Saturday, September 9, 2023

Argentine Army: Patagonian Group in the 40s

Agrupación Patagónica

Patagonian Group



In an official photo of the Nahuel DL-43 tank on the sides of the tower, on the cockade with the national colors the legend: "Patagonian Group" was perfectly read. Here are some details of this Association.

By decree of February 28, 1942, the "Patagonian Group" was established, determining that the Minister of War would issue instructions for the constitution of this combat unit that would depend on the General Inspector of the Army.

The Group's initial order of battle was as follows:

Command of the Patagonian Group, based in Comodoro Rivadavía.

Reg. 8 of Motorized Inf., reinforced with a battery of Krupp 75 mm L30 mod. 1909

Reg.24 of Inf. Motorized reinforced with a battery of Krupp 75 mm L30 mod. 1909. This unit was constituted based on the III R.I.14 (III battalion of the Reg. 14 of Inf, based in Rio IV (Province of Córdoba)


 

Detachment "Río Grande: It is constituted in Río Grande, based on a section of shooters and a section of machine guns belonging to the 24th Motorized Infantry Regiment. This unit arrives at its barracks on March 15, 1942.

Military Detachment "Río Deseado":
made up of the 2nd. Rifle Company of the 8th Infantry Regiment, which arrives at its garrison on September 20, 1940

Subsequently, the "Patagonian Group" is completed with the 1st. Motorized Communications Company, with garrison in Río Gallegos

On December 15 other units are established and the Group is reorganized.


25th Motorized Infantry Regiment,
based in Puerto Deseado.

1a. Company of Motorized Sappers "Patagonia", in Comodoro Rivadavía

Command of the 9th Detachment in Río Gallegos,
on which they depended

24th Motorized Engineer Regiment
remounted to two battalions.

9th. Light Artillery Group

1a. Company of Motorized Sappers "Patagonia"
transferred to Río Gallegos

 
 

Thursday, September 7, 2023

Conquest of the desert: Sargento, the loyal dog

Sargento, the loyal dog




Among the dogs in our story was Sargento (Sergeant), from Fort General Paz, in the 1880s. Sargento, a stray and highly intelligent dog, was a faithful night guard of the commander's post. He helped go hunting when food was scarce. And he could catch a hare and deliver it to the soldiers who, in many cases, sent Sargento to the kennel (cucha in the local slang). The dog obeyed without question and without reward.

At seven in the evening the time to pray was announced. The soldiers of the fort uncovered themselves, many knelt, all bowed their heads. Sargento, then, would sit and look at the floor, as if he were praying.

On the battlefield he was very brave. In one of those usual encounters, Sargento was left lying motionless on the battlefield, without moving, next to a pool of his own blood. When the combat ended, Corporal Ángel Ledesma returned to where the canine companion had fallen. He discovered that he was breathing and loaded him onto the haunches of his horse. At the fort, he and his elderly mother, Mamá Carmen, took care of him.

The local Rin Tin Tin became good friends with his savior. They walked together and at night the black man went to visit the dog at his guard, in front of the commander's ranch. Sargento separated a few meters from the ranch gate to be with his best friend. Not even Corporal Ledesma would allow him to come near the colonel's house at night.

During a relay outing for recruits, in which Mamá Carmen and Corporal Ángel participated, the patrol was ambushed. There, an Indian mortally wounded Ángel Ledesma. Mamá Carmen launched into a fury at the attacker. The black woman and the Indian rolled on the ground, in a ferocious combat that paralyzed the others. Mamá Carmen killed the person who had killed her son. She then loaded the body of the black Ángel on a horse and headed to the General Paz Fort, where Sargento heard the news.

After that unfortunate event, he stopped seeing the local Rin Tin Tin by day. He only appeared at sunset, when it was time to guard the commander's house. Intrigued by the constant disappearance of the dog during the day, a couple of soldiers followed him and discovered what was happening: although Sargento watched the commander's ranch at night, during the day he moved away to prostrate himself next to the grave of Corporal Ángel Ledesma, where guarded, impassively, the eternal rest of his hero.

Historias inesperadas

Tuesday, September 5, 2023

1955 Revolution: Plot in motion

The plot is in motion



Dr. Clemente Villada Achával played a crucial role as the intermediary between General Lonardi and a group of conspirators in the province of Córdoba. Underpinning this clandestine collaboration was a secret meeting held at the historic Colegio de La Salle in Buenos Aires. In attendance were key figures including the leader of the coup, General Lonardi, Colonels Arturo Ossorio Arana and Eduardo Señorans, Captain Edgardo García Puló, and Major Juan Francisco Guevara. The meeting was shrouded in secrecy and protected by heavily armed civilian guards.

Villada Achával disclosed that officers from the Artillery School in Córdoba were eager to partake in a potential coup, awaiting the signal to act. This gathering served to clarify doubts and expedite preparations, as State intelligence services had begun to detect suspicious movements, posing a significant risk.

These concerns were validated when General Lonardi faced sanctions and twenty days of house arrest on August 16. Additionally, the CGT called for a strike on August 31, urging the public to assemble in Plaza de Mayo to hear Juan Domingo Perón, whose vehement rhetoric amplified tensions among the military leadership and the public.

On September 4, Lieutenant Colonel Octavio Cornejo Saravia conveyed a crucial message to the Lonardi family, indicating that the planned uprising for September 16 had been postponed by General Aramburu. Lonardi, visibly agitated, insisted that the operation could not be delayed any further. He expressed urgency due to the government's alleged preparations, including arming workers' militias and retiring many involved officers. The situation demanded swift action to avoid potential repercussions.

-General –said Cornejo a bit embarrassed- I am only passing on some information that Colonel Zerda has just given me[1].

In view of such news, Lonardi believed it necessary to confirm the information and for this, he entrusted his son Luis Ernesto to arrange a meeting with Colonel Arturo Ossorio Arana, destined to discuss the issue in depth. This was done and that same afternoon, the general went to the residence of his friend, in order to update him on the latest events.

-General –said the owner of the house after hearing his words- take things in your hands because otherwise, this won't work.

-Ossorio –answered his interlocutor- I have already decided and be sure that I will spare no effort to carry out the movement [2].

On September 8 at 9:00 p.m. a new meeting was held in which Colonel Eduardo Señorans, chief of operations of the Army General Staff, was present. The same, organized by Alfredo Rodríguez García, a relative of Major Juan Francisco Guevara, was carried out in the car of Dr. Eugenio Burnichon and four fundamental points were agreed upon that should be taken into account when organizing the plot.



  1. Because of General Videla Balaguer's impulsive and rash actions in Río Cuarto, the authorities in Córdoba remained vigilant and had implemented stringent security measures.
  2. The coastal contacts were deemed both unreliable and inadequate, as only the IV Cavalry Division was available, and it would only pledge its support 72 hours after the uprising commenced.
  3. No units in Greater Buenos Aires had shown any signs of allegiance or support for the cause.
  4. General Aramburu was continuously monitored, and his aide, Major San Martín, had been apprehended.

