War with Brazil: Naval Battle of Los Pozos

June 11th. Anniversary of the Battle of Los Pozos

Background

Imagine a nation on the brink, its borders threatened by a powerful empire, rivers blockaded, and its very sovereignty hanging by a thread. The year is 1825, and the fledgling United Provinces of the Río de la Plata faces a formidable foe: the Empire of Brazil, a giant that seeks to crush any resistance and expand its dominion.

As the specter of war looms, Buenos Aires is thrust into a desperate struggle for survival. A small, hastily assembled fleet, funded by the patriotic fervor of its citizens, is their only hope against Brazil's mighty naval forces. Meanwhile, danger lurks on the southern coast, where whispers of invasion and treachery among indigenous allies threaten to unravel the fragile unity of the provinces.

This is not just a battle for land or power; it is a fight for the very soul of a nation. The stage is set for a conflict that will shape the destiny of South America, where courage, strategy, and determination will be tested to their limits. Will the United Provinces rise to the challenge, or will they be consumed by the imperial ambitions of their neighbor? The answer lies in the epic struggle that is about to unfold. 

The Actions

Picture a nation under siege, its fate hanging in the balance as forces clash on both land and water. The rivers that were once lifelines have become battlegrounds, and the mighty Plata, once claimed by the Empire of Brazil as its own, now bears witness to fierce resistance.

In the closing days of May 1826, the Argentine fleet, though outnumbered and outgunned, dared to challenge imperial dominance. Brig Balcarce, alongside a few schooners and gunboats, stealthily maneuvered to Las Conchillas, where they began the daring task of disembarking troops. The Empire, seeking vengeance, dispatched a squadron of 30 ships to crush this audacious move. But on June 11, as they approached Los Pozos, they met an unexpected foe: Admiral Guillermo Brown, a man of iron will and unyielding courage.

With Buenos Aires as a backdrop and ten thousand spectators lining the harbor, Brown's fleet engaged the imperial forces in a blaze of cannon fire. For fifteen intense minutes, the river roared with the thunder of battle until, against all odds, the imperial ships turned south, retreating from the fray. As the sun dipped below the horizon, the Argentine fleet stood victorious, a testament to their resilience and determination.

Yet, while these naval victories ignited hope, the land war stagnated. The Argentine army, led by General Las Heras, remained in a tense standoff, hindered by political turmoil at home. In a bid to stabilize the nation, Congress acted swiftly, establishing a permanent executive power and electing Bernardino Rivadavia as president.

The stage is set for a dramatic turn in the conflict, where the tides of war may shift at any moment. The courage displayed on the rivers may yet inspire a nation to rise above the challenges that lie ahead, but the road to victory is fraught with uncertainty.



Wikipedia

Argentina-Chile Naval Race: Py Squadron in Patagonia (6/13)

Py Squadron in Patagonia

The Devonshire incident and its impact on Argentine-Chilean relations
Tensions with Chile

Part 6
From Part 5

The last quarter of 1878 is underway. Doctor Nicolás Avellaneda has been the president of the republic for four years, assisted by General Julio A. Roca in dealing with military issues, from the position of Minister of War and Navy.

The Argentine Republic has very tense relations with Chile due to border issues dating back to 1843, when the trans-Andeans had settled in the Strait of Magellan. This situation has worsened with the presence of Chilean navy ships in the waters of the Santa Cruz River.

In 1876 the French barge Jeanne Amélie was at the mouth of that river, engaged in loading guano, an operation that was authorized by the Argentine consul in Montevideo. On October 20 of that year the Chilean war corvette Magallanes appeared on the scene and captured the French ship. The Chilean authorities based in Punta Arenas ordered that the French ship and its crew, who were detained, be transferred to that port, and during navigation the Jeanne Amélie ran aground on a reef at Cabo Vírgenes and sank.

This seizure, which represented a disregard for our sovereignty over that region, caused great indignation among the national authorities and the Argentine people; protests were filed with the Argentine government, which refused to give satisfaction and affirmed that Chile's jurisdiction extended to the southern bank of the Santa Cruz River. As the months went by, spirits calmed down, while diplomatic efforts were carried out to put an end to the issue.

On June 19, 1878, Augusto M. Ventury, a merchant from Buenos Aires, notified E.L. Baker, the American consular agent in that city, who had rented an American merchant ship, the Devonshire, for the purpose of loading the guano accumulated on the islands located at the mouth of the Santa Cruz River. But on October 11 of that year, the Chilean corvette Magallanes arrived in the area and its commander demanded from the crew of the Devonshire -anchored on the island of Monte León- the authorization of the Chilean government to carry out the operation of loading guano. Since the men of the Devonshire did not have such authorization, the commander of the Magallanes decided to capture the ship and its crew and take them to Punta Arenas, with the aggravating dishonor towards the minimum decorum of the Chilean military that they abandoned their captain on land. (1)

The then Navy Lieutenant Carlos María Moyano, who served as Navy subdelegate in Santa Cruz, sent a communication to the General Command of the Navy in which he reported on the attack committed by the Chilean ship, which again caused the situation to reach a very delicate limit, the slightest issue could force the casus belli.

