treated as a state policy that transcends the ideologies and administrations of the ruling governments. This analysis, in three parts, examines the successes, failures, and outstanding issues in the evolution of Argentine defense.

 

Politics, Diplomacy, and War

In 1811, Paraguay declared its independence and outlined its territorial borders. However, these territorial claims conflicted with Brazil's, sparking a long period of tensions between the two countries, which eventually affected Argentina as well.

Over time, Paraguay also had commercial disputes with the Argentine government, leading to a tacit alliance between Argentina and Brazil, both of whom sought to protect their respective territorial and economic interests. Paraguay also faced difficulties trading in Uruguay, which led to tensions with Montevideo. By the end of 1864, Paraguay sent troops to Uruguay to support the Partido Blanco, which was fighting against the Partido Colorado, backed by Brazil.

Paraguay requested permission from Argentine President Bartolomé Mitre to move its troops through the Argentine Mesopotamia region on their way to Uruguay. This request was denied, but in April 1865, Paraguayan forces entered Argentina and occupied the city of Corrientes, forcing Argentina to join Brazil and Uruguay in war against Paraguay, a conflict later known as the War of the Triple Alliance.

This bloody conflict ended in 1870 with Paraguay’s surrender, causing severe territorial losses and demographic devastation, as nearly half of the Paraguayan population and about 90% of its men died.

The Paraguayan occupation of Corrientes could have been avoided if Argentina had better-equipped and strategically deployed armed forces.

Armed Forces and Sovereignty in Patagonia

After the independence of Argentina and Chile, both countries entered a period of rising tensions over their territorial claims in southern Patagonia. These tensions were further complicated by the rugged geography of the Andes Mountains, which made it difficult to accurately demarcate borders, and by the frequent raids carried out by the Mapuche tribes, who originated from the Chilean side of the Andes and often attacked Argentine settlements.

The Mapuches had gained territory in Patagonia and the southern Pampa region, displacing or exterminating local tribes, which increased Chilean influence in the area. Historians suggest that the loot from Mapuche raids—mostly stolen livestock—was sold in Chile with the tacit approval of local authorities.

Argentina, still embroiled in internal conflicts for nearly half a century since its independence, had not made significant advances in securing sovereignty over Patagonia. By the early 1870s, tensions between Argentina and Chile escalated, with both nations reaffirming their territorial claims. In 1872, Chilean authorities interfered with Argentine commercial activities in Santa Cruz, prompting the Argentine government to establish a military garrison in the region and explore the territory.

Sea Fleet Supporting the Desert Campaign. Foto: Archivo DEF.

Tensions further escalated when, in 1876, Chile sent the corvette Magallanes to the port of Santa Cruz to seize a French ship that had been authorized by Argentina to extract guano. In response, the Argentine government dispatched a fleet under the command of Commodore Luis Py to Patagonia in 1878, with the mission of asserting Argentina’s sovereign rights over the region.

Given these tensions, President Nicolás Avellaneda informed Congress that, in legitimate defense, he had ordered Argentine warships to be stationed at the mouth of the Santa Cruz River and to fortify the area with artillery and troops. However, had there been a conflict, Argentina’s military forces would likely have been unable to defeat the Chilean fleet, which was simultaneously engaged in conflicts with Bolivia and Peru in the north.

The Desert Campaign and Affirmation of Sovereignty

In this context, with the nation’s territorial integrity at risk, General Julio Argentino Roca, then Minister of War and Navy, proposed to President Avellaneda the launch of a military campaign known as the Conquest of the Desert. The strategic objective was for the Argentine Army to advance southward to occupy Patagonia and reaffirm Argentine sovereignty over a region that, until then, had been under Mapuche control.

The Argentine government supported these military operations by establishing naval sub-delegations in Carmen de Patagones, Puerto Deseado, Río Gallegos, Isla de los Estados, and Ushuaia, which led to the settlement of the first Argentine communities in these regions, thus helping to consolidate national sovereignty in the south.

