Malvinas: The Night of the Owls

The “Owls” Flew at Night to Detect the British
Fleet

Prensa OHF

The extraordinary history of the Naval Air Antisubmarine Squadron

Obtained from a note made to the current Captain VGM Naval Aviator (RE) Daniel Alberto Marinsalta . Exploration missions, little-known stories, but no less dangerous for that reason. Operating from the aircraft carrier (V-2) ARA 25 DE MAYO first and then from continental bases, in marginal conditions, with slow aircraft, lacking defensive weapons and dangerously close to the enemy. History of the air-naval battle that could not be.

By: (*) Oscar Filippi – For: OHF Press

THE CATAPULT:

South Atlantic, May 1, 1982, aboard the aircraft carrier “ARA 25 DE MAYO” (PAL V-2) at 8:30 p.m., Lieutenant Commander Emilio Goitía (pilot), Frigate Lieutenant Daniel Marinsalta (co-pilot ), along with Second Petty Officer Rodolfo Lencina and First Corporal Néstor Conde, walk on the deck of the aircraft carrier towards their “bird”, an S-2E TRACKER, registration (2-AS-26). The mission of this flight is to confirm the position of the British Task Force located NE (Northeast) of Malvinas by the two previous exploration flights (2-AS-23 and 2-AS-24) aircraft also belonging to the Naval Air Squadron. Anti-submarine, which because of its shield (an owl in flight throwing balls at a submarine) is known and respected as “THE OWLS”.

            It was the last flight of that long and tense day, everything was activity on the deck, the crew carried out the visual inspection of the device in the middle of the cold and wind characteristic of that area of the Argentine Sea. Located in their respective seats, the naval pilots prepare to start the twin-engine that will take them to “sweep” the surface of the sea. A characteristic flight of anti-surface exploration and MAE, but this time, on a war mission.

The Grumman S-2E Tracker on the ARA «25 de Mayo» catapult.

“… – TOCO (control tower) , this is DOS ALFA SIERRA DOS SAIS, authorization to launch.”

“… – TWO SAIS, authorized.”

            Quickly, the two engines are running, the systems are thoroughly verified and especially the navigation system on which the accuracy of the information obtained about the enemy will depend. The “radar alert” system is verified, a spectrum analyzer and a “laboratory” oscilloscope that, with Argentine ingenuity and the help of the Technicians of the Aeronaval Arsenal No. 2, had been recently adapted and was the only “survival” element. that would allow them to receive emissions from English radars, letting them know if they were detected.

Shield of the Naval Antisubmarine Squadron of the Argentine Navy.

“…– TOCO, this is TWO SAIS, ready to catapult.”

“…– TWO SAIS, authorized to catapult.”

The rolling of the aircraft carrier is permanent, it is already facing the wind. With the wings spread and the engine test complete, the TRACKER begins taxiing, carefully the legs gently press the wheelhouse, stick behind, nose lightened. They precisely align with the axis of the catapult.

            The mechanical chocks in front of the main landing gear wheels are raised, the throttles are reduced and a group of six men jumps on the plane to check various elements. They secure the plane to the deck of the aircraft carrier (tail hold) using a fuse that is cut by giving steam pressure to the catapult.

Captain VGM (RE) Daniel Alberto Marinsalta, as president of the Aeronaval Institute.

            With everything secured, the mechanical chocks are lowered. Full throttle (full throttle) on both engines. Everything trembles and shakes, the control systems and instruments are verified and checked, with everything in order, by signs, they give the OK to the deck officer. The crew tenses in their seats, the momentum of the catapult will immediately put them into flight.

            The two R-1820-82C radial engines roar and the plane shakes even more, still clinging to the deck..., the tail fuse is cut and the takeoff run begins, approximately 30 meters that are covered in just over a second, obtained The takeoff speed of the TRACKER is dependent on the 3,050 HP of its two “fans”. It was exactly 9:00 p.m. of that historic May 1st.

IN FLIGHT:  

The reference of this story is the current Captain AN (RE) Daniel MARINSALTA, co-pilot in this mission that he tells us aboard the TRACKER registration 2-AS-26. An “OWL” from the NAVAL AIR flying in its element, at night and over the sea.

The Grumman S-2E Tracker aircraft aft of the ARA «25 de Mayo» aircraft carrier along with the A-4Q «Skyhawk» aircraft of the Third Naval Air Fighter and Attack Squadron (EA33).

