Argentina: On How the 1955 Revolution Shaped Military Thought

Under the Aegis of Aries

By Esteban McLaren

During World War II, as in World War I, Argentina maintained an official stance of neutrality for much of the conflict. However, within the armed forces—particularly in the Army—tensions emerged among factions debating what the country’s true position should be. One such faction, aligned with the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (United Officers Group - GOU), sympathized with the Nazi regime and, until 1943, advocated for Argentina to join the war on the side of the Axis powers. Following their successful coup d'état that same year, this faction seized control of the government, laying the groundwork for their preferred candidate, Juan Domingo Perón, to ascend to the presidency in the 1946 elections.

Perón, the son of Italian immigrants, initially assumed office as a constitutional president. However, he soon implemented a series of reforms aimed at suppressing opposition and consolidating his grip on power. Leveraging the surplus funds accumulated during Argentina’s wartime trade boom, he garnered support through bribes, subsidies, and other corrupt practices that allowed him to manipulate institutions to his advantage. Mismanagement of public resources became rampant: individuals with no prior wealth amassed fortunes, opposition media outlets were shut down or co-opted, and dissenting voices were systematically silenced—some through torture.

Amid this climate, a marginalized faction of the armed forces, sympathetic to the Allies and sidelined since the 1943 coup, began to regroup. This paper seeks to examine the recurring patterns within the anti-Peronist, or constitutionalist, forces that influenced Argentina's internal political-military dynamics, particularly during the period from 1955 to 1988, when these factions played a pivotal role in shaping the nation’s political landscape.

The Pro-Allied Faction

The earliest manifestations of this faction within the Argentine Army likely became evident during the failed coup attempt of 1951. What defined this group was their unwavering focus on action. These were military professionals trained to view challenges through the lens of the friend-enemy dichotomy. Their approach to any threat was inherently military: once the threat was identified, the enemy was delineated, and operations were executed to attack, pursue, and, if possible, annihilate it.

A prominent example of this ethos is Admiral Benjamín Gargiulo, the founder of the Argentine Navy's Marine Infantry Corps (IMARA). Inspired by the U.S. Marine Corps, Gargiulo instilled a spirit of rigorous preparation and combat readiness in his troops. During the failed coup of June 16, 1955, when his efforts were thwarted, Gargiulo chose to commit suicide—an act that shocked many but epitomized his sense of military honor and courage. This same valor would be echoed 27 years later at the Battle of Mount Tumbledown, where the Marine Infantry displayed exceptional bravery in the defense of Puerto Argentino during the Malvinas War.

This decisive and action-oriented approach stood in stark contrast to the hesitation shown by Juan Domingo Perón during the Liberating Revolution of 1955 (or 1955 Revolution). Faced with a rebellion in which only 18% of the troops turned against him, Perón faltered. The insurgents, led by General Eduardo Lonardi, stood firm, refusing to negotiate or compromise. Perón, accustomed to the political arena where deals and compromises were standard, seemingly misjudged the rebels’ intentions. Believing they sought a power-sharing agreement, he hesitated to order a decisive assault against their encircled forces. This hesitation allowed the insurgents to regroup and resume their offensive.

Once Lonardi's forces had reorganized, his first act was to order Perón’s arrest. This move, naturally, opened the door to his trial and potentially his execution—bringing Perón’s government to an abrupt end. Only then did Perón fully realize he was facing seasoned military professionals, not the political opportunists he was accustomed to outmaneuvering. His miscalculation sealed his fate, underscoring the stark difference between a military trained for decisive action and a politician unprepared for the harsh realities of armed rebellion.

The Liberating Revolution and the Formation of Army Officers

The Liberating Revolution, which overthrew the government of Juan Domingo Perón in 1955, had a profound impact on the composition and professional trajectory of officers within the Argentine Army. This process began with mass purges of officers deemed loyal to Peronism and the reinstatement of those aligned with anti-Peronist forces. Spearheaded by the Revolución Libertadora between 1955 and 1956, these changes disrupted the Army’s hierarchy, significantly altering its command structure and deeply affecting the careers of numerous officers (Mazzei, 2013).

The purge of Peronist officers resulted in the forced retirement of approximately 500 officers, many of whom were from the 60th to 74th graduating classes of the Military Academy. This affected officers from various branches, including infantry (53%), cavalry, and artillery. The vacancies left by their removal were often filled by less updated or less capable officers, which weakened the Army’s upper ranks.

Simultaneously, the Liberating Revolution reinstated around 180 anti-Peronist officers who had previously been dismissed. Many of these individuals later ascended to high-ranking positions within the military hierarchy, with some achieving the rank of general. The restoration of these officers solidified the influence of a military faction closely aligned with anti-Peronist ideology, significantly shaping the institution's leadership and operational outlook for years to come.na visión conservadora y antiperonista, que jugaría un rol crucial en los años venideros.

The "Blues" and the Consolidation of Military Power

Following the coup, the faction known as the "Blues" emerged as the dominant faction within the Army, consolidating its control throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This faction, under the leadership of figures such as Alejandro Lanusse and Alcides López Aufranc, imposed a militaristic and conservative vision that influenced both internal politics and Argentina's participation in territorial conflicts and the anti-subversive war. This faction managed to stay in power through a network of internal loyalties and through control of promotions and retirements within the military institution.

The Ideological and Operational Legacy

The impact of the Revolución Libertadora was not limited to a reconfiguration of the military hierarchy, but established a doctrine that would influence key events in Argentine history, such as the anti-subversive struggle and the conflict in the Malvinas Islands in 1982. The work underlines how this militaristic ideology promoted violent intervention in both internal and external conflicts, in defence of "national sovereignty" and the stability of internal order.

The changes in the composition and profile of Army officers during the Liberating Revolution significantly influenced military decisions in the following decades, particularly in how the Army approached counterinsurgency operations and territorial conflicts. The training and consolidation of these cadres during and after the Liberating Revolution instilled a distinctly aggressive decision-making style, exemplified by the harsh measures employed during the military dictatorship’s counterinsurgency campaign. This period saw the implementation of violent repression strategies against any perceived threat to the established order.

Moreover, the establishment of a high command that favored the use of force and embraced a nationalist perspective played a critical role in decisions such as the escalation of tensions during the Beagle Channel conflict with Chile in the 1970s and the invasion of the Malvinas Islands in 1982. The dominant ideology among these military officers—shaped during the Revolución Libertadora (1955 Revolution) and solidified in the subsequent decades—portrayed the Army as the guardian of national sovereignty against external enemies and as the enforcer of internal order against perceived subversion.

Professional soldiers trained under this doctrine operated with a clear and uncompromising premise: all problems were to be resolved militarily. Ambiguity was not an option. They assessed situations, identified enemies, planned attacks, and executed operations decisively, relying on force or the threat of it. The first major adversary of this philosophy was its ideological nemesis: the dictator Juan Domingo Perón. Subsequently, internal power struggles between factions emerged, including the infamous Azules versus Colorados clashes, leading to decades of military uprisings and internal conflicts.

Magdalena's 8th Tank Cavalry Regiment M4 Sherman Firefly over the Punta Indio Naval Station tarmac in 1965.

Conflict resolution within this faction of the Argentine military was consistently taken to extremes. The failed coup of 1951, the bombing of Plaza de Mayo on June 16, 1955, the decisive coup of September 13, 1955, the executions at León Suárez, and the series of coups throughout the 1960s left no doubt about the faction's uncompromising approach. On April 3, 1965, the 8th Tank Cavalry Regiment from Magdalena brutally attacked the Punta Indio Naval Air Base after being bombarded with rockets and napalm by naval aircraft. This level of unrestrained aggression became the norm.

