Sunday, September 3, 2023

War of Paraguay: The Fall of Asunción

Brazilian entry to Asunción

 
On January 1, 1869, the Brazilians entered Asunción, unleashing a wave of unrestrained looting and chaos. In a matter of days, the city was inundated with a diverse and chaotic population, speaking a multitude of languages and dialects in its once-peaceful streets. Private homes were forcibly occupied and quickly rented out by the audacious individuals who had taken them over, demanding exorbitant rents for entire quarters and semesters in advance.

Makeshift hotels, inns, restaurants, entertainment venues, public dance halls, shops, stores, and sweet shops sprang up overnight, all thriving on the proceeds extracted from the 30,000 allied soldiers and countless tourists, opportunists, and curious onlookers who eagerly flocked to witness the downfall of a once-mighty nation.

These invaders stormed houses, competing to seize the most valuable spoils. It is astonishing how the efforts of generations could be obliterated in mere hours. As the day wore on, the streets became littered with furniture discarded as houses were set ablaze. In the afternoon, ships from Argentina appeared along the Paraguay River, eager to purchase the looted goods. Soldiers thronged the docks, bartering their ill-gotten gains for gold, leading to arguments and scuffles. The ships remained anchored, awaiting more plunder, while the soldiers continued their relentless pillaging. By nightfall, the fires from the ravaged neighborhoods cast an eerie glow on the thick black clouds overhead.

Men concealed their loot wherever they could, stuffing their saddlebags, cloaks, the interiors of their boots, and helmets with gold, silver, and precious metals. The following day, they advanced to another section of the city, setting it ablaze as well. They had already ransacked government offices, embassies, opulent residences, and humble abodes alike. It was then that the refugees began to return.

Most of these returnees were young women and girls or children left behind by the men who had perished on the battlefield. These vulnerable individuals ventured back to the city driven by hunger and the faint hope of finding shelter. However, the invaders pounced on them, subjecting them to physical assault, public humiliation, and sexual violence in the streets. They mercilessly raped these women, with lines of ten, twenty, or even thirty men taking turns on a single victim. The desperate cries of these victims echoed throughout the city, and there was no corner or alley in Asunción where a woman was safe from harassment. Those who resisted were ruthlessly killed on the spot.

The horrors did not cease with the onset of night, nor did they relent with the arrival of a new day. The tormentors only relented when the victims, drained of life and devoid of the strength to resist any longer, met their end with a look of bitter resignation on their faces.

And then the thirst for gold is revived again and the officials look greedily at the cemeteries of Asunción. Under his orders, the soldiers dig everyone up. Those who have a ring or chain are stripped without respect. The rest, they leave lying everywhere; bones and more bones piled up everywhere, restlessly dead, warming in the sun.

The Brazilian minister in Asunción himself, José da Silva Paranhos, who later received the title of Viscount of Rio Branco, seized the immense treasure from the National Archives of Paraguay which, after his death, he donated to the National Library of Rio de Janeiro, the catalog of the Rio Branco collection, which contains the public archives of Paraguay taken at the end of the war, consists of a thousand pages divided into two volumes. The collection consists of fifty thousand documents on the early history of Paraguay, Portuguese infiltration, questions of limits and dates, and facts about the history of the Río de la Plata. It would also contain the act of the Foundation of the City of Asunción in 1537 and all the archives of the Jesuit Missions with the first geographical map of Paraguay, established before 1800 by the famous Spanish geographer Félix de Azara.

For three days the city was robbed by the imperial hosts, who did not spare the temples or the tombs, in their barbarous eagerness to increase their booty. Admiral Delfino de Carvallo himself - Baron del Pasaje - directed the looting, accumulating on the decks of his ships the pianos and fine furniture that adorned Paraguayan aristocratic homes. And when there was nothing important to steal, they even took the doors, windows and marbles of the López palace (2) and many houses and public buildings. In a word, Asunción, according to General Garmendia, "suffered the fate of the vanquished of distant times, the victor entering it by sack."

Many children were torn from their mothers' arms to end up sold as slaves on the plantations of Brazil. Everyone is running for their lives, and the once-populous Paraguayan capital is left deserted. “It was pitiful to see the city completely devoid of human beings,” says Brazilian colonel José Luis Da Silva.




The National Archive of Paraguay, with centuries of history inside, burns in flames. “El Paraguayo” from Asunción, in its edition of October 10, 1945, thus recalled the burning and looting of such vital documentation. “The archives of Paraguay were looted by the invaders during the War of the Triple Alliance. We lack many documents, even to reconstruct our history, and we can affirm that when our Archive was stripped, all those documents that could compromise the historical version that was forged were selected to take away all hope of vindication”.

Like the headquarters of the Archive, houses and public buildings are also looted, one by one, carefully and without haste. “The officers made use of the houses and things” points out the aforementioned Brazilian colonel.

The Argentine army camped five kilometers from the city, in Trinidad. And to be worthy of his ally, he turned the temple of that town into a stable, setting up a stable on the very grave of Carlos Antonio López. Soon the tombstone disappeared under the dung of the spirited steeds of the officers, substituting the noise of neighing for the voices of the organ and the prayers of the believers.

Just like "in the distant times" when Asia spread its barbarism, like a bloody shroud, over dying Europe. Breaking in and turning Christian churches into dunghills was the great pleasure of the men of the North. And no other was the delight of those terrible warriors, at whose step the earth trembled, led by the Scourge of God.

History repeats itself. Man is within men. Humanity advances, but has not yet finished leaving the cave. Ferocity boils in the depths of instinct, and there are moments when the beast that has crouched for centuries, dominated, but not defeated, leaps to the surface.
 
This is how peoples who called themselves Christians and men who invoked altruistic sentiments of humanity, fell into crime, reproducing, through an ancestral movement of inborn barbarism, acts that are repugnant to our conscience and that seemed already far from history. And all that was still nothing. The war was just about to enter a really wild period.

Meanwhile, Marshal López was preparing to resume the resistance. When he returned to occupy the old camp of Cerro León, after his last defeat, he had no more strength than his omnipotent will. All Paraguayan defensive power was concentrated in his person, a moral fortress more fearsome than the artillery walls of Humaitá. To no avail, the Duke of Caxías declared the war over.

The twenty thousand victorious soldiers, entrenched in Asunción, knew very well that as long as the Paraguayan president remained standing, the fight was not over.