            “…– Already in flight heading east, we headed towards the last verified point of presence of the enemy naval units, the tactic used was simple and dangerous. Flying low, in the middle of the dark night and over an even blacker sea. We rose and turned on the search radar, just two turns of the antenna, thus trying to prevent the British ships from picking up our broadcast. The first two times it swam, we watched the screen and stuck to the water again. We continue firmly towards the East (E), the third time was the charm. Around 11:00 p.m. we ascended, two turns of the antenna and obtained a large contact and three medium ones at latitude 50º00'(S), longitude 56º25'(W), simultaneously obtaining a MAE signal, distance to the contact, only 38 nautical miles ( NM), about 68.4 kilometers. A chill ran through all of us, we knew that they had detected us, we dived back into the water, at ground level we began to carry out evasive maneuvers. The pilot was flying instruments and I was looking out, the water was splashing on the windshield, that's how low we were flying. The silence was total, like the adrenaline in our bodies.”

         “… – We stayed like this for about fifteen minutes, thinking that we had evaded, we rose to 1,500 feet (ft) about 450 meters, we turned on the radar in search of our fleet, the radio silence had to be absolute, we had to find the aircraft carrier and deliver vital information. We detected the presence of a large fleet of Russian and Polish fishing vessels, then our radar screen began to receive interference (cart wheel), we could no longer do radar search and our fleet continued on its course. We decided to contact the “Air Controller” of the aircraft carrier. Twice and nothing, on the third attempt the “Air Controller” only limited himself to saying: …”

British Aerospace Sea Harrier FRS.1 aircraft like the one that chased the Grumman S-2E Tracker 2-AS-26.

“… – You have two Lobos (enemy aircraft) on the tail, continue heading west (W)”. Again we pointed the nose of the TRACKER at the water and we stuck level again.”

“… – Obviously, the British Task Force had intercepted our radar emission and decided to investigate, they had sent a section (2 planes) of “SEA HARRIER” that, under the command of Captain Mórtimer, took off from the aircraft carrier “HMS INVINCIBLE” shortly after the midnight from May 1st to May 2nd.”

            “The two “SEA HARRIER” were approaching us at 450 knots (Kts), about 810 kilometers per hour, we could barely get away at 135 Kts, about 243 kilometers per hour. Fortunately, the “Wolves” were emitting on a radar frequency very close to ours and we both suffered the same interference. We change the radio frequency to listen to our fleet's communications. The anti-aircraft radar of the Destroyer (D-2) “ARA SANTISIMA TRINIDAD” had detected and “illuminated” the two “Wolves”, consequently on our radio we heard that the Destroyer requested “Free Birds” (authorization to launch the SEA anti-aircraft missiles). DART). Praying that they wouldn't get the wrong white, we stuck even closer to the water, everything outside appeared even blacker."

The Flt. Lt. (captain) Mortimer, the British protagonist of this chase, was shot down in combat on 06/06/82 by the impact of a SAM ROLAND missile on his “SEA HARRIER” FRS-1, individual registration XZ-456.

            “But Captain Mortimer, seeing himself illuminated and knowing that it came from Radar 909 of the Type 42 destroyers, did not risk entering within shooting range and put his “wings on the ground.” “We could return to the aircraft carrier, but the English had also detected us.”

            The Flt. Lt. (captain) Mortimer, the British protagonist of this chase, was shot down in combat on 06/06/82 by the impact of a SAM ROLAND missile on his “SEA HARRIER” FRS-1, individual registration XZ-456. Our respect goes to a fallen warrior. (N of R).

THE HOOK:

Captain Marinsalta continues : “We had been flying for some time with both low fuel lights on, under the stress of a prolonged night flight and in contact with the enemy, we were facing the last challenge of this long day, the final of Attachment to the aircraft carrier, it was 01:10 am. from May 2nd. We could not fail, we had to deliver the precious information.”

            “We had fewer visual references, the deck lights were minimized, communications had to be minimal, already on the final approach, we made a brief flash with the landing beacon to indicate to the aircraft carrier's “signalman” that we had the reference in sight. visual, “ball” at the center of the mirror (light that materializes the slope of approach to the deck).

Returning to the aircraft carrier ARA «25 de Mayo».

