Sunday, November 12, 2023

South American Air Carriers

Air Carriers of South American Navies




Lieutenant Commander
Peruvian Navy
John Rodríguez Asti
Extracted from the Revista Arnada

Currently, on the South American continent, after the Argentine Navy retired the veteran aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo from service, the Brazilian Navy is the only one that has an aircraft carrier. However, two other countries, Chile and Peru, have at some point been interested in owning ships of this type in their respective fleets.

INTRODUCTION
The aircraft carrier, a type of ship born at the beginning of the last century, undoubtedly became a capital ship during the Second World War for the navies that owned them, deservedly gaining the place occupied by battleships until then. The countries that contributed the most to the development of on-board aviation until then were Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. During the post-war period, the possession of this class of ships was practically monopolized by Great Britain, the United States and many of the Western bloc allies who benefited from the British and North American remnants. In this way, apart from Great Britain and the United States, in the early 1950s, countries such as Canada, Australia, Holland and France had aircraft carriers in their respective fleets, and of those mentioned, France would be the only one to build its own towards end of that decade. Later, the Spanish Navy would also have one from the inventories of the United States Navy.
The novelty in terms of possession of aircraft carriers after the Second World War has come from some third world countries, such as India, Argentina and Brazil, and recently, Thailand. However, within the South American continent, not only have the navies of Brazil and Argentina been the only ones to be interested in this type of vessel, since Chile and Peru also at some point planned and took steps to obtain one.
The purpose of this article will be to review the presence of these ships in South American navies, specifically in Brazil and Argentina, as well as the efforts made by Chile and Peru to acquire a ship of this type.

AIR CARRIERS IN THE ARGENTINE NAVY
For much of the past decade, Argentine naval aviation stood out as the most advanced and experienced in combat on the entire continent. Established in 1920, it made significant progress in its first ten years of existence. By 1931, it achieved a milestone by deploying its first embarked aircraft, two Vought Corsair O2U seaplanes initially stationed on the catapults of the newly constructed Italian cruisers, the 25 de Mayo and Almirante Brown.

Notably, the Argentine Navy had been considering the inclusion of an aircraft carrier in its plans since the 1920s. The "Naval Material Renewal Law" of 1926 had authorized the acquisition of an aircraft carrier of that kind along with three submarines for the fleet. However, this plan didn't materialize, and instead, seven destroyers and later a cruiser were purchased. In 1939, the cruiser La Argentina was added to the fleet, equipped with a Supermarine Walrus seaplane. By 1940, naval aviation had developed into a significant force with 44 aircraft and 100 pilots, while, for comparison, the Army Aviation Corps had 200 aircraft and 325 pilots.

In 1942, the Argentine Navy maintained its desire for aircraft carriers, and in 1943, through Decree No. 9006 on September 16, the authorization for their purchase was obtained. However, due to the international situation resulting from World War II and the challenges of acquiring such ships abroad, Argentine aspirations were postponed for many more years.

After the war, circumstances changed, and the Argentine Navy aimed to match the fleet expansion of its neighbor, Brazil, which had bolstered its navy through its participation in the global conflict. In June 1956, Rear Admiral Teodoro Hartung, the Argentine Minister of the Navy, revealed the "Naval Plan of the Argentine Republic," which included a goal to acquire an aircraft carrier to replace the aging battleships Moreno and Rivadavia.

By 1953, the Navy had initiated a study to obtain an aircraft carrier for its Sea Fleet. One project involved converting a North American C3-S-A-1 cargo ship, the Artillero, back into an aircraft carrier, as it had been transformed into an escort aircraft carrier during World War II and served under the British flag as the HMS Smiter. However, financial constraints led to the rejection of this project, as well as an idea to convert one of the Almirante Brown class cruisers.

In early 1957, the United Kingdom offered to sell Argentina an aircraft carrier from the Illustrious class, the Indefatigable, or a light aircraft carrier from the Majestic class, the Magnificent. Both ships had not been modernized and lacked the improvements introduced to this type of vessel in the 1950s. They were not as appealing as the HMS Venerable, which Brazil had acquired in 1956 and was modernizing in the Netherlands.

The desired opportunity arose in the following year when the British Royal Navy, as part of its force reduction policy mandated by the Ministry of Defense, placed the aircraft carrier Warrior in reserve status and listed it for sale. Argentina became the first country to which the ship was offered and officially acquired it on July 4 of that year, making Argentina the second South American nation, after Brazil, to possess a ship of this kind.

The first Argentine air carrier: ARA Independencia

 

The Independencia, originally named Warrior by the British Royal Navy, had begun construction at the Harland & Wolff shipyard in Belfast in December 1942 and was completed in March 1946. It was immediately handed over to the Royal Canadian Navy for use as a on temporary "loan" until at the beginning of 1948, with the entry into service of the Magnificent under the Canadian flag, it returned to Great Britain. Later, it was designated to be used as a platform to carry out experiments with a flexible coating on its flight deck, installed at the Portsmouth Naval Base between March and September 1948. The tests were carried out from November concluding with the removal of the material in June of the following year, then moving to the reserve situation.
In July 1950, due to the Korean War, she returned to service, being used as a troop and aircraft transport ship to the Far East and Cyprus. Between April 1952 and October 1953 it underwent a partial modernization, which included the replacement of the tripod ratchet with a lattice one, the installation of a type 293Q short-range air surveillance radar, a second type 277 radar and a type 277 radar. 281BQ with an IFF system. Additionally, all the obsolete "pom-pom" type guns were removed, receiving four new double Bofors 40mm mounts and increasing the battery of single mounts of the same caliber to 20.
In February 1954, she relieved the Australian aircraft carrier Sydney in the United Nations multinational peacekeeping force tasked with monitoring the ceasefire in Korea, additionally assisting in the evacuation of refugees from northern Vietnam. Upon her return to British waters in December, she entered Devonport Naval Base to undergo further tour and modernization. The work consisted of expanding and equipping it with a flight deck with an angle of 5½°, replacing its hydraulic catapult with one of greater power capable of launching 20,000 lb aircraft, installing the new landing control system with mirrors, and a radar. air control for low visibility conditions. Additionally, she received a North American-made SPS-6C air search radar.
With new equipment, she returned to service in August 1956, being the only British aircraft carrier of her class to have incorporated the latest improvements for aircraft operation.
In February 1957, she was assigned to serve as the flagship of the British squadron in charge of the first tests with the Hydrogen bomb in the Pacific, returning from this mission to the Portsmouth Naval Base in February 1958. Upon arrival, The Warrior went into reserve status and after the respective negotiations, it was purchased by Argentina on the following July 4.
Renamed ARA Independencia (V-1), she was transferred on November 4, 1958 to the Argentine Navy, then beginning sea trials, setting sail on December 10 towards the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base. During the first five months of 1959, various internal structural modifications were carried out, until on June 3 she put to sea, beginning her first operations with aircraft on the 8th of the same month. On this aircraft carrier, initially the aircraft available to the Argentine Navy operated, such as the North American AT-6, but later F4U Corsair attack and exploration aircraft and Tracker S-2F anti-submarine aircraft, as well as exploration helicopters, were acquired. Years later, the Corsairs would be replaced by Panther and Cougar jets.
Between 1959 and 1968, the Independencia participated intensely in various exercises, either with ships of the Argentine Sea Fleet or with foreign ships, including four Unitas operations, or in combined exercises with French and British units. It is worth mentioning that in 1962 she had traveled to the United States to embark at the Norfolk Naval Base, a new complement of recently acquired S-2F Tracker aircraft, two Cougar training version aircraft and two S-55 anti-submarine aircraft. The last aircraft to join the aircraft carrier were the T-28 Fennec aircraft, which operated on board since May 1968.


The acquisition of the second Argentine aircraft carrier: 25 de Mayo, and the retirement of the Independencia
By the end of the 1960s, Argentine plans for its sea fleet considered the need to equip its aircraft carrier with an attack squadron. The main limitation of the Independencia was its inability to operate larger jet aircraft, since to do so it was necessary to reinforce its deck and prepare it to receive such aircraft, which added to the wear and age of its equipment and propulsion plant, did not make it its modernization profitable.


In mid-1968, there was news that the Royal Dutch Navy would withdraw its aircraft carrier, the Karel Doorman, from service, so the Argentine naval authorities, after learning of its situation and carrying out the corresponding studies, commissioned its Naval Commission in Europe to negotiate and obtain your purchase. Although it is true that it was not a new ship, it had the advantage compared to the Independencia of having better electronic equipment and, most importantly, that it had a steam catapult and a reinforced flight deck capable of operating jet planes and Greater weight.
After the purchase of the Karel Doorman, renamed 25 de Mayo, the Independencia went into reserve status, and part of its crew moved to Holland to crew the new aircraft carrier. Being completely inactive, it remained moored at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base, and meanwhile, the navy carried out various studies to give the ship a final destination, not ruling out the idea of converting it into a logistical support ship or amphibious assault ship or helicopter carrier. Once these ideas were discarded, it is known that it was also offered for sale to Peru, as we will see later. Having remained totally inactive and in disarmament during 1971, she was finally, after being decommissioned and scrapped for the benefit of her sister ship, she was sold on 17 March 1971 for demolition.
The 25th May (ex Karel Doorman), was originally named HMS Venerable, and was built for the British Royal Navy at the Cammell Laird shipyard in Birkenhead between December 1942 and January 1945. Immediately after being commissioned, she was commissioned She transferred to the Pacific Fleet as part of Carrier Squadron 11. With brief service under the British flag, she was placed in reserve on 30 March 1947 and sold to the Royal Dutch Navy on 1 April 1948, being commissioned on May 28 of that year with the name of Hr.Ms. Karel Doorman.
Between 1955 and 1958, it was subjected to a radical modernization process that included an extension of the flight deck with an angle to port, a new steam catapult, new equipment for aircraft operations, as well as the installation of modern sensors, to which made it necessary to replace the original tripod mast with a larger lattice mast and also another "mack" type chimney (similar to that of the cruiser De Zeven Provincien, later Peruvian B.A.P. Aguirre), on which a search radar was installed. combined LW-02 long range. After this transformation, it initially operated as an attack aircraft carrier, with its air group consisting of six Grumman Avenger anti-submarine aircraft, six Hawker FGA-50 Sea Hawk fighter-bombers as well as four Sikorsky HSS-1N (SH-34) anti-submarine helicopters and two Sikorsky SH-51 utility helicopters. Then, in the mid-1960s, its mission was reoriented to anti-submarine warfare, and it was equipped with eight Grumman S2F-1 Tracker aircraft and two more anti-submarine helicopters to replace the old Avenger and Sea Hawk helicopters.
Around 1968, the Royal Dutch Navy determined that among its future requirements it would not be necessary to have an aircraft carrier, so it was planned to withdraw from service before 1970. However, on April 26, 1968, being in what would be its Last tour, a fire broke out in the engine room, so it was decided not to repair it and consequently remove it from service earlier than planned.
After the purchase was made on October 15, 1968 by the Argentine Navy, she underwent repairs at the Wilton Fijenoord shipyard and during these repairs she replaced her turbines and boilers with those from her unfinished twin, the HMS Leviathan that was kept in reservation by the British. On August 8, 1969, she was incorporated into the Argentine Navy with the name 25 de Mayo, but she was not ready until the 22nd of the same month, setting sail for Argentina on September 3.
At the beginning of that month, training with aircraft began and her air group was initially made up of S2-E Tracker anti-submarine aircraft and S-61 Sea King helicopters. As an interesting fact, during the trip to Argentina, the British firm Hawker Siddeley carried out demonstrations on its deck with a V/STOL Harrier GR-Mk-1 aircraft with success. Subsequently, the Navy acquired A-4B Skyhawk fighter-bombers, which were received in January 1972 by the aircraft carrier itself in the port of May Port, Florida, which soon began operating from its flight deck. These aircraft, plus those for anti-submarine exploration, in the 1970s, provided the Argentine Navy with great air-naval potential within the continent's navies.
On the other hand, already in Argentine waters, on May 25 it received the British CAAIS command and control system that also incorporated a data link system, which made it possible to operate in coordination with the ADAWS-4 systems that led to on board the Type 42 destroyers Hercules and Santísima Trinidad commissioned between 1976 and 1979.