When Count D'Eu, who came to replace the Duke of Caixas, arrived in Asunción, he found a great demoralization of the allied troops. The solemn Te Deum commanded to be sung by Caixas, celebrating the end of the war, had fallen into immense ridicule. The discouragement was general.




Benigno López Palace (Asunción, 1869). Source



 

 

No Brazilian boss had wanted to take responsibility for a single initiative. And, meanwhile, López grew at a distance. From one moment to the next, a surprise was expected, believing him capable of extracting resources from nothing. And there Juan Bautista Alberdi had time to say in Europe that at that time Paraguay had its “second and most powerful army in what are called its mountains. They are the Andes –he added- of the new Chacabuco and the new San Martín, against the new Bourbons of America”.
In the battle of Lomas Valentinas the invalids and children had fought, loading the cannons with pieces of stone and even with earth. Three months after that defeat, Paraguay again had an army of thirteen thousand men, relatively well armed and equipped.

The wounded of the last battle threw themselves by the hundreds into the immense estuary of Ypecuá, crossing it, with water up to their necks, for three days, without eating, and joining Solano López in Cerro León. And all those who could still walk or carry a rifle rushed from the farthest reaches of the republic to surround the unfortunate hero who was holding the Paraguayan flag.

Weapons abandoned on the battlefields are collected, another arsenal is assembled, iron is cast, cannons are drilled, gunpowder and paper are manufactured, a newspaper is published, schools start operating again, the compulsory primary education law is in force, children Soldiers attend classes. And the Ybycuí foundry and the Caacupé arsenal worked tirelessly to arm that strange army, taking advantage of the scandalous indecision of the more than prudent victor. Despite Asunción having fallen, the war was not yet over.

References 

(1) On February 22, 1869, at 4:00 p.m., Francisco Solano López issued an edict ordering the evacuation of Asunción, it was then that all the Asunción families that still had some jewelry and metal money, ran to deposit them in the legation of the United States of America, in charge of Minister Carlos A. Washburn as well as in the consulates of France and Italy.

(2) The Palacio de los López is the seat of government of the Republic of Paraguay, since the official office of the President of the Republic is located there. It is one of the most beautiful and emblematic buildings of the Paraguayan capital, Asunción. Its location is on Paraguayo Independiente street, between Ayolas (before Paraná) and O'Leary (before Paso de Patria). Located in the center of Asunción, overlooking the bay, this building was built by order of President Carlos Antonio López, to serve as a residence for his son, General Francisco Solano López, hence the fact that the name of the building is "Palace of the Lopez". Its works began in 1857 under the direction of the English architect Alonso Taylor.
In the first half of the 19th century, Lázaro Rojas gave his baptismal godson Francisco López the property where the palace is located. After his famous trips to Europe, Francisco Solano brought several architects and engineers with him, who helped develop works of progress in the country. By order of Carlos Antonio López, President of the Republic since 1842, one of these works was the residence of his son. The construction, planned by the Hungarian Francisco Wisner, began directed by the English architect Alonso Taylor in 1857.

The materials for the construction of the palace came from various places in the interior of the country, stones from the quarries of Emboscada and Altos, wood and obrajes from Ñeembucú and Yaguarón, bricks from Tacumbú, cast iron pieces in Ybycuí, etc.

Various European artists came to Paraguay to be in charge of decorating the building. Artists such as the English engineer Owen Mognihan who was in charge of sculpting the necessary figures to create a palatial environment, the Italian Andrés Antonini who came to Paraguay exclusively to design and establish the marble staircase of the Palace that connects to the second floor, the painter Julio Monet, French, who painted the ceiling with floral decorations and figures.

By 1867, the time of the War of the Triple Alliance, the Palacio de los López was almost finished, although finishing details were lacking for its conclusion. The decoration was made of bronze statuettes and furniture imported from Paris, and large and decorated mirrors for the halls of the Palace. During the seven years that the Brazilians occupied Asunción, the Palace served as their forces' headquarters. After they abandoned it, the building was left in a state of abandonment. It was during the government of Juan Alberto González that the great restoration works of the Palace began, which lasted only two years. The building ended up regaining its former glory.


Source

  • Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado 
  • Estragó, Margarita Durán – Homenaje al pueblo de Patiño, en el centenario de su fundación (1909- 2009) 
  • O’Leary,Juan E. – El mariscal Solano López 
  • Rivarola Matto, J. Bautista – Diagonal de sangre: la historia y sus alternativas en la Guerra del Paraguay. 


www.revisionistas.com.ar 




Brazilian entrance to Asunción

Friday, September 1, 2023

1955 Revolution: The Conspiracy Resumes

The conspiracy resumes






The days that followed the uprising were full of tension and expectation. The balance of the damage and the count of deaths and injuries had the population plunged into deep consternation as the national and foreign press echoed the terrible events, clearly reflecting (especially the foreign one) the events that occurred.
The armed confrontations and the bombardment of the city produced a balance of 380 fatalities that rose to almost 400 in later days and almost a thousand wounded. Nine grenadiers fell during the defense of Government House[1]. Thirty-two others suffered injuries of varying degrees, as well as two officers from the “Buenos Aires” Motorized Regiment and seven from the 3rd Infantry Regiment, which also had a general and a soldier killed, the former when he was trying to reunite with his unit.
The government ordered a series of raids and raids, which resulted in numerous arrests, both of the military and of civilians and religious, who were taken to the Villa Devoto prison to await a sentence.
While the population tried to recover from the terrible events that had taken place in the Federal Capital, pilgrimages were organized to the burned temples and the CGT ordered a general strike for the 17th, as a sign of mourning and in support of the government.



