Wednesday, January 17, 2024

Anti-subversive War: The Death of Tamagnini (1973)

Terrorist revenge

Senior Inspector Hugo Tamagnini was murdered on August 5, 1973. The inspector specialized in action against terrorism, and was key in the investigation that made possible the discovery of a group of the terrorist organization FAR, in Taco Ralo. Revenge would not be long in coming: that August 5, Tamagnini was traveling in his car through the City of Tucumán, along with a companion, when a car in which four or five terrorists were traveling approached him, and they began to attack him. shoot him with automatic weapons.
Inspector Tamagnini told his companion to get on the floor and tried to defend herself. However, he was seriously injured by 12 bullets and lost control of the car he was driving. Before dying, Hugo Tamagnini managed to recognize the terrorist Carlos Santillán – from the ERP – as one of his attackers. Santillán had been imprisoned but had escaped in 1971, leaving 5 prison guards dead, and although he had been recaptured, Cámpora's amnesty law had left him free to murder again. Indeed, the ERP took credit for the murder.


CELTYV

Sunday, January 14, 2024

Argentina: Relations with Chile around 1880

Argentine and Chilean perceptions regarding the border conflict

Argentine public opinion became increasingly polarized around the border dispute. Chile was perceived as an aggressor state by the expanding "internationalist" faction. The "internationalists" included in their ranks distinguished personalities such as Roque Sáenz Peña, who had served in the Peruvian army during the Pacific War, Indalecio Gómez and Estanislao Zeballos. The last two advocated the adoption of a hard line towards Chile (1). Another faction, opposed to the previous one, was made up of former president Bartolomé Mitre, Carlos Pellegrini and other sectors closely linked to the export-import economy. These men perceived that a war against Chile could slow Argentina's economic progress and affect its foreign trade (2). For these men, Argentina's path to greatness was written in an economic key. As the years passed, Argentina would grow and become richer and more powerful each year, until the trans-Andean nation would no longer be a problem.

On the other side of the Andes, Chileans perceived their neighbor with varied emotions, which ran the entire possible spectrum, from envy to contempt and from smug complacency to fear (3). According to Encina, the majority of Chilean intellectuals - with the express exception of Miguel Amunátegui, Adolfo Ibáñez, Vicente Pérez Rosales and a few others - openly or covertly fought the Chilean government's efforts to defend their rights in Patagonia. In this sense, the cases of José Victorino Lastarria or Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna are evident. The latter developed a tenacious campaign against Chilean titles in the Patagonian region for more than ten years, which culminated with his great speech in the Senate, and with his book titled precisely "La Patagonia." Among bankers, capitalists and landowners, the idea of a break with Argentina for Patagonia was perceived as irrational. As for public opinion, initially it was indifferent to the issue, only to years later be captured by the arguments in favor of confrontation between the two countries (4).
In Rauch's opinion, Chile's victory over the Andean nations in the Pacific War inflamed the nationalist spirit of Chilean public opinion. If before 1879, Chile's economic progress led its inhabitants to perceive themselves as "the England of South America," their victory over the Andean nations led Chileans to believe that they had earned the nickname "the Prussia of South America" (5). Many of those who visualized their nation in the role of Prussia in 1870, in turn perceived Argentina in the role of South American France, corrupt and motivated by commercial greed, and that could be overwhelmed by Chilean power. There were also those Chileans who believed their country was superior to Argentina in virtue and power and who wanted to go to war to prove it (6). The results obtained in the Pacific War had certainly accentuated the perception of self-importance. Thus, Chilean diplomats adopted positions characterized by their rudeness, rooted in the idea that their army, the best after that of Prussia, and their navy, the second after the British, could easily defeat the Argentine forces (7).
For their part, Argentines reviewed their own perceptions regarding Chile. His admiration for the neighboring nation's past progress was replaced by a feeling of growing suspicion, particularly after the incidents with the Jeanne Amélie and Devonshire ships. By 1890, Argentina had achieved institutional stability, a prerequisite for economic development (8). According to Rauch, Argentina did not fear Chile's military power, as Chilean historians suggest (9). As the most basic rules of prudence advised vigilance over the aggressive neighbor to the west, the Argentine government began to be governed by an old proverb, si vix pacem para bellum.