During the conversations, Colonel Señorans said that the best thing to do was to wait and not rush because the conditions were not right to start a revolution. Lonardi expressed his total disagreement with this position because the discharge of the troops was imminent and also because, as he had raised it with Ossorio Arana in the previous meeting, the government was organizing popular militias that were going to endanger national security. In his opinion, continuing to wait would only lead to the total disaster of the operation because the latest arrests of officers seemed to show that the authorities knew something.
In this way, the command of the revolution passed from the indecisive General Aramburu to his peer who, in order to know the prevailing situation in the military units of the interior, dispatched his sons Luis Ernesto and Eduardo, in the direction of Córdoba and Cuyo, respectively.
The Lonardi brothers left Buenos Aires on Friday the 9th at night and arrived in the Mediterranean province at 08:30 the following day. Once there, they went to the house of their uncle, Dr. Clemente Villada Achaval, where they were informed of the latest news. Villada had organized a meeting for 4:00 p.m., at his private home, to which he had invited Captains Daniel Correa and Sergio Quiroga, Brigadier Jorge Landaburu, his brother-in-law, engineer Calixto de la Torre, and Dr. Lisardo Novillo Saravia. (h).
It was held at the agreed time and during the course of the talks, the situation of the revolutionary forces in the province, the contribution of civilians and the government's reaction were thoroughly analyzed.
To the satisfaction of the Lonardi brothers, the results of that meeting were better than they had expected since, according to what was said, the younger officers were ready to fold, except for the powerful Infantry School, which seemed to remain loyal. To this must be added the participation of the revolutionary civilian commandos that Commander Landaburu and Captain Basilio Arenas Nievas organized in those days, together with Mr. Damián Fernández Astrada and Edmundo Molina, who would constitute an essential element of support when the wars began. operations.
Captain Correa placed special emphasis on the urgent need to start the actions before September 16 because on that day the Artillery School finished its annual activities and had to deliver the weapons for maintenance tasks. All those present supported the motion, for which Luis Ernesto Lonardi stated that it would be among the first points that he would raise with his father when it came to imposing the news.
That night, at 9:00 p.m., Luis Ernesto boarded an Aerolíneas Argentinas plane and began his return to Buenos Aires while his brother continued his journey to Mendoza, in order to update Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Elizondo, officer of the Cuyo Mountain Association.

Luis Ernesto arrived shortly before 12:00 p.m. and as soon as he got off the plane, he went to his father's apartment, on Juncal street, to inform him of the latest news. The general, wearing a robe over his pajamas, listened carefully to his son and when he finished, he told her that he needed a few hours to meditate and that the next day he would have an answer.

On the morning of Sunday, September 11, the general sent for his son and once face to face, he told her that he was determined to lead the revolution and that it would begin in Córdoba, early on the 16th. ; therefore, it was necessary to take the necessary steps to start the operation.
Lonardi asked his son to establish urgent contact with Major Guevara because he was thinking of using his services as a liaison between the Army and the Navy. Wasting no time, Luis Ernesto went to the home of Captain (RE) Ezequiel Federico Pereyra Zorraquín, who was in charge of organizing the revolutionary civilian commandos of the Federal Capital for the defense of the always threatened Barrio Norte and Recoleta, and asked him about Guevara's whereabouts. The owner of the house told him that the aforementioned official had left his home because the government intelligence services were constantly watching him and that, for this reason, he did not know where he was hiding.

At that same moment, Lieutenant Colonel Eleodoro Sánchez Lahoz arrived, bringing with him news from Corrientes where, apparently, the commanders of the VII Division had declared themselves in favor of the plot. In view of this, Luis Ernesto Lonardi, believing an urgent meeting between the newcomer and his father was necessary, began to pull the strings so that the pamper would take place that same afternoon.

Around noon, Lieutenant Colonel Pedro A. Pujol and First Lieutenant Florencio A. Pareja Ortiz established contact with Luis Ernesto Lonardi to inform him that there were fifty officers at the Superior War College and the Superior Technical School willing to fold and that Captain Oscar F. Silva, belonging to that last unit, had organized a sabotage operation against the tanks at Campo de Mayo.

Two hours later, the son of General Lonardi received a communication from Captain Pereyra Zorraquín, who put him in contact with Alfredo Rodríguez García, who at that time was in a country house in the town of Pilar in the company of Captain Edgardo García Puló. They agreed to meet in Buenos Aires at 5:00 p.m. and that's how it happened. Luis Ernesto showed up punctually at the agreed place and they picked him up there (in Pereyra Zorraquín's car) to go to the home of Mr. Román María Bourdieu, located in the town of Olivos, where they had been staying for several days. Major Guevara and his family.
At a time when the vehicle was parked in front of the aforementioned house, Major Guevara arrived who, seeing them, hurried them to enter the residence because he did not want to be exposed for too long on the street. The owner of the house received them and once they were seated in the living room, Luis Ernesto referred to what he had discussed with his father and the answer he had given him. It was what those present expected to hear and for that reason, an undisguised but discreet jubilation was perceived among them. Immediately afterwards, he explained that the postponement requested by General Aramburu was inadmissible and that he himself had left no other path than the one adopted, that is, that General Lonardi assume command of the uprising, since if he did not do so, the plot would be left to nothing. your luck. In addition, it was known that the Navy was drawing up plans to carry out a new bombardment of the Government House, on September 17, in case the Army did not make a statement[3].

While these bustles were going on, the Navy was making its own moves.
On the night of September 2 to 3, a secret meeting was held at the home of Dr. Héctor Bergalli, attended by the ship captains Arturo H. Rial and Ricardo Palma, the frigate captain Aldo Molinari and on behalf of the Army, General Juan José Uranga with Colonel Eduardo Señorans. During the same, the latter asked for the floor to request to postpone the actions pending more opportune moments but the owner of the house was strictly opposed.

-To make the revolution, it is enough for a regiment to rise up, because the radicals of the province of Buenos Aires will form a wave that will cover the country.

To those words Señorans responded that he preferred to trust the Army and the Armed Forces rather than the radicals and the silence of the rest of those present seemed to agree with him. Wanting to know the position of the Navy, General Uranga asked Captain Arturo Rial about it and he, fully confident, replied:

-General, you can be absolutely sure of that.

"Then, gentlemen," said General Uranga, "the revolution is made."


To which Colonel Señorans added:
 

I hope to be with you that night.

The meeting continued at Captain Rial's house, where General Uranga was strict when referring to the political purposes of the uprising and the need to have the support of the Navy. He went on at length about it and immediately afterwards, he gave his word of honor regarding the revolt of the Military College.
On Monday morning, the 5th, revolutionary civilian commandos that were operating in Bahía Blanca under the command of Captain Edgardo García Puló, were informed by Navy officials that the outbreak was going to take place early on September 8. However, on the evening of the 7th, Captain Molinari informed García Puló that he had been suspended.
The head of the commandos expressed his concern about that decision because the arrest of engineer Jorge P. Estarico, liaison between the Navy and the civilian commandos, was an indication that something strange was happening, but Molinari explained to him that the Navy could do nothing without Army support.
A new meeting at Captain Rial's failed when it was learned that Major Dámaso Pérez, head of the cadet corps of the Military College, denied his support for the coup.
On the morning of Friday the 9th, a naval officer arrived at Comandante Espora to inform García Puló that it was imperative to establish contact with the rebel command of the Navy since the drastic decision had been made that if the uprising did not take place before the 17th September, the base on its own, would attack Government House. When García Puló asked why such a firm determination was due, the newcomer replied that by that date, the Ministry of the Navy had agreed to an inspection of the unit and that if it were carried out, the conspiracy would be exposed and numerous arrests would be made.
That day, in the afternoon, a new meeting took place between the base delegate and Captain Molinari in which the latter requested 24 more hours to give an answer. The following day, at night (it was Saturday), Molinari met again with García Puló and Guevara so that the Navy would join the uprising as long as at least one Army regiment did so. Guevara listened attentively and asked for 48 hours to respond and it was at that meeting that the name of General Bengoa, detained at the Directorate of Mechanical Traction, was once again considered, so that he personally led the coastal forces.
Once contact was established with Bengoa, he sent word that although he accepted the command of those troops, it should be taken into account that his escape from the military unit in which he was confined was going to put the government on alert.
Colonel Señorans did not believe that choice was prudent and so he informed Major Guevara, asking him to find another officer immediately. The idea of appointing Colonel Eduardo Arias Duval then arose, since he was more than sure that once notified, he would enthusiastically accept the responsibility.
On the afternoon of September 11, Major Guevara met again with Luis Ernesto Lonardi to agree on a new meeting with the command of the uprising. This was done and in addition to General Lonardi, Lieutenant Colonel Sánchez Lahoz attended to listen very carefully to the action plan drawn up by his superior.
It consisted of five points that established:

  1. Simultaneous uprising of the garrisons of Córdoba, Cuyo, the Litoral and Neuquén.
  2. Uprising the naval bases of Río Santiago, Puerto Belgrano, Punta Indio and Comandante Espora together with the Sea Fleet and the Ríos Squad.
  3. Uprising of the air garrisons of Paraná, Córdoba, Mendoza and Mercedes, province of San Luis.
  4. March on Santa Fe in support of the crossing of the Paraná River by the Litoral forces, with the protection of the Escuadra de Ríos.
  5. Ships from the Flota de Mar (Sea Fleet) would establish the blockade of the port of Buenos Aires and in case the government persisted in the defense, they would bombard the riverside area, mainly the Government House, the Ministry of War, the Central Post Office and other positions.

After the presentation, Sánchez Lahoz gave his word of honor that he would do everything possible to revolt the Corrientes garrison the same morning of the 16th and Guevara promised to organize new meetings with Captain Palma, Colonel Arias Duval and General Uranga at effects of transmitting the plan to the officers involved.
The meeting ended at 10:30 p.m. and immediately afterwards, Luis Ernesto Lonardi met with Captain Juan José Pierrestegui to entrust him with a conversation behind closed doors between General Lonardi and Colonel Víctor Arribau. It was held in the Belgrano neighborhood, on Monday the 12th at 10:00 a.m. and in it the second man expressed his support. For this reason, the leader of the uprising ordered him to go to Curuzú Cuatiá to help Colonel Juan José Montiel Forzano to revolt the armored regiments of that unit and he left immediately.
Then Lonardi decided to say goodbye to his family, starting with his grandchildren, the children of Dr. José Alberto Deheza and his daughter Marta, while his son-in-law[5], left quickly for the study of Dr. Teófilo Lacroze to ask him to send him to the colonel Ossorio Arana the following message: “The revolution is underway. He must get his things ready to go to Córdoba that very night” and he informed him that in the last hours of the afternoon, the general himself would give him the tickets with the latest instructions.
At 3:00 p.m. that same day, the meeting between General Lonardi, Colonel Arias Duval, and Major Guevara took place in Alfredo Rodríguez García's car. Once everyone was on board, the first one went straight to the point: Arias Duval had to go to the Litoral to start the uprising as soon as it broke out in Córdoba. The colonel listened to the call with a serious expression and when his superior had finished speaking, he asked her for 24 more hours to carry out the orders since, according to his point of view, on Saturday the 17th it would be easier to surprise the units. Lonardi flatly refused because, as he had stated on other occasions, the situation in Córdoba was extremely dangerous.
After the meeting, Guevara announced that that same morning, Colonel Señorans had told him at the Ministry of the Army that he was willing to place himself without hesitation under the orders of General Lonardi. On the other hand, the meeting with captain Palma agreed for 5:00 p.m. could not be carried out and he had been postponed until 11:00 p.m. that same day. At 6:00 p.m., the notary public Juan Carlos Soldano Deheza gave General Lonardi the two bus tickets that he was to bring to Colonel Ossorio Arana and half an hour later, the leader of the uprising contacted Captain Pereyra to order him and Captain Daniel Uriburu, moved to Córdoba in order to meet with him (Lonardi) at the house of Dr. Berrotarán. The meeting with General Uranga, scheduled for 7:00 p.m., did not materialize either, so it had to be postponed until 1:00 a.m. the following day.
At 9:00 p.m., Major Guevara and Luis Ernesto Lonardi accompanied the general to Dr. Lacroze's house where they were to meet with Colonel Ossorio Arana. Once there, Lonardi explained the situation chart to him and immediately afterwards explained the operations plan, which he followed with extreme attention. When he finished speaking, they hugged and immediately left the place quickly with his companions.
At 10:30 p.m., Colonel Ossorio Arana and his wife boarded the bus that would take them to Córdoba in Plaza Once. Upon arriving at his destination, the officer had to contact Dr. Villada Achaval so that he could take him immediately to the home of Dr. Calixto de la Torre where a new meeting had been planned that same morning. In the interim, he was to inform the chiefs and officers of the garrisons of the facts and organize a meeting at night with the heads of each unit.
From the Once bus terminal, Lonardi, his son, and Guevara (who had accompanied Ossorio Arana and his wife there), set out to meet Captain Palma.
Luis Ernesto was behind the wheel, with his father next to him and Guevara behind him. At the corner of Guido and Ayacucho streets, a man wearing a hat and coat was waiting for them, standing with his hands in his pockets. It was Colonel Arias Duval who, as soon as the vehicle stopped, quickly boarded it, shaking hands with those present once the son of the leader of the coup had resumed his march. Not far from there, Captain Palma, also dressed in a gray overcoat, was waiting for them. When he saw that the vehicle was approaching, he slowly approached the curb of the sidewalk and when it stopped him, he opened the rear door and entered it.
Once inside the car, the sailor was introduced to General Lonardi, to whom he shook hands while telling him that he was there representing Captain Arturo Rial.
The leader of the uprising went straight to the point explaining the reasons why he had taken command of the revolution and why it should take place on September 16. Next, he brought him up to date on the plan of operations and told him about the role that the Navy should play alongside the Army.
Palma listened attentively and when his interlocutor finished speaking, he said that it was imperative to take Martín García Island because air-naval attacks could be launched from it to neutralize the Morón Air Base. Immediately afterward, he referred to the role of the revolutionary civil commandos, who were thought to be assigned to take over the radio stations, and then he asked Lonardi what his opinion was.
The general gave his approval but clarified that civilians should not intervene until after 01:00 on September 16, since it was imperative to prevent information leaking that would destroy the surprise factor. Palma agreed and then the following dialogue was established between the two:

Capt. Palma: I understand that the movement is headed by General Aramburu and that he has decided to postpone it until a better opportunity. Who is the leader of the revolution?
Gen. Lonardi:
I am the leader of the revolution.
Capt Palma: Understood, sir.
Gen. Lonardi:
General Aramburu appreciated that the elements he had were not enough to launch a movement with chances of success. I understand that the conspiracy has reached a stage in which it tends towards its own disintegration due to the arrests that have occurred and any postponement will mean its complete annulment. In addition, the government is organizing armed groups whose mission is to oppose any subversive movement. We have entered into an honorary commitment with the young officers of the three armed forces that we must comply with, since they have assumed attitudes that any investigation will reveal and the sanctions will be severe. I have verified the number of units willing to participate in the movement and I consider them sufficient for there to be a chance of success. I think that the regime's own collaborators will welcome the elimination of Perón, which means that if the revolution succeeds in a single garrison in the interior for more than 48 hours, added to the blockade of the port of Buenos Aires, we cannot fail, always that we act with the firmest decision to win.
Captain, I want to know if I have the unconditional support of the force that you represent!
Capt. Palma: The Navy is willing to support you with all determination as long as you assure us that the Army will initiate hostilities.
Gen. Lonardi:
You have already heard our action plan that will not be postponed in any case: on September 16 the revolution will be launched. Take my word for it. So it will be done.
Capt. Palma: On behalf of the Navy, I assure you of your participation and I wish you success in the operation.

