1955 Revolution: The Last Arrangements

The Last Preparations


With the peace of mind that the day before Susana and Andrés Lonardi had left for Córdoba in the company of Ricardo Quesada, the general and his wife got up early and after cleaning, prepared the two suitcases that they planned to take on the trip.

General Eduardo Lonardi

At mid-morning they had breakfast and around noon the Lonardis went for a walk around the area, ending the tour at the comfortable Ballardino restaurant on Charcas Street where they had lunch.
Meanwhile, within the apartment, Luis Ernesto proceeded with utmost caution as he gently lowered the luggage, securing it within the trunk of his father's car, which was conveniently parked in the building's garage. Following the prearranged schedule, he set out at 3:00 p.m. to his sister Marta's residence in the Belgrano neighborhood, from where he intended to depart in his own vehicle to collect his parents from Libertad and Guido. However, fate intervened, and a few blocks into his journey, he suffered a tire puncture, rendering his car immobile.

Marta promptly rushed back to her home to report the unexpected issue and subsequently hailed a taxi, while her brother hastily made his way to the location where the car had been left to replace the damaged tire.

Eventually, Marta retrieved her parents from the designated meeting point and returned after 4:00 p.m. There was no time for prolonged farewells; Luis Ernesto, together with his parents, boarded his sister's vehicle, embarking on a rapid journey towards Plaza Once, accompanied by Deheza. During the trip, Lonardi seized the opportunity to recount his recent activities and offer a comprehensive overview of the prevailing situation. He had recently concluded a final meeting with Colonel Señorans at Dr. Cornejo Saravia's dental clinic. His subordinate had once again requested an extension of the deadline to commence operations, emphasizing the critical need for coordinated actions along the coastlines, for which time was running short. In response to inquiries from his son and son-in-law regarding his decision, the general stated that he had unequivocally denied the request, citing that orders had already been issued. Additionally, he mentioned Señorans' proposal for him to accompany them to Córdoba, where he intended to personally inform General Aramburu about the unfolding revolution. Señorans sought authorization for this mission, and he expressed his willingness to follow through, provided Lonardi approved. The leader of the uprising concurred, concluding by saying:

-Colonel Señorans, if he achieves that, he will deserve the good of the Fatherland.

As Lonardi elucidated, that conversation had left him profoundly content, as he was well aware that his conversational partner was a proficient, dynamic, and resolute senior officer.

Their arrival at Plaza Once bus terminal transpired at 4:30 p.m., where they promptly initiated the process of inspecting their luggage. It was at this juncture that General Lonardi realized he had only $14 to his name. In response, his son-in-law graciously offered to provide him with additional funds.

"Thank you very much, José Alberto," expressed the general appreciatively, "These $14 should suffice for my journey. If the revolution should falter, I shall have no need for money, and should it prevail, I shan't require it for my return."

At 4:50 p.m., with a mere ten minutes remaining before departure, Major Guevara arrived, alleviating the unease sparked by his earlier absence. In his company, he bore both favorable and unfavorable tidings, prompting his superior to request the unfavorable news first.

1. The Military College did not agree to the uprising and the involvement of the 1st Infantry Regiment was doubtful. For this reason, General Uranga requested permission to go to the Río Santiago Naval Base to support the Naval Military Academy with the elements he could gather.
2. Lieutenant Colonel Arribau was heading to Curuzú Cuatiá to run operations.
3. General Lagos prepared to march to Cuyo for the same purpose and left that same night.
4. General Bengoa insisted that his escape would nullify the surprise factor and for that reason, he proposed staying in the capitol city to collaborate with the movement and provide all his support from there.
   

Lonardi remained resolute in his insistence that General Uranga should push forward towards Rosario, but in the event that this was not possible, he granted him full autonomy to act according to his own judgment.

As the bus departure announcement resounded through the station's speakers, the Lonardi family prepared to bid their farewells. The venerable general embraced his son-in-law warmly, and after a similar embrace with his subordinate, he addressed her:

"I'm relying on you, Guevara, and I'll be waiting for you in Córdoba."

Luis Ernesto and his mother followed suit, and soon afterward, they boarded the bus, with the lady taking the lead. However, before they parted ways, there was one last exchange of words.

"Guevara," the general called from the bus's step, "we'll need a password."
"I've already thought of one, general. How about 'God is Just'?"
"It strikes me as the most suitable," Lonardi concurred, lightly patting the older man's shoulder. He then climbed the three steps and proceeded down the aisle towards the rear seats.

Lonardi and his wife stood further back, as the senior officer wished to avoid inconveniencing fellow passengers with his tobacco smoke. Meanwhile, their son settled into a front seat. With everyone aboard and tickets in hand, the bus closed its doors and commenced its journey towards the province of Córdoba.

September, the 14th, 5 p.m. Bus from Buenos Aires to Córdoba

While the bus moved slowly through the crowded streets of Buenos Aires, Lieutenant Colonel Sánchez Lahoz headed to Corrientes to revolt its garrisons and in Curuzú Cuatiá, Major Montiel Forzano, took the final decisions along with several officers, assisted by Colonel Arias Duval and Lieutenant Colonel Arribau. They had to wait for the arrival of General Armaburu and Colonel Señorans to lead their forces.
With the same purpose, General Lagos traveled to Cuyo despite the fact that there was no news of what was happening there because Eduardo Lonardi (h) had not yet returned.
Only one thing worried the leader of the uprising, the lack of support from the Military College in Buenos Aires and consequently, the non-participation of the 1st Infantry Regiment that was supposed to annul Rosario's forces. There were vague references to the rest of the military units and everything indicated that the situation was extremely precarious. Still, he was determined to keep going until he won or died.
Immediately after the bus left the station, Colonel Señorans contacted General Aramburu to meet him at a certain point in the city in order to “communicate something to him.” They met at 10:00 p.m., at the Petit Café on Av. Santa Fe and Callao, and sat at a table far from the windows to talk more calmly.
Once face to face, after ordering a couple of coffees, Señorans looked at his superior and informed her that the revolution was underway and that at that moment General Lonardi was traveling to Córdoba to begin the actions.

-My general, I come in compliance with an order from General Lonardi to convey to you that the date of the revolution has been set for midnight on September 16.

-But how?!! – Aramburu exclaimed, surprised and disgusted at the same time.

Next, Señorans explained the movements that had been carried out so far, as well as the decisions and results and then detailed the operations plan that his superior listened to unchanged. When he told him that Lonardi was counting on him to direct operations on the Litoral, he responded curtly.

-I'll be there.

Happy to have the participation of his boss, Señorans informed him that the next day a liaison was going to provide them with tickets to Puerto Constanza, Entre Ríos and then they said goodbye, each one taking different directions.
At that precise moment, Lonardi and Doña Mercedes were traveling along Route 9 in the direction of Córdoba, the former immersed in deep thoughts although engaging in occasional dialogue with her wife, so as not to worry her with her silence. In the front seat, his son Luis Ernesto was trying to sleep, taking advantage of the darkness and the monotonous noise of the engine.
According to Mrs. Mercedes Villada Achaval, her husband seemed calm and optimistic despite the seriousness of his face and the long silences in which he fell.
They were traveling in the middle of the countryside, beyond Rosario, when suddenly, the bus slowed down and stopped on the side of the road.
The passenger had to descend in the cold winter night and there, under the starry sky, the Lonardis began to worry about the delay and the possibility that their luggage would be searched and the combat uniforms of the general and his son would be found inside.

-Do you think you are going to succeed? – His wife asked him.
-Don't worry... I have a lot of faith in victory.

An hour later a second bus arrived in front of the shoulder. The passengers boarded the new bus and after a few minutes, they resumed their journey, but not before exchanging a few brief words. Lonardi told his son that he was worried that the suitcases would continue to Córdoba in the broken down vehicle but they trusted everything in providence.
The general and his wife sat again in the back seats while Luis Ernesto did so further ahead, along with a beautiful and friendly young woman who began to talk to him.
The girl belonged to the UES (Secondary Student Union, a youngster Peronist organization) and she was delighted because she was traveling to the Mediterranean city to attend a great party that the entity organized on September 15 to celebrate the arrival of spring.

-"There will be a great ball," she said enthusiastically, "and possibly General Perón himself will come."
-"But that's great," Luis Ernesto responded while he thought, "You can't imagine the dance they're going to have!"

The bus arrived in Córdoba around 10:00 a.m. and half an hour later, once the luggage that arrived a little later had been removed, Mrs. Mercedes went to her brother's home while Lonardi and her son went to that of Dr. Calixto de la Torre, brother-in-law of Villada Achaval, where Colonel Ossorio Arana was waiting for them.
At that time, the supervision tour that the Minister of the Army, General Franklin Lucero, was carrying out through the units of the province was ending and that was the first thing that Lonardi was informed of. However, nothing seemed to show that the government had detected anything and that increased the confidence of the leaders of the uprising.
That same night, the officers' meeting that Ossorio Arana had organized took place at De la Torre's house. On that occasion, Brigadier Landaburu and Damián were present.
Fernández Astrada, who were in charge of the revolutionary civilian commands of the region.
Lonardi insisted that these civilians had to take action after 01:00 on the 16th and Fernández Astrada reported that General Videla Balaguer was hiding in his apartment on Olmos Avenue, in the center of the city, and that at his request, Lonardi had to go there to have an interview with him. The San Juan general was unable to leave that refuge because the security forces were following him very closely, for that reason, Lonardi accepted, immediately leaving for there.