To replace the old Skyhawks, in 1978 the Argentine Navy acquired 14 Dassault Breguet Super Etendard fighter-bombers in France, purchased thanks to the Naval Reequipment Law of 1974, and among the weapons that equipped them were the AM-39 Exocet air-to-surface missiles. , thereby expanding the offensive capacity of the fleet. These aircraft began to arrive in Argentina at the end of 1981, and by the beginning of the Falklands Conflict, only 5 of them had been received and they were not yet operating from the aircraft carrier, since the necessary modifications to use them had not yet been completed.
The Veinticinco de Mayo led the task force that invaded the Malvinas Islands on April 1, 1982, and after the landings it carried out several patrols on the Argentine coast, but always away from the British Task Force. After the cruiser General Belgrano was sunk on May 4, 1982, the Argentine sea fleet was withdrawn to its ports, and the 25 de Mayo aircraft continued to operate from land.
Once the conflict was over, on May 25 modifications to operate the Super Etendard continued, which included an increase in the flight deck to accommodate two more aircraft and a general tour of the steam catapult. In April 1983 it was only able to carry out the first operations with its new aircraft and in that same year, its CAAIS command and control system was replaced by the more modern SEWACO of Dutch manufacture, very similar to that of the Almirante Brown class destroyers ( Meko 360) that were under construction in Germany.

In 1985, a study was concluded that determined that the 25 de Mayo could extend its service until 1992, projecting that in that year it should be replaced by a 30,000-ton aircraft carrier, capable of operating attack aircraft. However, the funds to build such a ship would not be available. To continue employing May 25, it was planned to replace its propulsion plant, considering several configurations, including a COSAG system with two new boilers and two gas turbines or a CODOG plant with four Sulzer engines and two gas turbines.
Its last operational navigation was carried out between February and March 1988, carrying out training at sea with the Naval Aero Group on board, and since the middle of that year, on May 25, it became inoperative due to propulsion limitations.
Subsequently, in June 1990, a contract was signed with the Italian firm Fincantieri, which would be responsible for providing technical assistance to the Argentine AFNE shipyard in Río Santiago to carry out the repowering of the ship. The project consisted of replacing the steam turbines with Fiat Aviazione LM 2500 gas turbines, diesel engines, and shafts with variable pitch propellers. With her turbines removed from board, the project was canceled due to severe budget restrictions and the aircraft carrier continued inoperable at its Puerto Belgrano berth, until on February 1, 1997, she was definitively withdrawn from service. Then, after being sold at public auction, in January 1999 she was towed for scrapping to Alang, India.
With the loss of May 25, the Argentine Navy, although it still has the Super Etendard, has been deprived of a deterrent element that gave its Fleet a great capacity to project its naval power at great distances. Due to the current conditions of the Argentine economy, we believe that it will be many years before that South American nation will have an aircraft carrier again.

AIR CARRIERS OF THE MARINHA DO BRASIL
Brazil was the first South American nation to establish its naval aviation in August 1916, made up of a naval aviation school equipped with North American Curtiss model F seaplanes. From then on, it had an important development, and in 1922, it was thought to equip to the aircraft carrier fleet, studying the idea of converting two old merchant ships of German origin Aracaju and Sahara, but this idea ultimately did not prosper.
By the end of the 1930s, the navy had about 100 airplanes and seaplanes of various types. The following year, as a result of a campaign to establish an air ministry that would control military and civil aviation in Brazil, the naval and army aviation corps were grouped to form the Brazilian Air Force, under the control of the new Ministry of Aeronautics.
Deprived of its air weapon, the Brazilian navy needed to have naval aviation again, even more so if at the beginning of the 1950s, the Brazilian Navy, within its modernization plans, contemplated acquiring an aircraft carrier in the shortest possible time. To this end, in 1955 he created the General Directorate of Aeronautics of the Ministry of the Navy, with the clear purpose of reconstituting its naval aviation. In 1958 it acquired two Bell 47-G helicopters, which operated aboard the hydrographic vessels Sirius and Canopus. Another measure derived from the new naval policy was the creation of an air-naval training center near Rio de Janeiro, as well as an air-naval transport service.

The Minas Gerais
Coinciding with Brazil's interest in acquiring an aircraft carrier, at that time, the policy of progressive reduction of naval forces carried out by Great Britain made possible the upcoming availability of ships of various types, including some Colossus class aircraft carriers. One of them, the Veangance, had been in reserve since August 1955 and was offered for sale to Brazil, finalizing its purchase on December 14, 1956. Under the name Minas Gerais, it would not be put into service until December 6. December 1960, after undergoing a complete modernization.
Built by Swan Hunter between November 1942 and January 1945 for the British Royal Navy, Veangance had a brief participation in the war, remaining in the Mediterranean for six months, being transferred to the Pacific Fleet based in Hong Kong in July. 1945. In August 1946 he returned to Great Britain. Between May and September 1948 she was fitted out to sail in the Arctic to test and measure her ability to operate in extreme cold conditions, as part of exercises during "Operation Rusty". In 1950 she was designated flagship of the Third Carrier Squadron of the Home Fleet, and in 1952, during the Korean War, she was employed as a troop transport. At the end of that year he began a period of tour that concluded in November 1953. From that moment until August 1955 when he was retired, he served in the Royal Australian Navy, while the aircraft carrier Melbourne (former HMS Majestic) was being completed. Purchased in December 1956 by Brazil, it was taken to the Verolme shipyard in Rotterdam, where in mid-1957 a total reconstruction and modernization process began until December 1960. The works included the reinforcement and expansion of the flight deck with a angle of 8 ½°, increase in the lifting capacity of the elevators, an improvement in its capacity to operate aircraft by providing it with a new steam catapult for launching and new braking cables that could receive aircraft of up to 30,000 lbs, as well as the installation of a new stacking control system with mirrors. In the propulsion plant, its boilers were retubed and its turbines routed. The new sensors for surveillance were of North American origin, receiving an SPS-12 air search radar, an SPS-8B for air control, and an SPS-4 for surface search. As far as her armament is concerned, two quadruple 40mm mounts were installed at the bow and stern of the new island, and another double of the same caliber on the port side towards the stern. The island was the part in which the changes made were most reflected. She was completely rebuilt with a new design, a larger lattice mast and a smaller funnel.
With her new equipment, modified flight deck and new island, upon completing her modernization, the Minas Gerais was an almost new aircraft carrier.
Despite having achieved the objective of obtaining an aircraft carrier, the Brazilian navy had to face an unexpected problem, arising from an absurd dispute with the air force about who would be in charge of the planes that would operate from its deck. As a result, from the end of its modernization until 1963, the ship was without aircraft. This problem originated in 1959, when the government decided that all aircraft operating from the aircraft carrier would belong to the air force, but nevertheless, the navy decided to fly from the ship and naval personnel were trained with the US Navy. waiting to take possession of the SH-34J Seabat helicopters and S-2A Tracker aircraft destined for the aircraft carrier. Then, in 1963 the navy created the naval aviation force, with an embarked air-naval group, and in addition 6 T-28 training aircraft and 4 more helicopters were purchased. The newly acquired aircraft began to operate from Minas Gerais, generating opposition from the Air Force, and motivating the intervention of President Castello Branco, who prohibited the T-28 from being used from the aircraft carrier for a time.

After other additional incidents, in January 1965, the government decided that fixed-wing aircraft would be controlled by the air force, and rotary-wing aircraft by naval aviation. This decision would limit the control of air operations on board for many years, and since then, during much of its service, the Minas Gerais was used as an anti-submarine aircraft carrier, with an air group normally made up of eight Grumman S2-E Tracker aircraft. and anti-submarine helicopters, which were initially the SH-34J Seabat and later the SH-3D Sea King.
In 1976, the Minas Gerais underwent a new modernization and general tour, which consisted of providing it with a tactical data link system to operate with the Niteroi class frigates, the replacement of the SPS air search radar -12 by the most modern SPS-40B, and the complete tour of the propulsion plant.
In 1984, the Brazilian government announced its plans to acquire 12 A-4 Skyhawk fighter-bombers for Minas Gerais, but this was rejected the following year due to finding the resources to purchase aircraft destined for the development of the Italian-Brazilian fighter project. AMX.

By the early 1990s, as the plans to build a new aircraft carrier announced in 1985 had not yet materialized, the retirement of the Minas Gerais was not yet contemplated. Meanwhile, it was decided to carry out reconditioning to extend its remaining life. On this occasion, between July 1991 and October 1993, the boilers were retubed, the turbines and auxiliary systems were routed, it was equipped with a new SISCONTA command, control and communications system, new equipment and radars for air control and a new data link system. The 40mm cannons were removed, and two Sadral launchers for Mistral surface-to-air missiles were installed in their replacement. Additionally, in 1999 the catapult was completely serviced, and some spare parts from the recently decommissioned Argentine 25 de Mayo were used.
After many years of struggle, the good news for Brazilian naval aviation came in 1997, after authorization was obtained from the Government to acquire from Kuwait a squadron of second-hand A-4 Skyhawk aircraft. The aircraft purchased in excellent maintenance conditions at a price of 70 million dollars were 20 A-4KU (designated AF-1 by the Navy) and 3 TA-4KU training aircraft (designated AF-1A). Once they arrived in Brazil, they underwent reconditioning, and in September 2000, they began the first approach, landing and immediate takeoff exercises on the deck of the aircraft carrier, with 5 of the Skyhawks, piloted by a North American naval pilot, one from Argentina. and three Brazilians. In January of the following year, the Skyhawks, grouped in the Interception and Attack Aircraft Squadron (Esqd VF-1), finally began to operate aboard the Minas Gerais, during the CATRAPO/HELITRAPO exercise.
With the arrival of the newly acquired aircraft carrier Sao Paulo (former Foch of the French National Navy) in February 2001, the Brazilian navy determined the prompt withdrawal of the Minas Gerais from service. This occurred on Tuesday, October 16, when the World War II veteran aircraft carrier was finally retired from service at the Rio de Janeiro Naval Arsenal. However, its final destination is not yet written, since from Great Britain, the 'Battle of the Atlantic Memorial Ships' (BAMS) association based at the Aeronautical Heritage Center in Southampton, has expressed its interest in acquiring it and then towing it. towards that British port, turning it into a floating museum. It is also known that the Mayor of Rio de Janeiro has the same idea of preserving the ship for the City.