NOTES


  1. Gustavo Ferrari, Conflicto y paz con Chile: 1898-1903, Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1968, pp. 29-30, 46-47, citado en George Victor Rauch, The Argentine-Chilean Boundary Dispute and the Development of the Argentine Armed Forces: 1870-1902, Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1989, p. 323.
  2. G. Ferrari, op. cit., pp. 65-66, cit. en ibid., pp. 323-324.
  3. Ibid., p. 324.
  4. Francisco A. Encina, La cuestión de límites entre Chile y la Argentina desde la Independencia hasta el tratado de 1881, Santiago de Chile, Nascimento, 1959, p. 104.
  5. Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States, 1880-1962: The Emergence of Chile's Social Crisis and the Challenge to United States Diplomacy, University of Notre Dame Press, 1963, p. 34, cit. en G.V. Rauch, op. cit., p. 326.
  6. Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and the Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, Cambridge and London, Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 137, cit. en ibid., p. 326.
  7. Vicente Quesada, La política chilena en El Plata, Bueno Aires, Moen, 1895, pp. 72-73, cit. en ibid., p. 327.
  8. Oscar E. Cornblitt, Ezequiel Gallo y Alfredo A. O'Connell, "La generación del 80 y su proyecto: antecedentes y consecuencias", en Torcuato S. Di Tella (ed.), Argentina, sociedad de masas, Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1965, pp. 48-49, cit. en ibid., p. 328.
  9. Ver, por ejemplo, los casos de Mario Barros, Historia diplomática de Chile, Barcelona, Ariel, 1971, 322-323, 353-355; Oscar Espinosa Moraga, La postguerra del Pacífico y la Puna de Atacama, Santiago, Andrés Bello, 1958, p. 180, cit. en ibid., p. 329.


The convention of 1888 and the Zeballos-Matta declaration of 1889. The divergence between the criteria of the "high peaks" and the "divortium aquarum"

As a consequence of mutual fears (both countries curiously perceived that the 1881 treaty implied territorial losses), until 1888 a convention on demarcation and experts was not reached to delimit on the ground what was agreed in the treaty. This convention was signed on August 20, 1888 in Santiago de Chile by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Demetrio Lastarria, and the Argentine extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary minister, José Evaristo Uriburu (1).
It established the procedure for the appointment of the two experts referred to in articles 1 and 4 of the boundary treaty of 1881. Each of these experts could have an advisory commission with the same number of members, and they had to execute in the ground the demarcation of the lines indicated in articles 1, 2 and 3 of the boundary treaty. If they did not reach an agreement, they had to communicate it to their respective governments, so that they could proceed to appoint the third expert, who would have to resolve the controversy.
The Lastarria-Uriburu convention was ratified by law No. 2488, and the exchange of its ratifications became effective on January 11, 1890. Consequently, the Argentine government appointed engineer Octavio Pico as an expert and the Chilean government appointed Diego Barros. Spider.
However, each small advance in the bilateral relationship had to be faced with new obstacles. By virtue of the offer of shares by a company in London for the acquisition of twenty-four leagues of land on the railway from Chubut to Bahía Blanca, the Chilean government ordered its representative in Buenos Aires, Guillermo Matta, to claim for what it perceived as a Argentine advance in contentious territory. To overcome this obstacle, the Argentine chancellor Estanislao Zeballos and the Chilean minister Matta formulated a reciprocal declaration in 1889, which established that any act of one or another government that extended its jurisdiction to the part of the mountain range of dubious ownership, because it had not been drawn its limit, would not affect the results of the demarcation that was going to be carried out. This declaration was general in nature, applicable to the entire border in dispute with Chile from Bolivia to Navarino Island. According to Carrasco Domínguez, it was intended "to establish a status quo in the undefined border region, detracting from the acts of the parties executed prior to the definitive demarcation, but after the corresponding boundary arrangements" (2).
In accordance with the provisions of the 1881 treaty and the 1888 convention, in 1892 the Argentine and Chilean experts met, but they were unable to reach an agreement. The Chilean expert, Diego Barros Arana, formulated, in January 1892, the theory of divortium aquarum, that is, the separation between the rivers that go to the Atlantic and those that flow into the Pacific, and sought to impose it on his Argentine colleague, Octavio Pico. , as a criterion prior to beginning the demarcation task. For his part, Pico remained firm in his position of defending the line of the highest peaks as a criterion, regardless of its continuity as a watershed. Pico maintained that the Andes mountain range was the natural barrier between the two countries. The essential divergence regarding the criteria to be used in the demarcation work caused the suspension of negotiations between both experts.
On the other hand, the tension between Buenos Aires and Santiago had been stimulated by the media. A report from the Chilean minister in Buenos Aires, at the end of 1887, detailed the support of the Argentine press for an expedition sent to Patagonia, which had supposedly discovered three rivers, whose origin was in Argentine territory and which flowed into the Pacific, and which therefore granted Argentina ports on said ocean. Although he did not believe in the existence of these rivers, the Chilean representative was convinced that the Argentine media supported the idea of ports in the Pacific, to pressure the Casa Rosada authorities to make a decision in that regard (3 ). This pressure paid off, as the Argentine authorities rejected the Chilean criterion of divortium aquarum, in order not to give up potential access to the Pacific (4).

