Malvinas: The Rasit radar at Wireless Ridge

Rasit Radar at Wireless Ridge

At Mount Longdon was exclusively operated by First Sargeant Nista 


The plotting table is an accessory that is like a plasma where the cartography of the area of operations is represented, and when the radar detects the target and the operator tracks it, the route of the target is automatically drawn on this cartography. As reported in another email, this Accessory was not provided so the operator must manually track it, making it difficult to transmit data (coordinates) to the support and fire elements who, ultimately, are the ones that would take advantage of that data. to make the shot more effective. Regarding the identification (type) of the detected target, this depends on the skill and experience of the operator. As I also explained previously, the operation of the radar is based on the Doppler effect, for which the radar has a device that compares the "frequency" of the "electromagnetic pulse" of the radar emission when it leaves and when it enters. This pulse, when it collides with a moving element, suffers a distortion in frequency and when compared by the radar, produces a "noise" that is characteristic of each element. For example, the engine of a wheeled vehicle has a particular sound, the tracks of armored vehicles have another. People or pedestrians also have a distinctive noise. That's why I tell you that depending on the skill of the operator, the targets can be conveniently identified. It takes thousands of hours of practice for an operator to tell them apart. Both operators (Nista and I) had taken the course and had a few hours of practice operating it.

While you were in your first position (in Wireless), do you suppose/do you claim that every time it was turned on it was detected and bombed, or do you think it was "linked" like the entire position?

The position that they occupied along with the rest of the Command Company was quite concentrated, so that it could not be ensured that each time they were hit by naval or field artillery fire, it was due exclusively to the radar emission. In any case, during the stay in Wireless the radar was put into operation exclusively at night and effectively, they were the target of the bombing.
The Rasit was initially in the Communications Company Position (-) NW of the RI 7 (Infantry Regiment 7) device that is in front of Furze Bush Pass near Murrell, changing position on June 9 together with the operators NW of Longdon with Company B (+), including Forward Observer Lt. Ramos

Regarding operation, the following must be taken into account, the enemy dominated the electromagnetic spectrum very well, with interference to Communications and/or denial thereof. Rasit Operator 1st Sergeant Nista could never have confused troops with "branches" as was intentionally mismentioned, since although it may have been difficult to appreciate what the radar represented (if you talk to other operators they can confirm it) even the most ignorant Not only did I know that there were no trees that could interfere, but it was also noticeable with the naked eye.

Argentine Radars in Malvinas

The mine explosion that hit Cape Milne was heard from the Command Post at Wireless Ridge.

Regarding the explosion of the mine, it is worth clarifying that there was no field or strip of mines, in all cases they were lines of mines, that is, a row, one next to the other, nothing more. It would have been very different in another case.

When movements are detected, two fundamental problems arise: Battery C/GA3 was no longer in position and (I must confirm) another movement may have been expected from the NW like the previous one, when the enemy had already crossed the starting line and was in the middle of the assault on Position 1/B where he killed Ramos, blinding the Artillery Support that "perhaps" could have been given. Yes, Wireless' 105mm recoilless cannons did it instead, but blindly (9 km) and it could be verified that they hit a Milan ATGM team with its operators.

The attack on Longdon was not with preparatory fires from A.

Regarding the guards, from the arrival until the last day the never modified order of 20% rest, 80% watch was maintained. This was due to the permanent alerts.

From the night of June 11 to June 14, the three 105 mm cannons fired about 250 fragmentation and incendiary projectiles at the enemy troops, the latter to regulate the firing since there was an order not to use the 120 mm mortars on the enemy troops. hill due to its own troops being scattered mixed with the enemy. That was only modified as of June 12.

It was shot at a distance of 6250 meters and a shooting angle of 36.5º.

Argentine Naval Prefecture: Schweizer 300C in service

Technical report Nº 74 

SEAV SCHWEIZER 300C

 
PNA Schweizer 300C. 
Fotografía: Sergio Hulaczuk.




Three years have passed since the province of Santa Fe suffered the most catastrophic flood in its history. On that occasion, despite the technological advances achieved by man, the waters advanced with all their energy on the unsuspecting populations, while naturally delineating a new channel.
At that time, both on television and in the print media, images of families could be seen on the roofs of their houses, in complete isolation, eventually assisted by the different security services stationed in the disaster zone, which soon became They showed that they had been surpassed by the magnitude of the assigned task.
In this disaster scenario, the activity carried out by small helicopters equipped with floats that, in hover over the roofs of the houses, delivered boxes with groceries to the helpless residents stood out. These are the Schweizer 300C of the Aviation Service (SEAV) of the Argentine Naval Prefecture (PNA), which had a notable participation during the flooding of the province of Santa Fe.

