Argentine Weapons: Bersa SA

Bersa SA

Bersa S.A. is an Argentine portable weapons manufacturing company, located in the city of Ramos Mejía, La Matanza District, Buenos Aires Province, Argentina.1 Initially founded under the name of Tecnofres in 1958 and changing its name to BERSA S.R.L. in 1962 (although the years of the company's life are counted from the founding of Tecnofres) with the acronym BERSA being the result of the union of the letters of the names of the founding partners, Benso Bonadimani, Ercole Montini and Savino Caselli. Currently the company focuses on the production of pistols, with an annual production that reaches 60,000 copies, reaching 6,500 units per month. In its entire history, 725,000 weapons have been manufactured, of which 345,000 have been exported.

History
The company was born with the association of a group of Italian immigrants who arrived in Argentina during the 1950s, they were Benso Bonadimani from Cologna Veneto, Ercole Montini, arrived from Brescia and Savino Caselli born in a town near Ivrea. Savino studied in Ivrea and in 1940 began working for the Olivetti company, which manufactured typewriters. In 1952, the management of Olivetti decided to install a manufacturing plant for its products in Argentina and carried out a selection of personnel, among whom Savino was selected and traveled to Argentina a year later where he obtained the position of Head of the Workshop. Die-casting, which was the most important sector of the plant. Ercole Montini, who had worked for some years at Beretta with his brother, arrived in Argentina as an immigrant in 1953 and once in the country he set up a small workshop, with a milling cutter and a lathe to do work in his free time. Given his Beretta background, most of the orders were related to weapons, such as the manufacture of spare parts that were difficult to obtain in the country. Savino was in the habit of designing various devices, but he needed a workshop where he could materialize them. This is how Ercole made contact, who allowed him to use his workshop when he was away from the factory.
Around 1958, Ercole was asked to manufacture a large number of parts for a weapon. But the quantity required by the client exceeded the capabilities of the small workshop, so he asked Savino for help. In addition to personnel and machinery, they would need a trusted man to control the process while both were away. For this reason, they contacted Benso, who was only 20 years old, for the task. The three formed a company that they named Tecnofres, the seedbed of what would later become BERSA.

First weapons 
Tecnofres was active without problems for a year and dedicated itself to manufacturing parts for the most important Argentine weapons factory of those times, Ballester Molina. However, after that period, they found that they could not sustain the workshop and pay the salaries and loans for the machinery.
If the young company wanted to stay alive, it had to find a new profitable business to keep it afloat and it was at that moment that Savino came up with the possibility of redesigning and manufacturing his own weapon.
Savino was sent back to Italy by Olivetti, Savino acquired a .22 caliber Beretta pistol (probably a Beretta M34), which he disassembled and studied carefully to understand its operation. Later he redesigned it to adapt it to the means of production that he and his partners had. To his original design he added stylistic details inspired by the Beretta 70 pistol, whose design plans he was able to see at the Brescia plant.
The prototype of the new pistol was completed in just forty days, thanks to the collaboration of other Olivetti workers who were on strike.
The result was the BERSA Model 60 pistol, which had excellent acceptance due to the lack of competition within the Argentine market for that class of weapons made in the European style. This initial success led to increased production and the design of new models such as the Model 62 and Model 64.
Around 1962 the company changed its name to BERSA S.R.L.

Pistols 

Bersa 83 

Bersa Thunder 22 

Bersa Thunder 22-6 

Bersa Thunder 32

Bersa Thunder 380 

Bersa Thunder 380 Concealed Carry 

Bersa Thunder 9 

Bersa Thunder 40 

Bersa Thunder 9 Ultra Compact 

Bersa Thunder 40 Ultra Compact 

Bersa Thunder 45 Ultra Compact 

Official Website

Argentina-Chile Naval Race: Chile Buys Ironclads (4/13)

The Purchasing of the Almirante Cochrane and Blanco Encalada Ironclads

By Eddie Cerda Grollmus



Part 1 || Part 2 || Part 3 || Part 4


The idea of providing Chile with armored ships dates back to 1864. It has its genesis in the events that led to the war between the allied side (Peru and Chile) against Spain, as a result of the occupation by the squadron of the latter. of the Chinchas Islands, at that time the main source of foreign exchange in the Peruvian economy (exploitation of the Guano). The first promoters of this idea were Messrs. Manuel José Irarrázaval (Former Minister of the Interior), Federico Errázuriz (Minister of Justice, Worship and Public Instruction), and Alejandro Reyes (Minister of Finance), they advocated the acquisition of two monitors or armored vehicles that were powerful enough to counter the Spanish squadron at that time in the Pacific 1.

Then the Interior and Foreign Relations portfolio was occupied by Abdón Cifuentes, who continued with the idea of such an acquisition, but given the poverty of the national treasury and the opposition of the then president José Joaquín Pérez Mascayo, Abdón Cifuentes' attempts were in vain. These were maintained throughout the decade in which Pérez governed (1861-1871).

The main consequence of this refusal was the bombing of the port of Valparaíso (March 31, 1866), by the Spanish fleet. The president's lack of vision resulted in the almost disappearance of the national merchant marine 2, and only the destruction . of the port cost close to 15,000,000 pesos 3.