NOTES


  1. The text of the convention is the following:
         The governments of the Republic of Chile and the Argentine Republic, animated by the common desire to implement what was established in the treaty signed by both on July 23, 1881, in accordance with the demarcation of the territorial limits between one country and the other , have appointed their respective plenipotentiaries, namely:

         His Excellency the President of the Republic of Chile, Mr. Demetrio Lastarria, Minister of Foreign Affairs. And His Excellency the President of the Argentine Republic, Dr. José E. Uriburu, his extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary minister in Chile.
         Those who, duly authorized for this purpose, have agreed to the stipulations contained in the following clauses:
         I. The appointment of the two experts referred to in articles 1 and 4 of the boundary treaty of 1881 will be made by the signatory governments within a period of two months, counted from the exchange of the ratifications of this agreement.
         II. To assist the experts in the performance of their functions, each of the governments will also appoint five assistants within the same period.
         The number of these may be increased in identical proportion by both parties, provided that the experts request it by mutual agreement.
         III. The experts MUST carry out, on the FIELD, the demarcation of the lines indicated in articles 1, 2 and 3 of the boundary treaty.
         IV. However, experts may entrust the execution of the work to commissions of assistants.
         These assistants will be appointed in equal numbers for each party.
         The commissions will adjust their procedures to the instructions that the experts will give them, by common agreement and in writing.
         V. The experts must meet in the city of Concepción, Chile, forty days after their appointment, to appoint themselves in agreement on the starting point or points of their work, and on any others that may be necessary.
         They will prepare duplicate minutes of all the agreements and determinations they make at that meeting, and in the course of their operations.
         SAW. Whenever the experts do not reach agreement on any point of the establishment of limits or on any other issue, they will respectively communicate this to their governments, so that they can proceed to designate the third party that must resolve the controversy, according to the boundary treaty. 1881.
         VII. The experts may have, at the will of the respective government, the necessary personnel for their particular service, such as healthcare or any other; and when they deem it convenient for their safety, they may request a troop party from each of the two governments, or only from that of the nation in whose territory they are located; In the first case, the escort must consist of an equal number of seats for each party.
         VIII. The experts will set the times of work in the field, and will set up their office in the city they determine, being able, however, by common agreement, to move it from one point to another, whenever the needs of the service so advise.
         Each government will provide the expert it appoints and its assistants with the necessary elements and resources for their work; Both will jointly pay the expenses incurred by the offices and the marking of the boundaries.
         IX. Whenever any of the positions of expert or assistant become vacant, the respective government must appoint the replacement within a period of two months.
         X. This convention will be ratified, and the exchange of ratifications will be made in the city of Santiago or Buenos Aires, in the shortest possible time. (...).
         Text of the Lastarria-Uriburu convention, Santiago de Chile, August 20, 1888, in Ernesto Quesada, Chilean politics in El Plata, Buenos Aires, Arnoldo Moen, 1895, pp. 348-349.
  1. Germán Carrasco Domínguez, El arbitraje británico de 1899-1903. Sus aspectos procesales, Santiago, Andrés Bello, 1968, p. 168, n. 43; Isidoro Ruiz Moreno, Historia de las relaciones exteriores argentinas (1810-1955), Buenos Aires, Perrot, 1961, p. 231.
  2. Guillermo Matta al ministro de relaciones exteriores de Chile, Buenos Aires, 11 de octubre de 1887, Legación de Chile en el Plata, 1887-1888, cit. en Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force. Chile and the Balance of Power in South America, 1830-1905, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967, p. 185.
  3. Memorándum quoted in Luis Vicente Varela, La República Argentina y Chile: historia de la demarcación de sus fronteras (desde 1843 hasta 1899). Obra escrita con motivo del arbitraje pendiente ante su majestad británica, apoyada en los documentos inéditos del Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina, 2 vols., Buenos Aires, 1899, I, pp. 256-258, n. 115, fuente a su vez citada en R.N. Burr, op. cit., p. 186..