PREFECTURE HELICOPTERS
In 1961, the then Maritime Prefecture acquired the Sikorsky S-51 LQ-XXR PM-20 helicopter from the Federal Police, which due to its age had to be decommissioned in 1964. Between 1962 and 1969, a total of five Bell 47s were incorporated, identified such as PM-21 (Bell 47 J-2), PM-22 (Bell 47 J-2A), PM-23 (Bell 47-G4A) and finally the PM-24 and 25, both former Argentine Navy (Bell 47-G4 ). These last three devices had dual command and since their entry allowed the training of helicopter pilots within the same Institution (previously they were trained in the Navy).
All Bells were equipped with floats and were intended for search and rescue (SAR), medical evacuation (MedEvac) and coastal surveillance tasks.
The second stage began with the arrival of five Hughes 369HS in 1971 and the three SA-330L Puma in the 1980s. In this way, the technological and operational level of the Rotary Wing Squadron (EscAlasRot) of the SEAV of the now Argentine Naval Prefecture (PNA) is significantly raised.
Currently, EscAlasRot has PUMA, AS-365N Dauphin and Schweizer 300C helicopters to fulfill the role assigned to the PNA.
The Schweizers are based mainly at the San Fernando Airport (SFO), from where the Aeronautical Professional Extension Center (CEPA) carries out training tasks for its own flight personnel, both helicopters and fixed wings. The Maintenance Center for all PNA aircraft was also installed there.
The first Schweizer 300C of the PNA arrived in our country in 1996, and due to the characteristics and equipment of these devices, their functions alternated between short-range coastal surveillance and the training of the new CEPA crews.
The 300C were delivered in three batches of two devices, and as a consequence of this there are subtle differences and technical improvements between each batch, which did not affect the overall performance. The six helicopters were registered PA-90 to 95.
Given the short range of the Schweizer, its operations were mainly confined to the banks of the Río de La Plata and Paraná, and for this reason Air Stations had to be established in the cities of Posadas, Corrientes and Santa Fe, where maintenance tasks were also carried out. first line. Due to the basic nature of Air Stations in terms of technical support, important work requires transfer to the SFO base by flight or, eventually, by land.

 
PA-90 operating in the SFO in 1996. Fotografía (arriba): Sergio Hulaczuk. 

    

SCHWEIZER 300C 

In 1989 the Schweizer Aircraft Corporation acquired the rights to all variants of the Hughes model 269 (commercially known as the Hughes 300, and with T.C. 4H12). In this way, it not only ensured sales exclusivity, but also took responsibility for the 2,800 helicopters already sold by Hughes to both civil and military operators.
In 1995, Schweizer independently developed a variant of this helicopter called the 269C-1, presented to the public as the Schweizer 300CB.
From a design standpoint, the 300s are essentially identical. They have a main rotor with three blades that use the NACA 0015 profile and are interchangeable, elastomeric shock absorbers and without brakes. The tail rotor is two-bladed and the drive transmission consists of eight belts (redundant quantity), and an electrical system that controls their tension, and acts as a clutch.
The model offered to the PNA was the 300C equipped with polyurethane-filled floats 4.7 m long, 27 kg total weight, and a side stretcher. The first two aircraft arrived with a single fuel tank, an engine air intake just below the pilot's position and, unlike previous models, the lower cockpit fairing is in one piece and has no ribs. Avionics are standard.
In later helicopters certain changes were introduced such as: exhaust pipe extended beyond the recirculation area of the main rotor, engine air intake in the center and below the cabin, two aluminum fuel tanks with a total of 185, 5 liters and the lower cabin fairing separated into three parts for easy maintenance.

 

 

All SEAV Schweizer 300Cs are two-seaters, with the possibility of transporting a person on the external stretcher that is mounted on the right side, on the fixed supports provided for this purpose.
The PA-90 was rebuilt and brought to the standard of the newest devices, after suffering an incident with immersion in the Río de la Plata in early 2000.
The PA-91 was destroyed during an emergency landing in a plowed field in Entre Ríos; while the PA-94 impacted in front of the Aviation Service hangar in San Fernando during a landing practice with autorotation. It was delivered to the firm's representative in Argentina for reconstruction.
Since its incorporation, the Schweizer has proven to be a very efficient platform for both training and maintaining the ratings of helicopter crews.

 
This 300C can carry a stretcher in the starboard side. 
Fotografía: Sergio Hulaczuk.

 
Note the lack of the PA-90's port tank.
Fotografía: Sergio Hulaczuk
 
 


Aeroespacio

Malvinas: Landing in San Carlos

Combat at San Carlos (1982)

 
Camp of the 3rd British Parachute Battalion in Puerto San Carlos shortly after the landing

The San Carlos combat was a confrontation between the British landing forces and a small group of Argentine infantry soldiers, which occurred on May 21, 1982 during the Falklands War in the context of Operation Sutton. The scene of this combat was the western coast of Soledad Island, in the area of Puerto San Carlos, on the strait of the same name (Falkland Sound).