Major Juan Francisco Guevara

In the talk they both had, various topics were addressed, all of them in detail, the main one being the order that the newcomer had given, in the sense that Videla Balaguer would take charge of the civil commands to take over the main points of the city and the steps that had to be followed once the actions had begun.
At 10:00 p.m. the general was back at Calixto de la Torre's to start a new conference. On this new opportunity, Major Melitón Quijano and Captain Ramón E. Molina from the Artillery school were present; First Lieutenant Julio Fernández Torres from the Parachute School, Major Oscar Tanco from the Aeronautical Non-Commissioned Officers School, Captains Mario Efraín Arruabarrena and Juan José Claisse from the Liceo Militar and Captain Eduardo Maguerit, the only officer from the Infantry School who he had given in to the riot. Each of them presented Lonardi with a status report on the military units to which they belonged and immediately afterwards, they proceeded to adjust the action plan, which consisted of:

1. The Artillery School, the Airborne Troops School, the Aviation School, the Aeronautical Non-Commissioned Officer Candidate School and the General Paz High School would take part in the uprising.
2. The paratroopers would take over the Airborne Troops School and once it was taken over, they would post pickets on the access routes to the provincial capital to stop anyone who tried to pass.
3. The Military Aviation and Aeronautical Non-Commissioned Officers schools would revolt.
4. Captain Molina should take over the Artillery School and grant access to General Lonardi and his companions to immediately arrest the director of the establishment. Once that objective was achieved, the troops would be ready and the pieces and artillery would be turned towards the Infantry School.
5. The Aspirant School would take over the I.A.M.E.
6. Captain Maguerti and Second Lieutenant Gómez Pueyrredón, from the Infantry School, would proceed to open its doors to the paratroopers and leave officers from the Military School at the School of Airborne Troops to be in charge of its custody.

Those present expressed their agreement and only Captain Molina made an observation, requesting that the arrest of the director of the Artillery School be carried out together with General Lonardi, a request that the head of the revolution accepted without hesitation.
As at that time of year a good part of the Artillery officers were on maneuvers in Pampa de Olaén, 110 kilometers from Córdoba, Lonardi approved postponing the uprising for just one hour, and insisted on trying to convince Colonel Brizuela, chief of the Infantry School, so that they would join the uprising and thus avoid useless bloodshed1. Immediately afterwards, he harangued those present and concluded by saying in a firm voice:

-Gentlemen, we must proceed, to ensure initial success, with maximum brutality!

Lonardi hugged each and every one of those present and that was a moment of great significance that was forever engraved in everyone's spirit.
The meeting ended at 01:00 on September 15, just 24 hours after the revolutionary outbreak that was going to change the course of Argentine history.
While these events were taking place in Córdoba, in the rest of the country, the main rebel units were preparing for the fight.
In Corrientes, Colonel Héctor Solanas Pacheco, unaware of General Bengoa's reticent attitude, awaited his arrival in a ranch located between Mercedes and Curuzú Cuatiá. By then, Major Pablo Molinari, head of the Gualeguay Military District, had established the first contacts aimed at providing support to Armaburu and Señorans during their transfer through the province of Entre Ríos, and other officers were waiting expectantly for the order to begin actions.
In Buenos Aires, meanwhile, Captain Palma had informed the naval commands, through his liaisons, and several sailors left towards the south divided into two groups, the first, under the command of Captain Rial, was heading to the Comandante Base. Spore to put himself in front and the other, headed by the ship captain Mario Robbio, went to Puerto Belgrano, ready to revolt the Sea Fleet.
Rial would be in charge of the Naval Aviation and for that reason, as the sun set, he gathered at his house in the town of Olivos the group of officers who would constitute his command, to adjust the last details of the operations plan. For this reason, his wife Susana Núñez Monasterio had told the maid to take it easy that day and keep the curtains and blinds of the house closed, so that nothing would leak through them.
The sailors were working on a map of routes and highways from the Argentine Automobile Club when the bell suddenly rang. Seized with great nervousness, they looked at each other in silence and sat up in alarm, ready to flee through the back of the house, when the owner of the house appeared to tell them that it was a straggling officer who had just arrived2.
In Puerto Belgrano, meanwhile, the battleships “Moreno” and “Rivadavia”, the cruisers “Almirante Brown” and “25 de Mayo”, the destroyers “Mendoza” and “Tucumán”, two BDI landing craft, three torpedo boats, auxiliary vessels without artillery, tugboats and flatboats. The cruiser “9 de Julio”, twin of the “17 de Octubre”, was undergoing repairs along with three destroyers, for that reason, its commander, captain Rafael Francos, was moving busily to speed up the work in order to have to the vessel ready to enter operations. As for the battleships, they were immobilized in port but it was planned to use their powerful artillery pieces to defend the base.
Regarding the non-commissioned officer personnel, mostly supporters of the government, it was decided to send them to Bahía Blanca with different commissions, in order to keep them away when the fighting broke out.
At the nearby Comandante Espora Base, meanwhile, all personnel were ready to go into action, hence the hasty return of frigate captain Edgardo S. Andrew, at that time subject to the authority of the military courts, to take charge. of its functions.

Cap. Jorge E- Perren

Naval Aviation was organized under the command of Lieutenant Commander Beaubeau de Secondignè, of the Aviation School, with Captain Hugo Simón Radl in charge of air transport, Lieutenant Commander Justiniano Martínez Achaval, the patrol boats; Captain Eduardo Estivariz the observation squadrons; Lieutenant Pedro Calvo Paz the defense (he would rely on the Marine Corps for this) and Captain Meteorologist Guillermo Mackinlay, the prisoners, all of them under the direction of Captain Jorge E. Perren, second commander of the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base.
At 09:00 a meeting took place on the road leading to Comandante Espora between captains Perren and Andrews. The naval officers moved at low speed along the route to Bahía Blanca, in the first's car, while they verbally addressed everything related to the weapons and ammunition of the planes, the occupation of the city by the Marines, the assignment of tasks for each officer, the surveillance of the nearby 5th Infantry Regiment, the taking of prisoners, the blowing up of roads, bridges and railways, the cutting of communications cables, the distribution of pamphlets, the alerts, the radiation of messages and other major issues.
Another meeting of the same characteristics took place between Andrew and a group of officers at 10:00 p.m. while in Buenos Aires the civil commands were actively working on assigning tasks and roles.
Florencio Arnaudo, together with Carlos Burundarena and Raúl Puigbó, drew up the plans for the so-called Black Rose Operation aimed at occupying and neutralizing the radio stations while other groups were dedicated to collecting and hiding weapons and documentation, one of them the marriage of Alberto V. Pechemiel and Angelita Menéndez (niece of the old rebel general), members of the civil command of the parish of the Holy Spirit, led by Captain Alberto Fernández, who turned their apartment on Coronel Díaz and Av. Libertador into a true arsenal.
Meanwhile, in front of Puerto Madryn, the bulk of the Sea Fleet was anchored with the cruiser “17 de Octubre” at the helm whose commander, ship captain Agustín P. Lariño, had announced that he was willing to fold. The rest of the units, almost all belonging to the group of destroyers commanded by Captain Raimundo Palau, remained waiting alongside smaller vessels. On the other hand, on the ground, Grumman aircraft from the Observation Squadron were waiting parked next to the runway of the Naval Air Station, under the command of Lieutenant Juan María Vassallo.

Thursday, September 15, passed with absolute normality in Río Santiago, despite the fact that the officers were aware that the revolution was going to break out that same night.
Before noon, frigate captains Jorge Palma and Carlos Sánchez Sañudo appeared at the base, who should have accompanied General Bengoa to Paraná. Captain Carlos A. Bourel, director of the Naval High School, Lieutenant Commander (RE) Andrés Troppea, General Uranga and several Army officers, among whom were Lieutenant Colonel Heriberto Kurt Benner of the Higher War School.
That day, Admiral Isaac Francisco Rojas, director of the Río Santiago Naval School, summoned the base commander, Captain Luis M. García, to his office to inform him of what was happening and inform him that at 0 hours that same day, the revolution broke out. Shortly after, he did the same with his staff, made up of Captain Abel R. Fernández, deputy director of the Naval Academy, and frigate captains Juan Carlos Bassi, head of the cadet corps, and Miguel Rondina, head of studies.

Admiral Isaac Francisco Rojas

The action plan consisted of cutting river communications from the La Plata roadstead to establish a blockade of Buenos Aires, depriving the government of its fuel supply.
The unit's firepower was supported almost exclusively by the Naval Training Force that constituted the Ríos Squadron, commanded by Captain Fernando Muro de Nadal. It was made up of the destroyers ARA “Cervantes” (D-1) and ARA “La Rioja” (D-4), the patrol boats ARA “King” (P-21) and ARA “Murature” (P-20), the BDI landing, trackers and tugboats with all their equipment, as well as the troops assigned to the defense of the base, the study centers and the shipyards, namely, officers and non-commissioned officers of the Application School, senior cadets of the Naval School and sailors armed with machine guns, pistols and rifles.
On Martín García Island, the head of the Seamanship School, frigate captain Juan Carlos González Llanos, waited expectantly, since he had known about the plot since July, when Captain Rial himself informed him. According to the operations plan, he had to transfer the troops and weapons in his charge to the Naval Academy, in Río Santiago3 and once there, put them at the disposal of Admiral Rojas to incorporate them into the fight. In that sense, on Thursday, September 15, his assistant secretary arrived on the island and confirmed that the uprising began at midnight that same night and that in view of this, he had to embark the three companies that made up the School and the Infantry Company No. 2 stationed there.

