Argentine Navy: ARA Hércules (D-28 / D-1 / B-52)

ARA Hércules (D-28 / D-1 / B-52)

ARA Hércules (D-28) was the only air-defence vessel operating in the South Atlantic Theatre of Operations (TOA). Equipped with four Exocet missiles and twenty-two Sea Dart surface-to-air missiles — which also had a secondary anti-ship capability — under ideal conditions, it alone could potentially have neutralised the entire Chilean Squadron.

The fast transport ship ARA Hércules (B-52) (TRHE) was a multipurpose rapid transport vessel of the Argentine Navy. It was built in the 1970s as a Type 42 destroyer and, following a refit in the 1990s, was reclassified as a fast transport. It was officially decommissioned and the national ensign was finally lowered on 20 June 2024, after 48 years of service.

Armed with Sea Dart surface-to-air missiles, its mission — along with its sister ship, the destroyer ARA Santísima Trinidad (D-2) — was to provide area air-defence for the light aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo (V-2), operating via data link.

Flag
History
Shipyard	Vickers Shipbuilding, Barrow-in-Furness, UK
Class	Type 42
Type	Guided-Missile Destroyer
Operator	Argentine Navy
Authorized	May 18th, 1970
Keel Laying	June, 7th 1973
Launched	May 10th, 1976, Barrow
Commissioned	June 1976 (Affirmation of the Argentine Ensign) July 1977 (incorporated to the Sea Fleet)
Decommissioned	March 22, 2024 (decommissioned)​ June 20, 2024 (Final lowering of the ensign)
Faith	Decommissioned, she is moored at Puerto Belgrano
General Specifications
Displacement	4100 tonnes at full load
Length	125,6 m
Beam	14,3 m
Draught	5,8 m
Armament	1 twin launcher for 22 GWS-30 Sea Dart Mk30 surface-to-air missiles 1 Vickers 115 mm (4.5")/55 Mk 8 automatic naval gun 2 Oerlikon 20 mm Mk 7 machine guns 4 MM-38 Exocet (SSM) missile launchers 2 triple 324 mm ILAS 3 torpedo tube launchers (firing Whitehead AS-244 torpedoes: 6 km range at 30 knots)
Propulsion	COGOG (Combined Gas or Gas) 2 Rolls-Royce Olympus TM38 gas turbines 2 Rolls-Royce Tyne RM1A gas turbines 2 propeller shafts
Powerplant	• Olympus TM38: 50 000 HP • Tyne RM1A: 9900 HP
Velocidad	• 30 knots  (Olympus) • 18 knots (Tyne)
Endurance	4500 nautical miles at 18 knots
Crew	166
Troops	238 full-geared marines
Aircraft	2 Sikorsky SH-3 Sea King helicopters
Aircraft facilites	Hangar

History

The vessel was originally built as a Type 42 destroyer, similar to the units of the same class commissioned by the British Royal Navy. It was constructed at the Vickers Shipbuilding yard in Barrow-in-Furness, United Kingdom, concurrently with the HMS Sheffield, the lead ship of the British series, which was sunk during the Malvinas War.

Following an irreparable fire that destroyed the stern of HMS Sheffield, a complete stern section from ARA Hércules was used in the British vessel. As a result, the Vickers 4.5" (115 mm)/55 Mk 8 automatic naval gun mounted on the British ship originally belonged to the Argentine destroyer.



F

The vessel was built as a Type 42 destroyer, similar to those commissioned by the British Royal Navy. It was constructed at the Vickers Shipbuilding yards in Barrow-in-Furness, United Kingdom, concurrently with HMS Sheffield, the lead ship of the British class, which was later sunk during the Falklands War. After an irreparable fire destroyed the stern of HMS Sheffield, a full stern section from ARA Hércules was used to repair her. As a result, the Vickers 4.5" (115 mm)/55 Mk 8 automatic gun mounted on the British ship originally belonged to the Argentine vessel.

She was delivered to the Argentine Navy and entered service on 19 September 1977. Upon commissioning, she was assigned to the 1st Destroyer Division as the guided missile destroyer ARA Hércules (D-28), DEHE, with Puerto Belgrano Naval Base as her home port. When her sister ship ARA Santísima Trinidad (D-2) joined the fleet, Hércules was redesignated as D-1, under which she operated until her conversion into a fast transport.

Several Argentine Navy ships have carried the name “Hércules”, but the most iconic remains the flagship of Admiral Guillermo Brown during the wars of independence — the famous “Black Frigate”, so named for her dark sails. The legacy of the name Hércules lives on today through this troop transport vessel.

Beagle Conflict

In December 1978, as part of Operation Soberanía, ARA Hércules formed part of Task Group 2 alongside the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo (V-2), with the mission to militarily occupy Lennox, Nueva and Picton Islands and Cape Horn, then in dispute with Chile. The operation was ultimately not carried out, and the Argentine Fleet began its withdrawal to Puerto Belgrano.


Malvinas War

In 1982, together with her sister ship ARA Santísima Trinidad (D-2), ARA Hércules took part in escorting ARA Veinticinco de Mayo during the Malvinas War. She participated in the initial landings to recover the islands, and her embarked helicopter operated for several hours at Puerto Argentino Airport.