Destruction in the church of Nuestra Señora de Lourdes in Bahía Blanca
(Pictures: Miguel Ángel Cavallo: Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. La Marina se subleva)

That day, before a crowd that filled Plaza de Mayo, Perón addressed the citizens to once again ask for calm and deplore the excesses that occurred during the fight. In the afternoon, at 5:00 p.m., he met in full with his cabinet in order to propose his definitive departure, a decision that those present categorically rejected, especially Governor Aloé and the CGT representatives, arguing, among other things, that this would be give in to the insurrection.
What did occur was a change of officials (almost all questioned by the opposition), necessary to appease the spirits, the first of them, the Minister of the Interior, Ángel Borlenghi, removed from his duties on the advice of the main government advisers.
As was to be expected, the high commands of the Navy, important heads of the Air Force and numerous Army officers were removed. The Punta Indio Naval Air Base was canceled and the 4th Marine Infantry Battalion together with the 2nd Air Naval Force were dissolved.
By decision of the high command, the planes from the Comandante Espora Naval Air Base were disarmed, their ammunition deposited in Puerto Belgrano and their fuzes sent to the Zárate Arsenal.
The VII Fighter Air Brigade based in Morón was suspended and reorganized as the Military Aeronautical Detachment[2], appointing Commodore Ricardo Alberto Accinelli as its first commander. As the CONINTES plan was still in force, the personnel of the new entity remained quartered by thirds while its headquarters adopted, as a first measure, to repatriate the air material that the rebel pilots had taken to Uruguay [3].
Of the thirty-nine planes used by the rebels during the actions, twenty-three landed at the Carrasco International Airport in Montevideo; six did so at the Colonia aerodrome, seven at the Boiso Lanza military base, one was shot down by the Air Force, another crashed in Tristán Suárez, a third fell due to lack of fuel in the Río de la Plata between Carmelo and Colonia and a fourth landed in the middle of the countryside, near the civilian airfield of Melilla, north of Montevideo, without being able to deploy its landing gear due to sabotage.
On June 17, the government proceeded to erase the traces of the battle, detonating the bombs that remained unexploded, which filled the unsuspecting passers-by who were circulating nearby with fear.
The plotted leaders were put on trial before specially constituted military courts and the most severe penalties were expected for them. During one of the interrogations, an event occurred that once again shocked public opinion.


Perón, on the right, observes the damage to the Government House

Officers Julio César Cáceres and Dardo Eugenio Ferreyra were testifying before Commodore Luis Lapuente, head of the Information and Aeronautical Safety Service, when in a moment of carelessness, the latter, shouting "Long live the Homeland!", threw himself to the void from the third floor where he was appearing, without achieving his goal of taking his own life because he fell on a plastic roof on the ground floor that cushioned the blow. He was hospitalized in serious condition at the Aeronautical Hospital where they continued to interrogate him without considering his condition.
Argentine aircraft began to be returned by decision of the Uruguayan government as of June 21, but not their pilots, who remained in the neighboring country magnificently cared for by the authorities and the people of the East. And it is that Uruguay felt on itself all the pressure that the Justicialista regime had been applying since 1946, as a result of the protection that Montevideo offered its opponents when they sought refuge in its territory. This hostility manifested itself in the closure of border crossings, the sale of meat and cereals at lower prices in international markets and the latent threat of an attack, especially the bombing of Radio Colonia due to its strong anti-Peronist campaign.
The first two aircraft returned by Uruguay were the Gloster Meteor I-031 and I-098 piloted by Commander Eduardo Catalá and First Lieutenant Antonio Corradini respectively, the first with a rivet that covered the impact of an anti-aircraft projectile. Three days later, on June 24, 1955, I-094 arrived under the command of Captain Daniel Aubone and I-058 under First Lieutenant José Lembi, and in later days, I-029 and I-064 arrived. the first aboard a Bristol 170 Freigther. The total number of naval aircraft was reintegrated in a staggered manner[4].
On July 21, the brand new Aeronautical Department of Morón began to report directly to the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, organizing at the same time the incorporation of new officers from different units[5]. A week later, the government decided to reactivate the VI Air Brigade based in Tandil, appointing Brigadier Juan C. Ríos and head of Group 2 of Interceptor Fighter[6].


Vandals have razed the Cathedral of Bahía Blanca
(Pictures: Miguel Ángel Cavallo: Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. La Marina se subleva)


Serious Damage to the Inmaculado Corazón de María (Bahía Blanca)
(Pictures: Miguel Ángel Cavallo: Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. La Marina se subleva)


Fire and destruction in the newsroom of "Democracia", an opposition newspaper from Bahía Blanca
(Pictures: Miguel Ángel Cavallo: Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. La Marina se subleva)


Luis E. Vera, director of "Democracia" (wearing a raincoat) observes the damage in the newsroom
(Pictures: Miguel Ángel Cavallo: Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. La Marina se subleva)

But despite the defeat, the arrests and raids, and ignoring the threats, pressures and raids, the Navy officers led by Navy Captain Arturo H. Rial and Lieutenant Commander Carlos Pujol at the head, they launched the second phase of the movement through an informal talk that they held at the offices of the Directorate of Naval Schools located at Florida 610, corner of Paraná. In later days, they were joined by other officers and noncommissioned officers of the weapon, highlighting among them Lieutenant Horacio Mayorga and Captains Jorge Gallastegui, Juan Carlos Duperré, Carlos Sánchez Sañudo and Jorge Palma, who began to organize clandestine meetings, tending to shape the motion.
A whole network of espionage and counterespionage was launched with the firm purpose of reactivating the revolution. It was extended to the main naval bases in the country, especially those of Puerto Belgrano and Comandante Espora, where they began to work very cautiously to obtain the commitment of the Sea Fleet, the Marine Infantry forces and the Naval Aviation. dependent on the Naval Maritime Area. Captain Jorge E. Perren was appointed to lead the uprising in that sector, although the true leader of this second phase would be Rear Admiral Isaac Francisco Rojas, who had just arrived from Brazil in those days, where he had performed duties at the Argentine embassy. , to take charge of the direction of the Naval-Military School based at the Río Santiago Naval Base. And it was he who was addressed by the conspirators to expressly request that he take command of the Navy during the actions that were to take place in the month of September.
On June 23, Perón spoke again on the national network to refer to the events of the 16th, minimizing the acts of vandalism against temples and institutions that had taken place shortly after the end of the hostilities. Four days later, some of the Catholic militants who had been arrested during the defense of the Cathedral began to be released and on the 28th of the same month, the main temple of the city of Buenos Aires resumed its religious services, in what was a massive ceremony. .
That same day, in San Miguel Arcángel, Monsignor Miguel Ángel de Andrea entered the temple on his knees while being applauded by the audience. During the services, he promised to wear black clothes instead of purple, as a sign of mourning for the dead, the wounded and the permanent grievances that the Argentine Catholic Church was suffering.
In the month of July, on the occasion of the feast of Saint Peter and Saint Paul, Perón sent his respects to Pope Pius XII who, in response, told him that he hoped with all his heart that the Lord would guide his steps so that the Argentine people could freely profess their faith.
Where the discontent slowly began to be perceived was in the ranks of the Army, a force that during the day of June 16 had maintained its absolute fidelity to the person of the first president. The latest events had called many of its officers to reflection and thus, in the days that followed the bombardment, a silent plot in favor of the revolution was launched, agreeing to carry out the first surveys with elements of the Navy. The persecution of the Church and the burning of the national flag had badly predisposed large sectors of the military, encouraged by nationalist civilians opposed to the government who worked hard to establish contact between elements of the three weapons.


