Roca and the "Day of the Race"

Columbus Day

By Rolando Hanglin | LA NACION





We Argentines have a defect that is, at the same time, our cardinal virtue. We are, in large part, grandchildren of gringos. Therefore, we ignore almost everything regarding the history of our country. We are part of the human tide that came down from the ships between 1880 and 1920, when the corpses of thousands of victims were not yet well covered by the pious earth. Indians and Christians, hostages and captives, chieftain (caciques) and soldiers (milicos), all of them who fell in the great Indian-Christian war, between 1820 and 1890.

 

Being, then, half gringos, we could know little about the raids, the forts, Roca and Villegas, Pincén and Calfucurá. To us, the Indians were guys with feathers that appeared in cowboy movies! Always losing the battle.

We are, in large part, grandchildren of gringos. Therefore, we ignore almost everything regarding the history of our country.

That is why we are surprised that, today, the supposed descendants of those Indians, today called "Mapuches", claim properties in places like Bariloche, Aluminé, La Angostura and even Toay, La Pampa.



Let's go in parts.

Actually, the term "Mapuche" was invented by the North American ethnologist Edmond E. Smith in 1850, and later spread in different countries of America. The meaning is clear: mapu: land; che: people. In the same way, myself, a fan of the Patagonian language (mapu-dungún) I have baptized my weekend country house "Epu-Trehua" (the two dogs) and a little chalet I have in Chapadmalal, "Antu-Catán " (house of the sun) without claiming any historical roots.

Reading the works of Lucio V. Mansilla, Estanislao Zeballos, Manuel Prado and other authors from the time of the forts, we never find the word "Mapuche". No such tribe or nation was ever spoken of. The literature of 1820-1880 does speak of the Pampas, the Serranos, the Araucanians or Chileans, the Vorogas, the Tehuelches, the Tubichaminís. But the word Mapuche never appears. History and anthropology agree that Argentine territory, from San Luis to the south, was occupied by the northern Tehuelches (pampas, aoniken), the southern Tehuelches (pampas, guenaken) and the Tehuelches who had crossed over to the island, known as onas. These countrymen were part of a community of hunter-gatherers. They did not farm the land or uphold the concept of private property or national boundaries. Just that of "living space", which moved settlements in those immense extensions, always looking for abundant hunting of guanacos, deer, piches, ostriches. They occupied, then, without occupying it, an immense country. It is believed that these Tehuelches (or their ancestors) stamped the rock walls of the Cueva de las Manos 8000 years ago. Casamiquela affirms that when Carmen de Patagones was founded, the Tehuelches began to traffic rhea feathers and guanaco skins. They did the same in Punta Arenas, in 1850, and in 1865 with the Welsh colony, in the Chubut valley. It was an activity of economic significance far superior to what it may seem today. All the testimonies agree that the Tehuelche people were peaceful and dispersed.



Hence, it's quite unusual to witness the emergence, even in 2012, of communes, movements, or unions identifying as "Mapuche" that assert claims over territories in Chubut, Río Negro, Neuquén, and Santa Cruz. Where do these groups originate? Are they indigenous peoples of our nation, to whom the Republic owes redress for its past injustices in usurping their lands and undermining their means of sustenance?

The Mapuche is Chilean and entered the sphere of the Argentine pampas in 1820, expelled by the internal wars in Chile.

We are going to leave the answer to Mr. Rodolfo Casamiquela, ethnologist and anthropologist who died in 2008, but not without writing 24 books and 200 monographs on the subject. Casamiquela, born in Jacobacci, considered himself the last man capable of correctly pronouncing the northern Tehuelche language (that is, "pampa") and his verdict was overwhelming: "The Mapuches are Chileans."

Other concepts: "Today only the Mapuche is spoken of. The Tehuelches suppressed themselves or forgot their own history, despite the fact that today there are many descendants, such as the Chagallo, Yanquetruz, Sayhueque, Foyel, Catriel, Chiquichano, Chelqueta, Chingolé, Chalao, Chacamata, Cual. These families are the Tehuelches that remain, that is, the so-called pampas. They were a lineage of enormous potential power, which gradually became Araucanized or Mapuchized based on their language. The Mapuche is Chilean and enters the sphere of the Argentine pampas in 1820, expelled by the internal wars of Chile. Many Chilean Indian chiefs sided with the King of Spain and, in the context of a war to the death, crossed the mountain range to save their lives. Here they were received by some relatives and , little by little, authorized by Brigadier Juan Manuel de Rosas to settle in the provinces of the Río de la Plata.

One wonders if the Tehuelches, a native people of Pampa and Patagonia, were exterminated by the Chilean Araucanians, or by the Argentine military forces, or by someone.

Casamiquela: "The issue is the language. To negotiate with Spanish, the so-called parliaments were held, that is, oratory and diplomacy assemblies where each chief (ulmén) with his little capitains (capitanejos) or little chieftain (caciquillos), and the representatives of the White or huinca (derived from the Incas, who also tried to subdue the Araucanians with little luck) competed in speeches and rhetorical figures to "adjust peace". In this diplomatic field, the Mapuche language was far superior to Tehuelche. Precise, clear, beautiful, simple, rude, Mapudungun is a very valuable language. With it religion penetrates, then the Mapuche predominates over the Tehuelche".



Our conclusion is that the Chilean Mapuches did not annihilate the Argentine Tehuelches; instead, they formed separate federations where Mapuche military leadership consistently held sway. As corroborated by meticulous historical travelers like the Englishman Musters, the Tehuelches were often characterized as "nomads, wanderers, free spirits, and undisciplined."

Professor Casamiquela asserts, "The Mapuche presence in Argentina lacks deep historical roots. They have been here for around a century." In this respect, they are akin to the Italians, Irish, or Croats. Casamiquela further explains, "When Professor Erice, the author of the most comprehensive Mapuche dictionary, arrived in our country, he found no speakers of that language in Viedma. Here in Jacobacci, there were the Linares, descendants of a captive bearing that surname who married the daughter of a Tehuelche chieftain, based near the Juncal lagoon, but they were Tehuelches. Creoles with surnames like Entrage or Castelo also belong to the Tehuelche heritage. In summary, the claims that the Mapuches make today regarding land rights... they simply do not have a historical basis. This is history, not conjecture. Currently, political dynamics are in play. Consequently, Chilean Mapuches declare themselves as Argentines and begin asserting a long-standing presence in our country. Historians are not primarily concerned with this aspect. What a politician or lawyer may argue... that is another matter altogether."



The tall and pensive Tehuelches were subjected to colonization and undoubtedly deceived by both Argentine settlers and Chilean Araucanians. Historically, the name Patagonia conjures images of a land inhabited by men with exceptionally large feet and towering stature.

Casamiquela explains, "The Spaniards, who were of shorter stature, often looked down at the Tehuelches as they stood atop the dunes. In 1896, a Frenchman named Delavaux conducted an excavation along Route 40 in southern Chubut, unearthing a Tehuelche burial site and measuring the skeleton of the interred individual, which reached a height of 1.99 meters. Another excavation, this time in Península Valdez, confirmed individuals reaching a height of two meters. They are indeed the tallest ethnic group in the world."

While they were of considerable stature, the Tehuelches were also known for their vices, free-spirited customs, docility, and kindness. They formed amicable relations with the Welsh settlers in Chubut and, in general, did not cause trouble. They allowed themselves to be influenced first by the Chilean Araucanians and later by the Argentine Republic.

One of the last heroic figures of the Tehuelche or Pampa lineage was undoubtedly Chief Pincén, whose name was remembered as Vicente, Juan, or Francisco Pincén, depending on the region. The surname is correctly pronounced as Pisen, Piseñ, or Pincel, always emphasizing the accent on the "i."



There are four pictures of Pincén. In these images, we see him with his characteristic fluke, colt boots, a short spear, his testicles hanging around his neck, his bare torso, long hair held in place by a headband, and he appears strikingly similar to Alberto Olmedo! He could also bear a resemblance to Don Alberto Rodríguez Saá, though the latter, more robust in build, still possesses the stature and charisma of his Ranquelino forebears.

Some individuals reject Columbus Day because it seems to categorize humanity on the same plane as creatures like golden retrievers or Hereford cows. The truth is, all humans belong to the same species, but there exist significant ethnic variations; a Swede is not the same as a Senegalese.

