Argentina-Chile: On the Historical Mistrust

Rivalry and Mistrust Between Argentina and Chile

Argentina and Chile's historical rivalry and mutual distrust can be traced back to several key moments and events that have shaped their relationship over the centuries. This essay will explore the origins of their conflict, highlighting significant dates and events that contributed to the tension, leading up to the contemporary period.

Early Conflicts and Colonial Legacies

The roots of the Argentine-Chilean rivalry can be traced back to the colonial period when both regions were part of the Spanish Empire. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the Spanish Crown established the Viceroyalty of Peru, which included both modern-day Argentina and Chile. However, administrative divisions within the viceroyalty created early distinctions between the two regions.

In 1776, the Spanish Crown established the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, which included the territory of present-day Argentina. This administrative change heightened the sense of separation and competition between Buenos Aires and Santiago, the respective capitals of the new and old viceroyalties. The different economic and political priorities of these regions sowed the seeds of future conflicts.

The Independence Wars (1810-1826)

The wars of independence from Spanish rule, which began in the early 19th century, further strained relations between Argentina and Chile. Both countries achieved independence around the same time, with Argentina declaring independence in 1816 and Chile in 1818. However, their paths to independence were intertwined with mutual suspicions and differing regional interests.

One of the pivotal moments was the crossing of the Andes by the Argentine general José de San Martín in 1817. San Martín's Army of the Andes, composed of Argentine and Chilean patriots, defeated the Spanish royalists in Chile, leading to the country's independence. Despite this shared struggle, the differing political ambitions and visions for the future of the region created underlying tensions.

The War of the Confederation (1836-1839)

A significant early conflict that exemplified the rivalry was the War of the Confederation. In the 1830s, Andrés de Santa Cruz, the President of Bolivia, formed the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, which Argentina saw as a threat to regional balance. Chile, fearing the confederation's expansionist aims, allied with Argentina against it.

The war culminated in the Battle of Yungay in 1839, where the Chilean-Argentine alliance defeated the confederation's forces. This conflict underscored the precarious balance of power in the region and established a precedent for future cooperation against common threats, but it also deepened mutual suspicions as both countries sought to expand their influence.

Border Disputes and the Boundary Treaty of 1881

Territorial disputes have been a recurring theme in the Argentine-Chilean rivalry. The most significant of these disputes arose from the unclear demarcation of borders following their independence from Spain. The Andes Mountains, which form the natural boundary between the two countries, became a focal point of contention.

In 1881, Argentina and Chile signed the Boundary Treaty, which aimed to resolve these disputes by defining the border along the highest peaks of the Andes. Despite this agreement, ambiguities in the treaty's language led to further conflicts, particularly over the Patagonian region and the Beagle Channel, areas rich in natural resources and strategically important.

The Beagle Channel Conflict (1978)

One of the most critical flashpoints in the 20th century was the Beagle Channel conflict. The Beagle Channel, a narrow strait in the southern tip of South America, became the center of a territorial dispute in the 1970s. Both Argentina and Chile claimed sovereignty over several islands in the channel, leading to a severe diplomatic and military standoff.

In 1978, the conflict nearly escalated into full-scale war. Both countries mobilized their armed forces, and a naval confrontation seemed imminent. However, intervention by Pope John Paul II, who mediated the conflict, led to the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1984. The treaty, which awarded most of the disputed islands to Chile, averted war but left lingering resentment in Argentina.

The Malvinas War (1982)

The Malvinas War between Argentina and the United Kingdom indirectly influenced Argentine-Chilean relations. During the war, Chile provided intelligence and logistical support to the British, further straining its relationship with Argentina. This support was motivated by Chile's desire to counterbalance Argentina's military strength and protect its own territorial claims in the region.

The aftermath of the Malvinas War saw Argentina's military regime weakened and its international standing diminished. The war's outcome also reinforced Chile's strategic calculations and its distrust of Argentina, leading to increased military readiness along their shared border.

Democratic Transitions and Modern Relations

Both Argentina and Chile transitioned to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, which led to a gradual thawing of relations. Diplomatic efforts focused on resolving remaining territorial disputes and fostering economic cooperation. The establishment of democratic governments in both countries provided a framework for dialogue and conflict resolution.

The signing of the 1998 Ushuaia Protocol, which declared the region a zone of peace and cooperation, marked a significant step toward normalization. Joint commissions were established to address border issues, and bilateral trade agreements were signed, promoting economic integration.

Contemporary Dynamics

In recent years, Argentina and Chile have continued to work on improving their relationship, though underlying tensions persist. Both countries have engaged in regional organizations such as Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, seeking to enhance economic ties and political cooperation.

However, issues such as competing claims in Antarctica and the ongoing need for resource management in shared territories require ongoing diplomatic efforts. The construction of the Binational Tunnel of Agua Negra, aimed at improving connectivity between the two countries, exemplifies the potential for collaboration despite historical rivalries.

Conclusion

The historical rivalry and mutual distrust between Argentina and Chile are rooted in colonial legacies, independence wars, territorial disputes, and geopolitical conflicts. Key moments such as the War of the Confederation, the Beagle Channel conflict, and the Falklands War have shaped their relationship, creating a complex dynamic of competition and cooperation. While democratic transitions and modern diplomatic efforts have improved relations, underlying tensions continue to influence their interactions. Understanding this history is crucial for appreciating the nuanced and evolving nature of Argentine-Chilean relations in the contemporary period.

 

Argentine Aircraft: FMA IA-30 Ñancú

FMA IA-30 Ñancú First Flight

Sean Eternos los Laureles

On July 17, 1948, under the command of Captain Edmundo O. Weiss, the FMA IA-30 Ñancú night fighter-bomber made its first flight, designed by the Aerotechnical Institute, which, like all the fantastic designs of that time, never reached the production stage in series or in service

During the Second World War, the then Army Aviation Command, which later became an independent Arm in the Argentine Military Aeronautics (original name of the Argentine Air Force), was immersed in an equipment program according to the potential level of Argentina, the very low threat level, and the most advanced technological advances in aeronautics, basically focused on the Curtiss 75-0 Hawk monoplane aircraft (see attached links) as a fighter element and built under license at the FMA (Fábrica Militar de Aviones ) from the province of Córdoba), the Douglas/Northrop 8A-2 attack aircraft, the twin-engine Glenn-Martin Model 139WAA (and WAN for the Argentine Navy) as a bomber, all of them of American origin, and this last after the single-engine nationally designed and built FMA Ae.M.B.1 Bombi did not satisfy bombing needs; in addition to a series of trainers of national design and manufacture, or foreign ones built under license already manufactured in the 1930s, to which were added the Dewoitine D.21C-1 fighters that, upon being retired from the front line in their role as hunting, they began to operate as advanced trainers.



However, shortly after the outbreak of the war, which soon became a World War, two phenomena emerged: First, the accelerated development of war technologies, aeronautics being no exception, which quickly made even the most advanced weapons systems obsolete. developed in the immediate prewar, like those that Argentina already operated and still incorporated and that were really at the top of military air power technology. And second: the provision of highly technologically complex materials on which Argentina still depended, especially with regard to power plants and some light metals for aircraft construction, since the supplier countries were either blocked or forced to preserve that material for their own use to cover war needs, or to provide aid to their allies already at war.
 For this reason, although Argentina was relatively well equipped in 1939 at the beginning of the conflict, and the equipment programs it carried out were consistent, all of this became obsolete in the face of new war developments, finding itself unable to obtain or conceive more sophisticated fighters or bombers having reached the national technological zenith and at the same time not receiving new material, mainly with regard to power plants.