After the war with Spain (1864-1866) ended, Chile could not take out the O'Higgins and Chacabuco corvettes from the English shipyards given the blockade imposed by England claiming neutrality in the conflict. In the same way, England had blocked the delivery of the Armored Frigates. “Victoria” and “Arapiles” to Spain, before this Spain reached an agreement with Chile (1868), which stipulated that for Chile to be able to take out its corvettes it had to commit to acquiring war supplies in England or any other state until the sum was equal. invested by Spain in its two frigates, the difference amounted to 403,000 pounds (540,000 pounds had cost the Spanish frigates and 137,000 the Chilean corvettes). Given the status of allies between Chile and Peru, the Chilean ministers in Europe, Maximiano Errázuriz and Alberto Blest Gana, informed their counterpart from Peru, Jara Almonte, who gave his approval, so on February 18, 1868, the agreement reached was submitted to the public. of the English government, but on March 5, 1868, Alberto Blest Gana was surprised by a note from his Peruvian colleague Jara Almonte in which he vetoed the agreement and indicated (verbally to Lord Stanley) that a state of war existed between Chile and Peru. , it happened at that time that President Mariano Ignacio Prado (1865-1868), had been replaced by Pedro Díez Canseco (1868), and the latter by José Balta (1868-1872), who took a turn in their foreign policy regarding to his former ally 4.

In 1871 5, Federico Errázuriz Zañartú won the presidency of Chile, and sent to Congress the bill that authorized the executive to acquire two armored vehicles, the project was approved with only one vote of rejection (that of the previous president José Joaquín Pérez Mascayo) , it was agreed that these armored vehicles would be of medium size (Second Class Armored), both ships were commissioned in 1872, at a cost of 2,000,000 pesos, this amount was approved by the congress authorized the president of the republic to hire a loan abroad for the total and allocate it only for the acquisition of said ships, in reality the total amount approved corresponds to $2,200,000 of which the 200,000 would be used for the construction of the Magallanes Gunboat, I will not go into more detail about this vessel since it is not relevant to topic 6.

Minister Alberto Blest Gana was commissioned to carry out all the arrangements in this regard. Blest Gana contracted the designer of the ships (E.J. Reed, former Naval Architect of the Admiralty), as Technical Advisor, who recommended lining the interior with Teak and Zinc wood in order to To improve its stability and protection, it also contracted the Earle's Shipbuilding Co shipyard, in Hull, Yorkshire, England for its construction, as well as other equipment for the ships (weapons, machines, etc.).

The Armored would be called Cochrane and Valparaíso, the first of them was commissioned in April and the second in June 1872, then to make the supervision of their construction closer, Captain Leoncio Señoret Montagne was sent to England, even so the construction Both suffered delays for different reasons, including worker strikes, unfit personnel, rain, and price increases in coal and iron 6.


Almirante Cochrane Armored Frigate

The previously mentioned situation (the delay) was aggravated given the new tensions between Chile and its neighbors Bolivia and Argentina due to treaty and boundary issues, the demonstration of force carried out by Peru in mussels as a result of Quevedo's expedition to the Bolivian coast. (1872), in which the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, José de La Riva Agüero, had expressed the surprise with which Peru viewed the purchase of two Armored Vehicles and that Chile did not need them for its defense 7.

In 1873, the Treaty of Defensive Alliance was signed between Peru and Bolivia (obviously this was secret and Chile was not aware of it), and Peru's attempt to extend this alliance to Argentina, given the above, the president ordered that work be done day and night. night in the armored Cochrane (at the time the most advanced), and to set out for Chile as soon as possible, the Cochrane arrived in Valparaíso on December 25, 1874, without the wooden and zinc lining and other details that would not prevent its use. as a war unit.

It was known, and this is demonstrated by the correspondence between President Errázuriz and his minister in Europe Alberto Blest Gana, that if a conflict broke out in the region, Chile would not be able to remove its ships from the shipyards, given the blockade that England would impose8




At that time, Chile was in talks with Bolivia that would result in the treaty of 1874, which was finally ratified by the Bolivian Congress. Argentina ultimately did not adhere to the treaty with Peru and Bolivia. The history of Chile indicates that there are two reasons for this: presence of Cochrane (the one that is most often referred to), and the territorial dispute with Bolivia over Tarija and a sector of the Chaco, I do not know which of the two weighed more in the decision, but I tend to think that it was more the second, given the details exposed in the negotiations of said treaty 9.

On January 24, 1876, the “Valparaíso” arrived in Chile, which unlike her sister ship (Cochrane) was completed and with all her rigs. On September 5, 1876, Admiral Blanco Encalada died (one of the heroes of the independence of Chile, who in 1818, in command of the squadron, captured a convoy and the Spanish frigate María Isabel that escorted it, and was also the commander in chief of the first expedition against Santa Cruz in the War Against the Peru-Bolivian Confederation with meager results), at the age of 86 and in recognition of his military merits, the name “Valparaíso” was changed to “Blanco Encalada”.


Blanco Encalada (former Valparaíso) Armored Frigate

In January 1877 the armored Cochrane was sent to England for completion and fairing, arriving in Chile again in 1878.

The armored vehicles had brigantine rigs, they displaced 3,560 tons, the power of their two engines (which moved two propellers) gave them 2,960 HP of power, their dimensions were: 210 feet in length (64 meters), 45 feet and 9 inches in height. beam (14 meters), draft 19 feet and 8 inches (6 meters), bunker capacity of 254 tons, speed 12 knots, and 300 men crew 10

The armament consisted of 6 9-inch (230 mm approx.) Armstrong muzzle-loaders, housed in a central casemate distributed three per side, capable of launching a 250-pound (113.5 kilo) grenade, each piece weighing 12 tons, and They were mounted on a Scout gun carriage with a central pivot. These pieces are installed in a central casemate and allow the bow gun to fire from the front to the beam, the central piece fired with an angle of 70º to the bow and 35º to the stern and the third from from the beam to the stern, her armament was completed by a 20-pounder cannon, one 9-pounder and one 7-pounder. The Blanco Encalada was equipped, in addition to the cannons, with 2 Noldenfeldt machine guns, the Cochrane only had one installed on the “apostle.” from the bow, its caliber was one inch (2.54 cm), and it fired a bullet weighing one pound (454 grams), 10.