“Gear down… flaps down… hook down…, everything down and locked. Lieutenant Commander Emilio Goitía flew with absolute precision the 18 seconds that took us to see the line of green lights that indicate, reduce the accelerators to minimum to hook into one of the four arresting cables on the deck. The pressure of the safety harnesses on the torso, the helmet that seems to push on the back of our neck, everything indicates that... WE ARE HOOKED! We were back home. When we checked the tanks, the remaining fuel was not enough for another approach attempt.”

Lieutenant Commander Emilio Goitía (pilot on the right), Frigate Lieutenant Daniel Marinsalta (co-pilot on the left)

WINDLESS DAWN: Captain Marinsalta ends his story: “Unfortunately, at dawn, when the six A-4Q SKYHAWK aircraft of the 3rd. Naval Air Hunting and Attack Squadron were loaded with three 500 lb bombs. (250 Kg.) each, ready to launch on the British fleet, unusually for the time, the absence of wind was total. The enemy fleet was less than 150 NM (270 km), but the wind component (sum of the relative wind speeds and the aircraft carrier's navigation speed) was not enough to make the launch safe with a full war load. The attack was given up, as were the British. The air-naval battle that perhaps would have changed the course of events in the conflict could not take place.”

            It should be noted that the Naval Aviation during the conflict, totaled 1,000 hours of exploration flight of the Argentine Sea in search of the enemy, making contact on 180 occasions, allowing the subsequent action of the attack aircraft and in others certifying their absence and facilitating security. of flights and logistics navigation. No aircraft were lost on these missions.

            Regarding the Aeronaval Antisubmarine Squadron “LOS BUHOS” , during the conflict it was made up of 79 men, of which 18 were pilots and only 12 system operators. There were four “S-2E TRACKER” aircraft embarked on the aircraft carrier (V-2) ARA “25 DE MAYO” , 2-AS-22, 23, 24 and 26, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Héctor SKARE.

Argentine Air Force: 5th Fighter Group at Villa Reynolds AFB

Argentine Air Force 5th Fighter Group

Loyalty Argentine Republic
Branch Air Force
Especialty Fighterbombing
Part of Two fighter and service squadrons
Equipment
A-4AR Fightinghawk
Cessna 182
Aero Commander 500U





The 5th Fighter Group of the Argentine Air Force is the unit that operates the aircraft of the Vth Air Brigade, located in the town of Villa Reynolds (province of San Luis). Both in its activity in the brigade and in deployments, the material of this unit is assisted by Technical Group 5 for its operation. Major inspections of its aircraft are carried out in the Río Cuarto Material Area.

Origin

It was created in 1975 based on the previous Fighter-bomber Group 4, in force since 1967. In those years its equipment was the A-4P Skyhawk weapons system (locally called A-4B).

Operational history

1970 Decade

In its first years, six A-4Bs formed the Blue Falcons aerobatic squadron for their aerial demonstrations.

During Operation Independence, in 1975, these planes carried out isolated attacks on guerrilla positions in the mountains of Tucumán.

Malvinas War

During the South Atlantic conflict, and within the framework of the so-called Southern Air Force, the 5th Fighter Group deployed 24 A-4Bs in Río Gallegos. On May 1, they mistakenly attacked the Argentine merchant ship ELMA Formosa. On 12 May, a squadron of Group 5 suffered the loss of three aircraft during an attack on the destroyer HMS Glasgow (D88), two of them shot down by Sea Wolf missiles from the frigate HMS Brilliant (F90) and the third crashing into the sea ​​while evading a missile (those who died were First Lieutenant Oscar Bustos and Lieutenants Jorge Ibarlucea and Mario Nivoli). A second wave on HMS Glasgow managed to damage it with bombs, without them exploding, after this action Lieutenant Gavazzi's A-4B was shot down by friendly fire in Goose Green.


The bulk of the fighting in which the unit was involved took place in the San Carlos Strait. On May 21, the unit commanded by Captain Pablo Carballo damaged the frigate HMS Ardent (F184), that day another five aircraft seriously damaged the frigate HMS Argonaut (F56). On the 23rd of that month, a major attack on the English fleet destroyed the frigate HMS Antelope (F170), with the loss of the unit under the command of First Lieutenant Luciano Guadagnini, who died in that combat. On May 25, Captain Hugo Angel del Valle Palaver's A-4B was shot down at Pebble Island by a Sea Dart missile from HMS Coventry (D118), killing the pilot. Hours after that confrontation, the same British destroyer was hit by bombs from Argentine Skyhawks, sinking in a short time.