 
Although the political and military threat from abroad that existed on Argentina at that time was almost zero, it was not oblivious to the strategic value of the country, nor to the position that, at some point and depending on how the conflict developed, it was going to take. have to assume. For this reason, and without going into details or political scenarios that at that time were being considered in our country where in principle there was a pro-Axis position, to move to a pro-Allied one, and then return to the pro-Axis one, but always being officially neutral Argentina at the same time that it provided the Allies with everything they needed to cover their war needs (that was the reality), it was decided based on existing availability, around the year 1942, to start a training program of 5,000 military pilots and the development of an advanced training aircraft for the training of these pilots, and an attack aircraft the following year, which were added to the development of a national engine that had already begun in 1939, this being the most that could be aspired to with the national technology developed until then, and which ended up giving life to the I.Ae-16 El Gaucho engine, and the FMA I.Ae-22DL training and I.Ae-24 Calquín attack aircraft, engine and aircraft that, as can be seen, were requested and conceived before Perón came to power, even though they were later produced during the first Peronist presidency, and specifically they were the engine and airplane models produced in greater quantities than To this day they dominate the minds of the nostalgic through images of the manufacturing lines of the FMA (Military Aircraft Factory) packed with aircraft and operators in full mass production.



However, it became evident that the obsolete Argentine air power required urgent updating and reinforcement and, despite the end of the Second World War in 1945 without Argentina actively participating in it, that Argentina was no longer going to need 5,000 pilots, it still needed new aircraft, especially combat aircraft, and even more so in view of the new developments arising from the same conflict.
 In this way, perhaps the most striking and, already important, novelty arising from the aeronautical innovation that Argentina accessed, was the Gloster G-41G Meteor fighter jet incorporated, to a large extent, due to the close alliance relationship. that the then President of the Argentine Nation, General Juan Domingo Perón, maintained with the British Prime Minister Winston Spencer Churchill, managing to make them part of the payment of the large Debt that Great Britain maintained with Argentina for the food and raw materials delivered during the Second World War, since it was Perón who submissively accepted the infamy of the inconvertibility of the £ibra, accepting payment in processed materials and British assets, and since there were other payment options, he decided on military material, the vast majority of which lagged behind the war and at a actual equivalent value much lower than that owed by the United Kingdom. Nor should we ignore that at that time there were not many fighter jet options available to access, the Meteor selected by Argentina being one of the best, and the other being the North American P-80A Shooting Star from a United States that It was also, although much smaller, a debtor to Argentina, and the United States was also a solid supplier of military equipment to Argentina (in fact, the Argentine Armed Forces were almost completely reequipped by the United States and the United Kingdom during the first Peronist presidency! !), nor should we forget that in turn both countries were creditors of Argentina for values ​​similar to that owed, and while Argentina paid its Debt with Gold, Perón accepted payment in processed materials and overvalued assets such as the Railways, which in the following 20 years they had to be completely rebuilt; or the Refrigerators to pay the union favor of the famous march demanding the release of Perón on October 17, 1945, which precisely started from the British Refrigerators in the southern area of ​​Greater Buenos Aires, and in any case remained in the hands of Peronist oligarchs friends of the can. Well, it was a fact that already in the middle of the Second World War, Argentina had begun its reequipment, including the aeronautical equipment that during that conflict had become obsolete as a result of the diversion of resources from the countries that supplied military material for its own war needs and its allies at war.



The Gloster F.Mk-IV Meteor, which at that time was perhaps the most powerful and advanced interceptor fighter aircraft, which was incorporated into the Argentine Aeronautics in mid-1947, was also accompanied by the piston fighter Italian Fiat G-55A/B, due to the distrust (of course, fully justified) that the 1st generation jets still had; as well as the second-hand AVRO 683 Lancaster B.Mk-1 ex-RAF bombers, and the new and ex-RAF AVRO 694 Lincoln B.Mk-2 bombers, forming unmatched air power in the region, regardless of That same year, that power was eclipsed by the appearance of 2nd generation fighter jets such as the F-86 Saber and MiG-15, which upon entering service in 1949 (the date in which the first bomber jets also began operating ) once again made all Argentine air power obsolete!
 However, and in the same way as during the prewar, and then, in the face of the contingency of war, plans were put in place that were considered appropriate according to the potential, availability of resources and, of course, level of threats/hypotheses of conflict, on this occasion the same thing was done, although as we will see below, unfortunately the result was not the same, and without the military planners suffering absolutely any type of opposition to their plans, except from the same government that requested the planning.



Returning to the contingency plan developed in the 1940s to provide a solution to the unexpected and rapid obsolescence that the Second World War generated in the Argentine air power, of the material that emerged from it, only the I.Ae-16 El Gaucho engine had complied expectations, but being only useful for the capacity it could deliver; while the I.Ae-22DL advanced trainer was quickly overshadowed by the purchase of Italian Fiat G-46-2B basic-advanced trainers already in the Peronist era, which condemned the Argentine project to the first series of 100 aircraft. penalties will be complemented with a second series until a total of 202 aircraft is reached and the remaining hundred will be cancelled; while the I.Ae-24 Calquín attack aircraft, although it presented major defects, in reality and for the type of design in question (we are talking about an aircraft built largely of wood, since that is how it was designed for the needs of war, and despite its production beginning years after the war ended), it turned out to be operationally successful, and was even known as the "Mosquito criollo" or Creole Mosquito, both for its similarity in design and for its function, despite being far behind of the British DH.98 design by the De Havilland firm, having initially planned to build 300 Calquín units for the Argentine Aeronautics.
 The prototype and 10 other pre-production examples were manufactured, of which the first was delivered on September 19, 1947, establishing the Experimental Flight Group for its evaluation, and beginning to allocate I.Ae-24 as series to the 1st Bombardment Regiment. at the BAM Coronel Pringles, in Villa Mercedes, province of San Luis, between September 1947 and February 1948; Already in 1948, the first 30 Calquín built, registered A-01 to A-30, went directly to active service in the then 3rd Attack Regiment, dependent on the Bombing Command, at the BAM El Plumerillo, province of Mendoza, fulfilling their function as light bomber and attack, or observation and reconnaissance.
 But aware that the I.Ae-24, which was powered by 2 Pratt & Whittney R-1830-65-A Twin Wasp, Model S1C3-G 14-cylinder radial engines, which developed a power of 1,065 HP at maximum normal speed and 2,300 RPM at 2,300 meters, or 1,200 HP at 2,700 RPM on takeoff, could not reach expectations, already during its development, perhaps impressed by the visit that, on the occasion of participating in the 1st edition of Aeronautics Week that was carried out in Buenos Aires in 1946, a De Havilland DH-98 Mosquito reconnaissance PR.Mk-34 of the RAF, serial VL-613 carried out to the FMA of Córdoba on October 9 of that year, and where the engineers and technicians who managed to see it in flight and then analyze it on the ground, evidently introduced some modifications to the Calquín, a more advanced variant had already been ordered during manufacturing, which was the IAe-28 which, according to official Aeronautics documentation, it was designed to use the very superior Rolls-Royce Merlin 604 linear engines (in essence we do not know which subtype of Merlin it refers to, since there is no reference from the manufacturer to a 604, it could well be the same one that was mounted on the PR.Mk-34 Mosquito , or even the one later mounted on the Ñancú, Rolls-Royce Merlin 134/135 and sometimes referred to as 604). Thus, in the Annual Report of the Secretariat of Aeronautics of 1946, you can read the request for "Study, project and construction of a light attack and bombing aircraft, using national wood: this study bears the No. 'I.Ae. 28', was started during 1946 and basically consists of designing and building an aircraft based on the I.Ae 24, modifying the structure in such a way as to allow the adaptation of the Rolls Royce-Merlin 604 liquid-cooled engines, and therefore of superior performances and characteristics to those of the I.Ae 24 'Calquin' with Pratt & Whitney engines". This work has already been partially completed, with 60% of the construction documentation having been executed, representing a total of 960 plans.



