Malvinas: Landing in San Carlos

Combat at San Carlos (1982)

 
Camp of the 3rd British Parachute Battalion in Puerto San Carlos shortly after the landing

The San Carlos combat was a confrontation between the British landing forces and a small group of Argentine infantry soldiers, which occurred on May 21, 1982 during the Falklands War in the context of Operation Sutton. The scene of this combat was the western coast of Soledad Island, in the area of Puerto San Carlos, on the strait of the same name (Falkland Sound).

Background

The conflict in mid-May
Around mid-May in 1982, the intensity of military operations in the Malvinas archipelago had diminished. While diplomatic negotiations were ongoing, both sides were gearing up for the next phase of the campaign. The British aimed to land troops and remove the Argentine forces, yet they lacked information about when or where this operation would occur. The Argentine strategy focused on defending Puerto Argentino (Stanley), assuming it was the primary target of the British. Consequently, most of the Argentine ground forces were concentrated in that area.

Despite the British not rushing into action, they initiated the first combat actions using their aircraft carrier group, consisting of HMS "Hermes" and "Invincible" and their escort ships. Air strikes and naval bombardments began targeting Puerto Argentino on May 1. Meanwhile, British special forces like the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) conducted covert reconnaissance missions across the archipelago. Argentina had withdrawn its Sea Fleet to port following the sinking of the cruiser ARA General Belgrano, leaving only its aviation (Southern Air Force Command) capable of engaging the Royal Navy.

On May 18, 1982, the Amphibious Task Group, responsible for the landing operation under the codename "Operation Sutton," joined forces with the Aircraft Carrier Group. All available resources were dedicated to this critical phase of the campaign.

San Carlos, the scene


British landing on Soledad Island and subsequent fighting (May 21, 1982). 

The selected location was the western region of Soledad Island, situated along the San Carlos Strait near its northern tip. At this location, two waterways extended inland, offering shallow waters and soft beaches conducive to a landing operation. To the north of the water entrance lay San Carlos Port, and to the south was the San Carlos Establishment. These places were sparsely populated, with only a few houses, and Puerto San Carlos even had a school. To the northwest of Puerto San Carlos, on the Fanning Head peninsula, stood a small elevated landmass known as "Height 234." East of Establecimiento San Carlos, there were other elevated areas, while to the south lay the Sussex Heights, obstructing the road to Darwin.

The British selected this site after a thorough analysis and after discarding other options. In the first half of May, they dispatched special units to conduct reconnaissance in the area and reported the absence of defenders. However, despite the absence of a permanent Argentine garrison in San Carlos, their patrols discovered evidence of British incursions, prompting them to deploy a Combat Team to the Puerto San Carlos and Fanning Head region on May 15th. The British only became aware of the presence of these troops upon their own landing.

Conflicting plans

British landing plan
The choice of location, as already mentioned, was due to the consideration of several factors.

• The place was not defended (even though the British did not expect to find any Argentine soldiers there, there was no garrison capable of preventing a landing)
• The series of heights that surrounded the place offered the possibility of setting up a defense line and would prevent Argentine aviation from using the Exocet missiles. At the same time, the fighter-bombers would be forced to gain altitude before attacking, thus exposing themselves to anti-aircraft fire.
• Argentina's chances of rejecting the landing were complicated if it took place in San Carlos. This was very far from the main garrison in Puerto Argentino (80 kilometers), which would delay the intervention of a heliborne counterattack force. * Darwin's garrison was 35 kilometers away and if an advance against the beachhead was attempted, it could be stopped by naval fire from the Strait and by positions established on the Sussex heights.
• Complete control of the sea and air cover could protect the landing, while the large number of helicopters available could speed up the transfer of troops to land.
  

 

Argentine Defense Plan
Argentine planning for the defense of the Malvinas archipelago postulated as a basis the defense of a strong position in the island capital (Puerto Argentino Army Group), where the enemy landing was expected. As for the rest of the islands, garrisons of different strengths were installed, but it was impossible to keep the entire coastal perimeter of the Malvinas defended. The Argentine commanders anticipated several possible points for a British landing, but they could not cover them all. British control of the sea gave them the initiative, which is why they were granted the ability to feign diversionary maneuvers in one place and make the main effort in another.
The movement of troops by land to reject a landing carried out far from Puerto Argentino was ruled out for the following reasons:1 

• This movement would be detected by the English and they would suffer heavy losses due to their air and naval fire.
• There was no possibility that the Southern Air Force would achieve the air coverage necessary to execute said maneuver.
• The Malvinas soil did not allow the march of armor or the transport of artillery and heavy equipment. A soldier could only cover 2 kilometers per hour marching by day in such terrain, and one kilometer per hour marching at night.
• The time spent on the march would fatigue the troops, who would arrive tired, not to mention giving the enemy enough time to prepare their defenses.
• Carrying out a helicopter movement to the site was also considered very risky, given the British's dominance of the air.
• The number of helicopters available made it impossible to concentrate the force necessary for combat on the beachhead in a short time.

Due to these factors, the Argentine strategy involved continuous coastal monitoring. If an enemy landing was detected as the primary offensive, the aviation forces were assigned the crucial task of obstructing the establishment of a secure beachhead.

The region around Puerto San Carlos fell under the jurisdiction of the Litoral Army Group. They made the decision to dispatch portions of the Darwin garrison to this area with a specific mission: to "alert and prepare for a counterattack." 2

Conflicting forces


Argentine soldiers in an event, before the English landing. Lieutenant Esteban marches next to the flag bearer.

Argentine Forces
The Litoral Army Group defended the western part of Soledad Island and also Gran Malvina Island. Its main garrisons were Darwin, Howard and Bahía Fox. Precisely from the Darwin garrison, a group of soldiers belonging to the 12th and 25th Infantry Regiments were drawn. The troop was organized as follows:

• Equipo de Combate Güemes (Lieutenant Esteban): 42 strong (riflemen). Located at Puerto San Carlos. 
• Support Section (Second Lieutenant Reyes): 20 strong, 2 mortairs 81 mm y 2 105 mm recoilless guns. Located in Fanning Head (Height 234). 