Background

The conflict in mid-May
Around mid-May in 1982, the intensity of military operations in the Malvinas archipelago had diminished. While diplomatic negotiations were ongoing, both sides were gearing up for the next phase of the campaign. The British aimed to land troops and remove the Argentine forces, yet they lacked information about when or where this operation would occur. The Argentine strategy focused on defending Puerto Argentino (Stanley), assuming it was the primary target of the British. Consequently, most of the Argentine ground forces were concentrated in that area.

Despite the British not rushing into action, they initiated the first combat actions using their aircraft carrier group, consisting of HMS "Hermes" and "Invincible" and their escort ships. Air strikes and naval bombardments began targeting Puerto Argentino on May 1. Meanwhile, British special forces like the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) conducted covert reconnaissance missions across the archipelago. Argentina had withdrawn its Sea Fleet to port following the sinking of the cruiser ARA General Belgrano, leaving only its aviation (Southern Air Force Command) capable of engaging the Royal Navy.

On May 18, 1982, the Amphibious Task Group, responsible for the landing operation under the codename "Operation Sutton," joined forces with the Aircraft Carrier Group. All available resources were dedicated to this critical phase of the campaign.

San Carlos, the scene


British landing on Soledad Island and subsequent fighting (May 21, 1982). 

The selected location was the western region of Soledad Island, situated along the San Carlos Strait near its northern tip. At this location, two waterways extended inland, offering shallow waters and soft beaches conducive to a landing operation. To the north of the water entrance lay San Carlos Port, and to the south was the San Carlos Establishment. These places were sparsely populated, with only a few houses, and Puerto San Carlos even had a school. To the northwest of Puerto San Carlos, on the Fanning Head peninsula, stood a small elevated landmass known as "Height 234." East of Establecimiento San Carlos, there were other elevated areas, while to the south lay the Sussex Heights, obstructing the road to Darwin.

The British selected this site after a thorough analysis and after discarding other options. In the first half of May, they dispatched special units to conduct reconnaissance in the area and reported the absence of defenders. However, despite the absence of a permanent Argentine garrison in San Carlos, their patrols discovered evidence of British incursions, prompting them to deploy a Combat Team to the Puerto San Carlos and Fanning Head region on May 15th. The British only became aware of the presence of these troops upon their own landing.

Conflicting plans

British landing plan
The choice of location, as already mentioned, was due to the consideration of several factors.

• The place was not defended (even though the British did not expect to find any Argentine soldiers there, there was no garrison capable of preventing a landing)
• The series of heights that surrounded the place offered the possibility of setting up a defense line and would prevent Argentine aviation from using the Exocet missiles. At the same time, the fighter-bombers would be forced to gain altitude before attacking, thus exposing themselves to anti-aircraft fire.
• Argentina's chances of rejecting the landing were complicated if it took place in San Carlos. This was very far from the main garrison in Puerto Argentino (80 kilometers), which would delay the intervention of a heliborne counterattack force. * Darwin's garrison was 35 kilometers away and if an advance against the beachhead was attempted, it could be stopped by naval fire from the Strait and by positions established on the Sussex heights.
• Complete control of the sea and air cover could protect the landing, while the large number of helicopters available could speed up the transfer of troops to land.
  

 

Argentine Defense Plan
Argentine planning for the defense of the Malvinas archipelago postulated as a basis the defense of a strong position in the island capital (Puerto Argentino Army Group), where the enemy landing was expected. As for the rest of the islands, garrisons of different strengths were installed, but it was impossible to keep the entire coastal perimeter of the Malvinas defended. The Argentine commanders anticipated several possible points for a British landing, but they could not cover them all. British control of the sea gave them the initiative, which is why they were granted the ability to feign diversionary maneuvers in one place and make the main effort in another.
The movement of troops by land to reject a landing carried out far from Puerto Argentino was ruled out for the following reasons:1 

• This movement would be detected by the English and they would suffer heavy losses due to their air and naval fire.
• There was no possibility that the Southern Air Force would achieve the air coverage necessary to execute said maneuver.
• The Malvinas soil did not allow the march of armor or the transport of artillery and heavy equipment. A soldier could only cover 2 kilometers per hour marching by day in such terrain, and one kilometer per hour marching at night.
• The time spent on the march would fatigue the troops, who would arrive tired, not to mention giving the enemy enough time to prepare their defenses.
• Carrying out a helicopter movement to the site was also considered very risky, given the British's dominance of the air.
• The number of helicopters available made it impossible to concentrate the force necessary for combat on the beachhead in a short time.