General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu

Senior Army officers, including General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, Colonels Eduardo Señorans and Arturo Ossorio Arana, Captain Ramón Eduardo Molina and Major Juan Francisco Guevara, began efforts to establish contact with the Air Force because it was known that Despite being a force extremely addicted to the person of the president, there were numerous officers who were willing to join the movement, such as Commodore Julio César Krausse and Captains Luis A. Bianchi and Orlando Capellini.
In the month of July several demonstrations against Perón took place, in one of which the radical youth militant Alfredo Prat was killed as a victim of police repression. Days later, the Democratic Party issued a statement harshly criticizing the government, denouncing the climate of fear in which the citizenry lived, placing special emphasis on the need for a total amnesty.
On the 15th of that month there were a series of resignations in the government as a result of certain statements by the president regarding the course his revolution was taking. Among them, the one of the Vice President of the Nation, Rear Admiral Alberto Teissaire, replaced by the Buenos Aires national deputy Dr. Alejandro H. Leloir and that of several ministers and secretaries, stood out especially.
On the 21st, the conservative leader Dr. Pablo González Bergez was arrested. Shortly after, the lifeless body of Dr. Juan Ingalinella, a communist militant who disappeared on June 17, tortured and murdered by the Rosario police, was thrown into the Paraná River. A massive student demonstration took place in Córdoba and numerous protests in favor of freedom and justice were held in Buenos Aires, harshly repressed by the forces of order.
Faced with such a climate, the government agreed, for the first time in many years, to grant opposition parties radio slots to express their points of view. The first to speak was Dr. Arturo Frondizi, head of the Radical Civic Union, who on July 27 gave an energetic speech on Radio Belgrano that ended with cheers and greetings from a multitude of followers who were waiting for him in the streets.
The conspiracy, meanwhile, continued, with the frigate captains Aldo Molinari and Jorge Palma acting as liaisons with elements of the Army. Rojas, for his part, had his own "undercover agents" in the persons of frigate lieutenants Oscar Ataide, his personal secretary, and Jorge Isaac Anaya, through whom he learned of the development of events and conveyed his points of view. of the.
It happened that around those days an event took place in Puerto Belgrano that served to give impetus to the conspiracy and speed up its preparations.
By decision of the government, all the munitions that had been withdrawn from the rebel units after June 16, were sent to that destination together with the naval planes recovered from Uruguay, thus reinforcing, and unexpectedly, the potential of unit fire. The sudden decision led the rebel commanders to adopt hasty measures, one of which was the accelerated construction of special fuzes to replace those that had been withdrawn and sent to the Zárate arsenal and the putting into operation of the naval planes.
Meanwhile, Army cadres continued to work actively on the complex mission of attracting followers, although with great difficulty given the extreme surveillance to which the weapon was being subjected.
In the province of San Luis, headquarters of the II Army Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Gustavo Eppens moved tirelessly, assisted by a significant number of officers. The unit was commanded by General Julio Alberto Lagos, a well-known nationalist stance and affiliated with the Peronist movement from the outset, so each move had to be made with great caution. For their part, in the Cuyo Mountain Group based in the city of Mendoza, several of its leaders tried to neutralize the marked pro-government position of the commander, General Héctor Raviolo Audisio, and his deputy, Colonel Ricardo Botto. The group was divided into four powerful detachments, Botto being head of No. 3 based in Callingasta, province of San Juan.
The conspirators were joined by Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Elizondo, head of the 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Group; Major Armando Aguirre, head of the “General Espejo” Military High School; the senior military instruction judge Enzo Garutti, all of them bound for Mendoza; Lieutenant Colonel Mario A. Fonseca, head of the San Juan Mountain Detachment 3 and General Eugenio Arandía, chief of the Cuyo Army General Staff, based in San Luis. On that side, it only remained to probe the position of General Lagos and then decide what to do about it.
While General Aramburu made feverish efforts to incorporate people, two other figures of importance within the ranks of Army officers, General Juan José Uranga and Colonel Héctor Solanas Pacheco.

In Córdoba, for his part, Colonel Arturo Ossorio Arana was actively conspiring while the revolutionary civilian commandos worked actively, serving as liaisons between the different military groups. His main operations centers in the city of Buenos Aires were the home of Dr. Eduardo Fauzón Sarmiento and the notary office of his brother Jorge, located on the 4th floor of Cerrito 512.
An unexpected event that somewhat puzzled the conspirators was the surprise addition to their ranks of General Dalmiro Videla Balaguer, whom everyone thought was a fervent supporter of Perón. That caused suspicions and some concern since there was more than one conspirator who supposed the high official, a spy at the service of the government.


General Eduardo Lonardi

What had happened to cause such a sudden decision? Something simple. The fidelity of the San Juan general towards the figure of the first president had begun to crack due to the persecution unleashed against the Catholic Church. Videla Balaguer was a deeply devoted man and from the moment the mob razed the main temples of the capital, a kind of internal struggle took place in him that led him to the difficult situation of having to make a choice.
It was during his visit to the ruins of the church of San Ignacio, in the company of his wife, that seeing so much desolation he decided to join the revolution.
He did so, after contemplating that terrible spectacle and praying before the ruined image of Santa Teresa, shortly before his return to Córdoba.
Another who decided to turn to the movement, motivated by similar causes, was General Julio Alberto Lagos who, after a second meeting with Aramburu in Buenos Aires, pledged his word and after a few days of reflection, confirmed his support. . He did so during a meeting with Colonel Señorans, shortly before the high command decided to replace him with General José María Sosa Molina, brother of the Minister of Defense and a man of Perón's absolute confidence.
The one who remained confined in his home, without being involved in the preparations, was Major General Eduardo Lonardi, arrested and retired after the frustrated uprising of 1951.
Neither Señorans nor Aramburu had a good relationship with him and if he was taken into account at some point it was at the insistence of his friend, Colonel Arturo Ossorio Arana and Dr. Fauzón Sarmiento, who had a hard time agreeing to an interview between they. Aramburu was the one who objected the most, arguing that the aforementioned was a retired officer, lacking authority.