A mentality shaped by the spirit of blitzkrieg dominated operations during the counterinsurgency campaigns, the near-war territorial disputes with Chile in 1978, and the climactic recovery of the Malvinas Islands. Operations such as Soberanía and Tronador exemplified this mindset. These plans were masterpieces of military strategy, marked by creative approaches and the ability to anticipate Chilean responses several steps ahead. They encapsulated the lessons learned by the officer corps, meticulously applying the most advanced military doctrine of the era.

The reliance on military solutions did not end there. The Carapintada rebellions and the brutal retaking of the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Regiment at La Tablada marked the closing chapter of a generation of soldiers forged for war. Often unable to resolve matters through other means, they consistently chose the use of military force as their primary response.

The negative consequences of this approach were evident in the widespread social condemnation of the methods employed during the counterinsurgency campaigns. The defeat in the Falklands War delivered the final blow to this mindset, leaving not only a profound loss of life but also a deep scar on national pride.

From a more positive perspective, the Argentine military approached their profession with uncompromising consistency, making decisions rooted firmly in military doctrine. Despite errors, indecision, and the brutalities committed, their actions often adhered to rigorous operational planning. Notable examples of military precision included Operation Rosario, an amphibious assault brilliantly executed against an enemy garrison with the explicit objective of avoiding casualties. Additionally, Argentina became the first country to simultaneously dismantle two terrorist movements—one urban and one rural—through a decentralized and audacious operation involving all military and police units to neutralize insurgent hideouts.

However, this war was later scrutinized in Argentine civil courts through a judicial process marred by irregularities, including the retroactive application of laws and improper proceedings that remain controversial. One critical misstep in the military’s counterinsurgency method was the disposal of insurgents’ bodies instead of returning them to their families, a decision that continues to fuel contention.

A Reflection on Military Responses and Leadership Failures

Allow me a personal reflection. One expects a military response from the armed forces; otherwise, there is no reason to call on them. When the military is summoned to address a problem, it is understood that the issue will be resolved manu militari. This entails frontal assaults, flanking maneuvers, precision strikes, saturating defenses, and seeking the enemy's surrender. The generation of Aries, guided by the Roman god of war, responded as expected—sometimes with massive errors, but always consistent with how the nation had trained them.

I deeply detest, with significant conviction, when a military officer ventures into political analysis, planning, or implementation for a real-world problem. When a tactician delves into geopolitics instead of focusing on executing orders from their superiors, it reflects a clear lack of professionalism. Such failures have existed, continue to exist, and will likely persist. A case in point was the HMS Shackleton incident, when the British oceanographic vessel intruded into Argentine waters in a blatant affront to national sovereignty. Intercepted by the ARA Rosales, the naval command from Libertad headquarters issued a direct order: "Sink it!" However, the naval officer in charge chose instead to have a coffee—a gesture that not only dishonored his uniform but also assumed roles reserved for the General Staff.

In 1982, General Luciano Benjamín Menéndez, as Argentina's military governor in the Malvinas, was tasked with designing the defensive plan against a potential British re-invasion. His plan, however, was a static defensive setup devoid of imagination or strategy. It resembled something conceived by a Chilean general—lacking in creativity and more concerned with maintaining good relations with the kelpers (the British-settled population) than defending the territory. When the enemy landing at San Carlos was detected, Menéndez's response was painfully reactive, if it could even be called that.

From that moment, events spiraled downward. There were no ambushes planned, no maneuvers to regroup forces, and no flanking or encirclement strategies implemented. Menéndez left each position commander to act independently, offering no centralized coordination or leadership. What emerged was a general with little intellect and even less courage, paralyzed by mediocrity, passively awaiting the inevitable. He failed to optimize the resources at his disposal, whether abundant or scarce. Instead of leading, Menéndez surrendered to inertia, displaying a complete lack of strategic vision and leadership. This was the cost of nepotism—elevating an officer tied to families associated with the Revolución Libertadora and the counterinsurgency campaigns. Menéndez prioritized geopolitical relations with those who despised him rather than focusing on his troops and crafting the best possible military plan.

A Broader Legacy of Patriotism

Despite the tragic context of Latin America, this generation of Aries left behind a lesson in patriotism that transcends generations. The shameful examples of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua—where senior military officers, lacking ethics, morals, and discipline, handed their nations over to petty dictators—stand as cautionary tales of what Argentina could have become. Yet, in Argentina, a cadre of patriotic officers emerged. When a dictator like Perón sought to perpetuate his rule, it was the brave 18% of troops who rose in rebellion to depose him. This is not the cursed Caribbean; this is Argentina. And in Argentina, when the military acts with honor, it does not surrender its homeland to tyrants.

Lessons from the Liberating Revolution

The Liberating Revolution not only restructured the Argentine Army and the entire armed forces in terms of their composition, but it also laid the ideological and operational groundwork for the decisions that would shape the nation’s military history in the decades that followed. From this experience, both positive lessons and critical errors emerge. It is our generation’s duty to learn from both as we shape the doctrine that will restore us to the military power we were destined to be.

GA 4: The Experience of the Young 2nd Lieutenant Jorge Zanela

Account of a Young Second Lieutenant

Jorge Zanela, who was then a 23-year-old second lieutenant and head of the artillery section of GA 4 (4th Airborne Artillery Group).

Starting on May 24, Battery A, composed of four artillery pieces, took a position in the Darwin area, joining Task Force "Mercedes." They would face the British advancing toward that point after having landed in San Carlos Bay with harassing fire.

Two artillery pieces were sent by sea aboard the Río Iguazú. After being attacked by British aviation, and in a complicated rescue operation that took over a day to recover the pieces blindly from the ship's flooded hold, they reached Darwin. The other two Oto Melara pieces were transported by a Chinook helicopter on the afternoon of May 26.

That day, the artillery pieces began to fire. They also targeted a British frigate, which retreated after 16 shots.

May 28 was a day of intense combat. Zanela recalls that everything came down to loading and firing. Each howitzer was commanded by a non-commissioned officer and assisted by five soldiers. He estimates that 2,400 rounds were fired, "everything we had," he described.

Most of the activity took place at night. During the day, they would scout the terrain and transport ammunition. It was a constant back-and-forth carrying crates.

The Oto Melara had a range of ten kilometers and could not effectively reach the enemy positions. It had a shorter range, requiring a steeper firing angle. Even so, the soft peat soil caused both Argentine and British projectiles to sink too deeply, making the explosions less effective than expected.

It was two days of relentless combat. Some soldiers bled from their ears due to ruptured eardrums caused by the continuous thunder of the artillery. Many were temporarily deaf, and soldiers ended up with swollen fists from the force required to push the projectiles into the artillery pieces.

They did not have forward observers or a fire direction center, so they relied on highly accurate Kelper maps and information from advanced infantry units.

On May 29, at 2:00 a.m., combat ceased in Darwin. The artillerymen suffered no fatalities, only minor injuries from shrapnel, and one non-commissioned officer injured his arm after being struck by the recoil of a cannon.

The cannons were rendered unusable: the breech blocks and aiming scopes were removed and thrown into the sea along with other equipment. A Mercedes-Benz jeep, which had only 80 kilometers on its odometer, had its oil drained and was left running to seize the engine. When the engine held up, parts of it were broken with sledgehammer blows.

Integrated Naval Base in Ushuaia: Perspectives and Antarctic Geostrategy

 

Analysis of the Integrated Naval Base in Ushuaia and Its Impact on Argentine Claims in the Antarctic Treaty Re-Negotiation

1. Strategic Importance of the Integrated Naval Base in Ushuaia

The Integrated Naval Base in Ushuaia, Argentina, represents a significant geostrategic development in the South Atlantic and Southern Ocean. Located at the southernmost tip of South America, this base offers Argentina a direct operational gateway to Antarctica, enhancing its ability to project maritime, scientific, and logistical capabilities in the region. The base strengthens Argentina's naval infrastructure, allowing for increased surveillance, patrolling, and the potential control of maritime chokepoints, especially around the Drake Passage, which is a critical maritime corridor.