Armstrong 9-inch gun, Blanco Encalada Ironclad.

The ships had a double hull and 7 watertight compartments, the armor was composed of a 9-inch (approximately 230 mm) shell in the central strip that was reduced to 4.5 (114.3 mm) in the bow and stern, The teak covering was 10 inches thick 10.

The Ram was shaped like a ram with a length of 7 feet (2.1 meters), submerged at 6 feet and 9 inches (2.06 meters), below waterline 10.

In January 1878, and faced with the economic problems, President Aníbal Pinto commissioned the Minister in Europe, Alberto Blest Gana, to put the ships up for sale as soon as the dispute with Argentina was resolved, commissioned by the Minister, the designer of the ships (E.J. Reed), offered Cochrane to England for 220,000 pounds sterling, the country was not interested, then an attempt was made to sell the two armored vehicles to Russia, obtaining the same result, in this way an attempt was made to alleviate the economic crisis that had prevailed in the country for some time. years 11..




Fortunately for Chile, the sale of the armored vehicles was frustrated, a situation that would have been critical in the event of a war, in some way these ships acted as a deterrent element, even so for the start of the Pacific War they required deep maintenance, their bottoms were dirty (accumulation of mollusks and other marine living beings), the boilers needed to change tubes and their machinery had to be completely serviced, the speed of the ships was limited to 9 knots, there was no dock in Chile for these ships and given the economic crisis It was impossible to send them to Europe to be faired. Of the two armored vehicles, the Cochrane was in better condition, in terms of its bottom cleaning, but not the machinery and boilers. This situation was the same in all units of the squadron except the Magallanes Gunboat.

Both armored vehicles were the fundamental axis of the squadron in the Pacific War (1879-1884) and strictly speaking the only ones truly of war and for 13 years they were the backbone of the Chilean Navy.

Notes

1. Historia de la relaciones Internacionales de Chile, Don Adolfo Ibáñez Su gestión con Perú y Bolivia, Ximena Rojas Valdés, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1971, Santiago, página 72.

2. La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III página 681. In 1861 there were 267 Chilean vessels totaling 60,847 tons, in 1864 there were 232 vessels, in 1867 there were 19 sailboats (2,7580 tons) and 2 steamers with 644 tons, in 1871 there were 75 vessels (14 steamers), totaling 15,870 tons.

3. $14,773,700, which was distributed as follows: private buildings $633,000; fiscal buildings $550,700; furniture and merchandise in private buildings $1,500,000; merchandise set on fire at customs $12,000,000; miscellaneous damages $30,000; Of the destroyed merchandise, $8,300.00 belonged to Foreigners and $3,700,000 belonged to Chileans. La Guerra Entre España y las Republicas del Pacífico, Alfonso Cerda Catalán, Editorial Puerto de Palos, Chile páginas 252-253.

4. See Historia de la relaciones Internacionales de Chile, Don Adolfo Ibáñez Su gestión con Perú y Bolivia, Ximena Rojas Valdés, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1971, Santiago, página 73 y La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III páginas 682-683.

5. By then, Peru had in its naval inventory the armored frigate “Independencia” (1866), monitor “Huascar” (1866) and the river monitors “Manco Capac” and “Atahualpa” (both arrived in 1870).

Independencia was commissioned in 1864, in anticipation of the events of the Chichas Islands, built in England by J.A. Samuda for 176,600 Pounds Sterling, displaced 2,004 tons, armored 4.5 inches, had a ram and was armed by 1 Vavasseur of 250 pounds in the bow, 1 Armstrong of 150 pounds in the stern and 12 Armstrongs of 70 pounds, or 6.4 inches, displaced in the central battery, all scratched.

Sources:
Peru Sovereign
Guerra del Pacífico

The Huáscar had its origin in the same events of the Chinchas Islands, it was commissioned to the Laird Brothers shipyard, Birkenhead, Poplar on Thames, England, designed by Captain Cowper Coles of the Royal Navy, under the "Ericsson" model.

The case had a double bottom and was divided into five watertight compartments, it displaced 1,130 tons, it had two engines that gave it a power of 1,500 horsepower and that moved a single propeller, it was protected by 4.5 (11.43 cm), inches of armor in the center that decreased to 2.5 fore and aft (6.35 cm), its main armament was a pair of 10-inch (254mm) muzzle-loading rifled Armstrongs, capable of launching a 300 lb grenade ( 136.2 kilos), mounted on a circular rotating tower installed in the bay, (Coles Tower), 30 feet in diameter (9.1 meters), manually moved, whose armor was 5.5 inches (14 cm), completed Its armament is 2 Armstrong of 40 pounds (18.6 kilos) on the port and starboard sides and 1 of 12 pounds (5.5 kilos) on the stern, coal capacity 300 tons, speed 11 knots.

Sources:
Armada Chile
Peru Sovereign

The river monitors Manco Capac and Atahualpa belonged to the Canonicus class built at the Niles & Rivers Works shipyard in Cincinnati, Ohio, by the Union Navy of the United States of North America, at the time of the Civil War, the first It was named Oneota and the second Catawaba, both were acquired by Peru in 1868.

