Saturday, November 18, 2023

Viceroyalty of the River Plate: British preparations for the Invasion of 1806


Preparation of the English Invasions

 

May 3, 1803. In the British legation building in Paris, the lights burn late at night. The ambassador, Lord Charles Whitworth, makes final preparations to leave the French capital. The war between his country and France is already a practically accomplished fact. Once again the two great powers will launch into the fight, to decide, in a last and gigantic clash, which will exercise supremacy in the world.

Shortly before midnight a French government official arrives at the embassy. He brings an urgent message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord. He asks Whitworth for an interview that should take place the following afternoon, and in which matters of extreme importance will be discussed. The British ambassador believes he discovers a ray of hope in the request. It is still possible, at the last moment, to preserve peace.


At the appointed time the meeting takes place. Talleyrand, bluntly, presents his proposal: Napoleon Bonaparte offers Great Britain an honorable exit. The center of the dispute, the island of Malta, a strategic key to the Mediterranean, will be evacuated by the British forces that occupy it. But when the British withdraw, Malta will be under the control of Russia, a country that will have to guarantee that the island does not serve the war interests of France or England. Whitworth listens attentively to the Minister, and then, without hesitation, gives his response:

-Mr Minister, my country considers Malta as a key position for its security. Our troops must, therefore, remain on the island for a period of no less than ten years...

Talleyrand, avoiding a specific response, incites the ambassador to transmit Napoleon's proposal to the London cabinet. Master in the art of persuasion, Talleyrand achieves his goal. Whitworth leaves the Minister's office determined to support the negotiation. Whether war is avoided depends on it.

May 7, 1803. The British cabinet, chaired by Henry Addington, Viscount of Sidmouth, studies Whitworth's office with the French proposal. The discussion is brief. For British Ministers there is no possibility of compromise. The offer only constitutes, in his opinion, a new ploy by Napoleon to gain time until his fleet, which is in the Antilles, reaches the European coast. Addington then issues a final order, which must be immediately transmitted to the embassy in Paris: the proposal is rejected. The French must accept, as the only way out, that the English forces remain in Malta for a period of ten years. If they refuse, Whitworth must leave Paris within thirty-six hours.

The die, for the British, is cast. On the night of May 11, Napoleon gathers his governing council at the Saint-Cloud palace. He has the British note in his hands, and makes it known to the Ministers. A dramatic silence follows his words. A vote is then taken to decide the issue. Of the seven members of the council present, only Talleyrand and Joseph Bonaparte oppose starting the fight. The war is finally underway.

On May 18, the British government officially announces the start of hostilities. On that same day the first meeting takes place. An English frigate, after a short cannonade, captures a French ship near the coast of Brittany. From that moment on, and for more than ten years, peace will no longer reign in Europe. Within the whirlwind of events generated by that conflict, the American emancipation movement will take place.

The war that begins soon engulfs Spain as well. At first the King, Carlos IV, and Manuel Godoy, his Prime Minister, try to stay out of the fight, evading the obligations of the alliance with France. To this end, and as a price for their neutrality, they offer Napoleon the signing of a treaty by which they undertake to give him a monthly subsidy of 6,000,000 francs. Napoleon, already working feverishly on organizing the invasion of England, accepts the deal. However, the British are determined to prevent Spain from sustaining a “half-war”, and will force it to define itself.

On May 7, 1804, William Pitt (son), the “pilot of the storms,” once again assumed the leadership of the English government. Eleven days later Napoleon takes the title of Emperor of the French. The two men who symbolize the will to predominance of their respective nations are thus confronted. For Pitt, the time has come for the final clash, and he is determined to maintain an all-out fight until he achieves absolute victory. Napoleon and his empire must be destroyed, so that the “European balance” that will allow Great Britain to continue its aggrandizement without hindrance is restored. Thus, upon receiving the Spanish ambassador in London, he categorically told him:

- The nature of this war does not allow us to distinguish between enemies and neutrals... the distance that separates both is so short that any unexpected event, any mistrust or suspicion, will force us to consider them equal.

This veiled threat soon translated into concrete aggression. The pretext is given by the reports sent by Admiral Alexander Cochrane, pointing out the concentration of French naval forces in Spanish ports. On September 18, 1804, the English government sent Admiral William Cornwallis, head of the fleet blocking the French port of Brest, the order to capture the Spanish ships that, coming from the Río de la Plata, took the flows to Cádiz. from America. Cornwallis immediately detaches four of his fastest frigates to set out in pursuit of the Spanish ships.


 
The British Ambassador in Paris, Lord Charles Witworth, facing Napoleon.

On October 5, 1804 the meeting took place. Advancing through the fog, the English ships intercept their prey twenty-five leagues off Cádiz. A brief and violent combat then ensues, during which one of the Spanish frigates, the "Mercedes", explodes and sinks. On board her, Mrs. María Josefa Balbastro y Dávila, wife of the second chief of the Spanish flotilla, Captain Diego de Alvear, perished. The latter, who travels on the frigate “Clara”, saves his life along with that of his son, Carlos María, the future General Alvear, warrior of Argentine independence.

The fight ends with the surrender of the three Spanish ships that escape destruction. These ships, loaded with more than 2,000,000 pounds of gold and silver bars, are taken to the port of Plymouth. This is the first blow of the English, and provokes a violent reaction in Spain. In Great Britain itself, the unexpected attack gives rise to a strict condemnation by Lord William Wyndham Grenville, who does not hesitate to declare:

-Three hundred victims murdered in complete peace! The French call us a mercantile nation, they claim that the thirst for gold is our only passion; "Do they not have the right to consider that this attack is the result of our greed for Spanish gold?"
The coup against the frigates, however, is nothing more than the beginning of a series of attacks that follow one another quickly. Off Barcelona, Admiral Nelson captures three other Spanish ships; and in the waters of the Balearic Islands, English ships attack a military convoy and capture an entire regiment of Spanish soldiers that is heading to reinforce the garrison of Mallorca. In the face of aggression, Spain cannot fail to respond with war. That is precisely what Pitt intends.

October 12, 1804
. In a luxurious country mansion located on the outskirts of London, an interview is held that will have decisive consequences for the future of the Río de la Plata. Prime Minister William Pitt, Henry Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Commodore Home Popham are gathered there.

The fight against Spain is now, for the British leaders, a reality, even though the rupture of hostilities has not yet been finalized. The meeting, therefore, aims to analyze possible plans of action against the Spanish possessions in America. That's why Popham is there. He, together with Francisco Miranda, has worked intensely on the development of projects aimed at operating militarily on American lands to separate the Spanish colonies from the metropolis. Pitt and Melville listen attentively to Popham's reports and agree with his intentions. One point, however, worries Pitt. He wishes to be assured that, should the planned war against Spain fail to break out, Miranda will not carry out the operation. Popham responds categorically:

-Mirando, who I know very well, will never violate his commitment. He will respect her pledged word to the end.
In this way the discussion concluded. Popham received the order from his superiors to draft the project in detail and present it to Lord Melville within four days.

Thus was born the famous “Popham Memorial”, the starting point of the British attack on Buenos Aires in June 1806. Upon receiving the news, Miranda met with Popham and, using documents and maps, proceeded with him to complete the memorial. . The main objective was Venezuela and New Granada, where Miranda intended to disembark and raise the cry for independence. Popham, in turn, introduced a secondary operation into the project, directed against the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, which he would attack using a force of 3,000 men. He also proposed that troops brought from India and Australia act in the Pacific against Valparaíso, Lima and Panama. Miranda would command the forces operating in Venezuela, and Popham would take charge of the expedition against Buenos Aires.

The purposes of the plan were clearly defined: the idea of conquering South America was completely ruled out, since the objective was to promote its emancipation. It was contemplated, however, "the possibility of gaining all its prominent points, establishing some military possessions." The American market, in turn, would be opened to British trade.

On October 16, punctually, Popham and Miranda presented the memorial to Viscount Melville. He found it satisfactory, but refrained from expressing a definitive opinion about the realization of the project, since England was facing a very serious threat at that time, which forced it to concentrate all its forces. On the other side of the English Channel, in the military camp of Boulogne, Napoleon had enlisted an army of almost 200,000 soldiers. The emperor was determined to carry out what seemed impossible: the invasion of the British Isles. “Since it can be done... it must be done!” he had stated, in categorical order, to his Minister of the Navy. Under the spell of this directive, in all the ports on the French coast the shipyards worked feverishly building thousands of vessels destined to ensure the passage of the army through the channel. In one of his dispatches, Napoleon clearly defined his unshakable resolve: “Let us be masters of the canal for six hours, and we will be masters of the world!”

The danger of a French landing was, therefore, imminent.

Within the climate of extreme alarm created by this situation, it was inevitable that Popham and Miranda's plans would be put aside. Another no less important fact came together to contribute to the definitive postponement of the planned expeditions. Russia began negotiations with the British government to form a new coalition of European powers against Napoleon. However, as a condition of that alliance, Tsar Alexander I demanded that an attempt be made to also attract Spain to the coalition. Pitt was thus forced to suspend all action against the American colonies.