The tall and introspective Tehuelches were subjected to colonization and, undoubtedly, taken advantage of by Argentine settlers and Chilean Araucanians, who primarily ventured into our pampas to steal cattle and capture fair-haired women. Along the way, unfortunate confrontations with Argentinians, including violent encounters, were inevitable. It was an unfortunate reality.

However, that's a different story. For now, we conclude this humble note with a traditional Patagonian greeting, one that is still used today when travelers cross paths: "Mari-mari." This phrase literally translates to "ten-ten." Wishing you good fortune, and sometimes, to convey a warmer farewell in passing, it is articulated more fully: "Mari-mari peñí." In other words, "Goodbye, brother."

NOTE: The sources for this article come from the website "Los Matuastos- Periodismo" (Sunday September, the 9th 2012) and "Pincén, vida y leyenda" wrote by Juan José Estévez, and published in 2011.

Malvinas/Falklands: HMS Conqueror chasing the Belgrano

The HMS Conqueror chasing the Belgrano

The Churchill-class submarine HMS Conqueror, which had 3 units, with nuclear propulsion, was launched on 05/12/1967 and joined the Sea Fleet on 09/11/1971. The main objective of these submarines was, in the Cold War, to spy on the movements of the Soviet submarine naval force. She was retired in 1990. To this day she was the only nuclear submarine to sink an enemy ship with conventional torpedoes, the cruiser ARA General Belgrano, in 1982.)

by LAWRENCE FREEDMAN and VIRGINIA GAMBA 

On April 27, the Argentine Navy had been deployed to oppose the planned landing of British forces. On April 29, the fleet divided into two groups and took up positions to defend the Falklands. The most important group included 25 de Mayo, with two destroyers equipped with guided missiles, as well as four smaller destroyers and frigates. This group was divided into two (Task Groups 79.1 and 79.4) and occupied positions on the edge of the Maritime Exclusion Zone, and to the northwest of the islands (Task Group 79.1 was 270 nautical miles east of the Gulf of San Jorge, in Patagonia, and Task Group 79.4 northeast of the same position).

The smaller group, which included the cruiser General Belgrano, plus two destroyers (Task Group 79.3), went on to occupy a position 260 miles south of the islands. His orders were to "search and destroy the Bitany fleet if the islands or the mainland were attacked." The Navy had been ordered to respect the 200-mile zone imposed by the British and not to launch attacks.

At 15:13 on 1 May, Admiral Allara, commanding Task Group I aboard 25 May, had received aerial reconnaissance to the effect that seven British ships were They were about 120 miles away, north of Puerto Argentino. Lombardo would later recall:

Our people in the Falklands, in the Malvinas, began to claim that there was a landing... Landing with helicopters and boats, with boats, both at various points, near Puerto Argentino, near Port Stanley... So I had to accept that that was the day of disembarkation. We believed that the British would concentrate efforts in the vicinity of Port Stanley and tried to attack isolated ships or small groups of ships outside that region. The Air Force would attack the ships that were near Port Stanley."

 

More or less simultaneously, information sent by Rear Admiral Otero of the South Atlantic Command arrived and said that there was a "landing underway north of the islands." The ships were claimed to have held between 010 and 145 degrees off Stanley, at intervals of 90, 40 and 10 nautical miles, protected by Sea Harriers.

At 15:55, upon receiving information from Admiral Allara, Lombardo left him "free of action to attack." Allara interpreted this as a modification of Argentine combat rules. He could now take action against the British fleet and issued orders to that effect to the groups under his command. This change was made without reference to higher authorities.

There is no reason to believe that if he had consulted he would have thought better of it. Admiral Anaya, commander in chief of the Navy, feared that the navy would not respond quickly enough, and that all the honors of the battle would go to the Air Force. He ordered Lombardo to commit the Navy and then backed off, as he thought his own attitude was unfair. Lombardo was "closer to the action" and, therefore, had to do what he judged "necessary and appropriate." In reality, Lombardo had already ordered the attack.

Granted freedom of action, Allara began moving toward the task force. At 20:07, now that he had more information about the British cannonades and possible landings, Allara gave the general order to begin offensive operations. At 8:39 p.m., General Menéndez, in Puerto Argentino, was convinced that a landing was taking place. At 20:55 there was intense naval fire on the airport and the helicopters approached the coast. But shortly before midnight the ships ceased fire and withdrew. No Sea Harrier attacks had been sustained since 19:00. More or less at that time the first SAS units were disembarking on Soledad Island (East Falkland). If, as has been suggested, the Argentine radars on the coast detected the Sea King helicopters transporting the men of the SAS units, it is possible that this verification reinforced the impression of a landing attempt.
 

At noon, a Tracker plane, on a reconnaissance mission, discovered six British ships. Allara, who was on board the May 25, was informed. Allara hoped to dispatch six Skyhawks with a combat radius of 240 miles, each armed with six 250-kilogram bombs. He needed a 40-knot wind to do it. At 10 p.m. the wind began to decrease. He now calculated that he would need to wait until 6 o'clock before finding himself in a position that would allow him to unleash the attack. Two hours later he had decreased even more. To send the planes from the ship he would have to load them with less fuel and fewer weapons. The radius of action was reduced to 140 miles and the load to two bombs. It was now concluded that the attack would not be possible until 11am on 2 May. Regardless, Allara decided to continue moving towards the task force.

At 0:30 on 2 May an echo was detected about 110 miles away, approaching Task Group 1. It was identified shortly afterwards as a Sea Harrier. The plane circled about 60 to 70 miles away from Task Group 1, which it had apparently discovered. At 1:19 Lombardo sent Allara the following signal: "Su 012007. There have been no air attacks on MLV since 011900. I do not know the position of enemy aircraft carriers. Unengaged enemy constitutes a strong threat to T 79."

If the enemy was not attacking Puerto Argentino now, it could be found anywhere within a wide radius. So now not only was there no immediate need to attack the Royal Navy, since there was no landing, but there was a threat to the Argentine fleet. This was not an order to retreat, but the consequences were clear.

Allara was not fully aware of the risks, as he had just been located by an enemy Sea Harrier. At 1:45 he informed Lombardo that there was little point in continuing the march, because wind conditions made an attack impossible, and the forecast for the next day suggested that things would not improve. Accordingly, he ordered the task groups to "return to their previous positions... That is, the two northern groups towards the mainland and the southern group towards the Island of the States." He wanted to return to shallower waters to limit the risk of falling victim to a submarine attack. When Admiral Anaya arrived at the Operations Center, at 2:30, he confirmed the messages from Allara and Lombardo and annulled the orders ordering the offensive action to begin.

Meanwhile, the Belgrano and the two accompanying destroyers patrolled between States Island and Bordwook Bank, southwest of the Falklands, with the double objective of preventing another British warship from joining the task force coming from the Pacific, and to warn of any movement towards the continental territory. That group was also destined to prevent Chilean intervention. On the afternoon of May 1, he received the order to avoid approaching the Exclusion Zone, and to avoid confronting the enemy without prior authorization; Instead, he was to offer a lateral threat, so that the enemy would divide his forces. Like the rest of the fleet, he had been ordered to intercept enemy units that were damaged or isolated, or had become separated from the main body of the British task force, if the opportunity arose. He was not to engage in a frontal attack.

 

At 2:50 the Belgrano commander received the order given by Allara at 1:45. He began to really alter course at 5:11. This maneuver ended at 6, and at that moment the cruiser pointed its bow towards the Island of the States. About ten hours later she was hit by two torpedoes from the port side. She immediately lost propulsive power and began to list. Half an hour later the evacuation was ordered, and at 5:02 p.m. the Belgrano sank. An accompanying destroyer, Hipólito Bouchard, believed she had been hit by a third torpedo that did not explode. With the other destroyer, the Piedrabuena, she adopted anti-submarine measures and moved away from her.

Lombardo later explained why the destroyers had not helped pick up survivors, and alluded to "the first spectacular submarine action" during the Great War, in the channel. A German submarine torpedoed a British ship, which began to sink, and then successively sank the two accompanying ships, which had stopped to pick up survivors. "The ships are not at sea to pick up survivors," he added, "but to fight and not be sunk." In the most costly individual encounter of the war, 321 crew members of the Belgrano lost their lives.