At the same time, the Argentine Army began to receive modern weapons (rifles, cannons, etc.) and the Navy acquired new warships (battleships and cruisers), positioning Argentina’s fleet as one of the most powerful in the world. These advancements allowed Argentina to reach a diplomatic resolution with Chile, culminating in the signing of the 1881 Boundary Treaty, which secured Argentine sovereignty over Patagonia.

In 1884, the Argentine Navy, under the command of Commodore Augusto Lasserre, deployed a fleet of six warships to Tierra del Fuego and Isla de los Estados. During this mission, Lasserre encountered a British mission in Ushuaia. After a brief conversation, on October 12, 1884, the British flag was lowered and the Argentine flag was raised, reaffirming Argentina's sovereignty over the southernmost part of its continental territory, a date now considered the official founding of Ushuaia.


The Desert Campaign. Colección Servicio Histórico del Ejército.

Conclusion

Argentina's ability to defend its sovereignty in the south was heavily dependent on strengthening its armed forces. The development of a modern navy and a diplomacy backed by military strength were crucial in securing Argentine control over Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego. The Desert Campaign, though controversial, was fundamental in consolidating Argentine control over vast southern territories, preventing territorial conflicts with Chile, and laying the groundwork for national defense in the late 19th century.

Beagle Crisis: Naval Fennecs Doing Airbase Attack over Chabunco

Naval Aviation School in Operation Tronador

On the last week of August, 2024, news broke of a scramble (a priority emergency takeoff of an interceptor fighter to respond to an immediate threat) involving two FACh F-5E Tiger III aircraft to identify an "unknown threat" at the mouth of the Strait of Magellan. The jets found nothing, but they had taken off from Chabunco Air Base (Presidente Carlos Ibáñez International Airport) in Punta Arenas. In 1978, during the Beagle crisis, this airport would have been a target in an operation aimed at neutralizing the main Chilean aircraft operating in the area: the Hawker Hunters. This daring mission was assigned to a fleet of T-28 Fennec aircraft, rugged, radial-engine, two-seat trainers and light attack planes from the Argentine Navy's Aviation Command. Hidden at a dispersal airstrip 50 km from Río Grande, these aircraft were tasked with supporting the helicopter-borne landing on the disputed islands and sinking small vessels. Their most daring mission: attacking the Hunters as they were preparing to land. Let's delve into this fascinating story.

The Naval Aviation School Goes to War

At the end of 1977, the Naval Aviation School had a small number of only nine T-28 aircraft in service, out of a total of 20 assigned. During that period, the last navigation of these aircraft between Punta Indio and Ushuaia was planned, called "Operation Austral," which involved the transfer of the nine operational aircraft at that time.


T-28P 0628/3-A-208. B.A Ushuaia, August 11. Pilot Midshipman Goñi, and Second Warrant Officer Ruiz.


1.2km dispersal runway at Estancia La Sara where the T-28 Fennec operated

Initially conceived as the farewell of these aircraft, the mission unintentionally became the prelude to Operation Tronador for the School. Given the growing tension in the Austral Zone, the Naval Aviation Command (COAN) was instructed to increase the level of readiness due to the possible occurrence of an armed conflict. As part of these measures, the deactivation of the T-28s was suspended.


T-28F 0581/1-A-250 during a stopover at Tandil Air Base on the way to Rio Grande Air Station.

In early 1978, a four-plane division from the Naval Aviation School was deployed to the Río Grande Naval Air Base, where it remained for the entire year, with the planes being replaced periodically.

As tensions increased in November, the Naval Aviation School Squadron reached a total of 19 T-28s in operational condition, with the number of available pilots also increasing. Lieutenant Hugo Ortiz was put in charge of the group, which consisted of several officers.