Both displaced 2,100 tons; power 350 horsepower; speed 8 knots, shell 3 inches and 5 in the vital parts; Armament 2 15-inch (381 mm) Rodmans, muzzle-loading smooth, capable of launching a 500-pound (227 kilo) spherical bullet, mounted in a 10-inch (25.4 cm) armored turret

Fuente: http://members.tripod.com/~Guerra_del_Pacifico/monitores.html

6. Historia de la relaciones Internacionales de Chile, Don Adolfo Ibáñez Su gestión con Perú y Bolivia, Ximena Rojas Valdés, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1971, Santiago, páginas 74-75.

The project in question established the following:

Article No. 1: The President of the Republic is authorized to acquire one or two armored warships.
Article No. 2: You are also authorized to acquire a steamship capable of arming itself for war and assigning it to the service of the colony of Magallanes.
Article No. 3: You are finally authorized to raise a loan that produces two million two hundred thousand pesos, which will be used exclusively for the payment of the aforementioned ships.
Article No. 4: This authorization will last two years.

7. La Guerra del Pacifico, Gonzalo Bulnes, Tomo I “De Antofagasta a Tarapacá, Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo, Valparaíso, 1911, página 36.

8. Historia de la relaciones Internacionales de Chile, Don Adolfo Ibáñez Su gestión con Perú y Bolivia, Ximena Rojas Valdés, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1971, Santiago, páginas 76-78.

9. In the book of Gonzalo Bulnes, Guerra del Pacifico, Tomo I “De Antofagasta a Tarapacá”, Capitulo II, emerge the details of the negotiations of said treaty appear.

10. La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III página 721. y La Guerra en el Pacifico Sur, Theodorus B.M. Mason, Editorial francisco de Aguirre, 1971, Argentina, páginas 33-36.

11. La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III, página 705.

12. Artículo Escuadra Chilena, 1879, A. Silva Palma.

Bibliography and Other Sources Consulted.

I. Historia de la relaciones Internacionales de Chile, Don Adolfo Ibáñez Su gestión con Perú y Bolivia, Ximena Rojas Valdés, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1971, Santiago.

II. La Guerra Entre España y las Republicas del Pacífico, Alfonso Cerda Catalán, Editorial Puerto de Palos, Chile.

III. La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III.

IV. La Guerra del Pacifico, Gonzalo Bulnes, Tomo I “De Antofagasta a Tarapacá, Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo, Valparaíso, 1911.

V. La Guerra en el Pacifico Sur, Theodorus B.M. Mason, Editorial francisco de Aguirre , 1971, Argentina.

VI. Influencia del poder Naval en la historia de Chile, desde 1810 a 1910, Luís Langlois. Valparaíso, Imprenta de la Armada, 1911.

VII. Enciclopedia Monitor, Editorial Salvat, España 1972, Tomo XII página 4.806.

IX. Chilean Navy website.
http://www.armada.cl/p4_tradicion_historia/site/edic/base/port/tradicion_historia.html
http://www.armada.cl/site/unidades_navales/156.htm
http://www.armada.cl/site/unidades_navales/155.htm
http://www.armada.cl/site/unidades_navales/163.htm

X. Foro Fach-Extraoficial.
http://www.fach-extraoficial.com/portal/modules/news/

XI. Big Ships of the Peruvian Navy
http://es.geocities.com/peruwarships/index.htm

XII. Some Historical Ships of the Marina de Guerra del Perú
http://www.geocities.com/perusovereign/buques.html

XIII. Peruvian Historian Juan del Campo Rodríguez Webpage
http://members.tripod.com.pe/~guerra_pacifico/index.html
http://members.tripod.com/~Guerra_del_Pacifico/guerra_pac.html
http://members.tripod.com/~Guerra_del_Pacifico/monitores.html

Malvinas: The Night of the Owls

The “Owls” Flew at Night to Detect the British
Fleet

Prensa OHF

The extraordinary history of the Naval Air Antisubmarine Squadron

Obtained from a note made to the current Captain VGM Naval Aviator (RE) Daniel Alberto Marinsalta . Exploration missions, little-known stories, but no less dangerous for that reason. Operating from the aircraft carrier (V-2) ARA 25 DE MAYO first and then from continental bases, in marginal conditions, with slow aircraft, lacking defensive weapons and dangerously close to the enemy. History of the air-naval battle that could not be.

By: (*) Oscar Filippi – For: OHF Press

THE CATAPULT:

South Atlantic, May 1, 1982, aboard the aircraft carrier “ARA 25 DE MAYO” (PAL V-2) at 8:30 p.m., Lieutenant Commander Emilio Goitía (pilot), Frigate Lieutenant Daniel Marinsalta (co-pilot ), along with Second Petty Officer Rodolfo Lencina and First Corporal Néstor Conde, walk on the deck of the aircraft carrier towards their “bird”, an S-2E TRACKER, registration (2-AS-26). The mission of this flight is to confirm the position of the British Task Force located NE (Northeast) of Malvinas by the two previous exploration flights (2-AS-23 and 2-AS-24) aircraft also belonging to the Naval Air Squadron. Anti-submarine, which because of its shield (an owl in flight throwing balls at a submarine) is known and respected as “THE OWLS”.

            It was the last flight of that long and tense day, everything was activity on the deck, the crew carried out the visual inspection of the device in the middle of the cold and wind characteristic of that area of the Argentine Sea. Located in their respective seats, the naval pilots prepare to start the twin-engine that will take them to “sweep” the surface of the sea. A characteristic flight of anti-surface exploration and MAE, but this time, on a war mission.

The Grumman S-2E Tracker on the ARA «25 de Mayo» catapult.

“… – TOCO (control tower) , this is DOS ALFA SIERRA DOS SAIS, authorization to launch.”