In early May, the Argentine Task Force anticipated a naval air engagement with the British Royal Navy’s Task Force. At one point, Hércules’ early warning radar detected a Sea Harrier from HMS Invincible being vectored to intercept a Grumman S-2 Tracker launched from Veinticinco de Mayo, which was attempting to locate the British fleet for a coordinated strike. However, favourable conditions for such an attack never materialised, and the Argentine ships withdrew to shallower waters, beyond the threat range of British nuclear submarines. Hércules continued operating in coastal patrol zones near the Argentine mainland.

Post-war

Following her service in the 1st Destroyer Division and later her reassignment to the Amphibious Naval Command, ARA Hércules regularly participated in naval exercises — known as “Etapas de Mar” — alongside other vessels of the Sea Fleet, the Maritime Patrol Division, the Submarine Force, as well as aircraft and helicopters of Naval Aviation, and in amphibious exercises with the Marine Corps. She also took part in joint naval operations with foreign forces.

In 1988, she visited the port of Buenos Aires along with most ships of the Sea Fleet, including her sister ship D-2.

In 1993, she carried out her final live-fire exercise with a GWS-30 Sea Dart missile. From that point, she began operating with spare parts salvaged from ARA Santísima Trinidad (D-2), which had been inactive since 1989 and was progressively cannibalised.

In 1994, she was transferred to the Amphibious and Logistics Naval Command (COAL), and by 1999, she underwent a major conversion into a fast transport vessel, with substantial modifications to her flight deck and helicopter hangar to accommodate two Sea King medium helicopters. These works were carried out at the Chilean Navy’s ASMAR shipyard in Talcahuano, with final completion between 2004 and 2006 at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Arsenal in Argentina.

In 2009, her Sea Dart missile launcher was removed, and the space was converted to house four MKV assault boats for the Argentine Marine Corps.

Among her deployments, she took part in the 1998 edition of the combined exercise “UNITAS”, and the amphibious phase of Exercise “Fraterno” in 2006. As a troop transport unit, she continues to participate in amphibious operations and all phases of fleet manoeuvres. In 2009, she underwent a major overhaul at CINAR (Argentine Naval Industrial Complex), rejoining the fleet in April of that year after maintenance of her hull, valves, and systems. That same year, she participated in a maritime control patrol and the search for survivors of the fishing vessel Atlantic, lost during a storm.

Between 2004 and 2012, she took part in all amphibious training exercises of the Sea Fleet, including the “Inalaf” exercises with embarked Marine Corps personnel from the Chilean Navy. During the same period, she also hosted training voyages for cadets of the Argentine Naval Academy (ESNM) along the national coastline, visiting ports such as Ushuaia and Puerto Madryn.

2010s

The vessel continued its annual live-fire training, amphibious exercises, and fleet manoeuvres, as well as port visits along the Argentine coast (such as Necochea) and training cruises with cadets from the Naval Academy and midshipmen from the Petty Officers’ School of the Navy.

Conversion

The ship underwent an initial conversion process in Chile (at ASMAR, the Chilean Navy’s shipyard) and later in Argentina (at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base, ARPB) during the late 1990s. Modifications included an expanded flight deck and hangar to accommodate and operate two Sea King helicopters armed with Exocet AM39 missiles, and an upgrade of its electronic systems, with INVAP, Argentina’s state technology company, contributing to additional systems reengineering.

Subsequently assigned to the Amphibious Naval Command, the ship began operating as a multipurpose fast transport under its new permanent designation: B-52. Its redesign allowed it to function as a fast troop landing ship. Interior spaces were converted into troop berths for embarked Marine Corps (IM) personnel.

The two radar domes (Type 909) and the Sea Dart missile launcher on the foredeck were removed. The vessel is equipped with a fully Argentine-developed Automated Command and Control System (SITACC), implemented through the SIAG-2006 platform. These upgrades also allowed the integration of a Combat Information Centre (CIC) for the KFD General Staff when embarked, and the installation of eight external mountings for safely securing MK V assault boats used by the Marine Corps.

The hangar doors were once again overhauled and modified by INVAP, and currently operate without major issues. For surface-to-air defence, RBS-70 missiles are deployed on an elevated aft platform with internal communications, where they are mounted during training voyages that include live-fire exercises.

Decommissioning

The vessel had been held in reserve status since 2013. It was officially decommissioned on 22 March 2024, and the final lowering of the ensign took place at Puerto Belgrano on 20 June 2024. The ship now awaits its final disposition.

Specifications

Original

Engines

• 2 Olympus TM38 gas turbines, 50,000 HP

• 2 Tyne RM1A gas turbines, 9,900 HP

• 2 propellers

Colours

• Hull and superstructure, including launchers, domes, lower mast sections, flight deck, and other surfaces painted in matte Admiralty grey

• Underwater hull (anti-fouling) in red anti-rust coating

• Waterline, mast tops, and funnel in matte black

• Flight deck marked with a white circle and white identification number with black shadow

General Characteristics

• Sister ship of the HMS Sheffield, which was destroyed and sunk at 53°04′S 56°56′W

• Standard displacement: 3,150 tonnes

• Full load displacement: 4,100 tonnes

• Length between perpendiculars: 119.50 metres

• Beam: 14.63 metres

• Maximum draught: 6.8 metres
  
  

Propulsion system

• COGOG configuration:

  • 2 Rolls-Royce Olympus MM3B gas turbines delivering 54,900 HP for maximum speed

  • 2 Rolls-Royce Tyne gas turbines providing 8,200 HP for cruising speed

Crew

• Between 300 and 312 personnel

Additions from the Conversion

The cantilevered flight deck and stern openings allow for the rapid deployment or recovery of inflatable boats ("Zodiacs") used by special forces. The ship is capable of carrying 238 fully equipped marines without any reduction in her maximum speed of 30 knots.