On Thursday morning, September 15, General Lonardi went to the convent of the Capuchin friars4 to hear the holy mass and take communion. That day he turned 59 years old and many things were going through his head.
Once the ceremony was over, he returned to his brother-in-law's house and once there, he met the young Eduardo Molina, husband of his niece, Ana María Villada Achaval and a revolutionary civil command who, upon seeing him enter, told him that in case he If the coup failed, he had a private plane ready to evacuate him from the city.
The general listened with a serious expression and when Molina finished speaking, he thanked him for his intention and told him that the aircraft was not necessary because the revolution was going to triumph.
The rest of the day he spent calmly, in the company of his wife and some relatives with whom he had lunch and chatted for a few moments after coffee.
The afternoon was the crucial moment. The time had come and he had to say goodbye. He did it with the height typical of a man of his category, in line with the moment in which he lived. After hugging his wife and each of those present, the general put on his jacket and his cap and immediately left followed by Colonel Ossorio Arana and his son.
They boarded the Villada Achaval car and left for the country house that Dr. Lisardo Novillo Saravia had in Argüello, a suburban neighborhood on the outskirts, northwest of Córdoba, with Luis Ernesto Lonardi at the wheel and his father next to him. Villada Achaval followed them in another vehicle carrying Dr. Lisardo Novillo Saravia (h) and engineer Calixto de la Torre, with whom he had to wait for the arrival of Brigadier Landaburu and write the revolutionary proclamation together with his brother-in-law.
As the hours passed, Captains Ramón E. Molina and Daniel Alberto Correa were ready at the Artillery School along with Lieutenant Augusto Alemanzor, assistant to the head of the Troop Group. On the other hand, at the neighboring Airborne Troops School, Lieutenants Julio Fernández Torres, César Anadón, Eduardo Müller, Bernardo Chávez, Abel Romero, Second Lieutenant Armando Cabrera Carranza and other officers were waiting, ready to begin actions.
When the clocks throughout the country showed 9:00 p.m., General Lonardi, Colonel Ossorio Arana and Brigadier Landaburu, left the Novillo Saravia farm wearing their combat uniforms, and headed to the weekend house that Calixto de la Torre had in the La Carolina neighborhood, somewhat further to the northwest, where they had to meet with other rebel officers to continue towards La Calera, a point where another group of soldiers and civilians were waiting for them to continue from there to the Artillery School5.

Colonel Arturo Ossorio Arana

At that same time, in Buenos Aires, the civil commandos led by Raul Puigbó and Florencio Arnaudo, received a suicidal order: they had to neutralize the state radio stations and then return to the Federal Capital with all their weapons, to guard the Naval Hospital facilities.
The members of the revolutionary high command arrived at the Calixto de la Torre farm one after another, firstly Captains Daniel Alberto Correa and Néstor Ulloa, followed by First Lieutenant Horacio Varela Ortiz, Lieutenants Jorge Ibarzábal and Héctor Nin and Captains Juan José Buasso and Carlos Oruezabala, the latter with orders to receive instructions to leave immediately afterwards to provide support to Major Quijano.
Captain Buasso was the bearer of disturbing news since, during the journey, he had seen movements of strange elements along the way, which were possibly intelligence services loyal to the government. As Lusi Ernesto Lonardi tells it in God is Just, seeing that this was generating some concern among those present, his father said in a firm tone of voice:

-Gentlemen, in every war operation, events do not develop as one wishes. I want to tell you that we must multiply in order to put ourselves in a relationship of one to ten and proceed with brutality. Captain Buasso, go to fulfill his mission.

-At your command, my general! – was the response.

After midnight (00:30), Arturo Ossorio Arana (h) appeared at the De la Torre farm along with two of his friends, Marcelo Gabastou and Iván Villamil, who had come to join the commandos.
It was then that General Lonardi decided to set off, but before doing so, he gathered the group of officers and civilians present around him and reiterated his previous premise to them:

-Gentlemen, we are going to carry out a company of great responsibility. The only instruction I give them is to proceed with the maximum possible brutality.

On the night of September 15, at the Artillery School, located a few kilometers from the city of Córdoba, Captain Ramón Eduardo Molina, following the plan drawn up by the revolutionary high command, took charge of the guard after notifying that night he would serve as a service officer. Once in office, he made it known, through Lieutenant Carlos Alfredo Carpani, that the guard posts were in the hands of the rebels and that was the signal that the group led by General Lonardi was waiting for to march.
Next to that military unit were the facilities of the Troop School
Airborne and in front of both, route in between, their Infantry pair, a powerful combat unit under the command of Colonel Guillermo Brizuela, with more than 2,000 troops under his command. The 13th Infantry Regiment had been merged into the latter when its transfer to Córdoba was ordered and in both, school and regiment, the Justicialist doctrine had taken hold strongly, so the rebel commanders sensed that it was not going to be captured. easy.
Very close by, at the Military Aviation School, captains Jorge Guillamondegui and Hilario Maldonado, the leaders of the rebel group, were awaiting the start of the fight, concerned about a meeting of officers that was taking place at that time. However, at that point, no matter what happened, nothing could prevent the launch of operations.

Following the instructions given, at 11:30 p.m. on September 15, the Artillery, Airborne Troops, and Military Aviation schools began war preparations. In the most absolute silence, provided with their war equipment and wearing combat uniform, their troops proceeded to take positions, turning the artillery pieces and heavy weapons towards the Infantry School and placing several machine gun nests at the pre-established points, after reducing all those sections that had offered some type of resistance. Half an hour later, a DC-3 plane with five rebel Aeronautics officers on board left the Aeroparque in the city of Buenos Aires, with the mission of collaborating in the control of the Espora Base.
Lonardi and his companions arrived at the Artillery School without incident, entering through the back aboard several cars. He was received by Assistant Sergeant Claudio García and Captain Ramón Eduardo Molina, with whom he headed towards the officers' casino after parking the vehicles near the access.
Lonardi was informed of the latest events, the main ones being the arrest of all the non-commissioned officers and the enlistment of the corps of candidates, a hundred soldiers who had to replace the detained troops. Immediately afterwards, he entered the officers' casino followed by Captain Molina, Colonel Ossorio Arana, officers Ezequiel Pereyra and David Uriburu, Marcelo Gabastou, Iván Villamil, Luis Ernesto Lonardi and Arturo Ossorio Arana (h) and with them he went up, gun in hand. hand, to the rooms of Colonel Juan Bautista Turconi, director of the School, located on the first floor.
Once there, Captain Molina opened the door and entered the room.

-"My colonel, I bring you an urgent message," he said and immediately afterwards, he gave way to General Lonardi.
-Surrender, colonel! – It was the order that the leader of the riot gave him while he pointed his 45 pistol at him.

Far from being intimidated, Turconi pounced on the newcomer and began to struggle in order to disarm him. Lonardi fired and the bullet grazed his right ear, forcing him to abandon his attitude. The unit commander was subdued and taken to the infirmary to be treated while the rebel general took control of the School. At that point it was evident that he was determined to act according to the instructions that he himself had given before leaving: “proceed with maximum brutality” and based on this, he ordered Captain Molina to prepare the combat unit:

-Show me the School in the parade ground, ready to go into action.
-At your command, my general!

Minutes later, more than 3,000 troops were waiting outside. The first person to speak to them was Captain Molina, to explain in a firm tone of voice that due to the corruption and arrogance of a government that had been dominating vast sectors of society for some time, the School had revolted. Lonardi spoke next, giving a fiery harangue in which he informed the troops that they were about to enter combat and that all possible firmness and determination was needed. Once it was over, he gave the order to occupy positions and after giving a series of directives to his closest assistants, he headed to his combat position.
The School had 60 heavy-caliber cannons that, in the absence of troops, constituted its main defense system and had soldiers from an Infantry company, a sufficient number to establish a relatively important perimeter, although not enough.
Twelve howitzers, under the command of Major Melitón Quijano, were placed outside the limits of the establishment, pointing towards the right side of the Infantry School, which would have the support of captains José Antonio Buasso, Eduardo Fossatti and Carlos Oruezabala, who acting jointly with other officers would try to cover them from both sides.
Shortly after the School was taken, the first death of that second phase of the revolution occurred.
For several hours, General Alberto Morello had been trying to contact Colonel Brizuela to warn him that something out of the ordinary was happening in the military units of the province and when he could not locate him, he dispatched Lieutenant Colonel Ernesto Félix Frías to the place. the effects of being personally imposed on the situation. Frías boarded a jeep and, accompanied by a driver, headed towards the Infantry School but, in the middle of the route, he ran into a patrol of paratroopers who told him to “stop.” Far from obeying it, he ignored the order and continued moving in the direction of the picket.

-Please don't move, my lieutenant colonel! - shouted the officer in charge when he saw that Frías continued advancing - Stop!!

The outcome was tremendous. As the loyal officer continued to approach the position, the paratroopers opened fire and shot him down just as he drew his weapon. He was left lying on the asphalt, lifeless, in the middle of a pool of blood.
At that precise moment the Infantry School turned on its lights so that the troops could dress and arm themselves, showing that the surprise factor that the revolutionary forces had had had been lost.
In a last attempt to avoid useless bloodshed, Lonardi telephoned the Infantry School to speak with his boss, but Brizuela hung up without engaging in dialogue. And when after a second call he refused to say a word, it became clear that combat was inevitable.
Everything was ready at the Artillery School, with all its pieces pointing at its Infantry pair and its men ready to go into action.
At the Airborne Troops School, meanwhile, Captain Arruabarrena was waiting with all of his deployed personnel. By then, Lonardi had tried, once again, to establish dialogue with Colonel Brizuela and faced with a new refusal, he had no choice but to begin hostilities. With sorrow and pain, although with absolute determination, he headed towards his command post, on top of the water tank of the military unit, accompanied by his old and loyal friend, Colonel Ossorio Arana, and at 1:00 a.m. on September 16 , ordered the attack.