The base is expected to support naval, coast guard, and scientific missions. Its dual-use capacity (military and scientific) provides Argentina with a legitimate presence in Antarctic-related activities, aligning with its obligations under the Antarctic Treaty while also reinforcing its geopolitical claims.

---

2. Transformation of Argentine Leverage in Antarctic Treaty Re-Negotiations

The Antarctic Treaty, established in 1959, is set to face re-negotiation pressures in 2048, as some signatories may seek to alter its key provisions, particularly those related to the extraction of natural resources. Argentina has a historical claim to a portion of Antarctica, overlapping with British and Chilean claims. The Ushuaia base will be a major strategic asset for Argentina during this renegotiation process for several key reasons:

1. Enhanced Physical Presence: The proximity of the Ushuaia base to Antarctica enables Argentina to demonstrate a "continuous presence" in the region. This presence matters under international law, as it strengthens sovereignty claims. Permanent facilities that support both scientific research and naval operations could bolster Argentina’s claim that it has an enduring and effective presence in its claimed sector of Antarctica.

2. Scientific Leadership: Argentina has already invested in Antarctic research, and the Ushuaia base provides expanded logistical support to its Antarctic research stations. This enables Argentina to increase its contributions to scientific discovery, which is a core pillar of the Antarctic Treaty. By leading in scientific research, Argentina can argue for a greater say in future treaty negotiations.

3. Maritime and Security Control: The Ushuaia base provides Argentina with the capacity to oversee maritime activities around Antarctica, especially in fishing, resource exploration, and illegal incursions. By controlling these activities, Argentina may position itself as a key steward of Antarctic conservation, while also subtly reinforcing the legitimacy of its claims.

4. Symbolic Power and National Prestige: Establishing a high-profile naval base at Ushuaia sends a symbolic message to domestic and international audiences. Domestically, it reinforces the Argentine government’s narrative of asserting sovereignty. Internationally, it signals to other claimants (notably the UK) that Argentina is serious about its Antarctic ambitions and will actively defend its position during any future negotiations.

---

3. Potential Geopolitical Consequences

• Shift in Balance of Power: Argentina's increased capacity to project power from Ushuaia could shift the balance of power in the South Atlantic, potentially challenging the UK's position in the Falklands/Malvinas dispute. Enhanced Argentine patrols may create diplomatic friction, especially if Argentina increases inspections of foreign-flagged vessels near the Antarctic region.

• Increased Regional Competition: Chile and Argentina have overlapping Antarctic claims. The development of the Ushuaia base could prompt Chile to respond with its own enhanced infrastructure. Brazil, another Antarctic Treaty signatory, may also perceive this as a sign to strengthen its role in Antarctic affairs.

• Linking the Antarctic to the Malvinas/Falklands Dispute: Argentina may attempt to link its Antarctic ambitions with its broader sovereignty claims over the Malvinas/Falklands. The operational capacity provided by the Ushuaia base would enable Argentina to strengthen patrols around the islands, adding pressure on the UK and heightening the symbolic link between its Antarctic and Malvinas/Falklands claims.

---

4. Final Assessment

The Integrated Naval Base in Ushuaia is a critical enabler of Argentina’s long-term strategy to secure a prominent role in the future of Antarctica. It provides Argentina with enhanced strategic, operational, and symbolic leverage. By expanding its physical presence, scientific contributions, and security role in Antarctic affairs, Argentina will be better positioned to influence the renegotiation of the Antarctic Treaty in 2048. This endeavor also places Argentina in a stronger geopolitical position in the South Atlantic, with potential repercussions for its relations with Chile, Brazil, and the UK.

Commandos in Malvinas: Lack of Technique and Doctrine in Reconnaissance Missions

Reconnaissance Patrols Without Technique or Doctrine

Reconnaissance Patrols Without Technique or Doctrine

Excerpt taken from the book "Comandos en Malvinas - The Other Story," chapter "Analysis of Operations." The book is available in print and e-book format on Amazon.

Without a doubt, it can be said that within the Argentine Army (EA), the Argentine Navy (ARA), and the Argentine Air Force (FAA), there was no clear doctrine regarding the use of commando units for reconnaissance tasks. Incredibly, reconnaissance missions were considered secondary and even looked down upon within the different units and in the commando training course itself. In this course, barely any time was devoted to such missions, when, as we all know, any technique is mastered by precisely dedicating time to it and practicing it repeatedly.

The problem in the Argentine case was that many of these techniques were simply unknown. A reflection of the perception of reconnaissance operations within Argentine units can be seen in comments made by Major Rico in several interviews. The commander of the 602 Commando Company stated that his men were wasted on reconnaissance missions when they should have been used for raids against high-value targets. According to Rico's exact words, exploration missions were not worth the effort and could be carried out by other units.

This outdated mindset among the Argentines regarding reconnaissance patrols, along with its resulting consequences, was in complete contrast to the practices followed at the time by units in countries with experience and ongoing conflicts, such as Israel, South Africa, and NATO nations. In these countries, reconnaissance missions occupied a large portion of training hours and unit resources, and they were valued by general headquarters as force multipliers and a high-value resource for the development of subsequent operations.

NATO countries had even established an international training school for deep reconnaissance patrols in 1979 in Weingarten, Germany. This center aimed to improve procedures, standardize protocols, and reduce training costs. The Soviet Union also placed great importance on reconnaissance patrols.

After the Malvinas conflict, the operations carried out by Argentine commandos were studied in many training centers and military schools worldwide, serving as a model of "what not to do." For example, at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) at Fort Bragg, U.S.A., the errors committed by Argentine patrols were part of the curriculum from 1984 until at least 1992. But it was especially at Weingarten, thanks in part to British instructors assigned there, that the serious mistakes of Argentine commando units were widely disseminated and known at the international level. From then on, these errors were used in commando schools and training courses in many countries as examples of the mistakes to avoid.

An old military adage says, "Time spent on reconnaissance is never wasted time," a principle that the Argentine Armed Forces and their commando units did not seem to have internalized — and had to learn the hard way.

Sarmiento and Patagonia

The historian Luciana Sabina analyzes the controversy that involved Domingo Sarmiento regarding the Patagonian lands and Chile’s claims over them.
Luciana Sabina || Memo




Map of the Southern Cone from 1849

Exiled in Chile, Sarmiento paid close attention to the colonizing expedition that the country sent to the Magellan region in 1843, founding Fuerte Bulnes. By 1848, that settlement moved a few kilometers, taking the name Punta Arenas. The occupation was based on the legal principle of res nullius (of no one), universally accepted at that time, according to which any nation could take possession of inhospitable spaces. Like it or not, the entire Patagonian territory was considered an empty space, lands in indigenous hands that had never been conquered by the Spanish, and because of this, they did not belong to the Río de la Plata or to Chile. They would belong to the first to settle there.

It was only five years later that Rosas, through the Foreign Ministry, presented Chile with a formal protest, claiming Argentine rights over the area. As a result, on March 11, 1849, Sarmiento published a first article on the matter in his newspaper La Crónica, titled “The Magellan Question.” There, he defended the Chilean position. Being fair and objective, he pointed out that since 1585 no one had established occupation in the area; that the act of sovereignty by Chile had been repeatedly mentioned in the press and in presidential messages; despite which the Restorer [Rosas] did not express himself. Rosas, remaining silent for years, had consented to the trans-Andean advance and was claiming something without showing titles or precedents of ownership. Furthermore, Sarmiento added, Rosas was concerned with claiming territories abroad while the heart of Argentina was a land of indigenous raids and uprisings. Consequently, he recommended the Restorer take care of populating the Chaco, Río Negro, and interprovincial borders. In other words, he reminded the government of Buenos Aires that it could not handle what it had and wanted more, only to leave it in complete neglect.