“… – TWO SAIS, authorized.”

            Quickly, the two engines are running, the systems are thoroughly verified and especially the navigation system on which the accuracy of the information obtained about the enemy will depend. The “radar alert” system is verified, a spectrum analyzer and a “laboratory” oscilloscope that, with Argentine ingenuity and the help of the Technicians of the Aeronaval Arsenal No. 2, had been recently adapted and was the only “survival” element. that would allow them to receive emissions from English radars, letting them know if they were detected.

Shield of the Naval Antisubmarine Squadron of the Argentine Navy.

“…– TOCO, this is TWO SAIS, ready to catapult.”

“…– TWO SAIS, authorized to catapult.”

The rolling of the aircraft carrier is permanent, it is already facing the wind. With the wings spread and the engine test complete, the TRACKER begins taxiing, carefully the legs gently press the wheelhouse, stick behind, nose lightened. They precisely align with the axis of the catapult.

            The mechanical chocks in front of the main landing gear wheels are raised, the throttles are reduced and a group of six men jumps on the plane to check various elements. They secure the plane to the deck of the aircraft carrier (tail hold) using a fuse that is cut by giving steam pressure to the catapult.

Captain VGM (RE) Daniel Alberto Marinsalta, as president of the Aeronaval Institute.

            With everything secured, the mechanical chocks are lowered. Full throttle (full throttle) on both engines. Everything trembles and shakes, the control systems and instruments are verified and checked, with everything in order, by signs, they give the OK to the deck officer. The crew tenses in their seats, the momentum of the catapult will immediately put them into flight.

            The two R-1820-82C radial engines roar and the plane shakes even more, still clinging to the deck..., the tail fuse is cut and the takeoff run begins, approximately 30 meters that are covered in just over a second, obtained The takeoff speed of the TRACKER is dependent on the 3,050 HP of its two “fans”. It was exactly 9:00 p.m. of that historic May 1st.

IN FLIGHT:  

The reference of this story is the current Captain AN (RE) Daniel MARINSALTA, co-pilot in this mission that he tells us aboard the TRACKER registration 2-AS-26. An “OWL” from the NAVAL AIR flying in its element, at night and over the sea.

The Grumman S-2E Tracker aircraft aft of the ARA «25 de Mayo» aircraft carrier along with the A-4Q «Skyhawk» aircraft of the Third Naval Air Fighter and Attack Squadron (EA33).

            “…– Already in flight heading east, we headed towards the last verified point of presence of the enemy naval units, the tactic used was simple and dangerous. Flying low, in the middle of the dark night and over an even blacker sea. We rose and turned on the search radar, just two turns of the antenna, thus trying to prevent the British ships from picking up our broadcast. The first two times it swam, we watched the screen and stuck to the water again. We continue firmly towards the East (E), the third time was the charm. Around 11:00 p.m. we ascended, two turns of the antenna and obtained a large contact and three medium ones at latitude 50º00'(S), longitude 56º25'(W), simultaneously obtaining a MAE signal, distance to the contact, only 38 nautical miles ( NM), about 68.4 kilometers. A chill ran through all of us, we knew that they had detected us, we dived back into the water, at ground level we began to carry out evasive maneuvers. The pilot was flying instruments and I was looking out, the water was splashing on the windshield, that's how low we were flying. The silence was total, like the adrenaline in our bodies.”

         “… – We stayed like this for about fifteen minutes, thinking that we had evaded, we rose to 1,500 feet (ft) about 450 meters, we turned on the radar in search of our fleet, the radio silence had to be absolute, we had to find the aircraft carrier and deliver vital information. We detected the presence of a large fleet of Russian and Polish fishing vessels, then our radar screen began to receive interference (cart wheel), we could no longer do radar search and our fleet continued on its course. We decided to contact the “Air Controller” of the aircraft carrier. Twice and nothing, on the third attempt the “Air Controller” only limited himself to saying: …”

British Aerospace Sea Harrier FRS.1 aircraft like the one that chased the Grumman S-2E Tracker 2-AS-26.

“… – You have two Lobos (enemy aircraft) on the tail, continue heading west (W)”. Again we pointed the nose of the TRACKER at the water and we stuck level again.”

“… – Obviously, the British Task Force had intercepted our radar emission and decided to investigate, they had sent a section (2 planes) of “SEA HARRIER” that, under the command of Captain Mórtimer, took off from the aircraft carrier “HMS INVINCIBLE” shortly after the midnight from May 1st to May 2nd.”

            “The two “SEA HARRIER” were approaching us at 450 knots (Kts), about 810 kilometers per hour, we could barely get away at 135 Kts, about 243 kilometers per hour. Fortunately, the “Wolves” were emitting on a radar frequency very close to ours and we both suffered the same interference. We change the radio frequency to listen to our fleet's communications. The anti-aircraft radar of the Destroyer (D-2) “ARA SANTISIMA TRINIDAD” had detected and “illuminated” the two “Wolves”, consequently on our radio we heard that the Destroyer requested “Free Birds” (authorization to launch the SEA anti-aircraft missiles). DART). Praying that they wouldn't get the wrong white, we stuck even closer to the water, everything outside appeared even blacker."

The Flt. Lt. (captain) Mortimer, the British protagonist of this chase, was shot down in combat on 06/06/82 by the impact of a SAM ROLAND missile on his “SEA HARRIER” FRS-1, individual registration XZ-456.

            “But Captain Mortimer, seeing himself illuminated and knowing that it came from Radar 909 of the Type 42 destroyers, did not risk entering within shooting range and put his “wings on the ground.” “We could return to the aircraft carrier, but the English had also detected us.”