INVAP redesigned the hangar door system as well as made certain modifications to the stern section of the vessel. The door is operated both electromechanically and manually, with a minimum opening width on each side of 6.2 metres and a height clearance of 5.4 metres. It is weatherproof and blocks exterior light radiation. The minimum opening/closing speed is 10 cm/s, and the maximum manual opening time is 5 minutes, under conditions of rolling, pitching, permanent list, and extreme wind pressure (with lateral inclination up to 30° and frontal inclination up to 10°, simultaneously).

The ship also features expanded accommodation capacity to transport a reinforced Marine Infantry Company, a dedicated operations room for the embarked Marine General Staff, and two fully equipped classrooms.

Its two 909 radomes and the Sea Dart missile launcher were removed. The deck has since been fitted with metal racks and electric winches for transporting MK-V landing craft, as well as a cargo hold for storing equipment.

Electronics

Navigation

• 2 GPS systems, integrated with the digital chart system and providing cartographic display both on the bridge and in the Combat Information Centre (CIC) via LCD screens

• 1 digital log

• 1 echo sounder

• 3 VHF radio units for maritime safety

Command and Advisory System

• Command and Advisory System – SITAC 2006

• Integrated consoles with visual interface

• Designed and installed domestically by SIAG – Puerto Belgrano (2006)

Communications

• HF - UHF y VHF (Low Band) Equipment
• Datalink- LINK ARA.

Radars

• Long-range Air Search - Marconi 965 (IFF).
• Surface Search - Marconi 992.
• Kelvin Hughes 1006 Helicopter Control.
• DECCA 1229 Navigation.

 

 

Malvinas: The use of cluster bomb by the British forces

The Myth of British Illegality in the Use of Hunting Engineering BL755 Cluster Bombs

During the 1982 Malvinas War, the British invading forces made use of the Hunting Engineering BL755 cluster bomb—a weapon not equipped with anti-personnel charges, but with shaped charges intended to destroy material targets. As such, its use was permitted under international law. Any cluster bomb designed to destroy enemy hardware—be it aircraft, tanks or ships—can be lawfully employed, and continues to be used by many militaries without violating any existing international conventions.

In contrast, cluster munitions such as the French-made Belouga BLG-66 from MATRA, designed to disperse shrapnel specifically to injure or kill human beings, are clearly prohibited. Such bombs were not used by the British in the Malvinas theatre.

That a blast-fragmentation anti-materiel bomb may wound or kill personnel as collateral damage does not make it an anti-personnel weapon per se. This distinction is crucial. Dum-dum bullets or Claymore-type mines—favoured tools of extremist Castro-Guevarist factions that waged genocidal campaigns against Argentina between 1959 and 1990—are examples of explicitly anti-personnel munitions.

The BL755, produced in the United Kingdom, was originally conceived as an anti-tank cluster bomb to counter the overwhelming numerical advantage of Warsaw Pact armoured units over NATO. It contains 147 high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) submunitions, each housed in a pre-fragmented casing that releases approximately 1,400 shards upon detonation. Naturally, these can cause harm to any individual within their effective radius—but that does not qualify them as illegal anti-personnel weapons. For comparison, a single Belouga can release over 200,000 lethal fragments.

To be clear: the use of a BL755 bomb, dispersing 147 submunitions that may each produce around 1,400 fragments, aimed at disabling enemy material across a broad zone of impact, cannot reasonably be equated with a weapon designed solely to maim or kill personnel. The intent and design of the weapon matter under international law.

Yet, ironically, Argentina did possess such anti-personnel cluster bombs in its arsenal—specifically the Belouga BLG-66, supplied by France and seen post-war mounted on aircraft such as the A-4C and Alpha Jet. These were acquired alongside Mirage IIIEA/DA fighters, originally for air superiority roles. The Belougas were tested and operational across several Argentine aircraft, including the A-4B/C and the Super Étendard. There is no confirmed information on whether they were adapted for use in the IA-58A Pucará or the Navy’s A-4Q. Still, Argentine commanders chose not to employ these weapons during the conflict.

In fact, even though Argentine forces had access to incendiary Napalm bombs—deployed on the Malvinas themselves—these too were not used against enemy troops, despite their obvious anti-personnel effects.

For Argentine soldiers subjected to these British weapons, the legality or ethics of their use were of little concern in the moment. A single fragment could wound, mutilate, or kill—but those same soldiers would have employed such weapons without hesitation had it meant surviving or gaining an upper hand. And still, despite possessing bombs with greater destructive power than those used by the British, Argentina chose restraint—out of adherence to the laws of war and a deeply human sense of morality, even in the inhuman context of battle.

Some claim Britain crossed into illegality—not due to the raw power of its bombs, but in the tactical method of their use. The sheer lethality of 147 submunitions and over 200,000 potential fragments raining down on an Argentine infantry company is known only to those who lived it. But the difference between that and a Belouga’s 198,600 extra fragments—a 1,430% increase in destructive capability—puts the argument of proportionality into sharp perspective.