British Forces
The British forces possessed a significantly larger contingent, which was commensurate with the scale of the operation. The 3rd Commando Brigade of the Royal Marines, bolstered by additional paratroopers from the British Army, had the primary objective of securing the beaches to facilitate the arrival of other units. The naval vessels were responsible for delivering artillery support, while the helicopter squadrons played a crucial role in the landing process. Simultaneously, the Sea Harrier fighters were deployed to provide aerial protection. All these components worked together in a coordinated effort for the operation.

• 3ª Commandos Brigade, Brigadier Julian Thompson 
• Comando 40 Royal Marines (Lieutenant colonel Hunt) 
• Comando 42º Royal Marines (Lieutenant colonel Vaux) 
• Comando 45º Royal Marines (Lieutenant colonel Whitehead) 

Additional Units Assigned

• 2 Para (Lieutenant colonel Jones) 
• 3 Para (Lieutenant colonel Pike) 
• Special Air Service 22 Regiment (Lieutenant colonel Rose) 
• 3ª Commando Brigade Air Squadron (Major Cameron) 

The order of battle arranged for the landing was as follows:

• Primera oleada: 2º Batallón de Paracaidistas y 40 Comando de Marines en San Carlos (Playa Azul).El 2º de Paracaidistas debía ocupar las montañas Sussex, al sur, para bloquear un eventual avance argentino desde Darwin. 
• Segunda oleada: 45º Comando de Marines en Ajax Bay (Playa Roja) y 3º Batallón de Paracaidistas en Puerto San Carlos (Playa Verde) 
• Reserva: 42º Comando de Marines (a bordo del buque Canberra) 

Landing Preparations

The Fanning Head Engagement
On Thursday night the British Amphibious Group entered the San Carlos Strait to begin the landing operation.
The first action was against the Argentine faction under the command of Second Lieutenant Reyes, located in Fanning Head.
At dawn (2:30) an Argentine patrol sent heard noises and voices from the Strait to the beach, perceiving at the same time the silhouette of the English ships. The Argentines then launched flares and fired their heavy weapons against the canal area, although without being able to appreciate the results due to darkness. The English ships opened fire, guided by the glare of the Argentine guns firing. This exchange of fire lasts several hours.
SBS men were sent in helicopters from the destroyer HMS Antrim. These forces landed east of Fanning Head, cutting off this Argentine faction from their comrades at Puerto San Carlos. Immediately afterwards (around 5:00) infantry combat began. In the following fight the British declared that they had killed several Argentines and captured others; while the Argentine report of the action denies fatal casualties although it confirms the loss of several men who were captured; It also says that three seriously wounded people were left behind with a non-commissioned medical officer, being treated and saved by the British.
However, the majority of the Argentine soldiers, led by Reyes, managed to break the British encirclement and retreat, although they did not join Lieutenant Esteban's faction. It is not clear where this force was located, but the Argentine version says that the Reyes Support Section remained there without being discovered throughout May 21.
The capture of Fanning Head assured the British possession of a sensitive area to cover the northern flank of the landing. While the Fanning Head fight was happening, the horrible Team Güemes remained in their positions.





Secondary Actions
The British report reports a blocking action carried out by Squadron D of the Special Air Service (SAS) in the Darwin-Goose Green area, to prevent the Argentine troops located there from moving north to repel the landing. . This blocking action was supported by naval fire from the frigate HMS “Ardent” from the waters of the Strait.
On the other hand, Royal Air Force Harrier planes carried out attacks at various points: an English fighter was shot down over Howard, while other planes managed to destroy three Argentine helicopters in the Monte Kent area, 20 kilometers from Puerto Argentino. This last coup pursued the objective of denying aeromobility to the Argentines to prevent them from transferring counterattack forces to San Carlos.

Landing
The first wave of landings reached the beach without opposition in the early morning hours. The frigate HMS Plymouth provided close cover, and four Scimitar and Scorpion light tanks reached the beach in the first wave, to provide firepower. It was the first British landing in war since the Suez Crisis in 1956.
Fulfilling the planned plan, the 2nd Battalion occupied the Sussex Heights, while the 40th Commando did the same with the Green Mountains. The southern flank, facing Darwin's Argentine position, was secured. The barges then returned to the canal to pick up and transport the second wave.
Meanwhile, the Güemes Combat Team observed the English movement in the canal. Communications with the Support Section had been cut during the early morning, but the Argentines in Puerto San Carlos could hear the noise of the combat taking place at Fanning Head. Lieutenant Esteban transmitted the information about the situation to his immediate boss in Darwin, who relayed it to Puerto Argentino.
At dawn the barges with the second wave of landings were arriving at the beach in the assigned sectors. The 45th Command took positions in a refrigerator in Ajax Bay (western sector of the landing) and the 3rd Parachute Battalion landed near Puerto San Carlos, in the vicinity of the main Argentine position.

San Carlos Frays

Argentine Perspective

By then the Argentines had occupied new positions to the east of Puerto San Carlos, from where they opened fire on the paratroopers. The San Carlos combat then took place, when the soldiers of the Güemes Team damaged a “Sea King”3 helicopter with the fire of their portable weapons (7.62 mm FAL assault rifles), which withdrew smoking from the area. The combat continued and a second helicopter arrived to attack the Argentine position with rockets, but was shot down with the same rifle fire by the defenders. The machine fell into the water in the canal, but then a third helicopter opened fire on Esteban's troop and they, with the same tactic, shot him down. The device fell to the ground and the Argentines verified that the three crew members had died. A fourth helicopter was damaged by rifle fire and managed to withdraw. According to Esteban, this combat lasted an hour, while the disembarked enemy fired mortar fire uninterruptedly. Furthermore, he verified that the Falkland Islands civilians, through signs, indicated to the English soldiers the position of the Argentine forces.



British Perspective
When the other beachheads had already been established, the amphibious ships entered the San Carlos channel and disembarked the 3rd Parachute Battalion. But the rush to establish anti-aircraft defenses led the English to move along the beach head without it being definitively secured. In such circumstances, a Sea King helicopter was maneuvering east of Puerto San Carlos without realizing that the vanguard elements of the 3rd Parachute Battalion were still west of the position. Under these circumstances he was hit by Argentine fire but was able to escape, but his escort, a Gazelle helicopter from the 3rd Commando Brigade, was shot down and fell into the water, killing one crew member. A few minutes later another Gazelle was hit and fell to the ground, killing its two crew members.



