Vuelta de Obligado: Argentine Captured Flags

Flags Captured at Vuelta de Obligado

Revisionistas


 
Flag returned by Admiral Sullivan in 1883. Currently in the National Historical Museum of Buenos Aires.

The first flag shown in this article is of merchant origin and belonged to one of the 24 coastal vessels or barges that, chained together, were anchored at Obligado to block the passage of the Anglo-French fleet. It is one of those banners that came in various sizes and bore different Federalist symbols, but they were not Argentine war flags.

It was captured by the forces of Admiral D.B.J. Sullivan after the battle on 20 November 1845 and returned in 1883 by the same admiral at the Argentine legation in London. It was received by the Argentine consul Alberto A. Guerrico, as a tribute to the bravery shown by Colonel Ramón Rodríguez, who led the 2nd Battalion of the Patricios Infantry Regiment at the Battle of Vuelta de Obligado.

Sullivan confused Colonel Rodríguez with the heroic Lieutenant Colonel Juan Bautista Thorne, who was in charge of the “Manuelita” battery and was the last to retreat from the battlefield, on 21 November.

According to the British admiral’s account, when the flag was lowered by the British, it fell upon the bodies of the fallen and was stained with patriotic blood.

It measures 4 metres in length by 2.5 metres in width, like all large naval flags. Due to its dimensions and the absence of the mandatory slogans from the Rosas era, it does not conform to the regulations for Federalist war flags. Therefore, it did not belong to any battalion and was not considered a trophy—although the French believe otherwise. They had four similar flags in the Hôtel des Invalides in Paris (now the Army Museum), registered under numbers 329 to 333 in the catalogue of the Musée de l’Armée by General Noix, page 164, under the title Drapeaux et Trophées, with an excerpt from a document: the Procès-verbal de réception de cinq drapeaux pris au combat d’Obligado dans le Paraná.

The battle report from Obligado by Captain Hotham, a subordinate officer under Sullivan, does not mention the capture of any flags. Nor is there any record from Lucio N. Mansilla of any ensign being lost.

The author Martiniano Leguizamón addressed this subject in two articles published in the newspaper La Nación. Evaristo Ramírez Juárez, for his part, drew accurate conclusions in his work Las banderas cautivas, where he includes photographs of the chapel of St. Louis in the Hôtel des Invalides, showing those very poorly preserved flags, taken in the 1930s. Lieutenant Colonel Ramírez Juárez wrote:

“1st – The flags said to have been taken at Obligado by the French and British were likely from merchant ships requisitioned by Mansilla, or from others of the same kind.

2nd – No combat flags were captured from the Argentine land or naval forces that fought at Vuelta de Obligado.”.

Flag hanging from the central nave of the Chapel of St. Louis, Paris, France

Moreover, the official report by French Admiral Trehouart refers to “…several Argentine flags taken from the batteries and the vessels that formed the barricade (ships holding the chains).”

The flag taken by the French at Obligado is composed of three horizontal stripes: the top and bottom ones are turquoise blue, and the middle stripe is white with a red punzó sun in the centre. The sun features a face surrounded by 32 rays. In each of the four corners are red Phrygian caps with pikes or spears, made of flannel, cut out and sewn onto the flag.

The flag is made of flannel, not silk as was customary for national or war flags. Along the hoist side, it has a braided cord forming loops at both ends. It is held at the National Historical Museum in the city of Buenos Aires, under file number 2568, folder 326. It was donated by the Municipal Government of the City of Buenos Aires on 18 April 1891, under the designation: “Flag taken by the British at the Battle of Obligado.”

One of the merchant flags that was in Paris (number 330) was returned by French President Jacques Chirac during his visit to our country in 1999 and was received by the Director of the National Historical Museum, Dr Juan José Cresto. It is now housed in that museum and, undoubtedly, beyond its vexillological interest, it holds significant historical value. It is identical to the one returned by Sullivan.

Two other Argentine merchant flags from Obligado (numbers 329 and 331) are believed to have been lost during the Second World War, either during the German occupation of Paris or due to deterioration. The Army Museum decommissioned them in 1957. The fate of flags numbered 332 and 333 is unknown; they measured 2.40 m by 1.35 m and bore no distinctive features.

At present, there is an Argentine flag—without sun, Phrygian caps in the corners, or inscriptions—hanging from the central nave of the Chapel of St. Louis. It appears to be new or restored. Of the two remaining Argentine flags mentioned above, and given that diplomatic enquiries made to the French Embassy in Buenos Aires have failed to clarify the matter, could it be one of the original merchant flags from 1845, now restored? We do not know.

Source

Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado
Leguizamón, Martiniano – Hombres y cosas que pasaron – Buenos Aires (1926)
Peña, J. M. y Alonso, J. L. – Las banderas de los argentinos – Aluar, Buenos Aires (2009)
Portal www.revisionistas.com.ar
Ramírez Juárez, Evaristo – La estupenda conquista – Buenos Aires (1946)
Turone, Oscar Alfredo – Las banderas de Obligado

Argentina: The Rise of the Peronist Guerrilla

Genesis and Evolution of the Revolutionary Process in Argentina

  

Preliminary Considerations

Several articles have been written about the genesis and evolution of the Revolutionary War in our country, and it would seem redundant to revisit them, given that they all generally mention the same sequence of causes and effects. However, it is never superfluous, as it will always be possible to incorporate new information into what is already known regarding dates, organizations, events, people involved, etc.

Some define the stages of the revolutionary process within the political timeframes of the governments that emerged from electoral processes or military coups; others analyze the process marked by the attitudes and events generated by subversive organizations, or by the outcome achieved by the regular forces that confronted them. Personally, I believe, as have several others, that the analysis to determine the stages should be based on those episodes or events that represent a change or a significant situation between what has occurred and its continuation with the new events that are unfolding. The work to be developed here aims to fall within this framework.


OUTLINE
1. Introduction
2. Origins of the Guerrilla Movement (1955-1965)
3. Creation and Development of the Revolutionary Armed Organizations (1965-1970)
-Revolutionary Workers' Party-People's Revolutionary Army (PRT-ERP)
-Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)
-Peronist Armed Forces (FAP)
-Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL)
-Montoneros (currently in government)
4. Evolution of the Revolutionary Process – Periods of the War
a. First period (1970 – May 1973)
b. Second period (May 25, 1973 – end of 1974)
c. Third period (1975-1978) d. Fourth period (1978-80).
e. Last period (1980-88).
f. Current situation.

Development

1. Introduction
The Argentine Republic was the theatre of a revolutionary war (RW) that began to take shape in 1956, showed its first signs of guerrilla activity in 1959, escalated in 1970, and reached its peak intensity between 1973 and 1976.

Signs of a military defeat could be seen before May 1973. However, political and legal circumstances turned the successes achieved—through the application of precise and specific justice—into failure, as the relevant legislation was repealed. Revolutionary activity then re-emerged with greater force. Despite this, its annihilation was completed by 1980. However, the military success was not matched politically, and developments in that sphere extended until 1988, persisting in distorted forms to this day.

The objective of this revolutionary process was to seize state power in order to impose a political, economic, and social system—and indeed an entire way of life—that was foreign to our traditions, alien in nature, and opposed to our national values. Fortunately, this ideology ultimately garnered support from only a small minority of the population. Amid a fratricidal conflict, Argentina was able to escape that situation, though to this day, true pacification has not been achieved.

This revolutionary process was not born in Argentina. It was imported, infiltrated, adopted, and developed in the context of a world shaken by ideological movements first proclaimed by Marx and Engels, and later expanded in the 20th century by Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, and other communist theorists who aimed to establish a proletarian world through unlimited violence, national liberation movements, and the unified action of communist countries. These aims constituted the true objectives of the global revolution of that time—a revolution from which Argentina could not escape, due to the actions of both domestic ideologues and others known as “useful idiots.” These actors formed various revolutionary organisations, which will be discussed later, and took part in waging the war on the internal front.

These organisations had complex and clandestine structures, based primarily on a political apparatus for leadership, propaganda, and indoctrination, and an armed-military apparatus responsible for overtly violent, terrorist, and revolutionary actions, forming a true irregular army.