-Here we need a general with command over the troops. There are thousands of retired anti-Peronist officials – he said at a meeting.

The meeting with Aramburu and Lonardi took place at the Military Hospital, where both went to visit General Roberto Nazar, who was hospitalized there. On the occasion, Lonardi stated that he was willing to subordinate himself, but Aramburu replied curtly that he was not leading any plot.

In July, the Sea Fleet was maneuvering off the San Matías Gulf when it detected the presence of foreign ships in jurisdictional waters. Almost at the same time, naval planes intercepted radio messages in English, which were recorded and immediately sent to the high command of the Navy in Puerto Belgrano.
To the astonishment of the officers, they were ignored, which is why the disturbing version began to circulate that British or American ships were monitoring the movements of the Navy at the request of the government, a version that caused indignation and uncertainty at all levels of government. the institution. That fear seemed to be confirmed when Admiral Guillermo Brown ordered the dispersal of the Naval Aviation and the closure of the Comandante Espora Base, in order to neutralize the force, openly showing that the Navy was disturbing the government authorities and continued in the look at the Peronist leadership. Faced with those extreme measures, Lieutenant Commander Eduardo A. Estivariz requested his retirement.
On August 18, 1955, the public learned of the ruling of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces that judged the soldiers who rose up on June 16. Rear Admiral Samuel Toranzo Calderón was sentenced to capital punishment with degradation, in accordance with the provisions of article No. 63, paragraph 1 of the Code of Military Justice, news that shocked the public.
In view of this, General Juan Heriberto Molinuevo dispatched the court secretary, Colonel Juan C. Villafañe to inform Perón of the news, but when the president heard the ruling, he was final in his decision.

-Son, I don't shoot anyone. Let Molinuevo find a way to avoid it..

Suddenly, the man who instigated the masses to “give firewood”, to “hang with barbed wire” and to “kill their enemies”, showed a prudent and humanitarian facet. A lot of people, within the Armed Forces, were really taken aback.
Almost all those involved were sentenced to indefinite prison terms and sent to the Santa Rosa prison, La Pampa province, where they would remain locked up for the next two months.

With the conspiracy underway, the Army and Navy conspirators held frequent meetings at the home of Dr. Fauzón Sarmiento, in the heart of the Belgrano neighborhood, guarded by a group of retired officers under the command of Colonel Ladislao Fernández Castellanos. Colonels Francisco Zerda, Arturo Ossorio Arana and Eduardo Señorans, Major Juan Francisco Guevara, Captain Tomás Sánchez de Bustamante, Navy Captain Arturo Rial and Frigate Captain Jorge J. Palma attended them.
General Aramburu was to attend the first of these conclaves, but a last-minute call from Father Septimio Walsh warned him that he was being watched twenty-four hours a day and, therefore, it was not prudent for him to move.
The plotters became aware of what was happening and drew up a plan. It was decided that the army staff should wait for the pronouncement of the Army, which was still looking for a firm hand to take command, and then Ossorio Arana stated that if he had to take charge of Córdoba, he wanted to tell General Lonardi, since he was the chief with higher hierarchy within the weapon. His request was listened to carefully and no one objected.
Days later, General Lucero removed Aramburu, passing him from his position at the head of the Health Directorate to that of head of the National Defense School.
Aside from the seditious activities, from the residence of Dr. Fauzón Sarmiento and other private homes, the civilian commandos began their preparations to collaborate with the rebel forces, either as support troops, as liaisons or contributing their assistance in any activity that was entrusted to them.
A group of them, led by the engineer Roque Carranza and made up of retired officers such as Captain Walter Viader and Vice Commodore Jorge Rojas Silveyra, dedicated themselves to making homemade bombs with gelinite. Other meetings were held at the Colegio Nuestra Señora del Huerto, run by Father Walsh, where thousands of pamphlets were printed, engineers Florencio Arnaudo, Carlos Burundarena and Manuel Gómez Carrillo working actively on it together with retired officer Edgardo García Puló, Raúl Puigbó, who was permanently wanted by the police at that time, and Adolfo Sánchez Zinny. In the command led by Captain Aldo Luis Molinari, Héctor Eduardo Bergalli, Roberto Etchepareborda and other radical militants acted, groups that were entrusted with the mission of taking over and disabling the radios.
In the civil command of the parish of Santo Cristo (Espíritu Santo), Captain Carlos Fernández was in charge of a large group of militants among whom were Alberto Pechemiel, Martín Cires Irigoyen and the lawyer Ismael Carlos Gutiérrez Pechemiel, the three of whom are relatives General Benjamin Menendez. Alberto Pechemiel was the husband of Ángela Menéndez, the niece of the famous soldier, and together with her, he acted as a liaison during the frustrated uprising of 1951, suffering both prison, home invasions and physical attacks.
While the intertwined network of espionage took place, acts of violence continued to worsen the climate throughout the nation.
On August 12, a Catholic demonstration that was headed for the Santo Domingo church was attacked by members of the Nationalist Liberation Alliance at a time when it reached the corner of Florida and Av. Corrientes, resulting in many of its members being detained. Two days later, the police raided several homes to arrest the members of an opposition group organized at the UBA Law School and several armed youths were detained aboard a jeep when it was driving through the heart of the Recoleta neighborhood, the same Religion teacher Sara Mackintosh, laid off since May[7].
On August 17, a crowded demonstration took place in Plaza San Martín, on the occasion of a new anniversary of the death of the Liberator, an act in which insults of all kinds were launched against Perón and his government. Once again the Nationalist Liberation Alliance attacked the demonstrators, wounding a young man named Menéndez Behety with a knife.
The air was getting rarer in the main epicenters of the country and everything seemed to presage new outbreaks of violence.