At the time, France and England—in the midst of imperialist expansion—saw Hispanic America as a set of young nations suffering the vicissitudes inherent to all infancy, and they attempted to establish themselves in the area. British, French, North American, and German maps of the time show Patagonia as res nullius, with which they could have easily occupied it. It was urgent to establish oneself in the area, and Chile was the only country with some political stability and in conditions to do so. The occupation of the mouth of the strait was surprising to the Europeans and had a deterrent effect. All of Patagonia could have met the same fate as the Falklands.

In response to Sarmiento’s publication, Rosas had a newspaper founded in Mendoza: La Ilustración Argentina. Under the direction of Bernardo de Irigoyen, he was the first to refer to Sarmiento as a “traitor.” Though for the Rosistas, anyone who thought differently was a “traitor to the homeland.”

The Restorer ended up submitting a request to extradite the man from San Juan, stating that Chile could not continue sheltering him because he disturbed the peace between the two nations, thereby violating the right of asylum. The trans-Andean authorities did not entertain the request, arguing that freedom of the press existed there.

Rosas was never able to demonstrate that the area belonged to us because, in fact, it does not belong to us. But the matter did not end there.

Three decades later, during Sarmiento’s presidency, the Chileans experienced a certain imperialist fever and claimed rights based on laughable grounds over Argentine Patagonia. To this end, they cited articles in the Chilean press from the past, in which Don Domingo had spilled his ink and ingenuity. The situation was complex for the man from San Juan: the Paraguayan War had not yet concluded, and the opposition—taking advantage of the moment—sought to tear him apart. The word “traitor” once again lashed at the colossus from Cuyo.

He then sought to demonstrate that he had never written in favor of Chilean sovereignty over our land. For this, he tasked Félix Frías—ambassador in Chile—with carefully reviewing the questioned articles. The seasoned diplomat concluded that, indeed, there was no comment referring to Patagonia. In all of them, Sarmiento referred to Chilean rights over the specific area of the Strait of Magellan. Despite this, many still consider him a traitor who wanted to give away the south.

Beagle Crisis: The Beagle/Cape Horne Air Naval Battle

Beagle Crisis: The Fleets Face Off in the Southern Sea

By Esteban McLaren for FDRA

On December 22, 1978, D-Day, coordinated military actions along the borders with Chile would have commenced as part of Operation Sovereignty. It is difficult to determine with certainty which of the planned actions would have officially initiated the war, but it is clear that a simultaneous assault on at least four fronts would have taken place. The primary front would have been the naval battle and landing in the Beagle Channel, where the Argentine Navy's Marine Corps (IMARA) would have deployed troops to the Lennox, Nueva (already occupied by Chilean Marine Corps, CIM), and Picton Islands.

The purpose of this article is to explore an alternative history scenario. The war never took place, but what would have happened if Argentina had not accepted papal mediation?

In December 1978, tensions between Argentina and Chile over the sovereignty of the Picton, Lennox, and Nueva islands in the Beagle Channel reached a critical point. Diplomacy had failed, and both countries were preparing for armed confrontation. The Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR), with its powerful combination of aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, was preparing to face the Chilean Navy (ACh), a well-equipped force but at a numerical and technological disadvantage. Chilean authors speculate that in terms of infantry, Argentine forces roughly doubled the Chileans in size; in terms of armored vehicles, the ratio was 5:1; for aircraft, 3:1; and in naval strength, Argentina was slightly superior in some aspects (surface combatants), decisively superior in others (submarines operating in the area), and qualitatively unmatched in yet another (aircraft carriers).

Order of Battle as of December 20, 1978

Chilean Navy (ACh)

• Main Ships:

  • Tre Kronor-class light cruiser: Almirante Latorre.
  • Brooklyn-class light cruiser: Capitán Prat.
  • Almirante-class destroyers: Almirante Riveros, Blanco Encalada, and Cochrane.
  • Leander-class frigates: Almirante Williams, Almirante Condell, and Almirante Lynch.
  • Fletcher-class destroyers: Blanco Encalada (DD-14) and Cochrane (DD-15).
  • Allen M. Sumner-class destroyer: Ministro Portales.

• Submarines:

  • SS Simpson, the only operational submarine, as the Oberon-class submarines were undergoing major maintenance.

• Naval Aviation:

  • AS-332 Super Puma helicopters.

Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR)

• Main Ships:

  • Aircraft carrier: ARA Veinticinco de Mayo.
  • Brooklyn-class cruiser: ARA General Belgrano.
  • Type 42 destroyer: ARA Hércules.
  • Gearing-class destroyer: ARA Py.
  • Allen M. Sumner-class destroyers: ARA Comodoro Seguí, ARA Bouchard, and ARA Piedrabuena.
  • Fletcher-class destroyers: ARA Rosales (D-22), ARA Almirante Domecq García (D-23), and ARA Almirante Storni (D-24).
  • A69-class corvettes: ARA Drummond and ARA Guerrico.

• Submarines:

  • ARA Santiago del Estero, ARA Salta, ARA San Luis, and ARA Santa Fe.

• Naval Aviation:

  • 8 A-4Q Skyhawk aircraft aboard the carrier, with one on 24/7 interceptor alert on the flight deck. The interceptor on deck intercepted a CASA 212 maritime patrol aircraft stationed at Puerto Williams twice.
  • SH-3 Sea King helicopters.

2. Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Both Fleets

Chilean Navy (ACh)

• Qualitative:

  • High defensive capability with frigates equipped with Exocet missiles.
  • Limited submarine capacity, with only one operational submarine.
  • Good coordination between surface and air units.

• Quantitative:

  • 2 light cruiser
  • 3 frigates
  • 6 destroyers
  • 1 operational submarine

Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR)

• Qualitative:

  • Air superiority with the aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo.
  • Greater submarine capacity with 4 operational submarines.
  • High force projection capability with modern destroyers and frigates.

• Quantitative:

  • 1 air carrier
  • 1 light cruiser
  • 8 destroyers
  • 2 missile corvettes
  • 4 submarines

 

Conflict Escalation

The conflict did not de-escalate; on the contrary, it worsened. The Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR) decided to launch an attack on the Chilean Navy, which quickly set sail from Valparaíso heading south toward the Beagle Channel. The last detected position of FLOMAR was 120 miles (some sources cite 193 miles) southwest of Cape Horn, preparing to support Operation Sovereignty, whose primary objective was the amphibious landing and capture of the Picton, Lennox, and Nueva islands.

 

Capabilities Analysis

Chilean Navy (ACh)
The ACh possessed a light cruiser, destroyers, and frigates, all equipped with anti-air and anti-submarine defense capabilities. However, operational issues with the SS Simpson left the fleet without effective submarine coverage, a critical disadvantage in modern naval warfare.

Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR)
FLOMAR, on the other hand, had the advantage of the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, which provided air superiority with its A-4Q Skyhawks. The modern destroyers and multiple operational submarines gave FLOMAR a robust capacity for both defense and attack.

 

Key Points of Advance and Refuge Locations for the Chilean Navy (ACh)

To reach the Beagle Channel, the Chilean fleet would advance southward from Valparaíso, passing through Puerto Montt, the Chacao Channel, the Gulf of Penas, Bahía Inútil, and the Strait of Magellan, before heading toward the Beagle Channel. If refuge were needed, Chilean fjords such as the Última Esperanza Fjord, Quintupeu Fjord, Aysén Fjord, or Comau Fjord would serve as strategic locations to hide and launch counterattacks.