In response to these realities, it became necessary to deploy the armed forces and security services to confront these political and military organisations—this being the only way to prevent them from seizing power, which they could not achieve through legal or democratic means due to their lack of representation.

This course of action was not aimed at achieving a social goal, but rather a political-ideological-revolutionary one—namely, the seizure of power—regardless of the means or methods used, in accordance with their own revolutionary philosophy.

2. Origins of the Guerrilla (1955–1965)
Revolutionary war in Argentina had its genesis immediately after the fall of Perón. Beginning in September 1955, a group of activists known as the "Peronist Resistance", organised and led by John William Cooke—originally a nationalist, later turned Marxist-Leninist—carried out numerous acts of terrorism during the governments of the “Revolución Libertadora”, President Arturo Frondizi, and President Arturo Illia.

In 1959, in the province of Tucumán, several individuals were arrested while operating in the hills, attempting to launch “rural guerrilla” actions. This marked the emergence of a Peronist-aligned guerrilla group called the "Union of Andean Guerrillas", led by a former military officer named Ciro Ahumada. Another similar group, known as the “Uturuncos” (Tigers of the Sierra), operated under the command “17 de Octubre” and its “National Liberation Army”. Lacking support, these groups eventually dissolved but served as precursors to future organisations.

With Fidel Castro’s rise to global prominence, revolutionary momentum spread through Latin America, prompting agitation and violence in Argentina. In 1961, a revolutionary apparatus began forming in Santiago del Estero through the “Popular Indo-American Revolutionary Front” (FRIP), which later became a foundation for the Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT), based on Trotskyist factions.

Che Guevara’s presence in Bolivia extended the revolutionary process in Latin America. In Orán, Salta, reports from locals and attacks against national gendarmerie personnel led to the discovery of an armed group equipped with automatic weapons, anti-tank weaponry, and explosives. In an abandoned camp, a "war diary" was found, in which guerrilla fighter Hermes Peña Torres (killed in a clash with the gendarmerie) described in detail the ambush of security forces—Orán Squadron—and the execution of two of their own members for violations of internal revolutionary discipline.

In 1964, another guerrilla camp was uncovered in Icho Cruz, Córdoba, named “Camilo Cienfuegos”. It was composed of seven young men with various weapons and explosives. The group, communist in orientation, was led by Juan Enrique Saleme, who had been trained in Cuba.

This period also saw numerous attacks and murders, such as:

• The attack on Captain Cabrera’s home, resulting in the death of his daughter and serious injury to one of his sons.

• The armed robbery of the banking polyclinic in Buenos Aires.

• The bombing of Shell Mex in Córdoba, which killed thirteen workers and injured several others.

• The discovery on 24 February 1964 of a new guerrilla camp in La Toma, Salta, operated by members of the “People’s Revolutionary Army” (ERP), aligned with Castroist-communist ideology.

• A major explosion in July 1964 on Posadas Street, Buenos Aires, where a guerrilla was killed while handling explosives. A terrorist cell was discovered, and documents revealed both past actions and planned operations.

These events—and many more—marked the first expressions of armed guerrilla warfare and laid the groundwork for what, in the 1970s, became the revolutionary war in Argentina. During this period, revolutionary organisations carried out more than 1,500 attacks. As a result, President Frondizi implemented the “Conintes Plan” (Internal Commotion), under which the armed forces were tasked—by executive order—with taking direct control of counter-terrorism efforts.

3. Creation and Development of Armed Revolutionary Organisations (1965–1970)
Between 3 and 13 August 1966, a meeting was held in Cuba named the “Tricontinental Conference of Havana”, attended by representatives of revolutionary movements and radical groups from Latin America, Asia, and Africa. At its conclusion, Latin American delegates met separately and, on 31 July 1967, established the “Latin American Solidarity Organisation” (OLAS), with the following main objectives:

• To promote armed revolutionary struggle in Latin America

• To coordinate strategy among revolutionary movements

• To foster solidarity among the peoples of the Americas, defending the Cuban revolution and similar movements across the region

As a result, clandestine armed organisations began forming across Latin America, including preparations for guerrilla warfare in Bolivia, led by Che Guevara and involving both foreign and local fighters.

To meet these goals, OLAS mandated the creation of a military apparatus in each country. In Argentina, the “National Liberation Army” (ELN) was established with the mission of operating in the north to support Che’s campaign in Bolivia. It was divided into three politically independent sectors—1, 2, and 8—which initially engaged in urban guerrilla actions.

With Che Guevara’s death in 1967 and Inti Peredo’s in 1969, guerrilla activity in Bolivia came to an end. The ELN was dissolved, and its three sectors returned to their respective organisations:

• Sector 1 joined the Revolutionary Workers’ Party (PRT), which, in addition to terrorism, promoted classist activity in factory unions such as SITRAM and SITRAC.

• Sector 2 formed the Armed Revolutionary Forces (FAR).

• Sector 8 split into two: one faction created the Montoneros trade union organisation via the group “Christianity and Revolution”; the rest joined the Peronist Armed Forces (FAP).

Meanwhile, a split in the Communist Party in 1967 gave rise to the Revolutionary Communist Party (PCR), whose armed wing became the Argentine Liberation Forces (FAL).

Within the PRT, two distinct factions emerged:

• El Combatiente, supporting armed struggle

• La Verdad, favouring a political solution

At its 5th Congress in 1970, the El Combatiente line prevailed, resulting in the formation of the armed wing: the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP).

In 1973, the original Montoneros group and the FAR merged into a new organisation retaining the name Montoneros, chosen for its nationalistic appeal to the Peronist base.

4. Evolution of the Revolutionary Process – War Periods

a) First Period (1970 – May 1973)
The year 1970 clearly marked the beginning of a widespread and coordinated assault on the country’s institutions, social groups, and through specific acts of systematic and selective violence.

The three most powerful organisations emerged publicly, each committing major crimes:

• Montoneros: Kidnapped, tortured, and murdered former President General Pedro E. Aramburu on Army Day, 29 May 1970.

• FAR: Took over the town of Garín, Buenos Aires Province, on 30 July 1970.

• ERP: Raided Police Station No. 24 in Rosario, Santa Fe Province, killing two officers in September 1970.

During this period, the ERP’s terrorist activities were largely conducted by smaller cells focused on propaganda, recruitment, training, and strengthening logistical capacity.

Montoneros and FAR were meanwhile in talks to merge, aiming to infiltrate the political base loyal to Peronism and planning long-term strategies. Both were responsible for high-impact terrorist operations such as:

• The armed takeover of La Calera on 1 July 1970

• The attack, weapons theft (70 FAL rifles), and murder of Lieutenant Asúa in Pilar, Buenos Aires Province, on 29 April 1970

• The kidnapping and murder of FIAT Argentina president Oberdán Sallustro in Buenos Aires on 21 March 1972

• The ambush and assassination of the deputy commander of the army, General Juan Carlos Sánchez, on 10 April 1972

• The armed assault and theft of military materials from Communications Battalion 141 in Córdoba Province on 19 February 1973

 

From the perspective of the actions taken by the legal forces and the government, this period was highly significant, as it saw the drafting and implementation of special criminal legislation tailored to this type of activity. Through the work of the National Federal Criminal Court, the main leaders of terrorist organisations, along with nearly all subversive elements, were identified and prosecuted. This resulted in the imprisonment of six hundred terrorists and criminals, and the initiation of legal proceedings against more than one thousand individuals for similar offences. This could have marked the beginning of the end of the armed struggle.

However, that was not the case, as with the arrival of the constitutional government of Dr Cámpora, all these legal measures were repealed.

It is also worth noting that during this period, the fight against armed criminal activity was primarily carried out by police forces, with the support of certain elements from the security services.

b) Second period (25 May 1973 – late 1974)

On 25 May 1973, Dr Cámpora assumed the constitutional presidency and repealed the existing anti-subversive legislation, declaring a total amnesty for all individuals imprisoned for "political reasons".

This period was marked by intense urban guerrilla activity, including numerous attacks, assassinations, and takeovers of towns, largely carried out by the many criminals who had been released from prison. In addition, subversive infiltration penetrated most levels of the state, as well as various social sectors and organisations (including trade unions, student groups, and other intermediary bodies).