Historia de las Relaciones Internacionales Argentinas (c)

Thursday, January 11, 2024

Argentine Navy: Auxiliary Ship ARA Tte Olivieri

Auxiliary Ship ARA Tte Olivieri



ARGENTINA - ARA Teniente Olivieri 


The auxiliary ship ARA Teniente Olivieri (A 2), the former Marsea 10, was a PSV (Platform Supply Vessel), built at the Quality Shipyard in Houma, Louisiana (USA) and commissioned in 1981. It was acquired by the Argentine Government to the US Maritime Administration, on November 15, 1987 and delivered in May 1988, to be used as a warning and Patrol.

The ship displaces 1,640 tons, and its dimensions are: 56.3 meters long, 12.2 meters wide and 3.6 meters deep. Propulsion is provided by two GM-EMD 16-645 E6 type diesels, which generate 3,700 HP and drive two propellers, with a speed of 14 knots and a radius of 5,200 km at 10 knots. She also has two 300 shp bow (side) thrusters. The crew consists of 15 men and she is armed with two 12.7 mm machine guns.



The load capacity on the aft deck, which measures 35.06 meters long by 9.33 meters wide, is 610 tons. In commercial service, it transports up to 315 tons of fuel, 514 tons of industrial water, 44 tons of drinking water and 113 tons of bentonite slurry. In Argentine Navy service, the ship normally carries up to 600 tons of fuel and 800 tons of water. She is based in Puerto Belgrano and is primarily used as a logistical support vessel for facilities and isolated locations.

In 1994, speculation about the acquisition of another similar vessel, an AHTS called "Erebus", which now belongs to the company Marítima Mexicana SA de CV (MARMEX) TMM Group, operating under the name "Isla Ballena".

Photo: Luis Padilha

ARA “TENIENTE OLIVIERI” (A-2)


Shipyards: Quality Shipyard, New Orleans, Louisiana, United States
Origin: Ex Marsea 10
Entry into service: 1981
Entry into service US Maritime Administration: November 1987
Entry into ARA service: s/d
Assigned to: Naval Amphibious and Logistics Command (COAL). Stationed at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base (BNPB)






Technical characteristics

Displacement at full load: 1640 tn
Dimensions: length 56.3 m; beam 12.2 m; draft 4.3 m.
Maximum speed: 14 knots
Propulsion: 2 GM/EMD 16-645 E6, 3230 HP, 2 propellers.
Autonomy: 2,800 nautical miles at 10 knots.
Crew: 25 men
Armament: 2 12.7 mm MG machine guns.
Radar: s/d


Poder Naval



Tuesday, January 9, 2024

Argentine Army: GMC, 2 1/2-ton, 6x6, Cargo, CCKW - (G 508) Truck

GMC, 2 1/2-ton, 6x6, Cargo, CCKW - (G 508) Truck

By Sergio Toyos  



This truck was named according to the production nomenclature of the General Motors Corporation company of the time, since the Second World War had begun. The acronym CCKW was assigned by it using its standard system:
C= Designed in 1941
C= Standard Body
K= Front wheel drive
W= Rear wheel drive

