The Paraguayan War: The Paraná Protocol

The Paraná Protocol

 
José Maria da Silva Paranhos (1819-1880)

Like those cubes that fit one inside the other, Brazil was included within the larger cube of British politics. Miter, in turn, would be the smallest hub of Brazilian diplomacy, as Captain Richard Burton himself would denounce.

Miter and his class did not enter into war, neither deceived nor naive. This general of pounds and surrenders, he knew that if war was declared “…. It would be an unprecedented event in South America, the most immoral in modern history. The Confederation has nothing to claim regarding the free navigation of the Paraguay River. Regarding the question of borders, it is not in the interest of the Republics of Silver to assist Brazil in its policy of invading foreign territory, betraying the cause of the Republic of Paraguay, our defense against the exaggerated pretensions of Brazil; and it would also be betraying our own cause, when similar issues may arise later between Brazil and the Argentine Republic.”

This was maintained by Miter against Urquiza, when he suspected that the Protocol of Paraná of December 14, 1857, which established the alliance between Brazil and the Confederation, to attack Paraguay, was about to be signed. The general's speeches and words are clarified politically in their historical context. Extracting from this quote by Miter a definitive meaning about his position favorable to Paraguay would be hermeneutically incorrect and historically false. Even the same representatives of Urquiza, in article 4 of the Paraná Protocol, had stated: “The war has only as its goal the free navigation of Paraguay in which the interest of the Confederation is secondary and remote due to its current lack of trade in those directions, would not be popular in his country, would not justify the Argentine Government before the national public opinion of abandoning the contemporary policy that has been prescribed until today, despite the serious damages that result from the deplorable system that the Paraguayan Government insists on.

“…That an alliance of the two States to draw their borders with Paraguay, a State weaker than either of them, would be odious and could seriously compromise the results that both promise to obtain.”.

Upon signing the Protocol of Paraná, on December 14, 1857, Paranhos gave the following “significant toast”: “I wish to see the closest union between the Empire and the Confederation realized, and that the glory of Caseros is not the only glory acquired.” in common for Brazil and the Argentine Nation.”

In a “confidential” from José Manuel Estrada to Wenceslao Paunero, dated December 24, 1868, it is clarified: “…The Government of Urquiza, which in 1857 was courting Brazil to bring it into an alliance against Buenos Aires and obtain loans, without which "He could not carry out what he called the war of reconstruction, that year he concluded a treaty with Mr. Paranahos in which he undertook to hand over the slaves who escaped from Brazil." This treaty was, effectively, another of those signed in Paraná on that occasion. Urquiza's “objectives” were exactly as described. For this reason, Pelham Horton Box rightly says “…in the agreements between Brazil, the Argentine Confederation and Uruguay, of 1856 and 1857, we already see the outline of the Triple Alliance of 1865.”

Miter would participate in the war, despite the position publicly held in 1857, because with it he consolidated his political alliance with the Brazilian Empire and ensured his triumph over the federals. With the alliance, on the other hand, the cycle begun with Urquiza, of financial-political dependence, with respect to Brazil, that is to say, England, was continued.

The price of the “repressive” tranquility of the provincial interior had been previously regulated by Baring Brothers, Rothschild and the Foreign Office. In Argentina, the livestock class, “exporter-importer”, urged Bartolomé Mitre. The newspaper of Melchor Rom – director of the Stock Exchange and one of the eminent representatives of that class – dreamed of the appropriation of Guaraní tobacco and yerba. His imagination as an economic speculator would cause the Paraguayan lands to be traveled, in his dreams, by Buenos Aires cattle.

Seduced by Mitrist rhetoric, a coincidental sublimation of their class interests, the young “autonomists” and “nationalists”, with aristocratic roots, would voluntarily enlist, commanded by their philosophy professors, to put an end to Paraguayan “barbarism”. “After the triumph of Paraguay,” said “La Nación Argentina” in December 1864, “the reign of barbarism will continue for us (…) As Argentines, then, and as enemies of barbarism and dictatorship, we hope that, if the Paraguayan government carries on the war is defeated by Brazil (...) no one can doubt the situation that awaits us if Paraguay triumphs."

After Curupaytí, Mitre's “nationalists” would be replaced by paid mercenaries or the unemployed. The mercenaries were Europeans, hired by Hilario Ascasubi in France. The couplings were made in Marseille and Bordeaux. Hundreds of men were embarked monthly on ships of the “Societé General des Transport Maritime”. The contracts were accompanied by a medical certificate of health of the mercenaries, and the statement of two witnesses, which proved that they knew how to handle weapons. All formalities were completed at the Argentine Consulate in Marseille or Bordeaux. The unemployed Argentines, in turn, were men who, destroyed by free trade the tasks of craftsmanship and industry that flourished under Juan Manuel de Rosas, were distressed and without work, forced to look for a “military” occupation.

All of them would go to carry out the bloody British plan on Guarani land.

Uruguay, converted into a political appendage of Brazilian-Mitrista diplomacy, after its national defeat, would participate through Venancio Flores in the war. The 5,000 men that he will send to their deaths will justify the geometric increase in his public debt, due to the measured “efforts” of the Baron of Mauá and the London bankers. The convention of October 12, 1851, had determined that the Eastern Republic of Uruguay was obliged to apply all its resources to the payment of the Brazilian debt. But, from this obligation, at the request of Brazil itself, the loans that Uruguay had obtained in London had been excluded. This requirement would be repeated in the protocol of 1867, and conclusively demonstrates the total dependence of Brazilian Banking on the English one. The credits of the Brazilian Empire were, in reality, British credits, which could not be settled with English money. León de Palleja, despite his position as an allied officer, would express the authentic Uruguayan thought: “I was not a supporter of this (war); Everyone knows my ideas in this regard, but I consider it a stupid war to wage between Orientals and Paraguayans. Nations of identical origin and causes; although by different means, they are destined to maintain a common policy and to be sisters and not enemies…”

The war seemed an irrational fact, but the world was experiencing the transformation of the export of merchandise into the export of capital, and South America was the favorable victim of that transformation, deeply “rational” for British interests.

Cotton, free navigation, loans, limits, commercial profits, industrial destruction, political power, ambition and fear, marked the war of the Double Alliance, between Financial Capital and local oligarchies. Drama of American characters, with a hidden protagonist and author: England, revealed, through the few traces left in its lethal path.

Faced with this plexus of interests and relationships, the Paraguayan people, with their statesman at the helm. The armed people, defending their economic freedom, their protectionist tariff, their closure of rivers, their agricultural production, their industry, their railroad, their telegraph.

But above all, sovereign Paraguay, defending the balance of the Río de la Plata, that is, the “American Union”, against the attack prepared by the foreign power.

Anticipating what would happen, Rosas had written to Carlos Antonio López a dozen years ago: “that he hoped for his happiness and for God to preserve him without admitting foreigners, who are bad locusts.”
Felipe Varela, director of the “American System” would say of the War, in an ephemeral moment of truce:

“… The war with Paraguay was an event already calculated, premeditated by General Mitre (...) The Argentine provinces, however, have never participated in these feelings, on the contrary, those people have contemplated, groaning, the defection of the President, imposed by the bayonets, on the Argentine blood, of the principles of the American Union, in which they have always looked to the safeguarding of their rights and their freedom, taken in the name of justice and the law”.

And that thought would be the fraternal echo of the high Paraguayan patriotic expression, synthesized in the doctrine of the balance of the Río de la Plata, which Francisco Solano López proclaimed, with just pride before all his people.