The projects for the construction of a new aircraft carrier and the purchase of the French Foch, renamed Sao Paulo
The construction of a new aircraft carrier has for many years been a project that for the Brazilian navy has in practice been unattainable due to the high costs that a ship of this type demands. The replacement of the Minas Gerais began to be considered in the late 1970s, and it was in July 1981, when the Brazilian navy announced its plans for the construction of two small aircraft carriers, capable of operating V/STOL aircraft. and helicopters. However, this project was successively postponed in favor of submarine construction programs in its own shipyards and the modernization of the Niteroi class frigates.
However, the evident age of the Minas Gerais made it essential to find a replacement in the medium term, and a solution to this problem was achieved with the possibility of purchasing the French aircraft carrier Foch, whose retirement from service was scheduled for the beginning of 2000.
After talks began for its acquisition in mid-1999, in August of the following year, the French Ministry of Defense officially announced the sale of the Foch to Brazil, for a price of $42 million, including the cost of the general reconditioning works, which were carried out at the Toulon Naval Arsenal.
The Foch, renamed Sao Paulo, was officially incorporated on November 15, 2000, and after completing its enlistment and respective tests, it set sail from Brest on February 6, 2001, with a reduced complement of 600 men bound for Rio de Janeiro , where he arrived on the 17th of the same month. After her arrival and once her new crew was completed and prepared, she began training with her air group, which is made up of 15 AF-1 Skyhawk fighter-bombers, 6 SH-3D Sea King helicopters, 3 Aerospatiale UH-12 Aeschylo and 2 UH-14 Cougar.

The most important thing about the Sao Paulo is that it has no limitations to embark any type of naval combat aircraft existing on the market with the ability to be catapulted and land on an aircraft carrier. In comparison to small aircraft carriers such as the Spanish Príncipe de Asturias, the Italian Garibaldi, or the British Invincible class, whose decks have the Sky Jump at the bow, which limits them to operating only with Harrier aircraft and helicopters, the Sao Paulo, Even though it is almost 40 years old, it continues to be a superior ship due to its capabilities. She can permanently maintain a combat air patrol in the air for self-defense and the rest of the aircraft on attack missions beyond the range of her task group's weapons, achieving long-range naval power projection.
The presence of this aircraft carrier in the Brazilian navy, added to the varied and numerous composition of its fleet, gives Brazil a great deterrence capacity and undoubtedly gives it supremacy among the continent's navies.


EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE AN AIR CARRIER IN THE CHILEAN NAVY
The Chilean Navy, like most other navies on the continent, saw the beginnings of its naval aviation during the 1920s. Among the small number of aircraft acquired by the navy were six Short 184 seaplanes and two Sopwith Baby floatplanes. It was with one of the latter that the first aeronaval operations were carried out experimentally aboard the cruiser O'Higgins, and in the course of 1920, the battleship Almirante Latorre embarked one of them on several occasions to carry out aerial scouting in shooting exercises. Later, in the modernization carried out on the Latorre in Great Britain between 1929 and 1931, a catapult was installed on the poop deck, using a Fairey IIIF seaplane. The Latorre kept its catapult until shortly after World War II. Another of the Chilean ships to use seaplanes was the submarine mother ship Araucano built in Great Britain in 1929, which also carried a Fairey IIIF.
Meanwhile, the Chilean naval aviation had been installed in 1921 in the Las Torpederas cove near Valparaíso, in a first improvised base, and in March 1923 its existence as an integral part of the navy was made official. In 1925, the naval air base was relocated to Quintero, from where it continued its operations.
It is worth mentioning that since March 1930, naval aviation merged with army aviation, giving rise to the formation of the Chilean Air Force, with which all aircraft were in charge of that new weapon.
Despite no longer having naval aviation, years later some efforts arose to train naval officers to pilot aircraft. For example, in 1945 the Chilean navy sent 10 officers to the US to qualify as naval aviators, and these naval pilots became qualified, operating fighters and torpedo boats aboard the aircraft carrier USS Wright, with a view to a future renaissance of naval aviation. Due to the efforts of the navy itself, this would occur in 1953, when the Chilean government authorized its reestablishment, beginning its activities from the El Belloto airfield, in the commune of Quilpué, 20 kilometers from Valparaíso, its first aircraft being two Bell helicopters.
With its naval aviation back in existence, plans apparently soon emerged to equip the Chilean Squadron with an aircraft carrier. In fact, in October 1956, the newspapers La Estrella and El Mercurio of Valparaíso published news about the Chilean Navy's intentions to acquire an aircraft carrier from the United States, indicating that a commission chaired by Admiral Alfredo Natho was He was in Washington making arrangements to obtain the sale of a ship of that type. Apparently these efforts were unsuccessful as they did not obtain an affirmative response from the US government in this regard.
The next known effort by the Chilean navy to obtain an aircraft carrier occurred in 1966, when the need to acquire an aircraft carrier was presented to the Government. Apparently, the intention was to purchase HMS Centaur from Great Britain, which was in reserve as a result of the new government policy aimed at withdrawing aircraft carriers from service in the fleet.
However, the purchase of the aircraft carrier remained a mere purpose, because it did not have government approval. This decision caused the disagreement of some Chilean naval chiefs who pressed for the purchase to proceed, which in turn provoked, in response from the government, the retirement of Vice Admirals Newmann and Searle.

The last known attempt by the Chilean Navy to acquire an aircraft carrier occurred in the early 1980s, specifically during 1981, when the British Royal Navy offered for sale the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes with its complement of aircraft. V/STOL Harrier, which at that time was scheduled to be retired from service in 1983. However, this offer would be cut short by the Malvinas Conflict.
After the conflict, the Chilean Navy continued its interest in the Hermes, and this was evident when in an interview, Vice Admiral Mauricio Poisson, Chief of Staff of the Navy, declared: "I think that every sailor has in mind the idea of having a carrier-based task force. This statement was not a simple idea, since in August 1983, a Chilean delegation visited the ship, which made clear the interest in said ship. However, there was a big obstacle to achieving the objective, and it was monetary. Despite having a buoyant and growing economy, the acquisition of the aircraft carrier was expensive, not so much because of the ship itself, but because of the air group with which it had to be equipped. At that time, for the Chilean navy it was a higher priority to "renew" the units of its aging squadron than to provide it with an aircraft carrier.
Given the impossibility of acquiring the Hermes, the Chilean Navy definitively lost the opportunity when India purchased this aircraft carrier in April 1986 at a cost of 25 million dollars, plus its Sea Harriers air group for 60 million more.
In recent years, some Chilean analysts have once again raised the need for the Chilean navy to have an aircraft carrier-type ship. We believe that this is still a remote possibility, since ruling out the construction of a new unit due to the high costs involved, within the next ten years, none of the navies that currently have aircraft carriers will retire them from service; However, we should not rule out other possibilities such as the conversion of a merchant or auxiliary ship for the operation of aircraft.


EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE AN AIR CARRIER IN THE PERUVIAN NAVY
Despite having been one of the pioneers in South America, the Peruvian Naval Aviation, originally created in 1919, in its first period, had a short but fruitful period of life before merging with the army aviation to form the Peruvian Air Corps. and then what is the current Air Force. Until its new formation as a component of the naval forces in 1963, the only occasion in which naval aircraft were used on board a combat unit was during the Conflict with Colombia. This occurred in April 1933, when a Vought UO-5 seaplane piloted by First Lieutenant José San Martín was embarked aboard the cruiser Almirante Grau, to be used as an exploration aircraft.
After 1963, the Naval Aviation Service had a modest initial development, until its true takeoff began in the mid-1970s. During this time, the first known occasion of the possibility of acquiring aircraft carriers dates back to 1968, at a time when the Argentine Navy - which owned the aircraft carrier Independencia (formerly HMS Warrior) - acquired a second ship of the same type, the Dutch Karel Doorman, later renamed 25 de Mayo. The offer of Independence to Peru was made in September 1968 by the then Chief of the General Staff of the Argentine Navy, Vice Admiral Pedro Gnavi to Rear Admiral Manuel Fernadez Castro of the Peruvian Navy. In subsequent conversations led by Peru's Naval Attaché in Argentina, Captain Melitón Carvajal, the interest in offering it to Peru exclusively was learned.
This interesting offer was discussed in the Superior Navy Council in the session corresponding to the month of September of that year, and was rejected mainly because at that time, the strategic conception of the formation of the Peruvian naval forces did not consider a ship of that type. type, as well as the limitations it had to operate with modern aircraft, and the age of its equipment, whose change and modernization would require a high investment for which the navy was not prepared.

The efforts to acquire the British aircraft carrier Bulwark
In 1976, Navy International magazine, in its July edition, presented an extensive report about the South American navies. The interesting thing about that article turned out to be the news that Peru was holding talks with the British Ministry of Defense to purchase the aircraft carrier HMS Bulwark as a platform to operate Harrier vertical takeoff aircraft.
Indeed, following an announcement made by the British Ministry of Defense in August 1975, which indicated the withdrawal from service of some naval units as a result of a reduction in the defense budget, the Naval Commissioner of Peru in Europe and Naval Attaché in Great Britain, Rear Admiral Daniel Masías, learned that among the units considered for withdrawal was the aircraft carrier HMS Bulwark. This news was communicated to the General Staff of the Navy on August 18, and immediately afterwards, on the following September 9, that leadership ordered that the naval commissioner, Rear Admiral Masías, take steps to obtain information from the British Ministry of Defense about the possible withdrawal of the aircraft carrier from service, subsequently receiving orders to formalize the procedures for its acquisition. This was done through a letter of intent addressed to the British Ministry of Defense in the month of October and in response and in consideration of the Peruvian proposal, the Ministry of Defense, through a document dated December 16 of the same year, communicated that it gave priority to Peru in case the ship was removed from service and put up for sale.
Meanwhile, the British Navy had arranged for the Bulwark to be placed in reserve at the Portsmouth Naval Base, in charge of a crew in charge of its preservation and maintenance.
This was also known to Admiral Masías, who had continued conversations with the British naval authorities and the Ministry of Defense, meeting on January 13, 1976 with Admiral Sir Edward Ashmore, First Sea Lord, who told him that The Bulwark would be kept in reserve until the entry into service of the new aircraft carrier HMS Invincible, and that on the part of the British Government there was no impediment for the ship to later be sold to Peru. At this meeting, it was authorized for a delegation of Peruvian officers chaired by Admiral Masías to carry out an inspection visit to the ship.
The aforementioned visit took place on April 6, four days before the ship moved to its new location, with the delegation made up of Admiral Masías, ship captain Raúl Vargas Fuller and frigate captain Luis Giampietri Rojas. After having inspected the Bulwark, the aforementioned chief would present his report to the Chief of the General Staff of the Navy, in which after thoroughly detailing the condition of the ship, he concluded that "due to the magnificent operational and conservation state of said ship, No investment would be necessary for its use and employment by the Peruvian Navy, except in case superiority deems it appropriate, the change of the air center and early warning radars and electronic countermeasures because they are of a certain age and there are problems in obtaining spare parts."
The next communication to be sent was a report dated the following May 17, in which Admiral Masías informed the General Command of the status of the progress of the efforts, indicating that the Director of Sales of the Ministry of Defense, R.J. Harding had stated again, among other points, that Peru had the first priority and that it was the only country that to date has made efforts to acquire Bulwark.
On February 21, 1977, the British Embassy informed the staff that the Director of Sales of the British Ministry of Defense R. J. Harding, accompanied by Brigadier General P. Heindenstam, would visit Peru from March 2 to 7, wishing to visit the Chief of the General Staff General of the Navy and the Director General of Logistics to discuss, among other things, HMS Bulwark.
In January 1978, the navy received a visit from two other representatives of the British Ministry of Defense where interest in HMS Bulwark was again evident. However, it was known that British officials continued traveling to visit other South American countries, and it is estimated that on such occasions they offered the aforementioned unit for sale.
Within the naval acquisition plans of the time, the purchase of the Bulwark was considered necessary, first of all with the aim of enhancing the capacity to carry out amphibious operations, since the ship could transport 24 Sea King type helicopters, 1,200 Marines and all the necessary material to maintain them in beach combat, for 24 hours for a period of 10 days, and had a maximum speed of 28 knots.