The British version does not mention infantry combat in the positions east of Puerto San Carlos and suggests that the helicopters were not intended to attack the Argentine troops, but rather fell into enemy fire due to carelessness and had to open fire to defend themselves. He also says that the helicopters hit by the Argentines were three and not four, although he agrees that two of them were destroyed.

To Dawn

The Landing Continous

The English landed the reserve (42nd Command) in Puerto San Carlos to reinforce the 3rd Battalion. Meanwhile, the other light tanks and field artillery were disembarked, along with the anti-aircraft defenses.
The two Argentine factions remained in their positions, without their presence being able to prevent the British landing. Esteban's report mentions continuous naval and mortar fire on his position, but the basic objective of his mission was accomplished, since he had raised the alarm about the enemy's landing operation.
As a result of this alarm, the Argentines sent an Aermacchi MB-339 fighter plane from Puerto Argentino on a reconnaissance mission, which (around 10:00) confirmed the magnitude of the British landing and carried out a daring attack against the frigate “HMS Argonaut”. which caused some damage. The Argentine pilot, Lieutenant Crippa, was decorated for this reconnaissance and attack mission.
Once the information about the landing was confirmed by Crippa, the Argentine aviation launched all its available potential against the beach head, but this is part of what is known as the Battle of the Strait of San Carlos.
Meanwhile, the landing perimeter had its first victory by shooting down an Argentine Pucará attack plane. This had been sent from Darwin and was shot down by SAS D Squadron over the Sussex Mountains in the morning.


Situation at the end of the day (May 21, 1982)

Consolidation

The two Argentine factions, cut off from each other, remained in the area until the hours of darkness, when it would be easier for them to break contact with the enemy. Esteban's men left Puerto San Carlos marching through Cerro Bombilla and arrived at Douglas Paddock on May 24. There they managed to reestablish communication with Puerto Argentino, from where helicopters were sent to pick them up. They were then sent back into combat at Darwin-Goose Green, where they were taken prisoner when the garrison capitulated.
As for the Support Section, a group of 11 soldiers managed to evade the British encirclement, while the rest were captured. Those who managed to leave the area marched through the northern part of Soledad Island, avoiding British airmobile patrols and also contact with the islanders. On June 14, this faction, under the command of Reyes, learned the news of the Argentine capitulation in the archipelago and came out into the open, surrendering to the British.
Thompson ordered the general landing to continue at a sustained pace, and a field hospital was established and the Rapier anti-aircraft missile batteries were deployed. The landing continued even after the Argentine air attacks began, and the English marines and paratroopers did not stop patrolling and reinforcing their perimeter. At the end of the day some 3,000 English soldiers were already on the ground.

 

Aftermath

The British forces commanded by Brigadier Thompson managed to establish a firm beachhead to prevent Argentine ground counterattacks, but these did not occur. The Argentine strategy of rejecting the landing with aviation transferred the fight to the air-naval level, allowing the English troops to be permanently reinforced.
The San Carlos combat was small in magnitude and significance. The Argentines had no means to defend the beach or prevent the landing, but instead presented a determined but formal resistance, in accordance with their main mission, which was to raise the alarm if an enemy landing occurred. The casualties caused to the British meant an extra moral victory, but did not affect the landing operation; However, the combat that occurred showed the English that the defenders could be tenacious, and convinced them of the need to reinforce the perimeter because an Argentine ground operation was not ruled out. The British decided not to underestimate the enemy.
The English landing in San Carlos was carried out with great precision and organization, even when combat was ongoing east of Puerto San Carlos and also when the air attacks began. The losses of helicopters during this action affected their mobility to a certain extent, but overall the casualties suffered in combat were not significant.
The British beachhead at San Carlos was consolidated and on May 26 the 2nd Parachute Battalion began the breakout to the south, leading against the Argentine garrison of Darwin-Goose Green. From there San Carlos stopped being a beachhead.

Notes 

1. These considerations were presented by the head of the Puerto Argentino Group, General Oscar Jofre, in his book “Malvinas, the defense of Puerto Argentino”, Editorial Sudamericana 1987
2. Cited in Kasanzew's book "Mavinas a Blood and Fire" (see bibliography).
3. In a combat situation it was normal for soldiers to confuse aircraft. On the other hand, Argentine troops had become accustomed to identifying all British helicopters with the Sea King and Sea Lynx models.

References

• Gambini, Hugo: Crónica Documental de las Malvinas, (incluye muchos documentos sobre la visión inglesa del conflicto). Editorial Redacción, Buenos Aires 1982. 
• Kasanzew, Nicolás: Malvinas a Sangre y Fuego. Editorial Abril, Buenos Aires 1982. 
• Jofre, Oscar: La defensa de Puerto Argentino (cita fuentes británicas en el relato de las acciones). Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires 1987. 
• Burden, Royden et al: Malvinas, la guerra aérea (edición argentina). Ediciones Open, Buenos Aires 1989. 

Wikipedia.es

Bell 47 D “Sioux” in the Argentine Navy

Bell 47 D “Sioux” 0289 / 2-HE-3

 
Two-seat transport and training helicopter

Dimensions
Length x rotor diameter x height: 8.33 x 10.72 x 2.89 meters.

Weight: 
Basic: 651 kg 
Maximum at take off 1067 kg. 

Performance: 
Max Speed: 159 km/h. 
Range: 360 km. 

Powerplant: 
One FRANKLIN 6V4-200-C32AB 200 SHP motor, main rotor with 2 blades. 

Avionics: 
AN/ARC 48 UHF 

Abstract: 
9 examples were acquired starting in 1949, which constituted the first helicopters of Naval Aviation. They operated until 1969 when they were transferred to the Argentine Naval Prefecture.