Full text of the Paraná Protocol

On the fourteenth day of the month of December, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-seven, in this city of Paraná, the Plenipotentiaries of the Argentine Confederation, doctors Don Santiago Derqui and Don Bernabé López, and the Plenipotentiary of YE. the Emperor of Brazil, Counselor José María da Silva Paranhos, agreed to record in writing the results of their conferences, on the means that their respective Governments should use to obtain from the Republic of Paraguay a satisfactory solution to the pending issues, which they say regarding common river navigation as well as the declarations that the same Plenipotentiaries made in the name of both Governments, presupposing the case that war becomes inevitable to achieve that goal that is of such interest to both countries and to civilization and commerce in general.
It was agreed at the same time that this document must be kept in the most complete confidentiality and is intended only to inform the two Governments of the circumstances and dispositions that each of them has towards the Republic of Paraguay, taking into account that , in any case they can mutually bring together all the good offices inherent to the benevolent and close relations that so happily exist between them and the peoples whose destinies they preside over.
Being an obligation contracted by the Empire of Brazil and the Argentine Confederation, in the Alliance Agreements of 1851, confirmed and again stipulated in the Treaty of March 7, 1856, and in the river Convention of November 20 of the present year, the invitation and use of all means within the reach of each of the two Governments so that the other coastal States and especially the Republic of Paraguay, adhere to the same principles of free navigation as well as the means of making them effectively useful, said Plenipotentiaries agreed:

1. In that the Government of the Argentine Confederation, based on the aforementioned stipulations and the special conditions that exist between it and that of the Republic of Paraguay, for the free transit enjoyed by the Paraguayan flag in the waters of the Paraná, belonging to the same Confederation and by the Treaty of July 29, 1856, will demand of said Republic that for its part it opens the Paraguay River to all flags and adopts in relation to common transit the franchises and means of Police and inspection that are generally used and found stipulated in the River Convention of November 20 between the Confederation and the Empire of Brazil.
2. In that the Government of the Confederation as well as that of Brazil will maintain said claim with the greatest possible effort, being however free to each of them to ensure that their claims reach the point of leaving diplomatic channels and compromising the state of peace. in which they find themselves with that neighboring State, given that the Government of the Confederation and the Imperial Government are not yet in agreement on the hypothesis of resorting to war.
   
3. In that, to make possible, as both Governments so desire, a peaceful solution to the pending issues with the Republic of Paraguay, regarding river navigation, both may stop insisting on the general concession and ultimately limit their claims, to that the Paraguayan Government effectively guarantees all its freedom of transit to its respective flags, according to the means indicated in the river Convention of November 20 of this year, each Government invoking its perfect right to this free transit, in view of the treaties in force between them and that of that Republic. 
4. In that, the claim of the Government of the Confederation will be made in a way that coincides with the special mission that the Government of H.M. The Emperor of Brazil now sends to the Republic of Paraguay with the demand that in the same sense and at the same time direct the Government of the Eastern State of Uruguay.

Sources

• Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado
• Peña, R. O. y Duhalde. E. – Felipe Varela – Schapire editor – Buenos Aires (1975).
• www.revisionistas.com.ar

Argentina-Chile Naval Race, 1890-1905 (1/13)

Argentina-Chile Naval Race, 1890-1905 

Part 1 || Part 2 || Part 3 || Part 4

Organic Growth and Development of the Argentine Navy: 1810-1902

Although the May Revolution of 1810 marked the end of the colonial era in Buenos Aires, Montevideo, on the opposite bank of the Plata, remained in the hands of the royalists. From this station, a powerful and well-trained squadron under the command of Captain Jacinto de Romarate soon established a blockade of Buenos Aires and threatened to cut the lines of communication along the coast. The patriot authorities reacted quickly and in August acquired three merchant ships, suitable to be transformed into warships. These were: the brig "25 de Mayo", the schooner "Invencible", and the sloop "Americano". An Argentine veteran of the Battle of Trafalgar, and former lieutenant of the Spanish navy, Francisco de Gurrucharaga dedicated himself vigorously to equipping this small squadron. The poverty of the treasury, the lack of trained personnel and materials complicated his task. The command of this flotilla was entrusted to Juan Bautista Azopardo, a privateer of Maltese origin, who was supported by two French privateers: Hipólito Bouchard and Angel Hubac. On February 10, 1811, three of the patriot ships set sail from Buenos Aires and headed towards the Paraná River. On March 2, the patriot squadron was intercepted by a powerful royalist squadron. In the fierce combat that took place, numerical and training superiority prevailed. Aboard the "25 de Mayo", 41 crew members out of a total of 50 on board were injured or killed. To the dismay of the patriots, the first Argentine naval squadron was captured and towed to Montevideo, where after being repaired, the ships were incorporated into the royalist fleet (1)

Phoenix Bird

On July 7, a royalist squadron bombed Buenos Aires, although not without being punished. Bouchard, who was in charge of a gunboat armed with a solitary 18-pounder cannon, went out in search of the royalist ships, managed to inflict serious damage on one of them, causing the enemy to retreat. As a result of this attack; The patriot government equipped a second squadron consisting of the schooners "Nuestra Señora del Carmen" and "Santo Domingo", the ketch "Hiena" and four smaller boats. The royalist fleet reappeared again off Buenos Aires on August 19, but when Bouchard directed his ships towards it, the enemy withdrew and tried, ineffectively, to bombard Buenos Aires from a safe distance. On October 20, 1811, the authorities of Buenos Aires and Montevideo concluded an armistice that provided for the cessation of hostilities and the end of the blockade. While the national government disarmed its flotilla, the royalists violated the armistice and proceeded to bomb towns on the Argentine coast with impunity, attacking commercial ships at will. This in turn motivated the creation of the third Argentine naval squadron, which was organized by an Irish merchant captain; Buenos Aires resident William Brown, who is very rightly considered the father of the Argentine navy. This squadron was made up of a frigate, four corvettes, a brig, five schooners and other smaller ships. The officers were mostly foreigners, but soon a growing number of Creoles joined the fleet. (2)

 
San Nicolás Battle

In May 1814 Brown defeated the royalist fleet that once dominated the Rio de la Plata. This triumph in turn made possible the blockade and subsequent taking of Montevideo. This magnificent victory deprived Spain of the only base of operations it had in South America and granted control of the waters to the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata. Furthermore, in order to harass and destroy Spanish trade in the region, the government of Buenos Aires began to grant letters of marque to foreign privateers, among whom those of American nationality predominated. The exact number of these privateers is unknown, although it is known that one of these privateer ships was active in 1815, 4 in 1816, 23 in 1819, 10 in 1820 and two in 1821. In 1815 the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata was the only Spanish American nation that the royalists had not managed to subjugate. In Spain, a powerful expedition was organized that would be commanded by General Pablo de Morillo who had been assigned the task of taking Buenos Aires, but the loss of Montevideo forced Spain to consider its strategy and Morillo's expedition was dispatched towards New Granada, the current Republic of Colombia.(3)

Expedition to the Pacific

In 1816 Brown led an Argentine squadron on a cruise to the Pacific. These ships blockaded Lima and Guayaquil, captured California and hit Spanish maritime trade vigorously. The frigate "La Argentina", commanded by Hipólito Bouchard that was part of this flotilla, separated from the other ships and was the first Argentine flag ship to circumnavigate the world. (4)

A Chilean naval historian describes the outcome of Brown's cruise in the following terms:

"This expedition was the only maritime activity that the Argentines carried out in the Pacific, and to tell the truth, it had magnificent results. As Worcester points out, since the arrival of Brown, Spanish maritime trade was halted. Marco del Pont not only feared the attack through the Cordillera, but he was convinced that another patriot division would attack him by sea. San Martín, for his part, circulated rumors that an expedition was being prepared in Buenos Aires that would attack Concepción and San Vicente with the aim of later invading Chile." (5) 

War against Brazil: 1825-1828

At the end of the wars of independence, the ARA was reduced to a minimum and most of its ships were sold to private shipowners. In 1825, when the war with Brazil broke out, the Argentine fleet consisted of four frigates, two corvettes and 12 gunboats built in Bajo, on the banks of Buenos Aires and armed with old 24-piece pieces taken from the fort of that city. Command of the fleet was again entrusted to Brown. In direct contrast, the fleet of the Brazilian Empire, manned by a plethora of high-ranking English officers and subordinates, veterans of the Napoleonic wars; It had 108 warships, of which half were larger units (frigates, corvettes, brigs) and the rest were gunboats and schooners armed in war of various types and sizes. In a rapid series of battles, the Argentine navy managed to defeat the powerful imperial fleet, and although the latter blocked Buenos Aires, the lines of communication between the United Provinces and the Eastern Band of Uruguay, where the Argentine army was located, They were never cut off or even affected. On the other hand, despite the notorious lack of resources and the immense numerical superiority of the enemy, between 1825 and 127 the Argentine navy managed to destroy or capture more than 50 Brazilian warships, many of which were incorporated into the navy. national and employed with great energy and great skill against their former owners. In addition, Argentine warships and corsairs from Buenos Aires captured 445 Brazilian merchant ships (6)

The Era of Rosas (1829-1852)-Fights for Argentine unification: 1852-1862

During the Rosas era (1829-52) the navy became essentially a riverine force, adequate enough to defeat the Uruguayan fleet in a series of battles throughout the year 1841, but not strong or modern enough to confront to the Anglo-French squadron sent to Plata in 1845. A maritime academy in which officers were trained operated until 1830, then naval cadets were assigned to fleet units. The Argentine navy would not enter the age of steam until 1851. The two nation states that emerged in Argentina after the overthrow of Rosas in 1852 established squadrons equipped with war-armed steam merchant vessels, most of which would be incorporated into the national navy after the Argentine reunification that occurs as a result of the Battle of Pavón. However, by mid-1865, the fleet was reduced to a few vessels in service, the rest having been reduced to pontoon status or serving as storage hulls. The navy did not have a land infrastructure, naval bases or even warships themselves. It was painfully evident that the navy had not experienced adequate development, not only in comparison to the fleets of the great powers, but also in comparison to the fleets of neighboring countries such as Brazil, Chile or Paraguay.

The War with Paraguay (1865-1870)

When the Paraguayan War broke out, the Argentine navy was reduced to a handful of armed merchant steamers, sailing cutters and old hulls that served as floating stores of material. There was no infrastructure on land, nor training centers for the training of personnel. Although during the war, the command of the allied armies was entrusted to the president of the Argentine Republic, Bartolomé Mitre, given the fact that among the allies, only Brazil had a navy worthy of the name, the Viscount of Tamandaré was placed in charge. charge of naval operations. The participation of the Argentine navy in this conflict, due to lack of suitable material, was reduced mainly to transportation and logistical support missions. (7)


 
Crew of the Steamship "25 de Mayo", captured in Corrientes, beginning the Argentine intervention in the Paraguayan War

Development of Institutes and land infrastructure: 1872-1902

The first steps on the long road towards modernization and expansion would be taken during the presidency of Domingo F. Sarmiento (1868-74). A figure of extraordinary creativity, whom North American historian Hubert Herring described as "Possibly the only practical genius to emerge from Spanish America," Sarmiento devoted considerable time and thought to the importance of naval power for communications and defense. . Therefore, when Major Clodomiro Uturbey, a graduate of the Spanish Naval Academy, proposed the creation of a similar establishment in Argentina, Sarmiento gave his support to this initiative. The necessary legislation was promulgated on October 2, 1872 and three days later the Naval Military School (ENM) was officially established aboard the steamship "General Brown", where it operated until 1877, when as a result of the "gabanes mutiny", The government ordered the closure of the ENM, although this measure did not interrupt the "curriculum" of the cadets who were simply transferred to various units of the navy until the ENM was transferred to a new headquarters in the heart of Buenos Aires. The number of cadets in the ENM grew gradually: 15 in 1872, 50 in 1883 and would exceed the figure of 70 in 1887 although the true growth would not occur until 1893, when the ENM was transferred again, this time to Juan's former residence Manuel de Rosas in Palermo, previously used by the Military College of the Nation. The cadet corps began to grow rapidly from then on: 77 in 1895, 88 in 1896, 110 in 1897 and 140 in 1898 (8)

Initially, the course of study at the ENM lasted six semesters. The first included geometry, rectilinear trigonometry, drawing, foreign languages, ballistics and general education. Spatial geometry, physics, naval astronomy and other academic subjects were studied in subsequent semesters, while practical teaching similarly progressed from the duties of a private seaman to those of a helmsman, from piloting small vessels to the duties and responsibilities of an officer. The later semesters emphasized the teaching of shipbuilding techniques, steam propulsion, international law, naval gunnery, and history. The cadets were then assigned to warships in service on the Patagonian coasts and the recently graduated midshipmen were assigned to a flotilla of sailing cutters that patrolled those latitudes, thus acquiring valuable experience. Long-duration trans-oceanic voyages began in the early 1880s, when the ENM received a new steam corvette specially designed as a training ship, we refer to the corvette "La Argentina". At the end of the 1890s this unit would be replaced by the ARA frigate "Sarmiento", a 2800-ton displacement unit, which in turn inaugurated the era of circumnavigation of the world. At the end of the 19th century, the prestige and efficiency of the ENM transcended the country's borders, and was fully recognized abroad, which is why students from neighboring countries competed in the entrance exams to this institution. (9)

In 1875, the School of Apprentice-Sailors was created aboard the boat "Vanguardia", and the following year, a reformatory for young people was established aboard the pontoon "General Paz", designated "Correccional de Menores", although the practice of sentencing young offenders of the penal code to serve in the army was abandoned soon after. In its replacement, the School of Cabins was established aboard the boat "Cabo de Hornos", a unit that during the period 1879-1884 patrolled the Patagonian coasts until it was removed from service, and replaced by the training ship "La Argentina". The Artillery School was established aboard the monitor "El Plata" in 1877 and the Artillery Apprentice School, where cannon corporals were trained, operated aboard various units since its creation in 1881. Firefighters, machinists and electricians received training at the School of Navy Mechanics, which existed under various names since 1880. Finally, the Torpedo School was established in 1883, aboard a ship incorporated at that time, the ARA torpedo ram "Maipú". (10)

In January 1879, the Central Hydrography Office (OCH) was established, which would be responsible for exploring and charting the coasts and waterways, as well as the construction of lighthouses and beacons. In January 1881, the newly created Naval Observatory was attached to the OCH. In this way, the ARA obtained a valuable wealth of information regarding the Argentine interior rivers and the Patagonian coasts. (11)