That attitude was maintained even after Spain had formally declared war on Great Britain on December 12, 1804. The insistent complaints that Miranda sent to Pitt were of no use. He remained imperturbable, and informed the Venezuelan general that the political situation in Europe had not yet reached the degree of maturity necessary to begin the enterprise.

It is the month of July 1805. Miranda, completely disillusioned by the failure of his efforts, decides to leave Great Britain and go to the United States, where he trusts that he will receive help to carry out the emancipation crusade. Popham, in turn, has lost all hope. He is serving in the port of Plymouth, far from London and his contacts with the senior leaders of English politics. For that adventurous man, inaction, however, cannot be prolonged.

Secret reports thus come to their knowledge about the weakness of the forces defending the Dutch colony of the Cape of Good Hope, at the southern tip of the African continent. This news is enough for the sailor to conceive a new and daring undertaking. He without delay heads to London, and there he meets with one of the members of the cabinet. For Popham it is necessary, and he states this, to take advantage of the extraordinary opportunity that is presented and, through a surprise attack, take over the aforementioned colony.

Finding out, Pitt decides to immediately launch the operation. This time, unlike what happened with the American projects, the prime minister does not show any hesitation. Without a doubt, the Cape of Good Hope constitutes a vital point for Great Britain, as it dominates the maritime communication route with its possessions in India. For the English it is essential that this strategic position does not fall into the hands of the French who you know, they have deployed naval forces in the South Atlantic.



Portrait of William Pitt

On July 25, 1805, the pertinent instructions were sent, under the label of "very secret", to General David Baird, who had been appointed head of the attack forces. Six infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment, with a total of almost 6,000 soldiers, are assigned to the expedition. Popham receives command of the escort flotilla, made up of five warships.

Four days later, Popham has a final interview with Pitt. The sailor has, meanwhile, received new and confidential reports. A powerful merchant from London, Thomas Wilson, informed him that he had positive news that Montevideo and Buenos Aires were practically unguarded, and that a force of a thousand soldiers would be enough to achieve the conquest of both places.

In the conversation he has with Pitt, Popham informs him of the data indicated. The prime minister, however, tells the commodore that, in view of the position adopted by Russia, which demands that Spain be drawn into the ranks of the coalition against Napoleon, he cannot authorize any hostile action against the American colonies. He concludes, however, with a statement that will have a decisive influence on Popham's subsequent behavior. These were Pitt's words:

-Despite this, Popham, and in case the negotiations we are carrying out with Spain fail, I am determined to re-adopt your project.
Thus, the Commodore left to join his ships, convinced that it would not be long before Pitt sent him the order to attack Buenos Aires. When embarking in Portsmouth on his flagship, the “Diadem”, Popham carries in his luggage a copy of the memorial that, in October 1804, he wrote together with Francisco Miranda. The plan, after all, will have to be carried out as soon as the favorable opportunity arises.

November 11, 1805.
The population of the Brazilian port of Bahia gathers at the docks and witnesses the unexpected arrival of the British expeditionary force. Popham goes ashore and obtains there, in addition to the water and food he needs for his squad, new reports that confirm those he has already received in London. The Río de la Plata lacks sufficient military forces to resist an assault carried out with determination and audacity. An Englishman who has just arrived in Bahia from Montevideo does not hesitate to declare to Popham: "If the attack is carried out, the same inhabitants of the city will force the Spanish garrison to capitulate without firing a single shot..."

When Popham leaves the Brazilian coast and heads towards the Cape of Good Hope, he has practically already decided to try the enterprise. The only thing left now is for the situation in Europe to take the necessary turn for the London authorities to abandon their refusal to carry out the attack.

The news of the English fleet's landfall in Bahia soon spread. Alarm is spreading in Buenos Aires, and Viceroy Rafael de Sobremonte mobilizes all forces to face the invasion, which he considers imminent. In the United States, in turn, the newspapers, based on rumors and erroneous reports, anticipate events and, four months before the British troops disembark in the Río de la Plata, publish the news that Buenos Aires it has already been conquered by Popham and Baird.

The aggression, however, was not yet to occur. Deviating from the American coasts, the English headed to the Cape of Good Hope, where they arrived in the first days of January 1806. The conquest of the colony was easily achieved, after defeating the Dutch forces in a short combat. The mission was thus accomplished. Popham, impatient, then waits for reports from Europe, ready to launch himself into the Río de la Plata as soon as circumstances allow it.

In the month of February, reports of the extraordinary victory obtained by Admiral Nelson at Trafalgar reach the commodore. The fleets of France and Spain have been eliminated as combative forces, in a day of fighting that definitively ensures the supremacy of Great Britain on all the seas. But this triumph was counteracted, shortly afterwards, by the crushing defeat that Napoleon inflicted on the Austrian and Russian armies in Austerlitz. The news of this last battle was obtained by Popham on March 4, 1806, through the crew of a French frigate that the English captured off the Cape of Good Hope.

A concrete fact arises, however, from these two events. Spain has been definitively linked to her alliance with Napoleon, and there is no longer any possibility of attracting her to the ranks of the coalition that, practically, has ceased to exist. Popham, therefore, is at liberty to carry out his plans.



Henry Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty. 

The commodore then decides to act. Thomas Waine, captain of the “Elizabeth”, a North American slave ship that has made several trips to Buenos Aires and Montevideo, confirms the news about the weakness of the forces defending both places. Therefore, there is no need to waste any more time. On April 9, Popham sends a letter to the admiralty in which he communicates that he has decided not to remain inactive in Cabo, since all danger has already disappeared there, and that he leaves with his ships to operate on the coasts of the Río de la Plata.

The next day Popham sets sail, but shortly afterwards he must interrupt sailing when the wind dies down. He then takes advantage of the circumstance to resolutely demand that General Baird support his plans, providing him with a contingent of troops. The reports from the American captain and those he obtains from an English sailor who has lived eight years in Buenos Aires serve as a powerful argument in the discussion he has with his colleague. Finally, Baird, convinced that nothing will stop Popham in his adventure, decides to give him the support he requests.

The attack on Buenos Aires is thus resolved. On April 14, 1806, Popham's ships set sail from Cape Town, escorting five transports carrying more than 1,000 soldiers, commanded by General William Carr Beresford. A veteran of many campaigns, Beresford is, because of his resolve and courage, the right man to attempt the plan. As the main assault force, the British leader has the troops of the brave 71st Scottish Regiment.

For six days the fleet sails without problems, heading west. On April 20, however, a violent gale breaks out and the ships disperse, losing contact with one of the troop transports. Popham, to cover the loss, heads to the island of Saint Helena, where he requests and obtains a reinforcement of almost 300 men from the British governor. Before leaving the island, the sailor sends a last letter to the admiralty to justify, once again, his behavior. To that note he attaches the famous memorial that, in 1804, he presented to Pitt. This is proof that the expedition does not respond to an improvised decision, but is the result of a plan already studied by the British government. The conquest of Buenos Aires, Popham points out, will give the English possession of the "most important commercial center in all of South America."

Then the long journey begins. A frigate, the “Leda”, overtakes the bulk of the fleet and sails quickly towards the American coasts, with the mission of reconnoitring the terrain. The appearance of that ship, which appears before the fortress of Santa Teresa, in the Banda Oriental, on May 20, 1806, gives the first alarm to the authorities of the Viceroyalty.


June 13, 1806. For five days the British fleet has been in the waters of the Río de la Plata. Popham and Beresford are now reunited aboard the frigate “Narcissus,” along with their top lieutenants. The two British leaders have convened a war meeting to make a final decision on what the target of the attack will be. Until that moment, Beresford has maintained the convenience of occupying Montevideo first, since this place has powerful fortifications that will be very useful for the small invading force, if there is a violent reaction from the population of the Viceroyalty. Popham, however, is determined to attack Buenos Aires directly, and has an extraordinarily convincing argument in his favor. Thanks to the reports of a Scotsman, who was traveling on a ship captured by the English a few days before, it is known that the royal funds destined to be sent to Spain are deposited in Buenos Aires. The prospect of getting hold of the treasure finally dispels all doubts. Furthermore, the conquest of Buenos Aires, capital of the Viceroyalty, will have, in Popham's opinion, a much greater influence on the mood of the colony's population than the capture of the secondary outpost of Montevideo. With extreme audacity, the British sailor thus decides to risk everything for everything.

June 22, 1806. At dusk, a Spanish ship anchors in the port of Ensenada de Barragán, a few kilometers east of Buenos Aires. The ship's commander brings alarming news that will soon reach Viceroy Sobremonte. The English ships are heading towards Ensenada, which indicates that the attack will be launched against the capital of the Viceroyalty. Sobremonte, upon receiving the report, immediately ordered the sending of reinforcements to the eight-gun battery located in Ensenada, and appointed the naval officer Santiago de Liniers to take charge of the defense of the position. Liniers leaves without delay to assume the new command.

From that moment on, events accelerate. On June 24, and given the arrival of new reports indicating the appearance of English ships in front of the Ensenada, Sobremonte launches a decree calling on all men fit to take up arms to join the corps within three days. of militias. Despite the seriousness of the situation, that night the Viceroy attends, along with his family, a performance held at the Comedias theater. His apparent serenity, however, will soon fade completely.