B-80 used as support of the Fennec deployment

In the framework of Operation Tronador, the T-28 Squadron was assigned close air support missions, attacks on smaller vessels in Bahía Inútil, and the risky task of attacking Chilean Air Force Hunter aircraft during their landing phase in Punta Arenas. Shooting practice, rocket attacks, and 30º bombings were carried out, usually in cooperation with troops from the 5th Marine Infantry Battalion (BIM-5). A forward operating base was established on the runway of the "La Sara" ranch, where a division of T-28s was kept on permanent readiness, while the rest were concentrated in Río Grande.



Photo taken by Frigate Lieutenant Urberti to Midshipman Goñi on board T-28P 0588/3-A-203. The small painted feature on the camouflaged T-28s can be seen. Estancia La Sara, Dec. 1978.

During this period, reconnaissance flights were carried out, including over Chilean airspace. On one of these flights, on August 13, 1978, a section of T-28s discovered a field airfield with troops and a C-47 of the Chilean Air Force, just 15 miles northwest of the "La Sara" ranch.



Dispersal airstrips of the FACH and the COAN in the northern area of ​​Tierra del Fuego

Finally, shortly before December 22, the readiness was completed and the squadron awaited attack orders, which never came. The T-28 squadron was one of the last to withdraw, doing so on January 27, 1979, flying from La Sara to Punta Indio. Despite the precarious operating conditions and the wear and tear of the aircraft, no major inconveniences were recorded. In June 1979, the last T-28Fs were decommissioned and scrapped.


Wrecks of the T-28F of the ESAN (Naval Aviation School)

The region covered by history can be seen on this map below. From the improvised runway at Estancia La Sara, a direct route of 185 km was to be flown to carry out an attack on the Chabunco air base and a 100 km route to patrol and harass ships in Bahía Inútil. The runway is located about 50 km NNW of Río Grande, where another section of ESAN T-28 Fennecs operated. Finally, from the runway to Ushuaia there are only 155 km.

Conclusions

In the vast expanse of southern Argentina, amidst the frigid and desolate region of Tierra del Fuego, the brave pilots and instructors of the Naval Aviation School prepared for the unimaginable. Aboard their sturdy and rugged T-28 Fennecs—aircraft considered obsolete by many—these men not only faced the challenge of operating under the most extreme conditions, but did so with a boldness that continues to inspire admiration to this day.

As the tension of the Beagle crisis reached its peak, these pilots were entrusted with a mission that seemed straight out of an epic tale: to strike the formidable Chilean Hawker Hunters just as they were landing in Punta Arenas. Imagine the courage required to confront a more modern and better-armed enemy, knowing the odds were against them. Yet, from a camouflaged dispersal airstrip at Estancia La Sara, these men stood ready, the roar of their radial engines their only companion in the tense wait for orders that ultimately never came.

The spirit of these Argentine pilots, capable of defying the impossible with ingenuity and determination, is a legacy of courage and dedication that transcends time. Following in the same footsteps as Owen Crippa in the Malvinas four years later, these pilots were prepared to attack a well-defended target and the enemy's most valuable assets with training aircraft. It wasn’t just about the machines, but about the men who, in their T-28 Fennecs, showed the world that the true strength of a nation lies in the bravery of its defenders. Today, their example is a beacon of pride for all Argentines, a reminder that when the nation calls, its people respond with unwavering valor.

Sources: North American T-28 Fennec, Aeronaval Series No. 28.

Beagle Crisis: General Las Heras Group

General Las Heras Group

A mechanized armored grouping was tasked with crossing through the passes near Bariloche, heading towards Temuco, effectively splitting Chile in two. This force consisted of approximately 7,800 men and around 200 combat vehicles, including Sherman tanks, Mowag vehicles, M-3 Diamonds, and M-113s. Leading the formation was the 28th Mountain Infantry Regiment (known as "Rodillas Negras"), a unit with a strong reputation earned in Tucumán in 1975. By the time the order to halt the operation arrived, some of its units had already crossed the border during the night.