As can be seen, the ARA placed special emphasis on the training of officers and junior personnel. In 1883, the ARA had a strength of 2,000 men, which included 1,503 sailors, 320 officers (including 48 cadets from the engineering branch) and 133 ensigns and cadets. During the struggles for national reunification and through the Paraguayan War, the ARA hired Argentine and foreign merchant sailors to complete some of the crews of its ships. The services of Argentine merchant ships were also contracted, including their crews for quarantine tasks and logistical support missions. During the 1880s-1890s the ARA experienced a shortage of specialists and machine personnel, so a substantial number of foreign specialists were hired. The naval ranking of 1891 revealed that of a total of 83 engineering officers, 32 were foreigners. In 1897, of a total of 155 officers in this branch, 97 were natives of the country, and the rest were foreigners. As the fleet grew in number, and the ships that were added were invariably of greater tonnage and technically more advanced than their predecessors, the need to increase personnel became apparent. For example, the four "Garibaldi" class battleship cruisers in the late 1890s required an average of 25 officers and 440 men per unit, a total of 109 officers and 1,636 crew. In 1902 the ARA had a strength of 8,336 men, a figure that included 327 line officers, 297 officer-engineers, 7,760 sailors and 450 marines. The growing importance of the navy was tacitly recognized on March 15, 1898, when the navy obtained the status of an independent force, that is, it no longer depended on the Ministry of War and Navy. From now on, it would be regulated by the Ministry of the Navy. (12)

Stations and bases

As the ARA increased its fleet and the ships added were increasingly larger, the ARA had to establish a network of naval stations and bases throughout the republic. Although we must deal with the expansion of the fleet separately, we must mention that the first modern units incorporated were shallow draft ships that could anchor in Rio de la Plata or in the Zárate naval base, but as fleet units were added increased tonnage the need for a deep water port became apparent. The town of Punta Alta, in the south of the Province of Buenos Aires was selected for said installation. A famous Italian engineer, Luigi Luiggi, was assigned to design the plans. Work began in 1898, and in July the first three coastal artillery batteries intended to protect the future base had already been placed. Upon completion of the works, in 1902 this strategic port, called Puerto Militar, would emerge as the largest naval base in South America, with enough space to house 20 "Garibaldi" class battleship cruisers. The facilities covered an area of 3000 hectares. A strategic railway connected the base with the city of Bahía Blanca, while batteries of cannons and coastal howitzers protected it against the eventuality of a naval attack. (13)

Coastal Artillery Corps

Coastal artillery did not receive special attention until the 1870s. Until 1879, coastal defense had been the responsibility of the army, whose Plaza Artillery Battalion garrisoned the island of Martín García. The Coastal Artillery Corps, established on November 15, 1879 under the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Emilio Sellstrom, former professor of ballistics at the ENM and superlative engineer. The Coastal Artillery Corps also provided marine infantry and protection forces, but the only existing fortifications were those of Martín García. During the Paraguayan War, the Ministry of War had ordered the construction of five barbettes of material that would mount 36 pieces of artillery, but in mid-1866 only 18 cannons had been installed, and even these were archaic relics inherited from the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata and low caliber. During Sarmiento's government, the first modern artillery pieces: 4 381 mm Rodmans and six 254 mm Parrotts were placed on the island. In 1877 these guns were complemented by a battery of 177 mm (7 in) Armstrong pieces that fired 150-pound anti-armor grenades, giving Martín García a true strategic capability. In the mid-1880s, Martín García's cannons and other installations were already outdated, since models with greater penetration capacity and greater range had appeared. The ARA selected the Krupp mod. 1887 240 mm L.35 as regulatory equipment for its batteries, and pieces of this type were located in Martín García, the Zárate Naval Arsenal and in Puerto Militar. In 1899 they would be complemented with three Krupp mod howitzer batteries. 1899 280mm L.11. Meanwhile, the constant tension with Chile led to an expansion of the ARA, whose fleet would be in 1898 the most powerful and best equipped in South America. (14)

1. Rauch, George , Conflict in the Southern Cone; the Argentine Military and the Boundary Dispute with Chile, 1870-1902 (Praeger (Wesport, Conecticut and London, 1999).pag. 101-102
2. Rauch, Conflict in the Southern Cone..Ibid pag.102-103
3. Iid, pag. 103-104
4. Iid pag.104
5. Lopez Urrutia, Carlos, Historia de la Marina de Chile (Editorial Andres Bello, Santiago de Chile, 1969) pag. 26
6. Baldrich, Amadeo J, Historia de la guerra del Brasil: Contribucion al estudio razonado de la historia militar argentina (Imprenta La Harlem, Buenos Aires, 1905) pag.258-70, Rauch, op cit, pag. 104
7. Rauch, op cit, pag 104-105
8. Burzio Humberto, Armada Nacional: Reseña Historica de su origen y desarrollo orgánico (Departamento de Estudios Historicos Navales, Serie B, No 1, Buenos Aires, 1960) pag.160 -161, Burzio, Humberto, Historia de la Escuela Naval Militar (Departamento de Estudios Historicos Navales, Serie B. 1972, Buenos Aires, 3 vols., 1972) I; 246-248,320-321, 352-353, Rauch, op cit, pag.115-116
9. Burzio, Historia de la Escuela Naval Militar, I: 236-27 ,337-338, 367.
10. Rauch, op cit, pag.115-116
11. Burzio, Armada nacional, pag.1590160, Rauch op cit, pag. 117
12. Burzio, Historia de la Escuela Naval Militar;II: 458-459, 767-
13. Rauch, p cit, pag. 117. Rauch, op it, pag.116-1177
14. Triado, Juan Enrique, Historia de la Base Naval Puerto Belgrano (Instituto de Publicaciones Navales, Centro Naval, Buenos Aires, 1992) pag.67-8, Rauch pag.117118

Author: André Marois

Malvinas: ARA San Luis Heros

ARA San Luis War Patrol  - 1982

Source: Malvinas: Tras los submarinos ingleses 

 
Lieutenant Commander Ricardo Alessandrini, Chief of Armaments and Lieutenant Alejandro Maegli, Chief of Communications

 

The ship's crew at the end of the 1982 naval year




Lieutenant Commander Alessandrini, in a wet suit, ready to check some noises coming from the free movement area of the submarine


Lieutenant Commander Alessandrini, Lieutenant Commander Luis Seghezzi, Corvettte Captain Macías y Lieutenant Maegli


Lieutenant Commander Jorge Dacharry, Electricity Chief, LC Seghezzi, Navegation Chief  y Lieutennat Maegli



Lieutenant Commander Maegli (in the periscope) y Lieutenant Fernando María Azcueta, Submarine Commander


The Commander, Frigate Captain Azcueta, harangues the crew, once the decision to return to port has been made.



Part of the crew of the San Luis, shortly after returning to port

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The commander of the Submarine Force reviews the crew of the submarine, as soon as it arrives in port