In the middle of the performance, an officer bursts into the Viceroy's box bringing urgent documents sent by Liniers from Ensenada. The English, that morning, had just carried out a landing feint, bringing eight boats loaded with soldiers closer to land. The attack, however, did not materialize, prompting Liniers to point out in his office that the enemy fleet is not made up of units of the English Royal Navy, but rather “despicable privateers, without the courage and resolution to attack, their own.” of the warships of every nation.”

Sobremonte, however, does not participate in the Liniers trial. He immediately leaves the theater, without waiting for the performance to end, and quickly goes to his office in the Fort. There he drafts and signs an order providing for the concentration and readiness of all defense forces. In order not to cause alarm in the city, which sleeps oblivious to the imminent danger, he orders that the regulatory cannon shots not be fired, and sends parties of officers and soldiers to verbally communicate the mobilization order to the militiamen.

Thus arrives the morning of June 25th. In front of Buenos Aires, the English ships appear in line of battle. In the Fort the cannons thunder, raising the alarm, and extreme confusion spreads throughout the city. Hundreds of men come from all the neighborhoods to the barracks, where weapons and equipment have already begun to be distributed, in the midst of terrible disorder.

Shortly after 11 o'clock, and to the surprise of Sobremonte, the enemy ships set sail again and headed southeast. The Viceroy believes that the English have given up the attack. Soon, however, she comes out of his delusion. From Quilmes the alarm cannon resounds, announcing that the landing has begun there.

At noon on June 25, the first British soldiers set foot on land on Quilmes beach. The landing operation continues without any opposition for the rest of the day. Men and weapons are carried in an incessant coming and going to land, by twenty boats. As night falls, Beresford inspects his men under a cold drizzle that soon turns into a heavy downpour. There are only 1,600 soldiers and officers, and they have, as their only heavy weapons, eight artillery pieces. However, this reduction


Advance of the English troops on Buenos Aires, at the moment of crossing the Riachuelo. English engraving of the time.

The clash, under these conditions, can only have one result. Marching through the grasslands, the companies of the 71st regiment resolutely climb the ravine and, despite the defenders' volleys, they gain the crest and overwhelm them, putting them to flight.

From that moment on, chaos breaks out in the defense forces of Buenos Aires, made up almost entirely of militia units lacking any military training. The leadership fails, in the person of Sobremonte, who, overwhelmed by the defeat of his vanguards, only manages to feign a weak attempt at resistance on the banks of the Riachuelo. He concentrated troops there and burned the Gálvez Bridge (current Pueyrredón Bridge) which, from the south, gives direct access to the city. That position, however, will not be sustained. Already on the afternoon of the same day, June 26, Sobremonte met with Colonel Arce, and clearly told him that he had decided to retreat towards the interior.

Beresford, on the other hand, acts with all the energy that circumstances demand. After the battle of Quilmes he only gave his troops two hours of rest, and then tenaciously set out to pursue the defeated enemy. He fails, however, to arrive in time to prevent the destruction of the Gálvez Bridge, but, on June 27, he subjects the defenders' positions on the other bank to violent cannonade, and forces them to retreat. Several sailors then jump into the water and bring boats and rafts from the opposite bank, in which a first assault force crosses the current.

This is how you gain a foothold. Beresford then orders an improvised bridge to be immediately built, using boats, and the rest of his troops quickly cross the Creek. Nothing will now be able to prevent the British advance on the center of the capital city of the Viceroyalty.

Sobremonte has witnessed, from the rear, the actions that culminate with the abandonment of the Gálvez Bridge position. At that time he was in charge of the cavalry forces which, with the arrival of reinforcements from Olivos, San Isidro and Las Conchas, numbered nearly 2,000 men. He avoids combat, however, and begins the retreat towards the city along the "long street of Barracas" (current Montes de Oca avenue).

Those who are not aware of the Viceroy's plans assume that the purpose of this movement is to organize a last resistance in the center of Buenos Aires. However, upon reaching the "Calle de las Torres" (current Rivadavia), instead of heading towards the Fort, Sobremonte turns in the opposite direction and leaves the capital. His hasty march, to which his family soon joins, will continue in successive stages until finally concluding in the city of Córdoba.


Meanwhile, a frightful confusion reigns in Buenos Aires. From the Riachuelo the militia units flow in disorganized groups, who, without practically firing a single shot, have been forced to withdraw, after the retreat of the Viceroy.

The Fort then becomes the center of the events that will culminate with the capitulation. The military leaders, the officials of the Court, the members of the Cabildo and Bishop Lué are gathered there.

Totally dejected, after receiving the news of Sobremonte's withdrawal, the Spanish officials await the arrival of Beresford to surrender the plaza. They have the impression that, in the most difficult hour, the head of the Viceroyalty and representative of the monarch has abandoned them.

Shortly after noon, a British officer sent by Beresford arrives at the Fort, with the Parliament flag. He expresses that his chief demands the immediate surrender of the city and that the resistance cease, pledging to respect the religion and property of the population.

The Spanish did not hesitate to accept the summons, limiting themselves to setting out a series of minimum conditions in a capitulation document that they sent to Beresford without delay. Thus, Buenos Aires and its 40,000 inhabitants are handed over to 1,600 Englishmen who have only fired a few shots.

Popham's audacious coup has fully paid off. The city is in their hands, and the British have only had to pay, as the price for the extraordinary conquest, the loss of one dead sailor. The remaining casualties of the Invasion forces only amount to thirteen wounded soldiers and one missing.

Beresford now marches resolutely on the Fort. On the way he receives the written conditions of capitulation sent to him by the Spanish authorities. The general only stops his progress for a few minutes, to read the documents, and then authoritatively states to the bearer of the document:


-Go and tell your superiors that I agree and will sign the capitulation as soon as the occupation of the city ends... Now I can't waste any more time!

At 4 in the afternoon the British troops arrive at the Plaza Mayor (current Plaza de Mayo), while heavy rain falls on the city. The English soldiers, despite their exhaustion, march martially, accompanied by the music of their band and their pipers. General Beresford tries to give the maximum impression of strength and has arranged for his men to march in spaced columns. The improvised ruse, however, cannot hide from the sight of the population the small number of invading troops that appear before the Fort.

The British General, accompanied by his officers, then enters the fortress, and receives the formal surrender of the capital of the Viceroyalty. The next day, the English flag flies over the building. For forty-six days, the banner will remain there as a symbol of an attempt at domination that, however, will not come to fruition.

Indeed. Neither of the two British bosses consider that the company is finished. Despite the formal compliance that the authorities give them, they know that indignation spreads among the people when they verify that the city has been captured by a simple handful of soldiers.

The resistance, which will not take long to organize, can only be faced through the arrival of the reinforcements that Beresford and Popham rush to request from the London government.


Historiador del País

Wednesday, November 15, 2023

Malvinas: RAF Planned to Attack Argentine Air Bases

According to a newspaper, the Royal Air Force had planes to bomb Argentina in 1982

By Guilherme Poggio 
Vulcan bombers would be used to attack Argentine Air Force bases from Ascension Island


The British newspaper The Telegraph reported in early March that the crews of the Vulcan bombers of the RAF (British Royal Air Force) were trained to bomb Argentine territory, specifically Air Force bases and airfields.

Information about training for the attack has now come to light, for the first time. The crews of the Vulcan bombers, which were developed for nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union, spent days and nights training in Scotland and Canada for a low-altitude attack several miles inside Argentine territory, and in a new edition of the acclaimed "Vulcan 607," military historian Rowland White tells this story.




Brigadier Simón Baldwin, the commander of the last unit to operate Vulcan bombers in 1982, formulated the plans. According to the white paper, he was unwavering in his belief that launching attacks on Argentine territory had become the primary mission for his squadron. No formal documentation was to be created. The directive to Air Commander Baldwin was simple: "Just do it." This directive was sanctioned by a senior officer from the General Staff in Group No. 1 of the Royal Air Force of Great Britain.

Baldwin assembled his most skilled crews, including the pilots who had executed the successful "Black Buck" operations against the Puerto Argentino airstrip in the Malvinas Islands. The strategy entailed penetrating deep into enemy airspace and releasing a barrage of bombs onto the runways of two major Argentine Air Force bases. During the summer of 1982 in the northern hemisphere, the squadron of eight bombers commenced their training missions, conducting simulated bomb runs on Royal Air Force bases and the Leuchars Valley in Scotland.

The attack involved two teams of two Vulcan bombers each departing from Ascension Island, a British territory located 1000 kilometers closer to the Malvinas Islands, which are Argentine territory. In-flight refueling would be carried out en route, and the attackers would descend to an altitude of 300 feet for the final segment of their journey.




The bombers planned to utilize their ground-mapping radars and their expertise in flying at low altitudes to conduct a night-time mission over Argentina. For the first time, the aircraft would be armed with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles as a precaution against potential encounters with Argentine fighter planes, even though such encounters were infrequent at night.