At midnight on September 15, frigate captain Carlos Sánchez Sañudo appeared at the private home of Admiral Rojas, at the Punta Indio Naval Air Base, to announce that the time established by the revolutionary command had arrived.

-Mr. Admiral: it is twelve o'clock.

Rojas, who at that moment was reading a book sitting in one of the armchairs in the living room, sat up and from his telephone called a meeting in his office with all the members of his general staff made up of his commander, Captain Jorge Palma, the Sánchez Sañudo himself as head of Communications, frigate captain Silvio René Casinelli in charge of Operations, his assistant, lieutenant captain Andrés Troppea and the head of the Ríos Squadron, ship captain Fernando Muro de Nadal.
During the conclave, Muro de Nadal questioned the success of the operation due to the lack of committed Army officers and was there, explaining his point of view, when a lieutenant entered the room to announce that General Juan José Uranga He had just arrived, accompanied by two of his nephews, also officers, who were bringing him by car from Rosario. It was the signal that Rojas had been waiting for, which is why, without wasting time, he ordered the enlistment of the destroyers “La Rioja” and “Cervantes”, so that in the first hours of the day they would gain open waters and establish the blockade of the Río de la Silver. At the same time, directives were given to Lieutenant Commander Mariano Queirel to set sail for Martín García Island aboard a torpedo boat, so that the Seamanship School could dispatch all its troops from there in order to reinforce Río Santiago. Immediately afterwards, the base was ordered to ready.
It began at 03:00 in the morning of the 16th when the naval officers, blowing their whistles, turned on the lights in the rooms and ordered the 1st and 2nd year cadets who were sleeping at that time, to get dressed and get dressed. Prepare your bags for boarding. They were struck by the fact that many of those giving the orders were 4th year cadets dressed in combat clothing and that the base was completely illuminated.
When the sailors went out into the hallways, they noticed that there were Army officers who were also wearing combat uniforms and then they understood that something serious was happening.
The troops were led to the study yard and, once there, they were made to form a square. Only then did the cadets realize that the highest authority of the base, Admiral Isaac Francisco Rojas, was there along with other officers, one of whom, frigate captain Bassi (chief of the Corps), gave a step forward to speak.
Through his superior, the cadets heard, astonished, that the Navy had rebelled against the government and was preparing to enter combat to overthrow it. Immediately afterwards, the head of the 4th year cadets announced loudly that anyone who did not agree with what was going to happen should step forward and then waited. The slogan was not to involve those who did not agree with the revolution, making it especially clear that no type of retaliation was going to be taken. As Isidoro Ruiz Moreno says, to his satisfaction and that of his superiors, no one moved.

At that same moment the high school cadets, among whom were the children of Rojas and Rial, were awakened by their boss, Lieutenant Jorge Isaac Anaya6, in charge of informing them of the novelty, before ordering their enlistment to carry out auxiliary and maintenance tasks. guard.
Marines on one side and cadets on the other took up combat positions and several more formed a line to board the naval units to which they had been assigned.

On the destroyers “Cervantes” and “La Rioja”, their commanders, frigate captains Pedro J. Gnavi and Rafael A. Palomeque, supervised the readiness while constantly giving directives. They were to set sail once the preparations had been completed, after receiving the operations plan from Captain Sánchez Sañudo.
The cadets lined up next to the “Hall of Battles”, a large hall decorated with magnificent paintings that represented the main naval battles of our nineteenth-century wars, and from there they marched in columns to embark, greeted by the director of the Naval Academy and the members of their Mayor state.
Once at the docks of the canal that separated the School from the Shipyards, the sailors began to board, the older and better trained ones occupying their positions next to the artillery and communications pieces and the younger ones, the surveillance ones, on the command booth.

In the nearby city of La Plata, Lieutenant Juan Manuel Jiménez Baliani was sleeping next to his wife when a prolonged and insistent ringing woke him up in the middle of the night. Extremely worried, he stayed still in bed because in those days, stories of arrests in the wee hours of the morning were commonplace. He remained motionless for about half a minute, hoping in the depths of his being that it had been a dream, when a second touch startled him. Even in the dark, he could see that his alarm clock showed 04:00 in the morning and that worried him even more.
His wife was awake when she got up. She told her to stay calm and that she was going to see what it was about her, and while she put on her slippers, she went to the front door, without turning on any lights.
Keeping the door closed he asked who he was and on the other side, a weak voice answered:

-Lieutenant Pérez, from the Officer Application School, sir.

Only then did Jiménez Baliani open and look out. He could see that, indeed, it was a Navy officer wearing his uniform, but he did not know him.

"Show me his identification," he said to the newcomer.

The officer obeyed by extending his credentials and after taking a careful look at the document, Jiménez Baliani asked, in a tone that showed annoyance and lack of courtesy.

-What's happening? What does he want?

-I have been given the order to inform him that he must report immediately to his destination. The situation makes this urgent. The readiness of all units has been arranged.

-Very good. "Thank you," he replied. "I'll introduce myself right away."

-I hope so, sir. I have a jeep parked at the door, to take it to the base.

Since Jiménez did not know the officer in front of him, he was suspicious and responded that it was not necessary for him to wait for him because he was going to go in his own car.

-It's going to be late! – insisted the young lieutenant.
-Retreat! -the officer ordered- I will report to my destination immediately. Go fulfill other duties you have.
-Well sir. Good evening - faith the answer, and immediately afterwards, the subaltern boarded his jeep and left.

Jiménez Baliani closed the door and when he saw his wife standing in the hallway, he told her to change her clothes because she had to take him immediately to Río Santiago. They dressed hurriedly and in the middle of the night, they went outside and got into the car that was parked at the door, the woman at the wheel and the officer next to her.
They took the deserted suburban streets and headed towards Ensenada, they entered the open field, previously crossing an emergency neighborhood halfway, where the woman accelerated their march when they thought they saw movements.
They thus arrived at the doors of the Shipyard, where they found the iron gates closed and the guard posted telling them to stop their march while dazzling them by illuminating them with extremely powerful spotlights. Without moving from the vehicle, they saw a Marine Corps officer approaching them, illuminating them with a flashlight. When he arrived at the window, the sailor recognized Lieutenant Jiménez and saluted him:

-Good morning. Where is it going?
-To the shortstop “La Rioja”, where I am stationed.
"Well," was the response, "get out of the car and go to the dock on foot." You better hurry up.

It was dawn when Jiménez Baliani said goodbye to his wife and got out of the car. The young woman remained inside the vehicle, with her hands on the wheel and the engine running, watching as her husband crossed the gate and walked away from her. Only then did she dare to speak to ask the officer on duty if she could stay parked there until she clarified since she was afraid to return alone.

-Sir, could I stay on the side, near the fence, until dawn and there is enough light to return without problems?
"Ma'am," the sailor responded politely, "do you know how to drive well?"
-Yes – she responded.
-Then don't wait a minute. In half an hour the situation will be set up here.” Leave as soon as possible and good luck.
-Thank you – the lady responded. And putting it in first gear, she walked away from the place, filled with deep concern.

Jiménez's wife was returning to her home while her husband hurried along the internal roads of the shipyard in the direction of the docks. It was reckless for him to have had himself taken to the base because the places he had to pass through to and from were unsafe and because a full-scale confrontation was imminent.

Once at the dock, she saw the personnel forming two lines, ready to board and Lieutenant Commander Carlos F. Peralta, her second commander, supervising the alignment with two officers.

From a list, previously prepared, they named the surnames of those who would make up the crew that would go sailing. When someone was named, he responded: Present! and she headed on board.
I introduced myself to the Second Commander who in brief words imposed my obligations on me: prepare the weapons for combat. He had two assistants: the permanent one, who was then Lieutenant Juan R. Ayala Torales, and a temporary one, Lieutenant Federico Ríos, a student at the Officer Application School, who had been designated for this opportunity.

Jiménez Baliani was informed of what was happening and that way he knew that once the personnel had embarked, the ships would set out to sea on a war mission.

Meanwhile, the base was hastily organizing its defensive device under the orders of Captain Carlos Bourel, who for this purpose had Marine Corps troops and Army officers. Sniper posts were located at different points of the facilities and the artillery pieces of the patrol boats “King” and “Murature” were ready, the first of which was undergoing repairs. Once the revolution began, the rebel high command awaited the reaction of the 7th Infantry Regiment and the Command of the II Division based in La Plata under the orders of General Heraclio Ferrazzano, so their movements, at that hour of the morning , they were feverish.

Notes

1. That day, the Scientific and Technical Research Institute of the Armed Forces had organized a shooting demonstration to which military attachés and war correspondents from different countries were specially invited. All the officers of the Artillery School had to attend, almost all of them committed to the uprising.
2. As Isidoro Ruiz Moreno relates, in those days, Captain Rial's home and movements were monitored by security personnel who traveled aboard a car with license plate No. 340 of the province of Buenos Aires.
3. The movement of the troops had to take place in BDI No. 6 and No. 11
4. It was located at the intersection of Buenos Aires and Obispo Oro.
5. The owner of the house, his wife Irene Gravier and his seven children were preparing to spend the weekend at the aforementioned residence. Luis Ernesto Lonardi remembers in Dios es Justo one of them, Irene de la Torre, a charming 15-year-old girl, who prepared and served them food and drinks with great presence of mind, enthusiastic about lending her collaboration.
6. In 1982 he would be the harshest exponent of the Military Junta that unleashed the South Atlantic War.
   