After the conversation, the sailor and Colonel Arias Duval got out and the vehicle continued its journey to where General Uranga was waiting. The handshake that Lonardi and Palma gave each other before saying goodbye was the seal of the alliance between the Army and the Navy, an inescapable commitment that from that moment on, no one could break.
The car, always guided by Luis Ernesto Lonardi, arrived at the home of Captain Garda where the occupants of it quickly descended.
The owner of the house ushered them in and led them to the living room, where General Uranga was sitting waiting. The meeting began at 1:00 am sharp when Lonardi began to explain the revolutionary plan and the situation that Córdoba was going through at that time. As soon as he finished, he ordered him along with him to lead the Military College and the 1st Infantry Regiment to march on Rosario and annul the 11th Infantry Regiment and take the Arsenal. Once these objectives were achieved, he should continue towards Santa Fe with the mission of reducing his military forces and establishing the bridgehead that would allow the troops from the Litoral to cross the Paraná River.
Uranga expressed his reservations regarding the Military College since at that point it was known that his commitment was null but that even so, he would advance on Rosario with the elements that he could gather. Taking this detail into account, Major Guevara was entrusted with establishing contact with his peer, Dámaso Pérez or Captain Genta, an officer from the Military College, to try to convince them to join the uprising and locate First Lieutenant Gastón Driollet so that he could go to to the home of Captain Garda to receive the instructions that General Uranga had to send urgently to the 1st Infantry Regiment.
The meeting at the Garda home ended at 03:00, when those present stood up and General Uranga enthusiastically declared:

-Look, General, even if it's alone, I'm going to go out and shoot at Government House.

Back in his apartment, General Lonardi learned from Major Guevara that General Lagos had been conducting some polls among officers and high-ranking military commanders, and for that reason, he ordered him to contact him as soon as possible at his home in San Isidro to tell him that he had to urgently move to Mendoza to take charge of the forces in that region. In addition, he ordered him to send an urgent message to General Bengoa indicating that the presence of a general was more than necessary there, especially that of Bengoa, because not long ago he had commanded the III Army Division stationed there.
In these conditions they separated and took different directions. They were to meet at 4:30 p.m. that same day, at the Plaza Once bus terminal, before Lonardi left for Córdoba6.
A fact that no one had taken into account facilitated the last movements of the leader of the uprising in Buenos Aires: his birthday and that of his daughter Susana, on September 15, the date that the young woman planned to take advantage of to announce her engagement to Ricardo Quesada. By then, the invitations had already been distributed and for a week the family had been preparing a reception. Unexpectedly, the general asked his daughter and his future son-in-law to change the date to September 17 and shortly after advised them to purchase tickets to travel to Córdoba before the 14th.
Thus came the day of departure. That morning, Lonardi and his wife began packing, knowing that the building where they lived was heavily guarded.

To all this, in the bases of the south, the conspiracy reached borders of proportions when starting a covert operation, destined to alleviate the lack of weapons.
As has already been said, after what happened on June 16, the government had decided to remove the armed bombs from the naval planes and send them under strong custody to the Zárate Naval Arsenal. Consequently, the Navy was practically out of action and unable to start operations, and this greatly compromised the success of the uprising. In a word, there were plenty of planes but no bombs.
What there was, and many, were empty casings and a good supply of trotyl, stored in the magazines of the naval bases, a fact that led a group of officers to evaluate the possibility of using this material to replace weapons. confiscated.
After a series of meetings, the construction of homemade projectiles was resolved using the trotyl loaves and available casings, hence, always with the utmost caution and in absolute silence, the first steps were taken to start the operation. . The idea was to have everything ready for September 15 and when hostilities broke out, to have equipped planes.
To achieve the task, it was necessary to melt the loaves in steam pots, at a temperature of 80º C and compress their content inside the casings, so it was necessary to find trained personnel and a suitable place to carry out the task. Someone suggested the kitchens of the Workers' Dining Room at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base, which had a capacity of one thousand people, and an officer recalled that the person in charge of them was an Italian who had some experience in handling explosives.
A Frigate Captain was commissioned to establish contact with him and almost at the same time, the aforementioned facilities began to be conditioned so that everything would be ready when the appropriate personnel arrived on the scene.
The officer in question went to a house in the Arroyo Parejas neighborhood, located within the perimeter of the base, where that individual had lived since 1952, the year he arrived in the country. The man ushered him into a small room that he used as a living room and once inside, always adopting the appropriate precautions, the newcomer asked him if he was up to doing the job. After a brief analysis of the situation, the Italian replied that he was, and thus, without wasting time, he was led to the Dining Room building, in whose kitchen he immediately got to work.
The subject worked diligently, practically without rest, under the close supervision of superior personnel who prevented access to anyone who did not have proper authorization. In this way, giving power to the pots, he melted the first loaves of trotyl, whose mixture of nitric acid based on hydrocarbons was placed well pressed inside one of the casings and with it an initial test was carried out, the results of which were satisfactory. .
The Italian worked for six days, assisted by very few personnel since the mass production of that material was considered a risky task. During all this time, he was prevented from leaving the Great Hall except on one occasion, when it was necessary to accompany him to his home to pick up a medication he was taking and that is how, by the end of the week, he had hundreds of bombs ready.
After an arduous task, the work was finished and in this way, it was possible to equip the naval planes with the appropriate weapons that would allow them to operate once the hostilities had begun.


Notes

  1. Luis Ernesto Lonardi, Dios es Justo, Francisco A. Colombo Editor, Buenos Aires, 1958.
  2. Ídem.
  3. The planes would depart from Comandante Espora.
  4. Luis Ernesto Lonardi, op. cit. Luis Alberto Deheza, son-in-law of General Lonardi, was Minister of Defense during the last days of María Estela Martínez de Perón (1976)..
  5. Luis Ernesto Lonardi, op. cit.
  6. That same morning, after resting for a few hours, Lonardi spoke with Dr. Rogelio Driollet, as had been agreed..
1955 Guerra Civil. La Revolucion Libertadora y la caída de Perón

Sunday, September 3, 2023

War of Paraguay: The Fall of Asunción

Brazilian entry to Asunción

 
On January 1, 1869, the Brazilians entered Asunción, unleashing a wave of unrestrained looting and chaos. In a matter of days, the city was inundated with a diverse and chaotic population, speaking a multitude of languages and dialects in its once-peaceful streets. Private homes were forcibly occupied and quickly rented out by the audacious individuals who had taken them over, demanding exorbitant rents for entire quarters and semesters in advance.

Makeshift hotels, inns, restaurants, entertainment venues, public dance halls, shops, stores, and sweet shops sprang up overnight, all thriving on the proceeds extracted from the 30,000 allied soldiers and countless tourists, opportunists, and curious onlookers who eagerly flocked to witness the downfall of a once-mighty nation.

These invaders stormed houses, competing to seize the most valuable spoils. It is astonishing how the efforts of generations could be obliterated in mere hours. As the day wore on, the streets became littered with furniture discarded as houses were set ablaze. In the afternoon, ships from Argentina appeared along the Paraguay River, eager to purchase the looted goods. Soldiers thronged the docks, bartering their ill-gotten gains for gold, leading to arguments and scuffles. The ships remained anchored, awaiting more plunder, while the soldiers continued their relentless pillaging. By nightfall, the fires from the ravaged neighborhoods cast an eerie glow on the thick black clouds overhead.