The leading bombers would employ a DASH-10 radar jamming pod, along with four AGM-45 Shrike anti-radar missiles, to target the Argentine surface-to-air missile systems.

Meanwhile, the second wave of attackers would focus on disrupting the road network, hampering the Argentine forces' capacity to launch their own attacks.

Each of the 21 bombs in the payload would weigh 1,000 pounds, equivalent to the payload of five Tornado aircraft, which had recently been deployed in Libya.

The aircraft would fly along the runway, releasing delayed-explosion bombs equipped with small parachutes. If the mission succeeded, the runway would be left with craters, and enemy fighters would be surrounded by fires.

In preparation for the operation, the squadron relocated to Goose Bay, Canada, to practice long-distance night flying.

Ultimately, Argentina transitioned to a democratic government, eliminating the threat to the Malvinas Islands.




SourceThe Telegraph (translation, adaptation and edition: Air Power) 

PHOTOS: Royal Air Force



EDITOR'S NOTE: The text of the original story, which was brief, was expanded based on the British newspaper's original report earlier this Saturday afternoon in order to clarify some issues raised by readers. The new revised and expanded edition of the book "Vulcan 607" Rowland White, who brings the newspaper said that the details of this mission destined for training bases in Argentina, are expected to be sold in early April.

Poder Aéreo


Sunday, November 12, 2023

South American Air Carriers

Air Carriers of South American Navies




Lieutenant Commander
Peruvian Navy
John Rodríguez Asti
Extracted from the Revista Arnada

Currently, on the South American continent, after the Argentine Navy retired the veteran aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo from service, the Brazilian Navy is the only one that has an aircraft carrier. However, two other countries, Chile and Peru, have at some point been interested in owning ships of this type in their respective fleets.

INTRODUCTION
The aircraft carrier, a type of ship born at the beginning of the last century, undoubtedly became a capital ship during the Second World War for the navies that owned them, deservedly gaining the place occupied by battleships until then. The countries that contributed the most to the development of on-board aviation until then were Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. During the post-war period, the possession of this class of ships was practically monopolized by Great Britain, the United States and many of the Western bloc allies who benefited from the British and North American remnants. In this way, apart from Great Britain and the United States, in the early 1950s, countries such as Canada, Australia, Holland and France had aircraft carriers in their respective fleets, and of those mentioned, France would be the only one to build its own towards end of that decade. Later, the Spanish Navy would also have one from the inventories of the United States Navy.
The novelty in terms of possession of aircraft carriers after the Second World War has come from some third world countries, such as India, Argentina and Brazil, and recently, Thailand. However, within the South American continent, not only have the navies of Brazil and Argentina been the only ones to be interested in this type of vessel, since Chile and Peru also at some point planned and took steps to obtain one.
The purpose of this article will be to review the presence of these ships in South American navies, specifically in Brazil and Argentina, as well as the efforts made by Chile and Peru to acquire a ship of this type.

AIR CARRIERS IN THE ARGENTINE NAVY
For much of the past decade, Argentine naval aviation stood out as the most advanced and experienced in combat on the entire continent. Established in 1920, it made significant progress in its first ten years of existence. By 1931, it achieved a milestone by deploying its first embarked aircraft, two Vought Corsair O2U seaplanes initially stationed on the catapults of the newly constructed Italian cruisers, the 25 de Mayo and Almirante Brown.

Notably, the Argentine Navy had been considering the inclusion of an aircraft carrier in its plans since the 1920s. The "Naval Material Renewal Law" of 1926 had authorized the acquisition of an aircraft carrier of that kind along with three submarines for the fleet. However, this plan didn't materialize, and instead, seven destroyers and later a cruiser were purchased. In 1939, the cruiser La Argentina was added to the fleet, equipped with a Supermarine Walrus seaplane. By 1940, naval aviation had developed into a significant force with 44 aircraft and 100 pilots, while, for comparison, the Army Aviation Corps had 200 aircraft and 325 pilots.

In 1942, the Argentine Navy maintained its desire for aircraft carriers, and in 1943, through Decree No. 9006 on September 16, the authorization for their purchase was obtained. However, due to the international situation resulting from World War II and the challenges of acquiring such ships abroad, Argentine aspirations were postponed for many more years.

After the war, circumstances changed, and the Argentine Navy aimed to match the fleet expansion of its neighbor, Brazil, which had bolstered its navy through its participation in the global conflict. In June 1956, Rear Admiral Teodoro Hartung, the Argentine Minister of the Navy, revealed the "Naval Plan of the Argentine Republic," which included a goal to acquire an aircraft carrier to replace the aging battleships Moreno and Rivadavia.

By 1953, the Navy had initiated a study to obtain an aircraft carrier for its Sea Fleet. One project involved converting a North American C3-S-A-1 cargo ship, the Artillero, back into an aircraft carrier, as it had been transformed into an escort aircraft carrier during World War II and served under the British flag as the HMS Smiter. However, financial constraints led to the rejection of this project, as well as an idea to convert one of the Almirante Brown class cruisers.

In early 1957, the United Kingdom offered to sell Argentina an aircraft carrier from the Illustrious class, the Indefatigable, or a light aircraft carrier from the Majestic class, the Magnificent. Both ships had not been modernized and lacked the improvements introduced to this type of vessel in the 1950s. They were not as appealing as the HMS Venerable, which Brazil had acquired in 1956 and was modernizing in the Netherlands.

The desired opportunity arose in the following year when the British Royal Navy, as part of its force reduction policy mandated by the Ministry of Defense, placed the aircraft carrier Warrior in reserve status and listed it for sale. Argentina became the first country to which the ship was offered and officially acquired it on July 4 of that year, making Argentina the second South American nation, after Brazil, to possess a ship of this kind.

The first Argentine air carrier: ARA Independencia

 

The Independencia, originally named Warrior by the British Royal Navy, had begun construction at the Harland & Wolff shipyard in Belfast in December 1942 and was completed in March 1946. It was immediately handed over to the Royal Canadian Navy for use as a on temporary "loan" until at the beginning of 1948, with the entry into service of the Magnificent under the Canadian flag, it returned to Great Britain. Later, it was designated to be used as a platform to carry out experiments with a flexible coating on its flight deck, installed at the Portsmouth Naval Base between March and September 1948. The tests were carried out from November concluding with the removal of the material in June of the following year, then moving to the reserve situation.
In July 1950, due to the Korean War, she returned to service, being used as a troop and aircraft transport ship to the Far East and Cyprus. Between April 1952 and October 1953 it underwent a partial modernization, which included the replacement of the tripod ratchet with a lattice one, the installation of a type 293Q short-range air surveillance radar, a second type 277 radar and a type 277 radar. 281BQ with an IFF system. Additionally, all the obsolete "pom-pom" type guns were removed, receiving four new double Bofors 40mm mounts and increasing the battery of single mounts of the same caliber to 20.
In February 1954, she relieved the Australian aircraft carrier Sydney in the United Nations multinational peacekeeping force tasked with monitoring the ceasefire in Korea, additionally assisting in the evacuation of refugees from northern Vietnam. Upon her return to British waters in December, she entered Devonport Naval Base to undergo further tour and modernization. The work consisted of expanding and equipping it with a flight deck with an angle of 5½°, replacing its hydraulic catapult with one of greater power capable of launching 20,000 lb aircraft, installing the new landing control system with mirrors, and a radar. air control for low visibility conditions. Additionally, she received a North American-made SPS-6C air search radar.
With new equipment, she returned to service in August 1956, being the only British aircraft carrier of her class to have incorporated the latest improvements for aircraft operation.
In February 1957, she was assigned to serve as the flagship of the British squadron in charge of the first tests with the Hydrogen bomb in the Pacific, returning from this mission to the Portsmouth Naval Base in February 1958. Upon arrival, The Warrior went into reserve status and after the respective negotiations, it was purchased by Argentina on the following July 4.
Renamed ARA Independencia (V-1), she was transferred on November 4, 1958 to the Argentine Navy, then beginning sea trials, setting sail on December 10 towards the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base. During the first five months of 1959, various internal structural modifications were carried out, until on June 3 she put to sea, beginning her first operations with aircraft on the 8th of the same month. On this aircraft carrier, initially the aircraft available to the Argentine Navy operated, such as the North American AT-6, but later F4U Corsair attack and exploration aircraft and Tracker S-2F anti-submarine aircraft, as well as exploration helicopters, were acquired. Years later, the Corsairs would be replaced by Panther and Cougar jets.
Between 1959 and 1968, the Independencia participated intensely in various exercises, either with ships of the Argentine Sea Fleet or with foreign ships, including four Unitas operations, or in combined exercises with French and British units. It is worth mentioning that in 1962 she had traveled to the United States to embark at the Norfolk Naval Base, a new complement of recently acquired S-2F Tracker aircraft, two Cougar training version aircraft and two S-55 anti-submarine aircraft. The last aircraft to join the aircraft carrier were the T-28 Fennec aircraft, which operated on board since May 1968.