Nicknamed by the soldiers as "The Jimmy", this truck began to be produced in 1941, ending production in 1945, with a total of 562,750 units being manufactured off the assembly line in different versions. It was the most commonly used tactical vehicle in World War II. It then continued in service until 1956, even being used in the Korean War. The CCKWs were originally fitted with a metal cabin (called a "closed cabin"), but after July 1943 it was replaced by a canvas one to save metal and reduce the volume for boarding (called an "open cabin"). They were designed and produced in two basic versions of chassis and wheelbase.


"Short": 145 inches (CCKW-352) for artillery trailer.
"Length": 164 inches (CCKW-353) for troops and cargo.

The configuration of the box was multiple, according to the various needs emerging from the conflicts in which it had to participate. It was equipped with a GMC 270 6-cylinder engine, which provided 92 hp. Its weight was 20,700 Kg for the short chassis model and 22,500 Kg for the long one. It had a width of 2.16 m. Its height without awning in place was 2.35 m. The basic cargo version had seats for the troops folded into the box. Other variants included


Air compressor
750 gallon tank
Two 350-gallon fuel tanks and Jerry Cans
Tipper.
Shop van (ST-5 and ST-6 body)

They could be equipped with Gar Wood (2-U512) or Heil (JJ-104-B, 125G or 125G1) winches, but only if the front and bumper were factory built for that purpose. A letter code had to be created to identify the various types of bodies



A: Loading without winch
B: Loading with winch
C: Tanker
D: Naphtha tanker without winch
E: Gasoline tanker with winch
F: Van
G: Water tanker without winch
H: Tipper with winch

After the Second World War, enormous quantities of these noble, rustic and strong vehicles were distributed throughout all the former battle fronts in states of maintenance. The armies of the countries in which they were located rebuilt their own fleets of vehicles and then sold the surplus to contractors. These, in turn, resold gigantic batches of vehicles of all types to countries around the world, to fulfill both military and civil tasks.

It should be emphasized that in Korea, after the war, gigantic repowering plants were installed for military vehicles used in the conflict. It is notable the way in which all types of materials were collected, establishing large factories, where all the vehicles intended for later use were remade, using the incredible quantities of spare parts available for this purpose.



Our country received part of this material after the Second World War, along with Studebaker, Chevrolet and Ford Canada trucks, and Sherman armored vehicles (English version), Crusader tanks, half-tracks and T 16 or Bren Carrier weapons-carrying vehicles.
The national organization that handled the transactions to import them was a state organization called IAPI (Argentine Institute for Exchange), which purchased enormous quantities of material of all kinds that were prohibited to us by the United States, as a result of our abstention in the participation in the world conflict. The material was purchased from a Belgian contracting company, which sold in-use material, some quite battered and others, literally new, with enormous quantities of spare parts still boxed. With this flood of automotive material, our Armed Forces became motorized and began a new era and a new doctrine.



Source

Asociación Argentina de Coleccionistas de Vehículos Militares 

A.A.C.V.M 
Soldados Digital

Friday, January 5, 2024

Argentine Historical Anecdote: A Parade for the Children

A Touching Parade


Story of the Cavalry Major Mr. Luis Noailles French


At the end of 1933 we returned from Cambai located north of the Mocoretá River in the Province of Corrientes. After carrying out some very rainy maneuvers, we had crossed the aforementioned river, swimming 1,000 meters wide and 5 km long. of bathing... we were very tired and with wet clothes.-

At the head of the column marched Lt. Col. Donovan with his assistant Second Lieutenant Espinosa. Behind them I marched with the war flag draped and then the 5 squadrons. It was around 11 o'clock and the sun was breaking the earth, the humidity was unbearable. From a hill we saw a group of boys, accompanied by a teacher of no more than 20 years old, running towards the road. In the background you could see a typical ranch school and its flag.-

The Lt. Col. Donovan ordered the bugler to give orders to halt and the regiment stopped. Then he called “prepare to parade” and ordered me: second lieutenant, draw the flag. He made the band come forward and we waited for the Miss Teacher to arrive with the boys at the fence. The band started and he headed towards that group of Argentines, greeting the Señorita and asking her permission to start the parade with his saber drawn.

