Perón, Surrounded by His Ministers, Listens to the Report from General Arnaldo Sosa Molina (Ilustración: Isidoro Ruiz Moreno, La Revolución del 55, Tomo I)
A striking aspect throughout the conflict was Perón's peculiar behavior. His reticence and silence puzzled many, as he delegated full command to General Lucero. “Both supporters and opponents were baffled by his passivity, while battles that would determine the Nation's future—and his own—raged fiercely by air, sea, and land,” remarked one historian.
The man who once led Latin America’s most transformative social revolution, challenged the United States and the Allied powers after World War II, and attempted to create a "Fourth Reich" in Argentina by bringing Axis scientists and war criminals to the country, now seemed hesitant and devoid of initiative. His fiery rhetoric of the past still resonated, chilling citizens with its violent tone: "You ask me to fight? Why don’t you start yourselves?" (May 1, 1953), "The day hanging begins, I’ll stand with those doing the hanging!" (August 2, 1946), "They’ll have to kill me fighting!" (August 13, 1946), "We’ll raise gallows across the nation to hang the opposition!" (September 11, 1947), "We’ll distribute baling wire to hang our enemies!" (August 31, 1947), and his infamous declaration, "For every one of us, five of them will fall!" Yet, now, the man who had once uttered these words with conviction appeared paralyzed.
This mysterious inaction, paired with his silence since the hostilities began, began to irritate even his closest allies. Major Carlos Aloé, Governor of Buenos Aires Province, could not understand why Perón remained in his heavily guarded residence, avoiding both military command and leveraging his powerful influence over the Armed Forces and the public.
General Raúl Tassi, head of the National Defense School, observed Perón’s behavior during a meeting at the underground bunker of the Ministry of the Army, where the Communications Center of the Repression Command was based. The meeting, convened by General Lucero, brought together senior military leaders to monitor the ongoing conflict. Perón arrived accompanied by generals and colonels, visibly distressed and, by all accounts, frightened. His demeanor worsened upon learning that the Cuyo Army had also joined the uprising. At that moment, whatever composure he had left completely absent.
At the headquarters of the 1st Army Division in Palermo, General Ernesto Fatigatti requested authorization from Perón to lead the 1st and 2nd Infantry Regiments (then in reserve) in a march on Córdoba to crush the revolution by midday on September 21. However, Perón—once renowned for his oratory skills, his ability to captivate and inflame the masses—offered no response. Instead, he nervously smoked, drank coffee, and remained silent.
Years later, Perón’s nephew and aide-de-camp, Major Ignacio Cialcetta, revealed that the dictator “did nothing.” He left all decisions to Lucero and, while not entirely defeated in spirit, seemed detached. Perón reportedly spent two nights hiding in a house in Belgrano and, according to other accounts, in the nuclear bunker he had built beneath the Alas building—a claim without concrete evidence, though rumors also suggested he used it during the June 16 bombings.
Despite having capable and loyal generals—Lucero, Fatigatti, Iñíguez, and Sosa Molina—Perón failed to act. His attitude infuriated Interior Minister Dr. Oscar Albrieu, who met with him at the Government House in the early hours of September 19. Albrieu urged Perón to take charge of the repression, arguing that the situation was deteriorating. Yet, the president remained inert. Ruiz Moreno captures their exchange in his work, highlighting Perón’s indecision at a critical juncture:
-"General, don’t lose focus. Let’s return to the Ministry of the Army. Things there are not being handled properly."These words displeased Perón, who responded badly.
-"And what do you want me to do?" Perón replied.
-"General, I believe you should assume command of the Repression Forces and announce on the radio that you will personally take command in Córdoba. I’m certain that would put an end to all of this.".
-You don't know the generals. I think they are handling things well. Besides, I don't like the fact that they kill the little soldiers. I prefer things to stay that way.
So it was Albrieu who expressed his annoyance.
-General, we are at war! I would even be justified in saying that the non-commissioned officer who kills a rebellious officer will take his place in the ranks...! I will take any measure to defend a constitutional government!
Despite the gravity in Albrieu’s tone, Perón did not react, effectively ending the conversation on the spot.
Meanwhile, General Lucero worked tirelessly, determined to crush the uprising as swiftly as possible. On the 18th, one of his first actions was to reinforce the units engaged in repression by calling up the 1931, 1932, and 1933 conscript classes in the First and Second Military Regions under the command of Lieutenant General Emilio Forcher. This measure bolstered key units, including the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Infantry Regiments, the 2nd Artillery Regiment, the Regiment of Mounted Grenadiers, and the Motorized Regiment "Buenos Aires." Together with the security companies tasked with guarding arsenals, military factories, and depots, these reinforcements brought troop numbers to 18,000, not counting an additional 1,200 volunteers.