Quintupeu and Comau Fjords

 
Última Esperanza Fjord or Sound

Final Approach to the Beagle Channel (or Cape Horn)

The upper map shows the route of the Chilean fleet according to official Chilean and Argentine bibliographies.

Note that the Chilean fleet’s course passed over the position of the ARA Santa Fé submarine because it had detected them precisely days before December 21. In other words, the enemy fleet had already been detected and followed by a submarine of the Argentine Submarine Force (CFS). The fleet was heading south of Cape Horn to combat stations, with two ships anchored side by side, awaiting orders to attack. The ships were arranged in this manner to allow for personnel exchange and social interaction while waiting (Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano, 2017). We will return to this point later.

Detection and Engagement Strategies

The Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR) would employ its S-2 Tracker and P-2 Neptune aircraft for reconnaissance missions (as they would successfully do four years later in the Malvinas), and the A-4Q Skyhawks for attacks, while Argentine submarines would ambush Chilean ships at critical points in the Strait of Magellan and the Drake Passage. FLOMAR’s destroyers and frigates would provide fire support and anti-aircraft defense to protect amphibious and heliborne assault operations.

Once again, it is enlightening to refer to the "official" account of the Chilean fleet’s movements (Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano, 2017). In this text, it is detailed how Chilean officers trained on a land-based simulator (this is not a joke) called Redifon, which consisted of interconnected cubicles simulating ships, and practiced maneuvers in the basement of the Tactical Training Center of the Naval War Academy in Valparaíso. Merino and López, practicing on this analog simulator, tried various attack combinations on the FLOMAR and concluded that they had to achieve "control of the sea," aiming for a decisive naval battle in the style of Mahan. The outcome of these exercises determined an optimal attack formation where "all missile-equipped ships would go ahead, with gunnery ships behind" (p. 86). I don’t understand why the Redifon was even required for something that seems like common sense. Or was there perhaps some logic to sending the gunships first (Prat, Latorre) and the missile ships behind (Almirante-class, Leander-class)?

FLOMAR, on the other hand, "lacked" such a simulator simply because the crews spent most of the naval year on board, maneuvering with real ships in real time and facing real problems. Approximately two-thirds of the year, the crews remained on board—a fact anyone with relatives in the Argentine Navy at that time can corroborate. Many sailors during this golden era of the Argentine Navy only met their children when they were 8 or 9 months old, as their life at sea prevented earlier visits. The distance between both fleets, beyond the geographic one, was astronomical.

 

Analysis of the Clash of Forces

Within the framework of the 1978 Beagle Crisis, tensions between Argentina and Chile reached a critical point, bringing both nations to the brink of armed conflict. Operation Sovereignty, planned by Argentina, had as its primary objective the amphibious landing and capture of the Picton, Lennox, and Nueva islands, located in the Beagle Channel. This operation was to be conducted under strong naval and air cover provided by the Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR).

Preparations and Force Composition

By late December 1978, FLOMAR was fully equipped and ready for action. It had at its disposal the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, a crucial asset that carried A-4Q Skyhawks and S-2 Trackers, providing both air interception and maritime patrol capabilities. The fleet also included several modern destroyers, such as the ARA Hércules (the only one equipped with medium range naval SAM like the Sea Dart), as well as frigates like the ARA Piedrabuena and ARA Espora. Additionally, Argentina possessed a significant submarine force with the ARA Santiago del Estero, ARA Salta, ARA Santa Fe, and ARA San Luis submarines.

The Chilean Navy (ACh), although smaller in number, maintained a robust defensive force. Its primary asset was the light cruiser CL-02 Capitán Prat and the still formidable Almirante Latorre, accompanied by frigates and destroyers equipped with MM-38 Exocet missiles. The Chilean fleet also included the submarine SS-21 Simpson, the only operational submarine at the time, as the other Oberon-class submarines were undergoing major maintenance.

 

Operation Development

The landing operation planned by Argentina focused on Isla Nueva, where it was known that around 150 Chilean marines were entrenched. The Argentine strategy was to land on the southern coast of the island, avoiding Chilean defenses in the north. To execute this, the amphibious transport ARA Cabo San Antonio would be employed, escorted by destroyers and frigates providing fire support and protection.

The Chileans anticipated a conventional landing on the islands, when in fact, the most likely scenario was that the occupation would be carried out via vertical assault using helicopters.

The final phase of FLOMAR’s approach was established with the Argentine fleet advancing from its last detected position, 120 miles south of Cape Horn, moving eastward toward the Beagle Channel. Meanwhile, the Chilean Navy (ACh) mobilized from Puerto Williams, heading toward the channel to intercept the Argentine forces. Here, two simultaneous courses of action can be evaluated: first, the main fleet moved toward the Drake Passage to engage FLOMAR in open waters; second, the smaller torpedo boats (Quidora, Fresia, Tegualda, and Guacolda) would confront the landing force.

Submarine Warfare

The book La Escuadra en Acción by Arancibia Clavel and Bulnes Serrano recounts the military and political activity during the conflict, with a focus on the Chilean Navy. Although the text is not highly technical regarding the means employed, it provides an interesting general description of the operations of the Chilean fleet in the south.

In this account, it is mentioned that the Chilean Submarine Force was composed of the Balao-class submarine Simpson (SS-21) and the modern, for the time, British Oberon-class submarines named Hyatt (SS-23) and O'Brien (SS-22).

According to this source, the O'Brien was in dry dock during the conflict, and the Hyatt had to interrupt its transit south and return to its base in Talcahuano due to a mechanical failure. The other Balao-class submarine, the Thomson (SS-20), is not even mentioned, possibly because it had already been decommissioned due to its age. In fact, both Brazil and Argentina had retired their submarines of this class in the early 1970s, after receiving the Guppy class.

Although the Simpson was technologically outdated for the circumstances, it managed to fulfill its mission. The old submarine had to surface frequently to recharge its batteries, dangerously exposing itself to Argentine radars and periscopes. It was photographed at least twice by Argentine submarines while on the surface. Due to its wear, it is not surprising that this operation had to be performed more frequently than usual. The Simpson was detected twice by Argentine submarines, which chose not to fire their torpedoes. Nonetheless, it is possible that its commander, Rubén Scheihing, attempted to attack despite his technological disadvantage.

Patrol Areas Assigned to the Argentine Submarines

Although the exact dates cannot be confirmed, the Guppy-class submarines were very close to engaging in combat, although fortunately, their commanders interpreted their orders with sound judgment. In mid-December, the Santa Fe submarine was patrolling the entrance to Bahía Cook at a depth of 50 meters. The sonar operators detected the sound of approaching warship propellers. The commander of the S-21 raised the combat alarm, the crew took their positions, and all torpedo tubes were prepared for launch. The propeller sounds grew in number, eventually forming what appeared to be "a fleet." The Chilean squadron sailed above the S-21, heading into the open waters of the South Pacific.

The sonar operators counted three, four, six... up to 13 ships. Some had "heavy" propellers, like cruisers, while most had "light" propellers, similar to those of destroyers.

However, the Chilean fleet was sailing without emitting signals, meaning they were not using active sonar on the escort ships. A fleet commander's decision to sail without emitting can have several justifications, such as not actively searching for submarines or preferring to be more discreet, as sonar emissions propagate over great distances and can be detected by submarine countermeasure equipment, revealing their course or trajectory.

It is not difficult to imagine the immense tension experienced by the crew of the Santa Fe. Suspended in silence dozens of meters below the Pacific, they awaited the Chilean fleet's actions, with weapons ready to launch if the right moment came to strike from a tactically advantageous position.