The Buenos Aires newspapers raised the alarm and stirred up public opinion, which demanded an end to Chilean interference in the Santa Cruz area. This reiteration of the insult on the part of Chile, led the Argentine government to send a warship to Santa Cruz to expel the Chileans from there. Dr. Avellaneda, in his message to the National Congress, stated: [... assuming the case of legitimate defense, the Executive Branch has decided to station a warship at the mouth of the Santa Cruz River, to build a fortification at its entrance and on its northern bank, equipping it with cannons and the corresponding garrison...

The Argentine authorities interpreted this incident as an insult to a friendly country. The Chilean authorities obviously adopted another point of view. As early as September 1878, Foreign Minister Alejandro Fierro had informed the American representative in Chile, Thomas A. Osborn, that an American ship was illegally loading guano south of the Santa Cruz River. After the incident, the minister clarified to the American diplomat that the actions of the Chilean government should not be considered as a provocation to the United States government, since any ship that violated Chilean territory would be captured in the same way. (2)

Monte León Island, Santa Cruz Province (Argentine Republic)

The incident, as in the case of the "Santa Cruz criminals," was linked to unresolved territorial jurisdiction. Chile claimed all lands located south of the Santa Cruz River, a claim that included, of course, the island of Monte León where the Chilean gunboat Magallanes had captured the Devonshire. This incident, far from being an isolated incident, responded to a defined line of Chilean foreign policy aimed at consolidating its dominance south of the aforementioned river. Thus, and with the aim of clearing up any possible doubt on the question of Chilean sovereignty in this area, the trans-Andean government had already issued a declaration on October 26, 1873, which was addressed to all foreign governments and established that Chile's authority should be respected south of the Santa Cruz River. The Chilean government added weight to this declaration when on April 27, 1876, it captured the French ship Jeanne Amélie for illegally loading guano, approximately in the same place as the Devonshire. For the Chilean government, the issue surrounding the Devonshire was simply one of reaffirming a long-established law. (3)


Chilean gunboat Magellan

In this new instance of the dispute between Buenos Aires and Santiago, the exaggerated reaction of both countries almost led to war. The Minister of War and Navy, General Julio A. Roca, with a deep understanding of the Patagonian problem - demonstrated the following year with the beginning of operations against the Indians to dominate the Desert - estimated that what Avellaneda proposed was not powerful enough and convinced the first magistrate that it was convenient to send a naval division to the Santa Cruz River. Roca's criteria prevailed and that is how Commodore Luis Py, then head of our Fleet, was appointed to carry out the delicate mission.

President Nicolás Avellaneda and his then Minister of War and Navy, Julio Argentino Roca, decided to occupy Santa Cruz and send warships to the southern area. Commodore Luis Py, of the Argentine Navy, received orders to organize and lead the naval division that was to set sail for Santa Cruz, with the objective of protecting the homonymous river from Chilean incursions. At the same time, according to the information provided by the American minister in Buenos Aires, General Thomas O. Osborn, on November 18, 1878, the Chilean government had sent two or three gunboats to Patagonia with experts to occupy the Strait of Magellan. (4) For Argentina, the capture of the Devonshire was a personal insult to its people and a matter of deep concern. On October 24, 1878, Augusto Ventury protested against the Chilean government before the American minister in Buenos Aires, Osborn, and before the American consul in this city, Baker. Ventury maintained that the Chilean gunboat Magellan had violated international law since it intervened in waters that were under the jurisdiction of the Argentine Republic and had also captured the Devonshire and abandoned the captain on the island of Monte Leon without provisions. Ventury also demanded that the Chilean government reimburse the sum sufficient to cover the costs of the capture and imprisonment of the ship and its crew. Osborn immediately transmitted these protests of the Buenos Aires merchant to the Argentine government and telegraphed them to Santiago. He also informed the commander of the American fleet in the South Atlantic. The protests of the Argentine authorities, together with the insinuation of military reprisals on the part of the Americans, forced the Chilean government to moderate its position. The Chilean foreign minister Alejandro Fierro met with Osborn's representative in Chile, informing him of the Chilean government's willingness to release the Devonshire and her crew in exchange for a promise to abide by the legal action of the courts. But the response of Buenos Aires almost led to war. Not only did it reject the Chilean proposal, but it reaffirmed its claims for compensation from the Chilean government to cover the losses suffered by the capture of the Devonshire. (5)