The type of construction is similar to that of the 'Calquín', with the difference, on the one hand, of the modifications that were essential to introduce to adapt the new engines, namely: fully metallic movable control surfaces to avoid deformations; adaptation of the radiators on the wing leading edge; change of landing gear; increase in fuel capacity and total change of the gasoline and oil circuits. At the same time, modifications have been introduced to facilitate the maintenance that experience has advised during the use of the 'Calquín' aircraft."
 But, as we saw and will see below, that year 1947 was decisive both for Argentine Aeronautics, and despite what many may think because mass production was already beginning, for the premature end of the I.Ae-24. Calquín, because that year the F.Mk-IV Meteor, G-55A/B, B.Mk-1 Lancaster and B.Mk-2 Lincoln were incorporated, and just to specifically mention combat aircraft, among many projects that were being developed in Argentina (including the first jet, the I.Ae-27 Pulqui), construction of the I.Ae-30 Ñancú fighter-bomber, the subject of this publication, had also begun.



Here a story that seems alien or bifurcated and that, taking the same path afterwards, should have ended wonderfully well, in reality this produced the opposite, and was the downfall of absolutely everything.
 At that moment, the Italian engineer Marquis Cesare Pallavicino entered the scene, who was a prolific aeronautical designer, undeservedly little to nothing recognized until today among the great aeronautical designers, even in the countries to which he gave his hard-working and brilliant knowledge, and who In essence they were Italy and Argentina. Designer of the Breda Ba.15, Ba.18, Ba.19, Ba.27, Ba.35 and Ba.39 models of the industrial giant, which included aeronautics, Società Italiana Ernesto Breda between 1927 and 1932. Between 1935 and 1941 he directed the design department of the company Società Italiana Caproni (which, under various names, operated between 1908 and 1950), where he designed several relevant aircraft, such as the Caproni models Ca.135, Ca.309, Ca.311, Ca .312, Ca.313, Ca.314 and Ca.315; also the Caproni Ca.355, SABCA S-47, Caproni Ca.335, Ca.350 and Ca.380 models, all aircraft that operated in World War II.



The Roman, whose political affiliation during the war is unknown, and therefore there is no evidence that, like the engineers of German and French origin who arrived in Argentina at that time, he was now escaping from the occupiers or their collaborators. in power, for having been a fascist or national socialist, on whom revenge usually fell if they were not useful/servile for the new power, since that was one of the main reasons they had for fleeing; The other reason was the degree of destruction in which Europe had been left, the future prospects being really bleak with a new conflict brewing between Western democracies and Marxist totalitarianism (that is, the same pre-national socialist confrontation), which forced people to migrate to more prosperous lands to millions of Europeans, but they were unaware that Argentina's decline was just beginning.



Thus, Pallavicino, shortly before migrating to Argentina, collaborated in the design of the Lambretta, the most famous Italian motorcycle, along with the Piaggio Vespa (the Argentine version of these, Siambretta was later manufactured in Avellaneda by Siam Di Tella) , and by 1946 he was already in our country joining the Special Projects Division No. 2, of the Aerotechnical Institute (I.Ae.), created on June 5, 1947, which was in charge of developing the aeronautical projects that later They would be developed at the Córdoba Military Aircraft Factory, in the province of Córdoba.
 By 1947, and having already outlined several ideas, upon receiving the order from the Aeronautics Secretariat of the Argentine government, he was put in charge of a team of Argentine aeronautical technicians and engineers, and one of their all-weather fighter and bomber escort designs. It was accepted to be developed as a night escort for the aforementioned B.Mk-1 Lancaster and B.Mk-2 Lincoln bombers that Aeronáutica Argentina was receiving at that time.



Thus, Pallavicino's team delivered the plans for a single-seat twin-engine monoplane, of entirely metallic construction, which received the nomenclature I.Ae.30, and was later baptized as Ñancú (eaglet in the Mapuche language), which without loss of time Already in July 1947, with the preparation of the plans, the construction of a full-size wooden model had begun. At the end of that year, progress had been made in the manufacture of a prototype that was 30% complete, and two other examples that were in an initial 10% manufacturing phase.
 The Ñancú was an all-metal twin-engine monoplane, powered by two Rolls-Royce Merlin engines, Model 134 on the left and Model 135 on the right, which were differentiated by the reverse direction of rotation, liquid-cooled and up to 2,034 hp at 3,300 rpm. Equipped with 4-blade de Havilland 4/4000/5 reverse direction propellers, constant speed, hydromatic control and feathering device per motor, and a diameter of 3.66 meters. The radiators were located on the leading edge of the wings, between the fuselage and the engine nacelle.



With cantilever spar type wing, with one-piece spars; split-flap type flaps operated by a system of bars controlled by a drive cylinder mounted on the rear spar in the fuselage area; Its ailerons were divided into three articulated sections to achieve perfect alignment, it had a rigid transmission command bar, a leading edge divided into an external sector, an air intake area (radiators) and an internal and external flap area. The pear section fuselage, very close to the triangular one, was specially adapted to house the maximum number of weapons in the lower part with a minimum frontal surface; with a tapered longitudinal profile of the all-metal semi-monocoque type, both the frames and currents were made up of omega profiles. Constructively it was divided into two areas: the front part and the rear part integral with the drift, and they were joined in correspondence with the previous spar. The stabilizer divided into two parts, monoplane cantilever, was attached to the drift almost halfway, and had adjustable incidence in flight. It had a twin-string drift integrated into the aft fuselage; with all-metal rudders and elevators with trim fins.