Damián Riveros

Malvinas: Tras los submarinos ingleses 

1955 Revolution: The actions in Curuzú Cuatiá

Curuzú Cuatiá




In the early morning of that hectic September 16, a military truck slowly approached the Gualeguay airfield with its lights off. Next to the landing strip, a group of revolutionary officers waited expectantly.
The vehicle, driven by Colonel Eduardo Arias Duval, stopped and several people got out of it. They were General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, Colonel Eduardo Señorans, Second Lieutenant Carlos B. Chasseing and Arias Duval himself, not counting the heavily armed soldiers who traveled in the back.
Those waiting next to the runway approached the new arrivals and after exchanging a few words, they headed towards the single-engine Piper that, under the command of First Lieutenant Enrique Méndez, was waiting with its engines on at the head, ready to take off.
The individuals loaded the luggage and weapons and immediately after boarded the machine, taking their position inside.
As soon as he started the engine, Méndez realized that he was overweight and that's why he ordered to unload everything that was dispensable. The crew unloaded several packages that they piled up next to the runway and immediately boarded again, verifying with dismay that the machine was still overloaded and, therefore, unable to take off. This is how Méndez explained it to General Aramburu and he told him that as his pilot, he would be in charge of deciding.
Señorans, who was listening to the conversation, turned to Dr. Eduardo Bergalli, radical leader and only civilian on board, and asked him to get off. The man tried to resist but, due to his condition, he was required to descend quickly because they were late and did not want to delay the departure any longer.
Much to his chagrin, the leader abandoned the aircraft and First Lieutenant Catani did the same next to him, as he was the youngest officer.
Once free of the overload, the plane closed its doors and, giving maximum power to its engine, began to taxi along the runway, just at the moment when the police from the province of Entre Ríos arrived at high speed with the aim of prevent his departure.
The plane was gaining speed when the agents got out of their mobile phones and opened fire, hitting the fuselage and wounding frigate captain Aldo Molinari in the leg.
The single-engine rose without problems and when it began to light up on the horizon, its pilot headed towards the neighboring province of Corrientes, more precisely to Curuzú Cuatiá, one of the two cities founded by General Belgrano during his expedition to Paraguay.
Molinari was holding his leg when he warned his companion that he was bleeding. Arias Duval, who was traveling in the passenger seat, got up and stood next to him to make a tourniquet with two handkerchiefs and in this way momentarily stopped the bleeding.
At 08:05 the plane stabilized and almost immediately, Lieutenant Méndez noticed that a storm front was forming in front of them with threatening dark clouds, which is why he turned on the radio to listen to the weather report.
At that time, the announcer's voice transmitted an official message that reported on the military uprising in the province of Córdoba, that it was beginning to be controlled by loyal forces and that calm reigned in the kingdom of the country. The crew looked at each other in surprise just as Méndez began a detour to avoid the storm by turning slightly to the left, a maneuver that allowed them to see the town of Rosario del Tala in the distance.
They were flying over the course of the Mocoretá River, when Colonel Señorans explained to the passengers that according to what was agreed upon when planning the operation, the signal that would confirm that the place was in rebel hands was an ambulance parked next to the landing strip.
Twenty minutes later, the single-engine vehicle began to descend although with very little visibility due to the dense layer of clouds that covered the sector and almost immediately they spotted the airfield, noticing a strange stillness and what was worse, no ambulance stopped next to it.
The aircraft began to fly in a circle while its occupants discussed the situation. Aramburu, who was traveling sitting in the back, had remained silent throughout the trip and only spoke when his comrades realized the situation, asking Molinari what his opinion was. The sailor responded that in his opinion, the best thing to do was to land and move forward with the plans. After listening to it, the general meditated for a moment and after a few seconds of meditation, he ordered the landing.



On the mainland, the determined Major Juan José Montiel Forzano had everything ready to start the uprising at the agreed time. He had been moving rapidly since the 14th, informing the rebellious officers and civilians of the plans, among them Sapadores Major Constantino Passoli, Captains Eduardo Rezzonico, Claudio Mas, José Eduardo Montes, Joaquín Vallejos and Francisco Balestra, Pedro E. Ramírez (son of the former president of the Nation Pedro Pablo Ramírez), Julio César and José Rafael Cáceres Monié (brothers of the military man), Mario de León, Juan Labarthe and Enrique Arballo.
At 0 hours on September 16, he proceeded to capture the headquarters of the town's Armored Exploration Detachment and arrest its main authorities, led by lieutenant colonels Carlos Frazer, Julio César Uncal y Carvajal and majors Tomás Rodolfo Orsi, Nadal , Hogan, Rodríguez and Idelbo Eleodoro Voda along with several captains and lieutenants. Immediately afterwards, he gathered the 180 non-commissioned officers of the unit in the main courtyard of the Exploration Detachment, and invited them to join the uprising, which the majority rejected. Faced with such a situation, he ordered their arrest, dismantling them and locking them in the materials warehouse in front of which he ordered to set up a strong guard to assume command immediately afterwards, distributing charges among his followers.
Everything was under control when the plane in which General Aramburu was traveling touched the ground, with the exception of the Armored Group, its School and its workshops, with its complement of 50 tanks and half-track vehicles, located at one end of the town, with the Curuzú Cuatiá stream in the middle.
Montiel Forzano dispatched Major Eduardo Samyn there at the head of a group of officers while the civilian commandos occupied the Municipality, the police station, the Post Office, the railway station, the Bank and the telephone office, without encountering opposition.
The School and the Armored Group fell without bloodshed and in this way, an entire Division, with its cannons, mortars and tanks, was left in the power of the rebel forces. Shortly after, Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Orfila, head of the Military District, subordinated himself to Montiel Forzano, placing the police and civil commands under his command.
Without loss of time, he dispatched a section under the command of Lieutenant José Luis Picciuolo to the airfield, with instructions to receive General Bengoa and immediately take him to the Detachment. The high officer had to lead the rebel forces, board the trains and head towards Paraná first and Rosario later, to gather the troops that, under the orders of General Lonardi, would march from Córdoba towards the Federal Capital, but once again The senior officer never appeared.
At 10:00 a.m., Colonel Héctor Solanas Pacheco arrived at the air station, coming from the “El Carmen” ranch to learn what was happening, and after hearing that nothing was known about Bengoa, he began his return.



The one who was greatly surprised by what was happening in the Curuzú Cuatiá School Armored Group was its commander, Colonel Ernesto Sánchez Reinafé, when shortly after arriving in Buenos Aires, he learned from General Francisco Antonio Imaz that his garrison had revolted.
He was ordered to return immediately and, together with General Carlos Salinas and Colonel José Eduardo Tabanera, commanders of the Armored Division and Artillery of the Mechanized Corps respectively, take charge of the situation. Thus, without wasting time, they headed to the Metropolitan Airport and once there they boarded a twin-engine LV civil plane and left for Corrientes.
Sánchez Reinafé had been the victim of a distraction maneuver by Montiel Forzano, who had sent him a message ordering him to urgently appear in Buenos Aires for a meeting at the Ministry of the Army.
The plane leading to Salinas and Sánchez Reinafé took off from the capital around 12:00 and an hour later, it flew over Curuzú Cuatiá dropping government pamphlets announcing the failure of the uprising. That and the official statements issued by the radios, announcing that the loyal forces were prevailing, caused confusion to spread in the armored garrison, to such an extent that several officers, including Captain Nicolás Granada and Lieutenants Alberto Rueda, Shefferd and Juan Rocamora, rebels until that moment, abandoned the plot and rushed to free the 180 non-commissioned officers they were guarding.
What until now had been a peaceful movement turned into a bloodbath. The noncommissioned officers, alienated, left the workshops in which they had been locked up and, shouting insults and cheers at Perón, ran to the arsenals to obtain weapons, previously reducing the officers Rubén Molli and Carlos Zone, who at that time were standing guard. From that point they headed towards the access gates, taking over the main entrance, thereby controlling access to the unit.
Seeing this, Major Samyn ran to the town where the rebel high command was meeting and informed them of what was happening1.
Extremely agitated, Samyn reported that the garrison had returned to loyal hands and that chaos and confusion dominated the Group, so Detang advised Solanas not to wait any longer and immediately take charge of the situation while Montiel Forzano hurriedly left to catch up. in front of his troops.
The circumstances were extremely complex since it was General Aramburu and not Bengoa who had presented himself to take command in Corrientes and that made the situation more confusing.
Ignoring and continuing with what had been planned, Montiel Forzano led a column of seven half-track vehicles, four cannons, personnel from Sappers and the Exploration Detachment and at the head of it he crossed the town to reach the end. opposite, when the loyal troops, on the other side of the stream, were carrying out preparations.
Two of the armored vehicles headed towards the sector, one under the command of First Lieutenant Jorge Cisternas and the other under the command of Second Lieutenant Juan Carlos González, while a loyal truck driven by Lieutenant Juan Rocamora left at full speed from the neighboring Escuela, violently ramming the side dividing rail to block the bridge. Both forces opened fire and engaged in tough combat with the non-commissioned officers, stationed in the workshops, shooting at the tanks. One of them ran up to Second Lieutenant González's armored vehicle and fired at point-blank range from the turret. The bullet hit a projection inside and that miraculously saved the officer. Lieutenant Villamayor shot down the aggressor from his armored vehicle when the loyalist was about to fire a second shot. The subject fell heavily to the ground at the precise moment when the tanks opened fire with their cannons and 7.65 mm heavy machine guns. One of them shot at Villamayor's carrier at a time when Montiel Forzano was climbing up it. The rebels returned fire and forced their adversaries to retreat as the fighting grew in intensity, even reaching hand-to-hand combat.