Fortunately, according to Willett, the moderate reaction of the American ministers in Santiago and Buenos Aires, and the selfless action of Warren Lowe, an American citizen and editor of the prestigious Buenos Aires Herald, prevented war. With the purpose of providing a way out of the delicate situation, Lowe met with the American minister in Buenos Aires and then went to the Chilean capital where he contacted the Argentine consul, Mariano de Sarratea, and the Chilean foreign minister, Alejandro Fierro. According to Willett, Fierro was pleasantly impressed with the arguments presented by Lowe. The editor of the Buenos Aires Herald rejected the idea of ​​a forced settlement, which would only guarantee a war between Argentina and Chile. It was better to arbitrate and avoid war, than to fight and arbitrate later. (6)

Lowe repeatedly suggested to Chilean Foreign Minister Fierro that the Devonshire be released unconditionally and returned to the United States as a preliminary step to deactivate the North American diplomatic pressure on Argentina and the negative influence of Argentine public opinion on its authorities, the latter factor paralyzing any progress in negotiations with Chile. Fierro argued that the real threat of war with Argentina prevented the Chilean government from acting on the valid recommendations of the Herald editor. After several twists and turns, the Chilean Foreign Minister confirmed his government's decision to voluntarily release the Devonshire and return it to the United States. This resolution had a positive impact in official circles in Buenos Aires, and finally, on November 15, 1878, the Chilean Foreign Minister sent a letter to the Governor of Magallanes authorizing the Devonshire to set sail, putting an end to the incident. (7)

The Chilean Navy's official version states: "In 1878, Argentina's systematic advance south of Río Negro in Patagonia nearly caused war between the two nations. The American barge "Devonshire" loaded guano at Monte León Cove under license from Argentine authorities, in Chilean territory. The "Magallanes" under the command of Commander Latorre followed orders from the Chilean government and seized the barge and took it to Punta Arenas. This led to claims from Argentina, which at the time claimed those territories, and tempers flared to the point of breaking off diplomatic relations. Common sense prevailed and an agreement was reached through the Fierro-Sarratea Pact."

Argentinian Squadron

On December 1, 1878, Commodore Luis Py of the Argentine Navy raised the national flag in the place called Cañadón Misioneros at 5 p.m. on that historic day. In itself, it was a simple and quick act, but its implications would endure over time until today.
As we know, there had been a long-standing, not-so-hidden confrontation between Argentina and our Chilean neighbors, regarding the definitive possession of Patagonia, which they claimed as their own. The international conflict was not long in coming and the Minister of War of President Avellaneda, General Julio A. Roca, sent Py in command of a squadron heading to the southern seas to avoid further interference from the trans-Andeans, among whose ships was one that would celebrate future days of glory: the then gunboat and later corvette “Uruguay” (today a museum exhibited in Puerto Madero, City of Buenos Aires). On November 27th he went up the Santa Cruz River and finally, on that first day of December, he reaffirmed Argentine rights over such a vast territory.
It is no coincidence that this sublime heroic act coincided with Roca's military campaign towards the Desert, the objective of which was to definitively end the empire of shameless looting and robbery of the Pampas populations by the Mapuches, who were supported by the Chilean government. Chile could not openly occupy our southern lands because it was engaged in a war against Peru and Bolivia, the so-called "War of the Pacific" and it was not strategically appropriate to open another Theater of Operations and one more enemy.

That is why men like Roca, Py, Piedrabuena, Levalle, Villegas or Vintter must be remembered with respect and with the due historical distance, without absurd anachronisms, nor arm-twisting Clio, the muse of History, because History, like Truth, does not need our lies...

This "disputed" territory is an integral part of the current Argentine Republic.

NOTES

1. Dipl. Desp., (M69), reel 20, T.A. Osborn to Evarts, 30-10-1878, cit. en D. E. Willett, op. cit., p. 72.

2. Dipl. Desp., (M 70), reel 16, Baker to Hunter, 22-10-1878; (M10), reel 29, T.A.O. to Evarts, 25-10-1878, fuentes citadas en ibid., p. 72.

3. R. Burr, op. cit., p. 134, cit. en ibid., p. 73.

4. Osborn to Evarts, Telegram Nº 207, November 18, 1878, U.S. National Archives, Washington D.C., RG 59, citado en G.V. Rauch, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

5. Dipl. Desp. (M 10), reel 29, T.A.O. to Evarts, 7-11-1878, cit. en D.E. Willett, ibid., p. 76.

6. Ibid., p. 78.

7. Dipl. Desp., (M 10), reel 29, T. A.O. to Evarts, 12-11-1878, (M69), reel 20, 12-12-1878; (M 70), reel 16, Baker to Hunter, 21-11-1878, fuentes citadas en ibid., p. 81.