On the other hand, a platform of this type would allow the exercise of sea control in specific areas considering its capacity to embark helicopters equipped with air-to-surface and anti-submarine missiles, as well as having all the communications systems necessary to function as a command ship. a task force, allowing tactical control of a large sea area to be exercised.
Bulwark's offer was attractive for several reasons. Knowing what the operational status of it was according to what was reported by the naval attaché in Great Britain, it was known that its commissioning would not require greater investment; On the other hand, the price, estimated at four million dollars, would allow us to obtain an aircraft carrier almost immediately, while if it were decided to build a new one - like the 18,000-ton aircraft carrier offered by the Yarrow shipyard - its cost would be much higher (about 42 million dollars) and it could only be available between 6 to 8 years after its construction began.
Despite the serious intentions of the Peruvian navy to purchase the Bulwark, which left everything progressed on a "zero page", it was the decision of the British authorities themselves. Indeed, in 1978, its largest aircraft carrier, the Ark Royal, would be definitively withdrawn from service, leaving the Hermes as the only aircraft carrier available. This, plus the delay in the completion of the construction of the VSTOL Invincible aircraft carrier, led to a reassessment of the situation of the Bulwark, whose reactivation and reincorporation as an anti-submarine helicopter carrier was soon decided.
This decision was announced by the British Secretary of Defense on January 25, 1978, and a week later, the British Defense Attaché in Peru communicated this news to the Peruvian naval authorities, indicating that the return of the Bulwark to service excluded the possibility of its sale to Peru for a long time.

Regarding the ship in March 1978, it began its reconditioning, entering service again in February 1979, operating as an anti-submarine aircraft carrier until it was definitively withdrawn from service at the beginning of 1981. Thus concluded the closest opportunity that our navy had to acquire a aircraft carrier.
After this frustrated episode, some studies on aircraft carriers would continue, but given the possibilities of obtaining a second-hand ship so scarce and those of building a new one so remote due to the high cost that it would require, the topic was definitively forgotten.


CONCLUSIONS
The international situation that led Great Britain to withdraw its aircraft carriers from service since the end of World War II and the 1980s was what allowed some European, Asian and South American nations to obtain aircraft carriers.
However, in current times it is practically impossible to acquire a second-hand ship of this class, the reason being that the few countries that own them simply have no plans to withdraw them from service. We must also consider that the cost to build an aircraft carrier and equip it with an air group is beyond any budget of the region's navies, so it is unlikely or perhaps impossible that any other South American navy could incorporate this type of ship into its fleet. its fleet in the medium term.
In the case of the Argentine Navy, although some publications have recently indicated a renewed interest in acquiring an aircraft carrier, there is no doubt that the drastic reductions in the defense budget that affect it will prevent for a long time the possibility of its sea fleet have a ship of this type again.
On the other hand, the withdrawal of May 25 has meant a notable decrease in the operational capacity of Argentine naval aviation and the projection of the naval power of its fleet. The Super Etendard and the S-2T Turbo Tracker have been deprived of a valuable platform that allowed them to increase their autonomy, currently having to operate from bases located on land.
Brazil, which during the last 20 years tried unsuccessfully to replace the Minas Gerais with a new aircraft carrier, with the purchase of the French Foch found a temporary solution that will allow it to continue using this type of ship for at least 10 more years before thinking about its replacement. .
As far as Chile is concerned, its aspirations to incorporate an aircraft carrier into its Squadron were limited in the past by economic factors (as in the case of the Hermes) and for the future, it must first achieve its ongoing projects for the replacement. of its ancient surface units before thinking about acquiring an aircraft carrier type ship.
In the case of Peru, after the unrealized projects to have an aircraft carrier in the 1970s, the strategic conception no longer considers this type of units, but does consider the use of rotary-wing aeronautical elements embarked on board frigates, with anti-surface and anti-submarine capabilities, as well as the use of land-based exploration and anti-submarine aircraft.

Bibliography
  • Arguindenguy, Pablo. Apuntes sobre los Buques de la Armada Argentina (1810-1970). Departamento de Estudios Navales, Bs.As., 1972. T. VI.Boniface, Patrick. "HMS Warrior" En: Warship World, ed. Noviembre 2000. pp. 18-19. 
  • Brown, David K. Nelson to Vanguard. Warship design and Development 1923-1945. U.S. Naval Institute Press. Annapolis, 2000.
  • Brown, David. The Royal Navy and the Falklands War. Leo Cooper. Londres, 1987.
  • Burns, Ken y Critchley, Mike. HMS Bulwark, 1948-1984. Maritime Books. Cornwall, 1986
  • Chesneau, Roger. Aircraft Carriers of the World, 1914 to the Present. Arms and armour Press. Londres, 1998.
  • Friedman, Norman. British Carrier Aviation. The Evolution of the Ships and their Aircraft. Conway Maritime Press. Londres, 1988
  • Gardiner, Robert (editor). Navies in the Nuclear age. Warships Since 1945 Conway's History of the Ship. Conway Maritime Press. Londres, 1995.
  • Huerta, Ismael. Volvería a ser Marino. Ed. Andrés Bello. Santiago, 1988. 2 Tomos.
  • Jane's Information Group. "Brazilian carrier operates Skyhawks" En: Jane's Defence Weekly. Ed. 4 oct. 2000. p. 3.
  • Layman, R.D. "Sparrows Among the Hawks: Shipboard Aviation of the Smaller Navies, 1919-1939. En: Warship International, N°2, 1984. pp.
  • Marina do Brasil. "Aeronaves AF-1 Skyhawk operam a partir do Minas Gerais". En: Nomar, ed. 5 febrero 2001, N° 706.
  • Preston, Antony. "South America's Navies". En: Navy International. ed. jul 1976. Vol. 81, N° 97. pp. 13-25.
  • Regelin, K. (editor). "Controversia acerca de los portaaviones británicos". En Revista Internacional de Defensa, N° 1970. pp. 208-
  • Scheina, Robert. "Latin American Navies". En Proceedings, marzo 1982. US Naval Institute Press. pp. .
  • "Latin American Navies". En Proceedings, ed. Marzo 1985. pp 32-37.
  • Iberoamérica: Una Historia Naval. Ed. San Martín. Madrid, 1987.

War Book (2003)

Wednesday, November 8, 2023

Military Rifle: Mauser M1889 (Belgium) / M1890 (Otoman Empire) / M1891 (Argentina)

Mauser M1889 (Belgium) / 
M1890 (Otoman Empire) / 
M1891 (Argentina) 


Mauser M1889 Belgium Rifle
  

Mauser M1889 Belgium Rifle
  

Mauser M1890 Turkish Rifle
  

Mauser M1891 Argentin Rifle
  

Mauser M1889 Belgium Cavalry Carbine
  

Mauser M1891 Argentine Carbine
  

Mauser M1889 Rifle, close up
  

Mauser M1889 rifle, diagram
  
Caliber: 7.65 x53
Total length:
1270mm/50"
Barrel length:
780mm/30.7"
Empty weight:
3.68 kg / 8.1 lbs
Magazine capacity:
5 shots
  
The Mauser Model 1889 rifle, also known as the Belgian Mauser, was the first rifle produced by the renowned German arms factory, Mauser Werke, designed for small-caliber smokeless powder ammunition. It was initially rejected by German authorities but was adopted by Belgium in 1889, Turkey in 1890, and Argentina in 1891. The rifles supplied to Belgium were manufactured in Belgium by the private factory Fabrique Nationale (abbreviated as FN, which was established specifically for producing these rifles) and by the state arms factory (Manufacture D'Armes De L'Etat, abbreviated as MAE).

During World War I, Belgian Mauser M1889 rifles were produced by the Belgian government in exile, manufactured by Hopkins & Allen in the United States and in Birmingham, UK, primarily by Belgian FN exiled labor. The Mausers sent to Turkey and Argentina of this model were produced in Germany. Turkish rifles were made by Mauser as a continuation of previous contracts, and Argentine rifles were initially produced by Ludwig Loewe and later by DWM. The standard Argentine Mauser rifles were also adopted by several other South American countries, such as Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.

In the 1930s, at least some of the Belgian Mauser M1889 rifles were converted into the short rifles Model 1889/36, which were intended for use by the civil guard.

  

Mauser 1891 Argentine carbine

Argentine soldiers with Mauser

The Mauser Model 1889 is a manually operated rifle with a rotating bolt action. Its bolt has two locking lugs at the front, with the extractor claw inserted in the bolt head and a fixed blade-type ejector in the receiver. The magazine box holds five rounds in a single stack and features spring-loaded feeding lips. The magazine can be loaded through the opening on top of the receiver using individual rounds or detachable 5-round clips. The magazine assembly is separate from the trigger guard and can be easily removed for maintenance or replacement. The magazine release is located within the trigger guard.

Similar to some contemporary rifles, the Belgian Mauser is equipped with a cylindrical barrel jacket. Argentine and Turkish Mausers of this type lacked barrel jackets and had wooden handguards. The stock is of conventional wooden type. A bayonet lug is provided near the muzzle. There were various carbine patterns based on the same basic design but with shorter barrels and barrel jackets. Belgian carbines had tubular barrel jackets, whereas Argentine carbines lacked barrel jackets and featured long wooden handguards that covered the entire barrel up to the muzzle. The modified Belgian model of short rifles, 1889/36, was also produced without a bayonet lug.








World-Guns

Sunday, November 5, 2023

Malvinas: Why Did the IMARA Perform so Well?

Organizational Factors and Combat Performance: The IMARA experience in the Malvinas [1]


by Alejandro L. Corbacho
Universidad del CEMA
Documento de Trabajo 255 




Abstract

When soldiers go into combat, they do so within the framework of an organization that sends them and supports them. In this way its quality is put to the test and for this reason, combat is the critical moment of any military organization. In this situation, its performance will depend not only on the strategic plans, its quantity and the available material, but also on the preparation and spirit that was instilled in its members throughout their time in the military organization.
There is no doubt that for the Argentine Armed Forces the Malvinas War was a critical moment. The following work explores the reasons for the behavior of the Marine Infantry units of the Argentine Navy (IMARA) based on the analysis of two organizational factors. The first factor, most commonly noted, is what is called structural in this analysis; the second focuses on some sociological aspects, more precisely the organizational culture. To explain the structural and cultural attributes of the Argentine Marine Corps, Navy officers on active duty or in retirement who participated or who were privileged witnesses of the events described, as well as official documents and articles and other printed testimonies, were interviewed.