The retractable type landing gear, made of cast aluminum alloy; It had its wheels mounted on forks, which moved forward during damping; and its retraction mechanism had the peculiarity that the wheel rotated on the diametral axis at the same time as it retracted backwards and upwards, a highly developed and complex mechanism that had been seen, for example, in the American Vought F4 naval fighter. U Corsair, but in the Argentine case they served to improve the aerodynamic lines of the engine nacelle; The shock absorbers (2 on each wheel of the train) were high-pressure oil-pneumatic; It had a retractable tail wheel; The tires were Dunlop, 0.43 cm in diameter, with a Dunlop-type pneumatic braking system; The doors of the nacelles were operated with a system of cams controlled by the train and arranged so that they remained closed both in the folded and unfolded position.
 The aircraft was equipped with a complete set of instruments for night flights, air navigation and additional instruments for prototypes; 24 V electrical power supplied by a 1450 W generator installed on the left engine and connected in parallel with two batteries in series of 12 V and 40 amps each. It had a Bendix transmitter/receiver and radio direction finder.
 The armament formed and planned for the Ñancú consisted of 6 Oerlikon 20x110 mm automatic cannons under the bow, although later it was decided to install the heavier Hispano Switzerland 804, also 20x110 mm. As external weapons, the installation of a 250 kg bomb was planned. launchable under the fuselage or a container with 2 other 20x110 mm Oerlikon cannons; and two batteries of 5 83 mm rockets each hanging on mounts-ramps under the wings, although none of them were ever installed.



The prototype left the factory on July 9, 1948, immediately beginning the tests of engines, taxiing and flight mechanisms, all under the command and supervision of the head of Flight Tests of the FMA, the Captain of the Argentine Aeronautics, Edmundo Osvaldo "Pincho" Weiss.
 Once the first test phases were satisfactorily completed, on Saturday, July 17, 1948, at 11:00 a.m., under the command of Captain Weiss, the Ñancú took flight after a taxi of 300 meters, and demonstrating very good flight characteristics for one hour. then it landed safely.
 Although the short times taken in the development of the aircraft may be surprising, it must be recognized that this was quite common at that time, either because the technologies used are not as complex as today, requiring much longer developments; Maybe because the tests and controls, although they were rigid, were not as rigid as today. In this way, and given the success of the tests carried out until then, it was decided to present the model in Buenos Aires before the President of the Nation.
 Thus, a few days later, in something that today may seem reckless, irresponsible, even insane, on August 8, the I.Ae-30 together with the I.Ae.27 Pulqui I jet (this one, designed by Argentine engineers Cardeilhac E., N.L. Morchio and H.J. Ricciardi, and the Frenchman Emile Dewoitine), is presented in Buenos Aires before the President of the Nation, General Juan Domingo Peron, next to the Vickers Viking presidential plane. The day before, while flying between Córdoba and Buenos Aires, the Ñancú broke a speed record for aircraft powered by piston engines, reaching an average of 648 kph with a maximum indicated horizontal speed of 780 kph at 5,600 meters above sea level. linking Weiss to Córdoba with Buenos Aires in just 55 minutes.



Then it was planned to exhibit the plane at the Farnborough International Fair, in Great Britain, in September 1948, but it did not materialize given that the aircraft was just beginning its tests, it was the only prototype, and it was not even in a position to make a ferry flight. to the United Kingdom, nor could the test program (that is, the development of the aircraft) be stopped for several months, to transport it by sea and back to the United Kingdom to display it there for several days. However, perhaps with some haste, since the aircraft still had to go through an exhaustive test program and most likely undergo numerous adjustments and even modifications before obtaining approval and moving on to the serial production phase, the intention to build 210 copies to be destined for the Argentine Aeronautics to replace the I.Ae-24 Calquín that at that same moment was being incorporated in its first copies to the Aeronautics, and keeping in mind that not even the first series of aircraft was yet complete. 100 copies of 300 Calquín planned, it was evident that the Calquín was already condemned, although to be fair, well condemned!, because despite being an aircraft that was successful in its subsequent service with the Argentine Aeronautics, and that for the regional level It was really good, as we already pointed out, it was far from similar twin-engine attack engines available worldwide or even, although in very small numbers, already in service in some South American countries, such as Venezuela, for example, however the I.Ae-30 Nancú was even more advanced than the Mosquito, and was more in line with aircraft such as the Focke-Wulf Ta-154 and Fw-187, Grumman F7F Tigercat, Lockheed P-38 Lightning, Northrop P-61 Black Widow, De Havilland Hornet, Vickers Type 432, Westland Whirlwind and Westland Welkin.



It was in this way that the construction of a second series of Calquín, responding to the improved design, was not carried out, of course neither was the third although, in fact, perhaps it should have already been the I.Ae-30 Ñancú. But curiously, the IAe-30 Ñancú design, as we will see below, did not prosper either despite investing significant resources in it, since the Engineer Brigadier Major Juan Ignacio San Martín, before leaving the direction of the Aerotechnical Institute, never received what was necessary to complete what was undoubtedly the last project he left in progress: the I.Ae-30.
 The tests of the I.Ae-30 Ñancú continued, and so did the demonstrations. In this way, and perhaps irresponsibly, since it must be considered that it was the only prototype that had flown for the first time just a few weeks ago, in October 1948 the device was unnecessarily taken to La Paz, Bolivia to participate in an industrial exhibition, although the event was used to evaluate the aircraft in high altitude conditions, something that could have been perfectly done in Argentine aerodromes located in similar geographical conditions. During his stay in Bolivia, Weiss performed a dive, taking the Ñancú up to 900 kph, a true record for this type of aircraft, and at the same time demonstrating that structurally the plane was capable of withstanding more demanding aerodynamic pressures, which required the installation of higher power power plants in it.
 Upon his return and thanks to the tests carried out, modifications were made to the prototype such as the installation of compensators in the ailerons and rudder, modification of flight controls and change of the canopy for a three-piece one with an armored front.
 After restarting the test flights in April 1949 and following the advice of Edmundo Weiss and the German engineer Kurt Tank, modifications were made to the second prototype that was not yet complete, incorporating a new tail unit with stabilizers in the lower part of the same instead of those located at mid-height, the rudder became a single piece instead of two, a closed bow nose was adopted prepared to install the 6 20 mm cannons provided and the cupola was replaced of the cabin for greater visibility, but incredibly and inexplicably that prototype was never completed.
 Thus, the only example built and in flight continued with its tests until at the end of 1949, on a landing approach, its pilot, Captain Carlos Fermin Bergaglio, let the machine stall without noticing that it was still too high above the runway. and when trying to recover its flight line, the Ñancú made a turn on its longitudinal axis and capped, partially destroying itself although without consequences for its occupant, who could be rescued unharmed, but the device was not repaired. Curiously, it was lost in an accident of the same type that the Calquín usually suffered: the bell roll during landing; This showed that the supposed instability alleged to the IAe-24 Calquín regarding the fact that it originally had to have larger and more powerful linear engines, at least did not seem to be the case, since this problem was suffered by the English Mosquito, and as was also later verified, the only existing Ñancú.