Woodward Request
As it came many hours after the fighting on May 1, it appeared that this British attack was unrelated to the previous combat. But it wasn't like that. He closely followed the action of the day before. To explain this, it is necessary to return to the way the British viewed the military situation.

On April 30, the nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror was sent to the Tierra del Fuego area, with orders to search for the Belgrano. The information that the cruise ship was in that area may have come from Chilean sources; According to one version, the Chilean naval command in Punta Arenas at the end of April sent a message to the British military attaché in Santiago through an intermediary. Later in the afternoon, the Conqueror picked up the first sounds on sonar. In reality, she was a tanker that accompanied the Belgrano.

The Conqueror's orders, received at 9 p.m., local time, on April 30, were to intercept the Belgrano and attack her when she entered, as it was expected she would, into the Total Exclusion Zone. The next morning he sighted the Belgrano and the two destroyers that accompanied it, and that were refueling with fuel from the tanker. At 11 o'clock the three ships began to move away towards the southeast, at the speed of 8 knots. The Conqueror began to follow them and sent signals to Fleet Headquarters at Northwood, outside London, indicating that she had established contact, and indicating her position and course. The signal also reached Admiral Woodward, who was aboard the Hermes. At 1 on May 2, the Conqueror reported that he was still following the Belgrano.

Admiral Woodward wanted the Conqueror to attack the Belgrano. He gave Conqueror a direct order to attack at 4:10 (8:10 British time) on the morning of 2 May. The order had to pass through Northwood, where Admiral Herbert, commander of the submarines, rescinded it, because he realized that he would need political approval. Woodward had the authority to attack the Argentine ships with his surface ships or aircraft, and he could have done so in this case, although not so easily. What he now demanded required that the forms of combat be modified, a step that Northwood was already contemplating.

Desde Northwood se envió una señal al capitán Wreford-Brown, del Conqueror, a las 6:15, y probablemente lo sorprendió la orden de que se abstuviera de desencadenar un ataque hasta que cambiasen las reglas. 

Although Britain seemed embroiled in a possibly unlimited naval battle with Argentina, the task force was constrained with respect to the possible use of its most lethal weapons - nuclear submarines - by established rules of combat.

In Northwood, Woodward's attitude aroused irritation. It was suggested that Admiral Fieldhouse had expressed his displeasure with him. Still, Woodward's request highlighted something that was already being addressed. Fieldhouse supported Woodward's view that the rules should be changed to allow the attack.

At Northwood it was estimated that there was enough time to get the rules of engagement modified before the Belgrano reached the task force. Not long after receiving Woodward's signal, at 9:15 British time on the morning of 2 May, Admiral Lewin arrived at Northwood and reviewed the situation with other senior commanders before proceeding to Checkers for a meeting. meeting of the War Cabinet. It was agreed that Lewin would lobby the War Cabinet for changes to the rules of engagement.

Admiral Woodward explained his concern this way:

"Early on May 2, everything indicated that the 25 de Mayo, the Argentine aircraft carrier and a group of escort ships had crossed my SSN barrier heading north, and that the cruiser General Belgrano and its escort ships were trying to complete the pincer movement from the south, still outside the Total Exclusion Zone. But the Belgrano was still followed by the Conqueror. My fear was based on the Belgrano breaking away from the SSN as it passed through the not-so-deep waters of Burdwood Bank, and that my advanced SSN barrier would also be evaded there. Therefore, I demanded, for the first and only time in the course of the campaign, a major change in the Rules of Combat, in order to allow the Conqueror to attack the Belgrano outside the Exclusion Zone." 

Woodward's concern therefore related to the immediate tactical situation in which he found himself. His own previous experience in Royal Navy exercises with the United States Navy meant that he knew that carrier groups were not invulnerable to surface ship action groups. He sent his claim to the Conqueror not long after receiving information indicating that the most important Argentine group was advancing towards him, and the union of the two fragments of information raised the possibility of a "pincer movement." It was known that the destroyers that accompanied the Belgrano carried Exocet, and it was possible that the cruiser itself had this missile. If anything, her 6-inch guns outclassed the British 4.5-inch guns. To attack the cruiser she only had the Harriers and the SSN. The Harriers were needed for the air defense task, especially because there was still a risk that the Skyhawks would be launched from the 25 de Mayo. The Conqueror remained. The concern here was that if the Belgrano sailed across the submerged risk called Burwood Bank, the Conqueror would have serious difficulties maintaining contact, especially if she wanted her presence not to be detected.

Based on available intelligence, Northwood's assessment was also that the Argentine Navy was attempting a pincer movement. What was known then about the Argentine movements? According to a number of versions, the signal sent by Admiral Allara at 15:55 (19:55 British time) ordering the groups under his command to begin the offensive against the British fleet had been intercepted, and this was which affected the Belgrano and its escort ships.

Lewin has also pointed out that the evaluation was based on the knowledge that there had been a significant flow of radio traffic between the different units of the Argentine Navy, and on the "evaluation of what one would have done if one had been in the place of Argentina".

The reference to radio traffic reflects Woodward's officers' analysis of the position and progress of the Argentine carrier group on the basis of interpretation of "wireless traffic patterns and observation of the direction from which they could approach." the planes of May 25".

After radar contact with one of the Tracker search aircraft launched on May 25, the Sea Harriers attempted to discover the aircraft carrier. One of them detected the presence of four or five ships not long after midnight local time. The pilot immediately noticed that he was also being illuminated by the search radar of a Type 909 Sea Dart. With this alarming confirmation that he had found enemy ships he hurried back to the Hermes. As we now know, this same contact was a fundamental factor in the Argentine decision to withdraw, and the withdrawal was taking place while Northwood officers considered how to deal with a threat they believed was looming.

It has been suggested that Lombardo's signal at 1:19 (5:19 British time) had also been intercepted by GCHQ, but was not yet deciphered.

This signal was more of a warning than an order to retreat (which later came from Allara), although retreat was implied. It is possible that other signals were intercepted that could have provided a clearer picture if deciphered; but even if this had been the case, the decryption task would have taken several hours.

According to the Foreign Affairs committee of the House of Commons, whose members were shown the available intelligence material: "The classified evidence we have seen and other evidence authoritatively and conclusively demonstrate that before the sinking of the Belgrano they did not come into the hands of the government "British intercepted orders regarding a withdrawal of Argentine forces."

The most recent direct evidence would have confirmed the impression that the Argentine fleet was continuing to advance. The Conqueror had reported at 5 (London time) that it was continuing to follow the Belgrano, which was undoubtedly avoiding the Exclusion Zone, but was approaching the task force at a speed of 13 knots.

So the tactical picture was in some ways disconcerting. The Argentine fleet, and especially the aircraft carrier, would have been drawn to sea according to plan, but the plan had been thwarted as the nuclear submarine HMS Splendid had been unable to establish contact with the 25 de Mayo, which was now in front. of the Argentine offensive. The only part of this offensive with which there was any contact was the Belgrano and the two destroyers that accompanied it. The Belgrano probably did not carry Exocet anti-ship missiles, but she could carry them, and the escort destroyers possessed such weapons. Likewise, although the speed at that time was reduced, it would still catch up with the task force.

This was calculated on the basis of the "Widest Circle", that is, a circle whose center is the last known position of the enemy, and whose radius is the maximum known speed of the enemy multiplied by the time that has elapsed since the last time he saw it. This circle widens with the passage of time. The Belgrano's last reported speed, i.e. 13 knots, was less than its maximum speed of 30 knots, but a prudent commander concerned about the vulnerability of the ships under his command would have felt compelled to assume the worst. .

Another tactical risk was that the Belgrano could have participated in a new expedition to occupy South Georgia, which did not have a good defense at that time. Meanwhile, the need to monitor it would be a further burden on the task force's strained helicopter and Harrier core.

Another factor that weighed on the minds of the commanders concerned the risk of delaying the special forces that were to reconnoiter the islands on the coast. According to Lewin's version:

"Having reached the vicinity of the Falkland Islands, he (Woodward) had to secretly send special forces to gather information on the Argentine dispositions. For this purpose he needed to approach within a very short distance of the Falklands every night. Whether it was to disembark or to resupply the committed special forces. He could not perform any of these tasks if the Argentine fleet was at sea. He did not know where he was, and it was assumed that his intention was to attack him. He could preserve his safety by retreating to the east and staying out of reach of the Argentines. If he adopted that criterion, he would be unable to fulfill his mission." 