The large number of casualties that occurred forced the parties to carry out a tactical withdrawal in order to regroup and evaluate the situation. It was at that precise moment that Montiel Forzano moved to a nearby square and communicated with the Artillery Group to order them to attack the School by firing over the town.
The order was not carried out because at that time Colonel Arias Duval was present in order to request a parliament. He couldn't stand the idea that friends and comrades-in-arms were killing each other and for that reason, he asked for a dialogue. Montiel explained to him that he had requested the bombing of the School and that it would be extremely difficult for him to stop it, but within a few minutes, he managed to establish a new telephone link and contained the action in time.
Arias Duval, former deputy director of the Group, had many friends among the non-commissioned officers and for that reason he tried to establish dialogue. Followed by Captain José Eduardo Montes, he went outside raising a white flag, but upon seeing them advance, the non-commissioned officers shot at them, forcing them to seek cover behind a tree. From that position they made signals by waving the flag and the firing ceased.
Arias Duval and Montes crossed the bridge and after being received by the enemy's advance guards, they headed towards their command post escorted by heavily armed men. Immediately afterwards, they entered the School where the head of the Shooter Company, Captain Nicolás Granada and Lieutenant Mario Benjamín Menéndez2 were waiting for them and they began conversations in a cordial but firm tone in which it was clear that the loyal leaders wanted nothing to do with the revolution. and they demanded the immediate release of Colonel Frazer, detained at the nearby police station.
Arias Duval agreed and sent for the officer who, after a few moments (which were extremely long), showed up to join the negotiations. It was agreed that both the School and the workshops would stay out of the conflict and that the prisoners on both sides would be released.


In the afternoon, the loyal command was meeting in the officers' casino of the VI Cavalry Division, organizing the repression.
It was made up of General Astolfo Giorello and Colonels Sánchez Reinafé and José Bernardo Tabanera, who decided to mobilize the 9th Cavalry Regiment and a support artillery group, previously infiltrating several non-commissioned officers dressed in civilian clothes among the population and the rebel cadres, to obtain information. The latter were efficient in fulfilling their mission and once they returned, they realized that the mutinous forces had not yet been deployed and that they were having some difficulties in organizing themselves.
That was precisely what the loyal leaders wanted to hear and what decided them to set out on Curuzú Cuatiá.
A long column of vehicles, made up of eighteen trucks, ten buses and at least five private cars, started moving from the barracks and was detected by a reconnaissance plane when it was moving near the town of Justino Solari3.
As soon as the pilot transmitted the information, General Aramburu asked Lieutenant Méndez to confirm it, an order that the young officer hurried to carry out, flying over the long line of vehicles minutes later, and even Artillery elements were advancing by train from Paso de los Free.
The news caused confusion among the rebel commanders who, extremely worried, hesitated between waiting for the attack in defensive positions or going out to meet those forces to surprise them on the way. Finally, this last alternative was chosen, preparing fourteen half-track vehicles, seven artillery pieces and several trucks to transport the troops4.
When everything was ready, General Aramburu ordered Colonel Solanas Pacheco to remain in the barracks in charge of the garrison and shortly after he boarded one of the trucks with which he left to confront the loyal forces.
It was after 6:00 p.m. and the sky was covered by thick clouds when Solanas Pacheco and Roger Detang saw the long line of vehicles moving away towards the road. When she disappeared from sight, the first proceeded to tour the facilities, first visiting Captain Molinari, who was recovering from his wounds satisfactorily at the local hospital (although in quite a bit of pain), and immediately afterwards returning to the barracks. .
Only then did he realize that he was in charge of a heterogeneous troop of soldiers and non-commissioned officers and that confusion was spreading in his ranks, so, according to Ruiz Moreno, he told Detang about the fact, requesting his advice based on his experience as a combatant. of World War II.

-This must be something normal for you but not for me – he told to the Frenchman – I consider the situation extremely difficult.
- I confess to you that it is the most screwed up situation of my life - the one responded - In the war we knew the enemy, but those around us can shoot us at any moment.

While this conversation was taking place, the revolutionary forces continued their advance led by Montiel Forzano's armored vehicle and Major Néstor Vitón, head of the Artillery Group. According to the plan, the column entered a grove of trees that extended to one side of the road and took positions to ambush General Giorello's troops arriving from Mercedes at that point. Aramburu and his staff remained there while Montiel Forzano went forward to explore.
The brave officer reached the enemy lines and, upon seeing his carrier, they retreated at high speed. At that precise moment, a jeep driven by Captain José Eduardo Montes arrived next to him, bringing an order from Aramburu according to which he must return as soon as possible.
Montiel obeyed and once in the presence of his superior, he knew that the vehicles were beginning to run out of fuel and that as it was getting dark, the situation was becoming disadvantageous.

-I consider it convenient to return to the barracks – said Aramburu.

Montiel Forzano felt quite disappointed when he heard those words because he had come to fight and he was willing to do so.

-My general, I ask for your authorization to organize an attack on the enemy positions with five half-tracks. I know where the enemy is.
-I don't know if that's convenient. I have been informed that the loyalist column has stopped in the town of Baibiene and that they are positioning their cannons and machine guns along the road.
-It is possible, but I think they will run away when they feel our shots above their heads.

Aramburu hesitated for a few seconds and finally conceded.

-OK. Proceed5.

Montiel Forzano left determined to fulfill his mission. He had planned to abandon the main road and flank the enemy's positions across the field and attack them from behind and for this he ordered to load fuel and place four machine guns in each armored vehicle.
When the soldiers were engaged in these tasks, a sergeant approached him to inform him that General Aramburu required his presence again. Extremely upset, the officer went to the command post to hear once again, from his superior, that the raid had to be aborted.

-We have analyzed your plan and we believe that it is unfeasible. It has been decided to suspend the attack.