Historia de las RR.EE. Argentinas
ACh
Los senderos de Mnemósine

Leadership of Small Groups in the Malvinas Gravel

Malvinas: Leadership in Small Groups

Marcos Gallacher

Twenty-five years ago, on May 28, 1982, ground combat erupted in the town of Darwin-Goose Green in the Malvinas. Following the defeat of the Argentine garrison there, British forces pressed on toward Puerto Argentino, engaging in battles that ultimately led to the outcome we all know. While much has been written about the Malvinas conflict, many aspects remain unexplored. One such overlooked area is the role and behavior of the officers who led small units during these intense battles.

The significance of leadership in such situations is vividly portrayed in the classic film The Bridge on the River Kwai. In the film, the British prisoner commander, played by Alec Guinness, refuses to let his officers do manual labor alongside the enlisted men. His defiance leads to brutal punishment at the hands of his captors. The commander’s reasoning is simple but profound: if officers take on the duties of common soldiers, the entire military hierarchy crumbles. Without that structure, a combat battalion—even a group of prisoners—becomes nothing more than a disorganized mob.

This reference comes to mind for an important reason: while watching the April 2 commemorative events on television, it was striking to see how this crucial principle of leadership was completely overlooked by the program creators. The broadcasts mixed the valuable testimonies of conscript soldiers who fought in the islands with the opinions of journalists, popular historians, and political commentators. However, the voices of those who were directly responsible for leading these soldiers into battle—the young officers who provided the critical leadership on the ground—were conspicuously absent.

These officers were the ones who ensured that a group of individuals could function as a cohesive combat unit in the heat of battle. Their contributions, vital to the outcome of the conflict, deserve to be recognized and understood as we reflect on this chapter of history.



The ranks of the officers involved in the Malvinas conflict varied widely—from fresh second lieutenants straight out of military college to seasoned majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels. However, few of these officers were interviewed about their experiences, with one notable exception: Ambassador Balza, who served as a lieutenant colonel during the conflict. His insights, it should be said, are invaluable in truly understanding what transpired.

Professional soldiers, much like doctors, lawyers, or engineers, possess a deep understanding of their field that far surpasses that of the average person. It is these professionals, particularly officers, who are best equipped to analyze the events and draw meaningful lessons from them. These officers are the ones who shape a group of men into an effective combat force, using their training to place everyday experiences into a broader context and learn from them.

The Malvinas conflict is often misunderstood by the general public, in part because much of what people read or see on television comes from observers who were not directly involved in the fighting. Even those who were present as conscript soldiers, while brave and valuable, had a limited perspective on the overall situation. Few people realize, for example, that the casualty rate among officers in ground combat was higher than that of non-commissioned officers and soldiers: 2.5 percent of the officers who participated were killed, compared to 1.7 percent of non-commissioned officers and 1.9 percent of soldiers. This is unusual in military history, where it is generally the enlisted men who bear the brunt of the casualties. But in the Argentine Army during the Malvinas conflict, the opposite was true.

The Malvinas conflict remains a deeply emotional issue for many Argentines, but there are important lessons to be learned. One of these lessons is the critical role of leadership at the small unit level, which was a key factor in the tough resistance our forces offered in several engagements. Argentina, in both its private and public sectors, suffers from a significant leadership deficit. Perhaps by reflecting on the positive examples of leadership from the Malvinas, we can begin to understand the kind of leadership that our country so desperately needs.

Marcos Gallacher is a professor of Business Organization at the University of CEMA.

U530 Submarine: The One that Surrended in Mar del Plata

U530 Submarine

Type IXc/40

Ordered: 15-08-40
Job number: 345
Shipyard: Deutsche Werft AG, Hamburg-Finkenwärder
Laid down: 08-12-41
Launched: 28-07-42
Baubelehrung: 8.KLA, Hamburg
Commissioned: 14-10-42
Feldpost: M 49 518

Destiny

• 10.42 - 02.43 in 4.U-Flottille, Stettin as Ausbildungsboot
• 03.43 - 09.44 in 10.U-Flottille, Lorient as Frontboot
• 10.44 - 05.45 in 33.U-Flottille, Flensburg as Frontboot

Commanders

• 14.10.42 - __.01.45: KL Kurt Lange
• __.01.45 - 10.07.45: OL Otto Wermuth

Record

• 5 Patrols. 2 sunk ships (12.063 tn) 1 damage.