Malvinas: Captain Azcueta and the ARA San Luis Performance

“I am ready”: the Captain’s Courage the Day the Firing Computer of the ARA San Luis Submarine Broke Down in Malvinas

The recovery of the Malvinas Islands on April 2, 1982 took the commanders of the submarine force by surprise, as they had not been informed of Operation Rosario. Nevertheless, they prepared as best they could a submarine with serious technical deficiencies and sailed with it within the exclusion zone. The decision of Frigate Captain Fernando María Azcueta and his inexperienced crew. And the order to destroy the enemy with the only possibility of firing torpedoes manually.

By Mariano Sciaroni || Infobae

The drumbeat of war on April 2, 1982 surprised the ARA San Luis (S-32) and all its crew, including its commander, Frigate Captain Fernando María Azcueta, 40 years old and son of one of the first submariners of the Argentine Navy. It was docked at a pier at the Mar del Plata Naval Base (BNMP), base of operations for the Navy's small submarine force.

ARA San Luis departs from Mar del Plata Naval Base

The surprise was due to the fact that the high naval command, in order to maintain the secrecy of the operation carried out that day, chose not to inform the commanders of the various units not directly involved about Operation Rosario: the capture of the Malvinas.

Therefore, the San Luis did not receive the order to prepare for a combat patrol until 24 hours after the assault on the islands. At that time, the recently completed crew began to prepare the ship, in order to make it fit for war in the shortest possible time.

The initial state of the submarine was not satisfactory and it greatly needed to enter dry dock, something that would have to be done at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base, the main base of the Navy, since Mar de Plata lacked such facilities.

The hull, propeller and internal cooling pipes of the San Luis had accumulations of small parasitic crustaceans, which affected its performance, increased its noise level and limited its speed. However, as there was not enough time to travel to Puerto Belgrano, the clean-up was carried out in Mar del Plata by divers (students from the Diving School) who worked 24 hours a day, equipped with manual scrapers, for almost a week.

Frigate Captain Fernando María Azcueta speaks to his crew during the 1982 war patrol. The beard indicates that they had already been at sea for quite a few days

Despite intense efforts before departure, several critical issues with the unit remained unresolved. One diesel engine had been out of service since 1976 due to a broken engine block, and the other three suffered from cooling problems that limited their power. Additionally, the snorkel frequently allowed seawater into the submarine, and the bilge pumps were unreliable. The DUUX system, a passive acoustic rangefinder, was deemed inaccurate and out of service.

Survival equipment also posed significant concerns. The life raft ejection system was non-operational, hydrogen burners were outdated, and the oxygen meter was being repaired on land. Gas measurement capsules, crucial for safety, had expired in 1976. This was particularly concerning given that the submarine was considered modern, having been incorporated in 1974.

The crew’s training level was compromised by the Argentine Navy’s personnel rotation policy, which resulted in many new and inexperienced crew members aboard. Key positions, including those in fire control systems, were held by junior non-commissioned officers, as the most experienced submariners were in West Germany overseeing the construction of new TR 1700-class submarines.

Lieutenant Luis Seghezzi, an exceptionally young Chief of Navigation, had just graduated from the Submarine School in late 1981. He reflected on the high turnover among the crew, acknowledging that most had only been on board for three months and that this was his first experience with the submarine's weapon systems. He noted that while high turnover allowed for more personnel to be trained in new technologies, it did not necessarily ensure better responses in unprecedented situations, such as those faced during the mission.

 

ARA San Luis's trajectory from the "Enriqueta" area to the exclusion zone, finally entering the "María" patrol area, within the Exclusion Zone
 

While the senior officers of the San Luis had extensive experience with submarines, neither Captain Azcueta nor his second-in-command had any with Type 209 submarines like the San Luis. Azcueta himself had only spent 16 days at sea as commander before the war began, having taken command on December 19, 1981.