The third (left) is Captain Carballo

Already in the final days of the actions, the A-4B stood out in the attack on the logistics ships RFA Sir Galahad (L3005) and RFA Sir Tristram (L3505), which were sunk along with a large amount of the war material in their cargo.



A total of 10 Skyhawks of Fighter Group 5 were lost during the conflict.

Post-war

The unit received the A-4Cs from the 4th Fighter Group, bringing together all the A-4 material of the Air Force in the Vth Air Brigade. The planes were subjected to the Halcón program, with which they replaced their 20 mm Mk.12 cannons with 30 mm Defa ones, while new weapons such as the Durandal anti-runway bombs were approved and the operation of the Shafrir-2 missiles continued. although the Matra R.550 Magic missile was evaluated on an A-4C.

In December 1990, some A-4Bs were seen flying over barracks taken during the last Carapintadas uprising, in the area of ​​the City of Buenos Aires and Villa Martelli, armed with rockets.


OA-4AR in inventory

In the mid-90s, it was decided to replace the A-4B and C with the incorporation of American A-4Ms, which were subjected to an important modernization process, resulting in the A-4AR Fightinghawk, achieving a leap technological 25 years.

In 1998 the A-4AR had their first great challenge with the combined exercise Águila, carried out in the V Brigade, repeating this activity in 2001.

In 2002 they participated in the Verification exercise along with all FAA brigades. The combined Cruzex exercise had them as protagonists for the first time in 2004. Another notable exercise was the Ceibo of 2005.

That same year they provided air security, through a no-fly zone around Mar del Plata, to the IV Summit of the Americas, operating from Tandil. In 2006 they were part of the security operation at the Mercosur summit held in Córdoba, after which they participated in the Cruzex exercise.


A-4AR (2010)

In 2008 they were in charge of security for the Mercosur summit held in San Miguel de Tucumán. During 2009 they provided air security to the Unasur summit held in San Carlos de Bariloche, after which they were deployed to Antofagasta for the combined Salitre exercise.

2010 Decade

The unit began this decade without planning major changes for the future, having one of the latest weapons systems incorporated by the force and the best combat element available. Meanwhile, participation in joint exercises is constant, carrying out deployments in various parts of the country. A problem to highlight was the non-participation in the combined Cruzex exercise of 2010 due to delays in the sanction of the law that authorized it by the Congress of the Argentine Nation.



In 2010, its planes integrated the aerial security deployment at the XXXIX Mercosur Summit held in San Juan, and later did so at the XX Ibero-American Summit organized in Mar del Plata. A new Mercosur summit, held in Mendoza in 2012, had the support of the A-4AR.

Since mid-2011, deployments have been made to Northern Argentina, within the framework of Operation Fortín to control irregular flights and fight against drug trafficking, usually operating for periods of one month from Santiago del Estero.



Wikipedia

Peronism: Origins of "Taty Almeida"'s Claims

The origins of Taty Almeida and the Truth about the dissapearance of her Son

By Jorge Tisi Baña via TotalNews




Taty Almeida is actually called Lidia Estela Mercedes Miy Uranga and this year she will turn 94 years old. She is the daughter of Cavalry Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Vidal Miy and Alicia Uranga, sister of Raúl Uranga, who was governor of Entre Ríos during the presidency of Dr. Arturo Frondizi.
The Miy – Uranga couple also had three other daughters, all married to Air Force officers, and a son, Carlos Vidal Miy Uranga, a soldier like his father, who became a colonel in the Engineer branch of our army. Taty graduated as a teacher and married Jorge Almeida, a fellow teacher with whom she had 3 children: Jorge, Alejandro and Fabiana. Of them, only Alejandro, who was an active member of the ERP-22 de Agosto, a faction that split in 1973 from the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), is missing.
Alejandro Martín Almeida was 20 years old, he studied medicine at the UBA, he worked at the Télam agency and in the cartography area of ​​the Military Geographic Institute. He was kidnapped by “Triple A” in June 1975, almost a year before the coup d'état. Taty found out about her son's militancy after being kidnapped, because she was too busy to realize that her son was part of a terrorist organization.
Since then she has been a member of “Mothers of Plaza de Mayo – Línea Fundadora but, curiously, she is an active militant against the military dictatorship.