 

The museum specimen was incorporated in 1951 as 0289/1-HE-6, then 0289/2-HO-3 and finally 2-HE-3.
In service until 1965.
Delivered to MUAN on July 26, 1995.
Restored, with the missing original plexiglass dome, which could not be obtained. It remains on display in the Technology Hangar.

MUAN

"Tridente I" Combined Special Forces Exercise in 2012

Joint Drill of Army and Navy Special Forces

13-4-2012 | It was called Tridente I, it included tactical divers and special forces personnel from the Army's 601st Company, it lasted for a week of training in Mar del Plata and concluded with an amphibious exercise.
 

Mar del Plata - During the month of March, the joint exercise Tridente I was carried out, which included groups of tactical divers from the Argentine Navy and special forces from the 601st Commando Company of the Argentine Army.



The aforementioned training – which included theoretical-practical classes on combat health, shooting and nautical cartography, among others – took place at the facilities of the Mar del Plata Naval Base and concluded with an amphibious exercise in the waters of the South Atlantic.





Ending the exercise
The amphibious day of the Tridente I exercise began with the departure of the ARA submarine “Santa Cruz” from its natural base at the Mar del Plata Naval Base, followed by the ARA patrol boat “Punta Mogotes” and the support vessel ARA “Sobral”, both dependent on the Maritime Patrol Division.



The hypothesis that articulated the exercise proposed the formation of a joint peace force under the orders of the United Nations that had to act under Chapter 7 in order to recover a unit taken over by a hostile group from a country in crisis.



To do this, the joint special forces were divided into two groups: the first boarded the submarine with the mission of recovering the support vessel, where the second group was in a hostile role.



Already several miles out to sea, the exercise began, which included the assembly of two Zodiac boats on the back of the submarine, while “Punta Mogotes” remained immediate to provide support in case of contingency.




Then the boarding and recovery of the support vessel was carried out, which concluded with the reduction of the hostile group. At the end of the day, the special forces groups aboard the units returned to port.




“This was the closing of an intense training with our Army counterparts, with whom we have already worked on other occasions. We deployed as a single force, achieving all the proposed objectives,” said the Chief of Operations of the Tactical Divers Group, Lieutenant Raúl Closter.



For his part, and led by Major Gustavo Oliver, Sergeant Julián René Espinoza expressed that “this is the second time that I have participated in an exercise with tactical divers but the first time to sail in a submarine. A very different experience that included assembling a boat on that type of unit. And although the boarding of the ship had not been done before either, the procedures and techniques are similar to others that we practice on land, only the spaces are more confined.”



“I had to be a shooter and my objective along with two others was to recover the ship's machines. In this task, everything is experienced as something real, because you do not know how the personnel designated as hostile are going to act, you have to take care of yourself in every opening or opening because you do not know how they are going to defend themselves," said Julián, while concluding that “The procedures with tactical divers are very similar, especially for those of us who did training with the Halcón group of the Federal Police.”




Marine Maneuvers
In the case of the “Sobral” crew, the amphibious exercise was an opportunity to continue their annual training. As explained by its commander, Lieutenant Commander Juan Ángel Días Ballve, “we were able to exercise ourselves in basic techniques, maneuvers with boats, anchoring, coastal navigation, communications, things that the warning must do while participating in any type of operation, whether military or not. "We were able to contribute as a simulated unit under hostile capture and the amphibian helped us train in a lot of maneuvers that we can only do if we go out to sea."


Notice the first operator from the left using a Steyr MPi 69, a submachine used by the Tactical Divers Unit of the Argentine Navy. The first photo of this report shows an operator using FN P90 in 5.56mm, the replacement of the Steyr MPi 69.




Finally, summarizing the performance of his personnel, he said that “they have performed very well, it is the beginning of the year and there are many things to adjust but it is part of the training. What always stands out is that when people go out to sea they show great good will and that is part of achieving success in training.”














Gaceta Marinera

Triple Alliance War: Battle of Yatay

Battle of Yatay

Battle of Yatay - August, 17th 1865

The War of Paraguay can be divided into five campaigns: that of Matto Grosso, that of Uruguay, that of Humaitá, that of Pikysyry and that of the Cordilleras. In Matto Grosso's campaign, the Paraguayans took over the fortresses of Coimbra, Alburquerque, Corumbá, Miranda and Dorados. The second had as its objective Uruguay, where two columns of the Paraguayan army headed, through Corrientes and Río Grande, to expel the Brazilians and maintain the sovereignty of that country. The objective of the third - for the allies - was the capture of the stronghold that was the center of the Paraguayan resistance. The fourth is called that because it was developed on the fortified line of the Pikysyry stream, the second center of the resistance in Paraguay. The fifth was the one that took place after the battle of Lomas Valentinas, on the other side of the Cordilleras, to Cerro Corá.

At the beginning of the second campaign, Solano López left the capital to go and lead his armies. He thus left the Assumption forever. He would never enter her again, not allowing her the hazards of a war to the death or even contemplating her from a distance again.

In reality, at that moment - June 8, 1865 - his agony began, which was that of his country, as he was condemned to a cruel and irremediable death. Before leaving, he addressed a proclamation to the people, in which he implied that he was determined to abandon “the bosom of the Homeland,” to join “his comrades-in-arms in the campaign.”

But he arrived in Humaitá and changed his mind, under the influence of insinuating courtiers, such as Bishop Palacios, who ended up convincing him that this useless sacrifice should not be imposed, having at his side so many capable men who could very well replace him... He therefore installed , there his headquarters, establishing active telegraphic communication with the city of Corrientes, where José Berges exercised his representation.

General Wenceslao Robles had, meanwhile, gathered 30,000 men from all three arms and was in a position to march, without any difficulty, overcoming the small obstacles that he found in his path. At that time the general camp of the allies in Concordia had not yet been established, nor did they have troops capable of counteracting the action of Paraguay. No Paraguayan doubted the success of the enterprise entrusted to Robles, an experienced military man, who had given so much evidence of his brilliant organizational skills. But events soon dashed such optimistic hopes.

At the head of that powerful column, Robles felt inferior to his task, unable to act with the resolution and expertise that circumstances imposed on him. He wasted his time with futile pretexts, advancing extremely slowly, distracted by small, unimportant guerrillas. Thus he lost the unique opportunity given to him, giving all the advantages to the opponents. Finally, he entered into deals with the allies, paying with his life for the serious errors committed.