Patrol	Comnander	Date	Hour	Ship	Origin	Type	Tonnage	Position	Method
1a	Lange	09/03/43	21:36	SS.Milos	Swedish	Steam merchant	3.058	AL1763	Torpedo
1a	Lange	05/04/43	22:11	MV.Sunoil	American	Motor Tanker	9.005	AK2521	Torpedo

Patrullas

1st Patrol

She left Kiel on 20 February 1943 for the North Atlantic.
U-530 was to form part of Group Neuland, located west of Ireland. On 7 March 1943, U-530 and ten other U-boats in the patrol line's northern section were sent to the northwest as Group Ostmark. The U-boats formed a patrol line from the 8th ahead of convoy SC121. This convoy had been sighted by U-405 on the 6th south of Greenland.
17 U-boats from Groups Wildfang, Burggraf, and Neptun operated against convoy SC121, apart from Group Ostmark. On the afternoon of the 9th, U-530 sank a straggling merchant ship from the convoy, the SS. Milos (Swedish 3,058 tons). Twelve ships of the convoy would be sunk and another damaged in the operations that would end on the 11th south of Iceland.
The Ostmark Group would be enlarged with the arrival of new U-boats and with three more from the Burggraf Group and would be renamed the Stürmer Group. The new Group would be located from the 14th in the central area of the North Atlantic to operate against convoys SC122 and HX229. In the operations against this convoy, a total of 21 Allied ships would be sunk, on the other hand, the U-384 would be lost. In the attacks, on the 17th, the U-530 would be damaged in a depth charge attack carried out by the destroyer HMS Beverley.
The U-530 and another six U-boats that had been part of the Stürmer Group would form the Seawolf Group, which would be joined by other recently arrived U-boats. On the 25th they were situated south-east of Cape Farewell and south of the patrol line deployed by Group Seeteufel. Both groups were waiting to intercept convoy SC123. From the 26th the patrol lines of Groups Seewolf and Seeteufel would overlap, thus extending the patrol line to 800 miles south of Cape Farewell.
U-305, situated at the northern end of the Seawolf line, sighted convoy HX230 on the 27th. U-530 was one of twenty-two U-boats detached from the two groups to harass convoy HX230. However, due to a strong storm which would develop into a hurricane on the 28th and air escorts arriving in the area on the 29th, the U-boats would not have much success. The operation would end on the 30th, when contact with the convoy was lost, with only one Allied ship sunk.
On the 4th of April, U-530, already returning to base, sighted convoy HX231 and notified Group Löwenherz. On the afternoon of the 5th, U-530 sank a straggler from this convoy, southeast of Cape Farewell, it was the tanker MV Sunoil (American 9,005 tons) that had been torpedoed ten hours earlier by U-563. Between the 11th and 13th of April, U-530 would form part of Group Lerche to attack convoy HX232, all of which would be repelled by the escorts. The operation would end on the 13th west of Ireland. The U530 would arrive at its new base in Lorient on April 22, 1943.

2nd Patrol

It left Kiel on May 29, 1943 towards the Central Atlantic.
On June 14, on its way to its area of ​​operations, it would be ordered to head southwest of the Canary Islands to perform U-Tanker duties. In mid-June it would resupply the U172, U572 and U759 so that they could continue operating and the U180 that was returning to the base.
U-530 arrived in Bordeaux on 3 July 1943.

3rd Patrol

She left Bordeaux on 21 September 1943 and arrived in La Pallice on 21 September 1943.

4th Patrol

She left La Pallice on 27 September 1943 and returned on 29 September 1943.

5th Patrol

She left La Pallice on 3 October 1943 and returned on 5 October 1943.

6th Patrol

She left La Pallice on 17 October 1943 to operate in the Caribbean.
In early November U-530 was resupplied by U-488 east of Bermuda. U-530 entered the Caribbean on the 21st via the Martinique Channel. The U-530 would patrol off the Gulf of Darien where it would unsuccessfully attack an oil tanker near San Blas. On December 26th it would torpedo and damage the turbine tanker Chapultepec (American 10,195 tons) northeast of Nombre de Dios, Panama. Three days later the U-530 would be damaged after being rammed by the tanker Esso Buffalo, due to the damage and breakdowns the U-530 would begin the return to base.
The U-530 would arrive at Lorient on February 22nd, 1944.

7th Patrol

It left Lorient on May 22nd, 1944 for the Caribbean.
On the evening of 23 June U-530 rendezvoused with the Japanese submarine I-52 off the Cape Verde Islands. U-530 supplied the Japanese submarine with a new radar system and two German technicians to operate it and a Japanese-speaking pilot to take I-52 to Lorient. Shortly after the rendezvous I-52 was attacked by an Avenger aircraft of VC-69 (Lt-Cdr J. Taylor) from the carrier USS Bogue. The carrier which was searching for U-530 had intercepted a transmission referring to the rendezvous with the submarine.
.