1955 Guerra Civil. La Revolucion Libertadora y la caída de Perón

AAF: A-4B without the refuelling probe

Douglas A-4B Skyhawk, C-221 serial, without the in-flight refueling probe.

Before the "Buddy Pack" arrives, the probes will be removed from the A-4s.

Roca and the "Day of the Race"

Columbus Day

By Rolando Hanglin | LA NACION





We Argentines have a defect that is, at the same time, our cardinal virtue. We are, in large part, grandchildren of gringos. Therefore, we ignore almost everything regarding the history of our country. We are part of the human tide that came down from the ships between 1880 and 1920, when the corpses of thousands of victims were not yet well covered by the pious earth. Indians and Christians, hostages and captives, chieftain (caciques) and soldiers (milicos), all of them who fell in the great Indian-Christian war, between 1820 and 1890.

 

Being, then, half gringos, we could know little about the raids, the forts, Roca and Villegas, Pincén and Calfucurá. To us, the Indians were guys with feathers that appeared in cowboy movies! Always losing the battle.

We are, in large part, grandchildren of gringos. Therefore, we ignore almost everything regarding the history of our country.

That is why we are surprised that, today, the supposed descendants of those Indians, today called "Mapuches", claim properties in places like Bariloche, Aluminé, La Angostura and even Toay, La Pampa.



Let's go in parts.

Actually, the term "Mapuche" was invented by the North American ethnologist Edmond E. Smith in 1850, and later spread in different countries of America. The meaning is clear: mapu: land; che: people. In the same way, myself, a fan of the Patagonian language (mapu-dungún) I have baptized my weekend country house "Epu-Trehua" (the two dogs) and a little chalet I have in Chapadmalal, "Antu-Catán " (house of the sun) without claiming any historical roots.

Reading the works of Lucio V. Mansilla, Estanislao Zeballos, Manuel Prado and other authors from the time of the forts, we never find the word "Mapuche". No such tribe or nation was ever spoken of. The literature of 1820-1880 does speak of the Pampas, the Serranos, the Araucanians or Chileans, the Vorogas, the Tehuelches, the Tubichaminís. But the word Mapuche never appears. History and anthropology agree that Argentine territory, from San Luis to the south, was occupied by the northern Tehuelches (pampas, aoniken), the southern Tehuelches (pampas, guenaken) and the Tehuelches who had crossed over to the island, known as onas. These countrymen were part of a community of hunter-gatherers. They did not farm the land or uphold the concept of private property or national boundaries. Just that of "living space", which moved settlements in those immense extensions, always looking for abundant hunting of guanacos, deer, piches, ostriches. They occupied, then, without occupying it, an immense country. It is believed that these Tehuelches (or their ancestors) stamped the rock walls of the Cueva de las Manos 8000 years ago. Casamiquela affirms that when Carmen de Patagones was founded, the Tehuelches began to traffic rhea feathers and guanaco skins. They did the same in Punta Arenas, in 1850, and in 1865 with the Welsh colony, in the Chubut valley. It was an activity of economic significance far superior to what it may seem today. All the testimonies agree that the Tehuelche people were peaceful and dispersed.



Hence, it's quite unusual to witness the emergence, even in 2012, of communes, movements, or unions identifying as "Mapuche" that assert claims over territories in Chubut, Río Negro, Neuquén, and Santa Cruz. Where do these groups originate? Are they indigenous peoples of our nation, to whom the Republic owes redress for its past injustices in usurping their lands and undermining their means of sustenance?

The Mapuche is Chilean and entered the sphere of the Argentine pampas in 1820, expelled by the internal wars in Chile.

We are going to leave the answer to Mr. Rodolfo Casamiquela, ethnologist and anthropologist who died in 2008, but not without writing 24 books and 200 monographs on the subject. Casamiquela, born in Jacobacci, considered himself the last man capable of correctly pronouncing the northern Tehuelche language (that is, "pampa") and his verdict was overwhelming: "The Mapuches are Chileans."

Other concepts: "Today only the Mapuche is spoken of. The Tehuelches suppressed themselves or forgot their own history, despite the fact that today there are many descendants, such as the Chagallo, Yanquetruz, Sayhueque, Foyel, Catriel, Chiquichano, Chelqueta, Chingolé, Chalao, Chacamata, Cual. These families are the Tehuelches that remain, that is, the so-called pampas. They were a lineage of enormous potential power, which gradually became Araucanized or Mapuchized based on their language. The Mapuche is Chilean and enters the sphere of the Argentine pampas in 1820, expelled by the internal wars of Chile. Many Chilean Indian chiefs sided with the King of Spain and, in the context of a war to the death, crossed the mountain range to save their lives. Here they were received by some relatives and , little by little, authorized by Brigadier Juan Manuel de Rosas to settle in the provinces of the Río de la Plata.

One wonders if the Tehuelches, a native people of Pampa and Patagonia, were exterminated by the Chilean Araucanians, or by the Argentine military forces, or by someone.

Casamiquela: "The issue is the language. To negotiate with Spanish, the so-called parliaments were held, that is, oratory and diplomacy assemblies where each chief (ulmén) with his little capitains (capitanejos) or little chieftain (caciquillos), and the representatives of the White or huinca (derived from the Incas, who also tried to subdue the Araucanians with little luck) competed in speeches and rhetorical figures to "adjust peace". In this diplomatic field, the Mapuche language was far superior to Tehuelche. Precise, clear, beautiful, simple, rude, Mapudungun is a very valuable language. With it religion penetrates, then the Mapuche predominates over the Tehuelche".



Our conclusion is that the Chilean Mapuches did not annihilate the Argentine Tehuelches; instead, they formed separate federations where Mapuche military leadership consistently held sway. As corroborated by meticulous historical travelers like the Englishman Musters, the Tehuelches were often characterized as "nomads, wanderers, free spirits, and undisciplined."

Professor Casamiquela asserts, "The Mapuche presence in Argentina lacks deep historical roots. They have been here for around a century." In this respect, they are akin to the Italians, Irish, or Croats. Casamiquela further explains, "When Professor Erice, the author of the most comprehensive Mapuche dictionary, arrived in our country, he found no speakers of that language in Viedma. Here in Jacobacci, there were the Linares, descendants of a captive bearing that surname who married the daughter of a Tehuelche chieftain, based near the Juncal lagoon, but they were Tehuelches. Creoles with surnames like Entrage or Castelo also belong to the Tehuelche heritage. In summary, the claims that the Mapuches make today regarding land rights... they simply do not have a historical basis. This is history, not conjecture. Currently, political dynamics are in play. Consequently, Chilean Mapuches declare themselves as Argentines and begin asserting a long-standing presence in our country. Historians are not primarily concerned with this aspect. What a politician or lawyer may argue... that is another matter altogether."



The tall and pensive Tehuelches were subjected to colonization and undoubtedly deceived by both Argentine settlers and Chilean Araucanians. Historically, the name Patagonia conjures images of a land inhabited by men with exceptionally large feet and towering stature.

Casamiquela explains, "The Spaniards, who were of shorter stature, often looked down at the Tehuelches as they stood atop the dunes. In 1896, a Frenchman named Delavaux conducted an excavation along Route 40 in southern Chubut, unearthing a Tehuelche burial site and measuring the skeleton of the interred individual, which reached a height of 1.99 meters. Another excavation, this time in Península Valdez, confirmed individuals reaching a height of two meters. They are indeed the tallest ethnic group in the world."

While they were of considerable stature, the Tehuelches were also known for their vices, free-spirited customs, docility, and kindness. They formed amicable relations with the Welsh settlers in Chubut and, in general, did not cause trouble. They allowed themselves to be influenced first by the Chilean Araucanians and later by the Argentine Republic.

One of the last heroic figures of the Tehuelche or Pampa lineage was undoubtedly Chief Pincén, whose name was remembered as Vicente, Juan, or Francisco Pincén, depending on the region. The surname is correctly pronounced as Pisen, Piseñ, or Pincel, always emphasizing the accent on the "i."



There are four pictures of Pincén. In these images, we see him with his characteristic fluke, colt boots, a short spear, his testicles hanging around his neck, his bare torso, long hair held in place by a headband, and he appears strikingly similar to Alberto Olmedo! He could also bear a resemblance to Don Alberto Rodríguez Saá, though the latter, more robust in build, still possesses the stature and charisma of his Ranquelino forebears.

Some individuals reject Columbus Day because it seems to categorize humanity on the same plane as creatures like golden retrievers or Hereford cows. The truth is, all humans belong to the same species, but there exist significant ethnic variations; a Swede is not the same as a Senegalese.

The tall and introspective Tehuelches were subjected to colonization and, undoubtedly, taken advantage of by Argentine settlers and Chilean Araucanians, who primarily ventured into our pampas to steal cattle and capture fair-haired women. Along the way, unfortunate confrontations with Argentinians, including violent encounters, were inevitable. It was an unfortunate reality.

However, that's a different story. For now, we conclude this humble note with a traditional Patagonian greeting, one that is still used today when travelers cross paths: "Mari-mari." This phrase literally translates to "ten-ten." Wishing you good fortune, and sometimes, to convey a warmer farewell in passing, it is articulated more fully: "Mari-mari peñí." In other words, "Goodbye, brother."