It’s also true that no formal declaration of war was ever issued by either side. The conflict unfolded in fact, not in law, with both nations operating in murky legal waters. Nonetheless, both Argentina and the UK largely respected the humanitarian norms of armed engagement, barring isolated abuses triggered by the brutal chaos of close combat.

Had this been a total war—like the Second World War, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf, or Yugoslavia—different thresholds of legitimacy and restraint would likely have applied to both sides.

The Hunting Engineering BL755, developed in the early 1970s with a standard weight of 264 kg, a length of 2.45 m, and a diameter of 419 mm, was manufactured in several variants (BL755, IBL755, RBL755). Beyond the Malvinas, it was also used in the Gulf War and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia by Britain and Germany (now withdrawn from service), and reportedly by Iran, Serbia (possibly reverse-engineered), and India—still in service today on aircraft such as the MiG-27, Jaguar, Sea Harrier, and possibly the MiG-29, HAL Tejas, and Su-30.

To Argentine Malvinas War Veterans, the BL755 remains a haunting symbol of destruction. Though no longer in production, its legacy is etched into the memories of those who faced it. And it remains a testament to the resilience, sacrifice, and moral clarity of Argentine forces, who fought with dignity—even as shadows fell over the South Atlantic skies.

Malvinas: Aerolíneas Argentinas' Secret Cargo Operations

Did You Know This Story?

43 years ago, Aerolíneas Argentinas flew covert missions to bring weapons home for the Malvinas War.

Their pilots and cabin crews accumulated acts of courage and solidarity that continue to make Argentines proud across generations. In 1982, seven of them undertook a daring secret operation to Israel, Libya, and South Africa to retrieve weapons that would later be used in the defence of our sovereignty during the Malvinas conflict.

As the war unfolded, they flew to the islands, to Río Gallegos, and to Comodoro Rivadavia—transporting soldiers, supplies, and equipment, without fanfare, but with a fierce commitment to their country.

For years, this story circulated in whispers and half-truths. But in 2012, the veil was lifted. The seven pilots—Gezio Bresciani, Ramón Arce, Leopoldo Arias, Juan Carlos Ardalla, Jorge Prelooker, Mario Bernard, and Luis Cuniberti—broke their silence and recounted the clandestine flights to the Middle East in what came to be known as Operación Aerolíneas.

The Boeing 707s flew a total of six missions: two to Israel and four to Libya. Every single one of them was carried out in radio silence, with all navigational lights switched off. "The aircraft couldn’t be a trail in the sky—it had to be a ghost," one of the pilots recalled.

When entering radar zones was unavoidable, they gave false positions. At the time, NATO satellites and the Western intelligence networks swept across the Atlantic with a ruthless gaze. For the British, the entire ocean was a theatre of war—any unidentified or suspicious aircraft was at risk of being intercepted or shot down.

After 2 April, an order came down from the top brass at the Edificio Cóndor: civilian aircraft and their crews were to serve the Armed Forces’ High Command. Pilots were summoned one by one, told only that their country needed them—and they answered without hesitation.



“When someone tells you your country is at war, and that you can help—well, you don’t think twice,”
said Bresciani in 2012, then 71, recalling the string of secret missions to distant lands in search of arms.

This chapter in our history—bold, silent, and patriotic—is a reminder that Argentines have always stood ready to defend their homeland, not just with weapons, but with resolve, unity, and honour in the skies.

April, the 2nd: The Landing Experience of the Argentine Marines

Lived Experiences During the South Atlantic War 

Account by 𝘑𝘶𝘢𝘯 𝘊𝘢𝘳𝘭𝘰𝘴 𝘔𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘭𝘭𝘪 – 𝘛𝘕𝘐𝘔 𝘝𝘎𝘔 (𝘙)



Malvinas 1982

Landing and Seizure of the Beachhead

It was 04:00 on the 2nd of April 1982 when reveille was sounded. I remember waking up and heading to the bathroom to take a shower and put on the new combat uniform I had packed in my rucksack, which I had brought especially for what I considered the most glorious day of my military career. I was going into combat to fulfil the oath I had made to our flag on 20th June 1974: to defend it with my life if necessary!

Boarding time for the Amphibious Tracked Vehicles (ATVs) was 05:45, and so we did – in order, in silence (despite the commands that could be heard).
At 06:00, the first four ATVs, under the command of CCIM Hugo Jorge Santillán, set off. Among that initial wave was our fellow graduate TCIM Carlos Ramón Schweizer.

I disembarked from the Command ATV, which was led by the Commander of BIM2 and Commander of Task Force 40.1, CFIM Alfredo Raúl Weinstabl. The initial leg of the crossing to the landing beach was made with the ATV hatches sealed shut. For those who have never landed in an amphibious vehicle, it's important to understand that such an approach under those conditions is highly dangerous. Had British forces had the opportunity to open fire on us, we would have become sitting ducks, and many of us would likely have ended up in the cold waters of the South Atlantic, given that the amphibious vehicles we were travelling in were not armoured.

Just before we reached the beach, the top hatches were opened, allowing us to peek out and see the tracer fire streaking through the darkness (it was still night at that hour), clear evidence that fighting had already begun ashore. Naturally, my blood was racing in anticipation of making landfall and entering combat. Fear: NONE. Uncertainty: COMPLETE.