Due to these factors, the Argentine strategy involved continuous coastal monitoring. If an enemy landing was detected as the primary offensive, the aviation forces were assigned the crucial task of obstructing the establishment of a secure beachhead.

The region around Puerto San Carlos fell under the jurisdiction of the Litoral Army Group. They made the decision to dispatch portions of the Darwin garrison to this area with a specific mission: to "alert and prepare for a counterattack." 2

Conflicting forces


Argentine soldiers in an event, before the English landing. Lieutenant Esteban marches next to the flag bearer.

Argentine Forces
The Litoral Army Group defended the western part of Soledad Island and also Gran Malvina Island. Its main garrisons were Darwin, Howard and Bahía Fox. Precisely from the Darwin garrison, a group of soldiers belonging to the 12th and 25th Infantry Regiments were drawn. The troop was organized as follows:

• Equipo de Combate Güemes (Lieutenant Esteban): 42 strong (riflemen). Located at Puerto San Carlos. 
• Support Section (Second Lieutenant Reyes): 20 strong, 2 mortairs 81 mm y 2 105 mm recoilless guns. Located in Fanning Head (Height 234). 

British Forces
The British forces possessed a significantly larger contingent, which was commensurate with the scale of the operation. The 3rd Commando Brigade of the Royal Marines, bolstered by additional paratroopers from the British Army, had the primary objective of securing the beaches to facilitate the arrival of other units. The naval vessels were responsible for delivering artillery support, while the helicopter squadrons played a crucial role in the landing process. Simultaneously, the Sea Harrier fighters were deployed to provide aerial protection. All these components worked together in a coordinated effort for the operation.

• 3ª Commandos Brigade, Brigadier Julian Thompson 
• Comando 40 Royal Marines (Lieutenant colonel Hunt) 
• Comando 42º Royal Marines (Lieutenant colonel Vaux) 
• Comando 45º Royal Marines (Lieutenant colonel Whitehead) 

Additional Units Assigned

• 2 Para (Lieutenant colonel Jones) 
• 3 Para (Lieutenant colonel Pike) 
• Special Air Service 22 Regiment (Lieutenant colonel Rose) 
• 3ª Commando Brigade Air Squadron (Major Cameron) 

The order of battle arranged for the landing was as follows:

• Primera oleada: 2º Batallón de Paracaidistas y 40 Comando de Marines en San Carlos (Playa Azul).El 2º de Paracaidistas debía ocupar las montañas Sussex, al sur, para bloquear un eventual avance argentino desde Darwin. 
• Segunda oleada: 45º Comando de Marines en Ajax Bay (Playa Roja) y 3º Batallón de Paracaidistas en Puerto San Carlos (Playa Verde) 
• Reserva: 42º Comando de Marines (a bordo del buque Canberra) 

Landing Preparations

The Fanning Head Engagement
On Thursday night the British Amphibious Group entered the San Carlos Strait to begin the landing operation.
The first action was against the Argentine faction under the command of Second Lieutenant Reyes, located in Fanning Head.
At dawn (2:30) an Argentine patrol sent heard noises and voices from the Strait to the beach, perceiving at the same time the silhouette of the English ships. The Argentines then launched flares and fired their heavy weapons against the canal area, although without being able to appreciate the results due to darkness. The English ships opened fire, guided by the glare of the Argentine guns firing. This exchange of fire lasts several hours.
SBS men were sent in helicopters from the destroyer HMS Antrim. These forces landed east of Fanning Head, cutting off this Argentine faction from their comrades at Puerto San Carlos. Immediately afterwards (around 5:00) infantry combat began. In the following fight the British declared that they had killed several Argentines and captured others; while the Argentine report of the action denies fatal casualties although it confirms the loss of several men who were captured; It also says that three seriously wounded people were left behind with a non-commissioned medical officer, being treated and saved by the British.
However, the majority of the Argentine soldiers, led by Reyes, managed to break the British encirclement and retreat, although they did not join Lieutenant Esteban's faction. It is not clear where this force was located, but the Argentine version says that the Reyes Support Section remained there without being discovered throughout May 21.
The capture of Fanning Head assured the British possession of a sensitive area to cover the northern flank of the landing. While the Fanning Head fight was happening, the horrible Team Güemes remained in their positions.





Secondary Actions
The British report reports a blocking action carried out by Squadron D of the Special Air Service (SAS) in the Darwin-Goose Green area, to prevent the Argentine troops located there from moving north to repel the landing. . This blocking action was supported by naval fire from the frigate HMS “Ardent” from the waters of the Strait.
On the other hand, Royal Air Force Harrier planes carried out attacks at various points: an English fighter was shot down over Howard, while other planes managed to destroy three Argentine helicopters in the Monte Kent area, 20 kilometers from Puerto Argentino. This last coup pursued the objective of denying aeromobility to the Argentines to prevent them from transferring counterattack forces to San Carlos.