NOTE: The sources for this article come from the website "Los Matuastos- Periodismo" (Sunday September, the 9th 2012) and "Pincén, vida y leyenda" wrote by Juan José Estévez, and published in 2011.

Malvinas/Falklands: HMS Conqueror chasing the Belgrano

The HMS Conqueror chasing the Belgrano

The Churchill-class submarine HMS Conqueror, which had 3 units, with nuclear propulsion, was launched on 05/12/1967 and joined the Sea Fleet on 09/11/1971. The main objective of these submarines was, in the Cold War, to spy on the movements of the Soviet submarine naval force. She was retired in 1990. To this day she was the only nuclear submarine to sink an enemy ship with conventional torpedoes, the cruiser ARA General Belgrano, in 1982.)

by LAWRENCE FREEDMAN and VIRGINIA GAMBA 

On April 27, the Argentine Navy had been deployed to oppose the planned landing of British forces. On April 29, the fleet divided into two groups and took up positions to defend the Falklands. The most important group included 25 de Mayo, with two destroyers equipped with guided missiles, as well as four smaller destroyers and frigates. This group was divided into two (Task Groups 79.1 and 79.4) and occupied positions on the edge of the Maritime Exclusion Zone, and to the northwest of the islands (Task Group 79.1 was 270 nautical miles east of the Gulf of San Jorge, in Patagonia, and Task Group 79.4 northeast of the same position).

The smaller group, which included the cruiser General Belgrano, plus two destroyers (Task Group 79.3), went on to occupy a position 260 miles south of the islands. His orders were to "search and destroy the Bitany fleet if the islands or the mainland were attacked." The Navy had been ordered to respect the 200-mile zone imposed by the British and not to launch attacks.

At 15:13 on 1 May, Admiral Allara, commanding Task Group I aboard 25 May, had received aerial reconnaissance to the effect that seven British ships were They were about 120 miles away, north of Puerto Argentino. Lombardo would later recall:

Our people in the Falklands, in the Malvinas, began to claim that there was a landing... Landing with helicopters and boats, with boats, both at various points, near Puerto Argentino, near Port Stanley... So I had to accept that that was the day of disembarkation. We believed that the British would concentrate efforts in the vicinity of Port Stanley and tried to attack isolated ships or small groups of ships outside that region. The Air Force would attack the ships that were near Port Stanley."

 

More or less simultaneously, information sent by Rear Admiral Otero of the South Atlantic Command arrived and said that there was a "landing underway north of the islands." The ships were claimed to have held between 010 and 145 degrees off Stanley, at intervals of 90, 40 and 10 nautical miles, protected by Sea Harriers.

At 15:55, upon receiving information from Admiral Allara, Lombardo left him "free of action to attack." Allara interpreted this as a modification of Argentine combat rules. He could now take action against the British fleet and issued orders to that effect to the groups under his command. This change was made without reference to higher authorities.

There is no reason to believe that if he had consulted he would have thought better of it. Admiral Anaya, commander in chief of the Navy, feared that the navy would not respond quickly enough, and that all the honors of the battle would go to the Air Force. He ordered Lombardo to commit the Navy and then backed off, as he thought his own attitude was unfair. Lombardo was "closer to the action" and, therefore, had to do what he judged "necessary and appropriate." In reality, Lombardo had already ordered the attack.

Granted freedom of action, Allara began moving toward the task force. At 20:07, now that he had more information about the British cannonades and possible landings, Allara gave the general order to begin offensive operations. At 8:39 p.m., General Menéndez, in Puerto Argentino, was convinced that a landing was taking place. At 20:55 there was intense naval fire on the airport and the helicopters approached the coast. But shortly before midnight the ships ceased fire and withdrew. No Sea Harrier attacks had been sustained since 19:00. More or less at that time the first SAS units were disembarking on Soledad Island (East Falkland). If, as has been suggested, the Argentine radars on the coast detected the Sea King helicopters transporting the men of the SAS units, it is possible that this verification reinforced the impression of a landing attempt.
 

At noon, a Tracker plane, on a reconnaissance mission, discovered six British ships. Allara, who was on board the May 25, was informed. Allara hoped to dispatch six Skyhawks with a combat radius of 240 miles, each armed with six 250-kilogram bombs. He needed a 40-knot wind to do it. At 10 p.m. the wind began to decrease. He now calculated that he would need to wait until 6 o'clock before finding himself in a position that would allow him to unleash the attack. Two hours later he had decreased even more. To send the planes from the ship he would have to load them with less fuel and fewer weapons. The radius of action was reduced to 140 miles and the load to two bombs. It was now concluded that the attack would not be possible until 11am on 2 May. Regardless, Allara decided to continue moving towards the task force.

At 0:30 on 2 May an echo was detected about 110 miles away, approaching Task Group 1. It was identified shortly afterwards as a Sea Harrier. The plane circled about 60 to 70 miles away from Task Group 1, which it had apparently discovered. At 1:19 Lombardo sent Allara the following signal: "Su 012007. There have been no air attacks on MLV since 011900. I do not know the position of enemy aircraft carriers. Unengaged enemy constitutes a strong threat to T 79."

If the enemy was not attacking Puerto Argentino now, it could be found anywhere within a wide radius. So now not only was there no immediate need to attack the Royal Navy, since there was no landing, but there was a threat to the Argentine fleet. This was not an order to retreat, but the consequences were clear.

Allara was not fully aware of the risks, as he had just been located by an enemy Sea Harrier. At 1:45 he informed Lombardo that there was little point in continuing the march, because wind conditions made an attack impossible, and the forecast for the next day suggested that things would not improve. Accordingly, he ordered the task groups to "return to their previous positions... That is, the two northern groups towards the mainland and the southern group towards the Island of the States." He wanted to return to shallower waters to limit the risk of falling victim to a submarine attack. When Admiral Anaya arrived at the Operations Center, at 2:30, he confirmed the messages from Allara and Lombardo and annulled the orders ordering the offensive action to begin.

Meanwhile, the Belgrano and the two accompanying destroyers patrolled between States Island and Bordwook Bank, southwest of the Falklands, with the double objective of preventing another British warship from joining the task force coming from the Pacific, and to warn of any movement towards the continental territory. That group was also destined to prevent Chilean intervention. On the afternoon of May 1, he received the order to avoid approaching the Exclusion Zone, and to avoid confronting the enemy without prior authorization; Instead, he was to offer a lateral threat, so that the enemy would divide his forces. Like the rest of the fleet, he had been ordered to intercept enemy units that were damaged or isolated, or had become separated from the main body of the British task force, if the opportunity arose. He was not to engage in a frontal attack.

 

At 2:50 the Belgrano commander received the order given by Allara at 1:45. He began to really alter course at 5:11. This maneuver ended at 6, and at that moment the cruiser pointed its bow towards the Island of the States. About ten hours later she was hit by two torpedoes from the port side. She immediately lost propulsive power and began to list. Half an hour later the evacuation was ordered, and at 5:02 p.m. the Belgrano sank. An accompanying destroyer, Hipólito Bouchard, believed she had been hit by a third torpedo that did not explode. With the other destroyer, the Piedrabuena, she adopted anti-submarine measures and moved away from her.

Lombardo later explained why the destroyers had not helped pick up survivors, and alluded to "the first spectacular submarine action" during the Great War, in the channel. A German submarine torpedoed a British ship, which began to sink, and then successively sank the two accompanying ships, which had stopped to pick up survivors. "The ships are not at sea to pick up survivors," he added, "but to fight and not be sunk." In the most costly individual encounter of the war, 321 crew members of the Belgrano lost their lives.

Woodward Request
As it came many hours after the fighting on May 1, it appeared that this British attack was unrelated to the previous combat. But it wasn't like that. He closely followed the action of the day before. To explain this, it is necessary to return to the way the British viewed the military situation.

On April 30, the nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror was sent to the Tierra del Fuego area, with orders to search for the Belgrano. The information that the cruise ship was in that area may have come from Chilean sources; According to one version, the Chilean naval command in Punta Arenas at the end of April sent a message to the British military attaché in Santiago through an intermediary. Later in the afternoon, the Conqueror picked up the first sounds on sonar. In reality, she was a tanker that accompanied the Belgrano.

The Conqueror's orders, received at 9 p.m., local time, on April 30, were to intercept the Belgrano and attack her when she entered, as it was expected she would, into the Total Exclusion Zone. The next morning he sighted the Belgrano and the two destroyers that accompanied it, and that were refueling with fuel from the tanker. At 11 o'clock the three ships began to move away towards the southeast, at the speed of 8 knots. The Conqueror began to follow them and sent signals to Fleet Headquarters at Northwood, outside London, indicating that she had established contact, and indicating her position and course. The signal also reached Admiral Woodward, who was aboard the Hermes. At 1 on May 2, the Conqueror reported that he was still following the Belgrano.

Admiral Woodward wanted the Conqueror to attack the Belgrano. He gave Conqueror a direct order to attack at 4:10 (8:10 British time) on the morning of 2 May. The order had to pass through Northwood, where Admiral Herbert, commander of the submarines, rescinded it, because he realized that he would need political approval. Woodward had the authority to attack the Argentine ships with his surface ships or aircraft, and he could have done so in this case, although not so easily. What he now demanded required that the forms of combat be modified, a step that Northwood was already contemplating.

Desde Northwood se envió una señal al capitán Wreford-Brown, del Conqueror, a las 6:15, y probablemente lo sorprendió la orden de que se abstuviera de desencadenar un ataque hasta que cambiasen las reglas. 

