AA: Prospective of Argentine Armored and Mechanized Forces

The prospective role of our armored and mechanized forces

Lieutenant Colonel Guillermo Horacio Eduardo Lafferriere.


The Persian Gulf conflict of 2003, as well as the ongoing actions of allied forces in Iraq up to the time of this writing, provide valuable insights into how we should envision employing our armored and mechanized troops (referred to as TBM) in future combat operations. This necessitates a comprehensive analysis that draws from recent conflict experiences and involves the formulation of scenarios wherein our TBM units could be effectively utilized. Crucially, this analysis must be conducted with complete impartiality to ensure that our insights contribute meaningfully to the overall effectiveness of our armed forces, rather than merely reinforcing pre-existing institutional beliefs.



Allow us to provide a brief observation that will lay the foundation for our forthcoming discussion on the operational role of TBM (armored and mechanized troops). The events during the Iraq operations in 2003 once again underscored a recurring phenomenon in conflicts since World War II. It has become increasingly evident that on today's modern battlefield, the utilization of large-scale airborne forces for combat operations with a reasonable chance of success is no longer feasible. For instance, in Iraq, we witnessed the deployment of a military force comprising nearly a thousand personnel in the northern region. However, this deployment starkly contrasted with the massive actions undertaken by the Allies in North Africa and Western Europe during World War II[1]. The primary reason behind this shift is the vulnerability of airborne forces to enemy aircraft and missile threats when attempting the type of operations that were once commonplace in earlier conflicts.

This shift doesn't negate the necessity of having infantry units capable of penetrating deep into enemy territory; it merely necessitates a change in the approach to achieve this objective. What we aim to convey here is that the landscape has evolved for TBMs, requiring them to reevaluate their doctrine to ensure efficient operations in future combat scenarios.

How do we traditionally see the use of TBMs?

We believe that in the environment of TBMs, the use of them continues to be glimpsed, in a similar way to what was put into practice in the Second World War in different German and allied campaigns; Israel Defense Force operations carried out in Sinai in their various campaigns from independence to 1973; or what the allies did in Kuwait and Iraq in 1991 and recently in Iraq at the beginning of the campaign. This image, so deeply rooted, sometimes seems not to adequately perceive the changes that were taking place even in the aforementioned conflicts, and it seems that all that remains is the somewhat romantic idea of masses of TBMs, moving at high speed, over flat and uncovered terrain. , in the direction of a vulnerable point of the enemy.

This idea, unfortunately, has suffered the same attack as the massive airborne operations. It is not viable to even be conceived if the enemy we must face has a minimum and sufficient command of the air, so that its vectors can severely affect the huge target that the TBMs make up, both in their concentration places and in displacements. towards your goals. When we look closely at history, we clearly perceive that Israel and the allies in the two versions of the Gulf War acted with masses of TBMs, with total impunity, since they were able to suppress the enemy air threat[2]. With absolute honesty, we can mention that it is at least very risky to think that in the event of a conflict, we will be able to count on the necessary aptitude to achieve control of the air even similar to the one that served as the framework for the operations that we previously referred to[ 3]. Of course, those who work at TBM are fully aware of this problem, however, we believe that we have not made an effort to find ways to move positively in this regard.

On the other hand, we continue to have certain precautions regarding the use of TBMs in terrains that are not those that are naturally best suited to their abilities. Thus, we continue to refuse urban combat[4], despite the fact that it offers TBMs a propitious field for the exploitation of many of the skills they possess, as has also been demonstrated by the Israelis in Ramallah and the allies in Iraq. . All of this, we consider, makes us lose the enormous potential of our TBMs, which is shaped in the first place by decades of experience in the training of personnel and in the maintenance and use of the means.