Men concealed their loot wherever they could, stuffing their saddlebags, cloaks, the interiors of their boots, and helmets with gold, silver, and precious metals. The following day, they advanced to another section of the city, setting it ablaze as well. They had already ransacked government offices, embassies, opulent residences, and humble abodes alike. It was then that the refugees began to return.

Most of these returnees were young women and girls or children left behind by the men who had perished on the battlefield. These vulnerable individuals ventured back to the city driven by hunger and the faint hope of finding shelter. However, the invaders pounced on them, subjecting them to physical assault, public humiliation, and sexual violence in the streets. They mercilessly raped these women, with lines of ten, twenty, or even thirty men taking turns on a single victim. The desperate cries of these victims echoed throughout the city, and there was no corner or alley in Asunción where a woman was safe from harassment. Those who resisted were ruthlessly killed on the spot.

The horrors did not cease with the onset of night, nor did they relent with the arrival of a new day. The tormentors only relented when the victims, drained of life and devoid of the strength to resist any longer, met their end with a look of bitter resignation on their faces.

And then the thirst for gold is revived again and the officials look greedily at the cemeteries of Asunción. Under his orders, the soldiers dig everyone up. Those who have a ring or chain are stripped without respect. The rest, they leave lying everywhere; bones and more bones piled up everywhere, restlessly dead, warming in the sun.

The Brazilian minister in Asunción himself, José da Silva Paranhos, who later received the title of Viscount of Rio Branco, seized the immense treasure from the National Archives of Paraguay which, after his death, he donated to the National Library of Rio de Janeiro, the catalog of the Rio Branco collection, which contains the public archives of Paraguay taken at the end of the war, consists of a thousand pages divided into two volumes. The collection consists of fifty thousand documents on the early history of Paraguay, Portuguese infiltration, questions of limits and dates, and facts about the history of the Río de la Plata. It would also contain the act of the Foundation of the City of Asunción in 1537 and all the archives of the Jesuit Missions with the first geographical map of Paraguay, established before 1800 by the famous Spanish geographer Félix de Azara.

For three days the city was robbed by the imperial hosts, who did not spare the temples or the tombs, in their barbarous eagerness to increase their booty. Admiral Delfino de Carvallo himself - Baron del Pasaje - directed the looting, accumulating on the decks of his ships the pianos and fine furniture that adorned Paraguayan aristocratic homes. And when there was nothing important to steal, they even took the doors, windows and marbles of the López palace (2) and many houses and public buildings. In a word, Asunción, according to General Garmendia, "suffered the fate of the vanquished of distant times, the victor entering it by sack."

Many children were torn from their mothers' arms to end up sold as slaves on the plantations of Brazil. Everyone is running for their lives, and the once-populous Paraguayan capital is left deserted. “It was pitiful to see the city completely devoid of human beings,” says Brazilian colonel José Luis Da Silva.




The National Archive of Paraguay, with centuries of history inside, burns in flames. “El Paraguayo” from Asunción, in its edition of October 10, 1945, thus recalled the burning and looting of such vital documentation. “The archives of Paraguay were looted by the invaders during the War of the Triple Alliance. We lack many documents, even to reconstruct our history, and we can affirm that when our Archive was stripped, all those documents that could compromise the historical version that was forged were selected to take away all hope of vindication”.

Like the headquarters of the Archive, houses and public buildings are also looted, one by one, carefully and without haste. “The officers made use of the houses and things” points out the aforementioned Brazilian colonel.

The Argentine army camped five kilometers from the city, in Trinidad. And to be worthy of his ally, he turned the temple of that town into a stable, setting up a stable on the very grave of Carlos Antonio López. Soon the tombstone disappeared under the dung of the spirited steeds of the officers, substituting the noise of neighing for the voices of the organ and the prayers of the believers.

Just like "in the distant times" when Asia spread its barbarism, like a bloody shroud, over dying Europe. Breaking in and turning Christian churches into dunghills was the great pleasure of the men of the North. And no other was the delight of those terrible warriors, at whose step the earth trembled, led by the Scourge of God.

History repeats itself. Man is within men. Humanity advances, but has not yet finished leaving the cave. Ferocity boils in the depths of instinct, and there are moments when the beast that has crouched for centuries, dominated, but not defeated, leaps to the surface.
 
This is how peoples who called themselves Christians and men who invoked altruistic sentiments of humanity, fell into crime, reproducing, through an ancestral movement of inborn barbarism, acts that are repugnant to our conscience and that seemed already far from history. And all that was still nothing. The war was just about to enter a really wild period.

Meanwhile, Marshal López was preparing to resume the resistance. When he returned to occupy the old camp of Cerro León, after his last defeat, he had no more strength than his omnipotent will. All Paraguayan defensive power was concentrated in his person, a moral fortress more fearsome than the artillery walls of Humaitá. To no avail, the Duke of Caxías declared the war over.

The twenty thousand victorious soldiers, entrenched in Asunción, knew very well that as long as the Paraguayan president remained standing, the fight was not over.

When Count D'Eu, who came to replace the Duke of Caixas, arrived in Asunción, he found a great demoralization of the allied troops. The solemn Te Deum commanded to be sung by Caixas, celebrating the end of the war, had fallen into immense ridicule. The discouragement was general.




Benigno López Palace (Asunción, 1869). Source



 

 

No Brazilian boss had wanted to take responsibility for a single initiative. And, meanwhile, López grew at a distance. From one moment to the next, a surprise was expected, believing him capable of extracting resources from nothing. And there Juan Bautista Alberdi had time to say in Europe that at that time Paraguay had its “second and most powerful army in what are called its mountains. They are the Andes –he added- of the new Chacabuco and the new San Martín, against the new Bourbons of America”.
In the battle of Lomas Valentinas the invalids and children had fought, loading the cannons with pieces of stone and even with earth. Three months after that defeat, Paraguay again had an army of thirteen thousand men, relatively well armed and equipped.

The wounded of the last battle threw themselves by the hundreds into the immense estuary of Ypecuá, crossing it, with water up to their necks, for three days, without eating, and joining Solano López in Cerro León. And all those who could still walk or carry a rifle rushed from the farthest reaches of the republic to surround the unfortunate hero who was holding the Paraguayan flag.

Weapons abandoned on the battlefields are collected, another arsenal is assembled, iron is cast, cannons are drilled, gunpowder and paper are manufactured, a newspaper is published, schools start operating again, the compulsory primary education law is in force, children Soldiers attend classes. And the Ybycuí foundry and the Caacupé arsenal worked tirelessly to arm that strange army, taking advantage of the scandalous indecision of the more than prudent victor. Despite Asunción having fallen, the war was not yet over.

References 

(1) On February 22, 1869, at 4:00 p.m., Francisco Solano López issued an edict ordering the evacuation of Asunción, it was then that all the Asunción families that still had some jewelry and metal money, ran to deposit them in the legation of the United States of America, in charge of Minister Carlos A. Washburn as well as in the consulates of France and Italy.

(2) The Palacio de los López is the seat of government of the Republic of Paraguay, since the official office of the President of the Republic is located there. It is one of the most beautiful and emblematic buildings of the Paraguayan capital, Asunción. Its location is on Paraguayo Independiente street, between Ayolas (before Paraná) and O'Leary (before Paso de Patria). Located in the center of Asunción, overlooking the bay, this building was built by order of President Carlos Antonio López, to serve as a residence for his son, General Francisco Solano López, hence the fact that the name of the building is "Palace of the Lopez". Its works began in 1857 under the direction of the English architect Alonso Taylor.
In the first half of the 19th century, Lázaro Rojas gave his baptismal godson Francisco López the property where the palace is located. After his famous trips to Europe, Francisco Solano brought several architects and engineers with him, who helped develop works of progress in the country. By order of Carlos Antonio López, President of the Republic since 1842, one of these works was the residence of his son. The construction, planned by the Hungarian Francisco Wisner, began directed by the English architect Alonso Taylor in 1857.