We finally landed without suffering any casualties among personnel or vehicles.
We immediately advanced towards the airport at what was then still Port Stanley. There was no enemy resistance, but we observed that the runway was blocked by vehicles and other obstacles, which would have prevented any aircraft from landing. The Commander gave the order to clear it. Just then, we received word that the vehicles under CCIM Santillán had come under enemy fire. One had been hit multiple times by machine-gun fire, and a conscript had sustained a minor shrapnel wound to the hand.

CFIM Weinstabl promptly ordered the driver of the Command ATV to head towards that position, accompanied by Delta Company under TNIM Di Paola.
We reached the forward position and dismounted from the amphibious vehicles. At this moment, I recall an anecdote involving Carlos Schweizer: as we dismounted, I saw Carlos standing and adjusting the heels of his conscripts to prevent a common wartime injury – being hit in the heels due to improper prone positioning. I shouted at him, “Bizcocho, get down, they’re shooting at us!” He turned around laughing and obeyed. I then told him, “Those recoilless rifles from Di Filippo (SSIM and Head of BIM2’s Recoilless Rifles) are making quite a racket!” To which he replied, “That’s the English mortars firing at us.”
At that moment, I thought, “You die in war without even realising it.” What I had assumed were our own cannons turned out to be enemy fire.

A key shot from one of our recoilless rifles forced the British troops to retreat into the settlement.



The forward elements remounted the vehicles and moved to support the Amphibious Commandos in Moody Brook. However, those forces had already completed their mission and were near Port Stanley from the opposite direction of the BIM2 advance, so Captain Santillán continued his operation to secure the Camber Peninsula.

Meanwhile, the Battalion Companies entered the town without resistance, took control of their designated responsibility zones, and established full control over the population and essential public services.
As we moved into the urban area of Port Stanley, we came under sniper fire. We quickly hit the ground, and I noticed a window where a curtain was being moved by the wind. I requested permission from Captain Weinstabl to return fire at that location, but, in accordance with the initial directive to recover the Islands without bloodshed, he denied my request.

The incident did not repeat, and we resumed our advance, eventually reaching a location where the Commander gathered the Officers of the vanguard. I realised we were in front of a two-storey building that looked like a gymnasium.
Considering that Royal Marines might be hiding inside, I requested permission to search it. Captain Weinstabl authorised me to enter with TCIM Gazzolo and two NCOs.

We entered the building and saw that to access the first floor there were two side staircases. I told Gazzolo to take the right flank with one of the NCOs, and I took the left with the other.




We advanced carefully, given our exposed position, and reached a room where we found five Royal Marines who had apparently surrendered – their five Sterling submachine guns lay on a table with their magazines removed – along with a female police officer.

We conducted a standard search of the British soldiers but did not touch the female officer.
After verifying that the soldiers had no other weapons, they were placed under guard and prepared for transfer to the Prisoner Collection Point (PRP).

But the biggest surprise came when we opened the door to a larger hall and discovered Argentine civilians who had been imprisoned there.
We freed them and sent the prisoners to the PRP.

Malvinas: A Struggle for Sovereignty and Dignity

The Malvinas War: Forty Years On—A Struggle for Sovereignty and Dignity

By Manuel Remira Oyón| Reflections | 14 May 2025

Preface

As a Chilean, writing about the Malvinas War is no small undertaking, especially given the historical tensions between Chile and Argentina. In April 1982, when Argentina reclaimed the Malvinas Islands—territory unquestionably part of its continental shelf and its sovereign rights—Chile’s military regime under Pinochet chose the wrong side of history, aligning itself with Britain and providing covert support to the colonial power. This shameful episode underscored the deep divisions sowed by dictatorship and the betrayal of Latin American unity in the face of imperialism.

It must be clear: the complicity of Pinochet’s regime in undermining Argentina’s rightful claim does not reflect the will of the Chilean people, who have long harboured a sense of solidarity with their Argentine brothers and sisters in their quest to end the last vestiges of colonial rule in our region.

A Fight Rooted in Principle

The Malvinas War was not a random clash, nor was it a folly of the moment. It was the culmination of nearly 150 years of Argentina’s steadfast insistence on the return of territory that had been seized by force. The Malvinas were recognised as part of Spanish South America, and after Argentina’s independence, as part of its national territory. Britain's occupation in 1833 was a flagrant act of imperial aggression, displacing Argentine settlers and establishing an outpost that has remained, to this day, a colonial relic.

This was not a marginal grievance. The Malvinas became a symbol of Argentina’s ongoing struggle for sovereignty and self-determination—a cause enshrined in international law and recognised by numerous United Nations resolutions calling for dialogue and resolution between the two parties. The islands’ strategic location in the South Atlantic and their proximity to Antarctica have always been of immense geopolitical significance, a fact long obscured by those who dismiss the conflict as over “barren rocks.”

The injustice of colonial occupation weighed heavily on the Argentine people, who, regardless of the shifting sands of political leadership, never relinquished their claim. The 1982 conflict, therefore, was not merely a military manoeuvre but the physical manifestation of a centuries-old demand for justice.

The Dictatorship’s Double Crime

It is undeniable that Argentina’s military dictatorship was a brutal regime, responsible for grave human rights violations. But the Malvinas cause stands apart from the crimes of the junta. The junta’s opportunistic timing—seizing on a noble cause to shore up its crumbling legitimacy—should never be confused with the righteousness of Argentina’s claim. If anything, the dictatorship’s mishandling of the conflict and its betrayal of the soldiers it sent to war only deepened Argentina’s national trauma.