[In Malvinas] The Argentines fought well and bravely in many parts of the islands. Not all. But many. And those groups of Argentines are more interesting than those who fled. [2] 




Introduction 
When soldiers go into combat, they do so within the framework of an organization that sends them and supports them. In this way its quality is put to the test and for this reason, combat is the critical moment of any military organization. In this situation, its performance will depend not only on the strategic plans, its quantity and the available material, but also on the preparation and spirit that was instilled in its members throughout their time in the military organization.

There is no doubt that for the Argentine Armed Forces the Malvinas War was a critical moment. This work investigates which of these issues affected the combat performance of a particular unit: the Marine Infantry of the Argentine Navy (IMARA).

The South Atlantic conflict that took place between April and June 1982 ended in defeat for Argentina and there are numerous works that analyze and reflect on the reasons for it. However, during the development of the conflict there were troops that stood out for their combat skills. These constitute successful cases that also deserve to be investigated. Among them are Marine Corps units. [3]

The following work explores the reasons for the behavior of Marine Corps units based on the analysis of two organizational factors. The first factor, most commonly noted, is what is called structural in this analysis; the second focuses on some sociological aspects, more precisely the organizational culture. To explain the structural and cultural attributes of the Argentine Marine Corps that were central to its outstanding performance in combat, Navy officers on active duty or in retirement who participated or who were privileged witnesses of the events described were interviewed and official documents and articles and other printed testimonies.


The Marine Corps in the Malvinas Theater
Once the recovery of the Malvinas Islands was successfully completed on April 2, 1982, the Marine Corps forces that participated in the operation must have returned to the continent since the original defense plan did not contemplate their subsequent use. However, when the British decided to respond militarily to the Argentine action, the Argentine authorities decided to reinforce the garrison of the islands and sent, among other units, a contingent of Marines.

The bulk of this contingent was made up of BIM 5. The Naval High Command decided to deploy this unit whose permanent base is in Río Grande (Tierra del Fuego) for several reasons:

  1. for being the best adapted to combat in a terrain similar to that of the Malvinas;
  2. for being well equipped; and
  3. be highly trained, particularly, in night combat and in the use of air cooperation;. 
For its deployment in the Islands, BIM 5 was reinforced by a group of 12.7mm caliber heavy machine guns, by the First Section of Amphibious Engineers, and by Battery B of the Marine Corps Field Artillery Battalion.



Between April 8 and 12, the battalion's personnel and equipment [5] were airlifted to Puerto Argentino. There, the local High Command assigned him the responsibility of defending part of the belt of elevations that surround that city. BIM 5 corresponded to [6] Mounts Tumbledown, Williams, and Sapper Hill. In addition to the battalion, other IMARA units were present on the Islands: the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, the Amphibious Engineer Company (-), a detachment of Amphibious Commandos, the Third Section of Company D of the BIM 2, Second and Third Sections of Company H of BIM 3, two groups of Bantam anti-tank missiles, three groups of air traffic controllers, a Security section with dogs and a group of Marine Corps Command. These units participated in the defense of the capital, the Camber Peninsula, and Bourbon Island, and all entered combat [7] with satisfactory results. In total, the Marine Corps troops stationed on the islands reached 1,590 men. At the same time, the First Marine Brigade with 3,587 men remained waiting in Tierra del Fuego. This constituted the strategic [8] operational reserve of the South Atlantic Theater of Operations (TOAS).
It is important to highlight that during their stay on the islands the Infantes were well fed, had adequate clothing and appropriate communications equipment. Also important was the fact that during the waiting period from their arrival until the British landed, the Marines were kept busy preparing for that moment. The battalion also had tools to prepare positions suitable for the [9] Malvinas soil. These were the famous “barretas”. These preparations were later key [10] in the tough defense that the Infantry presented to the British attackers.


Mount Tumbledown: recognition

The British landed at dawn on May 21 in San Carlos (Isla Soledad) and the final battles for the heights surrounding Puerto Argentino took place between June 11 and 14. The Second Battalion Scots Guards attacked Mount Tumbledown on the night of the 13th [11]. A British correspondent who witnessed the fighting described the action in the following terms:
Within minutes, Argentine snipers using night sights had killed three of the Guards and wounded two others. The typical British formula of responding with fire from 66 and 84 millimeter rockets seemed to have little effect on the enemy positions located among the rocks. The Scots Guards heard the Argentines shouting and even singing while they fought. These were the best troops that General Menéndez had on the battlefield, they were BIM 5... As the night progressed, the hard fighting continued and the Argentines showed no signs of breaking and their main positions remained firm. .[12] 
This action described by Hastings and Jenkins lasted eleven hours. His story continues
The Guards reached the last positions at Tumbledown only after fighting inch by inch on the rocks using phosphorus grenades and automatic weapons to eliminate the enemy bunkers... The Scots Guards battalion had... captured one of the Argentine positions most strongly defended from war [13]. 
After a long night fighting, the remains of the Infantry reinforced by dispersed Army units were still in possession of the BIM 5 command post and Sapper Hill. From there the Infantry prepared for the counterattack. But around noon on June 14, the Argentine High Command ordered a ceasefire on the islands. The armed struggle for the Malvinas had ended. At the end of the battle, BIM 5 suffered a total of 61 casualties, of which 16 were killed and 45 wounded. The Scots Guards claimed to have had 9 [14] dead and 41 wounded.


The Sunday Times team of correspondents later informed their readers that at Tumbledown “the Guards had faced the toughest action of all. There was, well entrenched in a series of intricate bunkers cut into the ground, a well-trained Argentine Marine Infantry battalion.” Furthermore, “the volume of fire from the Infantry was intense and impressive.” Similarly, American military analyst Harry G. Summers noted that “as the Scots Guards approached the main heights of Mount Tumbledown they encountered strong opposition. Instead of the hasty field fortifications the British had encountered earlier in the war, they faced a well-entrenched company of BIM 5." The American added that "a British artillery officer described those positions as exceptionally well prepared." [15]. 


Even in defeat, the Infantes did not lose cohesion and remained united and orderly [16]. According to the story of Lieutenant Colonel Vaux, commander of the 42nd Marine Commandos, the Argentine Marines marched along the streets of Puerto Argentino “elegantly” (smartly) and carrying their regimental colors high. Finally, the British historian Martin Middlebrook [17] also has words of recognition for the performance of the Argentine Infantes:
The Argentine Infantrymen who consider themselves better soldiers than those in the Army probably are. Its basic component was also conscripts, but the Infantry system of incorporating new conscripts in batches throughout the year meant that the unit had a higher degree of training and did not have any young men from the 1963 class when they were sent to the Malvinas. . Another advantage that the Marines enjoyed was that they had better winter clothing... At the same time they were supported by their own Marine Infantry artillery battery. [18] 
On the Argentine side, the Marine Corps also had positive evaluations from sources outside the Navy. For example, a publication by the Argentine Army listed the reasons, which according to them, explain the superior performance of BIM 5.: 
The BIM 5 possessed a well-balanced set of weapons and excellent communications equipment. But much more important was that it had men who, as a result of the Navy's incorporation system, had completed their training, adapted from peace to the terrain and extreme weather conditions...at the same time it had a particular logistics system of the Navy. Navy...managing to maintain it with excellent combat aptitude. [19] 
On the other hand, the report prepared by the Analysis and Evaluation Commission (also known as the Rattenbach Report) reported that:
The BIM 5 (+)...demonstrated a joint vocation, a high degree of readiness, professionalism and adequate equipment, which was evident in the ground combat, during the defense of Puerto Argentino, an action where it had an outstanding performance. [20] 
Therefore, both our own and our adversaries recognized the outstanding performance of the Marine Corps units and in particular of BIM 5. [21].


Organizational factors: structural and cultural

In general, the combat performance of land units is explained by a psychological variable: the degree of cohesion. According to this, men and units in combat cohere (or stay together) for survival, trust in their comrades, or for patriotism. Furthermore, it is argued that a high degree of cohesion allows units to “try to accomplish their mission despite the situation.” Other authors [22] claim that other factors such as national character, the relationship between society and the armed forces, religious beliefs, and ideology affect the way units fight [23]. However, there are still other factors that have so far been little studied. These are variables related to the characteristics of the organization within which soldiers fight. These also help cement cohesion and can be important when explaining “combat performance.” This concept is used here in terms tactical effectiveness similar to that of tactical effectiveness ( ) defined by Millet and Murray as “the specific techniques used by combat units to fight in confrontations that aim to secure operational objectives.” According to the authors, “tactical activity involves the movement [or deployment] of forces on the battlefield against the enemy, the provision of destructive fire against enemy forces or targets, and the preparation of logistical support to be applied.” in the confrontation.”[24]

In addition to the personnel that gives life to an organization, it is made up of structural and cultural elements. The first are the skeleton, the visible, external elements or characteristics, which can be, among others, military material and equipment, the number of members and the organizational chart and geographical arrangement of the units. The latter are more subtle and therefore more difficult to observe with the naked eye. These are the basic assumptions, norms, beliefs, and formal knowledge that the members of the organization have. Both sets of elements configure and shape the collective behavior of soldiers. Therefore, this work is based on the assumption that in addition to the degree of cohesion, both the structural and cultural aspects of the military organization must be studied to comprehensively explain its performance in combat since these ultimately help to develop, reinforce or maintain cohesion. In this way, the focus of the research shifts from the human dimension to the organizational dimension of war.

In a historical overview of military organizations, British historian Jeremy Black describes the following pattern: while successful weapons and tactics can be easily reproduced, it is much more difficult to reproduce “efficient military performance.” According to Black, the latter seems to be connected with the quality of the cadres, that is, officers and non-commissioned officers [25]. Therefore, how is it possible to obtain high quality paintings? A quick answer to this question is to look at how military organizations recruit and educate their personnel to get the job done. During this process, the military organization instills uniform knowledge, procedures, and values that allow its members to share the same spirit that distinguishes one group of soldiers from another [26]. Therefore, to understand the performance of an organization it is necessary to pay attention to both its visible aspects and the more subtle ones that are its characteristic cultural elements. The latter constitute “the invisible force behind the organization's activities” [27].


Organizational culture is commonly defined as “the set of assumptions, values, norms, beliefs, and formal knowledge that shapes collective understanding” [28].

According to Mintzberg, ideology (or organizational culture) encompasses “the traditions and beliefs of an organization and what distinguishes it from other organizations and infuses a certain life into the skeleton of its structure.” [29] Thus, organizational culture is the normative and social glue that holds the organization together and expresses the social values and ideals that the members of that organization come to share. At the same time, it helps to overcome challenges external to the organization. Additionally, it is important to note that these ideas are considered valid because they have worked. More importantly, culture is considered the “toolbox” or “repertoire” of organizational behavior [30]. However, it is important to highlight that culture does not define objectives. In this regard, there is a certain degree of agreement among experts about the consequences of culture in organizations [31]: it helps manage collective uncertainties, helps create a social order, and generates continuity in beliefs and practices. At the same time, members who share the same culture create a collective identity and commitment. [32]

Finally, military organizations, as “total” organizations, instill in their members a common culture or esprit de corps. For example, when analyzing the case of the United States Marine Corps, one historian observed that its “men share an institutionally defined relationship based on subordination to the spirit of the Marine Corps.” Therefore, this research investigates the influence that organizational factors of a specific organization can have, that is, the combat behavior of the Argentine marine infantry [33].