On April 11, late in the afternoon, the submarine, fully loaded with water, provisions, 10 SST-4 guided torpedoes, and 14 Mk 37 Mod 3 torpedoes, set sail from Mar del Plata with its 35 crew members. Second Corporal Eduardo Lavarello recalls the departure on that Easter Sunday as a cold, foggy evening, which was ideal for remaining undetected as they headed out to sea.

By April 13, Captain Azcueta reported the results of engine tests to his superiors, confirming that the engines operated acceptably up to 1200 amps, achieving a maximum submerged speed of 20 knots. Despite the numerous challenges—limited experience with the Type 209, an inexperienced crew, mechanical issues, and unreliable weapons—Azcueta's message concluded with the resolute words, “I am ready.” This declaration, made in the face of daunting odds and the prospect of confronting the world’s leading navy in anti-submarine warfare, encapsulates the captain’s bravery and determination.

On April 17, 1982, after an uneventful transit during which the captain continued to train his crew and address mechanical issues, the submarine received a coded message. They were ordered to proceed to a waiting area designated as “Enriqueta,” located southeast of Golfo Nuevo, near the Argentine mainland and just north of the British-established Exclusion Zone.

The VM-8/24 computer is out of service

Initially, due to ongoing diplomatic negotiations, there were strict Rules of Engagement that limited the use of weapons, similar to those imposed on British forces. Weapons could only be used within the Maritime Exclusion Zone and after positively identifying a target, except in cases of submerged contacts, which were presumed to be enemy vessels.

Two days later, the VM-8/24 fire control computer on the ARA San Luis failed completely, despite the crew's efforts to repair it. Captain Azcueta later explained that the computer lost its display and the target panels became unresponsive to sensor commands. The crew attempted multiple troubleshooting steps, including checking power supplies and adjusting voltage levels, but the computer remained largely nonfunctional, though it could still operate in a limited emergency mode.

The fire control computer is critical for a modern attack submarine, as it processes sensor data, calculates firing solutions, and controls torpedo guidance. The VM-8/24 system on the San Luis could track and prepare solutions for up to three targets simultaneously, integrating sonar, radar, and periscope data to determine positions and vectors.

The computer’s failure was a severe blow, leaving the submarine unable to use its automatic fire control system. This limitation meant that the San Luis could only fire a single torpedo at a time, which had to be manually guided by the crew, significantly reducing the submarine’s combat effectiveness.

With the breakdown of the computer, according to the post-war report, there was:

• Loss of the ability to automatically and instantly update the positions of the submarine, target and torpedo.
• Loss of the ability to accurately calculate the Aiming Angle (Torpedo Course) and its instant update.
• Poor precision of the manual guidance system dial (graduations every 5° by design)
• Practical impossibility of estimating the position of the torpedo and, as a consequence, serious difficulty in introducing effective corrections.

The seriousness of the breakdown led Azcueta to break the traditional radio silence with which submarines move and inform his superiors. The Commander of the Submarine Force (COFUERSUB) recognized the problem, but decided not to withdraw the ARA San Luis from the waiting area, after assessing the convenience of having at least one submarine patrolling despite the limitations it faced.

According to doctrine, the failure of the computer implies a “low probability of impact” and, therefore, the use of torpedoes is “in case of defensive launches and if no other weapon is available”. Therefore, it was considered that the failure of the computer implied “that the fulfillment of the unit's mission would be practically unfeasible”.


Inside the San Luis, however, and despite knowing the new limitations with which they would go to war, they were somewhat optimistic. As Lieutenant Ricardo Alessandrini, the submarine's Chief of Armament, recalls: “The firing control computer was not operational and left us short of capacity in the waiting area. This limited the number of torpedo shots that could be controlled from the submarine. However, in the submarine force we often practiced the old-fashioned method of firing torpedoes using manual calculations and it was entirely possible to carry out a successful attack with good information about our target.”