He was replaced by General Francisco Isidoro Resquín, who made his army countermarch, returning with him to Paraguayan territory. The failure of the Robles expedition determined the failure of the Estigarribia expedition. He, leading 12,000 men, invaded the State of Río Grande del Sud, following the line of Uruguay, to meet the other expeditionary column on the border of the Eastern Republic.

The timely arrival of Robles must have prevented the formation of the allied army that went out to defeat him, allowing him to easily subdue the Brazilians. But it didn't happen like that. Robles never reached the eastern border, not passing beyond the limits of Corrientes. Thanks to this, Miter was able to organize the army until he was in a position to defeat the Paraguayans.



Estigarribia really had to back down when he saw that the agreed plan had failed. But he was pushed forward by the numerous eastern leaders who accompanied him, who assured him that, upon reaching the border of his country, he would have the frank support of all Uruguayan compatriots.

Entering Uruguayana was for him entering a mousetrap. He was soon there surrounded by the already powerful allied army, having to succumb, defeated by hunger and death. A part of his army, which was marching along the right bank of the Uruguay River, under the command of Major Pedro Duarte, also succumbed, crushed by much superior forces.

In fact, on August 17, 1865, 3,500 Paraguayans, cavalry and infantry, fought battle, with 11,000 allies of the three arms, under the command of General Venancio Flores.

Despite his overwhelming enemy superiority, Estigarribia ironically rejected the proposal to surrender to the “liberators of his homeland.” “If VV.EE. (he said to the allied leaders) they are so zealous to give freedom to the Paraguayan people, why don't they start by giving freedom to the unhappy blacks of Brazil, who make up the majority of the population, and groan in the harshest and most frightening captivity to enrich and be idle for some of the hundreds of grandees of the Empire?”

After the defeat of the Paraguayans, Flores declared: “The Paraguayans are worse than savages in fighting, they prefer to die rather than surrender…”

Most of the prisoners were put to the sword (it is estimated that there were around 1,400) and the surviving soldiers were enlisted in the battalions of the allied army, thus forcing them to go against their homeland. Flores said: “The eastern battalions have suffered a great loss in Yatay, and I am determined to replace them with the Paraguayan prisoners, giving a part to General Paunero to increase his battalions, some of which are small.” Meanwhile, Argentine Vice President Dr. Marcos Paz adds: “General Flores has adopted a system of incorporating all prisoners into his ranks, and after reloading his battalion with them he has organized a new one of 500 places with pure Paraguayans.” .

The great oriental publicist, Carlos María Ramírez, protested in 1868 against the systematic repetition of the same event: “The prisoners of war,” he said, “have been distributed among the line corps and, under the flag and in the uniform of the allies, compelled to to turn their weapons against the defenders of their homeland. Never has the 19th century witnessed a greater outrage to the rights of nations, to humanity, to civilization!

In the Fifth Section, the Ombucito farm, there is a monolith that evokes the Battle of Yatay. This site was declared a Historic Site on February 4, 1942, by Law 12665, as stated in “Monuments and Historic Places” by Hernán Gómez. There a stream meanders, through bushes and grasslands, which empties into the Uruguay River. This landscape is adorned with elegant Yatay palm trees (Yatay means Palm Tree in Guaraní). They gave their name to the stream and the place. The toponym gave the name to the battle.

Source

Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado
O’Leary, Juan E. – El Mariscal Solano López – Asunción (1970).
Portal www.revisionistas.com.ar
Rosa, José María – La Guerra del Paraguay y las Montoneras Argentinas – Buenos Aires (1985).
Turone, Gabriel O. – La Batalla de Yatay – (2007)

Source: www.revisionistas.com.ar

Malvinas: The First Air Combat of the AAF 6th Fighter Group

First Duel of the G6C

By Federico Funes

May, the 1st
On Saturday, May 1, the weather report indicated rain and low ceilings at the Southern Air Force (FAS) deployment airfields in Patagonia, which would make the operation of our aviation difficult. However, there would be no alternative since Great Britain had kicked off in the early hours of the morning, with the start of Operation Black Buck.
The Chief of the RAF Strategic Air Command, Marshall Bentham, had implemented this operation, in which two Vulcan bombers from 44 Squadron (registrations XM 598 and XM 607) took off from Wideawake Airport, Ascension Island. After a long navigation including several resupply stations, they arrived at Puerto Argentino at 04:40, dropping twenty-one thousand-pound bombs on the Malvinas BAM. The result of the attack was ambiguous, but it made clear what the British position would be in the conflict, reaffirming the determination they had expressed just a few days before with the capture of Georgia. Reconquer control of the islands quickly and definitively.
The FAS Command, upon receiving the report of the attack, appreciated that there would be new air raids on ground targets in the Malvinas, tending to reduce the detection and response capacity (radars, anti-aircraft artillery, airfields, etc.) in preparation for a amphibious assault in the vicinity of the main strategic objective of the islands, Puerto Argentino.
The presence of the Task Force was also known, which included two aircraft carriers along with a group of escort destroyers, as well as a number of transport and amphibious assault ships. The position of this force had been constantly monitored through distant aeromaritime reconnaissance and exploration sorties, carried out by Air Force Boeing 707s. It was known that they were close to the archipelago and that they would have a leading role in the actions of the day to come. However, it was to be expected that these ships, and in particular the aircraft carriers, would be located far enough to the east to be outside the range of action of the Argentine attack aviation based on the continent. Based on this analysis, it was decided to launch interceptor fighter sorties, with the intention of gaining local air superiority and frustrating the actions of the British embarked aviation.

This was the strategic framework in which the crews and technical personnel operated on May 1st. At the Río Gallegos, Río Grande and San Julián airfields, the interceptor squadrons were in different degrees of readiness waiting for the departure order.
Thus the pilots endured the "taming" inside the cockpits of the Dagger and M-III, mitigating the prolonged early warning shifts based on reading comic magazines, which were thrown outside when the start-up was requested. Just the night before, April 30, the men of Hunting Group 6 had been celebrating the birthdays of the members of the Squadron deployed in San Julián. On that occasion they began to receive signs of what was coming in the coming days and the excitement and celebration turned to uncertainty and nervousness.