Notes

  1. Among those nine grenadiers were the conscripts Pedro H. Baigorria and Héctor Leónidas Paz, whose bodies were deposited in the Ramos Mejía Hospital.
  2. Resolution 519/55 dated June 20, 1955 and published in the Boletín Aeronáutico Nº 922.
  3. A. Marino, J. Mosquera, G. Gebel, V. Cettolo, H. Claria, G. Posaba, Gloster Meteor FMk IV en la Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Avialatina.
  4. Idem.
  5. Published in the Boletín Aeronáutico Nº 1002.
  6. On July 28, 1955.
  7. Opposition pamphlets were found at his home


1955 Guerra Civil. La Revolucion Libertadora y la caída de Perón

Wednesday, August 30, 2023

Malvinas: Argentine Navy Mobilization

Malvinas 30-years - Argentine Navy Mobilization 

William Poggio




After the landing of Argentine marines on the island of South Georgia on March 23, 1982 to protect Davidoff's employees, the Argentine military junta mobilized the military in "Operation Rosario." For the recovery of the Malvinas, the Argentine Navy organized the Amphibious Task Group 40 (TF 40). This naval force was organized as follows:

Task Force 40.1 - Landing Force

Task Force 40.2. - Transport Group



  • ARA San Antonio (NDCC) 
  • ARA Almirante Irizar (icebreaker) 
  • ARA Isla de los Estado (logistic support) 

Task Force 40.3. - Escort Group



  • ARA Hércules (DDG Type 42) 
  • ARA Santísima Trinidad (DDG Type 42) 
  • ARA Drummond (corvette A69) 
  • ARA Granville (corvette A69) 

Task Force 40.4. - Special Forces Group



  • ARA Santa Fe (Guppy-class submarine) 

In addition to the M 40, the M was also formed for 20 years whose purpose was to provide cover for the Amphibious Task Force. The FT 20 was organized as follows:

ARA 25 de Mayo (S2E Tracker 3, 3A-4Q Skyhawk, Alouette 3 y SH-3D Sea King) 

Escort Group



  • ARA Comodoro Py (Destroyer) 
  • ARA Hipólito Bouchard (Destroyer
  • ARA Piedrabuena (Destroyer
  • ARA Punta Dunas (Tanker) 

The United Kingdom did not observe the Argentine movements with crossed arms. In addition to presenting the South Georgia HMS Endurance with 22 Royal Marines aboard the British Government made the decision to send nuclear attack submarines (SSN) to the South Atlantic. This decision would be crucial for the military actions that followed.


Poder Naval




 

Monday, August 28, 2023

AA: Prospective of Argentine Armored and Mechanized Forces

The prospective role of our armored and mechanized forces

Lieutenant Colonel Guillermo Horacio Eduardo Lafferriere.


The Persian Gulf conflict of 2003, as well as the ongoing actions of allied forces in Iraq up to the time of this writing, provide valuable insights into how we should envision employing our armored and mechanized troops (referred to as TBM) in future combat operations. This necessitates a comprehensive analysis that draws from recent conflict experiences and involves the formulation of scenarios wherein our TBM units could be effectively utilized. Crucially, this analysis must be conducted with complete impartiality to ensure that our insights contribute meaningfully to the overall effectiveness of our armed forces, rather than merely reinforcing pre-existing institutional beliefs.



Allow us to provide a brief observation that will lay the foundation for our forthcoming discussion on the operational role of TBM (armored and mechanized troops). The events during the Iraq operations in 2003 once again underscored a recurring phenomenon in conflicts since World War II. It has become increasingly evident that on today's modern battlefield, the utilization of large-scale airborne forces for combat operations with a reasonable chance of success is no longer feasible. For instance, in Iraq, we witnessed the deployment of a military force comprising nearly a thousand personnel in the northern region. However, this deployment starkly contrasted with the massive actions undertaken by the Allies in North Africa and Western Europe during World War II[1]. The primary reason behind this shift is the vulnerability of airborne forces to enemy aircraft and missile threats when attempting the type of operations that were once commonplace in earlier conflicts.

This shift doesn't negate the necessity of having infantry units capable of penetrating deep into enemy territory; it merely necessitates a change in the approach to achieve this objective. What we aim to convey here is that the landscape has evolved for TBMs, requiring them to reevaluate their doctrine to ensure efficient operations in future combat scenarios.

How do we traditionally see the use of TBMs?

We believe that in the environment of TBMs, the use of them continues to be glimpsed, in a similar way to what was put into practice in the Second World War in different German and allied campaigns; Israel Defense Force operations carried out in Sinai in their various campaigns from independence to 1973; or what the allies did in Kuwait and Iraq in 1991 and recently in Iraq at the beginning of the campaign. This image, so deeply rooted, sometimes seems not to adequately perceive the changes that were taking place even in the aforementioned conflicts, and it seems that all that remains is the somewhat romantic idea of masses of TBMs, moving at high speed, over flat and uncovered terrain. , in the direction of a vulnerable point of the enemy.

This idea, unfortunately, has suffered the same attack as the massive airborne operations. It is not viable to even be conceived if the enemy we must face has a minimum and sufficient command of the air, so that its vectors can severely affect the huge target that the TBMs make up, both in their concentration places and in displacements. towards your goals. When we look closely at history, we clearly perceive that Israel and the allies in the two versions of the Gulf War acted with masses of TBMs, with total impunity, since they were able to suppress the enemy air threat[2]. With absolute honesty, we can mention that it is at least very risky to think that in the event of a conflict, we will be able to count on the necessary aptitude to achieve control of the air even similar to the one that served as the framework for the operations that we previously referred to[ 3]. Of course, those who work at TBM are fully aware of this problem, however, we believe that we have not made an effort to find ways to move positively in this regard.

On the other hand, we continue to have certain precautions regarding the use of TBMs in terrains that are not those that are naturally best suited to their abilities. Thus, we continue to refuse urban combat[4], despite the fact that it offers TBMs a propitious field for the exploitation of many of the skills they possess, as has also been demonstrated by the Israelis in Ramallah and the allies in Iraq. . All of this, we consider, makes us lose the enormous potential of our TBMs, which is shaped in the first place by decades of experience in the training of personnel and in the maintenance and use of the means.