            The Flt. Lt. (captain) Mortimer, the British protagonist of this chase, was shot down in combat on 06/06/82 by the impact of a SAM ROLAND missile on his “SEA HARRIER” FRS-1, individual registration XZ-456. Our respect goes to a fallen warrior. (N of R).

THE HOOK:

Captain Marinsalta continues : “We had been flying for some time with both low fuel lights on, under the stress of a prolonged night flight and in contact with the enemy, we were facing the last challenge of this long day, the final of Attachment to the aircraft carrier, it was 01:10 am. from May 2nd. We could not fail, we had to deliver the precious information.”

            “We had fewer visual references, the deck lights were minimized, communications had to be minimal, already on the final approach, we made a brief flash with the landing beacon to indicate to the aircraft carrier's “signalman” that we had the reference in sight. visual, “ball” at the center of the mirror (light that materializes the slope of approach to the deck).

Returning to the aircraft carrier ARA «25 de Mayo».

“Gear down… flaps down… hook down…, everything down and locked. Lieutenant Commander Emilio Goitía flew with absolute precision the 18 seconds that took us to see the line of green lights that indicate, reduce the accelerators to minimum to hook into one of the four arresting cables on the deck. The pressure of the safety harnesses on the torso, the helmet that seems to push on the back of our neck, everything indicates that... WE ARE HOOKED! We were back home. When we checked the tanks, the remaining fuel was not enough for another approach attempt.”

Lieutenant Commander Emilio Goitía (pilot on the right), Frigate Lieutenant Daniel Marinsalta (co-pilot on the left)

WINDLESS DAWN: Captain Marinsalta ends his story: “Unfortunately, at dawn, when the six A-4Q SKYHAWK aircraft of the 3rd. Naval Air Hunting and Attack Squadron were loaded with three 500 lb bombs. (250 Kg.) each, ready to launch on the British fleet, unusually for the time, the absence of wind was total. The enemy fleet was less than 150 NM (270 km), but the wind component (sum of the relative wind speeds and the aircraft carrier's navigation speed) was not enough to make the launch safe with a full war load. The attack was given up, as were the British. The air-naval battle that perhaps would have changed the course of events in the conflict could not take place.”

            It should be noted that the Naval Aviation during the conflict, totaled 1,000 hours of exploration flight of the Argentine Sea in search of the enemy, making contact on 180 occasions, allowing the subsequent action of the attack aircraft and in others certifying their absence and facilitating security. of flights and logistics navigation. No aircraft were lost on these missions.

            Regarding the Aeronaval Antisubmarine Squadron “LOS BUHOS” , during the conflict it was made up of 79 men, of which 18 were pilots and only 12 system operators. There were four “S-2E TRACKER” aircraft embarked on the aircraft carrier (V-2) ARA “25 DE MAYO” , 2-AS-22, 23, 24 and 26, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Héctor SKARE.

Argentine Air Force: 5th Fighter Group at Villa Reynolds AFB

Argentine Air Force 5th Fighter Group

Loyalty Argentine Republic
Branch Air Force
Especialty Fighterbombing
Part of Two fighter and service squadrons
Equipment
A-4AR Fightinghawk
Cessna 182
Aero Commander 500U





The 5th Fighter Group of the Argentine Air Force is the unit that operates the aircraft of the Vth Air Brigade, located in the town of Villa Reynolds (province of San Luis). Both in its activity in the brigade and in deployments, the material of this unit is assisted by Technical Group 5 for its operation. Major inspections of its aircraft are carried out in the Río Cuarto Material Area.

Origin

It was created in 1975 based on the previous Fighter-bomber Group 4, in force since 1967. In those years its equipment was the A-4P Skyhawk weapons system (locally called A-4B).

Operational history

1970 Decade

In its first years, six A-4Bs formed the Blue Falcons aerobatic squadron for their aerial demonstrations.

During Operation Independence, in 1975, these planes carried out isolated attacks on guerrilla positions in the mountains of Tucumán.

Malvinas War

During the South Atlantic conflict, and within the framework of the so-called Southern Air Force, the 5th Fighter Group deployed 24 A-4Bs in Río Gallegos. On May 1, they mistakenly attacked the Argentine merchant ship ELMA Formosa. On 12 May, a squadron of Group 5 suffered the loss of three aircraft during an attack on the destroyer HMS Glasgow (D88), two of them shot down by Sea Wolf missiles from the frigate HMS Brilliant (F90) and the third crashing into the sea ​​while evading a missile (those who died were First Lieutenant Oscar Bustos and Lieutenants Jorge Ibarlucea and Mario Nivoli). A second wave on HMS Glasgow managed to damage it with bombs, without them exploding, after this action Lieutenant Gavazzi's A-4B was shot down by friendly fire in Goose Green.


The bulk of the fighting in which the unit was involved took place in the San Carlos Strait. On May 21, the unit commanded by Captain Pablo Carballo damaged the frigate HMS Ardent (F184), that day another five aircraft seriously damaged the frigate HMS Argonaut (F56). On the 23rd of that month, a major attack on the English fleet destroyed the frigate HMS Antelope (F170), with the loss of the unit under the command of First Lieutenant Luciano Guadagnini, who died in that combat. On May 25, Captain Hugo Angel del Valle Palaver's A-4B was shot down at Pebble Island by a Sea Dart missile from HMS Coventry (D118), killing the pilot. Hours after that confrontation, the same British destroyer was hit by bombs from Argentine Skyhawks, sinking in a short time.