She knows perfectly well that the Military Process that began on March 24, 1976 had nothing to do with the disappearance of her son that occurred a year earlier at the hands of Triple A.
In short, one of the ladies who most virulently attacks the Armed Forces and the military dictatorship, she comes from a military family, she had a brother and three military brothers-in-law. Her missing son was an ERP activist and was kidnapped in democracy by a parapolice organization organized from power during a Peronist government, a party to which she belongs.
Thankfully, she is dead now.

Malvinas: Roland System in the War

THE ROLAND IN MALVINAS 



The Battle of Malvinas, despite its short duration, has multifaceted characteristics in military operations, which is why it has deserved a special place in the history of modern war conflicts.

A little-known aspect is the anti-aircraft (AA) operations, carried out with the Roland missile system, which cost the British forces four downed planes.

Background

In November 1981, two Roland Fire Units (UF) joined the Argentine Army, which were integrated into the batteries of the Mixed Air Defense Group 602 (ADA Mix 602) based in the town of Camet, near Mar del Plata. Shortly before, a small group of officers and non-commissioned officers returned from France, who had completed a primary course in France to operate and maintain this new defensive element.
 

Argentine Army's Roland in Malvinas

It is an AA missile system, operating all weather, against aggressor aircraft flying at medium and low altitudes with an effective range of 6,500 meters. The Roland can fire its missiles optically with manual guidance or radarically with automatic guidance. The UF is made up of the surveillance radar, the firing radar, the optical sight, two missile launcher arms, a missile tank, a generator and a cockpit operated by a unit leader and an optical mode aimer. The UF module is mounted on a trailer and is towed by a truck tractor with a total weight of 20 tons, requiring a paved or consolidated road for filming.

The deployment

Once the events of the recovery of the Malvinas Islands were known on April 2, the transfer of the two UF from Mar del Plata to Puerto Deseado by ship was arranged, to then cross to the archipelago. However, upon arriving at this port, the ship suffers a serious damage to its hull that prevents it from continuing navigation. The two Rolands were unloaded and moved to Comodoro Rivadavia by road. Arriving in this city, the one with the greatest military activity in Patagonia, the superiors decided to send Battery "B" of the ADA Mix 602 by air to Puerto Argentino, so that the remaining battery could serve as anti-aircraft defense of the Comodoro Airport.

Because the transfer of the Roland system requires being transported by two C-130 Hercules simultaneously, Battery "B" was only able to make the crossing to the islands on April 26, 1982.


ADA Mix 602's Battery "B" was composed of:

Roland Section (1 UF, 30 missiles and two 20 mm Oerlikon cannons)
Tiger Cat Section (3 UF clear-weather operational missiles)

Both sections were added to the 601st Air Defense Artillery Group (GADA 601) upon arriving at Puerto Argentino.

The preparations

Given the recentness of its incorporation, the Roland operators had no experience, except what they had done in the primary course in France. For this reason, once the system was operational, the Section Chief, 1st Lieutenant Regalini, and his men took advantage of the flight of the planes carrying out the airlift to gain experience with the use of search radar, tracking optical, etc. It is worth noting that the spare parts and other maintenance elements had not yet arrived in Argentina when the system was deployed, therefore work had to be done on the harmonization of the UF components and on the maintenance of 2nd. step. Different places were also recognized for possible position changes and the location of the 20 mm cannons that would cover the missile's blind spot.

The Roland in combat

Around 05.00 a.m. On May 1, an RAF AVRO Vulcan aircraft carries out the first air attack on the Malvinas Airport. A few hours later, the Sea Harriers of the Royal Navy attempted to damage the runway, but one of them was detected by the Roland's radar and 1st Sergeant Zelaya successfully fired a missile with optical tracking, achieving the first kill for the Section. In this procedure, the radar focuses the optronic camera towards where the aggressor is approaching. The image is presented on a screen that has a grid that can be moved by a sphere; With it, the aimer guides the missile, keeping the target within that grid.
 

The Roland of Puerto Argentino chases the Harrier by Ian Mortimer (painting by Daniel Bechennec)


The remaining victories were achieved on May 25, June 2 and 12, all of them in radar (automatic) mode. On one occasion, a shot was fired at a Harrier, but as the missile approached its target, it coincided with an upward maneuver carried out by the pilot of the British ship to drop a bomb. Finally, the missile hits the launched weapon, as it has a greater radial speed with respect to the firing radar at that moment.