The predominantly urban nature of the future battlefield

The world population tends to live more and more in urban conglomerates, which means that armies must prepare for the inevitability of having to fight in them[5]. Traditionally, the doctrine tries to avoid urban combat, and recommends going around large population centers, in order to keep TBMs out of them, and thus take advantage of empty spaces, where maneuvering skills can be exploited to the maximum. . This doctrine is not consistent with the reality of these times, since the impossibility that certain enemies have of fighting in open terrain against regular forces, makes them resort to the concept of "asymmetric warfare" as a procedure for the development of its operations[6]. The urban terrain, due to its compartmentalization, presents greater possibilities for a force to remain on the defensive for extremely long periods, with the capacity to inflict significant damage on the attackers. The TBM have been used marginally up to now in this environment, since it is thought that the constricted spaces make them easily targets for actions where anti-tank ambush procedures are carried out. To reinforce this belief, the Russian experience in Grozny seems to be a kind of reminder of the serious dangers that operating in urban environments entails for a TBM force. The Russians lost hundreds of armored vehicles in urban operations in the Chechen capital, but the cause was probably the use of them in an unintelligent way, while the Russian fire support agencies were destroying the city, and therefore Of course, they created dozens of new sectors for the Chechens to more appropriately combat the Russian TBN.

This example has been conveniently analyzed in the armies of the West, and credit must be given to the Israel Defense Forces, which in its operations in Palestinian urban territory, make continuous use of TBM elements, even using military vehicles. infantry combat in prototype stage. Likewise, the allies in Iraq, in 2003 and currently, make intense use of TBM in their urban operations, both in those that were carried out against regular troops and today that operate mainly against irregulars. What did they find in the TBMs? They found in them an immense ability to carry out urban combat with some protection against the enemy, while having a vast menu of variants that TBMs offer for urban combat. Likewise, they applied the old concept of more or less transitory groupings of armored and mechanized troops that for many years governed our doctrine for combat in open terrain, but brought to the compartmentalized conditions of urban combat. Let's move on in this regard. If a fraction of mechanized infantry troops is given the mission of fighting in urban terrain, they will surely use their dismounted troops, advancing ahead of the infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). This disembarked troop will be able to apply combat techniques in localities that are characteristic of any infantry, and would have the IFV that advance further back as direct fire support, to face a strong point that must be eliminated. However, that mechanized fraction will lack the heavier firepower in case of facing a threat that is protected against the action of the IFV's main weapon. That fire, traditionally, was provided by heavy infantry weapons or field artillery. This type of fire is counterproductive, since as we mentioned in the case of the Russians in Grozny, what happens in practice is that they end up working to improve the enemy's defense possibilities, since the margin of error of the projectiles, added to the link problems that forward observers normally have in a compartmentalized terrain, are the cause that favors the reinforcement of the enemy, as well as contributing to further compartmentalize the terrain that the city presents. Faced with this panorama, armored troops are added to the mechanized infantry fraction, which, marching as close as possible to the troops on foot, provides them with the necessary direct and precise support fire; without creating insurmountable restrictions on traffic through the town[7]. The combination of armored troops towards mechanized ones in urban combat, reverts, when in certain urbanizations, there are open spaces of relative importance, which mainly favor the use of armored vehicles. In this case, it is the mechanized troops that are added to the armored factions, so that the latter have the possibility of fighting anti-tank elements that could hinder the combat of the armored vehicles. It is worth asking ourselves, what level of integration can occur? We believe that it should in no way be restricted to those established by our doctrine, which are Task Forces or Combat Teams, since there will be situations where integration must be achieved at the section level. In this way, a IFV can be added to four dams, or a IFV to four tanks; Without this, more balanced groupings can be formed, which will depend on the circumstances, level of prior instruction achieved, and so on.

Obviously, the TBMs that we currently have present a design that is appropriate for combat in open terrain, and we can hardly expect to have in the foreseeable future TBMs mounted on combat vehicles that present a design specifically conceived for this very difficult environment. complex. However, we believe that even today, it would be important that in the event of fighting in urban areas, at least the following provisions could be made available:

  • Armored Troops: The ammunition of the main weapon should be mostly of the explosive type, although each tank would have to have specific ammunition to beat tanks, since it can meet enemy armored vehicles, incapable of fighting on the move, but located in specific locations as a strong point. It will be important for the tower machine gun to have a relevant number of tracing and piercing ammunition, so as to allow the tank to beat anti-tank weapon positions, at least while the mechanized infantry troops are in position to attack the enemy emplacement. The external telephone of the tanks must be in very good working conditions, since very high frequency communications will have a significant tendency to be hampered by the compartmentalization of the land. The phone will facilitate fire support in difficult circumstances, but highly likely to happen.
  • Mechanized Troops: They must have a reinforced amount of ammunition for anti-tank weapons, not so much for their use in this role, but to attack enemy strong points and to open passages in buildings, which allow groups of shooters the possibility of to "wrap" in the urban terrain. Likewise, explosive charges must be available to complement the use of anti-tank weapons. On the other hand, elements such as ropes, small ladders, paint and brushes will be useful when it comes to overcoming obstacles, as well as to identify buildings cleaned by the troop itself. The ammunition of the main weapon of the VCI must have a greater preponderance of the perforating type, and applies to external machine guns, a criterion that is the same as that expressed for the same type of tank weapons.




It is here that we make a brief comment on the night combat of TBMs in urban terrain. In principle, we believe that it should be avoided, since although we can count on different types of visors, the particularities of the urban terrain do not allow us to trust that the aforementioned devices can be useful in the development of an advance. Rather, we believe that acts of fratricide could very easily take place, as well as there would be a significant margin for high collateral damage to occur in the actions. The night should serve to establish a security perimeter for the TBM, which would take advantage of these circumstances to resupply, maintain the vehicles and rest. However, particular situations may impose combat in this type of conditions, and in this regard, the exercises carried out at the section level in the Infantry School in 2002 seem to indicate that with difficulties and with the use of precise coordination measures it is feasible. fight at night in urban terrain. Basically, the weight of the action would be carried by the landed mechanized infantry troops, with the armored vehicles advancing relatively closer than during the day, so that their fire can be more precise. The disembarked troop must be divided into two. One of them dedicated to the execution of the corresponding operation, and another, to the protection of the tanks. The latter must also serve as a guide in the execution of displacements, depending to a significant extent on radio communications and simple and precise light signals. We reiterate, the latter is not a recommended job, but it may be unavoidable.

Should we forget about combat in open terrain? No way. Between the cities there is land that must be conquered or defended, according to the type of operation in question, and there all the knowledge that our TBMs possess must be exploited. Fundamentally taking into account the serious threat that the different air vectors of the enemy pose for any more or less massive grouping of TBMs. What we have tried to promote in this work is the urgent need for TBMs to assimilate the idea that the battlefield is changing at a speed that even exceeds the technological development at our disposal. If we don't face the challenge that the changing operating environment presents, we run the risk of being tied down to doctrinal considerations that will in no way be useful in environments where combat may occur in the future. We have the knowledge and the ideal personnel to face urban combat in very good conditions, it only remains for us to think of it not as an eventuality in the course of a campaign, but rather as something routine; so that in this way we face the adjustments in the procedures that allow us to face this type of actions with a significant chance of being victorious.