In addition to concerns that the Belgrano was part of an imminent offensive, there were other reasons why task force commanders strongly supported an attack. Firstly, one of the original objectives of yesterday's operations was to create opportunities that would allow the Argentine Navy and Air Force to be worn down. Perhaps not all the consequences of the loss of the Belgrano were foreseen, but in any case it was an opportunity that the commanders did not want to waste. To quote Lewin again: "In war, it is necessary to seize opportunities while they exist; there may be no second chance."

There was something else. These arguments were themselves symptomatic of the fact that the limitations imposed on submarines seemed anomalous. All the information coming from the South Atlantic regarding the previous day's activity indicated that the fighting had begun in earnest. All this was clearly deduced from the attack in which the Glamorgan barely escaped, and from the evidence that at least one Argentine submarine had been searching for prey. The reports that arrived from Buenos Aires in the morning reinforced that impression.

The Argentine statements regarding the successes obtained the day before, although undoubtedly exaggerated, were nevertheless interpreted as a reliable indication of that country's intentions, and in themselves contributed to creating the atmosphere of the War Cabinet's subsequent decision.

Regardless of the specific reasons given in relation to the Belgrano, Lewin would have pressured the War Cabinet in favor of a change in the rules of combat. If the specific tactical situation of May 1 and 2 had not forced a change the question would have been raised the following day, during the War Cabinet meeting. The change would determine that all Argentine warships would be threatened by British submarines, and not just the Belgrano.

Lewin went to Checkers with Admiral Fieldhouse to highlight the military's argument. When he arrived, he immediately explained the situation to the prime minister and asked for the rules to be changed.

The War Cabinet itself did not discuss the matter. Outside of Lewin, the chiefs of staff were not included in the discussion, although they all agreed with Lewin's recommendation. As the matter was urgent, Thatcher called together the ministers and civil servants who had been invited to lunch before the formal body met in the afternoon. Therefore, it was not recorded in the minutes. There was little time to consider in advance the consequences of the step. The discussion lasted between fifteen and twenty minutes. One version states that there was a fairly extensive discussion, but in practice it seems that it was rather superficial, and that there was a general reluctance to question military judgment.

Whitelaw later recalled that it was "one of the easiest decisions he personally participated in" as soon as he (Whitelaw) realized the risk of losing contact with the Belgrano if the Conqueror was not allowed to attack it.

The absence of the Foreign Office Secretary may have meant that diplomatic aspects were not analyzed as carefully as they could have been. Antony Acland, head of the Diplomatic Service, may have been present, but his immediate predecessor, Sir Michael Palliser, who was now an adviser to the War Cabinet, had not yet arrived. Sir Michael Havers was concerned about the possible effect on international public opinion, but the effect on the peace negotiations was not taken into account, as it was believed that no such efforts existed at the time.

The accepted change was to "allow attacks on all Argentine ships on the high seas, as had previously been agreed only in relation to May 25." Nor was the need to immediately communicate the change to Argentina considered in this case. Once it was decided to send the signal, Lewin warned that by the time the Conqueror received it he might have lost sight of the Belgrano. At the time, he believed there was a 75 percent chance that the Conqueror would be successful.

At 13 (British time) Lewin contacted Northwood from Checkers, and thirty minutes later he reported this change to the task force.

The communications had to occupy space on a North American communications satellite that was available only infrequently and supported only short, precise messages. Furthermore, if the nuclear submarine was not waiting for a message, and also taking measures to prevent the enemy from discovering it, it might not receive the communication.

Apparently, this is what happened at 1:30 p.m. on May 2, when Northwood announced the change in the rules of engagement. It is claimed that the captain of the Conqueror received a "confusing" message. He had faced problems with communications during the eve, as a result of the damage caused to his masts by the rough seas. Furthermore, he probably wanted to ensure that the situation was fully understood before taking such an important step. Taking advantage of the next available slot at 3 p.m. British time (11 a.m. in the South Atlantic), the Conqueror reported that his quarry had altered course at 9 a.m. The course was now 270 degrees, and the speed was 14 knots.

Northwood's order could not be repeated until 5 p.m., and this time, at 5:30 p.m., the Conqueror acknowledged receipt and informed Northwood of its intention to attack. Information that the Belgrano had altered course reached Northwood at 3:40 p.m., but reportedly reached no further than Admiral Herbert, senior submarine commander. It seems that this commander did not then consider the information to be important: the cruiser could have changed course again, as he had done before, or had moved to attack South Georgia.

Aboard Conqueror, Wreford-Brown had decided to attack with the older and shorter-range Mark 8 torpedo, as a result of its larger warhead, which gave it a better chance of piercing the warship's armor and anti-torpedo shields. Likewise, he was a short distance from the target.

"I spent more than two hours trying to find an attack position on the port side of the cruiser. It was still day. Visibility was variable; at one point she descended to 2,000 yards. I insisted on going up to take a look - but when we were at periscope depth we would distance ourselves - and then I had to dive and catch up with them. I did the same thing five or six times. They weren't using sonar; They were limited to zigzagging slowly at the approximate speed of 13 knots. Twice I was in a reasonable firing position, but I found that they had deviated a few degrees". 

At 20 o'clock the Conqueror was in position to fire three torpedoes at Belgrano. At 20:30 British time (16:30 local time), he informed Northwood that the Belgrano had been successfully hit. The Conqueror had to escape quickly, because she soon faced an intense anti-submarine attack from the cruiser's escort ships.

 
16:25: The hull was inclined at 20° and submerged 7 meters. Because of the wind, the rafts had difficulty separating. Photo: Courtesy of the Friends of the General Belgrano Cruise Association

Source: Urgente 24.

Conquest of the desert: The huge mistake of the General Roca cancellation

General Roca cancellation: A huge historical mistake

By Roberto Ferrero. 


An article for controversy. Roberto Ferrero, another historical exponent of the Socialism of the National Left, presents us in this article with the vision and political position that the SIN historically had before Roquism. Pure historical materialism to defend national unification and lay the institutional foundations for the configuration of the country as we know it today. The death of no one is justified, the causes of the need to unify Patagonia to the National State against the imperialist threat coming from Chile are exposed.

Let's place these matters on the agenda, engage in open discussions, and use the resulting conclusions as a foundation for the ongoing reconstruction of our esteemed Latin American Nation. Such is the essence of this message.

Marcos D. Vega - 

Author: Roberto A. Ferrero, Former President of the Junta Provincial de Historia of Córdoba 

To my considerable surprise, I recently learned about the endeavor to remove General Julio A. Roca's name from the boulevard bearing his name in our city. I believe this decision is a significant error, possibly driven by a well-intentioned and compassionate concern for the plight of our indigenous populations. However, I find that the primary arguments in favor of this change lack substantial support.

These arguments, championed by the Argentine-German author Osvaldo Bayer – who openly advocates for Patagonia's separation from the rest of our country to establish an independent nation – essentially rest on two points. Both of these points, however, are as ahistorical and contextually flawed as each other. The more assertive of the two seeks to label General Roca as a "genocidal figure." Nevertheless, I consider this claim to be both semantically and politically frivolous. What is genocide, after all? It is the intentional extermination of an ethnic or social group solely because of their identity, typically perpetrated against people who are defenseless. For instance, the Turks brutally killed one and a half million Armenians, but they didn't harm any of their own. That is a true instance of genocide. Similarly, the Nazis annihilated six million Jews without persecuting or killing a single German. This, too, constitutes genocide.

But the case of Roca and the Conquest of the Desert is totally different. It was not a genocide, but the culmination of a very long war, in which the indigenous had, between 1820 and 1882 -according to the detailed inventory of the indigenous historian Martínez Zarazola- 7,598 casualties, but at the same time caused the death of 3,200 Creole (fortineros or fort soldiers), small owners, travelers, landowners, women, authorities, children...) In the so-called "Great Invasion" of Calfucurá in the province of Buenos Aires at the end of 1875, only in Azul the malón (Indian raid) murdered 400 residents, captivated 500 and seized 300,000 animals that, as always, were sold in Chile with juicy profits. (By the way: the chieftain Casimiro Catriel lived in Azul, used a carriage and had an open account in the city's bank...) Was Azul's then a Creole genocide caused by the Indians? By no means: it was a stage of this protracted and cruel war. Those who fought against Roca were not unfortunate Indians like those who now suffer unjustly on the banks of the Pilcomayo or in the suburbs of Rosario to which they have emigrated, compatriots who must be helped and integrated into their diversity.