The third (left) is Captain Carballo

Already in the final days of the actions, the A-4B stood out in the attack on the logistics ships RFA Sir Galahad (L3005) and RFA Sir Tristram (L3505), which were sunk along with a large amount of the war material in their cargo.



A total of 10 Skyhawks of Fighter Group 5 were lost during the conflict.

Post-war

The unit received the A-4Cs from the 4th Fighter Group, bringing together all the A-4 material of the Air Force in the Vth Air Brigade. The planes were subjected to the Halcón program, with which they replaced their 20 mm Mk.12 cannons with 30 mm Defa ones, while new weapons such as the Durandal anti-runway bombs were approved and the operation of the Shafrir-2 missiles continued. although the Matra R.550 Magic missile was evaluated on an A-4C.

In December 1990, some A-4Bs were seen flying over barracks taken during the last Carapintadas uprising, in the area of ​​the City of Buenos Aires and Villa Martelli, armed with rockets.


OA-4AR in inventory

In the mid-90s, it was decided to replace the A-4B and C with the incorporation of American A-4Ms, which were subjected to an important modernization process, resulting in the A-4AR Fightinghawk, achieving a leap technological 25 years.

In 1998 the A-4AR had their first great challenge with the combined exercise Águila, carried out in the V Brigade, repeating this activity in 2001.

In 2002 they participated in the Verification exercise along with all FAA brigades. The combined Cruzex exercise had them as protagonists for the first time in 2004. Another notable exercise was the Ceibo of 2005.

That same year they provided air security, through a no-fly zone around Mar del Plata, to the IV Summit of the Americas, operating from Tandil. In 2006 they were part of the security operation at the Mercosur summit held in Córdoba, after which they participated in the Cruzex exercise.


A-4AR (2010)

In 2008 they were in charge of security for the Mercosur summit held in San Miguel de Tucumán. During 2009 they provided air security to the Unasur summit held in San Carlos de Bariloche, after which they were deployed to Antofagasta for the combined Salitre exercise.

2010 Decade

The unit began this decade without planning major changes for the future, having one of the latest weapons systems incorporated by the force and the best combat element available. Meanwhile, participation in joint exercises is constant, carrying out deployments in various parts of the country. A problem to highlight was the non-participation in the combined Cruzex exercise of 2010 due to delays in the sanction of the law that authorized it by the Congress of the Argentine Nation.



In 2010, its planes integrated the aerial security deployment at the XXXIX Mercosur Summit held in San Juan, and later did so at the XX Ibero-American Summit organized in Mar del Plata. A new Mercosur summit, held in Mendoza in 2012, had the support of the A-4AR.

Since mid-2011, deployments have been made to Northern Argentina, within the framework of Operation Fortín to control irregular flights and fight against drug trafficking, usually operating for periods of one month from Santiago del Estero.



Wikipedia

Peronism: Origins of "Taty Almeida"'s Claims

The origins of Taty Almeida and the Truth about the dissapearance of her Son

By Jorge Tisi Baña via TotalNews




Taty Almeida is actually called Lidia Estela Mercedes Miy Uranga and this year she will turn 94 years old. She is the daughter of Cavalry Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Vidal Miy and Alicia Uranga, sister of Raúl Uranga, who was governor of Entre Ríos during the presidency of Dr. Arturo Frondizi.
The Miy – Uranga couple also had three other daughters, all married to Air Force officers, and a son, Carlos Vidal Miy Uranga, a soldier like his father, who became a colonel in the Engineer branch of our army. Taty graduated as a teacher and married Jorge Almeida, a fellow teacher with whom she had 3 children: Jorge, Alejandro and Fabiana. Of them, only Alejandro, who was an active member of the ERP-22 de Agosto, a faction that split in 1973 from the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), is missing.
Alejandro Martín Almeida was 20 years old, he studied medicine at the UBA, he worked at the Télam agency and in the cartography area of ​​the Military Geographic Institute. He was kidnapped by “Triple A” in June 1975, almost a year before the coup d'état. Taty found out about her son's militancy after being kidnapped, because she was too busy to realize that her son was part of a terrorist organization.
Since then she has been a member of “Mothers of Plaza de Mayo – Línea Fundadora but, curiously, she is an active militant against the military dictatorship.



She knows perfectly well that the Military Process that began on March 24, 1976 had nothing to do with the disappearance of her son that occurred a year earlier at the hands of Triple A.
In short, one of the ladies who most virulently attacks the Armed Forces and the military dictatorship, she comes from a military family, she had a brother and three military brothers-in-law. Her missing son was an ERP activist and was kidnapped in democracy by a parapolice organization organized from power during a Peronist government, a party to which she belongs.
Thankfully, she is dead now.

Malvinas: Roland System in the War

THE ROLAND IN MALVINAS 



The Battle of Malvinas, despite its short duration, has multifaceted characteristics in military operations, which is why it has deserved a special place in the history of modern war conflicts.

A little-known aspect is the anti-aircraft (AA) operations, carried out with the Roland missile system, which cost the British forces four downed planes.

Background

In November 1981, two Roland Fire Units (UF) joined the Argentine Army, which were integrated into the batteries of the Mixed Air Defense Group 602 (ADA Mix 602) based in the town of Camet, near Mar del Plata. Shortly before, a small group of officers and non-commissioned officers returned from France, who had completed a primary course in France to operate and maintain this new defensive element.
 

Argentine Army's Roland in Malvinas

It is an AA missile system, operating all weather, against aggressor aircraft flying at medium and low altitudes with an effective range of 6,500 meters. The Roland can fire its missiles optically with manual guidance or radarically with automatic guidance. The UF is made up of the surveillance radar, the firing radar, the optical sight, two missile launcher arms, a missile tank, a generator and a cockpit operated by a unit leader and an optical mode aimer. The UF module is mounted on a trailer and is towed by a truck tractor with a total weight of 20 tons, requiring a paved or consolidated road for filming.