Ultimately, the Chilean fleet entered open waters, moving away from the S-21. Following his orders, the commander of the Santa Fe did not interpret the Chilean fleet's maneuver as a hostile act, especially at a time when there was no formal declaration of war.

This situation clearly shows that the ARA Santa Fe was aware of the Chilean fleet's position and, in the event of war, it would have been the first to launch torpedoes against the Chilean fleet.

Meeting and Engagement Point

The meeting point of the fleets would be near the Beagle Channel. FLOMAR had to face the threat of the ACh's MM-38 Exocet missiles, with a range of 35-40 km. There is a recurring narrative in dialogues, discussions, and exchanges with trans-Andean experts and novices alike that suggests a certain accounting of Exocets, leading to the assumption that a potential naval battle would "clearly" tip in favor of the ACh. At that time, Chile was thought to have 4 to 8 more missile launchers than the ARA. This is the denial of the evident Argentine advantage, as these opinion shapers tend to overlook the key assets of the ARA: its aircraft carrier and its four operational submarines. For greater clarity, the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo provided Argentina with a significant advantage, enabling attacks from distances of over 200 miles (370 km). Another key factor, when compared with the experience in the Malvinas, is that the Argentine Naval Aviation had full experience in anti-ship attacks, and the bomb fuses would have been correctly adjusted to detonate on impact with the ships. Once the Chilean fleet was detected by the S-2 Tracker and P-3 Neptune aircraft, its position would be relayed to FAA airbases and the CFS submarines, and it would only be a matter of time to see who would arrive first to the hunt.

Landing and Engagement Scenarios

1. Chilean Fleet’s Approach to Stop the Landing
   The Chilean Navy (ACh) would rapidly advance from Puerto Williams toward the Beagle Channel, deploying its frigates and destroyers to intercept and attack the Argentine landing forces. Fast attack craft would also be used to disrupt the landings and support vessels. The Chileans would launch Exocet missiles and use naval artillery to harass the landing craft. Additionally, they would coordinate air strikes from Punta Arenas using Hawker Hunter and A-37 Dragonfly aircraft. Entering the Beagle Channel is a losing strategy for either fleet due to restricted movement, sensor disruption caused by terrain clutter, and the consequent degradation in weapon performance.

2. FLOMAR’s Response to This Movement
   In response to the Chilean approach, FLOMAR would deploy its A-4Q Skyhawks and S-2 Trackers from the aircraft carrier to conduct preemptive strikes against ACh units. Argentine submarines would patrol strategic areas to intercept Chilean ships. FLOMAR would use its air defense systems to intercept approaching aircraft and launch its own anti-ship missiles to neutralize key threats. Unlike the Chilean fleet, the Argentine Navy had an external attack element in the form of carrier-based aviation. The confined space of the channel would facilitate an air-naval attack and would have been ideal for a sequence of attacks followed by rearming to restart the cycle.

3. ACh Focuses on Seeking Out FLOMAR for Direct Defeat
   Based on the cited literature, this was the path chosen by the Chilean Navy. If the ACh had decided to seek out and directly confront FLOMAR, they would have circled Navarino Island or approached via the Drake Passage toward Cape Horn (southeast route). They would coordinate with the Simpson submarine and aerial patrols to locate the Argentine fleet, launching missiles and naval artillery strikes as soon as they detected it. According to the same literature, the ARA Santa Fe was positioned beneath the fleet when it entered open waters, meaning the target was detected first. Again, in this scenario, the Argentine naval aviation would have encountered them halfway, in any case, forcing them to endure several waves of A-4Q Skyhawk attacks. What remained of these waves would be what could confront an intact FLOMAR. Checkmate.

4. FLOMAR Focuses on Seeking Out ACh for Direct Defeat
   If FLOMAR decided to seek out and directly confront ACh, it would advance from its position south of Cape Horn toward the northeast. They would use their carrier-based aircraft for reconnaissance and attack, first launching repeated air strikes to sink or disable the main surface assets, followed by attacks to sink or damage various ships. They would then move closer to launch anti-ship missiles from their destroyers and frigates, coordinating strikes with their submarines.

   Here we recall the ACh's "combat station" formation: the ships were anchored side by side to share the wait with social interaction and the exchange of supplies. If the ARA had launched its A-4Q Skyhawks while this formation was still in place, it would have greatly facilitated the effectiveness of the bombs. A single bombing run by three aircraft with three 450-kilogram bombs could have impacted two ships at a time, doubling their efficiency. Checkmate.

Roles of Naval and Military Aviation

• Argentine Carrier-Based Naval Aviation:

  • A-4Q Skyhawk: These aircraft would conduct interception and air superiority missions, as well as attacks on enemy ships to protect the landing forces. A total of 8 units were carrier-based.
  • S-2 Tracker: These aircraft would perform maritime patrols, submarine detection, and coordination of anti-submarine and anti-ship attacks. 2 units were carrier-based.
  • P-3 Neptune: Operating from land bases, these long-range aircraft had highly trained crews who conducted year-round missions in the Argentine Sea.

• Naval Aviation Based in Río Grande:

  • T-28 Fennec: These aircraft would perform close air support missions and ground attacks to cover the landing forces (deployed in Río Grande and Estancia La Sara). A total of 19 units.
  • MB-326 Aermacchi: These aircraft would carry out interdiction and ground attack missions to support amphibious and land operations (Río Grande). The exact number of units is undetermined.
  • T-34C Turbo Mentor: These aircraft would undertake light attack missions, logistical support, and supply transport. More than 12 units.

• Chilean Military Aviation in Chabunco:

  • Hawker Hunter: These aircraft would perform interception and air combat, ship attacks, and provide support to ground forces (6 units).
  • A-37 Dragonfly: These aircraft would conduct ground attacks, close support, interdiction, and harassment of Argentine landing forces (12 units).

• Argentine Military Aviation in Río Gallegos:

  • A-4B/C/P Skyhawk: These aircraft would carry out attacks on ships and provide support to ground forces, as well as interception and air combat when necessary (12 units).
  • Mirage IIIEA/Mirage 5 Dagger/IAI Nesher: More than 30 units of the three models combined.
  • F-86 Sabre: These were pure interception fighters, deployed to engage the Hawker Hunters due to experience gained during the Indo-Pakistani wars. The exact number is unclear, but pilot reports suggest there were more than 4 units and less than 14.
  • Their objectives were first to initiate bombings against military targets in the cities of Punta Arenas (Chabunco airbase) and Puerto Williams (Zañartú airfield) and to destroy the Chilean Air Force, using a technique very similar to that employed by Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967. The same approach would be implemented across all active fronts.

 

A-4Q Launched from the Aircraft Carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo Strikes the ACh APD-29 Uribe

 

The offensive against Chile would follow the following sequence: (Wikipedia):

• Starting at 20:00 hours (H-2) on D-Day, December 22, 1978, FLOMAR and the Marine Infantry — Battalion No. 5 — would occupy the Freycinet, Hershell, Wollaston, Deceit, and Hornos islands (see map below).
• At 22:00 hours, the designated H-Hour, FLOMAR and marines — Battalions No. 3 and No. 4 — would occupy the Picton, Nueva, and Lennox islands, also gaining control of the Beagle Channel (see map below).
• The ground offensive would begin at 24:00 hours (H+2). The V Army Corps would launch an attack from the Santa Cruz area, aiming to conquer as much Chilean territory as possible in the Patagonian region. Simultaneously, the Argentine Air Force would begin strategic bombings.
• At 06:00 hours (H+8) on December 23, 1978 (23.06:00.DEC.978), the destruction of the Chilean Air Force on the ground would commence.