They were soldiers representing a quasi-indigenous state that competed with and challenged the national government while practicing slavery on both captive whites and Indians purchased in Chile. Reflecting on Mariano Bejarano's 1872 official visit, sent by the national government to Chief Sayhueque, leader of the "Country of Apples" (today Neuquén), the indigenous writer Curruhuinca-Roux remarked, "Bejarano's visit was an official encounter between government envoys of two separate entities. The raids were not merely defensive tactics against 'invading' whites but were actual expeditions aimed at capturing loot, akin to terrestrial Vikings – part pirates, part merchants. This plunder was later traded in Chile, whose authorities supported these raids to weaken the Argentine government and gain control of Patagonia. We must avoid simplifying history into a Manichaean and naive narrative. The true story is far more intricate than the childlike portrayal of heroes and villains, victims and oppressors. While there's much more to be said about this historically inaccurate first argument, it suffices for now.

The second argument posits that the original indigenous peoples were dispossessed of lands in the Pampean plain and vast Patagonian regions, but this assertion is far from accurate. Concerning the origin of the indigenous tribes inhabiting our pampas – mostly variants or offshoots of the Araucanian people – only an utter lack of knowledge about our country's history and that of Chile can account for such an error. In fact, these trans-Andean tribes cannot be considered "original" since they only began migrating from beyond the Andes into our country in the early 18th century.

In comparison, the natives of this land were more 'original' because the resilient pioneers of the frontier and Creole soldiers, officers, and leaders of the Conquest of the Desert – with the exception of individuals like Fotheringham (English) and Nicolas Levalle (Italian) – held no less valid claims to these lands than the Ranqueles, Pampas, or Manzaneros. Their ancestors inhabited these lands at the same or even earlier times. Regarding the designation of "landowners" asserted by indigenous tribes and their modern advocates, it must be acknowledged but with one important caveat: the incredibly fertile and expansive pampa belonged to all Argentines, whether Creole or indigenous, native or descendants of immigrants, those who already occupied it and those who awaited their turn in the ports to populate it.

Calfucurá, Namuncurá, Catriel, Baigorrita, Pincén, Mariano Rosas and other Indian leaders could not keep what was common heritage for themselves. Like the dog in the manger who, according to the popular Spanish saying, "does not eat or let eat", so those fearsome inhabitants of the Argentine plain did not make it produce nor let others do it. This refusal, placed like a wall against the impetuous growth of the productive forces, could not and did not last. The historical necessity that, as Hegel unfortunately says "always advances from its bad side", and that carried in its bosom the agricultural progress of the nation, had condemned it.

For the rest, Roca's defense in relation to the Conquest of the Desert cannot make us forget the other great contributions that he and the "Generation of 80" made to the construction of this Modern Argentina, today so devastated: the nationalization of Buenos Aires and its unique Port, the establishment of secular institutions, secular education, mass immigration and agrarian colonization.

These achievements make him more than worthy of national gratitude and, therefore, the nomination of a street, which is one of the ways in which towns usually remember their benefactors. The fact that this Generation has quickly turned into an Oligarchy and that the speculators and large merchants and landowners have later monopolized the areas recovered for work and production, is a different sub-stage of Argentine development, which cannot overshadow the management of those like Roca and his friends strove to finally give us a unified country.

If the enemies of genocide are looking for a culprit, it is better that they study the biographies of Miter and Sarmiento, who preached and carried out a true social catastrophe against the native Creole lineage. Why nobody refers to this genocide, which really was? Or did not the "civilizer" Sarmiento advise Miter "not to hesitate to shed the blood of gauchos, which is the only thing that is human about them"? I am not proposing that the name of Sarmiento street be changed to Coliqueo, but I do believe that, without removing General Roca from the boulevard that honors his name, the homage desired by the indigenistas could be paid on another street in the city.

In the end, both of them, whether we like it or not, are part of national history, if we want to understand it in its integral unity and not as a fight between good guys and bad guys, who knock each other out of their heads. pedestals like in the tournaments of the Middle Ages, dark ages by the way. This is not a time for denigration, but for integration, not for balkanization, but for Latin American unity. Anything that goes against this perspective can only play the game of the foreign enemy that stalks us and intends to take advantage of our confrontations and our artificial anger.

Roberto Ferrero 

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Argentine Army: Patagonian Group in the 40s

Agrupación Patagónica

Patagonian Group

In an official photo of the Nahuel DL-43 tank on the sides of the tower, on the cockade with the national colors the legend: "Patagonian Group" was perfectly read. Here are some details of this Association.

By decree of February 28, 1942, the "Patagonian Group" was established, determining that the Minister of War would issue instructions for the constitution of this combat unit that would depend on the General Inspector of the Army.

The Group's initial order of battle was as follows:

Command of the Patagonian Group, based in Comodoro Rivadavía.

Reg. 8 of Motorized Inf., reinforced with a battery of Krupp 75 mm L30 mod. 1909

Reg.24 of Inf. Motorized reinforced with a battery of Krupp 75 mm L30 mod. 1909. This unit was constituted based on the III R.I.14 (III battalion of the Reg. 14 of Inf, based in Rio IV (Province of Córdoba)

 

Detachment "Río Grande: It is constituted in Río Grande, based on a section of shooters and a section of machine guns belonging to the 24th Motorized Infantry Regiment. This unit arrives at its barracks on March 15, 1942.

Military Detachment "Río Deseado": made up of the 2nd. Rifle Company of the 8th Infantry Regiment, which arrives at its garrison on September 20, 1940

Subsequently, the "Patagonian Group" is completed with the 1st. Motorized Communications Company, with garrison in Río Gallegos

On December 15 other units are established and the Group is reorganized.

25th Motorized Infantry Regiment, based in Puerto Deseado.

1a. Company of Motorized Sappers "Patagonia", in Comodoro Rivadavía

Command of the 9th Detachment in Río Gallegos, on which they depended

24th Motorized Engineer Regiment remounted to two battalions.

9th. Light Artillery Group

1a. Company of Motorized Sappers "Patagonia" transferred to Río Gallegos

 
 

Conquest of the desert: Sargento, the loyal dog

Sargento, the loyal dog

Among the dogs in our story was Sargento (Sergeant), from Fort General Paz, in the 1880s. Sargento, a stray and highly intelligent dog, was a faithful night guard of the commander's post. He helped go hunting when food was scarce. And he could catch a hare and deliver it to the soldiers who, in many cases, sent Sargento to the kennel (cucha in the local slang). The dog obeyed without question and without reward.

At seven in the evening the time to pray was announced. The soldiers of the fort uncovered themselves, many knelt, all bowed their heads. Sargento, then, would sit and look at the floor, as if he were praying.

On the battlefield he was very brave. In one of those usual encounters, Sargento was left lying motionless on the battlefield, without moving, next to a pool of his own blood. When the combat ended, Corporal Ángel Ledesma returned to where the canine companion had fallen. He discovered that he was breathing and loaded him onto the haunches of his horse. At the fort, he and his elderly mother, Mamá Carmen, took care of him.

The local Rin Tin Tin became good friends with his savior. They walked together and at night the black man went to visit the dog at his guard, in front of the commander's ranch. Sargento separated a few meters from the ranch gate to be with his best friend. Not even Corporal Ledesma would allow him to come near the colonel's house at night.

During a relay outing for recruits, in which Mamá Carmen and Corporal Ángel participated, the patrol was ambushed. There, an Indian mortally wounded Ángel Ledesma. Mamá Carmen launched into a fury at the attacker. The black woman and the Indian rolled on the ground, in a ferocious combat that paralyzed the others. Mamá Carmen killed the person who had killed her son. She then loaded the body of the black Ángel on a horse and headed to the General Paz Fort, where Sargento heard the news.

After that unfortunate event, he stopped seeing the local Rin Tin Tin by day. He only appeared at sunset, when it was time to guard the commander's house. Intrigued by the constant disappearance of the dog during the day, a couple of soldiers followed him and discovered what was happening: although Sargento watched the commander's ranch at night, during the day he moved away to prostrate himself next to the grave of Corporal Ángel Ledesma, where guarded, impassively, the eternal rest of his hero.