Thousands of young conscripts, many from impoverished provinces in northern Argentina, were sent ill-prepared and under-equipped into battle. These were not seasoned soldiers; they were boys thrust into the freezing winds of the South Atlantic, bearing the weight of their nation’s hopes and the burden of their leaders’ incompetence. Their courage, in the face of overwhelming odds, was nothing short of heroic.

The British forces, equipped with superior technology and backed by one of the world’s most powerful navies, faced fierce resistance. The Argentine Air Force, despite limited resources, mounted daring attacks that resulted in significant British losses—ships sunk, aircraft destroyed, and lives lost. These victories on the battlefield were a testament to the valour and resilience of Argentine forces, who fought not for conquest but for liberation.

A War That Echoed Far Beyond the Battlefield

The consequences of the Malvinas War extended well beyond its 74 days of combat. For Argentina, the war precipitated the fall of the dictatorship and the return to democracy—a profound transformation that reshaped the nation’s trajectory. For Britain, it reinvigorated a government facing domestic unpopularity, entrenching policies of neoliberal austerity that would have lasting repercussions.

Yet the most enduring legacy is the wound that remains open: the unresolved sovereignty dispute. Decades on, the British government continues to maintain its colonial hold over the Malvinas, defying international calls for negotiation and dialogue. The islanders' right to self-determination, often cited by London, must be understood within the context of a population settled by the colonial power itself, a factor that complicates but does not nullify Argentina’s legitimate claim.

Honouring the Fallen and the Forgotten

The soldiers who returned from the Malvinas—victims of both war and neglect—were met not with the honour they deserved, but with silence and marginalisation. Many have since succumbed to the invisible wounds of war, their struggles largely ignored by successive governments. It is estimated that hundreds of veterans have taken their own lives, a silent testament to the deep scars left by the conflict.

The sacrifice of these men demands remembrance, not only as a chapter in Argentina’s history but as a reminder of the broader fight against colonialism. Their courage stands as a rebuke to the complacency of the international community, which has too often turned a blind eye to the persistence of imperial claims in our hemisphere.

The Path Forward

The Malvinas question is far from resolved. While military conflict must never again be the means, Argentina’s claim remains as valid today as it was in 1833. The road to justice lies in persistent diplomacy, international advocacy, and the unwavering resolve of the Argentine people to see their sovereign rights respected.

To dismiss the Malvinas as a relic of the past is to ignore the living legacy of colonialism—a legacy that continues to shape geopolitics in the South Atlantic and beyond. The cause of the Malvinas is not merely Argentina’s cause; it is the cause of all who stand for sovereignty, self-determination, and the end of imperial dominion.

Forty years on, the memory of the Malvinas War endures as a solemn reminder of what was lost and what remains to be reclaimed. It is a testament to a nation's dignity—a dignity that no war, no defeat, and no occupation can extinguish.

Operation Fingent: The United Kingdom “sells” radar to Chile to spy on Argentine flights

Operation Fingent: the radar the British sold to Chile to spy on Argentine movements during the Malvinas War

In a rushed move, Great Britain devised plans to detect the aircraft taking off from Argentina’s mainland air bases — a reminder of how, even in wartime, they were willing to involve neighbouring countries to monitor and undermine Argentine efforts in defending the Malvinas.

Based on Mariano P. Sciaroni || Infobae





As the British fleet set sail toward the Malvinas, the British high command was well aware it would face a serious problem if confronted by Argentina’s Air Force and Naval Aviation. At that time, the Royal Navy was designed to operate in the North Atlantic, under the protection of aerial cover and early warning systems provided both by the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and the U.S. Navy.

Operating outside that zone, with only the limited number of carrier-based aircraft aboard the Invincible and Hermes, the British would lack the advance warning needed to ready their missiles and position interceptors to counter any aerial threat.

Without such anticipation, every Argentine attack would effectively become a surprise, detected only when it was already mere miles from its target — something the British simply could not afford.

In a scramble, they rushed to design plans to detect the aircraft taking off from Argentina’s mainland air bases. The core idea was that no plane should be able to lift off from Argentine soil without being noticed, giving the British fleet at least 45 minutes’ warning of an incoming airstrike — just enough time to call a “Yellow Alert” for planes in the air and prepare for bombs or missiles.

First, special forces (possibly the famed Special Air Service) would be deployed on the continent to report movements at the Río Grande, Río Gallegos, and Comodoro Rivadavia bases (this fell under the so-called “Operation Shutter”; the commandos were only present from late May to early June, and it remains a mystery how they got there or how they left, as details on the matter are still classified).



Naval Station “Almirante Hermes Quijada” in Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego, during the war

They also considered that nuclear submarines would approach the Argentine coast to report on aerial movements, detecting them either through their periscopes or with electronic surveillance equipment.

Finally, arrangements were made with the “friendly” Chilean Air Force, whose Thomson-CSF radar located near Punta Arenas would provide alerts about takeoffs from Ushuaia, Río Grande, and Río Gallegos.

However, there remained a large gap: the entire province of Chubut and the Comodoro Rivadavia base were beyond radar coverage. That was a serious problem.