The boys were one open mouth and the teacher was crying, I mean badly... she was sobbing.
We were ready and then, the entire 6th Cavalry Regiment honored that teacher and her students. While the tears flowed silently, that Argentine human group looked absorbed at the weapons of the Homeland that recognized their sacrifices for doing something every day for Argentina.-

....It was for me the most brilliant parade of my entire military career... today at 86 years old (1998) I am moved to tears when I remember the moment that God allowed me to live...


****

Although it may seem like a fairy tale, we were once a people like that, with the Homeland in our hearts...

Monday, January 1, 2024

SMG: Halcón M/943 (Argentina)

Submachine gun Halcón M/943 (Argentina)





Halcon M/943 submachine gun

Caliber .45ACP
Weight 4.05 kilos
Length 850mm
Barrel length 292 mm
Rate of fire 700 rounds per minute
Magazine capacity 17 or 30 ammunition

The Halcon M/943 submachine gun (Halcón machine gun, model 1943) was developed by the Argentine arms factory Fábrica de Armas Halcón. It was manufactured for the Argentine army and police; The lighter and more compact variant of the same weapon was manufactured as the Halcón M/946 of the Argentine Air Forces (Halcón Machine Gun Carbine, model Aeronáutica Argentina 1946). This weapon is rarely found outside of South America.

The ¨Heavy Halcon¨

After a series of designs, tests and prototypes, in 1943 the Argentine Model 1943 or P.A. began to be produced. (Machine Gun) Heavy Model 43, in 45 ACP caliber. This weapon was adopted by the National Gendarmerie and is also known as the MP-43 Halcón.
It came with a wooden stock and had a very thick flash hider.
These "Heavy" models were not made of prints nor did they have plastics and were influenced by two submachine guns: the Beretta M-1938 and the Thompson M1928.
From the first it took its tubular receiver with a screw cap and from the second, its strong structure, the barrel with turned fins, the flash hider and its expensive machining, in addition to its caliber of course.
The 45 ACP was the regulation in the Armed Forces. Argentines at that time and it was chosen for this weapon for logistical reasons.
Later, the MP-46 and 49 were produced.
The MP-46 “Aeronautical Model” was a derivative of the MP-43 produced in 1946, more compact and designed for parachute troops. The 45 caliber was maintained, but the barrel and receiver were shortened and in addition, unlike the MP-43, it had a rotating collapsible nock on the right side of the barrel.
These changes, designed for parachutists, gave it more agility in handling and a reduction in weight. Like its predecessor, it was fed with straight magazines for 17 or 30 rounds, but the magazines of the two models were interchangeable.
The MP-49 weighed 4,625 kg and with the 36-round magazine, its weight rose to 5,311 kg.
It had a folding nock and seems to be designed to have a very long useful life. It is perhaps the most robust of the series.
The next model was the MP-43 but this time for the EA. The basic MP-43 was equipped with a folding nock and a compensating muzzle with a smaller diameter than that of the Gendarmerie, more similar to that of Aeronautics.
However, the most important change was in caliber, when the 9mm Parabellum replaced the 45 ACP in 1949.
All these models were built with the best raw materials available, but the quality was felt in the cost and it is then that, for economic reasons, the series of these submachine guns was rationalized in order to be lighter and easier to manufacture.

In Malvinas









How it Works

The Halcón M/943 submachine gun is a simple blowback weapon that fires from an open bolt. The weapon can fire single shots and fully automatic, thanks to the fire mode selector, which is located on the left side, above the trigger. The charging handle is also located on the left side and does not move when the gun is fired. The Halcon M/943 submachine gun is equipped with a strong finned barrel and a massive muzzle compensator, and has a peculiarly shaped wooden pistol grip/stock. The Halcon M/946 submachine gun was a similar design except that it had a shorter barrel and a bottom-deploying stock of the MP40 type.




Halcón 1946






Georgian Weapons
Pictures from Museo de Armas de la Nación by Gonzalo