Historias inesperadas

1955 Revolution: Plot in motion

The plot is in motion



Dr. Clemente Villada Achával played a crucial role as the intermediary between General Lonardi and a group of conspirators in the province of Córdoba. Underpinning this clandestine collaboration was a secret meeting held at the historic Colegio de La Salle in Buenos Aires. In attendance were key figures including the leader of the coup, General Lonardi, Colonels Arturo Ossorio Arana and Eduardo Señorans, Captain Edgardo García Puló, and Major Juan Francisco Guevara. The meeting was shrouded in secrecy and protected by heavily armed civilian guards.

Villada Achával disclosed that officers from the Artillery School in Córdoba were eager to partake in a potential coup, awaiting the signal to act. This gathering served to clarify doubts and expedite preparations, as State intelligence services had begun to detect suspicious movements, posing a significant risk.

These concerns were validated when General Lonardi faced sanctions and twenty days of house arrest on August 16. Additionally, the CGT called for a strike on August 31, urging the public to assemble in Plaza de Mayo to hear Juan Domingo Perón, whose vehement rhetoric amplified tensions among the military leadership and the public.

On September 4, Lieutenant Colonel Octavio Cornejo Saravia conveyed a crucial message to the Lonardi family, indicating that the planned uprising for September 16 had been postponed by General Aramburu. Lonardi, visibly agitated, insisted that the operation could not be delayed any further. He expressed urgency due to the government's alleged preparations, including arming workers' militias and retiring many involved officers. The situation demanded swift action to avoid potential repercussions.

-General –said Cornejo a bit embarrassed- I am only passing on some information that Colonel Zerda has just given me[1].

In view of such news, Lonardi believed it necessary to confirm the information and for this, he entrusted his son Luis Ernesto to arrange a meeting with Colonel Arturo Ossorio Arana, destined to discuss the issue in depth. This was done and that same afternoon, the general went to the residence of his friend, in order to update him on the latest events.

-General –said the owner of the house after hearing his words- take things in your hands because otherwise, this won't work.

-Ossorio –answered his interlocutor- I have already decided and be sure that I will spare no effort to carry out the movement [2].

On September 8 at 9:00 p.m. a new meeting was held in which Colonel Eduardo Señorans, chief of operations of the Army General Staff, was present. The same, organized by Alfredo Rodríguez García, a relative of Major Juan Francisco Guevara, was carried out in the car of Dr. Eugenio Burnichon and four fundamental points were agreed upon that should be taken into account when organizing the plot.

1. Because of General Videla Balaguer's impulsive and rash actions in Río Cuarto, the authorities in Córdoba remained vigilant and had implemented stringent security measures.
2. The coastal contacts were deemed both unreliable and inadequate, as only the IV Cavalry Division was available, and it would only pledge its support 72 hours after the uprising commenced.
3. No units in Greater Buenos Aires had shown any signs of allegiance or support for the cause.
4. General Aramburu was continuously monitored, and his aide, Major San Martín, had been apprehended.

During the conversations, Colonel Señorans said that the best thing to do was to wait and not rush because the conditions were not right to start a revolution. Lonardi expressed his total disagreement with this position because the discharge of the troops was imminent and also because, as he had raised it with Ossorio Arana in the previous meeting, the government was organizing popular militias that were going to endanger national security. In his opinion, continuing to wait would only lead to the total disaster of the operation because the latest arrests of officers seemed to show that the authorities knew something.
In this way, the command of the revolution passed from the indecisive General Aramburu to his peer who, in order to know the prevailing situation in the military units of the interior, dispatched his sons Luis Ernesto and Eduardo, in the direction of Córdoba and Cuyo, respectively.
The Lonardi brothers left Buenos Aires on Friday the 9th at night and arrived in the Mediterranean province at 08:30 the following day. Once there, they went to the house of their uncle, Dr. Clemente Villada Achaval, where they were informed of the latest news. Villada had organized a meeting for 4:00 p.m., at his private home, to which he had invited Captains Daniel Correa and Sergio Quiroga, Brigadier Jorge Landaburu, his brother-in-law, engineer Calixto de la Torre, and Dr. Lisardo Novillo Saravia. (h).
It was held at the agreed time and during the course of the talks, the situation of the revolutionary forces in the province, the contribution of civilians and the government's reaction were thoroughly analyzed.
To the satisfaction of the Lonardi brothers, the results of that meeting were better than they had expected since, according to what was said, the younger officers were ready to fold, except for the powerful Infantry School, which seemed to remain loyal. To this must be added the participation of the revolutionary civilian commandos that Commander Landaburu and Captain Basilio Arenas Nievas organized in those days, together with Mr. Damián Fernández Astrada and Edmundo Molina, who would constitute an essential element of support when the wars began. operations.
Captain Correa placed special emphasis on the urgent need to start the actions before September 16 because on that day the Artillery School finished its annual activities and had to deliver the weapons for maintenance tasks. All those present supported the motion, for which Luis Ernesto Lonardi stated that it would be among the first points that he would raise with his father when it came to imposing the news.
That night, at 9:00 p.m., Luis Ernesto boarded an Aerolíneas Argentinas plane and began his return to Buenos Aires while his brother continued his journey to Mendoza, in order to update Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Elizondo, officer of the Cuyo Mountain Association.

Luis Ernesto arrived shortly before 12:00 p.m. and as soon as he got off the plane, he went to his father's apartment, on Juncal street, to inform him of the latest news. The general, wearing a robe over his pajamas, listened carefully to his son and when he finished, he told her that he needed a few hours to meditate and that the next day he would have an answer.

On the morning of Sunday, September 11, the general sent for his son and once face to face, he told her that he was determined to lead the revolution and that it would begin in Córdoba, early on the 16th. ; therefore, it was necessary to take the necessary steps to start the operation.
Lonardi asked his son to establish urgent contact with Major Guevara because he was thinking of using his services as a liaison between the Army and the Navy. Wasting no time, Luis Ernesto went to the home of Captain (RE) Ezequiel Federico Pereyra Zorraquín, who was in charge of organizing the revolutionary civilian commandos of the Federal Capital for the defense of the always threatened Barrio Norte and Recoleta, and asked him about Guevara's whereabouts. The owner of the house told him that the aforementioned official had left his home because the government intelligence services were constantly watching him and that, for this reason, he did not know where he was hiding.

At that same moment, Lieutenant Colonel Eleodoro Sánchez Lahoz arrived, bringing with him news from Corrientes where, apparently, the commanders of the VII Division had declared themselves in favor of the plot. In view of this, Luis Ernesto Lonardi, believing an urgent meeting between the newcomer and his father was necessary, began to pull the strings so that the pamper would take place that same afternoon.

Around noon, Lieutenant Colonel Pedro A. Pujol and First Lieutenant Florencio A. Pareja Ortiz established contact with Luis Ernesto Lonardi to inform him that there were fifty officers at the Superior War College and the Superior Technical School willing to fold and that Captain Oscar F. Silva, belonging to that last unit, had organized a sabotage operation against the tanks at Campo de Mayo.

Two hours later, the son of General Lonardi received a communication from Captain Pereyra Zorraquín, who put him in contact with Alfredo Rodríguez García, who at that time was in a country house in the town of Pilar in the company of Captain Edgardo García Puló. They agreed to meet in Buenos Aires at 5:00 p.m. and that's how it happened. Luis Ernesto showed up punctually at the agreed place and they picked him up there (in Pereyra Zorraquín's car) to go to the home of Mr. Román María Bourdieu, located in the town of Olivos, where they had been staying for several days. Major Guevara and his family.
At a time when the vehicle was parked in front of the aforementioned house, Major Guevara arrived who, seeing them, hurried them to enter the residence because he did not want to be exposed for too long on the street. The owner of the house received them and once they were seated in the living room, Luis Ernesto referred to what he had discussed with his father and the answer he had given him. It was what those present expected to hear and for that reason, an undisguised but discreet jubilation was perceived among them. Immediately afterwards, he explained that the postponement requested by General Aramburu was inadmissible and that he himself had left no other path than the one adopted, that is, that General Lonardi assume command of the uprising, since if he did not do so, the plot would be left to nothing. your luck. In addition, it was known that the Navy was drawing up plans to carry out a new bombardment of the Government House, on September 17, in case the Army did not make a statement[3].