Now everything would change, night still reigned in the south and a compact, dark layer of clouds covered the sky with its mantle just ninety meters from the ground; The occasional drizzle and fog reduced the already poor visibility, enveloping everything in a gloomy and ghostly halo.
At five thirty in the morning, two pilots woke up to the reality of a task to complete. On the night of the 30th, Captain Moreno and Lieutenant Volponi had been instructed to carry out a hunting cover mission for a Naval Aviation Neptune, which would go out to try to locate the Task Force. They were to take off from Rio Grande at 06:30, still at night and forty minutes after the ASW Neptune took off, and then meet up with it near the islands.
When they arrived at the pilot's room they found the disturbing news: Malvinas was being attacked, the Navy plane was not leaving and they had to remain on alert because a departure order could arrive at any moment. A saturated and nervous, but at the same time controlled and professional, atmosphere enveloped everyone present, they waited for their turn to hit back, the day took a while to become present, increasing impatience.



07:30 hours. The first fragmentary order arrives; Takeoff at 07:45; The mission: air coverage over the islands. From that time on, and despite the bad weather, the FAS launched 21 more interception sorties; Mirage III, Dagger and even with Skyhawk A-4C.

Two Daggers rolled slowly to the head and stood at the threshold; from the control tower they were barely perceptible to the keeper's eyes due to the faint reddish flickering of the position lighthouse; the drizzle continued. Both machines were configured on the edge of the maximum takeoff weight, three additional tanks, two Shafrir air-to-air missiles and a full load of ammunition for the 30-millimeter DEFA guns. In the cabins the "Talo" and the "Volpi", enclosed under the domes, thus isolated from the icy wind outside, immersed in the dim light radiated by the dashboard indicators, prepared for takeoff. In front, the low intensity lights marked the path towards the sky on both sides.

Check the clock, 07:44. After the last checks of the procedural checklist, the turbines accelerated with their characteristic increasing howl, the number 1 leaned forward due to the thrust contained by the brakes, releasing them began the takeoff run; The bluish jet in the nozzle resulting from afterburner was the indication that number 2 had to confirm the takeoff, then the hoarse voice, deformed by the oxygen mask, indicated - "The one in the air."
"Red! Amber! Tachymeter pendulum!" - He mentally reviewed the afterburner ignition control procedure. Number two ran along the track until he felt that the commando responded docilely by releasing the wheels to the ground, just two hundred meters before the end of the track. "Two in the air" and like one the blue flare of the nozzle was immediately engulfed by the clouds and lost sight of, although the roar persisted floating in the wind for a few more seconds, it was 07:45.
Ascending to the pre-established cruise level, piercing the cloud layer, as they emerged dragging the shreds of cloud in the trails, they emerged into a beautiful, starry sky at 22,000 feet above sea level.



Forty minutes later they contacted the controller of the CIC (Information and Control Center) Malvinas, when they were about fifty miles from Puerto Argentino. The operator informed them that at that precise moment they were attacking the airport and that a Harrier engulfed in flames was falling near the port. A nervous smile escaped under the oxygen masks of both pilots who in unison shouted: Long live the Homeland!



The hubbub was instantly stopped when the controller confirmed they had "two chicks" that were 120 miles away (two Sea Harriers from HMS Invincible manned by LtCdr RN Robin Kent and Lt Brian Haigh). Moreno ordered Volponi, who was forming to his left 500 meters away, to maintain heading 020° -at full dry gas- (full power without post combustion).

Locked in the small trailer covered with peat and masking nets, the controller was a spectator of the unfolding drama, on the screen he could see them, two echoes, just two points marked momentarily by the sweep of the antenna, on the other side of the quadrant the "Bulls" fulfilling the instructions to the letter.

Minutes later the controller's voice declared -030°, the chicks are 30 miles away from each other- and when Moreno asked what this meant and the dizzying nature of the situation, the controller hurried to answer in pure Creole -De face kid, they are facing-
Nerves, if these Sea Harriers already have the Sidewinder 9L they can shoot them head on, and they can't shoot the Shafrir; Moreno asked the controller to guide him to get on his side so he could look for their tail.
-Now you have them at 9 miles, straight ahead and one mile on the right side! - Moreno ordered the wing tanks to be ejected, conserving only the ventral one, which still had "juice" left; The controller would ask them for fuel at regular intervals, as the minutes available before the point of no return would be few and they feared they would forget to check.
Close to the crossing with the Sea Harriers, they ejected the ventral tanks and turned, applying afterburner; The Daggers were at 22,000 feet and the Sea Harriers were 4,000 feet below.
At 08:20 a.m. they began to move in circles seeking eye contact, two pairs of eyes scanning the sky with growing anxiety, while asking the controller for confirmation.
-The four of them were in circles together but I can't tell them apart- They were close, very close; Volponi saw a missile that passed between both planes.
The game of cat and mouse continued like this, for approximately two minutes that to the racing minds of the pilots seemed like an eternity. During that time they were in an advantageous position for a few seconds but without being able to see them, then they had them behind them; The Sea Harriers changed attitude and position with incredible rapidity.
When they reached the minimum fuel (2450 liters) Captain Moreno ordered to always ascend with post-combustion and begin the return; The controller confirmed that the Sea Harriers were also moving away.
They were 5 miles from Puerto Argentino, so they immediately began to calculate the consumption for the return, fortunately there was no headwind so they would arrive, although with a tight margin.
Once in contact with the continent's radar, it confirmed that the weather was still marginal, with a ceiling of one hundred meters and visibility reduced to 2 kilometers, but by making an ILS approach they could land without further risk.
The radar guided them into the localizer beam and the Daggers entered the glide slope, with 5 miles separating them.
09:45 a.m. Landing at AFB Río Grande without incident.