Although Britain seemed embroiled in a possibly unlimited naval battle with Argentina, the task force was constrained with respect to the possible use of its most lethal weapons - nuclear submarines - by established rules of combat.

In Northwood, Woodward's attitude aroused irritation. It was suggested that Admiral Fieldhouse had expressed his displeasure with him. Still, Woodward's request highlighted something that was already being addressed. Fieldhouse supported Woodward's view that the rules should be changed to allow the attack.

At Northwood it was estimated that there was enough time to get the rules of engagement modified before the Belgrano reached the task force. Not long after receiving Woodward's signal, at 9:15 British time on the morning of 2 May, Admiral Lewin arrived at Northwood and reviewed the situation with other senior commanders before proceeding to Checkers for a meeting. meeting of the War Cabinet. It was agreed that Lewin would lobby the War Cabinet for changes to the rules of engagement.

Admiral Woodward explained his concern this way:

"Early on May 2, everything indicated that the 25 de Mayo, the Argentine aircraft carrier and a group of escort ships had crossed my SSN barrier heading north, and that the cruiser General Belgrano and its escort ships were trying to complete the pincer movement from the south, still outside the Total Exclusion Zone. But the Belgrano was still followed by the Conqueror. My fear was based on the Belgrano breaking away from the SSN as it passed through the not-so-deep waters of Burdwood Bank, and that my advanced SSN barrier would also be evaded there. Therefore, I demanded, for the first and only time in the course of the campaign, a major change in the Rules of Combat, in order to allow the Conqueror to attack the Belgrano outside the Exclusion Zone." 

Woodward's concern therefore related to the immediate tactical situation in which he found himself. His own previous experience in Royal Navy exercises with the United States Navy meant that he knew that carrier groups were not invulnerable to surface ship action groups. He sent his claim to the Conqueror not long after receiving information indicating that the most important Argentine group was advancing towards him, and the union of the two fragments of information raised the possibility of a "pincer movement." It was known that the destroyers that accompanied the Belgrano carried Exocet, and it was possible that the cruiser itself had this missile. If anything, her 6-inch guns outclassed the British 4.5-inch guns. To attack the cruiser she only had the Harriers and the SSN. The Harriers were needed for the air defense task, especially because there was still a risk that the Skyhawks would be launched from the 25 de Mayo. The Conqueror remained. The concern here was that if the Belgrano sailed across the submerged risk called Burwood Bank, the Conqueror would have serious difficulties maintaining contact, especially if she wanted her presence not to be detected.

Based on available intelligence, Northwood's assessment was also that the Argentine Navy was attempting a pincer movement. What was known then about the Argentine movements? According to a number of versions, the signal sent by Admiral Allara at 15:55 (19:55 British time) ordering the groups under his command to begin the offensive against the British fleet had been intercepted, and this was which affected the Belgrano and its escort ships.

Lewin has also pointed out that the evaluation was based on the knowledge that there had been a significant flow of radio traffic between the different units of the Argentine Navy, and on the "evaluation of what one would have done if one had been in the place of Argentina".

The reference to radio traffic reflects Woodward's officers' analysis of the position and progress of the Argentine carrier group on the basis of interpretation of "wireless traffic patterns and observation of the direction from which they could approach." the planes of May 25".

After radar contact with one of the Tracker search aircraft launched on May 25, the Sea Harriers attempted to discover the aircraft carrier. One of them detected the presence of four or five ships not long after midnight local time. The pilot immediately noticed that he was also being illuminated by the search radar of a Type 909 Sea Dart. With this alarming confirmation that he had found enemy ships he hurried back to the Hermes. As we now know, this same contact was a fundamental factor in the Argentine decision to withdraw, and the withdrawal was taking place while Northwood officers considered how to deal with a threat they believed was looming.

It has been suggested that Lombardo's signal at 1:19 (5:19 British time) had also been intercepted by GCHQ, but was not yet deciphered.

This signal was more of a warning than an order to retreat (which later came from Allara), although retreat was implied. It is possible that other signals were intercepted that could have provided a clearer picture if deciphered; but even if this had been the case, the decryption task would have taken several hours.

According to the Foreign Affairs committee of the House of Commons, whose members were shown the available intelligence material: "The classified evidence we have seen and other evidence authoritatively and conclusively demonstrate that before the sinking of the Belgrano they did not come into the hands of the government "British intercepted orders regarding a withdrawal of Argentine forces."

The most recent direct evidence would have confirmed the impression that the Argentine fleet was continuing to advance. The Conqueror had reported at 5 (London time) that it was continuing to follow the Belgrano, which was undoubtedly avoiding the Exclusion Zone, but was approaching the task force at a speed of 13 knots.

So the tactical picture was in some ways disconcerting. The Argentine fleet, and especially the aircraft carrier, would have been drawn to sea according to plan, but the plan had been thwarted as the nuclear submarine HMS Splendid had been unable to establish contact with the 25 de Mayo, which was now in front. of the Argentine offensive. The only part of this offensive with which there was any contact was the Belgrano and the two destroyers that accompanied it. The Belgrano probably did not carry Exocet anti-ship missiles, but she could carry them, and the escort destroyers possessed such weapons. Likewise, although the speed at that time was reduced, it would still catch up with the task force.

This was calculated on the basis of the "Widest Circle", that is, a circle whose center is the last known position of the enemy, and whose radius is the maximum known speed of the enemy multiplied by the time that has elapsed since the last time he saw it. This circle widens with the passage of time. The Belgrano's last reported speed, i.e. 13 knots, was less than its maximum speed of 30 knots, but a prudent commander concerned about the vulnerability of the ships under his command would have felt compelled to assume the worst. .

Another tactical risk was that the Belgrano could have participated in a new expedition to occupy South Georgia, which did not have a good defense at that time. Meanwhile, the need to monitor it would be a further burden on the task force's strained helicopter and Harrier core.

Another factor that weighed on the minds of the commanders concerned the risk of delaying the special forces that were to reconnoiter the islands on the coast. According to Lewin's version:

"Having reached the vicinity of the Falkland Islands, he (Woodward) had to secretly send special forces to gather information on the Argentine dispositions. For this purpose he needed to approach within a very short distance of the Falklands every night. Whether it was to disembark or to resupply the committed special forces. He could not perform any of these tasks if the Argentine fleet was at sea. He did not know where he was, and it was assumed that his intention was to attack him. He could preserve his safety by retreating to the east and staying out of reach of the Argentines. If he adopted that criterion, he would be unable to fulfill his mission." 

In addition to concerns that the Belgrano was part of an imminent offensive, there were other reasons why task force commanders strongly supported an attack. Firstly, one of the original objectives of yesterday's operations was to create opportunities that would allow the Argentine Navy and Air Force to be worn down. Perhaps not all the consequences of the loss of the Belgrano were foreseen, but in any case it was an opportunity that the commanders did not want to waste. To quote Lewin again: "In war, it is necessary to seize opportunities while they exist; there may be no second chance."

There was something else. These arguments were themselves symptomatic of the fact that the limitations imposed on submarines seemed anomalous. All the information coming from the South Atlantic regarding the previous day's activity indicated that the fighting had begun in earnest. All this was clearly deduced from the attack in which the Glamorgan barely escaped, and from the evidence that at least one Argentine submarine had been searching for prey. The reports that arrived from Buenos Aires in the morning reinforced that impression.

The Argentine statements regarding the successes obtained the day before, although undoubtedly exaggerated, were nevertheless interpreted as a reliable indication of that country's intentions, and in themselves contributed to creating the atmosphere of the War Cabinet's subsequent decision.

Regardless of the specific reasons given in relation to the Belgrano, Lewin would have pressured the War Cabinet in favor of a change in the rules of combat. If the specific tactical situation of May 1 and 2 had not forced a change the question would have been raised the following day, during the War Cabinet meeting. The change would determine that all Argentine warships would be threatened by British submarines, and not just the Belgrano.

Lewin went to Checkers with Admiral Fieldhouse to highlight the military's argument. When he arrived, he immediately explained the situation to the prime minister and asked for the rules to be changed.

The War Cabinet itself did not discuss the matter. Outside of Lewin, the chiefs of staff were not included in the discussion, although they all agreed with Lewin's recommendation. As the matter was urgent, Thatcher called together the ministers and civil servants who had been invited to lunch before the formal body met in the afternoon. Therefore, it was not recorded in the minutes. There was little time to consider in advance the consequences of the step. The discussion lasted between fifteen and twenty minutes. One version states that there was a fairly extensive discussion, but in practice it seems that it was rather superficial, and that there was a general reluctance to question military judgment.

Whitelaw later recalled that it was "one of the easiest decisions he personally participated in" as soon as he (Whitelaw) realized the risk of losing contact with the Belgrano if the Conqueror was not allowed to attack it.

The absence of the Foreign Office Secretary may have meant that diplomatic aspects were not analyzed as carefully as they could have been. Antony Acland, head of the Diplomatic Service, may have been present, but his immediate predecessor, Sir Michael Palliser, who was now an adviser to the War Cabinet, had not yet arrived. Sir Michael Havers was concerned about the possible effect on international public opinion, but the effect on the peace negotiations was not taken into account, as it was believed that no such efforts existed at the time.

The accepted change was to "allow attacks on all Argentine ships on the high seas, as had previously been agreed only in relation to May 25." Nor was the need to immediately communicate the change to Argentina considered in this case. Once it was decided to send the signal, Lewin warned that by the time the Conqueror received it he might have lost sight of the Belgrano. At the time, he believed there was a 75 percent chance that the Conqueror would be successful.