The predominantly urban nature of the future battlefield

The world population tends to live more and more in urban conglomerates, which means that armies must prepare for the inevitability of having to fight in them[5]. Traditionally, the doctrine tries to avoid urban combat, and recommends going around large population centers, in order to keep TBMs out of them, and thus take advantage of empty spaces, where maneuvering skills can be exploited to the maximum. . This doctrine is not consistent with the reality of these times, since the impossibility that certain enemies have of fighting in open terrain against regular forces, makes them resort to the concept of "asymmetric warfare" as a procedure for the development of its operations[6]. The urban terrain, due to its compartmentalization, presents greater possibilities for a force to remain on the defensive for extremely long periods, with the capacity to inflict significant damage on the attackers. The TBM have been used marginally up to now in this environment, since it is thought that the constricted spaces make them easily targets for actions where anti-tank ambush procedures are carried out. To reinforce this belief, the Russian experience in Grozny seems to be a kind of reminder of the serious dangers that operating in urban environments entails for a TBM force. The Russians lost hundreds of armored vehicles in urban operations in the Chechen capital, but the cause was probably the use of them in an unintelligent way, while the Russian fire support agencies were destroying the city, and therefore Of course, they created dozens of new sectors for the Chechens to more appropriately combat the Russian TBN.

This example has been conveniently analyzed in the armies of the West, and credit must be given to the Israel Defense Forces, which in its operations in Palestinian urban territory, make continuous use of TBM elements, even using military vehicles. infantry combat in prototype stage. Likewise, the allies in Iraq, in 2003 and currently, make intense use of TBM in their urban operations, both in those that were carried out against regular troops and today that operate mainly against irregulars. What did they find in the TBMs? They found in them an immense ability to carry out urban combat with some protection against the enemy, while having a vast menu of variants that TBMs offer for urban combat. Likewise, they applied the old concept of more or less transitory groupings of armored and mechanized troops that for many years governed our doctrine for combat in open terrain, but brought to the compartmentalized conditions of urban combat. Let's move on in this regard. If a fraction of mechanized infantry troops is given the mission of fighting in urban terrain, they will surely use their dismounted troops, advancing ahead of the infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). This disembarked troop will be able to apply combat techniques in localities that are characteristic of any infantry, and would have the IFV that advance further back as direct fire support, to face a strong point that must be eliminated. However, that mechanized fraction will lack the heavier firepower in case of facing a threat that is protected against the action of the IFV's main weapon. That fire, traditionally, was provided by heavy infantry weapons or field artillery. This type of fire is counterproductive, since as we mentioned in the case of the Russians in Grozny, what happens in practice is that they end up working to improve the enemy's defense possibilities, since the margin of error of the projectiles, added to the link problems that forward observers normally have in a compartmentalized terrain, are the cause that favors the reinforcement of the enemy, as well as contributing to further compartmentalize the terrain that the city presents. Faced with this panorama, armored troops are added to the mechanized infantry fraction, which, marching as close as possible to the troops on foot, provides them with the necessary direct and precise support fire; without creating insurmountable restrictions on traffic through the town[7]. The combination of armored troops towards mechanized ones in urban combat, reverts, when in certain urbanizations, there are open spaces of relative importance, which mainly favor the use of armored vehicles. In this case, it is the mechanized troops that are added to the armored factions, so that the latter have the possibility of fighting anti-tank elements that could hinder the combat of the armored vehicles. It is worth asking ourselves, what level of integration can occur? We believe that it should in no way be restricted to those established by our doctrine, which are Task Forces or Combat Teams, since there will be situations where integration must be achieved at the section level. In this way, a IFV can be added to four dams, or a IFV to four tanks; Without this, more balanced groupings can be formed, which will depend on the circumstances, level of prior instruction achieved, and so on.

Obviously, the TBMs that we currently have present a design that is appropriate for combat in open terrain, and we can hardly expect to have in the foreseeable future TBMs mounted on combat vehicles that present a design specifically conceived for this very difficult environment. complex. However, we believe that even today, it would be important that in the event of fighting in urban areas, at least the following provisions could be made available:

• Armored Troops: The ammunition of the main weapon should be mostly of the explosive type, although each tank would have to have specific ammunition to beat tanks, since it can meet enemy armored vehicles, incapable of fighting on the move, but located in specific locations as a strong point. It will be important for the tower machine gun to have a relevant number of tracing and piercing ammunition, so as to allow the tank to beat anti-tank weapon positions, at least while the mechanized infantry troops are in position to attack the enemy emplacement. The external telephone of the tanks must be in very good working conditions, since very high frequency communications will have a significant tendency to be hampered by the compartmentalization of the land. The phone will facilitate fire support in difficult circumstances, but highly likely to happen.
• Mechanized Troops: They must have a reinforced amount of ammunition for anti-tank weapons, not so much for their use in this role, but to attack enemy strong points and to open passages in buildings, which allow groups of shooters the possibility of to "wrap" in the urban terrain. Likewise, explosive charges must be available to complement the use of anti-tank weapons. On the other hand, elements such as ropes, small ladders, paint and brushes will be useful when it comes to overcoming obstacles, as well as to identify buildings cleaned by the troop itself. The ammunition of the main weapon of the VCI must have a greater preponderance of the perforating type, and applies to external machine guns, a criterion that is the same as that expressed for the same type of tank weapons.

It is here that we make a brief comment on the night combat of TBMs in urban terrain. In principle, we believe that it should be avoided, since although we can count on different types of visors, the particularities of the urban terrain do not allow us to trust that the aforementioned devices can be useful in the development of an advance. Rather, we believe that acts of fratricide could very easily take place, as well as there would be a significant margin for high collateral damage to occur in the actions. The night should serve to establish a security perimeter for the TBM, which would take advantage of these circumstances to resupply, maintain the vehicles and rest. However, particular situations may impose combat in this type of conditions, and in this regard, the exercises carried out at the section level in the Infantry School in 2002 seem to indicate that with difficulties and with the use of precise coordination measures it is feasible. fight at night in urban terrain. Basically, the weight of the action would be carried by the landed mechanized infantry troops, with the armored vehicles advancing relatively closer than during the day, so that their fire can be more precise. The disembarked troop must be divided into two. One of them dedicated to the execution of the corresponding operation, and another, to the protection of the tanks. The latter must also serve as a guide in the execution of displacements, depending to a significant extent on radio communications and simple and precise light signals. We reiterate, the latter is not a recommended job, but it may be unavoidable.

Should we forget about combat in open terrain? No way. Between the cities there is land that must be conquered or defended, according to the type of operation in question, and there all the knowledge that our TBMs possess must be exploited. Fundamentally taking into account the serious threat that the different air vectors of the enemy pose for any more or less massive grouping of TBMs. What we have tried to promote in this work is the urgent need for TBMs to assimilate the idea that the battlefield is changing at a speed that even exceeds the technological development at our disposal. If we don't face the challenge that the changing operating environment presents, we run the risk of being tied down to doctrinal considerations that will in no way be useful in environments where combat may occur in the future. We have the knowledge and the ideal personnel to face urban combat in very good conditions, it only remains for us to think of it not as an eventuality in the course of a campaign, but rather as something routine; so that in this way we face the adjustments in the procedures that allow us to face this type of actions with a significant chance of being victorious.

[1] My I Alejandro AGOGLIA, a deep connoisseur of everything related to airborne operations, has published in the Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra (Nro 550, Pag 105), a very interesting work on the use of what is known as "Light Infantry".
[2] In the case of massive airborne assaults, it should be remembered that when they are carried out at low altitudes, transport planes are not a profitable target only for enemy aviation, but for troops on the ground, both artillery and artillery. anti-aircraft, such as those that can make use of portable AA missiles.
[3] In the Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra No. 538, Pag 99, we present a paper where we mention a scenario where our military instrument could operate.
[4] Lt. Lt. (US Army / Retired) Ralph Peters has written extensively on the subject of urban combat, as well as the characteristics of the combat field in the future. In this regard, it is recommended to consult his work in Parameters magazine (US Army War College) at the following address: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/a-index.htm.
[5] See the article “Urban warfare and urban warfighter of 2025”, written by R. Hahn II and B. Jezior in volume XXIX, No. 2, page 74 of PARAMETERS.
[6] In a work titled "The Asymmetric War of the XXI Century" (Published in the Army Magazine of Spain in No. 730), we have extensively expatiated on this
issue.
[7] In 2002, during the development of the Basic Weapons Course, exercises of Mechanized Shooters Section level groups were carried out in urban terrain, practicing offensive, defensive and even retrograde operations in the Infantry School. that environment; both day and night; obtaining important experiences.