The materials for the construction of the palace came from various places in the interior of the country, stones from the quarries of Emboscada and Altos, wood and obrajes from Ñeembucú and Yaguarón, bricks from Tacumbú, cast iron pieces in Ybycuí, etc.

Various European artists came to Paraguay to be in charge of decorating the building. Artists such as the English engineer Owen Mognihan who was in charge of sculpting the necessary figures to create a palatial environment, the Italian Andrés Antonini who came to Paraguay exclusively to design and establish the marble staircase of the Palace that connects to the second floor, the painter Julio Monet, French, who painted the ceiling with floral decorations and figures.

By 1867, the time of the War of the Triple Alliance, the Palacio de los López was almost finished, although finishing details were lacking for its conclusion. The decoration was made of bronze statuettes and furniture imported from Paris, and large and decorated mirrors for the halls of the Palace. During the seven years that the Brazilians occupied Asunción, the Palace served as their forces' headquarters. After they abandoned it, the building was left in a state of abandonment. It was during the government of Juan Alberto González that the great restoration works of the Palace began, which lasted only two years. The building ended up regaining its former glory.


Source

  • Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado 
  • Estragó, Margarita Durán – Homenaje al pueblo de Patiño, en el centenario de su fundación (1909- 2009) 
  • O’Leary,Juan E. – El mariscal Solano López 
  • Rivarola Matto, J. Bautista – Diagonal de sangre: la historia y sus alternativas en la Guerra del Paraguay. 


www.revisionistas.com.ar 




Brazilian entrance to Asunción

Friday, September 1, 2023

1955 Revolution: The Conspiracy Resumes

The conspiracy resumes






The days that followed the uprising were full of tension and expectation. The balance of the damage and the count of deaths and injuries had the population plunged into deep consternation as the national and foreign press echoed the terrible events, clearly reflecting (especially the foreign one) the events that occurred.
The armed confrontations and the bombardment of the city produced a balance of 380 fatalities that rose to almost 400 in later days and almost a thousand wounded. Nine grenadiers fell during the defense of Government House[1]. Thirty-two others suffered injuries of varying degrees, as well as two officers from the “Buenos Aires” Motorized Regiment and seven from the 3rd Infantry Regiment, which also had a general and a soldier killed, the former when he was trying to reunite with his unit.
The government ordered a series of raids and raids, which resulted in numerous arrests, both of the military and of civilians and religious, who were taken to the Villa Devoto prison to await a sentence.
While the population tried to recover from the terrible events that had taken place in the Federal Capital, pilgrimages were organized to the burned temples and the CGT ordered a general strike for the 17th, as a sign of mourning and in support of the government.



Destruction in the church of Nuestra Señora de Lourdes in Bahía Blanca
(Pictures: Miguel Ángel Cavallo: Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. La Marina se subleva)

That day, before a crowd that filled Plaza de Mayo, Perón addressed the citizens to once again ask for calm and deplore the excesses that occurred during the fight. In the afternoon, at 5:00 p.m., he met in full with his cabinet in order to propose his definitive departure, a decision that those present categorically rejected, especially Governor Aloé and the CGT representatives, arguing, among other things, that this would be give in to the insurrection.
What did occur was a change of officials (almost all questioned by the opposition), necessary to appease the spirits, the first of them, the Minister of the Interior, Ángel Borlenghi, removed from his duties on the advice of the main government advisers.
As was to be expected, the high commands of the Navy, important heads of the Air Force and numerous Army officers were removed. The Punta Indio Naval Air Base was canceled and the 4th Marine Infantry Battalion together with the 2nd Air Naval Force were dissolved.
By decision of the high command, the planes from the Comandante Espora Naval Air Base were disarmed, their ammunition deposited in Puerto Belgrano and their fuzes sent to the Zárate Arsenal.
The VII Fighter Air Brigade based in Morón was suspended and reorganized as the Military Aeronautical Detachment[2], appointing Commodore Ricardo Alberto Accinelli as its first commander. As the CONINTES plan was still in force, the personnel of the new entity remained quartered by thirds while its headquarters adopted, as a first measure, to repatriate the air material that the rebel pilots had taken to Uruguay [3].
Of the thirty-nine planes used by the rebels during the actions, twenty-three landed at the Carrasco International Airport in Montevideo; six did so at the Colonia aerodrome, seven at the Boiso Lanza military base, one was shot down by the Air Force, another crashed in Tristán Suárez, a third fell due to lack of fuel in the Río de la Plata between Carmelo and Colonia and a fourth landed in the middle of the countryside, near the civilian airfield of Melilla, north of Montevideo, without being able to deploy its landing gear due to sabotage.
On June 17, the government proceeded to erase the traces of the battle, detonating the bombs that remained unexploded, which filled the unsuspecting passers-by who were circulating nearby with fear.
The plotted leaders were put on trial before specially constituted military courts and the most severe penalties were expected for them. During one of the interrogations, an event occurred that once again shocked public opinion.


Perón, on the right, observes the damage to the Government House

Officers Julio César Cáceres and Dardo Eugenio Ferreyra were testifying before Commodore Luis Lapuente, head of the Information and Aeronautical Safety Service, when in a moment of carelessness, the latter, shouting "Long live the Homeland!", threw himself to the void from the third floor where he was appearing, without achieving his goal of taking his own life because he fell on a plastic roof on the ground floor that cushioned the blow. He was hospitalized in serious condition at the Aeronautical Hospital where they continued to interrogate him without considering his condition.
Argentine aircraft began to be returned by decision of the Uruguayan government as of June 21, but not their pilots, who remained in the neighboring country magnificently cared for by the authorities and the people of the East. And it is that Uruguay felt on itself all the pressure that the Justicialista regime had been applying since 1946, as a result of the protection that Montevideo offered its opponents when they sought refuge in its territory. This hostility manifested itself in the closure of border crossings, the sale of meat and cereals at lower prices in international markets and the latent threat of an attack, especially the bombing of Radio Colonia due to its strong anti-Peronist campaign.
The first two aircraft returned by Uruguay were the Gloster Meteor I-031 and I-098 piloted by Commander Eduardo Catalá and First Lieutenant Antonio Corradini respectively, the first with a rivet that covered the impact of an anti-aircraft projectile. Three days later, on June 24, 1955, I-094 arrived under the command of Captain Daniel Aubone and I-058 under First Lieutenant José Lembi, and in later days, I-029 and I-064 arrived. the first aboard a Bristol 170 Freigther. The total number of naval aircraft was reintegrated in a staggered manner[4].
On July 21, the brand new Aeronautical Department of Morón began to report directly to the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, organizing at the same time the incorporation of new officers from different units[5]. A week later, the government decided to reactivate the VI Air Brigade based in Tandil, appointing Brigadier Juan C. Ríos and head of Group 2 of Interceptor Fighter[6].