U530 surrendered in Mar del Plata

The KL. Wermuth would take the U 530 southwards, arriving at the Mar de la Plata (Argentina) on 10 July 1945.
The crew of the U 530 would be interned and the U 530 would be handed over to representatives of the US Navy in Buenos Aires.
The U 530 would be used as an experimental submarine and would be sunk by a torpedo launched by the American submarine USS. Toro in some exercises on 28 November 1947 northeast of Cape Cod.

The Tale Behind the Painting

In the quiet vastness of the mid-Atlantic on June 23rd, 1944, a secretive exchange unfolds. The Type IXC-40 U-Boat, U-530, eases away from the Japanese C3 Class submarine, I-52, as two Japanese sailors in a rubber dinghy return to their vessel. The scene is shrouded in mystery and intrigue—surely, something clandestine is afoot. And, as history would later confirm, there indeed was.

I-52, later dubbed "Japan's Golden Submarine," was on a perilous mission, code-named "Momi," meaning "Evergreen" or "Fir Tree" in Japanese. Her destination was Lorient, a key port in German-occupied France. This was the maiden voyage of this brand-new C3-class submarine, and she carried a cargo of immense strategic value: essential raw materials like rubber, several civilian engineers and technicians lending their expertise to the Germans, nearly one hundred crew members, and, most tantalizingly, two tons of gold.

As dusk settled on that fateful June evening, the I-52 met with the German U-530. The Germans transferred a "Naxos" radar installation, along with two technicians to operate it and a pilot to guide the submarine safely to Lorient. With their mission complete, the two submarines parted ways, disappearing into the night.

Kapitäleutnant Kurt Lange, commander of the U-530, wisely decided to submerge and continue his patrol toward the Caribbean. In contrast, Commander Uno Kameo of the I-52, perhaps lulled into a false sense of security by the moonless night, chose not to.

But unbeknownst to both captains, Allied forces had been tracking them. Within hours, aircraft from the remarkably successful USS Bogue located the Japanese submarine. Relentless depth charges and torpedoes sent the I-52 to her watery grave, claiming the lives of 109 Japanese sailors and three German crew members.

In 1995, American explorer Paul Tidwell finally discovered and filmed the wreck of the I-52, sparking a new chapter in this tale—one that continues to unfold. Today, the site is recognized as an official Japanese War Grave.

And what of the two tons of gold? They remain untouched, still "up for grabs"—though any treasure hunter would be wise to consult Tidwell, the Japanese government, and a few others before making a claim.

And the U-530? She emerged unscathed from the war. After another year of service, she sailed into Mar del Plata, Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1945, surrendering to neutral authorities without a scratch.

U-Historia

Argentina-Chile Naval Race: Gunboat Magallanes (5/13)

Gunboat Magallanes

Part 5
From Part 4


Its acquisition was approved by a bill enacted on March 4, 1872. This legal body authorized, in addition to the gunboat, the construction of the armored ships Cochrane and Valparaíso (later renamed Blanco Encalada). The cost of the gunboat rose to $200,000 pesos and its construction was commissioned to the Raenhill & Co. shipyards in London, England. 1.

It arrived in Chile in 1875. Its acquisition was due to the death of two English castaways in Tierra del Fuego at the hands of the Fuegian aborigines. Upon learning of this, the British government launched a protest to its Chilean counterpart, in which it threatened to occupy said territory, given the Chilean government's lack of capacity to avoid these bloody events and ensure transit through the Strait of Magellan. For this reason, it was decided to acquire a ship that was capable of arming itself in war for use in the Punta del Fuego Colony. Arenas 1.

   
Gunboat Magallanes 7 

She displaced 950 tons (maximum), her hull was made of mixed iron and wood, she was armed with one 7-inch caliber cannon (177.8 mm), and weighed 7 tons, which launched a 115-pound (52.1 kilo) grenade, one 64-pound (29 kilo) grenade, and two 20-pound (9 kilo) grenades; she had a speed of 11 knots, engine power of 1,230 HP, 220 tons of coal capacity, coal consumption of 24 tons per day, she had a brig-schooner rig of 2.

Since her arrival she served the colony of Punta Arenas, and carried out exploration and hydrographic survey work in the southern channels and in Patagonia.