The second section of Dagger that took off was the one composed of Captain Mir Gonzalez and Lieutenant Bernhardt (who would be shot down over the islands on May 24), with the callsign "Cyclone". Like the previous outing, they linked up with the CIC Malvinas, which guided them to the target, a section of Harriers that were converging towards them and when they made contact with the Daggers, they began a downward spiral maneuver to fight at a low level and inciting the Daggers. to follow them, then, placing the nozzles at a negative angle, they braked abruptly so that the pursuers would pass them, the roles would be reversed and they would become the pursued.
The section, upon noticing the maneuver, threatened to follow them but rose again, this was enough for the Harriers to make the break, refusing to fight at altitude.
Upon reaching the limit of autonomy, the Ciclón returned without incident.



The third section was made up of Major Martínez and First Lieutenant Luna, callsign "Limón". Also under the guidance of the Malvinas radar, they made three crossings with the Harriers; they remained low while the Daggers stalked high up. This occasion allows us to speculate that perhaps at first not all Harriers had the AIM-9L Sidewinder, since as seen they refused to fight, or as was seen in the case of the Toro section, they missed a missile.

The fourth hunting trip belonged to the "Fierro" section, led by Captain Raúl A. Díaz, Squadron Operations Officer who, as such, had placed himself first on the list of available crews. When he was at the headland ready for takeoff, his flight aborted due to failures in his device. A single Fierro rose to fulfill his duty.
In the book The Air Battle of Our Malvinas Islands by Commodore F.P. Matassi, Captain Díaz relates:

"Near the islands I made contact with the Information and Control Center (CIC) of Puerto Argentino, who directed me to a raider 60 nautical miles east of the islands."

"I armed the missile and gun panel, turned to the ordered intercept course (090 Degrees) and automatically followed the CIC indications. It informed me that the raider was about 6,000 feet below; the radar controller was still indicating the course of interception and distance... We were approaching head on. When a distance of 12 miles separated us, the raider descended sharply enough for our radar to completely miss it."

"This encouraged me to think that the opponent did not want to engage in aerial combat."

"The operator had me set a course west to return over the islands, from which he was taking me a few miles to the east."

"There was a layer of clouds that made it difficult to see enemy ships. At one point the controller reported that I was flying over a naval echo that could be a missile frigate, suggesting that I be extremely vigilant in the face of the possibility of being attacked with missiles. surface-air; that did not happen."

"When I was again over the islands which I could see through a hole in the clouds (I saw the San Carlos Channel and the Darwin area) the operator informed me of an air attack that the enemy was carrying out - with the Sea Harriers. - about Puerto Argentino."

"I asked him if he was directing me there, and he responded negatively because the raiders were within the sector of our anti-aircraft defense."

"Then he alerted me to the presence of an echo that was heading towards me, from the Southeast at high speed and gaining height. It was detected when it was 18 miles away, I turned towards the South to adopt a collision course and maintained a altitude of 26,000 feet, accelerating to 450 knots, I dedicated myself to observing the instruments for the last time before the crossing and with apprehension I discovered that I had no more than 5 minutes of fuel left to reach the minimum level required for the long return."

"When they separated us (with the raiders) by about 8 miles and being about 3,000 feet higher than him, he decided to abandon the entry into combat, probably because he did not have an advantageous position; the truth is that he descended quickly until our radar lost its echo."

"I made an effort to try to visualize it, without losing my advantageous height, but I couldn't. At this point I heard the controller's voice asking me how much longer I could stay over the islands, answering that the time had come to return due to lack of fuel. "

"He wished me good luck and gave me the direction home; I ascended to the optimal level for the return and conceived, during the long return, this mistaken idea: the English avoid aerial combat."

"A few days later I would suffer the experience of being shot down, along with my entire squadron, by two Sea Harrier planes, when I was about to attack the Puerto San Carlos beachhead."

The Rubio section, composed of Captain Rhode and First Lieutenant Ardiles, was to take off from Río Grande on a patrol mission over the islands; The section chief could not do so due to failures in his aircraft, and since there was no reserve plane, he had to stay on the ground, watching as the wake of the "Pepe" Ardiles' nozzle was lost in the clouds.
Alone, across 700 kilometers of raging South Atlantic, perhaps to go into combat, perhaps to be damaged or suffer the imponderable of a failure, alone.
At 4:30 p.m. he was arriving at the archipelago, when he sighted two ships in the Choiseul Sound that were entering it to approach Goose Green, the location of the AFB Cóndor, the seat of the Pucará.
Although his plane was configured with air-to-air missiles, he launched himself at the ships and opened fire with his cannons in two passes; This was observed by AFB Cóndor personnel. Without responding to the attack, both ships withdrew into the open sea.
Around 16:40 he linked up with the CIC Malvinas, requesting an aerial target while gaining altitude again. The radar operator vectored him toward an echo; Ardiles confirmed -In sight- at that moment the echo split into two (both planes were formed very close to each other, so the reflection on the radar showed a single echo instead of two).
The Harrier section (comprising Flt Lt T. Penfold (RAF) and Lt Cdr M. Hale (RN)) was at 20,000 feet with Ardiles' Dagger 13,000 feet above and 5 miles away, when an air-to-air missile -air was fired by the Argentine plane. The missile was aimed at Hale's plane and he evaded it by maneuvering and launching countermeasures, immediately descending to a level of 5,000 feet.



At 16:41 Penfold had pulled up behind Ardiles' plane, at a distance of three miles; he fired an AIM-9L which hit the Dagger. The fighter exploded without any ejection being seen.

Silence... Ardiles was called on all frequencies that day, no response.
The remains of the plane fell in flames on the island of Bouganville, and the helicopters flew over this place several times in search of Pepe but without result.
First Lieutenant José Leonidas Ardiles was the first G6C pilot to spread the archipelago with his blood.

Overwhelmed by the constant signs of ships attempting helidembarkations near Puerto Argentino, and faced with a direct request from the Military Garrison, the FAS decided to relegate the attempt to gain air superiority (this decision is influenced by the meager results of the numerous hunting sorties). of that day) and proceed to carry out attack operations on naval targets. 11 fighter-bombers (A-4B/C and Dagger) and 6 light bombers (Canberra Mk-62) left to comply with the imposed order.