Vandals have razed the Cathedral of Bahía Blanca
(Pictures: Miguel Ángel Cavallo: Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. La Marina se subleva)


Serious Damage to the Inmaculado Corazón de María (Bahía Blanca)
(Pictures: Miguel Ángel Cavallo: Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. La Marina se subleva)


Fire and destruction in the newsroom of "Democracia", an opposition newspaper from Bahía Blanca
(Pictures: Miguel Ángel Cavallo: Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. La Marina se subleva)


Luis E. Vera, director of "Democracia" (wearing a raincoat) observes the damage in the newsroom
(Pictures: Miguel Ángel Cavallo: Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. La Marina se subleva)

But despite the defeat, the arrests and raids, and ignoring the threats, pressures and raids, the Navy officers led by Navy Captain Arturo H. Rial and Lieutenant Commander Carlos Pujol at the head, they launched the second phase of the movement through an informal talk that they held at the offices of the Directorate of Naval Schools located at Florida 610, corner of Paraná. In later days, they were joined by other officers and noncommissioned officers of the weapon, highlighting among them Lieutenant Horacio Mayorga and Captains Jorge Gallastegui, Juan Carlos Duperré, Carlos Sánchez Sañudo and Jorge Palma, who began to organize clandestine meetings, tending to shape the motion.
A whole network of espionage and counterespionage was launched with the firm purpose of reactivating the revolution. It was extended to the main naval bases in the country, especially those of Puerto Belgrano and Comandante Espora, where they began to work very cautiously to obtain the commitment of the Sea Fleet, the Marine Infantry forces and the Naval Aviation. dependent on the Naval Maritime Area. Captain Jorge E. Perren was appointed to lead the uprising in that sector, although the true leader of this second phase would be Rear Admiral Isaac Francisco Rojas, who had just arrived from Brazil in those days, where he had performed duties at the Argentine embassy. , to take charge of the direction of the Naval-Military School based at the Río Santiago Naval Base. And it was he who was addressed by the conspirators to expressly request that he take command of the Navy during the actions that were to take place in the month of September.
On June 23, Perón spoke again on the national network to refer to the events of the 16th, minimizing the acts of vandalism against temples and institutions that had taken place shortly after the end of the hostilities. Four days later, some of the Catholic militants who had been arrested during the defense of the Cathedral began to be released and on the 28th of the same month, the main temple of the city of Buenos Aires resumed its religious services, in what was a massive ceremony. .
That same day, in San Miguel Arcángel, Monsignor Miguel Ángel de Andrea entered the temple on his knees while being applauded by the audience. During the services, he promised to wear black clothes instead of purple, as a sign of mourning for the dead, the wounded and the permanent grievances that the Argentine Catholic Church was suffering.
In the month of July, on the occasion of the feast of Saint Peter and Saint Paul, Perón sent his respects to Pope Pius XII who, in response, told him that he hoped with all his heart that the Lord would guide his steps so that the Argentine people could freely profess their faith.
Where the discontent slowly began to be perceived was in the ranks of the Army, a force that during the day of June 16 had maintained its absolute fidelity to the person of the first president. The latest events had called many of its officers to reflection and thus, in the days that followed the bombardment, a silent plot in favor of the revolution was launched, agreeing to carry out the first surveys with elements of the Navy. The persecution of the Church and the burning of the national flag had badly predisposed large sectors of the military, encouraged by nationalist civilians opposed to the government who worked hard to establish contact between elements of the three weapons.


General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu

Senior Army officers, including General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, Colonels Eduardo Señorans and Arturo Ossorio Arana, Captain Ramón Eduardo Molina and Major Juan Francisco Guevara, began efforts to establish contact with the Air Force because it was known that Despite being a force extremely addicted to the person of the president, there were numerous officers who were willing to join the movement, such as Commodore Julio César Krausse and Captains Luis A. Bianchi and Orlando Capellini.
In the month of July several demonstrations against Perón took place, in one of which the radical youth militant Alfredo Prat was killed as a victim of police repression. Days later, the Democratic Party issued a statement harshly criticizing the government, denouncing the climate of fear in which the citizenry lived, placing special emphasis on the need for a total amnesty.
On the 15th of that month there were a series of resignations in the government as a result of certain statements by the president regarding the course his revolution was taking. Among them, the one of the Vice President of the Nation, Rear Admiral Alberto Teissaire, replaced by the Buenos Aires national deputy Dr. Alejandro H. Leloir and that of several ministers and secretaries, stood out especially.
On the 21st, the conservative leader Dr. Pablo González Bergez was arrested. Shortly after, the lifeless body of Dr. Juan Ingalinella, a communist militant who disappeared on June 17, tortured and murdered by the Rosario police, was thrown into the Paraná River. A massive student demonstration took place in Córdoba and numerous protests in favor of freedom and justice were held in Buenos Aires, harshly repressed by the forces of order.
Faced with such a climate, the government agreed, for the first time in many years, to grant opposition parties radio slots to express their points of view. The first to speak was Dr. Arturo Frondizi, head of the Radical Civic Union, who on July 27 gave an energetic speech on Radio Belgrano that ended with cheers and greetings from a multitude of followers who were waiting for him in the streets.
The conspiracy, meanwhile, continued, with the frigate captains Aldo Molinari and Jorge Palma acting as liaisons with elements of the Army. Rojas, for his part, had his own "undercover agents" in the persons of frigate lieutenants Oscar Ataide, his personal secretary, and Jorge Isaac Anaya, through whom he learned of the development of events and conveyed his points of view. of the.
It happened that around those days an event took place in Puerto Belgrano that served to give impetus to the conspiracy and speed up its preparations.
By decision of the government, all the munitions that had been withdrawn from the rebel units after June 16, were sent to that destination together with the naval planes recovered from Uruguay, thus reinforcing, and unexpectedly, the potential of unit fire. The sudden decision led the rebel commanders to adopt hasty measures, one of which was the accelerated construction of special fuzes to replace those that had been withdrawn and sent to the Zárate arsenal and the putting into operation of the naval planes.
Meanwhile, Army cadres continued to work actively on the complex mission of attracting followers, although with great difficulty given the extreme surveillance to which the weapon was being subjected.
In the province of San Luis, headquarters of the II Army Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Gustavo Eppens moved tirelessly, assisted by a significant number of officers. The unit was commanded by General Julio Alberto Lagos, a well-known nationalist stance and affiliated with the Peronist movement from the outset, so each move had to be made with great caution. For their part, in the Cuyo Mountain Group based in the city of Mendoza, several of its leaders tried to neutralize the marked pro-government position of the commander, General Héctor Raviolo Audisio, and his deputy, Colonel Ricardo Botto. The group was divided into four powerful detachments, Botto being head of No. 3 based in Callingasta, province of San Juan.
The conspirators were joined by Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Elizondo, head of the 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Group; Major Armando Aguirre, head of the “General Espejo” Military High School; the senior military instruction judge Enzo Garutti, all of them bound for Mendoza; Lieutenant Colonel Mario A. Fonseca, head of the San Juan Mountain Detachment 3 and General Eugenio Arandía, chief of the Cuyo Army General Staff, based in San Luis. On that side, it only remained to probe the position of General Lagos and then decide what to do about it.
While General Aramburu made feverish efforts to incorporate people, two other figures of importance within the ranks of Army officers, General Juan José Uranga and Colonel Héctor Solanas Pacheco.

In Córdoba, for his part, Colonel Arturo Ossorio Arana was actively conspiring while the revolutionary civilian commandos worked actively, serving as liaisons between the different military groups. His main operations centers in the city of Buenos Aires were the home of Dr. Eduardo Fauzón Sarmiento and the notary office of his brother Jorge, located on the 4th floor of Cerrito 512.
An unexpected event that somewhat puzzled the conspirators was the surprise addition to their ranks of General Dalmiro Videla Balaguer, whom everyone thought was a fervent supporter of Perón. That caused suspicions and some concern since there was more than one conspirator who supposed the high official, a spy at the service of the government.