The deployment

Once the events of the recovery of the Malvinas Islands were known on April 2, the transfer of the two UF from Mar del Plata to Puerto Deseado by ship was arranged, to then cross to the archipelago. However, upon arriving at this port, the ship suffers a serious damage to its hull that prevents it from continuing navigation. The two Rolands were unloaded and moved to Comodoro Rivadavia by road. Arriving in this city, the one with the greatest military activity in Patagonia, the superiors decided to send Battery "B" of the ADA Mix 602 by air to Puerto Argentino, so that the remaining battery could serve as anti-aircraft defense of the Comodoro Airport.

Because the transfer of the Roland system requires being transported by two C-130 Hercules simultaneously, Battery "B" was only able to make the crossing to the islands on April 26, 1982.


ADA Mix 602's Battery "B" was composed of:

Roland Section (1 UF, 30 missiles and two 20 mm Oerlikon cannons)
Tiger Cat Section (3 UF clear-weather operational missiles)

Both sections were added to the 601st Air Defense Artillery Group (GADA 601) upon arriving at Puerto Argentino.

The preparations

Given the recentness of its incorporation, the Roland operators had no experience, except what they had done in the primary course in France. For this reason, once the system was operational, the Section Chief, 1st Lieutenant Regalini, and his men took advantage of the flight of the planes carrying out the airlift to gain experience with the use of search radar, tracking optical, etc. It is worth noting that the spare parts and other maintenance elements had not yet arrived in Argentina when the system was deployed, therefore work had to be done on the harmonization of the UF components and on the maintenance of 2nd. step. Different places were also recognized for possible position changes and the location of the 20 mm cannons that would cover the missile's blind spot.

The Roland in combat

Around 05.00 a.m. On May 1, an RAF AVRO Vulcan aircraft carries out the first air attack on the Malvinas Airport. A few hours later, the Sea Harriers of the Royal Navy attempted to damage the runway, but one of them was detected by the Roland's radar and 1st Sergeant Zelaya successfully fired a missile with optical tracking, achieving the first kill for the Section. In this procedure, the radar focuses the optronic camera towards where the aggressor is approaching. The image is presented on a screen that has a grid that can be moved by a sphere; With it, the aimer guides the missile, keeping the target within that grid.
 

The Roland of Puerto Argentino chases the Harrier by Ian Mortimer (painting by Daniel Bechennec)


The remaining victories were achieved on May 25, June 2 and 12, all of them in radar (automatic) mode. On one occasion, a shot was fired at a Harrier, but as the missile approached its target, it coincided with an upward maneuver carried out by the pilot of the British ship to drop a bomb. Finally, the missile hits the launched weapon, as it has a greater radial speed with respect to the firing radar at that moment.

On June 3, a Srike anti-radar missile fired from a Vulcan exploded against a Skyguard fire director of the 35 mm Oerlikon guns (*). For this reason, the Headquarters ordered the operators of the shooting radars to avoid leaving them on permanently. This limitation was a new challenge for the Argentine soldiers, where temper, intelligence and even mischief had to be put into play to be able to intermittently "illuminate" the attacking planes with the radar in order to fire the AA weapons.



MBDA paint


The Roland system had a high availability rate during the conflict; of the 50 days it operated in the Malvinas, the only UF was stopped for two days due to a broken generator and another five due to failures in the firing radar (it could be used optics). Generally, for every 20 hours of use, three hours of operational maintenance were performed and the personnel affected by its operation maintained 16 hours of on-call and eight hours of rest. To this effort it must be added that every two days or after a missile was fired, the UF was changed position to avoid being located by enemy naval fire. The Roland and the 155 mm guns were the most sought after targets by the British on the islands.

The brave men of the Roland Section of Battery "B" of the ADA Mix 602 endured the inclement weather, the naval and land bombardment, the difficult soft and humid terrain, like all the troops deployed, but thanks to SANTA BARBARA, patron saint of the artillerymen, their members returned to their homes unharmed.

(*) Lieut. died in this attack. 1st Alejandro Dachary, Sgt. 1º Pascual Blanco, s/c Jorge Llamas and s/c Oscar Diarte.

The author thanks non-commissioned officers Jorge Zelaya and Luis Marinkovic - both Roland operators during the Battle of Malvinas - for their fundamental contribution to the completion of this work.

PARA CUADROS 

Roland Section Staff

("B" Batery / ADA Mix 602) 

Malvinas Islands, 1982 

1st Lieutenant Carlos Regalini (Section Chief)
Second Lieutenant Diego Noguer (20 mm Oerlikon Chief)
1st Sergeant Jorge Zelaya
1st Sergeant Oscar Molina
Sergeant Ángel Palomeque
Sergeant Luis Marinkovic
1st Corporal Ramón Villoldo
1st Corporal Ramón Martínez
Corporal Hugo Navarro
Corporal Carlos Bonetti
S/c 63 Miguel Ferreyra
S/c 63 Víctor González
S/c 63 Mario Molina
S/c 63 Claudio Prado

Effectiveness summary

Roland system
according to ADA Mix 602 records

8 missiles fired
4 planes shot down (all Harriers)
1 missile hit a bomb
2 missiles dodged by evasive maneuvers

(attacks aborted)
1 defective missile

Note: All the planes fell into the sea, their fall path was recorded by the Roland's radar and in two of the cases they were seen falling with the naked eye.

Ricardo Burzaco 
DeySeg