The acquisition of the second Argentine aircraft carrier: 25 de Mayo, and the retirement of the Independencia
By the end of the 1960s, Argentine plans for its sea fleet considered the need to equip its aircraft carrier with an attack squadron. The main limitation of the Independencia was its inability to operate larger jet aircraft, since to do so it was necessary to reinforce its deck and prepare it to receive such aircraft, which added to the wear and age of its equipment and propulsion plant, did not make it its modernization profitable.


In mid-1968, there was news that the Royal Dutch Navy would withdraw its aircraft carrier, the Karel Doorman, from service, so the Argentine naval authorities, after learning of its situation and carrying out the corresponding studies, commissioned its Naval Commission in Europe to negotiate and obtain your purchase. Although it is true that it was not a new ship, it had the advantage compared to the Independencia of having better electronic equipment and, most importantly, that it had a steam catapult and a reinforced flight deck capable of operating jet planes and Greater weight.
After the purchase of the Karel Doorman, renamed 25 de Mayo, the Independencia went into reserve status, and part of its crew moved to Holland to crew the new aircraft carrier. Being completely inactive, it remained moored at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base, and meanwhile, the navy carried out various studies to give the ship a final destination, not ruling out the idea of converting it into a logistical support ship or amphibious assault ship or helicopter carrier. Once these ideas were discarded, it is known that it was also offered for sale to Peru, as we will see later. Having remained totally inactive and in disarmament during 1971, she was finally, after being decommissioned and scrapped for the benefit of her sister ship, she was sold on 17 March 1971 for demolition.
The 25th May (ex Karel Doorman), was originally named HMS Venerable, and was built for the British Royal Navy at the Cammell Laird shipyard in Birkenhead between December 1942 and January 1945. Immediately after being commissioned, she was commissioned She transferred to the Pacific Fleet as part of Carrier Squadron 11. With brief service under the British flag, she was placed in reserve on 30 March 1947 and sold to the Royal Dutch Navy on 1 April 1948, being commissioned on May 28 of that year with the name of Hr.Ms. Karel Doorman.
Between 1955 and 1958, it was subjected to a radical modernization process that included an extension of the flight deck with an angle to port, a new steam catapult, new equipment for aircraft operations, as well as the installation of modern sensors, to which made it necessary to replace the original tripod mast with a larger lattice mast and also another "mack" type chimney (similar to that of the cruiser De Zeven Provincien, later Peruvian B.A.P. Aguirre), on which a search radar was installed. combined LW-02 long range. After this transformation, it initially operated as an attack aircraft carrier, with its air group consisting of six Grumman Avenger anti-submarine aircraft, six Hawker FGA-50 Sea Hawk fighter-bombers as well as four Sikorsky HSS-1N (SH-34) anti-submarine helicopters and two Sikorsky SH-51 utility helicopters. Then, in the mid-1960s, its mission was reoriented to anti-submarine warfare, and it was equipped with eight Grumman S2F-1 Tracker aircraft and two more anti-submarine helicopters to replace the old Avenger and Sea Hawk helicopters.
Around 1968, the Royal Dutch Navy determined that among its future requirements it would not be necessary to have an aircraft carrier, so it was planned to withdraw from service before 1970. However, on April 26, 1968, being in what would be its Last tour, a fire broke out in the engine room, so it was decided not to repair it and consequently remove it from service earlier than planned.
After the purchase was made on October 15, 1968 by the Argentine Navy, she underwent repairs at the Wilton Fijenoord shipyard and during these repairs she replaced her turbines and boilers with those from her unfinished twin, the HMS Leviathan that was kept in reservation by the British. On August 8, 1969, she was incorporated into the Argentine Navy with the name 25 de Mayo, but she was not ready until the 22nd of the same month, setting sail for Argentina on September 3.
At the beginning of that month, training with aircraft began and her air group was initially made up of S2-E Tracker anti-submarine aircraft and S-61 Sea King helicopters. As an interesting fact, during the trip to Argentina, the British firm Hawker Siddeley carried out demonstrations on its deck with a V/STOL Harrier GR-Mk-1 aircraft with success. Subsequently, the Navy acquired A-4B Skyhawk fighter-bombers, which were received in January 1972 by the aircraft carrier itself in the port of May Port, Florida, which soon began operating from its flight deck. These aircraft, plus those for anti-submarine exploration, in the 1970s, provided the Argentine Navy with great air-naval potential within the continent's navies.
On the other hand, already in Argentine waters, on May 25 it received the British CAAIS command and control system that also incorporated a data link system, which made it possible to operate in coordination with the ADAWS-4 systems that led to on board the Type 42 destroyers Hercules and Santísima Trinidad commissioned between 1976 and 1979.

To replace the old Skyhawks, in 1978 the Argentine Navy acquired 14 Dassault Breguet Super Etendard fighter-bombers in France, purchased thanks to the Naval Reequipment Law of 1974, and among the weapons that equipped them were the AM-39 Exocet air-to-surface missiles. , thereby expanding the offensive capacity of the fleet. These aircraft began to arrive in Argentina at the end of 1981, and by the beginning of the Falklands Conflict, only 5 of them had been received and they were not yet operating from the aircraft carrier, since the necessary modifications to use them had not yet been completed.
The Veinticinco de Mayo led the task force that invaded the Malvinas Islands on April 1, 1982, and after the landings it carried out several patrols on the Argentine coast, but always away from the British Task Force. After the cruiser General Belgrano was sunk on May 4, 1982, the Argentine sea fleet was withdrawn to its ports, and the 25 de Mayo aircraft continued to operate from land.
Once the conflict was over, on May 25 modifications to operate the Super Etendard continued, which included an increase in the flight deck to accommodate two more aircraft and a general tour of the steam catapult. In April 1983 it was only able to carry out the first operations with its new aircraft and in that same year, its CAAIS command and control system was replaced by the more modern SEWACO of Dutch manufacture, very similar to that of the Almirante Brown class destroyers ( Meko 360) that were under construction in Germany.

In 1985, a study was concluded that determined that the 25 de Mayo could extend its service until 1992, projecting that in that year it should be replaced by a 30,000-ton aircraft carrier, capable of operating attack aircraft. However, the funds to build such a ship would not be available. To continue employing May 25, it was planned to replace its propulsion plant, considering several configurations, including a COSAG system with two new boilers and two gas turbines or a CODOG plant with four Sulzer engines and two gas turbines.
Its last operational navigation was carried out between February and March 1988, carrying out training at sea with the Naval Aero Group on board, and since the middle of that year, on May 25, it became inoperative due to propulsion limitations.
Subsequently, in June 1990, a contract was signed with the Italian firm Fincantieri, which would be responsible for providing technical assistance to the Argentine AFNE shipyard in Río Santiago to carry out the repowering of the ship. The project consisted of replacing the steam turbines with Fiat Aviazione LM 2500 gas turbines, diesel engines, and shafts with variable pitch propellers. With her turbines removed from board, the project was canceled due to severe budget restrictions and the aircraft carrier continued inoperable at its Puerto Belgrano berth, until on February 1, 1997, she was definitively withdrawn from service. Then, after being sold at public auction, in January 1999 she was towed for scrapping to Alang, India.
With the loss of May 25, the Argentine Navy, although it still has the Super Etendard, has been deprived of a deterrent element that gave its Fleet a great capacity to project its naval power at great distances. Due to the current conditions of the Argentine economy, we believe that it will be many years before that South American nation will have an aircraft carrier again.

AIR CARRIERS OF THE MARINHA DO BRASIL
Brazil was the first South American nation to establish its naval aviation in August 1916, made up of a naval aviation school equipped with North American Curtiss model F seaplanes. From then on, it had an important development, and in 1922, it was thought to equip to the aircraft carrier fleet, studying the idea of converting two old merchant ships of German origin Aracaju and Sahara, but this idea ultimately did not prosper.
By the end of the 1930s, the navy had about 100 airplanes and seaplanes of various types. The following year, as a result of a campaign to establish an air ministry that would control military and civil aviation in Brazil, the naval and army aviation corps were grouped to form the Brazilian Air Force, under the control of the new Ministry of Aeronautics.
Deprived of its air weapon, the Brazilian navy needed to have naval aviation again, even more so if at the beginning of the 1950s, the Brazilian Navy, within its modernization plans, contemplated acquiring an aircraft carrier in the shortest possible time. To this end, in 1955 he created the General Directorate of Aeronautics of the Ministry of the Navy, with the clear purpose of reconstituting its naval aviation. In 1958 it acquired two Bell 47-G helicopters, which operated aboard the hydrographic vessels Sirius and Canopus. Another measure derived from the new naval policy was the creation of an air-naval training center near Rio de Janeiro, as well as an air-naval transport service.