Cámpora’s resignation, the elections of 12 September, and the subsequent presidency of General Perón marked a turning point in the relationship between the ruling party—the Justicialist Party—and the subversive organisations. These groups found their political paths blocked and intensified their armed actions, returning to clandestine operations.

The actions carried out during this period reached such a level of magnitude and aggression that they seriously disrupted social order and shocked the population. 

Among the most significant events during this period were:

• The assassination of the Secretary-General of the CGT, José Ignacio Rucci, on 25 September 1973.

• The armed assault on the 10th Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Armoured Artillery Group in Azul, Buenos Aires Province. This involved the murder of Colonel Camilo Gay, his wife, and a soldier, as well as the kidnapping of Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Ibarzábal, who was later killed after a prolonged captivity (19 January 1974).

• The assassination of Federal Judge Jorge Quiroga—formerly a judge on the National Federal Criminal Court who had presided over trials of subversives—on 27 April 1973.

• The assassination of former Minister of the Interior, Dr Arturo Mor Roig, on 15 July 1974.

• The armed takeover, theft of weapons, kidnapping, and subsequent murder of Major Argentino del Valle Larrabure, at the Military Gunpowder and Explosives Factory in Villa María, Córdoba, on 12 August 1974.

• The kidnapping and extortion of Juan and Jorge Born, executives of the Bunge & Born company, who were released following the payment of a $60 million ransom, on 19 September 1974.

• The murderous attack on the Chief of the Federal Police, Commissioner General Alberto Villar, and his wife, in Tigre, on 1 November 1974.

 

At the same time, in Tucumán, the reconnaissance of the south-western area was completed in preparation for launching a rural guerrilla campaign. The ultimate goal was to declare the province—and its surrounding area—a “liberated zone”, which could potentially lead to international recognition. Beginning on 30 May 1974, with the takeover of the town of Acheral by the ERP company “Ramón Rosa Giménez”, the ERP began its open operations in Tucumán.

c) Third period (1975–1978)

On 9 February 1975, the Army launched “Operation Independence”, with the mission of neutralising and/or annihilating rural subversive activity in Tucumán. This was carried out under Presidential Decree 261/75, and the mission was accomplished after just over a year and a half.

On 23 December 1975, the ERP’s Ramón Rosa Giménez Company attempted to seize Arsenal Battalion 601 in Monte Chingolo. This operation, the most ambitious ever undertaken by the urban guerrilla movement, ended in defeat for the insurgents. It marked a serious blow to the PRT-ERP, leading to the beginning of the dissolution of that company.

The year 1975 represented the peak of revolutionary activity, with significant material and financial resources—largely obtained through foreign support, ransom payments, and robberies carried out within the country. Social unrest deepened as the population faced growing insecurity due to a wave of indiscriminate attacks.

Following the military’s assumption of power, the Armed Forces, Security Forces, and Police Forces intensified counter-revolutionary actions to restore order and bring about the definitive defeat of the irregular forces.

Among the most significant events during this period were:

• Attack on a C-130 Hercules aircraft in Tucumán, on 28 August 1975.

• Assault, killings, and theft of weapons from Infantry Regiment 29.

• Bombing of the Federal Security Superintendency in Buenos Aires on 2 July 1976, resulting in 22 deaths and 60 injuries.

• Bomb attack at the Military Circle cinema on 17 October 1976, injuring 50 people.

• Explosion at the Undersecretariat of Planning of the Ministry of Defence on 15 December 1976, which left 14 dead and several injured.

 

The actions of the regular forces in control, intelligence gathering, identification, and prevention led to a decline in revolutionary activity. By late 1976 and throughout 1977, the terrorist organisations began to disintegrate—initially the PRT-ERP, and later the Montoneros. The leaders of these organisations either fled abroad, were killed in open combat with legal forces (as was the case with Mario Roberto Santucho, head of the ERP, in July 1976), or committed suicide to avoid capture.

d) Fourth period (1978–1980)

In 1978, the main focus of the Montoneros was to interfere with preparations for and the hosting of the FIFA World Cup, through an intensive campaign carried out in Western Europe aimed at discrediting Argentina and deterring tourism.

At the same time, the PRT-ERP formed the so-called "ERP Support Command", which re-entered the country to carry out acts of sabotage. However, it was completely neutralised.

That same year, the Montoneros also began preparing what they called the “Counteroffensive Maneuver”. Between January and April 1979, specialised groups arrived clandestinely in Argentina to conduct shock operations, agitation, and propaganda. These groups, known as TEA and TEI, were responsible for three major attacks:

• The attack and destruction of the home of Dr G. W. Klein, injuring members of his family, on 29 September 1979

• An attack on Dr Juan Alemán, on 7 November 1979

• The assassination of engineer Guillermo Soldatti, on 13 November 1979

At the same time, a psychological campaign was launched abroad, aimed at achieving international isolation of the Argentine Republic.

e) Final period (1980–1988)

After the failure of the Counteroffensive campaign, the Montoneros—like the PRT-ERP—decided to abandon armed struggle and pursue their goals through political means.

Following the decision in July 1982 to restore constitutional order in Argentina, the Montoneros resolved to reintroduce their militants into the country, seeking to infiltrate the Justicialist Party (PJ). Their aim was to represent their organisation within the party by appealing to the idea of Peronist unity. This involved a shift in strategy, with a deliberate effort to rebrand themselves from a guerrilla force to a political group.

Despite this repositioning, the PJ maintained a place within its internal structure for revolutionary Peronism, regarding it as the vanguard of a mass movement.

Meanwhile, the PRT reorganised its ranks and entered a period of party reconstruction, which it declared complete during its 7th Congress, held in Argentina in April 1987. From that point on, the PRT aligned itself with the Broad Front for National Liberation (FRAL), led by the Communist Party.

f) Current situation

Analysing the current situation requires a separate and specialised study, as it falls outside the immediate context of this work—not only because of the changes experienced by society itself, but also due to the influence of international forces in the internal affairs of individual countries.

Nevertheless, it can be stated that within the national and political sphere, there is a clear tendency among radical and subversive groups, including so-called front organisations, to seek legal recognition. This would allow them to keep their activity alive, placing them in the best possible position to resume the struggle should conditions permit.

On the international level, this strategy reflects the doctrine of “non-armed approximation”, which in Argentina is being pursued primarily through labour and trade union groups, considered the most likely sectors to initiate armed struggle in the form of a mass urban insurrection.


O. E. Guerrero (Brigadier General, Ret.)

Lamadrid, the Bravest of the Brave

The Bravest of the Brave

Domingo Faustino Sarmiento once said of him:

“General Lamadrid is one of those natural-born figures of the Argentine land. At the age of 14, he began waging war against the Spaniards, and the feats of his romantic bravery go beyond the limits of possibility: he has been in a hundred and forty encounters, in all of which Lamadrid’s sword emerged nicked and dripping with blood; the smoke of gunpowder and the neighing of horses drive him into ecstasy, and as long as he can slash everything before him—cavalry, cannons, infantry—it matters little to him whether the battle is won or lost.

I said he is a natural type of this country, not for his fabulous courage alone, but because he is both a cavalry officer and a poet. He is a kind of Tyrtaeus, inspiring soldiers with war songs—the same bard I mentioned in the first part; he is the gaucho spirit, civilized and devoted to freedom. Sadly, he is not a 'square' general, as Napoleon required; bravery outweighs his other qualities by a hundred to one.”

They say he was an inveterate candy eater.
He was terrified of water and did everything possible to avoid boarding boats and ships.
He would sing vidalitas to his soldiers before battles.

When San Martín took command of the Army of the North in early 1814, replacing Manuel Belgrano—recently defeated at Vilcapugio and Ayohuma—the Dragoon Captain from Tucumán, Gregorio Aráoz de Lamadrid, served as aide-de-camp to the future Condor of the Andes.

He was present in Tucumán and Salta. Also at Vilcapugio and Ayohuma.
And when he became entangled in the fratricidal civil wars between Unitarians and Federalists, fate took him to a place called El Tala.
There, fortune turned against him.
It was 1827. And he was nearly killed in that battle.