Montiel Forzano was taken aback, but like the good soldier he was, he obeyed the order. That's why there was a general there and there was a reason he made that decision. An event even occurred that seemed to prove Aramburu right: before leaving the barracks, the vehicles that made up the column had loaded fuel but at that time, their tanks were practically empty, reliable proof that they had been sabotaged and that urgent measures had to be adopted to avoid a disaster.
Fulfilling Aramburu's orders, the column turned around and began its return in the middle of the night.
Once in the barracks, the rebels found new evidence of sabotage. The non-commissioned officers had spilled the fuel from the tanks and there was not a single drop of gasoline and to make matters worse, Rolando Hume, who had been sent by Dr. José Rafael Cáceres Monié to the town of Justino Solari to requisition all the diesel oil in the place , had fallen prisoner of the loyalist outposts and there was no news of him. In view of this, Aramburu decided to dispatch Solanas Pacheco to try to turn General Giorello into the revolution, since there were indications that he was inclined to do so.
Accompanied by Detang and Carlos Passeron, Solanas got into a private car and headed towards Baibiene to change his uniforms for civilian clothes there and continue his journey in the middle of the night.
The car was only 30 kilometers from the Curuzú Cuatiá barracks when bursts of machine gun fire forced it to stop. Seeing that several soldiers were approaching them with their weapons pointed at them, Detang descended with his hands raised, shouting in his typical French accent that they were three landowners on a business trip.
The soldiers surrounded the car while a non-commissioned officer opened the rear door of the vehicle and illuminated its interior with a flashlight. Upon recognizing Solanas, he called Colonel Juan José Arnaldi, director of the Cavalry School in charge of the operation, who upon arriving at the scene ordered the occupants of the vehicle to descend immediately.

-The three remain detained! - He said.

Unarmed and under strict surveillance, Solanas Pacheco, Detang and Passeron were taken to three military vehicles in which they were going to be transferred to the town of Mercedes as detainees. The war for them had ended.

Meanwhile, in Curuzú Cuatiá Montiel Forzano, following direct orders from General Aramburu, hurriedly organized the attack on the loyal troops stationed in Paso de los Libres.
The rebel officer was planning the offensive in the Cavalry Exploration Detachment, when around 11:00 p.m. two non-commissioned officers showed up to report that elements of the Artillery Group and the Sapper Battalion had deserted to join the government forces that had just free all the prisoners and that at their head they advanced towards the place, heavily armed.
Montiel Forzano and his companions were unaware that at that precise moment, the loyal non-commissioned officers were surrounding the Casino and preparing to open fire and without wasting time he asked a messenger to immediately go to General Aramburu's command post to tell him that he should retreat. to the Exploration Detachment and prepare to resist the government onslaught. Upon learning the news, the general gathered his officers and informed them of the situation, namely: the loyal troops had been immobilized, there was no fuel and forces from Paso de los Libres, Mercedes and Monte Caseros were converging on the sector. .

-Everything is over. They remain free of action. Whoever wants to go to Córdoba can do so.

To avoid being surrounded, the rebel command hastily deconcentrated while gunshots began to be heard outside.
Aramburu boarded a jeep with Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Ayala and captains Claudio Mas and José Eduardo Montes and left for Paso de los Libres without saying what his next steps would be. Colonel Señorans headed towards the airfield, accompanied by the pilot Enrique Méndez and lieutenants Hernández Otaño and Castelli, to board the plane that had brought them from Buenos Aires and fly to Córdoba, but they found it surrounded by government troops and for that reason , they gained the field and headed towards the ranch of Eduardo Cazes Irigoyen.
The one who decided to remain in his position was Colonel Arias Duval, in his capacity as former deputy director of the Armored School. He knew that he was going to be taken prisoner and that he would suffer the consequences but he was not willing to hand over command to the non-commissioned officers but would do so personally with a competent officer.
He did so and when Major Nadal, head of the group's workshops, was present, Arias Duval proceeded to transfer control of the military unit to him and placed himself at his disposal. Nadal, who was his friend, did not arrange for his arrest but, on the contrary, forced him to get into a jeep and he himself drove him to the limits of the garrison.
Arias Duval escaped at night, across the country and hid in a ranch near the route that led to Monte Caseros, where he remained hidden until September 18 when he boarded a train bound for Paraná, firmly determined to reach Córdoba to join the to the fight.
Montiel Forzano, who until the last moment maintained the hope of carrying out an attack on the enemy forces, gave up his plan and boarded another jeep to head to Goya in the company of several officers, knowing that Captain Francisco Balestra was waiting for them with a plane. individual ready to leave as soon as they arrived.
Ruiz Moreno says that due to exhaustion, Montiel Forzano fell asleep as soon as the jeep started and that he only woke up on the Santa Lucía stream bridge when a Peronist platoon stopped his march and took him prisoner along with the driver and his companions. companions.
Perón's forces won the battle of Curuzú Cuatiá, Colonel Frazer took charge of the Armored Group and the School from him and in this way, the population and its garrison returned to the hands of the government. At 02:00 the next day he handed over command to Colonel Sánchez Reinafé, whose first measure was to send an urgent telegram to the capital, notifying with satisfaction that the military unit was once again in loyal hands.

Notes

1. Among those present were Colonel Solanas Pacheco, Major Montiel Forzano and the French World War II veteran, Robert Detang, who at that time were exchanging information with the newly arrived General Aramburu.
2. Great-nephew of the general raised in 1951 and son of the eminent doctor and professor of Chañar Ladeado, with the same name and surname, he would become famous, twenty-seven years later, for his unconvincing performance as governor of the Malvinas archipelago during the South Atlantic War.
3. The town is named after Mariano I. Loza. The pilot who manned the reconnaissance plane was Julio Delage, a civilian instructor at the Curuzú Cuatiá flying club.
4. According to the agreement with the Armored Group, the tanks would not be used.
5. Isidoro Ruiz Moreno, op. cit, pp. 145-146.

1955 Guerra Civil. La Revolucion Libertadora y la caída de Perón

1955 Revolution: The Fighting in the South of Buenos Aires

Fight in the Southern Part of Buenos Aires Province

Aircraft from the Comandante Espora Naval Air Base take off to conduct bombing operations against the 5th Infantry Regiment in Bahía Blanca. (Image: Miguel Ángel Cavallo, Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. La Marina se subleva)

With the Sea Fleet positioned in open waters and no updates on its location, only the battleships "Moreno" and "Rivadavia," along with the destroyers "Santa Cruz," "Misiones," and "Juan de Garay" from the Ríos Squadron, remained in port. The cruisers "25 de Mayo" and "Almirante Brown," designated as reserve ships without artillery, three torpedo boats, a beacon, two BDI, flatboats, and tugboats completed the contingent. Argentina undeniably possessed a significant war fleet; however, at the onset of the conflict, most of its units were distanced from their home bases.

On the night of September 15, the Comandante Espora police force exhibited heightened activity, leading Captain Jorge E. Perren, the leader of the uprising, to suspect a possible information leak.

Following a series of strategic maneuvers, with officers discreetly convening at predetermined locations, all preparations were finalized. Accompanied by a cadre of rebel leaders, Perren departed from the residence of Lieutenant Commander Ciro Scotti, where he had been in hiding. The group made their way to the house of Vice Admiral Ignacio Chamorro, the base commander, with the intention of arresting him.

Both Vice Admiral Chamorro and Admiral Héctor W. Fidanza, a member of the Special Court of the Navy, were subdued and transported as detainees to the battleship "Moreno." The same fate befell the ship captains overseeing the 2nd Division and all officers who had not aligned themselves with the revolution.


Navy Armored Vehicles run the city



At 7:00 in the morning, a time when both military and civilian personnel were entering the unit, the area fell under rebel control, including the nearby Naval Base of Puerto Belgrano. As Ruiz Moreno outlines in his work, after securing strategic points, the primary concern arose from the 5th Infantry Regiment stationed near Bahía Blanca, led by Lieutenant Colonel Amadeo Angel Albrizzi.

Faced with the regiment's tight-lipped stance on the revolution, a decision was made to dispatch a message urging them to either join the uprising or lay down their arms. Albrizzi, employing tactical measures, maintained radio silence in an attempt to confound his adversaries, unaware that his calls for assistance from colleagues in Olavarría and Azul had been received that morning and appropriate measures were being taken.