Landing
The first wave of landings reached the beach without opposition in the early morning hours. The frigate HMS Plymouth provided close cover, and four Scimitar and Scorpion light tanks reached the beach in the first wave, to provide firepower. It was the first British landing in war since the Suez Crisis in 1956.
Fulfilling the planned plan, the 2nd Battalion occupied the Sussex Heights, while the 40th Commando did the same with the Green Mountains. The southern flank, facing Darwin's Argentine position, was secured. The barges then returned to the canal to pick up and transport the second wave.
Meanwhile, the Güemes Combat Team observed the English movement in the canal. Communications with the Support Section had been cut during the early morning, but the Argentines in Puerto San Carlos could hear the noise of the combat taking place at Fanning Head. Lieutenant Esteban transmitted the information about the situation to his immediate boss in Darwin, who relayed it to Puerto Argentino.
At dawn the barges with the second wave of landings were arriving at the beach in the assigned sectors. The 45th Command took positions in a refrigerator in Ajax Bay (western sector of the landing) and the 3rd Parachute Battalion landed near Puerto San Carlos, in the vicinity of the main Argentine position.

San Carlos Frays

Argentine Perspective

By then the Argentines had occupied new positions to the east of Puerto San Carlos, from where they opened fire on the paratroopers. The San Carlos combat then took place, when the soldiers of the Güemes Team damaged a “Sea King”3 helicopter with the fire of their portable weapons (7.62 mm FAL assault rifles), which withdrew smoking from the area. The combat continued and a second helicopter arrived to attack the Argentine position with rockets, but was shot down with the same rifle fire by the defenders. The machine fell into the water in the canal, but then a third helicopter opened fire on Esteban's troop and they, with the same tactic, shot him down. The device fell to the ground and the Argentines verified that the three crew members had died. A fourth helicopter was damaged by rifle fire and managed to withdraw. According to Esteban, this combat lasted an hour, while the disembarked enemy fired mortar fire uninterruptedly. Furthermore, he verified that the Falkland Islands civilians, through signs, indicated to the English soldiers the position of the Argentine forces.



British Perspective
When the other beachheads had already been established, the amphibious ships entered the San Carlos channel and disembarked the 3rd Parachute Battalion. But the rush to establish anti-aircraft defenses led the English to move along the beach head without it being definitively secured. In such circumstances, a Sea King helicopter was maneuvering east of Puerto San Carlos without realizing that the vanguard elements of the 3rd Parachute Battalion were still west of the position. Under these circumstances he was hit by Argentine fire but was able to escape, but his escort, a Gazelle helicopter from the 3rd Commando Brigade, was shot down and fell into the water, killing one crew member. A few minutes later another Gazelle was hit and fell to the ground, killing its two crew members.



The British version does not mention infantry combat in the positions east of Puerto San Carlos and suggests that the helicopters were not intended to attack the Argentine troops, but rather fell into enemy fire due to carelessness and had to open fire to defend themselves. He also says that the helicopters hit by the Argentines were three and not four, although he agrees that two of them were destroyed.

To Dawn

The Landing Continous

The English landed the reserve (42nd Command) in Puerto San Carlos to reinforce the 3rd Battalion. Meanwhile, the other light tanks and field artillery were disembarked, along with the anti-aircraft defenses.
The two Argentine factions remained in their positions, without their presence being able to prevent the British landing. Esteban's report mentions continuous naval and mortar fire on his position, but the basic objective of his mission was accomplished, since he had raised the alarm about the enemy's landing operation.
As a result of this alarm, the Argentines sent an Aermacchi MB-339 fighter plane from Puerto Argentino on a reconnaissance mission, which (around 10:00) confirmed the magnitude of the British landing and carried out a daring attack against the frigate “HMS Argonaut”. which caused some damage. The Argentine pilot, Lieutenant Crippa, was decorated for this reconnaissance and attack mission.
Once the information about the landing was confirmed by Crippa, the Argentine aviation launched all its available potential against the beach head, but this is part of what is known as the Battle of the Strait of San Carlos.
Meanwhile, the landing perimeter had its first victory by shooting down an Argentine Pucará attack plane. This had been sent from Darwin and was shot down by SAS D Squadron over the Sussex Mountains in the morning.