He received eleven saber blows to the head; his nose was broken and the tip dangled over his upper lip. His right ear, nearly sliced in two, hung by a thread of skin. Another slash severed the biceps of his left arm, and a bayonet struck deep into his shoulder blade.

When he fell to the ground, still gripping his saber, they clubbed him with rifle butts, trampled him with their horses, and broke his ribs. As they stripped him of his weapons and clothing, Lamadrid summoned his last strength and shouted, as best he could, that he would not surrender.
His body bathed in blood, they finished him off with a shot to the back.
They left, believing he was dead.

But he survived—against all odds.
And earned the nickname: “The Immortal.”

General Gregorio Aráoz de Lamadrid was born on November 28, 1795, in Tucumán.

A daguerreotype of the General reveals the true face of the warrior.
And a photograph of the bullet that was removed from his back—the one that shattered his shoulder blade—is on display at the National Historical Museum.

 

Malvinas: Bombs Away! (Part 2)

Bombs Away! (Part 2)

The second part of An intimate, marvellous and moving account by Mr Captain JOSÉ NICOLÁS PAGANO
(Navigator of a Canberra aircraft)
ACCOUNT DATE: 4 June 1982

The story continues...

We were flying on a bombing mission.
Above the clouds, there was a huge moon and a dark blue sky; we levelled out.
I was tracking the navigation minute by minute, occasionally "drifting" to thoughts of my wife and kids.

— N: Oxygen.
— P & N: Sufficient, two lines flowing normally.
— N: Electrics.
— P: 28 volts, all dark, generator lights off.
— N: Engines.
— P: RPM, pressure, and temperatures all normal.

After the silence that followed the checks, the radar from Puerto Argentino, operated by Major SILVA, called us. He would be our guide to the target and would alert us if we were intercepted.
— No hornets (enemy fighters).



One less worry — only the Sea Dart missiles from the frigates remained a threat. Perhaps the absence of “hornets” was thanks to the tireless work of the beloved “FÉNIX” Squadron.
We flew over the cushion of clouds far below. We entered the island via the Federal Peninsula.

— Open bomb bay doors.
— PUMA - RADAR, confirm heading for final run, looks like they’re spreading slightly.
— Affirmative, final run heading 140°.
— LINCES - RADAR, stand by... 1 and 2, fire range... NOW! ... Number 3, correct 5° to the right, perfect ... standby ... NOW!

Eighty seconds of flight — and the eighteen bombs from the “LINCE” were released. The “PUMA” bombs followed right behind.
Below us, the thick cushion of clouds lit up with the glare of the explosions.

— LINCES and PUMAS - RADAR: GOOD HIT!!! Stay calm, no hornets, and thank you.
— Thanks to you for the support. (A Quechua accent)
— Let’s thank the Lord God!!!



I began to entrust the fallen enemies and their families to God — for we truly dropped those bombs without hatred — when the calm, battle-hardened voice of the radar operator warned us:
— Attention “LINCES” and “PUMAS”, hornets on the tail of the “PUMAS”, 25 miles... 23... go full throttle and try to climb if you can.
— “PUMAS” going full throttle.
— 20 miles... 19... stay calm, I think they’re turning back... 18 miles... they’re no longer closing in... they’re turning back.

Ten relieved sighs echoed inside our oxygen masks.
From their baptism of fire, our noble birds had cleansed their “Original Sin” of having been born in the land of the usurpers (the Canberra aircraft is of British origin).

Again, the alarmed voice!
— Attention, the returning “LINCE” is alone, it has a radar echo ahead at 15 miles, turn immediately to starboard, heading 290°.

We all turned hastily. I miscalculated nervously and dropped the chaff (a rudimentary electronic countermeasure) and a flare — which exploded and made the pilot think it was a missile. I earned quite a few "congratulatory" remarks (they remembered my mother) for not giving prior warning.



Once more, the radar chimed in during those tense moments:
— It’s disappeared — must’ve been a missile.

We kept flying, now more relaxed.
— LINCE “ONE” to “TWO”, I’ve lost an engine.

Due to power loss, we all overtook him — he fell to the rear of the formation, but he was still flying.

We landed...
The Canberras had completed yet another mission!
I embraced Warrant Officer LUIS SÁNCHEZ, an old armourer, as the night filled with cheers and caps flying through the air.

Before falling asleep with the rosary between my fingers, I thought about those fighting, those giving what little they had, the pride of the families of those who fought with honour, and a friend’s home where their children prayed each night for our dead — and theirs — and asked God “so the English wouldn’t steal the Malvinas from us again.”

Mount Longdon: The Letter of Private Albert Petrucelli

The Letter of Private Alberto Petrucelli (7th Mechanised Infantry Regiment)

Malvinas 1982

This is the story of a letter that was never sent to its addressee, written by the Argentine soldier Alberto Daniel Petrucelli before he was killed in action during the Battle of Mount Longdon, in the Malvinas, in 1982.




Although this letter did not come directly into my hands, I learned about it thanks to the kindness of Malvinas veteran Fernando Arabio. We got chatting after I posted on social media about the circumstances in which Sergeant Ian McKay, a British soldier of the 3rd Battalion of The Parachute Regiment, was killed while assaulting Argentine positions on Mount Longdon on the night of 11–12 June 1982. The Argentine soldier Alberto Daniel Petrucelli had been born on 18 October 1962 in the Federal Capital, and in the Malvinas he formed part of the First Rifle Group, Second Section, B “Maipú” Company, 7th Mechanised Infantry Regiment “Coronel Conde”.

The letter is addressed to Nancy, Alberto Petrucelli’s girlfriend, and is dated 29 May 1982. It is possible that he wrote it at a moment when he was left on his own because Corporal Gustavo Pedemonte, the group commander, and soldiers Enrique Ronconi (A Team Leader) and Felipe Ramírez (B Team Leader) had gone out on patrol to carry out a forward observation on the Murrell River. It is written on a sheet of Government Telegraph Service, Falkland Islands, stationery which Corporal Pedemonte himself had given him. Pedemonte in turn had received it from another soldier who had managed to get hold of some of the stationery that was seized in the house of the British governor Rex Hunt after Operation Rosario.



In the letter “from a hero to his official girlfriend” (as he himself headed it), Private Petrucelli conveys his deep love for his girlfriend and other feelings he was harbouring, from a strong faith in God and in the Virgin who protected him, to uncertainty about how events would unfold, which had remained unchanged since 1 May. Not least is his mention of that very day on which he was writing, when he was delighted to see snow start to fall and then disappointed shortly afterwards because the snow turned into British shells. The paragraph begins by telling her that he was well and that he would stay “escondidito” (“nicely hidden”), just as she had asked him to do in previous letters. However, in another passage of the letter Petrucelli wrote that he felt like crying but did not, because he “made himself strong and felt like a man”.



During the assault on the Argentine positions, carried out by the 3rd Battalion of The Parachute Regiment, Privates Alberto Petrucelli and Enrique Ronconi together with Corporal Gustavo Pedemonte brought down Sergeant Ian McKay, who fell on the edge of the foxhole they occupied. An hour later Private Julio Maidana joined the position and began refilling the magazines with two or three rounds at a time so that they could keep firing without delay. The three soldiers died heroically when a grenade managed to get into the foxhole and its explosion killed them. Corporal Pedemonte, who was at one end of the hole and shielded by the bodies of the soldiers, was hit by shrapnel in a leg and a buttock but survived. Afterwards, when the British soldiers who had approached the position moved away, he was able to climb out of the foxhole to seek help desperately for his men.

Private Gareth Rudd, belonging to the machine-gun team of 3rd Section, 2nd Platoon, A Company, 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment, told his comrade David J. Reeves that after the assault on Mount Longdon the British held firm in their defensive positions to protect themselves from the Argentine field artillery fire that was pounding them. Later, he went out with another soldier to patrol the northern side of Mount Longdon and they discovered the bodies of Sergeant Ian McKay and of the soldiers who had died with him while assaulting an Argentine position that had been very well constructed. They searched the position and found the bodies of three Argentine soldiers, pulled them out of the foxhole and laid them alongside the fallen British. The Argentine soldiers were better equipped with clothing and boots for the climate of the Malvinas, and as it was bitterly cold, Gareth Rudd took the duvet from one of the dead soldiers in an attempt to keep himself warmer. He then informed a non-commissioned officer about the bodies they had found and went back to his own shelter, as the Argentine artillery fire had started up again.