Structural Factors

When describing the combat behavior of BIM 5, the comments expressed above agree in pointing out observable aspects, that is, structural factors. These were cohesion, a balanced set of weapons and equipment, superior logistics, and skill in preparing defensive positions. The observers also agreed [34] in valuing another characteristic of the Navy, the system of incorporation of conscripts.

According to one of its members, one of the characteristics of the Argentine Marines is “the obsession with training and enlistment.” And according to him, that means [35] that the Infantes want to be prepared at all times. Without a doubt, an element that helps develop this characteristic is the geographical location of the main base of the Marine Corps, Batteries. Indeed, the location of said base guarding the entrance to the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base helps explain part of this “impulse” for training. Therefore, the isolated location of the base provides the incentive to train more often than [36] any other unit located near a city.

Added to the isolation factor of the Battery garrison is the fact that the core of the force is concentrated there, the Marine Infantry Brigade and the Amphibious Support Force. The first “plans, regulates and supervises the instruction, training and all [37] activity or operational task of the Organic Units” of this great combat unit.

During the Malvinas campaign it was made up of the Command Battalion, BIM 1, BIM 2, Field Artillery Battalion 1, the Logistics Support Battalion, and the Amphibious Engineer Company. The mission of the Amphibious Support Force is to “supply with its personnel, means and weapons systems, the support and/or reinforcements ordered by the Marine Corps Command, at the request of the different Forces of the Corps that must enter or are located in operations” [38]. This unit was made up of the Amphibious Vehicle Battalion 1, the Communications Battalion 1, the Anti-Aircraft Battalion and the Amphibious Commando Group. It is another structural factor that can help consolidate military cohesion, or esprit de corps size. In this regard, the Argentine Marine Corps is a small force that exists within the context of a larger organization, the Navy. In this way, it is possible for its members to know or be more familiar with each other and learn to work together. In that case, it can be said that the Marine Corps is also made up of a dense web of relationships between its members [39]. In 1982 the Marine Corps had a total of 9,500 troops. The total number of troops in the Navy reached 36,000 at that time. This figure included conscripts [40].


Most officers interviewed agreed that these three factors help create an integrated, cohesive and coordinated amphibious force.

As has been pointed out repeatedly, an advantage that the Navy has over other armed forces arises from having its own means of logistical support. In this regard, a veteran officer of the campaign stated [41] that “the secret of the successful logistics capacity of the Navy's land units in the Malvinas was due to the fact that the logistics were ours.” In that sense, “we did not depend on anyone else” [42].

Finally, many observers pointed out another institutional aspect that distinguished the Navy compared to the Army. When the time came, they considered that the conscript incorporation system was critical for their performance. The Navy incorporated new conscripts in five successive bimonthly batches and the conscripts served a fixed period of fourteen months [43]. For many, this system adopted in the 70s was “one of the reasons why the force was always ready for combat” [44].
Up to this point, this research has identified a set of structural aspects that make up the organization's configuration: geographical location, concentration of troops, size, own logistical support and conscript incorporation system. The conjunction of these factors facilitated training and helped to form an integrated, dense and cohesive force that fulfilled the mission expected of it.




Organizational Culture: values, norms, beliefs and ideals

In addition to the factors here called structural, some of the positive assessments of the performance of BIM 5 mention the attribute of “professionalism”. This concept is difficult to quantify but responds, at least, to the impression that those who carry out a specific task perform it as expected [45]. The demonstration of professionalism in the face of a situation such as combat in extreme conditions against an enemy of stature is a demonstration of the presence of a shared culture that allows those who possess it to face and overcome it with greater success than those who lack this attribute. Analysis of official and semi-official documents and personal interviews with Navy and IMARA personnel suggests the presence of the following key elements as part of the organizational culture of the Navy and particularly the Marine Corps. While some elements are common to both, others are specific to the latter.


Integration 

The idea of integration of its cadres is incorporated into the Navy's educational system. From the beginning, with their incorporation into the Naval Academy, the young cadets become part of an integrated force. During the first two years, instruction is given without distinguishing between naval or infantry cadets. Later, when the last ones graduate as midshipmen, they all start in charge of an infantry section. After two years of service in the rifle companies, they begin their specialization in artillery, communications, engineers or infantry in the corresponding school units. It is important to note that Infants consider these specializations as orientations or technical skills [46]. This process contrasts with that used by the Army. There, the separation of weapons was strictly established and the cadets from the beginning received instruction in separate classrooms and had their blocks separated by weapons. [47]




Members of the Marine Corps are also accustomed to working as a whole on extensive campaigns [48]. Consequently, continuous activity generates integration, that is, a situation in which “everyone knows a little about everything and trains together.” For this reason [49], during the Malvinas campaign, the Marine Corps was very effective in the use of coordinated fire support. Integration was not only achieved within the force but also [50] [51] with the other components of the Navy such as naval support and, especially, aviation. In general, the Navy emphasizes the importance of unity of action and the concept of “interoperability”, that is, the ability to operate in any geographic area in conjunction with other components of the weapon [52].
Finally, due to the characteristics of the naval profession, it teaches its personnel the need to work harmoniously as a team. The staff knows that they will be confined to the same ship for a long time. Under these circumstances, the crew members are in close contact with each other and each one performs an important task for the entire group on the ship. Furthermore, the idea is present that “if the ship sinks, all crew members are equal on the rafts” [53].


The Importance of Leadership

Historian Craig Cameron in his book on the combat readiness of the US 1st Marine Division observes that “Marines almost universally attribute their achievements primarily to their extraordinary leadership at the small unit level.” Argentine infants were no exception to this observation [54].



When remembering his experience in the Malvinas, Commander Alberto Baffico points to the quality of leadership of the officers and non-commissioned officers as the key to the success of the Infantes. According to him, leadership is exercised both by presence and by example. The Navy in general emphasizes personnel leadership in both practical and theoretical terms [55].

In contrast to some accounts in which it is stated that Argentine officers abandoned their men at the front, Baffico maintains that the Infantes “were not alone in their positions.” Indeed, “there was a constant presence of the commanding officers.” Furthermore, “in the Navy it is important to be a natural leader and not merely an institutional one.” [56] Rear Admiral (IM) (ret.) Carlos Büsser pointed out that the good performance of the Marine Infantry units was due to the fact that

The officers and non-commissioned officers were always very close to the troops they led, in very direct contact with the different situations posed by modern combat and therefore, in a position to adopt resolutions quickly and safely. [57] 
In short, driving is “knowing how to give an order in such a way that it can be carried out.” [58]

In relation to the role of the leader, some interviewees mentioned that Navy officers are always taught to be concerned for the well-being of their subordinates. Their “concern for staff is real, not merely formal or simply stated” [59].

Furthermore, for infantrymen, “the man and his personal weapon are the most important weapon system” [60].

Discipline

As in any military institution, the Navy and Marine Corps emphasize the value of discipline. In this regard, Vice Admiral (IM) (ret.) Julio Bardi and Captain (IM) Enrique Olmedo agreed in describing the Argentine Infantry as a highly disciplined force. Both stressed that within the force discipline is both formal and fundamental. Infants tend to emphasize formal discipline because they are more rigid and because “they manifest fundamental discipline by adhering to the principles of formal discipline” [61]. Within the Navy, Infantrymen are recognized for their personal care and military manners [62]. According to one officer, “the infantrymen need their formal discipline as a complement to their combat training” [63].


The importance of the initiative

According to those interviewed, the Infantes respect the independent decision-making criteria. That is, they emphasize inventiveness, self-confidence, and the ability to carry out independent action. In this case, “the ability to act on one's own initiative is most marked in the Marine Corps” [64]. The author of this article vividly remembers his time at CIFIM in City Bell as a newly recruited conscript. During the training the non-commissioned officers always repeated: “the soldier thinks and executes!” [65] This contrasted with what his high school friends who were serving in the Army at the same time told him. They were not instructed under the slogan: “the soldier thinks, he executes!” This simple exercise highlights an important aspect of the culture of an organization where even its lower-ranking elements were instilled in the idea of “thinking.” This can be very useful for exercising initiative in the event that men lose the superiors who normally give orders.

The importance of planning

According to CN Olmedo, Infantry officers are educated in such a way that they develop a characteristic capacity for planning. For this reason, Infants are typically assigned planning tasks [66]. This tendency can be illustrated with an anecdote that exists in the Corps. During the Malvinas War, the General Staff of the Marine Corps Command, once it had planned and executed the mobilization and support operations of its troops on the islands and on the continent, was ordered to prepare numerous schematic plans. These very general plans were intended to cover a wide spectrum of contingencies. The demand to carefully plan every conceivable situation was so great that staff began using the unofficial acronym “PAPs” for these plans [67].



The value of tenacity

Tenacity is another of the values indicated by the officers interviewed. According to Captain (IM) (ret.) Jorge Errecaborde “tenacity is valued by the Marines.” Furthermore, it can be said that infants are different not because they are “more intelligent, but because they are more tenacious.” Infants are taught that they should do what they say they are going to do [68]. In this case, stated CN Olmedo, “the idea of fulfilling the mission is such that it must be very difficult to find a justification for not having fulfilled it” [69]. In the Marine Corps, training aims to teach recruits how to “overcome obstacles by creating the means to do so” [70]. A maxim characteristic among its members is: “overcoming shortcomings with ingenuity and sacrifice” [71].

Foresight: logistics culture

One of the advantages of the Navy most often commented on is that in the Malvinas it had “excellent logistical support.” CLIM (ret.) Büsser explains that the Navy had supplied the Marines stationed on the islands with food, fuel, medicine, spare parts and enough clothing for 180 days. The naval command also sent sufficient ammunition to sustain continuous combat for 30 days [72].
The reasons for such foresight derive from an important idea in the Navy. The concept of “ship” which means that to operate successfully the unit must be self-sufficient and, therefore, everything necessary to remain operational must be carried on board [73]. Consequently, due to these requirements, the Navy has developed a profound characteristic “idea of foresight”.




Learning capacity

With respect to preparation, the Navy as an organization showed a remarkable ability to learn from past experiences. In effect, the naval commanders took advantage of the military preparations of 1978 in anticipation of an armed clash with Chile over the Beagle Channel dispute. This experience allowed the Navy to adjust its equipment and obtain the necessary supplies to carry out a campaign in regions with harsh climates such as the Malvinas [74]. The North American naval specialist Robert Scheina agrees in commenting that “one of the lessons that the Argentine fleet learned during the tensions was its need for greater logistical capacity” [75]. Later, during the Malvinas experience, the logistical changes introduced after the 1978 mobilization worked adequately.