That is, the S-32 crew would launch torpedoes using plottings and abacuses, in the same way that straight-running torpedoes were launched at short distances until the beginning of World War II.

Captain Azcueta also narrates: “As has been said, during the stay in the Enriqueta area, we took advantage of the stoppage to intensify the training in the different roles and to adjust ship values ​​that we had not updated. Among them the so-called “cavitation threshold”. In a submarine, the speed at which its propellers cavitate (a fluid phenomenon that produces an undesirable and significant noise of its own), depends on the depth and increases with it. That is, if I increase the immersion plane, I can apply more speed without cavitating. With resignation we verified that, whatever the depth, up to 150 meters, we cavitated at 6 knots. This circumstance led me to be very cautious with the speed in the patrol area. It became evident that, despite the great effort of the student divers of the Diving School, the propeller had not been sufficiently cleaned. There was nothing to be done.

By April 26, the negotiations on the fate of the islands were practically closed. COFUERSUB (Command of the Submarine Force) decided to send the San Luis to the “María” patrol zone, located north of the islands. It arrived there on the 28th, not without danger.

In the afternoon of the same day, with the deterioration of the military and political situation, the S-32 received the order to destroy any enemy target if it found it within the Exclusion Zone around the islands: “From COFUERSUB to San Luis. I cancel restrictions on the use of weapons. All contact is enemy.”

Even with all the problems mentioned and a broken firing computer (the brain of the submarine), the San Luis would cover itself in glory in the days to come. Admiral Brown would have been proud of this brave Navy lad.

Argentina-Chile Naval Race: Argentina Buys Garibaldis (7/13)

The Brown's Robust Boy Is a Man Today

Gone were the days when riverine units, with heterogeneous crews, set out to sea to assert sovereignty in Santa Cruz.

As can be seen from the tables accompanying this work, the ARA not only ceased to be a riverine force in the 1880s, but also, following the motto "let us be strong and we will be respected," the national authorities, supported by public opinion, at a level of consensus rarely equaled in our history, had drawn up plans to obtain not only parity, but naval supremacy in South America.

It should be noted that with the acquisition of the transports, the ARA Guardia Nacional (6,700 tons), the ARA Chaco and the ARA Pampa (8,700 tons), the ARA has an effective transport squadron, since these ships, together, can carry a load of 15,000 tons and supplies. The incorporation of the four "Garibaldi" type armored cruisers was an unbalancing factor that totally altered the balance of power in favor of Argentina. These ships, well protected, armed and fast, were the most modern, most powerful and most homogeneous group of warships in the Southern Cone. The Jane's Fighting Ships yearbook for 1936 observes in this regard: these ships constitute the best class of armored cruisers ever designed. The four "Garibaldis": together with the cruiser ARA Buenos Aires, destroyers, auxiliary ships, make up the Bahía Blanca Division, while the cruisers ARA 9 de Julio, ARA 25 de Mayo and ARA Patria and auxiliaries make up the Río de la Plata Division. On January 8, the Bahía Blanca Division sets sail on a series of exercises through the southern ports that will take it to the Beagle Channel. These exercises will last for 80 days. On January 18, in turn, The Río de la Plata Division sets sail on a journey that will take it to Cape Horn, which will last 62 days. The crews carry out exhaustive artillery, torpedo and landing practices without the slightest incident or accident. As an article in the Bulletin of the Naval Center proclaims in those days, it was evident that "the robust child of Brown is a man today" (3 )

Despite the meeting between the presidents of Argentina and Chile known as "The Embrace of the Strait", tensions, far from decreasing, increased.