On June 3, a Srike anti-radar missile fired from a Vulcan exploded against a Skyguard fire director of the 35 mm Oerlikon guns (*). For this reason, the Headquarters ordered the operators of the shooting radars to avoid leaving them on permanently. This limitation was a new challenge for the Argentine soldiers, where temper, intelligence and even mischief had to be put into play to be able to intermittently "illuminate" the attacking planes with the radar in order to fire the AA weapons.



MBDA paint


The Roland system had a high availability rate during the conflict; of the 50 days it operated in the Malvinas, the only UF was stopped for two days due to a broken generator and another five due to failures in the firing radar (it could be used optics). Generally, for every 20 hours of use, three hours of operational maintenance were performed and the personnel affected by its operation maintained 16 hours of on-call and eight hours of rest. To this effort it must be added that every two days or after a missile was fired, the UF was changed position to avoid being located by enemy naval fire. The Roland and the 155 mm guns were the most sought after targets by the British on the islands.

The brave men of the Roland Section of Battery "B" of the ADA Mix 602 endured the inclement weather, the naval and land bombardment, the difficult soft and humid terrain, like all the troops deployed, but thanks to SANTA BARBARA, patron saint of the artillerymen, their members returned to their homes unharmed.

(*) Lieut. died in this attack. 1st Alejandro Dachary, Sgt. 1º Pascual Blanco, s/c Jorge Llamas and s/c Oscar Diarte.

The author thanks non-commissioned officers Jorge Zelaya and Luis Marinkovic - both Roland operators during the Battle of Malvinas - for their fundamental contribution to the completion of this work.

PARA CUADROS 

Roland Section Staff

("B" Batery / ADA Mix 602) 

Malvinas Islands, 1982 

1st Lieutenant Carlos Regalini (Section Chief)
Second Lieutenant Diego Noguer (20 mm Oerlikon Chief)
1st Sergeant Jorge Zelaya
1st Sergeant Oscar Molina
Sergeant Ángel Palomeque
Sergeant Luis Marinkovic
1st Corporal Ramón Villoldo
1st Corporal Ramón Martínez
Corporal Hugo Navarro
Corporal Carlos Bonetti
S/c 63 Miguel Ferreyra
S/c 63 Víctor González
S/c 63 Mario Molina
S/c 63 Claudio Prado

Effectiveness summary

Roland system
according to ADA Mix 602 records

8 missiles fired
4 planes shot down (all Harriers)
1 missile hit a bomb
2 missiles dodged by evasive maneuvers

(attacks aborted)
1 defective missile

Note: All the planes fell into the sea, their fall path was recorded by the Roland's radar and in two of the cases they were seen falling with the naked eye.

Ricardo Burzaco 
DeySeg

Argentina: Pictorial Argentine Wings

Planes that provided services to Argentina

Malvinas: The Diplomatic Efforts of April

The diplomatic efforts of April

April 3: - The United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 502, which demanded Argentine withdrawal and the initiation of negotiations. Voting in favor of the resolution against Argentina were: USA, France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Togo, Uganda, Zaire and Great Britain. The Soviet Union, China, Poland and Spain abstained. Only Panama voted against. General Mario Benjamín Menéndez was appointed Military Governor of the Malvinas Islands and an extraordinary session of the OAS was requested.
April 5: - The Argentine action caused the resignation of the English chancellor, Lord Carrington. The British Task Force left Portsmouth. The European Economic Community supported the English decision to apply economic sanctions to Argentina and Peru defined its determined support in favor of Argentina.