In 1877, the Magallanes, under the command of Captain Juan José Latorre, suppressed the mutiny of the artillery company that covered the square in Punta Arenas (which at that time had approximately 1,100 inhabitants), called “La Fija de Magallanes”, which had revolted under the work of Corporal Antonio Riquelme and Sergeant Isaac Pozo 3.

In 1876 and 1878, it captured the French ship Jeanne Amelie, and the American barge Devonshire respectively, both vessels loading guano in Río Negro. In both cases, these ships had been authorized by the Argentine government to carry out this task. At that time, both Argentina and Chile claimed sovereignty over said territory, which ultimately determined that their intervention had violated international law 4.

  
Armstrong cannon of 115 pounds (52.21 kilos) and 7 inches of caliber (17.78 cm), belonging to the Magellan Gunboat 8

At the start of the Pacific War, the Magallanes gunboat was the only Chilean warship that was fully operational, as revealed by the technical report prepared in the fleet in 1878 by Captain Ramón Vidal Gormaz contained in the Navy Report of that same year 5.

It carried out the entire campaign of the Pacific War and was the Chilean ship that participated in the first naval action of the war on April 12, 1879 (Naval Battle of Chipana) against the Peruvian corvette Unión and the gunboat Pilcomayo. It also participated in the second Naval Battle of Iquique on the night of July 9-10, 1879, in which it saved the fleet's coalman Matías Cousiño from being captured, and in the Battle of Antofagasta on August 28 of the same year, saving the corvette Abtao, which was undergoing repairs. On both occasions, it was faced the Huáscar and on both occasions the ship was commanded by Captain Juan José Latorre 6.

    
Another view (from bow to stern) of the 115-pounder Armstrong, along with the 64-pounder 9.

After the war, it continued in hydrographic survey operations along the Chilean coast and in the civil war of 1891 it participated on the Congressional side, which was the victor at the time. After that, it continued in hydrographic work until its transfer to the merchant marine in 1906. It was wrecked in a storm in Corral in 1907 and sank.

Sources

1. Historia de la relaciones Internacionales de Chile, Don Adolfo Ibáñez Su gestión con Perú y Bolivia, Ximena Rojas Valdés, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1971, Santiago, Páginas 73-75,; La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III Página 694. 

2. La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III Página 722-723; La Guerra en el Pacifico Sur, Theodorus B.M. Mason, Editorial francisco de Aguirre, 1971, Argentina, Página 39 

3. El Motín de los Artilleros, Armando Braun Menéndez, Editorial francisco de Aguirre , segunda edición 1972, Argentina. 

4. La Armada de Chile: Desde la Alborada al Sesquicentenario (1813-1968), Rodrigo Fuenzalida Bade. Santiago, Chile: 1978, Empresa Periodística Aquí Está, Tomo III Página 705; Sitio WEB Armada de Chile.

5. Partes del informe se encuentran en: Influencia del poder Naval en la historia de Chile, desde 1810 a 1910, Luís Langlois. Valparaíso, Imprenta de la Armada, 1911, paginas 159-163 

6. Para una relación de ambos combates se recomienda: Pacifico, Gonzalo Bulnes, Tomo I “De Antofagasta a Tarapacá, Sociedad Imprenta y Litografía Universo, Valparaíso, 1911, Páginas 206-213 y 442-449 

7. Artículo Escuadra Chilena, 1879, Almirante A. Silva Palma

8. Memoria Chilena 

9. Especial Revista Ercilla sobre la Guerra del Pacífico Fascículo 2 página 27, suplemento que circulo junto con la revista Nº 3.238 de la quincena del 29/03/2004 – 11/04/2004, la imagen fue obtenida primitivamente desde el libro: Álbum Grafico Militar de Chile: Campaña de Pacífico 1879-1884 de Antonio Bizama Cuevas. Santiago, 1909, Editorial Universo.

Beagle Crisis: The Advices of Sun Tzu

Sun Tzu Leading the Soberania Operation

 

 

Imagine 1978, the Beagle crisis between Argentina and Chile. Put yourself on the Argentine side. If Sun Tzu were in the Argentine High Command... what would he recommend as a course of action on December, 22nd, D-Day for the Argentine invasion of Chile?

If Sun Tzu were advising the Argentine High Command on December 22, 1978, the D-Day for the planned Argentine invasion of Chile during the Beagle Crisis, his recommendations would likely emphasize strategic deception, psychological warfare, and leveraging strengths against weaknesses to achieve victory with minimal conflict. Here’s a detailed hypothetical course of action he might suggest:

1. Strategic Deception

"All warfare is based on deception."

• Disinformation Campaign: Spread false information about the timing, location, and scale of the invasion to confuse and mislead Chilean forces. This could involve feints and dummy troop movements.
• Camouflage and Concealment: Use terrain and weather conditions to conceal the true positions and movements of Argentine forces.