At 13 (British time) Lewin contacted Northwood from Checkers, and thirty minutes later he reported this change to the task force.

The communications had to occupy space on a North American communications satellite that was available only infrequently and supported only short, precise messages. Furthermore, if the nuclear submarine was not waiting for a message, and also taking measures to prevent the enemy from discovering it, it might not receive the communication.

Apparently, this is what happened at 1:30 p.m. on May 2, when Northwood announced the change in the rules of engagement. It is claimed that the captain of the Conqueror received a "confusing" message. He had faced problems with communications during the eve, as a result of the damage caused to his masts by the rough seas. Furthermore, he probably wanted to ensure that the situation was fully understood before taking such an important step. Taking advantage of the next available slot at 3 p.m. British time (11 a.m. in the South Atlantic), the Conqueror reported that his quarry had altered course at 9 a.m. The course was now 270 degrees, and the speed was 14 knots.

Northwood's order could not be repeated until 5 p.m., and this time, at 5:30 p.m., the Conqueror acknowledged receipt and informed Northwood of its intention to attack. Information that the Belgrano had altered course reached Northwood at 3:40 p.m., but reportedly reached no further than Admiral Herbert, senior submarine commander. It seems that this commander did not then consider the information to be important: the cruiser could have changed course again, as he had done before, or had moved to attack South Georgia.

Aboard Conqueror, Wreford-Brown had decided to attack with the older and shorter-range Mark 8 torpedo, as a result of its larger warhead, which gave it a better chance of piercing the warship's armor and anti-torpedo shields. Likewise, he was a short distance from the target.

"I spent more than two hours trying to find an attack position on the port side of the cruiser. It was still day. Visibility was variable; at one point she descended to 2,000 yards. I insisted on going up to take a look - but when we were at periscope depth we would distance ourselves - and then I had to dive and catch up with them. I did the same thing five or six times. They weren't using sonar; They were limited to zigzagging slowly at the approximate speed of 13 knots. Twice I was in a reasonable firing position, but I found that they had deviated a few degrees". 

At 20 o'clock the Conqueror was in position to fire three torpedoes at Belgrano. At 20:30 British time (16:30 local time), he informed Northwood that the Belgrano had been successfully hit. The Conqueror had to escape quickly, because she soon faced an intense anti-submarine attack from the cruiser's escort ships.

 
16:25: The hull was inclined at 20° and submerged 7 meters. Because of the wind, the rafts had difficulty separating. Photo: Courtesy of the Friends of the General Belgrano Cruise Association

Source: Urgente 24.

Conquest of the desert: The huge mistake of the General Roca cancellation

General Roca cancellation: A huge historical mistake

By Roberto Ferrero. 


An article for controversy. Roberto Ferrero, another historical exponent of the Socialism of the National Left, presents us in this article with the vision and political position that the SIN historically had before Roquism. Pure historical materialism to defend national unification and lay the institutional foundations for the configuration of the country as we know it today. The death of no one is justified, the causes of the need to unify Patagonia to the National State against the imperialist threat coming from Chile are exposed.

Let's place these matters on the agenda, engage in open discussions, and use the resulting conclusions as a foundation for the ongoing reconstruction of our esteemed Latin American Nation. Such is the essence of this message.

Marcos D. Vega - 

Author: Roberto A. Ferrero, Former President of the Junta Provincial de Historia of Córdoba 

To my considerable surprise, I recently learned about the endeavor to remove General Julio A. Roca's name from the boulevard bearing his name in our city. I believe this decision is a significant error, possibly driven by a well-intentioned and compassionate concern for the plight of our indigenous populations. However, I find that the primary arguments in favor of this change lack substantial support.

These arguments, championed by the Argentine-German author Osvaldo Bayer – who openly advocates for Patagonia's separation from the rest of our country to establish an independent nation – essentially rest on two points. Both of these points, however, are as ahistorical and contextually flawed as each other. The more assertive of the two seeks to label General Roca as a "genocidal figure." Nevertheless, I consider this claim to be both semantically and politically frivolous. What is genocide, after all? It is the intentional extermination of an ethnic or social group solely because of their identity, typically perpetrated against people who are defenseless. For instance, the Turks brutally killed one and a half million Armenians, but they didn't harm any of their own. That is a true instance of genocide. Similarly, the Nazis annihilated six million Jews without persecuting or killing a single German. This, too, constitutes genocide.

But the case of Roca and the Conquest of the Desert is totally different. It was not a genocide, but the culmination of a very long war, in which the indigenous had, between 1820 and 1882 -according to the detailed inventory of the indigenous historian Martínez Zarazola- 7,598 casualties, but at the same time caused the death of 3,200 Creole (fortineros or fort soldiers), small owners, travelers, landowners, women, authorities, children...) In the so-called "Great Invasion" of Calfucurá in the province of Buenos Aires at the end of 1875, only in Azul the malón (Indian raid) murdered 400 residents, captivated 500 and seized 300,000 animals that, as always, were sold in Chile with juicy profits. (By the way: the chieftain Casimiro Catriel lived in Azul, used a carriage and had an open account in the city's bank...) Was Azul's then a Creole genocide caused by the Indians? By no means: it was a stage of this protracted and cruel war. Those who fought against Roca were not unfortunate Indians like those who now suffer unjustly on the banks of the Pilcomayo or in the suburbs of Rosario to which they have emigrated, compatriots who must be helped and integrated into their diversity.

They were soldiers representing a quasi-indigenous state that competed with and challenged the national government while practicing slavery on both captive whites and Indians purchased in Chile. Reflecting on Mariano Bejarano's 1872 official visit, sent by the national government to Chief Sayhueque, leader of the "Country of Apples" (today Neuquén), the indigenous writer Curruhuinca-Roux remarked, "Bejarano's visit was an official encounter between government envoys of two separate entities. The raids were not merely defensive tactics against 'invading' whites but were actual expeditions aimed at capturing loot, akin to terrestrial Vikings – part pirates, part merchants. This plunder was later traded in Chile, whose authorities supported these raids to weaken the Argentine government and gain control of Patagonia. We must avoid simplifying history into a Manichaean and naive narrative. The true story is far more intricate than the childlike portrayal of heroes and villains, victims and oppressors. While there's much more to be said about this historically inaccurate first argument, it suffices for now.

The second argument posits that the original indigenous peoples were dispossessed of lands in the Pampean plain and vast Patagonian regions, but this assertion is far from accurate. Concerning the origin of the indigenous tribes inhabiting our pampas – mostly variants or offshoots of the Araucanian people – only an utter lack of knowledge about our country's history and that of Chile can account for such an error. In fact, these trans-Andean tribes cannot be considered "original" since they only began migrating from beyond the Andes into our country in the early 18th century.

In comparison, the natives of this land were more 'original' because the resilient pioneers of the frontier and Creole soldiers, officers, and leaders of the Conquest of the Desert – with the exception of individuals like Fotheringham (English) and Nicolas Levalle (Italian) – held no less valid claims to these lands than the Ranqueles, Pampas, or Manzaneros. Their ancestors inhabited these lands at the same or even earlier times. Regarding the designation of "landowners" asserted by indigenous tribes and their modern advocates, it must be acknowledged but with one important caveat: the incredibly fertile and expansive pampa belonged to all Argentines, whether Creole or indigenous, native or descendants of immigrants, those who already occupied it and those who awaited their turn in the ports to populate it.

Calfucurá, Namuncurá, Catriel, Baigorrita, Pincén, Mariano Rosas and other Indian leaders could not keep what was common heritage for themselves. Like the dog in the manger who, according to the popular Spanish saying, "does not eat or let eat", so those fearsome inhabitants of the Argentine plain did not make it produce nor let others do it. This refusal, placed like a wall against the impetuous growth of the productive forces, could not and did not last. The historical necessity that, as Hegel unfortunately says "always advances from its bad side", and that carried in its bosom the agricultural progress of the nation, had condemned it.

For the rest, Roca's defense in relation to the Conquest of the Desert cannot make us forget the other great contributions that he and the "Generation of 80" made to the construction of this Modern Argentina, today so devastated: the nationalization of Buenos Aires and its unique Port, the establishment of secular institutions, secular education, mass immigration and agrarian colonization.

These achievements make him more than worthy of national gratitude and, therefore, the nomination of a street, which is one of the ways in which towns usually remember their benefactors. The fact that this Generation has quickly turned into an Oligarchy and that the speculators and large merchants and landowners have later monopolized the areas recovered for work and production, is a different sub-stage of Argentine development, which cannot overshadow the management of those like Roca and his friends strove to finally give us a unified country.

If the enemies of genocide are looking for a culprit, it is better that they study the biographies of Miter and Sarmiento, who preached and carried out a true social catastrophe against the native Creole lineage. Why nobody refers to this genocide, which really was? Or did not the "civilizer" Sarmiento advise Miter "not to hesitate to shed the blood of gauchos, which is the only thing that is human about them"? I am not proposing that the name of Sarmiento street be changed to Coliqueo, but I do believe that, without removing General Roca from the boulevard that honors his name, the homage desired by the indigenistas could be paid on another street in the city.

In the end, both of them, whether we like it or not, are part of national history, if we want to understand it in its integral unity and not as a fight between good guys and bad guys, who knock each other out of their heads. pedestals like in the tournaments of the Middle Ages, dark ages by the way. This is not a time for denigration, but for integration, not for balkanization, but for Latin American unity. Anything that goes against this perspective can only play the game of the foreign enemy that stalks us and intends to take advantage of our confrontations and our artificial anger.

Roberto Ferrero 

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