[1] My I Alejandro AGOGLIA, a deep connoisseur of everything related to airborne operations, has published in the Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra (Nro 550, Pag 105), a very interesting work on the use of what is known as "Light Infantry".
[2] In the case of massive airborne assaults, it should be remembered that when they are carried out at low altitudes, transport planes are not a profitable target only for enemy aviation, but for troops on the ground, both artillery and artillery. anti-aircraft, such as those that can make use of portable AA missiles.
[3] In the Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra No. 538, Pag 99, we present a paper where we mention a scenario where our military instrument could operate.
[4] Lt. Lt. (US Army / Retired) Ralph Peters has written extensively on the subject of urban combat, as well as the characteristics of the combat field in the future. In this regard, it is recommended to consult his work in Parameters magazine (US Army War College) at the following address: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/a-index.htm.
[5] See the article “Urban warfare and urban warfighter of 2025”, written by R. Hahn II and B. Jezior in volume XXIX, No. 2, page 74 of PARAMETERS.
[6] In a work titled "The Asymmetric War of the XXI Century" (Published in the Army Magazine of Spain in No. 730), we have extensively expatiated on this
issue.
[7] In 2002, during the development of the Basic Weapons Course, exercises of Mechanized Shooters Section level groups were carried out in urban terrain, practicing offensive, defensive and even retrograde operations in the Infantry School. that environment; both day and night; obtaining important experiences.

Saturday, August 26, 2023

Argentine Weapons: Fittipaldi Machine Gun

Fittipaldi Machine Gun





The Fittipaldi machine gun was produced by the Argentine gunsmith Rafael Fittipaldi (registered under patent 1099 of 06/09/1914), assembled with an Argentine model 1891 Mauser rifle barrel and its bolt transformed into a straight line. The machine gun was jacketed with water for cooling, in a way that covered the entire barrel (making its external appearance similar to the air-cooled Lewis). It was fed by non-disintegrating belts and was based on a traditional tripod. There are no more data on its effectiveness or reasons for its non-adoption by the Argentine Army. This prototype is on display in Room XVI "Paseo de la Libertad" of the Museo de Armas de la Nación (Museum of Weapons of the Nation) (Buenos Aires, Argentina).

Model: Argentine prototype 1912
Caliber:
7.65 X 53 mm. Mauser.
Country of origin:
Argentina.
Feeding:
Non-disintegrating belts
Operation:
Gas-Operated










On Display in the MAN


Thursday, August 24, 2023

Argentine Navy: Minehunter Bathurst and Bouchard

Minehunters "Bathurst" and "Bouchard" Class


Introduction

Given the effectiveness and development of mine warfare during the Russo-Japanese War, at the beginning of World War I, the Hochseeflotte ordered the construction of minesweepers and minelayers, given their lack of means to develop this type of warfare. In principle, the Allied commanders made use of the lack of German units to counteract the mines, blocking trade lines and ports in the North Sea.


By 1914, certain light ships were ordered to take on the role of minehunters, although they proved not to have sufficient conditions to be subjected to the exhausting task of tracking. It was thus that the construction of small, fast units began, with a certain firepower to face possible encounters with allied destroyers, and with mine-sweeping capacity. Its name: Minensuchboot 1914. The construction of some 176 units is ordered, which not all manage to be finished, given the development of the war, as well as the capacity that these would demonstrate.

Of these minelayers, 3 more classes are developed, the 1915, the 1916 and the Flachgehendes. Added to these classes are more armor, more firepower to deal with DD's and a power plant with better features.

This class of ships played a fundamental role in the war, acting as screen ships, patrolling tasks, and demining areas. Many ended up sinking given the rigor of their tasks.


The Argentinian Experience

Given our Country's need to have units capable of lending themselves to patrolling and mining tasks in the southern corners or coasts, by 1920 10 units were acquired from Germany. Of these ships, 4 were "1915" Class, and 6 "1916" Class, all called "Bathurst" Class. These arrive in 1922.

Of the 10 acquired, 6 continued to serve as Notices during the period 1939-1945. These were:

* Golondrina (1922-1955)
* Pinedo (1922-1969)
* Segui (1922-1950)
* Bathurst (1922-1951)
* Thorne (1922-1947)
* Jorge (1922-1940)

Features

Minensuchboot 1915 
Displacement: 507-513 tons
Length: 58.20 meters
Beam: 7.30 meters
Draft: 2.25 meters.
Armament: 3 75mm cannons and 30 mines
Engine: 2 3-cylinder triple expansion, 1800-1890 shp.
Speed: 16.3-16.5 knots
Autonomy: 2000 nautical miles at 14 n.


Minensuchboot 1916 
Displacement: 535-630 tons
Length: 59.30 meters
Draft: 2.15 meters.
Engine: 2 3-cylinder triple expansion, 1600-1850 shp.

All other data is the same.

In 1935, and given the experience with this type of units, the construction of 9 more units is projected, but in national shipyards. The task is entrusted to ARS (Astilleros Río Santiago), who in 1936 laid the keel of what would be the first tracker built entirely with Argentine capacity, the Bouchard. This entered service in 1937, and the last one built, in 1940. The units built were the following:


* Drummond (1937-1964) 
* Bouchard (1936-1964) 
* Robinson (1938-1967) 
* Fournier (1940-1949) 
* Granville (1937-1967) 
* Py (1937-1968) 
* Spiro (1938-1962) 
* Parker (1937-1963) 
* Seaver (1939-1968) 

Features: 


Avisos Bathurst Class

Displacement: 450-520 tons
Length: 59.35 meters
Beam: 7.30 meters
Draft: 2.60 meters.
Armament: 2 100mm cannons, 2 20mm AA machine guns, 2 7.65 machine guns and 30 mines
Engine: 2 MAN diesel engines, 2,000 CVE,
Speed: 15 knots
Range: 3000 nautical miles



Minehunter ARA "Granville"


Minehunter ARA "Seguí"


Minehunter ARA "Pinedo"

Sources: Translation from German Navy, Bubble Watcher, among others.