Luckily for the British, Wing Commander Sidney Edwards, the Royal Air Force’s delegate in Chile, had already secured from General Fernando Matthei, commander of the Chilean Air Force, a “blank check” to move forward in solving such inconveniences.

But the Chileans had no radar stationed there — nor did they have a mobile radar system.

To overcome this, the British had to urgently sell them a radar. The operation was quickly agreed upon: the price was set at under one British pound (and, for the same token, they also received six Hawker Hunter fighter jets, three Canberra bombers, and anti-aircraft missiles). An entire air force for less than 60 Argentine pesos at today’s exchange rate — a bargain, to put it mildly.

With political approval secured, the military phase began moving. Thus, the so-called “Operation Fingent” was designed and took shape. It was decided that the radar to be transferred (or rather, sold) would be a Marconi S259 transportable unit, part of the British Royal Air Force’s Mobile Reserve.


A S259 radar operating at RAF Saxa Vord in the 70s in the Shetland Islands, North Scotland. Possibly this very same radar has been sold to Chile in 1982,

The radar would be accompanied by a so-called “sales team” — which, in reality, was nothing more than British Royal Air Force military personnel dressed in civilian clothes, tasked with operating the radar and training the supposed new “owners.”

This “sales team” was made up of four officers and seven non-commissioned officers, who would carry no weapons and would formally be working under the Chilean armed forces. They were instructed to buy warm civilian clothing and ensure their passports were in order. They were also informed that their mission was absolutely secret and that they were to behave at all times as civilian contractors.

They were forbidden from speaking about this matter to anyone — neither in Great Britain nor in Chile.

The deployment location was ultimately decided by General Matthei: it would be set up in Balmaceda, positioned at the latitude of Comodoro Rivadavia, and would be protected by the Chilean Army. A strategic spot, ideal for monitoring Argentine movements.

With the mission in place, on May 5, 1982, a Boeing 747 from the Flying Tigers airline departed RAF Brize Norton (not far from London), loaded with the radar equipment and personnel, heading for Santiago de Chile. The route included a stop in San Juan, Puerto Rico, making it a long journey.

Upon landing, a military transport plane — a C-130 Hercules — appeared to carry them to their final destination. The issue was that this aircraft bore camouflage very similar to British military planes, and painted on its fuselage were the words FUERZA AREA (not AÉREA) DE CHILE — in short, it was a British plane.

A British plane, carrying British military personnel and British radar, to just a few kilometers from the Argentine border.

A Chilean C-130 Hercules and another from the British Royal Air Force (RAF) wait on the tarmac, photographed from an RAF VC-10. The photo was taken on April 24, 1982, on Easter Island (Chile).

Soon after, the radar reached its final destination and was swiftly installed. The British put it to good use, while Chilean troops guarded the area to prevent any issues.

The information gathered by the radar was securely transmitted to the headquarters of the Chilean Air Force’s intelligence service. From there, a special British team operating a satellite communication system would relay the data to their fleet.

It was a well-oiled system that ultimately worked very effectively — and, as mentioned earlier, it was complemented by reports from ground commandos, another radar, and finally the nuclear submarines near the coast (for example, the submarine HMS Valiant, operating near Río Grande, alone provided 300 alerts of aircraft in the air).

When it was all over, as General Matthei later explained, “we kept the radars, the missiles, and the planes, and they were satisfied because they received the information they needed on time. The deal was over, and Sidney Edwards was dismissed the next day.”

“Argentina has its back well covered,” said Sergio Onofre Jarpa, Chile’s ambassador in Buenos Aires, not long before. A peculiar statement, considering that right in the middle of Argentina’s back, a British radar was operating — helping foreign forces monitor and strike at Argentine defenses in the Malvinas.

Malvinas: The Real British Casualties and Why the Secret?

The Malvinas/Falklands: Why Will British Casualty Figures Remain Classified Until 14 June 2072?

At the end of the Malvinas/Falklands War, the British government enacted a military secrecy order effective until 14 June 2072—a period of 90 years. Until that date, anyone who discloses or publishes any information contained within that classified material will face appropriate prosecution before a court martial.

This is not merely a preliminary form of censorship but a clear instance of state-imposed secrecy for national security reasons.

So far, no substantial details regarding the contents of the secrecy order have emerged, but it is widely believed that one of its main points concerns the significant loss of life suffered by the United Kingdom during the conflict. There are also suggestions that it includes records of considerable losses of military vehicles—both naval and aerial. A large part of Britain’s logistical apparatus was reportedly destroyed or left at the bottom of the Atlantic.

The official British figures list 255 killed, 777 wounded, and approximately 280 subsequent suicides linked to war-related trauma. However, taking into account that an attacking force typically suffers higher casualties than a defending force—with even the most conservative estimates ranging from 2:1 to 3:1—the official numbers appear questionable, especially considering the harsh terrain, comparable to Greenland or the Scottish Highlands.