 

The naval confrontation between Argentina and Chile in 1978 would have been a complex, multidimensional operation, involving naval, air, and ground forces in a challenging geographical environment. Argentina's air and submarine superiority gave it a significant advantage, though Chile's coastal defenses and tactical coordination offered formidable resistance. The outcome would have depended on numerous tactical and strategic factors, as well as the effectiveness in executing the planned operations by both nations.

In this specific scenario, it should be noted that the Argentine armed forces had three air bases on the front: one mobile (the ARA Veinticinco de Mayo) and two air bases in Río Grande and Río Gallegos, which would prove to be highly operational four years later in the Malvinas. In contrast, only the Chabunco air base in Punta Arenas would bear the burden of attempting to stop the landing operations, conduct anti-ship missions against FLOMAR, combat air attacks from the northeast (Río Gallegos air base) and from the east-northeast (Río Grande naval air base), and then plan ABA (Airbase Attack) operations against these same bases. Is that not too many objectives for a single runway?

For its part, the Argentine Naval Aviation (COAN) would focus exclusively on anti-ship strikes or very close air support, while the Argentine Air Force (FAA) would support the advance of the armored assault on Punta Arenas, conduct an ABA against the Chabunco air base, and ensure air superiority over Punta Arenas. Additionally, at the request of the Argentine Navy (ARA), the FAA would provide air support to the landing operations.

Probabilities of Success

Argentine Forces: With air superiority provided by the aircraft carrier and a modern surface fleet and submarines, Argentine forces had a significant advantage. The joint air-sea-submarine operations of FLOMAR would increase their chances of success.

Comparative Strength Between ACh (Left) and FLOMAR (Right)

The pink bands indicate the range of their main weapons (MM38 Exocet, 20 miles or 35-42 km). The aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo is represented by an A-4Q fully loaded with bombs and fuel, with a range of 350 km. These are the vital areas to cover before considering a real threat to the adversary. As an analyst, I find it difficult to even see a glimpse of equality between both forces.

Before analyzing the Chilean case, let us review the probability the Chilean Squadron had of repelling an air attack, which would have been the primary weapon of the Argentine Navy (ARA). Some Chilean destroyers (Almirante-class) were equipped with the British Short Seacat system. This is a small subsonic missile, powered by a two-stage solid-fuel rocket motor. In flight, it is guided by four cruciform wings and stabilized by four small tail fins. It is guided by command line-of-sight (CLOS) through a radio link, meaning flight commands are transmitted by a remote operator with both the missile and target in sight. The same system was installed on the Argentine carrier Veinticinco de Mayo and, in its land-based version (Tigercat), was deployed in Tierra del Fuego (IMARA) and Río Gallegos (Army). The missile proved highly inaccurate in the Malvinas conflict due to its lack of autonomy and reliance on the operator’s coordination of pulse and vision, with the inherent human eye difficulties in accurately perceiving depth and distance in space. Therefore, perhaps the best-equipped Chilean ship for self-defense against air attacks was likely the cruiser Almirante Latorre or Prat, with up to 14 Bofors 40mm pom-pom guns. These would have been the most difficult targets to approach and attack, and, if communications had allowed, the task might have been delegated to submarines.

Another intellectual exercise that no one has conducted, to my knowledge, is the following:

Chilean ships would approach at 21/28 knots (cruising speed/full speed) towards the Argentine naval forces (assuming that the CASA-212 aircraft correctly located them, as Chile had no other "eyes" available; there is a myth about electronic interception that is mentioned below). The distance to be covered was estimated to be between 140/193 miles according to various Chilean reports. This would take the Chilean fleet just over 5/8 hours of sailing to get within 20 miles of the Argentine ships (20 miles being the first point where they could attempt to strike the fleet, as that was the range of the MM38 Exocet missile, Chile’s only decisive weapon).

During those 5/8 hours, the ships would not be able to fire or damage the enemy. Meanwhile, during this period, the aircraft carrier ARA 25 de Mayo could launch and recover 3 to 5 combat sorties from its air group. Assuming each attack group flew at 400 knots round trip, landed, and took 25 minutes to reload bombs and refuel before taking off again, each A-4Q Skyhawk would take off with 3 bombs of 450kg on the central pylon, equipped with fuzes adapted to hit ships.

In the first pass alone, 24 bombs would be dropped on the "Squadron". Assuming no losses for the Argentine planes, by the fourth or fifth pass, between 96 and 120 bombs would have been dropped on the ships. Even if an Argentine plane was shot down in each pass, resulting in up to 4 losses, the worst-case scenario would still see up to 36 bombs launched against the "Squadron". In other words, before the Chilean fleet could close the gap between them and the enemy, they would have been hit by between 36 and 120 bombs (see the table below).

All of this would happen before any Chilean combat station operator could even press the launch button for a single Exocet missile. Do you understand how serious this plan was for the Chilean command? What were they thinking? Perhaps the worst part is that at the end of this death corridor, a fleet almost identical to the Chilean one in terms of surface combatants and Exocet launch capability, but completely intact, was waiting for them. Those who managed to survive would be met by a volley of French missiles.

Approximation times to 20 miles, passes, and number of bombs considering losses

Chilean Forces: The Chilean fleet in open waters was at the mercy of naval aviation first, and Argentine submarines later. As mentioned above, the distance between both fleets worked in favor of the FLOMAR. If the Chilean Navy had been detected at 190 miles, the bomb runs carried out by the Skyhawks would have left little afloat, even considering shoot-downs. It is almost sad to imagine a fleet speeding up to strike the enemy while being progressively bombarded over and over again with absolutely no help. Possibility of success: Zero.

Jorge Martínez Bush, a Chilean officer, stated the following in the book Soldados de Mar en Acción (Sánchez Urra, 2020), a compilation of the activities of the CIM.

"From what could have been the 'Naval Battle of Drake', then-Commander Jorge Martínez Bush, the second-in-command of the cruiser 'Prat', points out that 'we were about to enter combat, and we were prepared. In naval tactics, the position was in our favor because the sea and the wind worked for us, putting the Argentinians in a very complicated position' (p. 196)."

This officer accuses Vice Admiral López Silva of trusting the sea and the wind to defeat Argentine naval aviation. Did he take a pencil and paper and make a basic diagram to see if his statements had any foundation? What does Martínez Bush think about the air group (GAE) of the 25 de Mayo? Or did it not exist? If he is reading this, he could clarify this matter to the Chilean public. By the way, Sánchez Urra's account of the FLOMAR is suspiciously incomplete (he omits 2 Argentine submarines and speaks of "Chilean submarines" in the plural, portraying the Simpson as fully operational, on par with the Argentinians), which casts doubt on many other descriptions and lists presented throughout his work.

The other alternative was to hide in the fjords, which would have offered better chances of survival. However, with more than 100 enemy planes flying over their position and planning an attack, it was only a matter of time. The Chilean Navy was a serious opponent but completely lacked decisive weapons: neither aviation to disturb the two-dimensional plane nor operational submarines to attack from the complete stealth of the depths. Had the situation dragged on for only a week, it’s not unreasonable to think that the entire Chilean fleet would have ended up sunk or, for all practical purposes, out of combat. Possibility of success: Zero.

Defeat Scenario and Seeking Refuge in the Chilean Fjords

If the ACh suffered a defeat, a likely outcome would have involved the sinking or disabling of its main assets. In terms of naval target value, without a doubt, the Leander-class frigates would have been the primary focus of the attack, followed by the light cruisers Prat and Latorre, given their gunfire capability to affect landing operations. The remaining targets would have been defined by circumstance.