The Minas Gerais
Coinciding with Brazil's interest in acquiring an aircraft carrier, at that time, the policy of progressive reduction of naval forces carried out by Great Britain made possible the upcoming availability of ships of various types, including some Colossus class aircraft carriers. One of them, the Veangance, had been in reserve since August 1955 and was offered for sale to Brazil, finalizing its purchase on December 14, 1956. Under the name Minas Gerais, it would not be put into service until December 6. December 1960, after undergoing a complete modernization.
Built by Swan Hunter between November 1942 and January 1945 for the British Royal Navy, Veangance had a brief participation in the war, remaining in the Mediterranean for six months, being transferred to the Pacific Fleet based in Hong Kong in July. 1945. In August 1946 he returned to Great Britain. Between May and September 1948 she was fitted out to sail in the Arctic to test and measure her ability to operate in extreme cold conditions, as part of exercises during "Operation Rusty". In 1950 she was designated flagship of the Third Carrier Squadron of the Home Fleet, and in 1952, during the Korean War, she was employed as a troop transport. At the end of that year he began a period of tour that concluded in November 1953. From that moment until August 1955 when he was retired, he served in the Royal Australian Navy, while the aircraft carrier Melbourne (former HMS Majestic) was being completed. Purchased in December 1956 by Brazil, it was taken to the Verolme shipyard in Rotterdam, where in mid-1957 a total reconstruction and modernization process began until December 1960. The works included the reinforcement and expansion of the flight deck with a angle of 8 ½°, increase in the lifting capacity of the elevators, an improvement in its capacity to operate aircraft by providing it with a new steam catapult for launching and new braking cables that could receive aircraft of up to 30,000 lbs, as well as the installation of a new stacking control system with mirrors. In the propulsion plant, its boilers were retubed and its turbines routed. The new sensors for surveillance were of North American origin, receiving an SPS-12 air search radar, an SPS-8B for air control, and an SPS-4 for surface search. As far as her armament is concerned, two quadruple 40mm mounts were installed at the bow and stern of the new island, and another double of the same caliber on the port side towards the stern. The island was the part in which the changes made were most reflected. She was completely rebuilt with a new design, a larger lattice mast and a smaller funnel.
With her new equipment, modified flight deck and new island, upon completing her modernization, the Minas Gerais was an almost new aircraft carrier.
Despite having achieved the objective of obtaining an aircraft carrier, the Brazilian navy had to face an unexpected problem, arising from an absurd dispute with the air force about who would be in charge of the planes that would operate from its deck. As a result, from the end of its modernization until 1963, the ship was without aircraft. This problem originated in 1959, when the government decided that all aircraft operating from the aircraft carrier would belong to the air force, but nevertheless, the navy decided to fly from the ship and naval personnel were trained with the US Navy. waiting to take possession of the SH-34J Seabat helicopters and S-2A Tracker aircraft destined for the aircraft carrier. Then, in 1963 the navy created the naval aviation force, with an embarked air-naval group, and in addition 6 T-28 training aircraft and 4 more helicopters were purchased. The newly acquired aircraft began to operate from Minas Gerais, generating opposition from the Air Force, and motivating the intervention of President Castello Branco, who prohibited the T-28 from being used from the aircraft carrier for a time.

After other additional incidents, in January 1965, the government decided that fixed-wing aircraft would be controlled by the air force, and rotary-wing aircraft by naval aviation. This decision would limit the control of air operations on board for many years, and since then, during much of its service, the Minas Gerais was used as an anti-submarine aircraft carrier, with an air group normally made up of eight Grumman S2-E Tracker aircraft. and anti-submarine helicopters, which were initially the SH-34J Seabat and later the SH-3D Sea King.
In 1976, the Minas Gerais underwent a new modernization and general tour, which consisted of providing it with a tactical data link system to operate with the Niteroi class frigates, the replacement of the SPS air search radar -12 by the most modern SPS-40B, and the complete tour of the propulsion plant.
In 1984, the Brazilian government announced its plans to acquire 12 A-4 Skyhawk fighter-bombers for Minas Gerais, but this was rejected the following year due to finding the resources to purchase aircraft destined for the development of the Italian-Brazilian fighter project. AMX.

By the early 1990s, as the plans to build a new aircraft carrier announced in 1985 had not yet materialized, the retirement of the Minas Gerais was not yet contemplated. Meanwhile, it was decided to carry out reconditioning to extend its remaining life. On this occasion, between July 1991 and October 1993, the boilers were retubed, the turbines and auxiliary systems were routed, it was equipped with a new SISCONTA command, control and communications system, new equipment and radars for air control and a new data link system. The 40mm cannons were removed, and two Sadral launchers for Mistral surface-to-air missiles were installed in their replacement. Additionally, in 1999 the catapult was completely serviced, and some spare parts from the recently decommissioned Argentine 25 de Mayo were used.
After many years of struggle, the good news for Brazilian naval aviation came in 1997, after authorization was obtained from the Government to acquire from Kuwait a squadron of second-hand A-4 Skyhawk aircraft. The aircraft purchased in excellent maintenance conditions at a price of 70 million dollars were 20 A-4KU (designated AF-1 by the Navy) and 3 TA-4KU training aircraft (designated AF-1A). Once they arrived in Brazil, they underwent reconditioning, and in September 2000, they began the first approach, landing and immediate takeoff exercises on the deck of the aircraft carrier, with 5 of the Skyhawks, piloted by a North American naval pilot, one from Argentina. and three Brazilians. In January of the following year, the Skyhawks, grouped in the Interception and Attack Aircraft Squadron (Esqd VF-1), finally began to operate aboard the Minas Gerais, during the CATRAPO/HELITRAPO exercise.
With the arrival of the newly acquired aircraft carrier Sao Paulo (former Foch of the French National Navy) in February 2001, the Brazilian navy determined the prompt withdrawal of the Minas Gerais from service. This occurred on Tuesday, October 16, when the World War II veteran aircraft carrier was finally retired from service at the Rio de Janeiro Naval Arsenal. However, its final destination is not yet written, since from Great Britain, the 'Battle of the Atlantic Memorial Ships' (BAMS) association based at the Aeronautical Heritage Center in Southampton, has expressed its interest in acquiring it and then towing it. towards that British port, turning it into a floating museum. It is also known that the Mayor of Rio de Janeiro has the same idea of preserving the ship for the City.

The projects for the construction of a new aircraft carrier and the purchase of the French Foch, renamed Sao Paulo
The construction of a new aircraft carrier has for many years been a project that for the Brazilian navy has in practice been unattainable due to the high costs that a ship of this type demands. The replacement of the Minas Gerais began to be considered in the late 1970s, and it was in July 1981, when the Brazilian navy announced its plans for the construction of two small aircraft carriers, capable of operating V/STOL aircraft. and helicopters. However, this project was successively postponed in favor of submarine construction programs in its own shipyards and the modernization of the Niteroi class frigates.
However, the evident age of the Minas Gerais made it essential to find a replacement in the medium term, and a solution to this problem was achieved with the possibility of purchasing the French aircraft carrier Foch, whose retirement from service was scheduled for the beginning of 2000.
After talks began for its acquisition in mid-1999, in August of the following year, the French Ministry of Defense officially announced the sale of the Foch to Brazil, for a price of $42 million, including the cost of the general reconditioning works, which were carried out at the Toulon Naval Arsenal.
The Foch, renamed Sao Paulo, was officially incorporated on November 15, 2000, and after completing its enlistment and respective tests, it set sail from Brest on February 6, 2001, with a reduced complement of 600 men bound for Rio de Janeiro , where he arrived on the 17th of the same month. After her arrival and once her new crew was completed and prepared, she began training with her air group, which is made up of 15 AF-1 Skyhawk fighter-bombers, 6 SH-3D Sea King helicopters, 3 Aerospatiale UH-12 Aeschylo and 2 UH-14 Cougar.

The most important thing about the Sao Paulo is that it has no limitations to embark any type of naval combat aircraft existing on the market with the ability to be catapulted and land on an aircraft carrier. In comparison to small aircraft carriers such as the Spanish Príncipe de Asturias, the Italian Garibaldi, or the British Invincible class, whose decks have the Sky Jump at the bow, which limits them to operating only with Harrier aircraft and helicopters, the Sao Paulo, Even though it is almost 40 years old, it continues to be a superior ship due to its capabilities. She can permanently maintain a combat air patrol in the air for self-defense and the rest of the aircraft on attack missions beyond the range of her task group's weapons, achieving long-range naval power projection.
The presence of this aircraft carrier in the Brazilian navy, added to the varied and numerous composition of its fleet, gives Brazil a great deterrence capacity and undoubtedly gives it supremacy among the continent's navies.


EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE AN AIR CARRIER IN THE CHILEAN NAVY
The Chilean Navy, like most other navies on the continent, saw the beginnings of its naval aviation during the 1920s. Among the small number of aircraft acquired by the navy were six Short 184 seaplanes and two Sopwith Baby floatplanes. It was with one of the latter that the first aeronaval operations were carried out experimentally aboard the cruiser O'Higgins, and in the course of 1920, the battleship Almirante Latorre embarked one of them on several occasions to carry out aerial scouting in shooting exercises. Later, in the modernization carried out on the Latorre in Great Britain between 1929 and 1931, a catapult was installed on the poop deck, using a Fairey IIIF seaplane. The Latorre kept its catapult until shortly after World War II. Another of the Chilean ships to use seaplanes was the submarine mother ship Araucano built in Great Britain in 1929, which also carried a Fairey IIIF.
Meanwhile, the Chilean naval aviation had been installed in 1921 in the Las Torpederas cove near Valparaíso, in a first improvised base, and in March 1923 its existence as an integral part of the navy was made official. In 1925, the naval air base was relocated to Quintero, from where it continued its operations.
It is worth mentioning that since March 1930, naval aviation merged with army aviation, giving rise to the formation of the Chilean Air Force, with which all aircraft were in charge of that new weapon.
Despite no longer having naval aviation, years later some efforts arose to train naval officers to pilot aircraft. For example, in 1945 the Chilean navy sent 10 officers to the US to qualify as naval aviators, and these naval pilots became qualified, operating fighters and torpedo boats aboard the aircraft carrier USS Wright, with a view to a future renaissance of naval aviation. Due to the efforts of the navy itself, this would occur in 1953, when the Chilean government authorized its reestablishment, beginning its activities from the El Belloto airfield, in the commune of Quilpué, 20 kilometers from Valparaíso, its first aircraft being two Bell helicopters.
With its naval aviation back in existence, plans apparently soon emerged to equip the Chilean Squadron with an aircraft carrier. In fact, in October 1956, the newspapers La Estrella and El Mercurio of Valparaíso published news about the Chilean Navy's intentions to acquire an aircraft carrier from the United States, indicating that a commission chaired by Admiral Alfredo Natho was He was in Washington making arrangements to obtain the sale of a ship of that type. Apparently these efforts were unsuccessful as they did not obtain an affirmative response from the US government in this regard.
The next known effort by the Chilean navy to obtain an aircraft carrier occurred in 1966, when the need to acquire an aircraft carrier was presented to the Government. Apparently, the intention was to purchase HMS Centaur from Great Britain, which was in reserve as a result of the new government policy aimed at withdrawing aircraft carriers from service in the fleet.
However, the purchase of the aircraft carrier remained a mere purpose, because it did not have government approval. This decision caused the disagreement of some Chilean naval chiefs who pressed for the purchase to proceed, which in turn provoked, in response from the government, the retirement of Vice Admirals Newmann and Searle.

The last known attempt by the Chilean Navy to acquire an aircraft carrier occurred in the early 1980s, specifically during 1981, when the British Royal Navy offered for sale the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes with its complement of aircraft. V/STOL Harrier, which at that time was scheduled to be retired from service in 1983. However, this offer would be cut short by the Malvinas Conflict.
After the conflict, the Chilean Navy continued its interest in the Hermes, and this was evident when in an interview, Vice Admiral Mauricio Poisson, Chief of Staff of the Navy, declared: "I think that every sailor has in mind the idea of having a carrier-based task force. This statement was not a simple idea, since in August 1983, a Chilean delegation visited the ship, which made clear the interest in said ship. However, there was a big obstacle to achieving the objective, and it was monetary. Despite having a buoyant and growing economy, the acquisition of the aircraft carrier was expensive, not so much because of the ship itself, but because of the air group with which it had to be equipped. At that time, for the Chilean navy it was a higher priority to "renew" the units of its aging squadron than to provide it with an aircraft carrier.
Given the impossibility of acquiring the Hermes, the Chilean Navy definitively lost the opportunity when India purchased this aircraft carrier in April 1986 at a cost of 25 million dollars, plus its Sea Harriers air group for 60 million more.
In recent years, some Chilean analysts have once again raised the need for the Chilean navy to have an aircraft carrier-type ship. We believe that this is still a remote possibility, since ruling out the construction of a new unit due to the high costs involved, within the next ten years, none of the navies that currently have aircraft carriers will retire them from service; However, we should not rule out other possibilities such as the conversion of a merchant or auxiliary ship for the operation of aircraft.


EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE AN AIR CARRIER IN THE PERUVIAN NAVY
Despite having been one of the pioneers in South America, the Peruvian Naval Aviation, originally created in 1919, in its first period, had a short but fruitful period of life before merging with the army aviation to form the Peruvian Air Corps. and then what is the current Air Force. Until its new formation as a component of the naval forces in 1963, the only occasion in which naval aircraft were used on board a combat unit was during the Conflict with Colombia. This occurred in April 1933, when a Vought UO-5 seaplane piloted by First Lieutenant José San Martín was embarked aboard the cruiser Almirante Grau, to be used as an exploration aircraft.
After 1963, the Naval Aviation Service had a modest initial development, until its true takeoff began in the mid-1970s. During this time, the first known occasion of the possibility of acquiring aircraft carriers dates back to 1968, at a time when the Argentine Navy - which owned the aircraft carrier Independencia (formerly HMS Warrior) - acquired a second ship of the same type, the Dutch Karel Doorman, later renamed 25 de Mayo. The offer of Independence to Peru was made in September 1968 by the then Chief of the General Staff of the Argentine Navy, Vice Admiral Pedro Gnavi to Rear Admiral Manuel Fernadez Castro of the Peruvian Navy. In subsequent conversations led by Peru's Naval Attaché in Argentina, Captain Melitón Carvajal, the interest in offering it to Peru exclusively was learned.
This interesting offer was discussed in the Superior Navy Council in the session corresponding to the month of September of that year, and was rejected mainly because at that time, the strategic conception of the formation of the Peruvian naval forces did not consider a ship of that type. type, as well as the limitations it had to operate with modern aircraft, and the age of its equipment, whose change and modernization would require a high investment for which the navy was not prepared.

The efforts to acquire the British aircraft carrier Bulwark
In 1976, Navy International magazine, in its July edition, presented an extensive report about the South American navies. The interesting thing about that article turned out to be the news that Peru was holding talks with the British Ministry of Defense to purchase the aircraft carrier HMS Bulwark as a platform to operate Harrier vertical takeoff aircraft.
Indeed, following an announcement made by the British Ministry of Defense in August 1975, which indicated the withdrawal from service of some naval units as a result of a reduction in the defense budget, the Naval Commissioner of Peru in Europe and Naval Attaché in Great Britain, Rear Admiral Daniel Masías, learned that among the units considered for withdrawal was the aircraft carrier HMS Bulwark. This news was communicated to the General Staff of the Navy on August 18, and immediately afterwards, on the following September 9, that leadership ordered that the naval commissioner, Rear Admiral Masías, take steps to obtain information from the British Ministry of Defense about the possible withdrawal of the aircraft carrier from service, subsequently receiving orders to formalize the procedures for its acquisition. This was done through a letter of intent addressed to the British Ministry of Defense in the month of October and in response and in consideration of the Peruvian proposal, the Ministry of Defense, through a document dated December 16 of the same year, communicated that it gave priority to Peru in case the ship was removed from service and put up for sale.
Meanwhile, the British Navy had arranged for the Bulwark to be placed in reserve at the Portsmouth Naval Base, in charge of a crew in charge of its preservation and maintenance.
This was also known to Admiral Masías, who had continued conversations with the British naval authorities and the Ministry of Defense, meeting on January 13, 1976 with Admiral Sir Edward Ashmore, First Sea Lord, who told him that The Bulwark would be kept in reserve until the entry into service of the new aircraft carrier HMS Invincible, and that on the part of the British Government there was no impediment for the ship to later be sold to Peru. At this meeting, it was authorized for a delegation of Peruvian officers chaired by Admiral Masías to carry out an inspection visit to the ship.
The aforementioned visit took place on April 6, four days before the ship moved to its new location, with the delegation made up of Admiral Masías, ship captain Raúl Vargas Fuller and frigate captain Luis Giampietri Rojas. After having inspected the Bulwark, the aforementioned chief would present his report to the Chief of the General Staff of the Navy, in which after thoroughly detailing the condition of the ship, he concluded that "due to the magnificent operational and conservation state of said ship, No investment would be necessary for its use and employment by the Peruvian Navy, except in case superiority deems it appropriate, the change of the air center and early warning radars and electronic countermeasures because they are of a certain age and there are problems in obtaining spare parts."
The next communication to be sent was a report dated the following May 17, in which Admiral Masías informed the General Command of the status of the progress of the efforts, indicating that the Director of Sales of the Ministry of Defense, R.J. Harding had stated again, among other points, that Peru had the first priority and that it was the only country that to date has made efforts to acquire Bulwark.
On February 21, 1977, the British Embassy informed the staff that the Director of Sales of the British Ministry of Defense R. J. Harding, accompanied by Brigadier General P. Heindenstam, would visit Peru from March 2 to 7, wishing to visit the Chief of the General Staff General of the Navy and the Director General of Logistics to discuss, among other things, HMS Bulwark.
In January 1978, the navy received a visit from two other representatives of the British Ministry of Defense where interest in HMS Bulwark was again evident. However, it was known that British officials continued traveling to visit other South American countries, and it is estimated that on such occasions they offered the aforementioned unit for sale.
Within the naval acquisition plans of the time, the purchase of the Bulwark was considered necessary, first of all with the aim of enhancing the capacity to carry out amphibious operations, since the ship could transport 24 Sea King type helicopters, 1,200 Marines and all the necessary material to maintain them in beach combat, for 24 hours for a period of 10 days, and had a maximum speed of 28 knots.