Conclusions 

Once the Malvinas War was over, different commentators highlighted the notable performance of the Argentine Marine Infantry units deployed in the Islands. The reasons for such performance, according to them, were the high degree of cohesion, the availability of a balanced supply of weapons and equipment, and the ability to prepare defensive positions. A more comprehensive analysis allows us to observe the presence of other characteristics that also contributed to the force carrying out outstanding work. These factors are: geographical location, concentration of resources, size, own logistical support and the conscript incorporation system. All these elements that we call structural are easily observable and facilitate the presence of the next level of factors, the organizational culture. At the same time, the mere presence of these factors does not guarantee outstanding performance but is supported by the notion of “professionalism.” Therefore, only when the factors are considered together do they help explain the behavior of the IMARA in combat. Thus, this research adds a rarely discussed dimension. It, more subtle and less visible, is present throughout the Navy's educational system and helps shape the spirit of the organization. In the case of IMARA, the organizational culture dimension includes the following elements: integration, leadership, discipline, initiative, planning, tenacity, foresight, and learning capacity.

It could be argued that these elements are common to the cultures of all military organizations and that this research is therefore superfluous. However, the Infantrymen as members of the Navy share these basic values and beliefs that were tested in combat and demonstrated notable performance during the campaign. Consequently, these values and beliefs can be considered valid components of the IMARA culture. This work does not mean to affirm that only the Marine Corps had outstanding behavior, as already noted, other Army units also had it. However, other research by the author seems to suggest that this behavior depended more on individuals, both officers and soldiers, than on the organization as a whole. [76]

This research also shows that as new troops joined, the Marine Corps was successful in instilling a “Marine pride” that appears to be a nearly universal trait of Marine forces around the world. According to an Argentine Infantryman “the Marines are the best troops that have ever existed in the history of our country and to this day” [77]. These words written in present times are similar to others written years earlier by a young United States Marine: “the spirit of the Marine Corps that I cannot explain (you feel it in your body and act according to it) is the reason why which ours is the largest combat organization in the world” [78]. Perhaps this last phrase is the one that best encapsulates the idea of organizational culture and the role it plays.

Finally, a Navy publication published shortly before the Malvinas conflict characterized the BIM 5 as a particularly cohesive unit, capable of “obtaining superlative achievements.” According to it, the causes that explain this condition are isolation, the geographical insularity of Río Grande, and the adverse conditions that prevail in the area. More importantly, the publication noted the presence of a special spirit that provides a “single and inflexible will... that drags and compels its men to give their best” [79]. This work is a first attempt to find an explanation for that spirit.




References 

[1] This is an improved version of the work presented at the XIVth Naval History Symposium, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, September 23-25, 1999. The author thanks Rear Admiral (ret.) Guillermo Delamer for his comments and the support provided during the research for the same, and Captain (ret.) Guillermo Montenegro for for their valuable comments and to the officers interviewed for having generously shared their experiences with the author. (New York: Brasseys,
[2] Nora Kinzer Stewart, Mates & Boys. Unit Cohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas War 1991). pp. 127-128.
[3] In addition to BIM 5, Stewart identifies as Argentine units that fought with distinction the 25th Infantry Regiment, the 601st and 602nd Commando Companies, the 7th Infantry Regiment and the 3rd Artillery Group. p. 108.
[4] See, for example, Martin Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas. The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War (London: Penguin Books, 1990) pp. 47-48; F. R. Aguiar et. al., Land Operations in the Malvinas Islands (Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar, 1985) pp. 33-34, 60-61, 103; and Carlos Augusto Landaburu, The Malvinas War (Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar, 1988) pp. 133.
[5] Disembarkation Separata No. 16 (1996), 14-15. CLIM (ret.) Carlos Büsser also mentions geographical proximity as one of the reasons that led to the decision to send BIM 5 to the islands (Emilio Villarino, Battalion 5. The Marine Infantry Battalion No. 5 in the Malvinas War (Buenos Aires: Aller Atucha, 1992), p. 9. The BIM 5 is the school unit specialized in cold areas, low mountain terrain and combat in the southern mountains. The VLIM (ret.) Julio Juan Bardi explained in a personal interview with the author that the fact that BIM 5 was prepared and ready was the product of the Navy's strategic vision. This highlighted the battalion in a maritime area (Personal interview, Buenos Aires, 10-08- 99).Vice Admiral Julio Juan Bardi was commander of the Marine Corps during the 70s.
[6] Battalion 5, 58. From the Front. Marine Infantry Battalion; Carlos H. Robacio and Jorge Hernández, Villarino, Battalion N° 5 (Buenos Aires: Solaris, 1996) pp. 250 and 258. On April 28, the Malvinas Military Garrison was organized into two sub commands, the Litoral Army Group and the Puerto Argentino Army Group. BIM 5 came under the command of the latter.
[7] Disembarkation, Separatas No. 10 (s/f), 14 (1995), No. 15 (1995), and No. 20 (1997).
[8] On the South Georgia Islands there was also a small detachment of Marines (70 men) (Landing). According to the Official Report of the Argentine Army No. 160, March 1997, pp. 41-42 the number of force personnel in the Malvinas reached 10,001 (t. 2, Annex 21) ().
[9] Villarino, pp. 64-65; Robacio and Hernández, Battalion 5, pp. 72, 118, 189.
[10] Ibid. 123; ibid. 19; Disembarkation from the Front, Separata No. 16 (1996), 20.
[11] The British first attacked Longdon, Two Sisters, and Harriet Mountains during the night of the 11th and 12th. On the night of the 13th and 14th they attacked Tumbledown, Williams, and Wireless Ridge Mountains.
[12] Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (New York: W. W. Norton, 1983) pp. 301-303.
[13] Ibid. 303. According to Middlebrook, “the Argentinians lost Tumbledown after a determined and prolonged resistance that upset the English schedule (The Fight for the Malvinas, 262).
[14] Paul Eddy et al., The Falklands War, 253; Martin Middlebrook, Task Force. The Falklands War, 1982 (London: Penguin Books, Rev. ed. 1987) p. 366; Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle..., 303.
[15]Harry G. Summers Jr., “Yomping to Port Stantley,” Military Review LXIV (3) March 1984, p. 14.
[16] Stewart, Mates & Boys, p. 104.
[17] N. Vaux, March to the South Atlantic: 42 Commando Royal Marines in the Falklands War (London: Buchan and Enright, 1986) p. 206-07 cited in ibid. p. 105; Villarino, Battalion 5, p. 201. As a sign of recognition the British allowed the Infantrymen to keep their personal weapons for a short time.
[18] Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, pp. 254-55.
[19] Eugenio Dalton and Martin Balza, “The Battle of Puerto Argentino” in Land Operations in the Malvinas Islands (Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar), p. 203.
[20] Rattenbach Commission, Rattenbach Report. The Drama of Malvinas (Buenos Aires: Espartaco, 1988), p. 236.
[21] However, an IMARA officer present during the conflict told the author that the unit was not able to operate at one hundred percent of its capacity due to the extreme fatigue of his men due to lack of sleep due to the intense bombing. They were subdued for many days. This observation seems to be supported by the statement of a British intelligence officer: “The Marines coped well with the hostile conditions. However, rain, rest and recovery were rare” (Nicholas van der Bijl: Nine Battles to Stantley, Leo Cooper: 1999. p. 189). For an evaluation of the performance of the other IMARA units see Horacio A. Mayorga, No Expired. Accounts of naval operations in the South Atlantic conflict (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1998), pp. 458-462, 463-471, 495, 501-02, and Desembarco Separatas Nos. 10 (sf), 14 (1995), 15 (1995), 16 (1996), 20 (1997).
[22] John G. Fowler, Jr.: “Combat Cohesion in Vietnam,” Military Review, December 1979, p. 26. On the topic specifically referring to the Malvinas conflict, see Stewart, Mates & Muchachos... op. cit.
[23] Martin van Creveld: Fighting Power. German and U.S. Army performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 1982) p. 4. See also Omer Bartov: Hitler's Army. Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 1992) and Stephen Fritz: Frontsoldaten. The German Soldier in the World War II (Lexington, Ky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1995).
[24] Allan Millett and Williamson Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness Vol. I, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 19. Another similar definition may be that of “combat power,” which according to military historian Martín van Creveld is “the sum of all the mental qualities that make an army fight.” (Fighting Power. German and U.S. Army performance, 1939-1945. p. 3)
[25] Jeremy Black: “Military Organization and Military Change in Historical Perspective.” Journal of Military History 62 (4) October 1998, p. 884.
[26] According to North American historian Elisabeth Kier, “military organizations develop strong cultures due to their long-term membership and powerful assimilation mechanisms.” (Imagining War. French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 28).
[27] Steven J. Ott, The Organizational Culture Perspective, (Pacific Grove, Ca.: Brooks/Cole, 1989) p. fifty.
[28] Kier, Imagining War, p. 28.
[29] Henry Mintzberg: “The structuring of organizations” p. 372.
[30] According to Schein, organizational culture is, among other things, a pattern of basic assumptions that “have worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be transmitted to new members as the correct way of perceive, think, and feel in relation to problems.” (Edgard H. Schein, 25 (2) 1984, p. 3). “Coming to a New Awareness of Organizational Culture”, Sloan Management Review
[31] Kier, Imagining War, p. 31.
[32] See Harrison Trice and Janice Beyer: The Cultures of Work Organizations, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993. pp. 8-10.
[33] Craig M. Cameron, American Samurai. Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division, 1941-1951 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 196.
[34] This ability is more notable given that the Marine Corps' primary mission is to attack positions and not the static defense of the front.
[35] Personal interview with Captain IM (ret.) Jorge Errecaborde (07-21-1999). Captain Errecaborde collaborated with the Commission for Analysis of Combat Actions in the Malvinas Conflict, and since 1987 he has been Head of the Malvinas Office of the Marine Corps Command.
[36] Interview with Errecaborde (07-21-1999) and with a high-ranking officer who requested to remain anonymous (07-17-1999). Geographic isolation also helps to explain the traditional predisposition of BIM 5 to training and professional development (Jorge A. Errecaborde, Anecdotario de la Infantería de Marina de la Armada Argentina Buenos Aires: Instituto de Publicaciones Navales, 1997. p. 179).
[37] Argentine Navy, Marine Infantry. Three Centuries of History and One Hundred Years of Organic Life. 1879-November 19-1979, Buenos Aires, 1979. p. 122.
[38] Ibid. p. 134.