Below is a day-by-day account of British losses from their arrival at South Georgia on 23 April until 14 June 1982, when the islands were retaken. (In red are the daily combat casualties; in brackets, in some cases, are estimated figures reflecting the likely proportion of troops lost in each engagement):

Summary:

23/04: 1 – A Sea King helicopter crashes at South Georgia.
01/05: 10 (2) – Two Harriers destroyed near Port Stanley. Eight sailors killed in attacks on: HMS Arrow, HMS Exeter, HMS Glamorgan, HMS Hermes, HMS Alacrity.
02/05: 1 – A Sea Harrier shot down over Port Stanley by 20 mm artillery.
04/05: 43 (3) – Harriers downed at Condor Air Base. HMS Sheffield sinks (40 dead). HMS Hermes possibly hit by an Exocet missile, forcing a change of course and reducing air coverage. Some reports suggest severe damage or partial sinking.
05/05: 1 (1) – Royal Marine killed at Elephant Bay.
06/05: 2 (2) – Two Harriers shot down north of East Falkland.
12/05: 4 – HMS Glasgow disabled; attack on HMS Brilliant.
17/05: 1 (1) – Sea King helicopter downed near the Argentine coast.
18/05: 22 – Sea King crashes into Albatross (Argentine sources claim it was shot down).
19/05: 1 (1) – Sea King helicopter crash; SAS specialist killed.
21/05: 32 – Two Gazelles downed at San Carlos (3 dead). HMS Ardent sunk (22 dead). HMS Argonaut, HMS Antrim, HMS Brilliant disabled; HMS Broadsword damaged. Three Sea Harriers (1) and one Sea King (1) shot down.
22/05: 1 – Harrier shot down.
23/05: 8 – Harrier crashes during a night sortie from HMS Hermes (1 dead). HMS Antelope sunk (7 dead).
24/05: 10 – Damage to: HMS Sir Lancelot, HMS Sir Galahad, HMS Sir Bedivere, HMS Fearless (6+ casualties; actual figures may be higher, given the number of troops on board and the circumstances of the attack).
25/05: 135 – Three Harriers downed (3 dead). HMS Coventry sunk (90+ dead), HMS Atlantic Conveyor sunk (20 dead). HMS Broadsword, HMS Sir Lancelot disabled; HMS Alacrity, HMS Yarmouth damaged. Two Sea Kings shot down; two others damaged.
27/05: 11 – Seven Royal Marines killed at San Carlos (7 dead). Three Gazelle helicopters and one Sea King downed (4 dead).
28/05: 136 – Two Sea Kings and a Scout helicopter downed (3 dead). One soldier killed on West Falkland (1 dead). 130 troops from 2 Para and the Royal Auxiliary killed during the Battle of Darwin (27–29 May)—the equivalent of an entire infantry company.
30/05: 44 – 38 killed during the Battle of Goose Green (23–30 May). A Sea Harrier crashes (1 dead). HMS Invincible reportedly attacked (5+ casualties) by an Exocet and two 250 kg bombs. Unconfirmed reports suggest the ship sank, which would imply higher casualties.
08/06: 162 – Fitzroy attack: HMS Sir Galahad (89 dead), HMS Sir Tristam (40 dead), Foxtrot 4 landing craft (6+ dead). Several Chinese dockworkers killed on the beach during heavy bombardments. HMS Avenger disabled. HMS Plymouth attacked by five Argentine missiles at Pleasant Bay.
09/06: 18 – Two Sisters Mountain, SAS commandos.
10/06: 4 – Four Royal Marines killed in an accident.
11/06: 44 – Deaths between 11 and 12 June: (3) at Mount Harriet, (23) from 3 Para at Mount Longdon, (4) from 45 Commando, (1) from 42 Commando, (13) from B Company.
12/06: 29 – (4) at Two Sisters Mountain. HMS Glamorgan (25 dead) disabled by an Exocet missile fired from Port Stanley.
13/06: 360 – Deaths between 13 and 14 June in the battles of Mount Longdon, Mount Williams, and Wireless Ridge.
14/06: 10 (5) at Tumbledown; two Sea Kings shot down. Five killed at Top Malo House.

Total: 1,090 killed, not including potential additional unrecorded losses.

Damaged and Lost Vessels:

• Sunk/Destroyed: 8 ships (including HMS Sheffield, HMS Coventry, HMS Ardent, HMS Antelope, HMS Sir Galahad, HMS Sir Tristam, Atlantic Conveyor, Foxtrot 4 landing craft).

• Disabled: 9 ships (e.g., HMS Invincible (possibly sunk), HMS Alacrity, HMS Avenger, HMS Glamorgan, HMS Glasgow).

• Heavily Damaged: 5 ships (e.g., HMS Brilliant, HMS Broadsword, HMS Plymouth, HMS Ambuscade, HMS Sir Lancelot).

• Moderately Damaged: 9 ships (e.g., HMS Hermes, HMS Exeter, HMS Fearless, plus others).

Total Affected Ships: 31.

Aircraft Losses:

• Fleet Air Arm: 19 Sea Harriers shot down, 10 grounded due to mechanical failure; 13 helicopters downed, 32 others disabled.

• RAF: 12 Harriers downed, 5 grounded; 12 helicopters downed, 26 grounded.

• Royal Marines and Army: Multiple helicopters lost (46 downed overall; 62 disabled).

Total Aircraft Lost: 154.

Of 77 fixed-wing aircraft deployed (Harriers and Sea Harriers), 46 were rendered inoperable. Out of 171 helicopters deployed, 108 became unusable.

Conclusion:

• Total Dead: 1,090.

• Total Ships Affected: 31.

• Total Aircraft Lost: 154.

The UK has never disclosed the full extent of its personnel and equipment losses, which, by all accounts, exceeded those of Argentina and are reflected in the scale of damage sustained.

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