The "Tornos" 
They had been on alert all morning, sitting in the cabins waiting for the departure order, they even took off and then had to return due to the arrival of a Fragmentary Order.
The Chief called the three pilots who were on alert to plan a navigation at altitude with a subsequent leg (navigation section) at ground level. The squadron was made up of Captain Dimeglio, First Lieutenant Román and Lieutenant Aguirre Faget. The callsign would be Torno.



The objective was north of Puerto Argentino and about fifteen miles from the coast. Leaning over the navigation chart, the three pilots plotted the navigation course, which would take them to a fixed geographical point (navigation was visual) from which they would descend at low altitude to complete the final stretch towards the target.
The three men dressed in their orange survival flight jackets approached the planes, which had already been reconfigured with two 250-kilogram MK-82 BRP (Parachute Delayed Bomb) bombs. They took off and climbed to cruising altitude in a fluid (open) formation. The cloud cover gave a glimpse of the dark sea sliding beneath.
A glance at the clock, it's time for descent; After drilling the layer they had a visual with the geographical point. They continued leveling a few meters from the water and closed the formation, both numbers side by side of the leader. They skirted Gran Malvina Island to the north and then Soledad.
Four minutes to the target, First Lieutenant Román spotted a helicopter to the left, immediately notifying the leader - We continue towards the objective! - was his order.
A shape emerging from the water emerged in front, and with a gentle stroke of the lever they focused their firing sights on it, beginning the attack; They approached at high speed ready to open fire with their cannons when they realized that it was a rock.
They changed course and continued along the coastline. According to the navigation calculation, they had arrived at the target area but they did not see anything, they decided to continue towards Puerto Argentino.
Someone was shooting on the coast and in front of the Daggers there were explosions that looked like fireworks. Suddenly three ships appeared, close to Puerto Argentino and were bombing it mercilessly.

The radio silence was broken by the voice of the squad leader who indicated

-One to the one in the center, two to the one on the left and three to the one on the right!-

The sea was calm and dark gray, the clouds barely 300 meters above covered the sky in a compact mass. Each plane centered its nose on the designated target and approached it as level as it could with the turbines at full power, while the hands groped the weapons panel, arming the cannons and bombs. It was 16:16, the three Daggers attacked from north to south. In front of them three targets appeared, one larger than the other two, towards which the Squad Leader headed.



Piques in the water in front, white fountains of water that emerged as a result of the fire from the leader's cannons, but which caused surprise in his numbers who believed they were attacked by the ships. The leader unloaded his cannons and released his bombs at no more than 180 meters high, passing at high speed over the Destroyer, number two rose to enter at an angle for cannon shooting and was received with heavy fire from the weapons. anti-aircraft fire of the ship and then also launched its bombs, number three did not use its cannons, believing that they could be ships of the Argentine Navy, but then, in the face of the evidence of the large response fire, it discharged its bombs.

-The one coming out!-
-Turn two coming out!-
-Turn three coming out!-
-Good!!!-

Joy and frenzy in the frequency, after just a few seconds that were eternal in the minds of each pilot and surely also in those of the crew of those ships who were suddenly overwhelmed by the fury of the attack.
Immediately the raiders made their escape by piercing the cloud layer in search of height, thus losing sight of themselves, undertaking the return individually but being certain that somewhere beyond the cloud cover, their companions followed them on the return. to home.
On the islands, witnesses who observed the attack confirmed the impact of Captain Dimeglio's bombs on the destroyer, which was immediately enveloped in smoke. The ships turned and headed southeast.

The feeling of loneliness that flying between clouds gives was increased when the controller's voice gave the alarm so feared in those circumstances -The turnstiles have bandits on their tail!-
-The winches are submerged in the water!- The squad leader's response.
At that moment, the 1st Ten Roman reported seeing two Harriers diving downward, when in reality they were his companions, but he ignored it.
When they finally came out of the clouds they found themselves flying over a valley surrounded by mountains which they did not hit only by the will of God, since they had no way of knowing where they were going and the visibility until that moment had been zero. Meanwhile the Harriers continued their pursuit.



The Fortín section (Captain Donadille and First Lieutenant Senn) who were on patrol with their Daggers armed with Shafrir missiles received the order from the CIC Malvinas to go to the aid of the Tornos by placing themselves between them and the interceptors. Having received the vector, both ejected tanks and attacked at full power, the Harriers began their escape.
Upon returning to San Julián they were received by an overflowing crowd, the pilots merged in an excited hug, a moment that will be recorded with indelible precision in the retinas of those who witnessed it.

Thus the formations returned in what was the last combat sortie of the 6th Fighter Group on May 1, 1982. Due to the characteristics of this attack, the pilots could not have precise confirmation of the damage caused. However, it was determined that the three attacked ships correspond, according to the description of numerous witnesses, to two Type 21 Frigates and a Type 42 Destroyer.
Regarding this, numerous disagreements have arisen about which ships were attacked, the Argentine Air Force maintains that the Destroyer would have been the HMS Exeter, while the British affirm that it was the HMS Glamorgan. The Type 21 Frigates have been identified as HMS Alacrity and HMS Arrow. Another theory (perhaps the most controversial on this topic) is the one that concludes that the destroyer attacked by the Daggers on May 1 is the HMS Sheffield, which sank while she was being towed to the Georgia Islands.

Beyond this there is no doubt that the blow was forceful enough to persuade the fleet to withdraw to a safe distance. This was confirmed between 16:20 and 16:30 by the then Chief of the Río Gallegos Mobile Radar, Vicecomodoro C. Velazco, who captured a radio message, apparently from the "Flag Ship" (flagship of the fleet). , which ordered the withdrawal due to an unexpected tactical situation.

The 6th Fighter Group, operating from the continental bases of San Julián and Río Grande, with marginal weather conditions and at the limit of its autonomy, executed thirteen combat sorties, the majority being Combat Air Patrols, with the exception of the three corresponding ones. to the Torno squadron who carried out an anti-ship mission. As a testimony of the commitment to "Defend the flag with honor and patriotism and follow it until losing one's life" remains the sacrifice of First Lieutenant Ardiles.




1982 / 2003 

Hangar Digital