General Eduardo Lonardi

What had happened to cause such a sudden decision? Something simple. The fidelity of the San Juan general towards the figure of the first president had begun to crack due to the persecution unleashed against the Catholic Church. Videla Balaguer was a deeply devoted man and from the moment the mob razed the main temples of the capital, a kind of internal struggle took place in him that led him to the difficult situation of having to make a choice.
It was during his visit to the ruins of the church of San Ignacio, in the company of his wife, that seeing so much desolation he decided to join the revolution.
He did so, after contemplating that terrible spectacle and praying before the ruined image of Santa Teresa, shortly before his return to Córdoba.
Another who decided to turn to the movement, motivated by similar causes, was General Julio Alberto Lagos who, after a second meeting with Aramburu in Buenos Aires, pledged his word and after a few days of reflection, confirmed his support. . He did so during a meeting with Colonel Señorans, shortly before the high command decided to replace him with General José María Sosa Molina, brother of the Minister of Defense and a man of Perón's absolute confidence.
The one who remained confined in his home, without being involved in the preparations, was Major General Eduardo Lonardi, arrested and retired after the frustrated uprising of 1951.
Neither Señorans nor Aramburu had a good relationship with him and if he was taken into account at some point it was at the insistence of his friend, Colonel Arturo Ossorio Arana and Dr. Fauzón Sarmiento, who had a hard time agreeing to an interview between they. Aramburu was the one who objected the most, arguing that the aforementioned was a retired officer, lacking authority.

-Here we need a general with command over the troops. There are thousands of retired anti-Peronist officials – he said at a meeting.

The meeting with Aramburu and Lonardi took place at the Military Hospital, where both went to visit General Roberto Nazar, who was hospitalized there. On the occasion, Lonardi stated that he was willing to subordinate himself, but Aramburu replied curtly that he was not leading any plot.

In July, the Sea Fleet was maneuvering off the San Matías Gulf when it detected the presence of foreign ships in jurisdictional waters. Almost at the same time, naval planes intercepted radio messages in English, which were recorded and immediately sent to the high command of the Navy in Puerto Belgrano.
To the astonishment of the officers, they were ignored, which is why the disturbing version began to circulate that British or American ships were monitoring the movements of the Navy at the request of the government, a version that caused indignation and uncertainty at all levels of government. the institution. That fear seemed to be confirmed when Admiral Guillermo Brown ordered the dispersal of the Naval Aviation and the closure of the Comandante Espora Base, in order to neutralize the force, openly showing that the Navy was disturbing the government authorities and continued in the look at the Peronist leadership. Faced with those extreme measures, Lieutenant Commander Eduardo A. Estivariz requested his retirement.
On August 18, 1955, the public learned of the ruling of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces that judged the soldiers who rose up on June 16. Rear Admiral Samuel Toranzo Calderón was sentenced to capital punishment with degradation, in accordance with the provisions of article No. 63, paragraph 1 of the Code of Military Justice, news that shocked the public.
In view of this, General Juan Heriberto Molinuevo dispatched the court secretary, Colonel Juan C. Villafañe to inform Perón of the news, but when the president heard the ruling, he was final in his decision.

-Son, I don't shoot anyone. Let Molinuevo find a way to avoid it..

Suddenly, the man who instigated the masses to “give firewood”, to “hang with barbed wire” and to “kill their enemies”, showed a prudent and humanitarian facet. A lot of people, within the Armed Forces, were really taken aback.
Almost all those involved were sentenced to indefinite prison terms and sent to the Santa Rosa prison, La Pampa province, where they would remain locked up for the next two months.

With the conspiracy underway, the Army and Navy conspirators held frequent meetings at the home of Dr. Fauzón Sarmiento, in the heart of the Belgrano neighborhood, guarded by a group of retired officers under the command of Colonel Ladislao Fernández Castellanos. Colonels Francisco Zerda, Arturo Ossorio Arana and Eduardo Señorans, Major Juan Francisco Guevara, Captain Tomás Sánchez de Bustamante, Navy Captain Arturo Rial and Frigate Captain Jorge J. Palma attended them.
General Aramburu was to attend the first of these conclaves, but a last-minute call from Father Septimio Walsh warned him that he was being watched twenty-four hours a day and, therefore, it was not prudent for him to move.
The plotters became aware of what was happening and drew up a plan. It was decided that the army staff should wait for the pronouncement of the Army, which was still looking for a firm hand to take command, and then Ossorio Arana stated that if he had to take charge of Córdoba, he wanted to tell General Lonardi, since he was the chief with higher hierarchy within the weapon. His request was listened to carefully and no one objected.
Days later, General Lucero removed Aramburu, passing him from his position at the head of the Health Directorate to that of head of the National Defense School.
Aside from the seditious activities, from the residence of Dr. Fauzón Sarmiento and other private homes, the civilian commandos began their preparations to collaborate with the rebel forces, either as support troops, as liaisons or contributing their assistance in any activity that was entrusted to them.
A group of them, led by the engineer Roque Carranza and made up of retired officers such as Captain Walter Viader and Vice Commodore Jorge Rojas Silveyra, dedicated themselves to making homemade bombs with gelinite. Other meetings were held at the Colegio Nuestra Señora del Huerto, run by Father Walsh, where thousands of pamphlets were printed, engineers Florencio Arnaudo, Carlos Burundarena and Manuel Gómez Carrillo working actively on it together with retired officer Edgardo García Puló, Raúl Puigbó, who was permanently wanted by the police at that time, and Adolfo Sánchez Zinny. In the command led by Captain Aldo Luis Molinari, Héctor Eduardo Bergalli, Roberto Etchepareborda and other radical militants acted, groups that were entrusted with the mission of taking over and disabling the radios.
In the civil command of the parish of Santo Cristo (Espíritu Santo), Captain Carlos Fernández was in charge of a large group of militants among whom were Alberto Pechemiel, Martín Cires Irigoyen and the lawyer Ismael Carlos Gutiérrez Pechemiel, the three of whom are relatives General Benjamin Menendez. Alberto Pechemiel was the husband of Ángela Menéndez, the niece of the famous soldier, and together with her, he acted as a liaison during the frustrated uprising of 1951, suffering both prison, home invasions and physical attacks.
While the intertwined network of espionage took place, acts of violence continued to worsen the climate throughout the nation.
On August 12, a Catholic demonstration that was headed for the Santo Domingo church was attacked by members of the Nationalist Liberation Alliance at a time when it reached the corner of Florida and Av. Corrientes, resulting in many of its members being detained. Two days later, the police raided several homes to arrest the members of an opposition group organized at the UBA Law School and several armed youths were detained aboard a jeep when it was driving through the heart of the Recoleta neighborhood, the same Religion teacher Sara Mackintosh, laid off since May[7].
On August 17, a crowded demonstration took place in Plaza San Martín, on the occasion of a new anniversary of the death of the Liberator, an act in which insults of all kinds were launched against Perón and his government. Once again the Nationalist Liberation Alliance attacked the demonstrators, wounding a young man named Menéndez Behety with a knife.
The air was getting rarer in the main epicenters of the country and everything seemed to presage new outbreaks of violence.


Notes

  1. Among those nine grenadiers were the conscripts Pedro H. Baigorria and Héctor Leónidas Paz, whose bodies were deposited in the Ramos Mejía Hospital.
  2. Resolution 519/55 dated June 20, 1955 and published in the Boletín Aeronáutico Nº 922.
  3. A. Marino, J. Mosquera, G. Gebel, V. Cettolo, H. Claria, G. Posaba, Gloster Meteor FMk IV en la Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Avialatina.
  4. Idem.
  5. Published in the Boletín Aeronáutico Nº 1002.
  6. On July 28, 1955.
  7. Opposition pamphlets were found at his home


1955 Guerra Civil. La Revolucion Libertadora y la caída de Perón