Incredibly, the interest in the I.Ae-30 Ñancú immediately disappeared on the part of the Defense planning political authorities, and the work was abandoned in favor of the Pulqui II despite being a different type of aircraft and conceived for another purpose, and Both this Ñancú example and the second and third prototypes were dismantled. One of the fantastic excuses put forward is that in 1949 it was planned to begin manufacturing under license the Rolls-Royce Nene II jet engine that was going to power the prototypes of the I.Ae-33 Pulqui II fighter, the work of Professor Kurt Tank in the Aerotechnical Institute at that time, an agreement having been reached with the British firm, and that this would consume resources that made it impossible to develop both aircraft at the same time, being strange, although not impossible, the manufacture of that turbine in a country where it was difficult It was barely possible to produce medium power radial engines under license or of one's own design, and in any case, as we will see below, none of this happened, in fact, there was not even a serious threat that would ever begin to occur.
 On the boards of the designers of Cesare Pallavicino's team of aeronautical technicians and engineers from the Special Projects Division No. 2 of the Aerotechnical Institute, there were even the variants of the Ñancú, none ever built even as a prototype, and known as I.Ae .30 Pallavicino I, a modification of the IAe-30 Ñancú jet also designed by Cesare Pallavicino, also single-seat in a class similar to that of the Gloster Meteor, featuring the same fuselage as the normal IAe-30 Ñancú, but with linear engine nacelles replaced by 'jet' engine nacelles (as jet engines were then called), each with a Rolls-Royce Derwent V engine with a static thrust of 1,587.5 kg, cabin replaced by a elongated with a full metal nose instead of the glass nose of the Ñancú, to accommodate 4 Hispano-Suiza 20mm autocannons "in" the nose instead of the 6 20mm autocannons featured on the Ñancú found " under" the nose. The I.Ae-30 Pallavicino II, similar to the Pallavicino I but with extended wings and a more squared tail, but which would be a two-seater (pilot and navigator) bombing/light attack aircraft; the navigator had to be seated in a glass nose or behind the pilot (later with a solid nose); Its armament included 4 Hispano-Suiza 20 mm cannons and 2 bombs of 900 or 1,000 kg. each in an internal bomb bay, could also carry 20 75mm air-to-surface rockets.




However, the Pulqui II will not prosper either, because despite concentrating on its development during the next 5 years, there was never more than one copy at a time available for the complicated and already laborious tests to be carried out, while the turbines that were supposed to (according to some versions) they were going to be produced in Argentina, not even a test copy was ever manufactured, with a view to obtaining even approval!, and being a 2nd generation fighter jet that appeared already 3 years behind their similar ones that, at that same moment, 1950, nothing envied them, the truth is that their competitors were already in service while the FMA could not even put more than one prototype into flight or homologate the model, which after being lost one after another in a series of fatal tests, having only one copy, the delay became more delay, while its competitors, already in service, were developed in more advanced variants and even gave life to a new stage, a 3rd generation of jets when the Pulqui II had not even been approved yet.



By 1955, the only existing Pulqui II prototype was stopped on the ground, unapproved and literally obsolete, and that year the 1st generation of supersonic jets entered service, that is, 3 generations above a Pulqui II that was not yet ready to be mass produced. , it was a reality of a totalitarian Peronism that squandered formidable resources in the Aerotechnical Institute and the FMA throughout 9 years of absolutist totalitarianism, without suffering a boycott or external opposition (since even the English provided everything from weapons and reflector sights, to the most advanced existing power plants such as the Rolls-Royce Merlin 134/135 linear engines, and the Rolls-Royce Derwent V and Nene II jet engines), nor any internal developments, it had not managed to put even one into series production! only of the designs that he developed!!!, and even the aircraft that during the first phase of the first Peronist presidency were or were put into mass production, and we are referring to the I.Ae-22DL and I.Ae-24 Calquín, They ended up annulled due to a boycott by the Peronist administration itself against their production!!! In fact, by 1955 the Military Aircraft Factory had already been producing military aircraft in series for more than 3 years even though the Argentine Aeronautics was still waiting for 100 I .Ae-22DL, 200 I.Ae-24 Calquín or I Ae-28 Calquín improved or failing that 210 I.Ae-30 Ñancú; in addition to the at least 100 I.Ae-33 Pulqui II that were part of the Aeronautics request or already approved programs, but which in any case had never been fulfilled by Peronism.



 The arrival of the 1955 Revolution, however, and in view of what had already been invested in the IA-33 Pulqui II program, despite its obvious obsolescence, decided to continue it, without it being clear even today for what purpose, since the discussion between the famous 100 fighters, and the 50 that at some point was the option to build after finally, in 1956, the Pulqui II was homologated, surely they would seek to take advantage of it as an attack jet given its very limited potential as an Interceptor by the time it was built. could put it into production and service, something that in turn was further delayed when that single prototype was also lost, and thus the last Pulqui II prototype only managed to take flight in 1959, with prospects of putting it into production as early around 1961, something that was already meaningless at the time that the 2nd generation of supersonic fighters was already entering service, and even Argentina already had fighters of the same generation as the Pulqui II, the even better F-86F, in service! -NA30 Saber, with which the end of the IA-33 Pulqui II fighter jet that was so promising in 1949, which was sealed in 1951, in 1955 there was not the slightest doubt about it and for 1959 was a reality.



But it was also a reality that when the I.Ae-30 Ñancú was conceived in 1947, with 3 prototypes of a formidable design that did not envy its similar ones and really progressed at a pace of development that could even be said to be war-like, already a year later Next all of this was suppressed, since the recommendations received, considered and adopted by the Special Projects Division No. 2 of the Aerotechnical Institute for Ñancú never received the necessary resources for the FMA to carry them out, not even in the 2 prototypes that there was already in the plant; while with the only prototype in flight it was evident that nothing else could be done, much less with such an incredible and irresponsible schedule of tests and at the same time marketing exhibition that was carried out, all of this being aware of the officials of the Secretariat of Aeronautics that they had already stoned the I.Ae-24 Calquín first; to its improved version I.Ae-28, which literally left the Aeronautics without 200 of the 300 planned attack and reconnaissance aircraft to make way for an I.Ae-30 Ñancú that in 210 copies was to fill that gap but in less than one year it was already more than evident that it was going to be abandoned, so not a single cent was invested in it, to move on to another aircraft, the IA-33 Pulqui II, which even no longer had anything to do with those described, but accepting that in truth it was going to replace them in the production line, although in truth it was to replace the recently incorporated Gloster F.Mk-IV Meteor in its role as an interceptor, the Meteor would surely be destined for fighter-bomber missions, something that as we know anyway It happened when, starting in 1960 and already replaced by the Sabre, the Meteor even changed the prefix I (Interceptor) to C (Fighter-bomber), serving obsoletely until 1970-71.
 


By 1955 there had been no production line in operation for years, there were only a few obsolete prototypes on the platform, including the still unapproved I.Ae-33 Pulqui II, with a single prototype already surpassed by three generations of foreign fighter jets, without the slightest possibility of being introduced into a fighter market where the 1st generation supersonic fighters were already entering service and the 2nd generation ones were beginning to be developed, because like the excellent I.Ae-30.Ñancú in 1949 it had its moment in 1949 and in 1949 it ended up in a trash can, the Pulqui II had it in 1951 and that same 1951 it ended up in a trash can, in the same way that the I.Ae-24/I.Ae-28 ended in 1947 when A small group of stateless despots began to sell illusions, trading on the faith of a people.
As General Perón used to say, using Aristotle's own words, and to which the popular imagination gave undisputed status as truth, "the only truth is reality", and this was the reality of the I.Ae-30 Ñancú, born from the reality of the I.Ae-24/I.Ae-28 Calquín/Super Calquín, and died in the shadow of the unreality of the I.Ae-33 Pulqui II and a despotic government, which when it fell in 1955 left the Force Argentine Air Force, mired in a generational delay at the end of the Second World War, which took almost a decade to mass produce aircraft in the aircraft factory that was intended to produce abions and not subsidized scooters, almost 20 years to update the attack capacity. , and 25 years to update the interceptor fighter capacity.