Situation at the end of the day (May 21, 1982)

Consolidation

The two Argentine factions, cut off from each other, remained in the area until the hours of darkness, when it would be easier for them to break contact with the enemy. Esteban's men left Puerto San Carlos marching through Cerro Bombilla and arrived at Douglas Paddock on May 24. There they managed to reestablish communication with Puerto Argentino, from where helicopters were sent to pick them up. They were then sent back into combat at Darwin-Goose Green, where they were taken prisoner when the garrison capitulated.
As for the Support Section, a group of 11 soldiers managed to evade the British encirclement, while the rest were captured. Those who managed to leave the area marched through the northern part of Soledad Island, avoiding British airmobile patrols and also contact with the islanders. On June 14, this faction, under the command of Reyes, learned the news of the Argentine capitulation in the archipelago and came out into the open, surrendering to the British.
Thompson ordered the general landing to continue at a sustained pace, and a field hospital was established and the Rapier anti-aircraft missile batteries were deployed. The landing continued even after the Argentine air attacks began, and the English marines and paratroopers did not stop patrolling and reinforcing their perimeter. At the end of the day some 3,000 English soldiers were already on the ground.

 

Aftermath

The British forces commanded by Brigadier Thompson managed to establish a firm beachhead to prevent Argentine ground counterattacks, but these did not occur. The Argentine strategy of rejecting the landing with aviation transferred the fight to the air-naval level, allowing the English troops to be permanently reinforced.
The San Carlos combat was small in magnitude and significance. The Argentines had no means to defend the beach or prevent the landing, but instead presented a determined but formal resistance, in accordance with their main mission, which was to raise the alarm if an enemy landing occurred. The casualties caused to the British meant an extra moral victory, but did not affect the landing operation; However, the combat that occurred showed the English that the defenders could be tenacious, and convinced them of the need to reinforce the perimeter because an Argentine ground operation was not ruled out. The British decided not to underestimate the enemy.
The English landing in San Carlos was carried out with great precision and organization, even when combat was ongoing east of Puerto San Carlos and also when the air attacks began. The losses of helicopters during this action affected their mobility to a certain extent, but overall the casualties suffered in combat were not significant.
The British beachhead at San Carlos was consolidated and on May 26 the 2nd Parachute Battalion began the breakout to the south, leading against the Argentine garrison of Darwin-Goose Green. From there San Carlos stopped being a beachhead.

Notes 

1. These considerations were presented by the head of the Puerto Argentino Group, General Oscar Jofre, in his book “Malvinas, the defense of Puerto Argentino”, Editorial Sudamericana 1987
2. Cited in Kasanzew's book "Mavinas a Blood and Fire" (see bibliography).
3. In a combat situation it was normal for soldiers to confuse aircraft. On the other hand, Argentine troops had become accustomed to identifying all British helicopters with the Sea King and Sea Lynx models.

References

• Gambini, Hugo: Crónica Documental de las Malvinas, (incluye muchos documentos sobre la visión inglesa del conflicto). Editorial Redacción, Buenos Aires 1982. 
• Kasanzew, Nicolás: Malvinas a Sangre y Fuego. Editorial Abril, Buenos Aires 1982. 
• Jofre, Oscar: La defensa de Puerto Argentino (cita fuentes británicas en el relato de las acciones). Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires 1987. 
• Burden, Royden et al: Malvinas, la guerra aérea (edición argentina). Ediciones Open, Buenos Aires 1989. 

Wikipedia.es

Bell 47 D “Sioux” in the Argentine Navy

Bell 47 D “Sioux” 0289 / 2-HE-3

 
Two-seat transport and training helicopter

Dimensions
Length x rotor diameter x height: 8.33 x 10.72 x 2.89 meters.

Weight: 
Basic: 651 kg 
Maximum at take off 1067 kg. 

Performance: 
Max Speed: 159 km/h. 
Range: 360 km. 

Powerplant: 
One FRANKLIN 6V4-200-C32AB 200 SHP motor, main rotor with 2 blades. 

Avionics: 
AN/ARC 48 UHF 

Abstract: 
9 examples were acquired starting in 1949, which constituted the first helicopters of Naval Aviation. They operated until 1969 when they were transferred to the Argentine Naval Prefecture.


 

The museum specimen was incorporated in 1951 as 0289/1-HE-6, then 0289/2-HO-3 and finally 2-HE-3.
In service until 1965.
Delivered to MUAN on July 26, 1995.
Restored, with the missing original plexiglass dome, which could not be obtained. It remains on display in the Technology Hangar.

MUAN

"Tridente I" Combined Special Forces Exercise in 2012

Joint Drill of Army and Navy Special Forces

13-4-2012 | It was called Tridente I, it included tactical divers and special forces personnel from the Army's 601st Company, it lasted for a week of training in Mar del Plata and concluded with an amphibious exercise.
 