2. Psychological Warfare

"The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting."

• Propaganda: Disseminate propaganda aimed at lowering Chilean morale, possibly through leaflets, radio broadcasts, and other means.
• Diplomatic Pressure: Continue diplomatic efforts to isolate Chile internationally, gaining support or at least neutrality from neighboring countries and major powers.

3. Exploiting Terrain and Weather

"Know the terrain and the weather."

• Terrain Analysis: Utilize knowledge of the local terrain to launch surprise attacks where Chilean defenses are weak or unprepared.
• Weather Utilization: Plan operations to take advantage of favorable weather conditions, such as fog or rain, which can obscure movements and hinder Chilean defenses.

4. Economy of Force

"He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious."

• Selective Engagement: Focus on key objectives and avoid unnecessary engagements. Concentrate forces on vital targets like command centers, supply depots, and key communication hubs.
• Avoid Prolonged Engagements: Ensure that engagements are quick and decisive, minimizing the risk of a prolonged conflict which could drain resources and morale.

5. Surprise and Speed

"Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected."

• Surprise Attacks: Plan initial assaults to catch the Chilean forces off-guard, targeting weak points in their defenses.
• Rapid Mobilization: Ensure that Argentine forces can move swiftly to exploit any breakthroughs and maintain momentum.

6. Logistics and Supply Lines

"The line between disorder and order lies in logistics."

• Secured Supply Lines: Ensure that supply lines are secure and capable of supporting sustained operations.
• Reserves and Reinforcements: Maintain reserves to exploit successes or reinforce threatened sectors.

7. Alliances and Intelligence

"Know your enemy and know yourself."

• Intelligence Gathering: Invest in intelligence to understand Chilean plans, troop dispositions, and weaknesses.
• Alliances and Support: Strengthen alliances and seek external support to apply pressure on Chile diplomatically and economically.

8. Post-Conflict Strategy

"Build your opponent a golden bridge to retreat across."

• Clear Objectives: Define clear political and military objectives to avoid mission creep.
• Negotiated Settlement: Be prepared to offer terms that allow for a negotiated settlement to prevent prolonged conflict and facilitate a stable post-war environment.

 

At the World's End

Sun Tzu’s approach would focus on achieving Argentine objectives through a combination of deception, speed, psychological operations, and targeted engagements. The goal would be to minimize direct confrontation and maximize the strategic impact of each move, ultimately seeking a swift and decisive resolution to the conflict.

Argentine Air Force: CIC Squadron (Río Gallegos)

“Ice Radar Operators”

 
Known by this name, the CIC Squadron, which is part of the Río Gallegos Military Air Base, maintains permanent control of the airspace under national jurisdiction.

Composed of twelve radar operators, including officers and non-commissioned officers, the CIC Squadron (Control and Information Center) belonging to the Río Gallegos Military Air Base, works every day to maintain control of Argentine airspace.

Under the command of Major Gabriel Eduardo Torres, it receives support from the Communications Group III and the Southern Air Region (RASU), maintaining permanent communication with the Aerospace Surveillance and Control Center (CeVyCA), the radar operator's governing unit.

Unlike the surveillance sectors in the north of our country, which operate in Resistencia (Chaco) and Posadas (Misiones) controlling illegal flights in that area, the CIC Squadron fulfills the surveillance function of the bordering part of southern Argentina, focusing on the defense of national sovereignty.

It carries out control tasks when airmobile squadrons arrive at the Base.
Thanks to the excellent relationship that this Air Base has with the Rio Gallegos community, support was obtained from the Provincial Road Authority and a fiber optic network was installed that significantly improved data transmission.

The radar has a range of about 220 nautical miles, approximately 440 kilometers, at 360º, and this allows monitoring of almost the entire provinces of Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego.
At the same time, while detecting the different flights, this information is sent to the Information and Control Center located at CeVyCA.

Due to the inclement weather in this region of the country, the radar antenna is protected with a radome, allowing its correct performance and preserving its operational life.
The Base also has a bunker next to the radar and a simulator to train personnel.

Known as “Ice Radarists” and continuing the tradition of the “Ice Warriors” who operated in the 10th Fighter Squadron of the former 10th Air Brigade, currently the Río Gallegos Military Air Base, the CIC Squadron works tirelessly to improve day by day, providing operational support and logistical support, making it possible for the radar to cover the entire south of our country.

“I have to highlight the dedication and professionalism of each of the people who make up this Squadron, who work uninterruptedly throughout the year, managing to cover and cover all functions satisfactorily. The truth is that what the staff does is impressive” - said Major Torres proudly.



Source: FAA