The truth is that the Argentine Aeronautics was missing 200 combat aircraft; The production of 200 combat aircraft was suppressed by the FMA; the design of four models of combat aircraft, in addition to all the enormous resources invested in their development, ended up being thrown away; The Argentine Aeronautics saw its air power reduced and obsolete; The Argentine national aeronautical industry saw its production chain completely broken to become a designer and producer of simple technological demonstrators to sell illusion that, of course, cannot be denied, has delighted many, because the illusion lasts to this day!

Technical specifications I.Ae-30 Ñamcú

• Designer: Aerotechnical Institute; Engineer Cesare Pallavicino.
• Manufacturer: FMA
• Country: Argentina 
• Year: 1948
• Type: Single-seat fighter, interceptor and escort monoplane
• Power Plant: 2 V-12 Rolls-Royce Merlin 134/135 liquid-cooled linear engines and up to 2,034 hp at 3,300 rpm, 4-blade de Havilland 4/4000/5 reverse direction propellers, constant speed, hydromatic control and control device flagged by engine, 3.66 meters. diameter.
• Fuel: 2,980 liters. (internal), 3,592 liters. (with drop tanks); oil 200 liters
• Wingspan 15.00 meters.
• Length: 11.52 meters.
• Height: 5.12 meters.
• Wing area 35.32 m²
• Weights: Empty 6,208 kg, maximum takeoff 7,600 kg.
• Wing loading: 215 Kgs/m²
• Power-weight ratio: 2.06 hgs/hp;
• Speed: 740 kph maximum, 500 kph cruise.
• Stall speed: (full load): 155 kph
• Climbing speed 11 meters/sec.
• Service ceiling: 12,200 meters.
• Takeoff run: 300 meters
• Flight autonomy: 6 hours.
• Range: 3,950 km. to 1,390 km, depending on load and speed
• Planned armament: 6 Oerlikon guns or 4 Hispano-Suiza HS-804 20x110 mm guns; a 250 kg bomb. on a ventral mount or a container for 2 Oerlikon 20x110 mm guns; 10 83 mm rockets. in ramp-underwing mounts
  

Below, the dictator Perón greeting the crew.

Casamiquela: Araucanians are Chilean and Cannot Claim Lands in Argentina

Rodolfo Casamiquela: The historian who assured that “The Mapuches do not have rights to Argentine lands”

10/22/2017
Informa de Patrulla

Rodolfo Casamiquela was a paleontologist, archaeologist, Doctor of Science, researcher, teacher, historian and writer. He left around twenty books and 400 research papers. He dedicated his life to the study of the origins of Patagonia. He was born in Ingeniero Jacobacci (province of Río Negro) in 1932  and died in Cipolletti in 2008. He was the author of numerous publications on the origins of human settlement in Patagonia and promoted the recognition of the Tehuelche ethnic group as a native people of the northern part of the Patagonia region.

The historian Rodolfo Casamiquela was harsh with the Mapuches, who "scratched" him several times. He says that "they have no real interest in safeguarding indigenous culture, but are rather 'piqueteros'." He spoke of fighting to rescue the language of the Tehuelche people from oblivion. And that worried him much more than the insults he receives when he wants to talk about the story. "If they define themselves as Mapuches, they are Chileans and if they are Chileans they have no right to the land of Argentina," said Casamiquela.

He graduated as a National Mining Expert, while continuing his training in Patagonian topics in the library of the Ethnographic Museum. A scholarship took him to Belgium and, upon his return, he decided to pursue a career in Paleontology at the University of La Plata. He worked for Conicet until the military coup of 1966. He decided to settle in Chile, where he graduated with a doctorate in Biology at the end of the 60s. He returned to Río Negro, where he created the Río Negro Scientific Research Center, based in Viedma.

In 1978, Casamiquela created the Ameghino Foundation in Viedma to promote regional research and the study of agriculture, geology, mining, fishing and biology. His research works include iconological and ethnological studies of Patagonia, rock art and Tehuelche grammar,

In 1965 he received the first National Prize for Anthropology and the third for Biology from the Undersecretary of Culture of the Nation. He served as a professor at different universities and academic institutions in Chile and Argentina. He was an emeritus professor at the National University of Southern Patagonia and nominated for an honorary doctorate.

“Casamiquela had different episodes where he was harshly criticized for investigations in which he maintained that the Tehuelches were the true original settlers of Chubut and northern Patagonia. His studies led him to affirm that the Mapuches crossed the border and invaded the Tehuelches in the 17th century, a people whom he considered practically extinct.

“This position earned him severe criticism from aboriginalists from Argentina and Chile, who on several occasions prevented the researcher from completing his dissertations in universities and institutions. The root of the discussion is that Casamiquela considered the Mapuches, Chileans, when it comes to “pre-existing” peoples that inhabited the mountain range before the political geographical delimitations that we currently know. However, it was a basis that served judicially to evict several indigenous communities. Beyond the controversies over this extreme position, his contributions to the knowledge of Patagonia acquire special relevance; which is expressed in a work of great extension and depth.”



His opinion expressed almost 10 years after his death

-What led you to study about this?

– My concern for indigenous things began when I was 14 years old. I went to study in Buenos Aires and one day, in the National Library, I started reading Mapuche, without knowing that in my town (Ingeniero Jacobacci) half of the kids my age spoke that language, because then they hid their origin. Not even the teachers knew. So, when I returned, it was a pleasant surprise to discover that the laborers who baled the wool in a commercial house where my father worked were of indigenous origin. I had a fantastic summer with them, because I began to write down the first things about their language. At the age of 16, always accompanied by the indigenous people, he was already building the first museum referring to his history.

-What have you been able to learn about them?

– I have met hundreds of indigenous people and all the Tehuelche speakers in Patagonia. I studied and learned that first came the Paleolithic Tehuelche world, very ancient. The ancestors of their ancestors date back to 10,000 or 12,000 years ago and evolved in Patagonia. Long after the arrival of the Spanish, around 1600, the horse allowed the Tehuelches to dominate the entire Pampas and Neuquén area. At that same time Mapuchization began. There are differences between them.



The Patagonian giants are not a fantasy, but rather the Tehuelches, who reached almost two meters in height and weighed 150 kilos, with dark complexions and Asian eyes, who lived by hunting and dressed in skins. The Araucanos or Mapuches, however, are a race of medium height, cultivators of Andean culture, who had houses made of wood and straw and worked wonderfully with weaving and silversmithing; They had a superior cultural trajectory, which the Tehuelches imitated.

-What was happening with the language?

– With the arrival of religion and name days, a transformation takes place in it. Then, the Tehuelche men, especially the caciques, in northern Patagonia, began to be bilingual. But the women continued speaking Tehuelche, some families even switched from Tehuelche to Spanish, without going through Mapuche. There was a religious syncretism and the Tehuelche became Mapuchized. But the Mapuche as a people were on the other side of the Cordillera.

-Do the descendants preserve the indigenous language?