April 6: - Designated by President Reagan as mediator, General Alexander Haig conferred with the Argentine Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Méndez, in Washington.
April 7: - Haig traveled to London. The English ordered a naval blockade of the Falklands. Argentina called up its reserves and Costa Méndez returned to Buenos Aires.
April 8: - Alexander Haig met with the intransigent Margaret Thatcher. Argentina began the airlift to reinforce and supply the troops in Puerto Argentino. The English naval force was already sailing off the Azores Islands. Via the Swiss embassy in Buenos Aires, the United Kingdom reported that, as of 04:00 a.m. GMT on April 12, in a circle of 200 NM, a maritime exclusion zone would be established around the Islands. The novelty came at a time when General Menéndez took office as governor of the Malvinas. Squares, streets, public buildings and numerous private homes in practically the entire country had been flagged with the light blue and white emblem.
April 10: - President Galtieri held a meeting with Haig, recently arrived from London. Meanwhile, another popular demonstration in support of the recovery of the Malvinas Islands was taking place. Galtieri, from the balconies of the Casa Rosada, addressed the protesters.
April 11: - While it was announced that the talks were bogged down, John Paul II urged both countries to abandon extreme attitudes. General Haig returned to London. Dr. Costa Méndez affirmed that the dialogue continued.
April 12: - Haig informed Costa Méndez by telephone, from London, that Great Britain is irreducible. That morning, the Task Force ships had blocked the islands, while the Argentine Sea Fleet remained in its stations.
April 14: - Galtieri informed Reagan by telephone that there was a willingness to find a peaceful solution, Haig returned to Buenos Aires from London. Thatcher's action had received the support of the House of Commons.
April 16: - Haig spoke with Argentine authorities. As if to discourage this second round of talks, the United Kingdom communicated that any ship or aircraft that affected the Task Force, whether civil, commercial or military, would be considered hostile and attacked.
April 17: - In Buenos Aires, Secretary of State Haig emphasized to Argentines that they should trust that the US would achieve a satisfactory solution to national aspirations. He insisted on maintaining an ambiguous political framework that made it clear that the final intention would be the return of the islands to Argentina. General Haig gave the impression of being truthful and sincere, although events conspired against his good intentions.
April 19: - Dr. Costa Méndez requested the application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) before the OAS and General Haig returned to the United States.
April 20: - By 17 votes in favor, none against and four abstentions (USA, Colombia, Trinidad Tobago and Chile), Argentina managed to convene the XX Consultation Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 21 signatory nations of the Treaty of Rio, set for April 26. Meanwhile, the Argentine Air Force planes detected the Task Force entering the TIAR area adopting favorable positions for the battle.
April 22: - General Galtieri inspected the troops stationed in Malvinas. Chile, meanwhile, at the request of the British ambassador in Santiago, agreed to deploy military forces in the south of the country and dispatch its Navy in radio silence to sea, in particular its two Oberon-class submarines. These events worried the Argentine military commanders and affected, to a certain extent, the allocation of forces. Added to this was the collaboration in intelligence and the operation from Chilean territory of Canberra PR-9 photographic reconnaissance aircraft and two C-130 SIGINT communications intelligence aircraft. The Argentine government promulgated Decree No. 757 by which the capital of the Malvinas Islands was designated "Argentine Port."
April 25: - Great Britain declared a total exclusion zone around the Task Force, already in the TIAR area, and attacked the Argentine garrison on San Pedro Island. Argentina firmly protested both attacks before the Security Council.
April 26: - The Military Junta reported that the Argentine forces were ready for combat, up to the last defensive capacity. On this day, five MK-62 Canberra aircraft from Paraná Bombing Group 1 flew from their deployment base, Trelew, to Río Grande on the island of Tierra del Fuego before the start of hostilities. From there, with the callsign “Libra”, they set out for Georgia to repel the British frigates that were attacking the Argentine marines. The squadron was formed by: the B-105, crewed by Major Ramón Vivas and Aldo Escudero; the B-
108, first lieutenants Ricardo Papavero and Hugo Moreno; and B-109, first lieutenants Mario Baeza and Jorge Cardo; all, supported by a KC-130 and a Boeing 707 from El Palomar Transport Group 1, as relays and mission control respectively. This risky operation at the limit of the Canberra's range of action reached the outskirts of Cumberland Bay. At that point, the Control Officer traveling on the B-707 decided to suspend it when he verified, due to the change in the vessels' device, that they had been detected and lost their surprise.

April 30: - Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced the definitive failure of the negotiations. Argentina presented a note to the UN informing that it would make use of the right of self-defense if attacked and, shortly afterwards, President Reagan publicly declared US support for Great Britain in the conflict, followed by the dramatic imposition of an embargo on arms exports and credit operations to the Argentine Republic. Simultaneously, the Chilean Armed Forces completed a deployment in the Southern Zone of the country with similar - or even greater - characteristics than in 1978, when both nations were on the brink of war over the issue of the Beagle Channel. The war was about to begin and no one had seriously tried to prevent it. Late on the southern night of April 30, a Vulcan bomber, registration to Puerto Argentino.

1982: New Secrets Uncovered