On the other hand, a platform of this type would allow the exercise of sea control in specific areas considering its capacity to embark helicopters equipped with air-to-surface and anti-submarine missiles, as well as having all the communications systems necessary to function as a command ship. a task force, allowing tactical control of a large sea area to be exercised.
Bulwark's offer was attractive for several reasons. Knowing what the operational status of it was according to what was reported by the naval attaché in Great Britain, it was known that its commissioning would not require greater investment; On the other hand, the price, estimated at four million dollars, would allow us to obtain an aircraft carrier almost immediately, while if it were decided to build a new one - like the 18,000-ton aircraft carrier offered by the Yarrow shipyard - its cost would be much higher (about 42 million dollars) and it could only be available between 6 to 8 years after its construction began.
Despite the serious intentions of the Peruvian navy to purchase the Bulwark, which left everything progressed on a "zero page", it was the decision of the British authorities themselves. Indeed, in 1978, its largest aircraft carrier, the Ark Royal, would be definitively withdrawn from service, leaving the Hermes as the only aircraft carrier available. This, plus the delay in the completion of the construction of the VSTOL Invincible aircraft carrier, led to a reassessment of the situation of the Bulwark, whose reactivation and reincorporation as an anti-submarine helicopter carrier was soon decided.
This decision was announced by the British Secretary of Defense on January 25, 1978, and a week later, the British Defense Attaché in Peru communicated this news to the Peruvian naval authorities, indicating that the return of the Bulwark to service excluded the possibility of its sale to Peru for a long time.

Regarding the ship in March 1978, it began its reconditioning, entering service again in February 1979, operating as an anti-submarine aircraft carrier until it was definitively withdrawn from service at the beginning of 1981. Thus concluded the closest opportunity that our navy had to acquire a aircraft carrier.
After this frustrated episode, some studies on aircraft carriers would continue, but given the possibilities of obtaining a second-hand ship so scarce and those of building a new one so remote due to the high cost that it would require, the topic was definitively forgotten.


CONCLUSIONS
The international situation that led Great Britain to withdraw its aircraft carriers from service since the end of World War II and the 1980s was what allowed some European, Asian and South American nations to obtain aircraft carriers.
However, in current times it is practically impossible to acquire a second-hand ship of this class, the reason being that the few countries that own them simply have no plans to withdraw them from service. We must also consider that the cost to build an aircraft carrier and equip it with an air group is beyond any budget of the region's navies, so it is unlikely or perhaps impossible that any other South American navy could incorporate this type of ship into its fleet. its fleet in the medium term.
In the case of the Argentine Navy, although some publications have recently indicated a renewed interest in acquiring an aircraft carrier, there is no doubt that the drastic reductions in the defense budget that affect it will prevent for a long time the possibility of its sea fleet have a ship of this type again.
On the other hand, the withdrawal of May 25 has meant a notable decrease in the operational capacity of Argentine naval aviation and the projection of the naval power of its fleet. The Super Etendard and the S-2T Turbo Tracker have been deprived of a valuable platform that allowed them to increase their autonomy, currently having to operate from bases located on land.
Brazil, which during the last 20 years tried unsuccessfully to replace the Minas Gerais with a new aircraft carrier, with the purchase of the French Foch found a temporary solution that will allow it to continue using this type of ship for at least 10 more years before thinking about its replacement. .
As far as Chile is concerned, its aspirations to incorporate an aircraft carrier into its Squadron were limited in the past by economic factors (as in the case of the Hermes) and for the future, it must first achieve its ongoing projects for the replacement. of its ancient surface units before thinking about acquiring an aircraft carrier type ship.
In the case of Peru, after the unrealized projects to have an aircraft carrier in the 1970s, the strategic conception no longer considers this type of units, but does consider the use of rotary-wing aeronautical elements embarked on board frigates, with anti-surface and anti-submarine capabilities, as well as the use of land-based exploration and anti-submarine aircraft.

Bibliography
  • Arguindenguy, Pablo. Apuntes sobre los Buques de la Armada Argentina (1810-1970). Departamento de Estudios Navales, Bs.As., 1972. T. VI.Boniface, Patrick. "HMS Warrior" En: Warship World, ed. Noviembre 2000. pp. 18-19. 
  • Brown, David K. Nelson to Vanguard. Warship design and Development 1923-1945. U.S. Naval Institute Press. Annapolis, 2000.
  • Brown, David. The Royal Navy and the Falklands War. Leo Cooper. Londres, 1987.
  • Burns, Ken y Critchley, Mike. HMS Bulwark, 1948-1984. Maritime Books. Cornwall, 1986
  • Chesneau, Roger. Aircraft Carriers of the World, 1914 to the Present. Arms and armour Press. Londres, 1998.
  • Friedman, Norman. British Carrier Aviation. The Evolution of the Ships and their Aircraft. Conway Maritime Press. Londres, 1988
  • Gardiner, Robert (editor). Navies in the Nuclear age. Warships Since 1945 Conway's History of the Ship. Conway Maritime Press. Londres, 1995.
  • Huerta, Ismael. Volvería a ser Marino. Ed. Andrés Bello. Santiago, 1988. 2 Tomos.
  • Jane's Information Group. "Brazilian carrier operates Skyhawks" En: Jane's Defence Weekly. Ed. 4 oct. 2000. p. 3.
  • Layman, R.D. "Sparrows Among the Hawks: Shipboard Aviation of the Smaller Navies, 1919-1939. En: Warship International, N°2, 1984. pp.
  • Marina do Brasil. "Aeronaves AF-1 Skyhawk operam a partir do Minas Gerais". En: Nomar, ed. 5 febrero 2001, N° 706.
  • Preston, Antony. "South America's Navies". En: Navy International. ed. jul 1976. Vol. 81, N° 97. pp. 13-25.
  • Regelin, K. (editor). "Controversia acerca de los portaaviones británicos". En Revista Internacional de Defensa, N° 1970. pp. 208-
  • Scheina, Robert. "Latin American Navies". En Proceedings, marzo 1982. US Naval Institute Press. pp. .
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War Book (2003)

Wednesday, November 8, 2023

Military Rifle: Mauser M1889 (Belgium) / M1890 (Otoman Empire) / M1891 (Argentina)

Mauser M1889 (Belgium) / 
M1890 (Otoman Empire) / 
M1891 (Argentina) 


Mauser M1889 Belgium Rifle
  

Mauser M1889 Belgium Rifle
  

Mauser M1890 Turkish Rifle
  

Mauser M1891 Argentin Rifle
  

Mauser M1889 Belgium Cavalry Carbine
  

Mauser M1891 Argentine Carbine
  

Mauser M1889 Rifle, close up
  

Mauser M1889 rifle, diagram
  
Caliber: 7.65 x53
Total length:
1270mm/50"
Barrel length:
780mm/30.7"
Empty weight:
3.68 kg / 8.1 lbs
Magazine capacity:
5 shots
  
The Mauser Model 1889 rifle, also known as the Belgian Mauser, was the first rifle produced by the renowned German arms factory, Mauser Werke, designed for small-caliber smokeless powder ammunition. It was initially rejected by German authorities but was adopted by Belgium in 1889, Turkey in 1890, and Argentina in 1891. The rifles supplied to Belgium were manufactured in Belgium by the private factory Fabrique Nationale (abbreviated as FN, which was established specifically for producing these rifles) and by the state arms factory (Manufacture D'Armes De L'Etat, abbreviated as MAE).

During World War I, Belgian Mauser M1889 rifles were produced by the Belgian government in exile, manufactured by Hopkins & Allen in the United States and in Birmingham, UK, primarily by Belgian FN exiled labor. The Mausers sent to Turkey and Argentina of this model were produced in Germany. Turkish rifles were made by Mauser as a continuation of previous contracts, and Argentine rifles were initially produced by Ludwig Loewe and later by DWM. The standard Argentine Mauser rifles were also adopted by several other South American countries, such as Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.

In the 1930s, at least some of the Belgian Mauser M1889 rifles were converted into the short rifles Model 1889/36, which were intended for use by the civil guard.

  

Mauser 1891 Argentine carbine

Argentine soldiers with Mauser

The Mauser Model 1889 is a manually operated rifle with a rotating bolt action. Its bolt has two locking lugs at the front, with the extractor claw inserted in the bolt head and a fixed blade-type ejector in the receiver. The magazine box holds five rounds in a single stack and features spring-loaded feeding lips. The magazine can be loaded through the opening on top of the receiver using individual rounds or detachable 5-round clips. The magazine assembly is separate from the trigger guard and can be easily removed for maintenance or replacement. The magazine release is located within the trigger guard.

Similar to some contemporary rifles, the Belgian Mauser is equipped with a cylindrical barrel jacket. Argentine and Turkish Mausers of this type lacked barrel jackets and had wooden handguards. The stock is of conventional wooden type. A bayonet lug is provided near the muzzle. There were various carbine patterns based on the same basic design but with shorter barrels and barrel jackets. Belgian carbines had tubular barrel jackets, whereas Argentine carbines lacked barrel jackets and featured long wooden handguards that covered the entire barrel up to the muzzle. The modified Belgian model of short rifles, 1889/36, was also produced without a bayonet lug.








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