Gareth Rudd was part of the group of British soldiers who wrapped that whole group of dead British and Argentine soldiers in ponchos. It was not until he reached Puerto Argentino and settled with other soldiers in one of the houses that, when checking the pockets of the duvet, he discovered the letter from Alberto Petrucelli to his girlfriend Nancy. The letter ended up being kept in a wardrobe where he also had photographs, newspaper cuttings, maps and his own correspondence with his family.

More than forty years later, Mr David J. Reeves got in touch with Fernando Arabio and sent him the letter and the note in which his comrade Gareth Rudd told him how he had found it. Fernando managed to contact Mrs Nancy, who now lives in Chile with her family. At first, Mrs Nancy agreed to receive the letter, but in the end she decided not to, perhaps because of the memories it would stir up. Fernando then contacted Gustavo Pedemonte and the letter was donated to be placed on public display in the Museum of the 7th Mechanised Infantry Regiment.

Malvinas: The Navigator of a Canberra Bomber (Part 1)

The Navigator

Account taken from the book WITH GOD IN THE SOUL AND ALCOHOL IN THE HEART
Narrated by: Captain Pastran – Canberra Pilot
Date: Night of 13 June 1982

At the aircraft flown at II Air Brigade, based in the city of Paraná, camaraderie and team spirit are vital, for the Canberra’s crew consists of a pilot and a navigator. A team was precisely what we became throughout the whole war—my course-mate, friend, and navigator, Captain Fernando Juan Casado, and I. For nine years we served together at the same postings: six years at II Brigade and three at the Military Aviation School, until we returned to Paraná in December. We also went to war together.

Our callsign that day was “Baco”.

On the final armed raid carried out by the Argentine Air Force, on 13 June 1982 at 22:55 hours, once the mission had been completed and the bombs released—only six hours before the ceasefire—our aircraft was struck by a British missile and fell into the sea. I managed to eject; he remained forever in our Malvinas. Sadness overwhelmed me, yet I accepted God’s will, for only He knows what awaits each of us.

When I hit the water, the shock of the cold was tremendous. My hands froze almost instantly, making it extremely difficult to inflate the life raft. My reactions were slow, even though my mind urged haste, for I knew my life depended on it; without the anti-exposure suit I would not have survived more than a minute before suffering cardiac arrest. By God’s grace I managed to inflate my life jacket and raft, free myself from the parachute, and climb onto my fragile little means of salvation. In the moment when I could not inflate the raft, I thought God had abandoned me, but I later realised that was not so.

Then came that terrible night, shivering with cold and navigating by the light of the flares fired during the final battle for Puerto Argentino. I knew that, even if only slightly, the bombs I had dropped on a concentration of British troops and equipment had delayed the final assault.

Everything unfolded just as we had been taught in our survival classes. When I finally reached the coast, it was extremely hard to get out of the water due to the exhaustion of the mission, the strain of ejecting, and the supreme effort of navigating through the night in a tiny raft upon the immensity of the sea.



I searched for shelter to avoid freezing during the night. Soon I found a crevice between some rocks and covered myself with the rubber dinghy. I kept my hands and feet moving constantly while fighting against sleep, fearing that I might never wake again. In the morning of 14 June, I began to walk; the disorientation and cold were intense, until I managed to orient myself by the sight of a helicopter flying from Darwin towards Puerto Argentino.

As I walked, I sang and whistled, trying to keep my spirits up—already greatly diminished by the loss of my closest friend and the situation I was enduring. Later I was taken prisoner by the British, who already held control of the entire island. They truly treated me very well; I could almost say as though I had been one of their own.

That same night, General Moore informed Brigadier Castellano that I had been rescued, though the news only reached my home on the 15th; for two days my family lived with the sole information that I was “missing in action”. After that came the uncertainty of captivity.

I was told that when General Moore spoke to Brigadier Castellano in Puerto Argentino, he asked how we managed to bomb with such accuracy with the Canberra, and how we knew the location of his command post, as it had been hit twice. He had survived only because he happened to be inspecting British positions at the time. That was a source of pride for our Group.

Lastly, I wish to pay tribute to Captain Casado and, through him, to all the brave and devoted navigators of the Argentine Air Force.

Before 1 May, the Canberras carried out reconnaissance and exploration sorties over the Islas Malvinas.
During the war they executed 35 combat sorties, 25 of them at night, performing low-level and high-altitude bombing runs and dropping nearly 100,000 pounds of bombs.

Among their honoured dead in combat were Captain Casado, Lieutenant De Ibáñez, and First Lieutenant “Coquena” González.

Malvinas: Machine Gunner Conscript Oscar Ledesma Remembers H. Jones

Those Things of War...

Lieutenant Colonel Herbert "H" Jones was the highest-ranking British officer killed during the Malvinas War. He commanded the British Parachute Regiment and was a legend among his men. He was killed in action by Argentine conscript Oscar Ledesma, who was 19 years old at the time and in charge of the only functioning MAG machine gun in his group. Years later, the Argentine soldier wrote a heartfelt letter to Jones’s widow, Sara.

Open Letter to Sara (widow of Herbert Jones)

"Time acts in accordance with our deeds, and memory is shaped by our actions."

"At the age of just 19, I found myself facing the British 2nd Parachute Regiment on the morning of 28 May 1982, during the battle of Darwin Hill. Regardless of how the events unfolded, nothing can erase from my heart and mind the memory of that terrible confrontation."

"Eventually, I had to pull the trigger and bring down an adversary. At no moment did I feel hatred in doing so, nor did I ever boast about it or take joy in the act. I had no choice—I had to protect my fellow soldiers, who watched in terror as a Para assaulted their position, unaware that just a few metres away, my machine gun was waiting. Just as I did not know who that daring soldier was—who, in a display of astonishing bravery, charged an Argentine position."

"Once the battle ended, I offered a prayer for all those who had fallen, and I asked God to comfort their families."

"It has always weighed on me that I never had the chance to look you in the eye and tell you that your husband died as a brave soldier, and that his former adversary honours him every day with the utmost respect—just as I honour all the fallen."

"I offer you my deepest respects, and to your children as well—heirs of a valiant warrior."

Oscar Ledesma

Beagle Crisis: Depth Charges Against the Chilean Submarine Hyatt

Testimonies – Beagle Conflict 1978: “Attack the Enemy Submarine”

“In ’78, I was a Second-Class Petty Officer in the Argentine Navy, serving aboard the landing ship ARA Cabo San Antonio. During the Beagle Conflict, we were transporting Marine Infantry troops and supplies towards the south.

At the outset, when we set sail, we were told that we would be navigating without radio communication with higher command, so that the Chileans could not intercept our transmissions.

One evening, at dusk, we supposedly detected a Chilean submarine beneath our ship (which was said to have crossed into Argentine territorial waters). As time passed and it remained there, it was decided to attack it.

I don’t know whether that decision came from higher up (as radio silence was in place) or from our ship’s commanding officer.

Depth charges were dropped, fearing that the submarine might attack us, and hoping that this defensive action would drive it away.

The next morning, at dawn, oil-like patches were spotted on the surface, along with bits of metal or tin, or something of that sort. We never knew what it really was...

We served our country, and we would do it again.”

(Gonzalez, Juan Carlos – Argentine veteran, Beagle Channel Conflict)

5th Marine Batallion: The Experience of An NCO

Account of a Marine Non-Commssioned Officer – Company “OBRA” – BIM5 Ec (Part 1)

Extracted from: Revista Desembarco – Volume 12

 

 

Petty Officer Roberto Tejerina recalls:

"I went to Malvinas as part of the Advance Party of BIM5 Ec, assigned to the Forward Platoon. Upon arrival at the airport, the Commander and some members of the Staff went ahead to receive orders; we remained at the airport. Later, we moved forward in a truck to the shearing shed near Moody Brook, where we spent the night.