– Today there are living descendants of great Tehuelche chiefs. There are only a few families, the others are descendants of Mapuches. The Ñanco, for example, are descendants of Sacamata, one of the most serious chiefs of northern Patagonia, born between 1870 and 1880. One of my teachers was the one who saved the Tehuelche language, since he was the last one who spoke it. His name was José María Cual (which in Tehuelche means neck). He died in 1960, aged 90. When I met him, I was a boy and he was blind. For many years we dedicated ourselves to the Tehuelche language and for this I want to pay the greatest tribute to this people, descendants of the oldest inhabitants of all of America.

-How?

– One day I swore to pay tribute to this unique town, saving everything I could from its history. Unfortunately I'm alone in all this. Descendants do not study their ancestors, because that means reading white people and there is a kind of rejection, a denial that is like cheating in life's solitaire. You can't move forward. So I am a plum teacher, that is, a scientist, who tells the story as it is told by science, anthropology. I do not make demagogic concessions. Therefore, if I say that there were no Mapuche here in 1865 and that they only arrived in 1890, I am saying what history is, I am not inventing it. Only others don't say it or say it differently. So I'm the bad guy.

-Is that why they give you escraches?

– Yes. But these people are not indigenous in the cultural sense, they are in the piquetero sense. They are politicians.

-What are they questioning you about?

– There are no questions. That's a pretext. You have to think about what they are looking for. If they define themselves as Mapuches they are Chileans and if they are Chileans they have no right to the land of Argentina. This is the key. So, as I explain that they are Chileans, I am the enemy. Any Chilean knows that the Mapuches are Chileans. Leaders know it too. But not youth. 99 percent of those who define themselves as Mapuche are of Tehuelche origin. But there have been many confusions due to language or surname. This is how identity is lost.

-Why would they have the need to feel like Mapuches if they are not?

– Because the word Mapuche is very attractive. It means people of the earth. If it is used as a symbol it is correct. I am also people of the earth. In 1960, as a tribute, the First Congress of the Araucanian Area of ​​Argentina proposed that the Araucanians be called Mapuche as in Chile.

-What would be the answer if someone asked who the originators were?

– It would be necessary to see with respect to what. Upon the arrival of the Spanish it is one thing. The constitution of the Argentine State is another. Because in 1816 there were no Mapuches in Argentina. The first settled in the center of La Pampa in 1820 and in 1890, south of Limay Negro, the first settlers of Chilean origin were the Mapuches and the Chilotes. You have to distinguish this whole thing very subtly.

-Why do you mention the loss of identity?

– That is the most terrible thing. The grandchildren of my teachers, who knew what they were, today are all Mapuche. That is, the grandfather is pure Tehuelche, but the grandson is Mapuche. Then Patagonia lost its identity. This is a land of floods, because people arrive from other places every day. So, the teachers are not from here and it is very difficult to recreate that wonderful identity that - until 30 years ago - was the word, the open house, the hospitality, the security and the indigenous base, now faded by all this confusion that there is with the Mapuches. But until a few years ago the story was clear.

-What happens with the Tehuelche language?

– It is a dead language. He died in 1960. And there are no people interested in learning it. I did it because I was aware that my teacher, José María Cual, was one of the last to speak it. He communicated with me in Spanish and we could make translations from Mapuche to Tehuelche, review them for several years and pass them clean. He was aware that he was the only one left to speak that language. But he died before seeing the grammar. Today culture is lost. The descendants, for the most part, do not maintain the language. Even the names that are here, in the shops, are false. The vocabulary is wrong and that is my suffering. This worries me much more than the escraches. Indigenous people have to improve and professionalize themselves without losing their language of origin. In Argentina, the indigenous language has one generation left and no one cares about recovering it.

-What do you feel every time you say you are alone in this?

– You feel helplessness, because it is difficult to reach teaching and those who have political decision over it. When I go to teach at schools, the kids and teachers are amazed. At the end of the talks, the boys who have indigenous surnames who were shy come forward and feel good, because they are descendants of the great chiefs. The same thing happens when they know what the meanings of their names are in Mapuche, because the Tehuelches have no meanings. All of this can be done, but who bells the cat.

Source: El Chubut Newspaper – Azkintuwe Noticia

Argentine Weapons: FARA 83 / FAA 81 (Fusil Automático República Argentina)

FARA 83 / FAA 81 (Fusil Automático República Argentina)

Military Factory



 

Overview

The Argentine FARA 83/FAA 81 assault rifle was only produced in about 1,200 examples before lack of funds forced its termination.

Origin: Argentina
Year: 1981
Manufacturer: Fabrica Militar de Armas Portatiles Domingo Matheu - Argentina
Operadores: Argentina

Specifications

Common measurements, and their respective conversions, are shown where possible. Calibers listed may be model/camera dependent.

Action: Gas operated, rotating bolt
Caliber: 5.56x45mm NATO
Length (overall): 1,000 millimeters (39.37 inches)
Length (barrel): 452 millimeters (17.80 inches)
Weight (unloaded): 8.71 pounds (3.95 kilograms)
Sights: Adjustable iron
Muzzle speed: 980 meters per second
Firing rate: 750 rounds per minute
Range (effective): 1,312 feet (400 meters; 437 yards)

Variants

Series Model Variants
• FARA 83 - Basic series designation
• FAA 81 ("Fusil Automatico Republica Argentina") - Official designation

History

For decades, the Argentine military, along with numerous other militaries worldwide, has utilized the highly regarded Belgian Fabrique Nationale FN FAL automatic rifle, which is chambered for the 7.62x51mm NATO cartridge. Over 2,000,000 units of this rifle have been produced, with more than 90 countries adopting some version of the weapon, and many still keeping it in active service. Production of the FN FAL began in 1947 and continues to this day (as of 2012). The FN FAL has undeniably experienced extensive combat use across the globe.



Argentina adopted the FN FAL into frontline service in 1955, with the first units arriving in 1958. In Argentine service, these rifles were designated as FSL-FAL, where the Belgian "FAL" (Fusil Automatique Léger) was adapted to the Argentine "Fusil 'Lightweight Automatic'". Licensed production was granted in 1960, firmly establishing the Belgian design as the standard-issue battle rifle in the Argentine military. In the early 1980s, Argentina sought to modernize its arsenal, resulting in the development of the "FARA 83" or "FAA 81" (Fusil Automático Argentino). The FARA 83 was a blend of various components from other tested designs, including the FN FAL. It bore a striking resemblance to the Israeli IMI "Galil" assault rifle, itself an evolution of the Soviet-era AK-47 through the Finnish RK 62, which is believed to have influenced Argentine development.



The FARA 83 was a conventional assault rifle with tried-and-true design features, resulting in a highly functional weapon system. Its rectangular receiver housed the ejection port and an HK-style charging handle on the right side. The pistol grip, positioned just behind the trigger unit, was well-angled and ergonomically designed. The firing system allowed for both semi-automatic and fully automatic fire. The magazine feed, located just forward of the trigger group, accepted curved, spring-loaded magazine boxes. The semi-skeletal stock hinged to fold over the right side of the receiver, creating a more compact design suitable for vehicle crews or paratroopers who required smaller weapons. The front of the weapon featured a horizontally ribbed gas cylinder and barrel assembly, with the gas cylinder positioned above the barrel and capped with a front iron sight. Another iron sight was fitted at the extreme rear of the receiver. The barrel protruded slightly from the weapon and was capped with a distinctive grooved muzzle brake.