While these bustles were going on, the Navy was making its own moves.
On the night of September 2 to 3, a secret meeting was held at the home of Dr. Héctor Bergalli, attended by the ship captains Arturo H. Rial and Ricardo Palma, the frigate captain Aldo Molinari and on behalf of the Army, General Juan José Uranga with Colonel Eduardo Señorans. During the same, the latter asked for the floor to request to postpone the actions pending more opportune moments but the owner of the house was strictly opposed.

-To make the revolution, it is enough for a regiment to rise up, because the radicals of the province of Buenos Aires will form a wave that will cover the country.

To those words Señorans responded that he preferred to trust the Army and the Armed Forces rather than the radicals and the silence of the rest of those present seemed to agree with him. Wanting to know the position of the Navy, General Uranga asked Captain Arturo Rial about it and he, fully confident, replied:

-General, you can be absolutely sure of that.

"Then, gentlemen," said General Uranga, "the revolution is made."

To which Colonel Señorans added:
 

I hope to be with you that night.

The meeting continued at Captain Rial's house, where General Uranga was strict when referring to the political purposes of the uprising and the need to have the support of the Navy. He went on at length about it and immediately afterwards, he gave his word of honor regarding the revolt of the Military College.
On Monday morning, the 5th, revolutionary civilian commandos that were operating in Bahía Blanca under the command of Captain Edgardo García Puló, were informed by Navy officials that the outbreak was going to take place early on September 8. However, on the evening of the 7th, Captain Molinari informed García Puló that he had been suspended.
The head of the commandos expressed his concern about that decision because the arrest of engineer Jorge P. Estarico, liaison between the Navy and the civilian commandos, was an indication that something strange was happening, but Molinari explained to him that the Navy could do nothing without Army support.
A new meeting at Captain Rial's failed when it was learned that Major Dámaso Pérez, head of the cadet corps of the Military College, denied his support for the coup.
On the morning of Friday the 9th, a naval officer arrived at Comandante Espora to inform García Puló that it was imperative to establish contact with the rebel command of the Navy since the drastic decision had been made that if the uprising did not take place before the 17th September, the base on its own, would attack Government House. When García Puló asked why such a firm determination was due, the newcomer replied that by that date, the Ministry of the Navy had agreed to an inspection of the unit and that if it were carried out, the conspiracy would be exposed and numerous arrests would be made.
That day, in the afternoon, a new meeting took place between the base delegate and Captain Molinari in which the latter requested 24 more hours to give an answer. The following day, at night (it was Saturday), Molinari met again with García Puló and Guevara so that the Navy would join the uprising as long as at least one Army regiment did so. Guevara listened attentively and asked for 48 hours to respond and it was at that meeting that the name of General Bengoa, detained at the Directorate of Mechanical Traction, was once again considered, so that he personally led the coastal forces.
Once contact was established with Bengoa, he sent word that although he accepted the command of those troops, it should be taken into account that his escape from the military unit in which he was confined was going to put the government on alert.
Colonel Señorans did not believe that choice was prudent and so he informed Major Guevara, asking him to find another officer immediately. The idea of appointing Colonel Eduardo Arias Duval then arose, since he was more than sure that once notified, he would enthusiastically accept the responsibility.
On the afternoon of September 11, Major Guevara met again with Luis Ernesto Lonardi to agree on a new meeting with the command of the uprising. This was done and in addition to General Lonardi, Lieutenant Colonel Sánchez Lahoz attended to listen very carefully to the action plan drawn up by his superior.
It consisted of five points that established:

1. Simultaneous uprising of the garrisons of Córdoba, Cuyo, the Litoral and Neuquén.
2. Uprising the naval bases of Río Santiago, Puerto Belgrano, Punta Indio and Comandante Espora together with the Sea Fleet and the Ríos Squad.
3. Uprising of the air garrisons of Paraná, Córdoba, Mendoza and Mercedes, province of San Luis.
4. March on Santa Fe in support of the crossing of the Paraná River by the Litoral forces, with the protection of the Escuadra de Ríos.
5. Ships from the Flota de Mar (Sea Fleet) would establish the blockade of the port of Buenos Aires and in case the government persisted in the defense, they would bombard the riverside area, mainly the Government House, the Ministry of War, the Central Post Office and other positions.

After the presentation, Sánchez Lahoz gave his word of honor that he would do everything possible to revolt the Corrientes garrison the same morning of the 16th and Guevara promised to organize new meetings with Captain Palma, Colonel Arias Duval and General Uranga at effects of transmitting the plan to the officers involved.
The meeting ended at 10:30 p.m. and immediately afterwards, Luis Ernesto Lonardi met with Captain Juan José Pierrestegui to entrust him with a conversation behind closed doors between General Lonardi and Colonel Víctor Arribau. It was held in the Belgrano neighborhood, on Monday the 12th at 10:00 a.m. and in it the second man expressed his support. For this reason, the leader of the uprising ordered him to go to Curuzú Cuatiá to help Colonel Juan José Montiel Forzano to revolt the armored regiments of that unit and he left immediately.
Then Lonardi decided to say goodbye to his family, starting with his grandchildren, the children of Dr. José Alberto Deheza and his daughter Marta, while his son-in-law[5], left quickly for the study of Dr. Teófilo Lacroze to ask him to send him to the colonel Ossorio Arana the following message: “The revolution is underway. He must get his things ready to go to Córdoba that very night” and he informed him that in the last hours of the afternoon, the general himself would give him the tickets with the latest instructions.
At 3:00 p.m. that same day, the meeting between General Lonardi, Colonel Arias Duval, and Major Guevara took place in Alfredo Rodríguez García's car. Once everyone was on board, the first one went straight to the point: Arias Duval had to go to the Litoral to start the uprising as soon as it broke out in Córdoba. The colonel listened to the call with a serious expression and when his superior had finished speaking, he asked her for 24 more hours to carry out the orders since, according to his point of view, on Saturday the 17th it would be easier to surprise the units. Lonardi flatly refused because, as he had stated on other occasions, the situation in Córdoba was extremely dangerous.
After the meeting, Guevara announced that that same morning, Colonel Señorans had told him at the Ministry of the Army that he was willing to place himself without hesitation under the orders of General Lonardi. On the other hand, the meeting with captain Palma agreed for 5:00 p.m. could not be carried out and he had been postponed until 11:00 p.m. that same day. At 6:00 p.m., the notary public Juan Carlos Soldano Deheza gave General Lonardi the two bus tickets that he was to bring to Colonel Ossorio Arana and half an hour later, the leader of the uprising contacted Captain Pereyra to order him and Captain Daniel Uriburu, moved to Córdoba in order to meet with him (Lonardi) at the house of Dr. Berrotarán. The meeting with General Uranga, scheduled for 7:00 p.m., did not materialize either, so it had to be postponed until 1:00 a.m. the following day.
At 9:00 p.m., Major Guevara and Luis Ernesto Lonardi accompanied the general to Dr. Lacroze's house where they were to meet with Colonel Ossorio Arana. Once there, Lonardi explained the situation chart to him and immediately afterwards explained the operations plan, which he followed with extreme attention. When he finished speaking, they hugged and immediately left the place quickly with his companions.
At 10:30 p.m., Colonel Ossorio Arana and his wife boarded the bus that would take them to Córdoba in Plaza Once. Upon arriving at his destination, the officer had to contact Dr. Villada Achaval so that he could take him immediately to the home of Dr. Calixto de la Torre where a new meeting had been planned that same morning. In the interim, he was to inform the chiefs and officers of the garrisons of the facts and organize a meeting at night with the heads of each unit.
From the Once bus terminal, Lonardi, his son, and Guevara (who had accompanied Ossorio Arana and his wife there), set out to meet Captain Palma.
Luis Ernesto was behind the wheel, with his father next to him and Guevara behind him. At the corner of Guido and Ayacucho streets, a man wearing a hat and coat was waiting for them, standing with his hands in his pockets. It was Colonel Arias Duval who, as soon as the vehicle stopped, quickly boarded it, shaking hands with those present once the son of the leader of the coup had resumed his march. Not far from there, Captain Palma, also dressed in a gray overcoat, was waiting for them. When he saw that the vehicle was approaching, he slowly approached the curb of the sidewalk and when it stopped him, he opened the rear door and entered it.
Once inside the car, the sailor was introduced to General Lonardi, to whom he shook hands while telling him that he was there representing Captain Arturo Rial.
The leader of the uprising went straight to the point explaining the reasons why he had taken command of the revolution and why it should take place on September 16. Next, he brought him up to date on the plan of operations and told him about the role that the Navy should play alongside the Army.
Palma listened attentively and when his interlocutor finished speaking, he said that it was imperative to take Martín García Island because air-naval attacks could be launched from it to neutralize the Morón Air Base. Immediately afterward, he referred to the role of the revolutionary civil commandos, who were thought to be assigned to take over the radio stations, and then he asked Lonardi what his opinion was.
The general gave his approval but clarified that civilians should not intervene until after 01:00 on September 16, since it was imperative to prevent information leaking that would destroy the surprise factor. Palma agreed and then the following dialogue was established between the two:

Capt. Palma: I understand that the movement is headed by General Aramburu and that he has decided to postpone it until a better opportunity. Who is the leader of the revolution?
Gen. Lonardi: I am the leader of the revolution.
Capt Palma: Understood, sir.
Gen. Lonardi: General Aramburu appreciated that the elements he had were not enough to launch a movement with chances of success. I understand that the conspiracy has reached a stage in which it tends towards its own disintegration due to the arrests that have occurred and any postponement will mean its complete annulment. In addition, the government is organizing armed groups whose mission is to oppose any subversive movement. We have entered into an honorary commitment with the young officers of the three armed forces that we must comply with, since they have assumed attitudes that any investigation will reveal and the sanctions will be severe. I have verified the number of units willing to participate in the movement and I consider them sufficient for there to be a chance of success. I think that the regime's own collaborators will welcome the elimination of Perón, which means that if the revolution succeeds in a single garrison in the interior for more than 48 hours, added to the blockade of the port of Buenos Aires, we cannot fail, always that we act with the firmest decision to win.
Captain, I want to know if I have the unconditional support of the force that you represent!
Capt. Palma: The Navy is willing to support you with all determination as long as you assure us that the Army will initiate hostilities.
Gen. Lonardi: You have already heard our action plan that will not be postponed in any case: on September 16 the revolution will be launched. Take my word for it. So it will be done.
Capt. Palma: On behalf of the Navy, I assure you of your participation and I wish you success in the operation.

After the conversation, the sailor and Colonel Arias Duval got out and the vehicle continued its journey to where General Uranga was waiting. The handshake that Lonardi and Palma gave each other before saying goodbye was the seal of the alliance between the Army and the Navy, an inescapable commitment that from that moment on, no one could break.
The car, always guided by Luis Ernesto Lonardi, arrived at the home of Captain Garda where the occupants of it quickly descended.
The owner of the house ushered them in and led them to the living room, where General Uranga was sitting waiting. The meeting began at 1:00 am sharp when Lonardi began to explain the revolutionary plan and the situation that Córdoba was going through at that time. As soon as he finished, he ordered him along with him to lead the Military College and the 1st Infantry Regiment to march on Rosario and annul the 11th Infantry Regiment and take the Arsenal. Once these objectives were achieved, he should continue towards Santa Fe with the mission of reducing his military forces and establishing the bridgehead that would allow the troops from the Litoral to cross the Paraná River.
Uranga expressed his reservations regarding the Military College since at that point it was known that his commitment was null but that even so, he would advance on Rosario with the elements that he could gather. Taking this detail into account, Major Guevara was entrusted with establishing contact with his peer, Dámaso Pérez or Captain Genta, an officer from the Military College, to try to convince them to join the uprising and locate First Lieutenant Gastón Driollet so that he could go to to the home of Captain Garda to receive the instructions that General Uranga had to send urgently to the 1st Infantry Regiment.
The meeting at the Garda home ended at 03:00, when those present stood up and General Uranga enthusiastically declared:

-Look, General, even if it's alone, I'm going to go out and shoot at Government House.

Back in his apartment, General Lonardi learned from Major Guevara that General Lagos had been conducting some polls among officers and high-ranking military commanders, and for that reason, he ordered him to contact him as soon as possible at his home in San Isidro to tell him that he had to urgently move to Mendoza to take charge of the forces in that region. In addition, he ordered him to send an urgent message to General Bengoa indicating that the presence of a general was more than necessary there, especially that of Bengoa, because not long ago he had commanded the III Army Division stationed there.
In these conditions they separated and took different directions. They were to meet at 4:30 p.m. that same day, at the Plaza Once bus terminal, before Lonardi left for Córdoba6.
A fact that no one had taken into account facilitated the last movements of the leader of the uprising in Buenos Aires: his birthday and that of his daughter Susana, on September 15, the date that the young woman planned to take advantage of to announce her engagement to Ricardo Quesada. By then, the invitations had already been distributed and for a week the family had been preparing a reception. Unexpectedly, the general asked his daughter and his future son-in-law to change the date to September 17 and shortly after advised them to purchase tickets to travel to Córdoba before the 14th.
Thus came the day of departure. That morning, Lonardi and his wife began packing, knowing that the building where they lived was heavily guarded.

To all this, in the bases of the south, the conspiracy reached borders of proportions when starting a covert operation, destined to alleviate the lack of weapons.
As has already been said, after what happened on June 16, the government had decided to remove the armed bombs from the naval planes and send them under strong custody to the Zárate Naval Arsenal. Consequently, the Navy was practically out of action and unable to start operations, and this greatly compromised the success of the uprising. In a word, there were plenty of planes but no bombs.
What there was, and many, were empty casings and a good supply of trotyl, stored in the magazines of the naval bases, a fact that led a group of officers to evaluate the possibility of using this material to replace weapons. confiscated.
After a series of meetings, the construction of homemade projectiles was resolved using the trotyl loaves and available casings, hence, always with the utmost caution and in absolute silence, the first steps were taken to start the operation. . The idea was to have everything ready for September 15 and when hostilities broke out, to have equipped planes.
To achieve the task, it was necessary to melt the loaves in steam pots, at a temperature of 80º C and compress their content inside the casings, so it was necessary to find trained personnel and a suitable place to carry out the task. Someone suggested the kitchens of the Workers' Dining Room at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base, which had a capacity of one thousand people, and an officer recalled that the person in charge of them was an Italian who had some experience in handling explosives.
A Frigate Captain was commissioned to establish contact with him and almost at the same time, the aforementioned facilities began to be conditioned so that everything would be ready when the appropriate personnel arrived on the scene.
The officer in question went to a house in the Arroyo Parejas neighborhood, located within the perimeter of the base, where that individual had lived since 1952, the year he arrived in the country. The man ushered him into a small room that he used as a living room and once inside, always adopting the appropriate precautions, the newcomer asked him if he was up to doing the job. After a brief analysis of the situation, the Italian replied that he was, and thus, without wasting time, he was led to the Dining Room building, in whose kitchen he immediately got to work.
The subject worked diligently, practically without rest, under the close supervision of superior personnel who prevented access to anyone who did not have proper authorization. In this way, giving power to the pots, he melted the first loaves of trotyl, whose mixture of nitric acid based on hydrocarbons was placed well pressed inside one of the casings and with it an initial test was carried out, the results of which were satisfactory. .
The Italian worked for six days, assisted by very few personnel since the mass production of that material was considered a risky task. During all this time, he was prevented from leaving the Great Hall except on one occasion, when it was necessary to accompany him to his home to pick up a medication he was taking and that is how, by the end of the week, he had hundreds of bombs ready.
After an arduous task, the work was finished and in this way, it was possible to equip the naval planes with the appropriate weapons that would allow them to operate once the hostilities had begun.

Notes

1. Luis Ernesto Lonardi, Dios es Justo, Francisco A. Colombo Editor, Buenos Aires, 1958.
2. Ídem.
3. The planes would depart from Comandante Espora.
4. Luis Ernesto Lonardi, op. cit. Luis Alberto Deheza, son-in-law of General Lonardi, was Minister of Defense during the last days of María Estela Martínez de Perón (1976)..
5. Luis Ernesto Lonardi, op. cit.
6. That same morning, after resting for a few hours, Lonardi spoke with Dr. Rogelio Driollet, as had been agreed..

1955 Guerra Civil. La Revolucion Libertadora y la caída de Perón