Early the next day, 9 April, we set out on foot toward tentative zones where we were to take up positions. The Commander accompanied us on foot, gave us our primary fields of fire and the sector to occupy, and ordered us to draft a Tentative Fire Plan, along with requests for fire and logistical support. That same day, the Company Commander arrived. I briefed him on what had been done, and after inspecting the area, he submitted the requests and the Fire Plan. Among other things, he requested additional support weapons, communications equipment and a vehicle — which was never provided, so all equipment and supplies had to be carried on our backs."

Petty Officer Tejerina was the Company Sergeant Major of Company “OBRA” (also referred to as “Oscar” or “O”) of BIM5 Ec. In reality, OBRA, with fewer than 80 men, was closer to a reinforced platoon than a full company.

From its arrival in Malvinas on 8 April until 14 June, this company successfully completed three distinct missions:

1. First Mission (8–16 April): Defensive position on Wireless Ridge, protecting the northern sector of Puerto Argentino’s initial defences.

2. Second Mission (17 April – 8 June): Upon arrival of Mechanised Brigade X, the unit was repositioned to the eastern slopes of Mount Tumbledown, serving as the battalion’s reserve. During this phase, it performed all the demanding tasks expected of a reserve unit, including logistical efforts which, while tactically inadvisable, were practically unavoidable.

3. Third Mission (5–14 June): As an advance combat element, it engaged enemy attacks.

Company OBRA was the smallest rifle company in BIM5 Ec, yet it participated in all unit exercises and was routinely assigned roles as reserve or forward security. It was known for being highly cohesive and close-knit. Its successive company commanders —young and modern— gained considerable experience and developed a strong bond with the unit, shared also by the NCOs.

Years prior, OBRA had been stationed in Ushuaia, specialising in medium and low mountain combat and southern terrain operations. Later, it relocated to Río Grande, becoming a permanent part of the battalion, but retaining its distinctive spearhead spirit.

In 1981, the company conducted numerous live-fire combat exercises with air support. Under the leadership of Sub-Lieutenant Carlos Alberto Calmels, it became a well-trained and highly motivated team. The company specialised in heliborne operations, conducting extensive helicopter training. Their repeated assignments as reserve force, heliborne unit, and security element enabled them to gain solid experience in assault planning, counterattack execution, and independent operations across broad sectors.

At the end of January 1982, Sub-Lieutenant Calmels handed command of “O” Company to Sub-Lieutenant Ricardo Quiroga. From February to late March, the company conducted patrols and field exercises, fostering cohesion and strong camaraderie. During the retaking of Malvinas, they were in the midst of a 15-day campaign.

Marine Petty Officer Second Class Roberto Tejerina, Company Sergeant Major, was in his second year in that role and served as an essential pillar in the company’s leadership. The company was composed of three rifle groups, a weapons section with three 60 mm mortars, two 7.62 mm machine gun teams, and four rocket launchers (only two of which were operational; the rest travelled with the baggage train). In Malvinas, additional reinforcements arrived, including Petty Officer Orozco from the reconnaissance section, who took command of the Support Weapons Section.

"We conducted many foot reconnaissance missions to familiarise ourselves with the terrain since we were the battalion reserve."

On Wireless Ridge – Mount Longdon

Company O / BIM5 Ec deployed on the designated height (1800 metres east of the Royal Marines’ Barracks) and spent 10 April organising its defensive position. The company deployed in an arc formation, with its three groups in the front line. Main fields of fire were directed westward, toward Moody Valley and Mount Longdon (positioned on its reverse slope), and northward toward Murrell Valley. Support fire was to be provided by 106.6 mm mortars, with a detailed white point fire map.

According to Petty Officer Tejerina, the number of dead zones was “countless,” so double listening posts were established at 150 and 300 metres ahead of the main position. On that same day, Petty Officer Second Class Orozco, Corporal Second Class Daniel A. Carrasco, and additional ammunition and field equipment joined the company.

Tejerina celebrated his birthday on 17 April:

“That day, I received —right on time— a parcel from home with a 5 kg chocolate cake, which I shared with everyone, down to the last conscript. It coincided with Easter celebrations, for which the battalion logistics team (N.B.: referring to the ZOSERU – Unit Service Zone) had distributed plenty of chocolates, some Easter pastries, and cigarettes.
Celebrating birthdays wasn’t unusual — the company always celebrated them, at least since I joined. In Río Grande, we grouped birthdays by month, and even the Commander often attended those gatherings.”

 

Life on the Trenches

Tejerina states:

“The period we spent as reserve was active and exhausting. We not only had to establish our primary positions, but also set up two alternate positions, and plan and prepare for counterattacks toward Tumbledown and Sapper Hill.

What drained us most, however, was our proximity to BIM5’s command post — we were constantly assigned extra duties, such as transporting supplies or building positions for other units. That frustrated me, as these logistical burdens were contrary to tactical doctrine, which clearly states that frontline troops should not be used for such tasks.

I raised the issue with the Company Commander and the Battalion Sergeant Major, Petty Officer First Class Hernández, who acknowledged the problem but couldn’t resolve it. Fortunately, these tasks decreased as the battalion’s positions became more consolidated."

“Luckily, we had weekly access to showers at SPAC (the Amphibious Group’s logistics unit in Puerto Argentino) until 1 May. Afterwards, we took rest days in Puerto Argentino, also at SPAC’s shed. Not everyone managed to follow this routine, but it was still a relief.

We never lacked food. As reserve, we always had hot meals — even under fire. Oddly enough, everyone was constantly hungry and smoked heavily, perhaps due to tension. Cigarette rations had to be limited, and Charlie rations (combat rations) strictly monitored.

We had no issues with clothing distribution. I had a full reserve of kit for the company, stored in the lower compartment of each soldier’s 2-in-1 backpack, since our unit didn’t receive the TEMPEX backpacks, except for a few NCOs.

For building positions, we used the famous crowbars made in Río Grande, ordered by Sgt. Maj. Hernández, who had the foresight to see that our standard tools wouldn’t work with Malvinas soil.

Using materials to reinforce our positions became problematic. Troops sourced them from nearby structures in the settlement, prompting constant complaints from the Kelpers. The materials included posts, wires, metal sheets, timber, and 220-litre drums."

“As an anecdote: once, Midshipman Accountant Pellegrino, part of the ZOSERU, came to our company’s command post asking us to send a platoon to collect food he’d left 500 metres behind, as he couldn’t advance due to enemy fire. When we fetched the thermal food containers, they were riddled with shrapnel. They’d lost all liquid — but not the food. This sparked a surge of morale among the conscripts, who shouted:

¡Viva la Patria! Viva Midshipman Pellegrino!”

Malvinas: Darwin - Goose Green Combat

Darwin - Goose Green Combat

Part 1

Background

Consolidation of the British Beachhead at San Carlos

Following the successful attacks carried out by the Argentine Air Force (Fuerza Aérea Argentina, FAA) on the afternoon of 21 May, during the night of 21–22 May, the enemy undertook an intense effort to land the bulk of its forces and deploy security elements to the high ground surrounding the beachhead. All available helicopters were used successively for that purpose.

On the same afternoon of 21 May, numerous troop movements were observed, transporting personnel, heavy weapons, and air defence systems to the northwest of Cerro Alberdi, as well as to the heights southeast of San Carlos settlement and Montevideo Hill.

By the afternoon of 22 May, when the FAA resumed its attacks, the enemy had succeeded in consolidating its landing, with an effective ground-based air defence network already established around the beachhead.

On 21 May, the Joint Command Malvinas requested continuation of aerial bombing, which was carried out as mentioned above, although the results could not be assessed. Requests for aerial photography could not be fulfilled due to active enemy air defences.

On 22 May, since the heavy mortars of Regiment 12 (RI 12) had not yet arrived at Puerto Argentino, orders were issued to embark two artillery pieces from the 4th Airborne Artillery Group (GA Aerot 4) with their crews aboard an Argentine Coast Guard vessel. This ship departed for Darwin at first light on 23 May. Near the entrance to Choiseul Bay, the vessel was attacked by British Harrier aircraft, which inflicted severe damage, forcing the ship to run aground on the northern shore.