The FARA 83 measured 40 inches in length with the stock fully extended, which reduced to a compact 30 inches when the stock was collapsed. The barrel was 18 inches long. The unloaded weight was nearly 9 pounds. The rifle was designed to fire 5.56x45mm cartridges from 30-round detachable box magazines. It had a cyclic rate of fire of approximately 750 rounds per minute, and a muzzle velocity of 3,166 feet per second.



As its alternative designation suggests, the FAA 81/FARA 83 rifle appeared in 1981, with production starting in 1984 under the direction of Fabrica Militar de Armas Portatiles Domingo Matheu in Rosario, Argentina. Despite its potential, the Argentine military faced financial difficulties during this period. Consequently, production of the FARA 83 was limited, resulting in only 1,193 units entering service with the Argentine Army. Production ceased in 1986 due to lack of funds, making the FARA 83 a brief and fleeting success. Limited production is believed to have resumed around 1990, but the manufacturing totals for this secondary effort remain unknown.

Beagle Crisis: The Scenario of Tierra del Fuego Battleground

Beagle Crisis: Analysis of the Scenario of Local Response

 

Updated Analysis of Scenario: Argentina Took the Islands and Chile Responded in the Area

Given the updated information about the deployment and conditions of the forces involved, we can refine the analysis of the conflict scenario where Argentina seizes Picton, Lennox, and Nueva islands, and Chile responds directly in the area.

Initial Argentine Assault on the Islands

Argentine Forces Deployment:

• Naval Forces: The Argentine navy would use its surface fleet, including the Veinticinco de Mayo air carrier destroyers, frigates, and corvettes, to establish naval superiority in the Beagle Channel.
• Naval Aviation: Argentine aircraft such as the T-28 Fennec, Turbo Mentors, and Aermacchi MB 326 light-attack trainers, based at the Rio Grande naval station, would provide air support for the operation.
• Ground Forces: Amphibious forces, including marine infantry, would be deployed to assault the islands. The objective would be to quickly secure the islands, especially Nueva island, where Chilean marines are fortified.

Updated Operational Plan

1. Naval Bombardment and Blockade:

   • Argentine naval forces would begin with a coordinated bombardment of Chilean positions on Nueva island to soften defenses.
   • Surface ships would establish a blockade around the islands to prevent Chilean reinforcements from arriving by sea.

2. Air Superiority and Support:

   • Argentine T-28 Fennecs, Turbo Mentors, and Aermacchi MB 326s would conduct air strikes on Chilean fortifications and provide close air support for the landing forces.
   • A-4Q Skyhawk were deployed in the Veinticinco de Mayo air carrier.
     
   • Efforts would focus on maintaining air superiority over the channel, leveraging the compromised state of Chilean submarines and the absence of significant Chilean air assets in the immediate area.

3. Amphibious Assault:

   • Argentine marine infantry would land on Picton and Lennox islands first, securing them quickly due to the lack of significant Chilean presence.
   • The main effort would then focus on Nueva island, where 150 Chilean marines are entrenched. The initial bombardment and air strikes would aim to weaken Chilean defenses, followed by a multi-pronged amphibious assault to overwhelm the defenders.

4. Defensive Preparations:

   • Once the islands are secured, Argentine forces would establish fortified positions and prepare for a potential Chilean counteroffensive.
   • The Argentine navy would maintain the blockade and continue patrolling the area to detect and deter any Chilean naval movements.

Río Grande Naval Station (BARG) (SAWE)

Chilean Response in the Area

Chilean Forces Deployment:

• Naval Forces: With the submarine Simpson compromised, Chile's surface fleet would have to engage the Argentine navy directly. This includes deploying destroyers and frigates to challenge the blockade and attempt to retake the islands.
• Air Force: With F-5Es concentrated in Santiago, Chile's immediate air response would be limited. They would need to mobilize whatever air assets were available in the south, possibly using older aircraft or redeploying F-5Es, though this would take time.
• Ground Forces: Chilean marines on Nueva island would be the first line of defense. Any reinforcements would likely come from nearby bases but would face significant logistical challenges due to the Argentine blockade.

Potential Course of Action and Engagements

Chilean Naval Response:

• Immediate Naval Engagement: Chile would mobilize its surface fleet to engage the Argentine navy in the Beagle Channel. The objective would be to break the blockade and provide support for the marines on Nueva island.
• Tactical Challenges: The compromised state of the submarine Simpson would limit Chile's underwater capabilities, making the naval engagement primarily a surface battle. Argentine submarines Santiago del Estero and Salta, aware of Simpson's issues, would likely play a significant role in disrupting Chilean naval movements.

Air Engagements:

• Initial Air Strikes: Argentine air assets would continue to provide close air support and target any Chilean reinforcements attempting to reach the islands.
• Chilean Air Mobilization: Chile might redeploy F-5Es from Santiago, but this would take time. In the short term, they would rely on whatever air assets are available in the region, potentially utilizing older aircraft for immediate support.

Ground Counteroffensive:

• Defense of Nueva Island: The 150 Chilean marines on Nueva island would mount a determined defense. However, they would face overwhelming Argentine firepower from both naval and air strikes.
• Reinforcement Efforts: Chile would attempt to send reinforcements by sea, but the Argentine blockade and naval presence would make this difficult. Small-scale infiltration and supply missions might be attempted, but larger reinforcements would be unlikely to succeed without breaking the blockade.

A-4Qs participated in Operation "Defense and Affirmation of Sovereignty" in 1978, during the border conflict with Chile over the Lennox, Picton, and Nueva Islands (Beagle Channel crisis) deployed aboard the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, from where they carried out air patrols of armed combat, intercepting Chilean aircraft.

Outcome and Strategic Implications

Short-Term Outcome:

• Argentine Success: Given the overwhelming firepower and logistical advantages, Argentina is likely to succeed in securing the islands initially. The compromised state of Chilean submarine assets and the limited immediate air response from Chile would contribute to this success.
• High Casualties: The battle for Nueva island, in particular, would be intense and result in high casualties on both sides, especially among the entrenched Chilean marines.

Long-Term Strategic Implications:

• Prolonged Conflict: Even if Argentina secures the islands, the conflict would not necessarily end there. Chile would likely continue to seek ways to retake the islands or open new fronts elsewhere.
• Regional Tensions: The conflict would significantly heighten regional tensions, drawing in international attention and potentially involving other countries diplomatically or militarily.
• Military Readiness: Both nations would continue to mobilize and prepare for extended engagements, potentially escalating the conflict into a broader war involving multiple fronts.

In conclusion, the updated scenario analysis indicates that Argentina, leveraging its superior naval and air power and the compromised state of Chilean submarine assets, would likely succeed in its initial objective of securing the islands. However, the conflict would likely escalate, leading to prolonged engagements and heightened regional tensions. Two aspects to be taken into account: Argentine developed a complex military industry, so ammunition and small arms can be guaranteed to be provided to troops jointly with food and clothes. Chile, empoverished through decades of economical mismanagement especially during Allende's administration, was far to even compared to its neighbor.

Esteban McLaren compilation