As we have seen, with the acquisition of a cruiser (the Chacabuco) and six destroyers by Chile, Argentina responded with the purchase of the ARA Moreno and ARA Rivadavia. Chile, in turn, used funds reserved for the sewerage of Santiago and ordered two battleships of 11,800 tons. Day after day, the Argentine authorities received coded telegrams from the military and naval commissions in Europe detailing the urgent purchases of ammunition and all kinds of items by the Chilean authorities. The Argentine commissions, of course, also had no rest, ensuring the provision of grenades of all calibers in large quantities, replacement fuel stocks and the thousand and one indispensable items. The response to the two new Chilean battleships would not take long to arrive: two 14,800-caliber battleships that would be built by the Ansaldo Company, in a construction period similar to that of the new Chilean ships. These ships, which would be called ARA Chacabuco and ARA Maipú.

In addition, the ARA signed a contract with the Pattison Company, of Naples, for six destroyers of the "Nembo" class that were under construction for the Royal Italian Navy, and whose first units had already been launched in October 1899.

With the consent of his country's government, a well-known Chilean financier contacted the British minister in Santiago, as the arms race threatened to ruin both countries. An Argentine industrialist and financier, in turn, initiated contacts with the British minister in Buenos Aires. The British minister in Santiago in turn contacted London and the British minister in Buenos Aires, and an agreement was reached by this means. Chile agreed to part with its two ships under construction if Argentina in turn agreed to do the same with the four ships ordered.

The "Constitución" and "Libertad" were acquired by England to prevent these ships from falling into the hands of the Tsarist Russian navy, as this country was on the verge of war with Japan, a country with which England had established an undeclared alliance, and a country whose fleet had been built almost entirely in English shipyards, and was governed by British patterns. The ARA Moreno and ARA Rivadavia were sold to Japan while they were still under construction. In that country they were designated Nishin and Kasuga. When the anticipated war between Japan and Russia broke out, these ships distinguished themselves during the bombardment and siege of Porth Arthur and the naval battle of Tsu-Shima.

The ARA Chacabuco and ARA San Martín were never built. The peace agreements made them unnecessary. According to oral sources, the abundant materials collected for these units were used for the construction of some of the four battleships of the "Roma" class, for the Italian Navy, since they were ships with practically the same characteristics and armament.

The ARA also cancelled the contract for the six "Nembo" class destroyers, whose construction, since the danger of war had disappeared, was carried out at a slower pace by the Pattison shipyard and they were incorporated into the Italian Navy, where they were designated Aquilone, Borea, Espero Nembo, Turbine, and Zeffiro.


Nembo class destroyers
Displacement: 450 tons
Length: 70 m
Beam: 7 m
Draft: 1.90 m
Armament: 5 x 102 mm
4 torpedo tubes
Engine: 5200-5350 HP
Maximum speed: 30-30 1/2 knots
Crew: 65 men


Photos:

1) Armored cruiser ARA "Moreno" during trials under the national flag. 1903-?


2) ARA Entre Ríos class destroyers- (photos Ingo Würster collection)

ARA Moreno, ARA Rivadavia
Builder: Ansaldo, Genova (Italy)
Launched: May, 1902
Completed: January, 1904
Displacement: 7,750 tons. (9,800 complete)
Dimensions:
Length: 105.15 m
Beam: 18.7 m
Draft: 7.90 m

Armament: (Armstrong)
-4 x 203 mm L.45 (Rivadavia" 2 x 254 L.45)
-14 x 152 mmL.45
-10 x 76mm L.40
- 6 x 47 mm
- 8 Maxim machine guns cal 7.65mm
Torpedo tubes: 4x406mm
Armor:
-Belt: 152 mm
-Deck: 38 mm
-Turns: 140 mm
-Battery: 152 mm
Engine: 2 pairs of 3 cylinders, triple expansion: 13,500 HP
Speed: 20 knots (21 during tests)
Fuel: (coal) normal 650 tons, Maximum: 1100 tons
Crew: 525 -575 men.

Referencia
Jane, Frederick, Fighting Ships (Sampson, Low , Marston and Co, London, 1914) pag. 231