A fire broke out onboard. The crew managed to disembark and take cover under makeshift shelters along the beach. Later, they were able to recover equipment and supplies from the ship, including materials for treating the wounded. On 24 May, during a risky helicopter operation, the personnel were evacuated, along with the artillery pieces and ammunition, which were transported to Darwin, where they were immediately assigned to defensive positions. The operation was secured by a patrol under the command of an officer dispatched from Darwin. Once the mission was completed, the patrol had to withdraw on foot due to the unavailability of helicopters. Only one of the rescued artillery pieces could be brought back into service; the second had been damaged in the bombing and could not be repaired.

On the morning of 23 May, British aircraft attacked south of Howard a formation of Army helicopters that had departed Puerto Argentino en route to that location. The helicopters were carrying supplies and heavy mortars for RI 12 (received on that date), conducting reconnaissance south of San Carlos, and attempting to extract personnel from 601 Commando Company, who were operating in the area of RI 5 on a previously assigned mission.

In this attack, two Puma helicopters and one Augusta A-209 helicopter were destroyed. A second Puma, piloted by First Lieutenant Hugo Alberto Pérez Cometo, managed to evade the enemy strike, returned to the area, and rescued the crews of the downed helicopters — risking a second enemy attack to save his comrades. Subsequently, patrols from RI 5 recovered the heavy weapons and part of the ammunition.

On the same day, 23 May, following intense air attacks, the British seriously damaged the Carcarañá vessel, which was anchored in San Carlos Strait near Soledad Island Bay. Another British air attack hit the Bahía Buen Suceso, anchored in Fox Bay, causing damage. The vessel was later repaired and restored to sailing condition.

On 24 May at 21:00, the Commander of the Coastal Group issued the Commander of Task Force Mercedes (RI 12) the defence operations order, which was received on 25 May at 18:00, followed by an order for a disruption attack, received on 26 May at 08:30.

On 26 May, two 105 mm howitzers from GA Aerot 4, along with their crews, were airlifted to Darwin by Army helicopters to reinforce the guns received the day before. They were assigned fire missions against Cerro Alberdi and Monte Osborne. As previously mentioned, only three artillery pieces were operational.

Operations of Task Force Mercedes from 1 May to 27 May (Darwin Position)

By 30 April, RI 12 had completed the concentration of its forces, except for Company B (still at Monte Challenger under orders of the Joint Command Malvinas), the Signals Section and part of the Service Company in Puerto Argentino, and the Heavy Mortar Section, which had not yet been transported from the mainland. The Commando Company and the remaining elements of the Service Company completed their movement to Darwin on 22 May.

In the afternoon, the RI 12 Commander attended a briefing by the Commander of RI 25 on the situation and deployment of his unit. He also met with the Commander of the Vicecommodore Pedrozo Military Air Base, who briefed him on the deployment of available resources and the measures taken with the local population. Reconnaissance was carried out alongside company commanders and members of the Logistics Planning Team (PL My).

It continued to rain, as it had in previous days. Since arriving in Malvinas, troops and officers had been operating with damp clothing. Nevertheless, overall health conditions remained acceptable, although several cases of frostbite in the lower limbs were reported. The unit was bivouacked near the airstrip.

The RI 12 Commander ordered that the companies bivouacked near the airstrip immediately relocate to the positions reconnoitred the previous afternoon by Company A. By 06:00, the movement was completed, and the elements were positioned 4 km from their original location.

At 08:30, the anticipated British air attack on Darwin began. Four Sea Harrier aircraft struck the area around the airstrip. A Pucará aircraft, with engines running, took an almost direct hit. Two more bombs fell on the runway, and a fourth landed near a Jeep carrying personnel.

At Fanning Head, the SBS accepted the surrender of Argentine soldiers — marking the first encounter between the two infantry forces.

Deployment and Combat Readiness in the Darwin–Goose Green Area

The unit takes up its assigned positions. All light and heavy weapons, ammunition, supplies, and the large field gear bags —impractical for troops in operations— must be transported manually and across open terrain. The transport means belonging to the Military Air Base (helicopters, jeeps, and tractors) cannot be used, as they are reserved for exclusive use by the Air Force.

Digging of positions begins using short-handled shovels — the only available entrenching tools, which are in limited supply. Improvised tools are also used. Only by nightfall are troops able to have a hot meal. Since arrival, it has rained almost constantly.

As of 2 May, Argentine forces deployed in Darwin–Goose Green number 642 men, with 202 from the Air Force (FAA).

On 3 May, reports from the BAM Commander suggest that the 1 May Harrier attack on the airstrip may have been guided from the ground, allegedly with assistance from a local resident. Control measures are adopted over the civilian population, also intended to protect them from renewed British air and naval strikes. The population is gathered inside the local church. This decision provokes significant complaints from the Kelpers.

On 4 May, at first light, a Chinook helicopter from the FAA transports the Deputy Commander of RI 12, one officer, and 18 soldiers from the Commando Company still stationed in the Monte Challenger area to Darwin, along with a food resupply.

Shortly after, a British air raid targets the airstrip from east to west. A Sea Harrier is shot down; the pilot ejects but is found dead, only 20 metres from the runway threshold. He is identified as Lieutenant Nicholas Taylor. The wreckage and body show numerous small-calibre bullet impacts, indicating that concentrated light weapons fire can be effective against low-flying aircraft.

During this action, the courageous conduct of Military Chaplain Santiago Mora is noteworthy, as he moves among positions under enemy fire, providing spiritual support to the troops.

Personnel continue to improve their positions and lay mines and obstacles. At 17:30, a formation is held and honours rendered to Lt. Nicholas Taylor, followed by the burial of his remains.

Due to food shortages, sheep begin to be requisitioned for troop rations. The situation is reported by radio to higher command. On 9 May, the food supply situation becomes critical and is reiterated to command. A shipment of provisions for 10 days is arranged and begins arriving on 10 May.

On 11 May, a helicopter delivers food for 7 days. At 23:30, the ship Montsunen arrives carrying 100 drums of JP-1 fuel (helicopter fuel), 97 drums of petrol, and 100 crates of 105 mm ammunition.

On 13 May, the Commander of the Coastal Task Group issues an operations order to detach a reduced-strength company-sized element to occupy the San Carlos area. Urgent allocation of support weapons is requested for this.

On 17 May at 09:00, two air attacks strike anti-air and heavy weapons positions near the airstrip and within the C Company / RI 12 sector. Numerous Beluga-type bomblets are scattered across the terrain. This is the first air raid since 4 May. That night, starting at 23:00, British helicopters once again overfly the area.

On 18 May, the BAM and TF Mercedes Commanders conduct a joint inspection of positions to coordinate use of FAA and Army resources. It is agreed to employ 500 lb bombs as interceptive fire. A request is made to Coastal Task Command for anti-personnel mines and detonators.

Rotationally, troops use designated barns to dry clothing and conduct physical recovery — a system in place since 5 May, yielding satisfactory results despite tactical constraints.

On 19 May, the Signals Section finally arrives from Puerto Argentino, though without its equipment, which remains in Comodoro Rivadavia, awaiting transport. First Lieutenant Ernesto Kishimoto, the Section Commander, reorganises the existing system. Civilian radio equipment is requisitioned for wireless communication, both with higher command and between company and platoon commanders. These sets are mounted on jeeps due to their battery requirements. Company leaders lack both wired and wireless communication with their sections, and sections have no comms with their squads. A wired network is improvised using discarded materials sourced from the local population.

That evening, from 21:00, British helicopters again overfly the area but withdraw under fire.

On 20 May, the health of the troops begins to deteriorate. Officers and soldiers suffer from harsh weather conditions (constant humidity and cold, especially at night) and insufficient food. Measures are taken to prioritise care for the worst affected. Some officers and NCOs, despite illness, refuse to abandon their posts. Twelve soldiers are hospitalised in an improvised infirmary, nine of them due to malnutrition.

On 21 May at 09:00, a 120 mm mortar section (one piece) arrives under an officer. From 09:00 to 11:00, intense naval gunfire is received from the northwest, directed by a British helicopter. Fire is accurate and targets anti-aircraft and heavy weapons positions. One FAA 20 mm cannon is knocked out, though no casualties occur. Between 11:00 and 12:00, enemy aircraft conduct two simulated attack runs.