By Monday, the 19th, Perón arrived at the Ministry of the Army before 6:00 AM, accompanied by Governor Aloé. In Lucero’s office, Generals José Domingo Molina, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Carlos Wirth, Chief of Staff, informed him that the situation on the front was favorable and that the rebellion’s suppression was only a matter of hours. However, the leaders of the repression failed to recognize a critical error: by not ordering a final offensive with the requisite force, they allowed the revolutionaries to regroup. Hoping to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, they opted instead to pressure the rebel forces with sheer numbers, aiming to convince them of the futility of resistance. This half-measure was a serious misstep, as the revolutionary forces were resolute and prepared to fight with unrelenting ferocity, as demonstrated by General Lonardi’s fiery speech on September 16.
Perón had every advantage. His forces surrounded Córdoba and Bahía Blanca, the Cuyo troops were wavering, and no other garrison had declared against him. The Fleet posed the only significant threat, but the Air Force and Naval Aviation were expected to neutralize it.
Given these circumstances, the Peronist high command began to feel confident, even euphoric. However, in the middle of the meeting, Perón abruptly called for silence and requested to be left alone with Lucero and Aloé.
Confused but compliant, the senior officers exited the room, waiting in the antechamber in a mix of anticipation and uncertainty. As the door closed behind them, they had no idea that the final chapter of the crisis was about to unfold.
Once alone, Perón announced that he had decided to resign.
-We already know that these barbarians will have no scruples about doing so (he was referring to bombing the cities of La Plata and Buenos Aires). It is necessary to avoid massacre and destruction. I do not wish to be a factor in such savagery being unleashed on the innocent city, and on the works that we have worked so hard to build. To feel this, it is necessary to know how to build. Parasites hardly love the work of others.Lucero and Aloe were speechless, astonished and confused. They remained like that for a few moments until Lucero broke the silence to express that he was in solidarity with his boss and that, consequently, he would also resign. However, he immediately seemed to react and, trying to convince Perón, he expressed his opinion, proposing the creation of an operations force under the direct orders of the president based on the First Army Division, declaring at the same time Buenos Aires an open city, defended by elements of the General Maritime Prefecture, the National Gendarmerie, the Federal Police and the Armed Forces (the latter in small numbers), all of them supported by Peronist militiamen. However, his words were of no use. Under the pretext of avoiding a useless shedding of blood and the destruction of what he considered his “masterpiece”: the oil installations in La Plata, Perón repeated that he had decided to leave power. Lucero insisted again, explaining that the rebellion was practically under control and that it was only a matter of hours before both Córdoba and Bahía Blanca fell (he knew perfectly well that the Army of Cuyo did not constitute any threat). But even so, Perón maintained his position and withdrew, ordering a meeting of generals for that same afternoon.
Two hours later, the still-President of the Nation sent Lucero a handwritten note addressed to the Army and the People. In it, he announced his resignation and declared that he was leaving everything in the hands of the Army, the only entity he deemed capable of taking control of the situation and achieving the much-desired pacification of the country.
With the note in hand, Lucero summoned Vice President Rear Admiral Alberto Teissaire, Minister of the Interior Dr. Carlos Albrieu, and CGT Secretary General Héctor Di Pietro to his office. After informing them of its contents, he opened the floor for their comments. Di Pietro stated that if this was the general's will, the workers would comply, as they had always followed Perón's wishes. Expressing solidarity with his leader, Lucero immediately drafted his irrevocable resignation and then summoned General José Domingo Molina, entrusting him with organizing a Junta of Generals to take charge of governance and peace negotiations.
At 12:55 PM, Radio del Estado, broadcasting nationwide, issued a message that shocked both the revolutionary leaders and the broader population. General Lucero invited the rebel commanders to the Ministry of the Army to begin discussions aimed at pacifying the country and finding a resolution.
This announcement stunned General José María Sosa Molina, commander of repression in Córdoba, who could hardly believe what he was hearing. His astonishment was so great that he initially thought it was a tactic to confuse loyalist forces. “With victory practically in his grasp, Perón walked away,” Sosa Molina would later recall. “...With the battle nearly won, my commanders informed me they had heard the ceasefire order on the radio. I couldn’t believe it. We had everything in our hands, and now we were being told to hold our positions.” It wasn’t until he heard the resignations confirmed on the radio later in the afternoon that he accepted the situation.
A similar reaction came from the resolute General Iñíguez, who was leading his forces in a rapid advance toward central Córdoba. As his troops pressed forward, a messenger rushed to his position with an order to halt the attack and news that a junta of generals had assumed control. When Iñíguez learned that government forces were to cease all hostilities, hold their positions, and await further instructions, he was left dumbfounded.
At 2:27 PM, General Lucero's message, broadcast on Radio del Estado, was answered by Admiral Rojas aboard the La Argentina. Rojas announced that military operations would be suspended until midnight on September 19 and that the requested meeting would take place aboard his ship, anchored at the mouth of the Río de la Plata, rather than at the Ministry of the Army, as Lucero had suggested. Meanwhile, from Córdoba, Lonardi issued a statement signed as the leader of the "Revolución Libertadora," demanding the immediate resignation of the President and his entire cabinet. Distrustful of Perón, Lonardi took precautionary measures to ensure the revolution's success.
Notes
- Isidoro Ruiz Moreno, op. cit, Cap. 9, Tomo II.
- Ídem, p. 315, Tomo II.
- It was the first time ever to use this designation.