Given Albrizzi's unyielding position, Captain Arturo Rial, the revolutionary commander in the Southern Sector, issued a subsequent summons. The response confirmed that the regiment's leader would personally appear before Commander Espora to engage in dialogue. However, the revolutionary leaders saw these responses as mere delaying tactics.

By 3:00 p.m., an air-naval formation identified troop movement near General Cerri, causing concern among base authorities who promptly went on high alert. These were three trucks carrying reinforcements for the 5th Infantry Regiment, dispatched that very morning by the Repression Command.

In an attempt to halt their advance, rebel planes were deployed towards them, releasing bombs that forced the reinforcements to hastily disperse. Subsequently, the occupation of Bahía Blanca was coordinated, a pivotal point for the unfolding events. To execute this, Marine Corps troops received orders to mobilize towards the city. At 3:30 p.m., the troops boarded several trucks, setting out under the command of Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Castellanos—the same individual who, earlier that morning, had flown over the barracks of the 5th Infantry Regiment in a Catalina plane piloted by Frigate Captain Raúl Galmarini.



Rebel Forces Occupy Bahía Blanca (Image: Miguel Ángel Cavallo, Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. La Marina se subleva)

According to Ruiz Moreno, Bahía Blanca was occupied at 4:00 p.m. sharp, without opposition, patrolling the access roads and raiding the GCT and CGE premises, where weapons and documentation were seized. The final movements took place in Villa Mitre, a working-class neighborhood with a marked Peronist presence, where two trucks and an armored vehicle with twenty men and a radio equipment were stationed in order to keep such a conflictive sector under strict surveillance.
When Captain Castellanos was installed in the Municipality (6:00 p.m.), the population was under complete control and it was then that citizens took to the streets en masse to support the movement, cheering the Navy and hurling epithets against Perón.
From the LU7 broadcasting station, Castellano radiated a fiery revolutionary proclamation that only increased the combative ardor of the population. Many civilians volunteered, eager to join the anti-government ranks, while naval planes dropped leaflets spreading the principles of the uprising and inviting the people to join.
It was beginning to get mid-afternoon when Captain Perren was able to inform the rebel command that both Bahía Blanca and Punta Alta, up to a radius of 300 kilometers around, were under revolutionary control, with the exception of the facilities of the 5th Infantry Regiment.


Naval Aircraft Flying over Bahía Blanca

At that point it was evident that Lieutenant Colonel Albrizzi hoped to receive reinforcements from the Azul and Olavarría regiments, ignoring that the sailors, upon occupying Bahía Blanca, had seized the Army's communications codes and were aware of all his movements. For this reason, Captain Rial, after the agreed deadlines for a definition had expired, decided to attack the unit.
By his order, Commander Edgardo S. Andrew established a new telephone contact and after he handed him the device, he notified Albrizzi that he had exactly two minutes to speak because otherwise the regiment was going to be bombed. .
After receiving the order to ready, six naval aircraft were positioned at the head of the runway, ready to take off and, faced with a new series of excuses, after the agreed time had expired, they received the order to take off.
Concerned, Captain Andrew tried to mediate, asking his superior to stop the raid:

-Sir, don't bomb them, I know them and I know that sooner or later they are going to give in to us.

Not accustomed to war, the officer did not admit entering into action. However, Captain Rial remained firm.

-Give the order to bomb!

One after another, the North American AT-6s taxied down the runway and took off with a difference of half a minute from each other, towards the outskirts of the city.
At 5:00 p.m. they attacked the regiment's facilities, receiving intense machine gun and rifle fire in response. Lieutenant Rubén Iglesias' plane was hit and although the pilot was injured in the leg, he was able to reach Espora and land without problems.
The first raid was followed by another, with their planes making low flights over the objective, in order to keep the unit intimidated. However, far from giving up its attitude, the regiment maintained its silence, evidencing its intention not to give in to the uprising.

Preparations in Comandante Espora

While the second attack was taking place, the Repression Command encouraged the resistance from Buenos Aires and announced the sending of reinforcements. Albrizzi must have experienced great relief when he learned that the III Cavalry Division under the command of General Eusebio Molinuevo was advancing to his aid, reinforced by elements of the 2nd Artillery Regiment, the 3rd Communications Detachment, and the powerful 3rd Motorized Infantry Regiment based in La Tablada (the same one that entered into combat against the Gloster Meteor on June 16) and the Sapper Detachment 3. For its part, the 1st Cavalry Regiment set out from Azul and the 2nd Regiment from Tandil, both taking the paths of Juárez and Tres Arroyos.

Ground crew assembles a bomb under the wing of a PBY Catalina


Information received from different parts of the country showed that the fighting at the Río Santiago Naval Base was becoming unfavorable and that in the Río de la Plata, the destroyers “La Rioja” and “Cervantes” had received harsh punishment from Air Force. That, plus the advance of the Army units, decided a new attack on the 5th Infantry Regiment.
At 9:30 p.m. on that eventful day, two Catalina bombers left Comandante Espora bound for the military unit, reaching the objective fifteen minutes later.
The first threw flares to illuminate the target and the second dropped its bombs, impacting the facilities, without causing any casualties. This time there was no response and the devices returned to the base without incident. Half an hour later, a communication from the Army was intercepted haranguing the 5th Infantry which, among other things, said: “Do not surrender to the Navy. The bombing will be suspended because they do not have fuses. "In a short period of time, it will receive air support."

An AT-6 North American fly towards the 5th Infantry Regiment in Bahía Blanca

That radio interception led the rebel high command to adopt defensive measures in anticipation of the regiment carrying out some type of mobilization. To this end, permanent air patrols were maintained over their barracks and the regrouping of the military forces occupying Bahía Blanca was ordered. The rebel advances came so close to the enemy lines that at two different points, the sections of lieutenants Martín Schwarz and Juan J. Costa surpassed their defensive perimeter.



At 11:00 p.m. Navy troops, who had already cut the telephone lines that connected Bahía Blanca with Buenos Aires, blew up the bridge of National Route No. 3, over the Quequén Salado River, located between Coronel Dorrego and Tres Arroyos, 150 kilometers away. of the naval air base. The mission was carried out by a demolition section made up of seventeen men under the command of Lieutenant Engineer Jorge Yódice, supported by Lieutenant Navy Infantry Eduardo Fracassi and Midshipman Luis Pozzo, an expert in explosives. The commandos took off in a plane from Comandante Espora and at 6:45 p.m., they landed in a field near the objective. As soon as they landed, one group ran to the route to block it with branches and different types of obstacles while the other proceeded to place the explosives in two different points of the structure.

Communication Center. Comandante Espora Base

Once the device was assembled, the troops withdrew and when they were at a safe distance, they stopped and activated the mechanism. A terrible explosion occurred that shook the night and while the glow and flames illuminated the area, the bridge collapsed. The plan included blowing up a railway bridge near the previous one, but lack of time prevented the operation. The commandos boarded the plane and at 12:00 p.m. they began their return, after successfully completing the first phase of the plan aimed at hindering access to the rebel sector.

Rebel troops occupy the Municipality


DC Guillermo Castellanos (right), naval chief in charge of Bahía Blanca (Pictures: Miguel Ángel Cavallo, Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. La Marina se subleva)


Images
Pictures: Miguel Ángel Cavallo, Puerto belgrano. Hora Cero. La Marina se subleva

Notes

1. In 1982, Admiral Carlos Büsser led the occupation forces of the Malvinas/Falklands archipelago during Operation Rosario.
2. Jorge E. Perren, Puerto Belgrano y la Revolución Libertadora, p. 187.

1955 Guerra Civil. La Revolucion Libertadora y la caída de Perón