Mar del Plata - During the month of March, the joint exercise Tridente I was carried out, which included groups of tactical divers from the Argentine Navy and special forces from the 601st Commando Company of the Argentine Army.



The aforementioned training – which included theoretical-practical classes on combat health, shooting and nautical cartography, among others – took place at the facilities of the Mar del Plata Naval Base and concluded with an amphibious exercise in the waters of the South Atlantic.





Ending the exercise
The amphibious day of the Tridente I exercise began with the departure of the ARA submarine “Santa Cruz” from its natural base at the Mar del Plata Naval Base, followed by the ARA patrol boat “Punta Mogotes” and the support vessel ARA “Sobral”, both dependent on the Maritime Patrol Division.



The hypothesis that articulated the exercise proposed the formation of a joint peace force under the orders of the United Nations that had to act under Chapter 7 in order to recover a unit taken over by a hostile group from a country in crisis.



To do this, the joint special forces were divided into two groups: the first boarded the submarine with the mission of recovering the support vessel, where the second group was in a hostile role.



Already several miles out to sea, the exercise began, which included the assembly of two Zodiac boats on the back of the submarine, while “Punta Mogotes” remained immediate to provide support in case of contingency.




Then the boarding and recovery of the support vessel was carried out, which concluded with the reduction of the hostile group. At the end of the day, the special forces groups aboard the units returned to port.




“This was the closing of an intense training with our Army counterparts, with whom we have already worked on other occasions. We deployed as a single force, achieving all the proposed objectives,” said the Chief of Operations of the Tactical Divers Group, Lieutenant Raúl Closter.



For his part, and led by Major Gustavo Oliver, Sergeant Julián René Espinoza expressed that “this is the second time that I have participated in an exercise with tactical divers but the first time to sail in a submarine. A very different experience that included assembling a boat on that type of unit. And although the boarding of the ship had not been done before either, the procedures and techniques are similar to others that we practice on land, only the spaces are more confined.”



“I had to be a shooter and my objective along with two others was to recover the ship's machines. In this task, everything is experienced as something real, because you do not know how the personnel designated as hostile are going to act, you have to take care of yourself in every opening or opening because you do not know how they are going to defend themselves," said Julián, while concluding that “The procedures with tactical divers are very similar, especially for those of us who did training with the Halcón group of the Federal Police.”




Marine Maneuvers
In the case of the “Sobral” crew, the amphibious exercise was an opportunity to continue their annual training. As explained by its commander, Lieutenant Commander Juan Ángel Días Ballve, “we were able to exercise ourselves in basic techniques, maneuvers with boats, anchoring, coastal navigation, communications, things that the warning must do while participating in any type of operation, whether military or not. "We were able to contribute as a simulated unit under hostile capture and the amphibian helped us train in a lot of maneuvers that we can only do if we go out to sea."


Notice the first operator from the left using a Steyr MPi 69, a submachine used by the Tactical Divers Unit of the Argentine Navy. The first photo of this report shows an operator using FN P90 in 5.56mm, the replacement of the Steyr MPi 69.




Finally, summarizing the performance of his personnel, he said that “they have performed very well, it is the beginning of the year and there are many things to adjust but it is part of the training. What always stands out is that when people go out to sea they show great good will and that is part of achieving success in training.”














Gaceta Marinera

Triple Alliance War: Battle of Yatay

Battle of Yatay

Battle of Yatay - August, 17th 1865

The War of Paraguay can be divided into five campaigns: that of Matto Grosso, that of Uruguay, that of Humaitá, that of Pikysyry and that of the Cordilleras. In Matto Grosso's campaign, the Paraguayans took over the fortresses of Coimbra, Alburquerque, Corumbá, Miranda and Dorados. The second had as its objective Uruguay, where two columns of the Paraguayan army headed, through Corrientes and Río Grande, to expel the Brazilians and maintain the sovereignty of that country. The objective of the third - for the allies - was the capture of the stronghold that was the center of the Paraguayan resistance. The fourth is called that because it was developed on the fortified line of the Pikysyry stream, the second center of the resistance in Paraguay. The fifth was the one that took place after the battle of Lomas Valentinas, on the other side of the Cordilleras, to Cerro Corá.

At the beginning of the second campaign, Solano López left the capital to go and lead his armies. He thus left the Assumption forever. He would never enter her again, not allowing her the hazards of a war to the death or even contemplating her from a distance again.

In reality, at that moment - June 8, 1865 - his agony began, which was that of his country, as he was condemned to a cruel and irremediable death. Before leaving, he addressed a proclamation to the people, in which he implied that he was determined to abandon “the bosom of the Homeland,” to join “his comrades-in-arms in the campaign.”