It’s worth adding here a piece of information that Admiral López Silva (theoretically the most prepared in naval-air warfare) of the ACh did not possess: Four years later, Argentine aircraft demonstrated that a fleet confined in a channel (like the San Carlos Strait) or very close to the coast (such as the southern islands of Cape Horn) was a perfectly reachable target for low-flying jet aircraft. The Royal Navy, equipped with much better air defense missiles than the ACh, only achieved a few isolated shootdowns, and only the failure of the fuses on bombs dropped by the FAA prevented its complete neutralization as a surface combat force before the end of the conflict. The attackers of the ACh would have been A-4 Skyhawks, both in their B and P variants, and Israeli Mirage fighters of the FAA, as well as the well-known A-4Qs of the COAN—all of which proved to be lethal in attacking a fleet. Did the Chilean fleet really expect a different outcome in their case?

If the ACh were to pass through the channel, it would ensure its demise. The fleet would be trapped in the Beagle Channel or advancing close to the southern coast of the islands, facilitating the approach of aircraft outside radar detection. The attack, as would later happen in the Malvinas, would take full advantage of the geography, just as it was in the San Carlos Strait. We now know that the likelihood of the main ACh units escaping an air attack was almost nil. Once the main units were disabled, the rest of the Chilean fleet would be attacked by Argentine destroyers and corvettes with their Exocets. This would not be the defeat chosen, according to the book by Arancibia Clavel and Serrano Bulnes.

The ACh would be forced to rely on air support from the Chilean Air Force (FACh), based at Chabunco airbase. At 6 AM on December 21, this base would be the primary target of a preemptive strike from all air assets stationed at BAM Río Gallegos. To make matters worse, if the Chilean fighters managed to take off, the COAN was lying in wait less than 200 km from Chabunco with a dozen T-28 Fennecs, ready to attack the Chilean fighters with machine guns and rockets as they landed.

Even so, if we consider that some units remained afloat after a defeat in the Fuegian channels, they would retreat to fjords such as Última Esperanza, Quintupeu, or Comau. With Argentine air superiority, Chilean forces would have little chance of success, as FLOMAR could carry out precise and sustained attacks. Without air superiority, Chilean forces would have a better chance of defending themselves, but they would still face a significant threat due to FLOMAR’s ability to coordinate attacks from both air and sea.

I want to add two final details before the conclusions. First, Chilean literature, whether academic or journalistic, as well as television media reports, engage in a repeated act of pretending ignorance. It is almost impossible to find books endorsed by the Chilean Navy (ACh) or other military forces, let alone by journalistic outlets, that mention the key word "A-4Q Skyhawk." Apparently, this weapon never existed in the theater of operations. And if it did, it was never a threat. In fact, they probably didn’t even fly. Oh, and the Argentine sailors got seasick due to rough seas. The books from the CIM or the “Squadron” pretend ignorance, as they reflect at all times, and absolutely without deviation, that what was going to take place was a naval battle, in the style of Jutland/Latakia. Two large fleets, now without cannons but with missiles, would come into firing range, each firing their volleys, and the better one would win. It almost seems as if the Argentine aircraft carrier was going to stay in the rear watching the scene, like a spectator in the stands.

This scenario is a complete disrespect to the informed reader. It is truly shameful that professional Chilean naval officers avoid addressing the clear impending air-naval battle and lie to their public by speaking of courage and patriotism to cover up what was entirely and fundamentally a technical issue. Sadly, Chilean "technical" literature is filled with this appeal to bravery rather than focusing on tools or tactics.

Finally, that same literature claims a level of information about Argentine forces' movements that surpasses what would be available today, even with two British AWACS donated as part of the collaboration during the Falklands War. Apparently, they had information on troop movements, aircraft movements, the position of the Argentine fleet, the order of operations of various units, and who knows what else. Moreover, this information was updated hourly. Not even with their own satellites would they have had such an instantaneous real-time picture. Apparently, Argentine communications had been "decoded," similar to Japan’s Purple Code. This is mentioned by anonymous authors using the mysterious term "electronic interception or tracking." Well, that was not the case. Argentine encrypted communications were not decoded. What naval intelligence actually did was maintain open channels to broadcast the information they wanted to be accessible to Chilean listening posts (counterintelligence). Argentine communications were indeed intercepted, but that happened in 1982, by NATO intelligence agencies, specifically from a station in Norway. But let’s never confuse NATO with Chile under any circumstances. In the previous statement, Martínez Smith himself comments that the Argentine fleet was an hour's sailing distance from the Chilean border, knowing this only through intercepted communications. Dear reader, in air-naval warfare, one does not order an attack on a fleet whose location has not been confirmed by one’s own sensors (an observer or radar providing the position). If FLOMAR was going to be attacked based on "intercepted" information, it was probably an ambush planned by the Argentine naval command.

The TransAndean Squadron, such as it was detected by the ARA Santa Fe submarine
 

In summary, the technological and operational superiority of FLOMAR granted the Argentine forces a considerable advantage in a direct confrontation with the ACh. The geography of the Chilean fjords would provide a natural refuge, but Chilean forces would still face significant challenges without the ability to counter Argentine air and naval superiority.

Retreat to the Fjords, Perhaps the Best Outcome for the ACh...

This report does not diminish the performance or the planning executed by the ACh. They did the best they could with what they had. That said, it wasn’t enough. The stars aligned to leave them without sufficient submarine capability (the SS-21 Simpson was detected and photographed twice before December 21, while their best submarines were undergoing major maintenance). Air support was going to be limited because they lacked a naval attack aviation force, and the FACh's air assets were going to receive their baptism of fire that same morning, meaning they would be fighting for their own survival. According to the plan, by the afternoon of December 21, Chabunco was expected to be inoperable—whether by FAA A-4 and Mirage strikes in the early morning or by T-28 Fennec/MB326 attacks throughout the rest of the day.

A criticism that can be leveled against López Silva’s plan is that he adhered to a Mahanian philosophy of seeking a decisive large-scale naval battle. He was committing the entire fleet ("all-in") in a maneuver where it would suffer many losses before even seeing the enemy on their radar screens. Once the events were set in motion, the fate of the Chilean fleet would be sealed for the rest of the conflict. This invites reflection on alternatives: when a smaller fleet faces a larger one, it should better rely on naval guerrilla tactics or small attrition battles. The Argentine Navy was born this way—facing much larger fleets, such as the Spanish and the Brazilian Imperial Navy, dragging them into small battles that favored minor but exhausting victories against the enemy. The fjords are an ideal setting for such a task: hiding ships to later conduct coordinated attacks. Even with enemy air superiority, this tactic can still be effective, as the Germans demonstrated during WWII by sheltering ships in protected fjords with dense layers of air defense and achieving success. This alternative would likely be more reasonable than facing a fully equipped aircraft carrier in open waters, without air superiority, and with an impaired submarine force. And here, the term "larger fleet" is more qualitative than quantitative—the Chilean "squadron" was going solo, with very little support from the depths and no air support, against naval pilots who trained intensively every year on how to sink ships and were highly skilled.

Did López Silva think that the ARA would bring its main naval assets within the range of Chilean Exocets for a gentleman’s duel? Was López Silva expecting a Jutland or a Latakia while heading into a Midway? Could it be that the Chilean naval command believed that the ARA would not exploit its submarine and naval air superiority by deploying its submarines and carrier-based fighters before they could even detect FLOMAR on their radars? Did López Silva think the A-4Q Skyhawks would not be launched against his ships? Long before a Chilean sailor would get the chance to press the launch button on an Exocet, the Chilean fleet would encounter the COAN and the CFS—either sequentially or simultaneously.

Sources

• Arancibia Clavel, Patricia y Bulnes Serrano, Francisco. La escuadra en acción. 1978: el conflicto Chile-Argentina visto a través de sus protagonistas, Santiago, Chile: Catalonia, 2017 (ISBN: 978-956-324-298-0)
• Burzaco, Ricardo. La Fuerza de Submarinos de la Armada Argentina en la crisis de 1978. DeySeg