One Against All Odds

The secret history of the ARA San Luis submarine in Argentina in the Malvinas War

Jorge R. Bóveda

The ARA San Luis was one of two submarine units sent in early April 1982 and the only one to face the powerful British task force face to face. Its modern technology and sophisticated sensors predicted that in the short term, losses would be terrible for the enemy. Inexplicably, after 74 days of fighting, no British ship was sunk by an Argentine torpedo. This document aims, based on the testimonies of the protagonists, to shed light on the dramatic 39 days of patrol, in which the ARA San Luis disputed (unsuccessfully) the naval supremacy of the Royal Navy in the South Atlantic.

Therefore, the testimony of an unprecedented battle between "David and Goliath", which projected beyond the conflict, provides valuable conclusions that can be drawn for the future of Argentine submarine weapons.
The brave performance of the ARA "San Luis" in extreme adversity, against an enemy many times superior in quantity and quality of anti-submarine means, demonstrates the high quality of the crew. San Luis's incredible ability to overcome such adverse circumstances is part of the most deeply rooted traditions of the Argentine Navy and, without a doubt, will be an example for new generations of submariners.

Since his retirement from active duty in 1995, the former commander of the ARA San Luis, Captain (RE) Fernando María Azcueta, has cultivated a low profile and the thorny issue of the conflict in the South Atlantic is rarely addressed outside his circle. of friends.

A few years ago, Azcueta rejected a tempting offer to put to paper his war experiences and the many interviews he gave. Since then, the subject was never addressed with all the details that are revealed in the following story, which shows for the first time, some dramatic situations of the 39 days of patrol, in which naval supremacy plays with the Royal Navy in the Atlantic South

Lightning preparation

When frigate captain D. Fernando María Azcueta, son of a prominent diver, took command at the end of December 1981, the modern 209 class submarine ARA San Luis, the hands of frigate captain D. Miguel C. Miguel C. Really, I couldn't even imagine that in just over three months, a war will be waged against the third naval power in the world.

And even less could he have foreseen the serious operational limitations that his unit suffered, and this could seriously compromise his effectiveness as a combat unit.

In mid-March 1982, while Azcueta and his men were exercising with the A-69 corvettes ARA Drummond and ARA Granville, on the coast of Mar del Plata, he received the order to stop the commission and return to port, but without receive no explanation for this unusual purpose.

Shortly after, he highlighted that the ARA Santa Fe was being prepared at the Naval Base, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Horacio Blicaini, but he did not receive any information that could alleviate the tremendous uncertainty that existed.
Only on the morning of April 2, Argentina's landing in the Malvinas was revealed to the public on radio and television throughout the country.

However, Azcueta had to wait another 24 hours to be received by COFUERSUB (captain Eulogio Latrubesse Moya), who gave the order, "Prepare in the shortest possible time to suspend (set sail)." From that moment he began a frantic race against time to see how the crew embarked with the best possible operating conditions.

In the image above you can see the San Luis at its base, with the aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo appearing in the background

The problems before departing

During sea trials carried out in the waters near the submarine base, the first of a series of problems was discovered when it was discovered that the San Luis could not develop a diving speed of more than 14.5 knots.

Closer inspection revealed that not only was the ship's hull and propeller covered with incrustations of small crustaceans known as "limpets" or "dog teeth," but the diesel cooling pipes were as well. This caused the engines to stop due to overheating, due to the lack of cooling water flow.

As there was no time to put the ship in dry dock to clean the hull - given the urgency of the departure - Azcueta had to turn to students from the nearby diving school, using shallow respirators as a "hookah" and do the scraping the hull "by hand" in rotating shifts of eight hours of continuous work, "to rid the hull of pests."

One of the causes of the problem originated in 1974 with the construction of the "wall" that separates the submarine dock from the civil dock in Mar del Plata.

This was built to prevent the new 209 class submarine from crashing into the dock in periods of rough seas, remaining tied up, a bad experience that had been experienced with the old "Fleet" type submersible and the veteran "Guppy", but that thanks to its design, the port had been "reconsidered", which allowed the detention of the ship.

Although laudable, the construction of a wall caused ecological changes with the lack of seawater circulation, which favored the formation of large colonies of barnacles, which had since settled in submarines docked at the dock.

On the San Luis, of the four diesel engines, only three were working, increasing the time to recharge the batteries and the exposure of the snorkel, making her extremely vulnerable to enemy search radar emissions.

The No. 1 engine had failed in early 1974, shortly after joining the Submarine Force. To repair it, it was necessary to cut the strong hull, a technology that the Argentine Navy did not have at the time.

TF Somonte, head of the ship's main propulsion, together with the Army Material Directorate and Tandanor, had managed to "free" the engine, using it until the end of 1978, when they decided to keep it out of service for safety reasons.

To make matters worse, neither the commander nor the submarine's chief weapons officer had had access to a report in mid-December 1981, which detailed the outcome of torpedo launches by the "Skip" class submarines during the period covered. between August and December of that same year, with special emphasis on the development of the exercise with the SST-4 torpedo.

The report showed that of all the launches made during this period, only once had the torpedo completed the run as planned.

A surprising percentage of launches were irregular, as a result of various factors (e.g. alteration in cable orientation, flooding of the torpedo, breakage of the strap, etc.), no one could identify the causes that led to the weapon's malfunction. .

The report in question had been released by the office of the Commander of the Sea Fleet, on which the Submarine Force depended, having failed to reverse the situation. As we will see later, the real causes of the problem would only come to light after the conflict.

Despite these serious limitations, Azcueta was heavily pressured by the political/military context in which he lived; he reported that he was able to put to sea on April 11.

The submarine sailed through the night, its small rooms stocked with food and water for a protracted war patrol, with 10 German-made SST-4 anti-surface torpedoes and 14 American MK-37 Mod. 3 anti-submarine torpedoes.

His rules of engagement prohibited him, until that moment, from any confrontation with enemy units, since it was believed that it was an offensive action that would jeopardize the negotiations that were taking place in the United Nations.

The transit to the area of operations in the Malvinas was used to carry out some minor repairs and continue with the training of personnel in the use of passive sonar, on which the survival of the submarines would depend from now on, having the latter to operate within a maritime zone completely controlled by the enemy.

On April 17, ARA San Luis arrived safely in its "fixed sanctuary" or holding area, designated with the code name "Enriqueta."

PART II: "At a disadvantage from the beginning"

Poder Naval