But he arrived in Humaitá and changed his mind, under the influence of insinuating courtiers, such as Bishop Palacios, who ended up convincing him that this useless sacrifice should not be imposed, having at his side so many capable men who could very well replace him... He therefore installed , there his headquarters, establishing active telegraphic communication with the city of Corrientes, where José Berges exercised his representation.

General Wenceslao Robles had, meanwhile, gathered 30,000 men from all three arms and was in a position to march, without any difficulty, overcoming the small obstacles that he found in his path. At that time the general camp of the allies in Concordia had not yet been established, nor did they have troops capable of counteracting the action of Paraguay. No Paraguayan doubted the success of the enterprise entrusted to Robles, an experienced military man, who had given so much evidence of his brilliant organizational skills. But events soon dashed such optimistic hopes.

At the head of that powerful column, Robles felt inferior to his task, unable to act with the resolution and expertise that circumstances imposed on him. He wasted his time with futile pretexts, advancing extremely slowly, distracted by small, unimportant guerrillas. Thus he lost the unique opportunity given to him, giving all the advantages to the opponents. Finally, he entered into deals with the allies, paying with his life for the serious errors committed.

He was replaced by General Francisco Isidoro Resquín, who made his army countermarch, returning with him to Paraguayan territory. The failure of the Robles expedition determined the failure of the Estigarribia expedition. He, leading 12,000 men, invaded the State of Río Grande del Sud, following the line of Uruguay, to meet the other expeditionary column on the border of the Eastern Republic.

The timely arrival of Robles must have prevented the formation of the allied army that went out to defeat him, allowing him to easily subdue the Brazilians. But it didn't happen like that. Robles never reached the eastern border, not passing beyond the limits of Corrientes. Thanks to this, Miter was able to organize the army until he was in a position to defeat the Paraguayans.



Estigarribia really had to back down when he saw that the agreed plan had failed. But he was pushed forward by the numerous eastern leaders who accompanied him, who assured him that, upon reaching the border of his country, he would have the frank support of all Uruguayan compatriots.

Entering Uruguayana was for him entering a mousetrap. He was soon there surrounded by the already powerful allied army, having to succumb, defeated by hunger and death. A part of his army, which was marching along the right bank of the Uruguay River, under the command of Major Pedro Duarte, also succumbed, crushed by much superior forces.

In fact, on August 17, 1865, 3,500 Paraguayans, cavalry and infantry, fought battle, with 11,000 allies of the three arms, under the command of General Venancio Flores.

Despite his overwhelming enemy superiority, Estigarribia ironically rejected the proposal to surrender to the “liberators of his homeland.” “If VV.EE. (he said to the allied leaders) they are so zealous to give freedom to the Paraguayan people, why don't they start by giving freedom to the unhappy blacks of Brazil, who make up the majority of the population, and groan in the harshest and most frightening captivity to enrich and be idle for some of the hundreds of grandees of the Empire?”

After the defeat of the Paraguayans, Flores declared: “The Paraguayans are worse than savages in fighting, they prefer to die rather than surrender…”

Most of the prisoners were put to the sword (it is estimated that there were around 1,400) and the surviving soldiers were enlisted in the battalions of the allied army, thus forcing them to go against their homeland. Flores said: “The eastern battalions have suffered a great loss in Yatay, and I am determined to replace them with the Paraguayan prisoners, giving a part to General Paunero to increase his battalions, some of which are small.” Meanwhile, Argentine Vice President Dr. Marcos Paz adds: “General Flores has adopted a system of incorporating all prisoners into his ranks, and after reloading his battalion with them he has organized a new one of 500 places with pure Paraguayans.” .

The great oriental publicist, Carlos María Ramírez, protested in 1868 against the systematic repetition of the same event: “The prisoners of war,” he said, “have been distributed among the line corps and, under the flag and in the uniform of the allies, compelled to to turn their weapons against the defenders of their homeland. Never has the 19th century witnessed a greater outrage to the rights of nations, to humanity, to civilization!

In the Fifth Section, the Ombucito farm, there is a monolith that evokes the Battle of Yatay. This site was declared a Historic Site on February 4, 1942, by Law 12665, as stated in “Monuments and Historic Places” by Hernán Gómez. There a stream meanders, through bushes and grasslands, which empties into the Uruguay River. This landscape is adorned with elegant Yatay palm trees (Yatay means Palm Tree in Guaraní). They gave their name to the stream and the place. The toponym gave the name to the battle.

Source

Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado
O’Leary, Juan E. – El Mariscal Solano López – Asunción (1970).
Portal www.revisionistas.com.ar
Rosa, José María – La Guerra del Paraguay y las Montoneras Argentinas – Buenos Aires (1985).
Turone, Gabriel O. – La Batalla de Yatay – (2007)

Source: www.revisionistas.com.ar