[39] Interview with Errecaborde (07-21-1999). See also Errecaborde, “Reflections”, 32 (5); personal interviews with Bardi (08-10-1999) and Baffico (08-20-1999).
[40] Errecaborde, “Reflections”, 42-42. At the same time, the Army had a total of 125,000 troops (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, IISS, Military Balance, 1982-1983, London, 1983, p. 99)
[41] Interview with Errecaborde (07-21-1999). See also Errecaborde, “Reflections”, pp. 37-38 (6. Logistics).
[42] Interview with Baffico (08-20-1999).
[43] Robacio and Hernández, From the Front, p. 14; Villarino, Battalion 5, p. twenty-one.
[44] Interview with Bardi (08-10-1999).
[45] See above commentary on the Rattenbach Report. In a recently published book, General Martín Balza, who commanded Artillery Group 3 deployed during the conflict on the islands, points out the following: “the English say that in Tumbledown they faced an elite Marine Infantry Battalion. I attest to his professionalism”, Buenos Aires: Editorial Atlántica, 2003, p. 175)(Malvinas. Deed and incompetence
[46] Interview with Olmedo (07-20-1999).
[47] The contrast with the Army is stark. The Arms within it remained strongly separated and a very competitive spirit was created among its members, it can be described as “tribal”. In those years, Army cadets took classes in separate classrooms according to the Arm to which they belonged (infantry, cavalry, artillery, communications, engineers and quartermasters). Each one had its block separate from the others. Once graduated, the young second lieutenants were assigned to the units of their specialization and then to the Arms' own schools.
[48] According to Olmedo, “Brigade-wide exercises begin every October...This is a system operating as a whole. In this way, the Brigade is accustomed to operating together in long campaigns” (Interview 07-20-1999).
[49] Interview with Errecaborde (07-21-1999).
[50] To achieve such a degree of efficiency “you need to be highly trained” (ibid.. See also Jorge Errecaborde, “Reflections 15 years after the feat,” Desembarco XLI No. 160, 1997, p. 36). The account of the operations of the Marine Corps artillery is found in Desembarco, Separatas N° 16 (1996) 58-66 and N°, 124-25.
[51] Errecaborde, Anecdotario, 84-85; Mayorga, Not Expired, 463-471. 17 (1996), pp. 162-64; Villarino, Battalion 5
[52] Interviews with Olmedo (07-20-1999); Bardi (08-10-1999) and Baffico (08-20-1999). CF Baffico commented that “in the Navy we continually work with other arms, there was integration, especially with naval aviation.”
[53] Interview with a naval officer who asked to remain anonymous (Buenos Aires, 07-17-1999).
[54] Cameron, The American Samurai, pp. 222-23.
[55] Personal interview with Baffico (08-20-1999).
[56] idem. This statement contrasts with that of British journalists Hasting and Jenkins who maintain that when the war ended “many Argentine soldiers were bitterly critical of the lack of leadership shown by their officers on the battlefield...many officers withdrew from their positions. at the front as soon as the battle began" and cite the opinion of an Argentine stretcher-bearer conscript who stated that "when the soldiers found themselves alone, in the middle of the night, in total darkness, and sought the support of their superiors they did not “They were able to find them.” (The Battle for the Malvinas, pp. 296).

[57] Büsser in Villarino, Battalion 5, p. 16.
[58] Interview with Errecaborde (07-21-1999).
[59] Interview with Olmedo (07-20-1999).
[60] Interview with Errecaborde (07-21-1999).
[61] Interview with Bardi (08-10-1999) and Olmedo (07-20-1999). This can be summarized in the phrase “short hair and a flat belly” (Errecaborde, Anecdotario, p. 168).
[62] Errecaborde, Anecdotario, p. 168.
[63] Ibid. p. 127.
[64] Olmedo (07-20-1999). Some anecdotes about the inventiveness of the Infantes during their training are told in the Anecdotario, pp. 29-30, 38-.39 and, 40-41.
[65] CIFIM: Marine Corps Instruction and Training Center. The center was located in City Bell, Province of Buenos Aires.
[66] Interview with Olmedo (07-20-1999).
[67] Errecaborde, Anecdotario, pp. 187-188. In the comments to this work, CN (ret.) Guillermo Montenegro confirmed that the Infantes are recognized as “fanatics” in terms of their attachment to planning in general (XIVth Naval History Symposium, Annapolis, United States, 09-14- 1999).
[68] Interview with Errecaborde (07-21-1999).
[69] Interview with Olmedo (07-20-1999).
[70] Interview with Bardi (08-10-1999).
[71] Errecaborde, Anecdotario, p. 41.
[72] Büsser in Villarino, Battalion 5, p. fifteen.
[73] Interviews with Olmedo (07-20-1999) and Bardi (08-10-1999).
[74] Interviews with Olmedo (07-20-1999) and Baffico (08-20-1999), and interview with Vice Admiral Máximo E. Rivero Kelly, Naval Center Bulletin N° 752/753, Buenos Aires, 1987, p. 100.
[75] Robert L. Scheina, Iberoamerica. A Naval History, 1810-1987 (Madrid: Ed. San Martin, s.f.) p. 200.
[76] Alejandro L. Corbacho: “Reassessing Fighting Performance of Conscripts Soldiers during the Malvinas/Falklands War (1982)” Paper presented at the Annual Congress for the Society for Military History 1998 Lisle Hilton, Lisle, IL. United States, April 24-26, 1998.
[77] Captain of the Frigate (IM) Jorge Saénz in Errecaborde, Anecdotario, p. 132.
[78] Letter to his parents from Second Lieutenant Richard C. Kennard (USMC), cited by Cameron, American Samurai, p. 156.
[79] Argentine Navy, Marine Infantry, pp. 133-134.

Thursday, November 2, 2023

Malvinas: ARA San Luis against the Royal Navy

One Against All Odds


 

The secret history of the ARA San Luis submarine in Argentina in the Malvinas War

Jorge R. Bóveda 



The ARA San Luis was one of two submarine units sent in early April 1982 and the only one to face the powerful British task force face to face. Its modern technology and sophisticated sensors predicted that in the short term, losses would be terrible for the enemy. Inexplicably, after 74 days of fighting, no British ship was sunk by an Argentine torpedo. This document aims, based on the testimonies of the protagonists, to shed light on the dramatic 39 days of patrol, in which the ARA San Luis disputed (unsuccessfully) the naval supremacy of the Royal Navy in the South Atlantic.

Therefore, the testimony of an unprecedented battle between "David and Goliath", which projected beyond the conflict, provides valuable conclusions that can be drawn for the future of Argentine submarine weapons.
The brave performance of the ARA "San Luis" in extreme adversity, against an enemy many times superior in quantity and quality of anti-submarine means, demonstrates the high quality of the crew. San Luis's incredible ability to overcome such adverse circumstances is part of the most deeply rooted traditions of the Argentine Navy and, without a doubt, will be an example for new generations of submariners.


Since his retirement from active duty in 1995, the former commander of the ARA San Luis, Captain (RE) Fernando María Azcueta, has cultivated a low profile and the thorny issue of the conflict in the South Atlantic is rarely addressed outside his circle. of friends.

A few years ago, Azcueta rejected a tempting offer to put to paper his war experiences and the many interviews he gave. Since then, the subject was never addressed with all the details that are revealed in the following story, which shows for the first time, some dramatic situations of the 39 days of patrol, in which naval supremacy plays with the Royal Navy in the Atlantic South


Lightning preparation

When frigate captain D. Fernando María Azcueta, son of a prominent diver, took command at the end of December 1981, the modern 209 class submarine ARA San Luis, the hands of frigate captain D. Miguel C. Miguel C. Really, I couldn't even imagine that in just over three months, a war will be waged against the third naval power in the world.

And even less could he have foreseen the serious operational limitations that his unit suffered, and this could seriously compromise his effectiveness as a combat unit.

In mid-March 1982, while Azcueta and his men were exercising with the A-69 corvettes ARA Drummond and ARA Granville, on the coast of Mar del Plata, he received the order to stop the commission and return to port, but without receive no explanation for this unusual purpose.

Shortly after, he highlighted that the ARA Santa Fe was being prepared at the Naval Base, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Horacio Blicaini, but he did not receive any information that could alleviate the tremendous uncertainty that existed.
Only on the morning of April 2, Argentina's landing in the Malvinas was revealed to the public on radio and television throughout the country.

However, Azcueta had to wait another 24 hours to be received by COFUERSUB (captain Eulogio Latrubesse Moya), who gave the order, "Prepare in the shortest possible time to suspend (set sail)." From that moment he began a frantic race against time to see how the crew embarked with the best possible operating conditions.

 
In the image above you can see the San Luis at its base, with the aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo appearing in the background

The problems before departing

During sea trials carried out in the waters near the submarine base, the first of a series of problems was discovered when it was discovered that the San Luis could not develop a diving speed of more than 14.5 knots.

Closer inspection revealed that not only was the ship's hull and propeller covered with incrustations of small crustaceans known as "limpets" or "dog teeth," but the diesel cooling pipes were as well. This caused the engines to stop due to overheating, due to the lack of cooling water flow.

As there was no time to put the ship in dry dock to clean the hull - given the urgency of the departure - Azcueta had to turn to students from the nearby diving school, using shallow respirators as a "hookah" and do the scraping the hull "by hand" in rotating shifts of eight hours of continuous work, "to rid the hull of pests."

One of the causes of the problem originated in 1974 with the construction of the "wall" that separates the submarine dock from the civil dock in Mar del Plata.

This was built to prevent the new 209 class submarine from crashing into the dock in periods of rough seas, remaining tied up, a bad experience that had been experienced with the old "Fleet" type submersible and the veteran "Guppy", but that thanks to its design, the port had been "reconsidered", which allowed the detention of the ship.

Although laudable, the construction of a wall caused ecological changes with the lack of seawater circulation, which favored the formation of large colonies of barnacles, which had since settled in submarines docked at the dock.

On the San Luis, of the four diesel engines, only three were working, increasing the time to recharge the batteries and the exposure of the snorkel, making her extremely vulnerable to enemy search radar emissions.

The No. 1 engine had failed in early 1974, shortly after joining the Submarine Force. To repair it, it was necessary to cut the strong hull, a technology that the Argentine Navy did not have at the time.

TF Somonte, head of the ship's main propulsion, together with the Army Material Directorate and Tandanor, had managed to "free" the engine, using it until the end of 1978, when they decided to keep it out of service for safety reasons.

To make matters worse, neither the commander nor the submarine's chief weapons officer had had access to a report in mid-December 1981, which detailed the outcome of torpedo launches by the "Skip" class submarines during the period covered. between August and December of that same year, with special emphasis on the development of the exercise with the SST-4 torpedo.

The report showed that of all the launches made during this period, only once had the torpedo completed the run as planned.

A surprising percentage of launches were irregular, as a result of various factors (e.g. alteration in cable orientation, flooding of the torpedo, breakage of the strap, etc.), no one could identify the causes that led to the weapon's malfunction. .

The report in question had been released by the office of the Commander of the Sea Fleet, on which the Submarine Force depended, having failed to reverse the situation. As we will see later, the real causes of the problem would only come to light after the conflict.

Despite these serious limitations, Azcueta was heavily pressured by the political/military context in which he lived; he reported that he was able to put to sea on April 11.

The submarine sailed through the night, its small rooms stocked with food and water for a protracted war patrol, with 10 German-made SST-4 anti-surface torpedoes and 14 American MK-37 Mod. 3 anti-submarine torpedoes.

His rules of engagement prohibited him, until that moment, from any confrontation with enemy units, since it was believed that it was an offensive action that would jeopardize the negotiations that were taking place in the United Nations.

The transit to the area of operations in the Malvinas was used to carry out some minor repairs and continue with the training of personnel in the use of passive sonar, on which the survival of the submarines would depend from now on, having the latter to operate within a maritime zone completely controlled by the enemy.

On April 17, ARA San Luis arrived safely in its "fixed sanctuary" or holding area, designated with the code name "Enriqueta."

PART II: "At a disadvantage from the beginning"


Poder Naval