On 22 May at 09:30, two air strikes target the runway. One enemy aircraft appears damaged and is seen heading out to sea.

Night Attacks, Artillery Movements and Contact with the Enemy

On 24 May, 30 troops previously attacked by Harriers and helicopters 17 km from Goose Green, are airlifted to the position from the Iguazú Coast Guard ship. Patrols are dispatched to recover two 105 mm artillery pieces and ammunition. That night, the enemy launches illumination rounds and conducts naval fire against the position.

During the morning of 26 May, four air raid alerts are issued. Between 04:20 and 12:30, heavy naval shelling hits the position. A Company, ordered to relocate to new frontline positions at the isthmus entrance, becomes pinned down in open terrain.

At 08:30, an order for a disruption attack is received from the Coastal Task Commander. It includes:

1. Confirm the current defence order.

2. Conduct a night attack (26/27 May) with one infantry company against potential enemy concentrations south and southwest of Cerro Alberdi, supported by reconnaissance elements in Sussex.

3. Based on outcomes, launch a second similar attack the following night (27/28 May).

4. All operations must be conducted at night; other units are to continue improving defences.

Between 12:30 and 13:00, four air attacks are launched from east–west and north–south approaches. One enemy aircraft is shot down.

During the afternoon, reconnaissance of the new position is carried out. Artillery pieces are manually moved due to the Land Rovers being unfit for towing. Fire missions are calculated and executed that night on hills to the north and northeast, using 30% of available ammunition.

A Company advances north of the isthmus, preceded by Reconnaissance Section patrols. The advance is made in wedge formation, with the 1st Section deployed. With extreme effort, they reach the vicinity of Camilla Creek, without encountering enemy forces. From that line, the company commander reports back and is ordered to return. The troops are exhausted.

The rest of the unit continues intense work, constructing new positions and moving equipment and supplies.

At 23:00, a patrol 20 km southeast of the position reports a large vessel sailing in Darwin Bay. One artillery piece is repositioned and opens long-range fire toward the presumed enemy ship. The South Sector Commander is ordered to deploy patrols to the beach to monitor for possible landings.

At 04:00, Coastal Task Command orders the deployment of a reduced section to Saladero (18 km northwest of Goose Green) to verify possible presence of the British ship Uganda and determine its mission.

A patrol under Sergeant First Class Berdugo is launched but subsequently loses all contact. Transported by FAA helicopter, they cannot be retrieved due to lack of air assets. Later, it is learned that after repeatedly evading British forces, the patrol was captured on 7 June following a brief engagement.

Operational Development

General Situation as of 27 May

The Reconnaissance Section, the Combat Advance, and A Company, as well as one section of the Commando Company deployed west of Darwin, have not yet managed to establish their positions or transport their logistical supplies. Notably, A Company and the Reconnaissance Section are exhausted due to the operation carried out during the night of 26/27 May, combined with the hardships, physical strain, and tension of the preceding days.

On the high ground to the north-northeast and east of Boca House, the RI 8 Section (under Second Lieutenant Aliaga) has been positioned, along with a group of service personnel equivalent to two understrength sections. To equip the latter with FAL rifles, it was necessary to withdraw such weapons from the personnel of 4th Airborne Artillery Group and the Section of the 601st Air Defence Artillery Group, who were instead issued 11.25 mm pistols.

To the north of Salinas Beach, one section of the Argentine Air Force is operating independently, under the direct command of the BAM Commander (totaling 202 personnel).

The forces of Task Force Mercedes, with the exception of the central sector between Goose Green and the airstrip (where small FAA elements operate independently), are cut off from one another. This situation forces the Regiment Commander to deploy service personnel with limited training in frontline positions. Communications between the Task Force Commander and company commanders, and between them and subordinate levels, are entirely inadequate due to the unit never having received its communications equipment.

With regard to the personnel and materiel situation within Task Force Mercedes, it is important to note that most of the heavy equipment embarked on the ship Córdoba never arrived. The unit has the following support weapons in service:

• Two 81 mm mortars, each with 126 rounds of standard and high-capacity ammunition

• One 120 mm mortar, used with limitations, as its base plate had been welded to the tube

• Two additional 120 mm mortars, left on the mainland, arrived at Puerto Argentino on the night of 27 May, and were redirected to Darwin on the afternoon of 28 May, by which time the battle was essentially over and they did not take part in it

• One 105 mm recoilless rifle, without a sighting device

• Ten MAG general-purpose machine guns

• One 12.7 mm machine gun, mounted on a requisitioned jeep

B Company, detached and deployed to the Monte Kent area under the command of the Joint Command Malvinas, arrived in the combat zone —minus one section that remained in Puerto Argentino— at nightfall on 28 May 1982. It was airlanded 4 km south of Goose Green, at a point when the situation had already become critical.

C Company, formed from a redistribution of NCOs and conscripted soldiers, is organised into two rifle sections, each with four squads. Its only support weapon is a single MAG machine gun. Of the company's 22 NCOs, 16 are acting corporals from the Sergeant Cabral NCO School.

The Service Company has only part of its personnel present, since most members of the Intendance and Ordnance Sections remain in Puerto Deseado (loading and unloading the Córdoba) and in Comodoro Rivadavia (airlifting equipment and supplies), and have not yet arrived in the theatre of operations.

Pucara's Rocket Launcher Transportations

Formation and Composition of Ec Güemes (San Carlos Area)

To form Ec Güemes —operating in the San Carlos area— the following elements have been employed: the Company Commander, the Company Command Group, and 1st Section of C Company / RI 25; along with the Support Section of RI 12, composed of two 81 mm mortars (out of the four available to the unit) and two 105 mm recoilless rifles (out of three available).

As a result, the remaining support weapons available for combat are one 105 mm recoilless rifle, which lacks a sighting device, and two 81 mm mortars.

The A Battery of the 4th Airborne Artillery Group (GA Aerot 4) is composed of three howitzers, a third of their ammunition having been expended in fire missions between 26 and 27 May. An additional cannon, recovered following the attack on GC Iguazú, could not be repaired and remains out of use.

3rd Battery, 601st Air Defence Artillery Group (3/B GADA 601) is equipped with two 35 mm anti-aircraft guns, integrated into the air defence system established by the Condor Military Air Base (J BAM Cóndor).

Argentine Air Force (FAA) personnel assigned to the BAM are deployed in air defence roles around the runway, in securing installations and deployed equipment, and in forming a section-level defensive position northwest of the airstrip.

The unified command structure under the Task Force Commander —intended to coordinate ground defensive operations— was not ultimately established.

Pucará rocket launcher installed on top of a tin shed

Company Leadership and Logistical Situation – Task Force Mercedes

The company commanders of RI 12 assigned to lead these detachments are not the unit’s original organic officers, as they were replaced in order to complete the organisational structure. The appointed commanders are senior in rank to the original company commanders, who now remain with their respective elements as executive officers.

Logistical Situation of Task Force Mercedes

Rations:
Since 15 May, food has been reduced to one ration per day due to the shortage of supplies. Distribution has been severely hampered by the lack of transport, thermal containers, and the long distances involved. At the start of the British ground assault, the force had autonomy for 3 to 5 days.

Although airdrops of food supplies were carried out on 25 and 26 May to extend this autonomy, part of the cargo was lost, and another portion was retained by the FAA detachment for its own needs. As a result, only a limited amount of provisions reached Task Force Mercedes.

Personnel have, in general, lost a significant amount of weight due to the imposed restrictions since 1 May, compounded by prior shortages since the unit left its home garrison. This situation, combined with accumulated physical strain, has had a clear impact on morale.

Equipment and Materials:
No spare parts, replacement materials, or equipment are available. Of particular concern is the lack of cleaning equipment for weapons, which has had a very negative impact on their performance — especially under the prevailing climatic conditions.

Ammunition:
The ammunition allocation for personal weapons is sufficient for 3 to 5 days of combat. The quantity of available rounds for 81 mm and 120 mm mortars is very limited. Ammunition stocks for the 105 mm guns are satisfactory (3 to 5 days of combat). The FAA garrison maintains its own supply depots.

Argentine soldiers surrender at Goose Green


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