Biography: Lieutenant Colonel Cruz Cañete (1815-1868)

Lieutenant Colonel Cruz Cañete (1815-1868)

Lieutenant Colonel Cruz Cañete (1815-1868)

He was born in Buenos Aires in 1815, the son of Mariano Cañete and Leonor Peñalva, both from Buenos Aires. He entered military service in June 1835 as a soldier in the 4th Campaign Regiment’s Line Squadron.

In 1837, as a standard-bearer (a rank he achieved in 1836), he participated in a battle against Chilean Indigenous groups who had attacked friendly chiefs Llanqueleu and Francisco. That same year, he fought against the same forces under Lieutenant Colonel Quesada, and later in the Battle of Loreto on December 22, 1838, against a large contingent of Chilean and Ranquel Indigenous fighters, directly under Colonel Hilario Lagos as a cavalry lieutenant. In 1842, he was severely wounded in another action against Indigenous groups, under Captain Seguí’s command.

He continued his service at Fort Junín until 1844 as a lieutenant, then transferred to San Nicolás under Colonel Juan José Obligado’s command, where he remained until June 12, 1845. He subsequently served under General Lucio Norberto Mansilla and participated in the Battles of Vuelta de Obligado (November 20, 1845) and Quebracho (June 4, 1846) against Anglo-French naval forces, commanding a squadron he had personally trained. Mansilla, in a report dated November 15, 1860, described Cañete as “a disciplined, exemplary officer, devoted to his duties.”

He was promoted to captain in 1848 and major in November 1851. That same year, with his squadron, he joined a division that General Mansilla assigned to Colonel Julián Sosa, under whom Cañete fought in the Battle of Caseros. Mansilla had assigned command due to an illness requiring his return to Buenos Aires.

When Colonel Hilario Lagos rebelled against the Buenos Aires government on December 1, 1852, Major Cañete was stationed in San Nicolás, where Colonel José María Cortina, acting under Lagos’s command, enlisted him to help disarm groups moving towards San Nicolás after the disbandment of the Buenos Aires besieging army on July 13, 1853, maintaining order “with honor, activity, and patriotism” (Cortina’s report, November 20, 1860).

In November 1854, during the Buenos Aires invasion led by enemies from the province of Santa Fe and commanded by General Jerónimo Costa, Cañete, then a retired major, offered his services to Lieutenant Colonel Mariano Artayeta, the local military commander. Artayeta accepted, tasking him with organizing local cavalry forces, which he did successfully, leading 50 cavalrymen in capturing the defeated forces from El Tala and performing other missions, gaining the Superior Government’s recognition.

In January 1856, he accompanied Colonel Esteban García, commanding the first skirmishes against the invading forces of Generals Flores and Costa at Ensenada and Villamayor, where Costa was defeated and executed. As part of the Extramuros Regiment under Colonel García, he fought in the Battle of Cepeda, leading a squadron. After the dispersion of Buenos Aires cavalry, Cañete reached Morón, then returned to the capital and participated in the brief siege until the treaty of November 11. In a report dated December 17, 1860, Colonel García praised Cañete’s conduct: “I have nothing but respect for his morality, skill, and dedication to service.”

He participated in the Battle of Pavón and joined the "General San Martín" Regiment under Colonel García when the Paraguayan War began, taking part in the battles of Yatay, Uruguayana, Paso de la Patria, Itapirú, Estero Bellaco del Sud, Tuyutí, Yataytí-Corá, Boquerón, Sauce, and the cavalry demonstration at San Solano on September 22, 1866.

Promoted to brevet lieutenant colonel, he received full rank on May 8, 1868. However, he was forced to return to Buenos Aires due to severe dysentery. Complications from “malaria” led to Lieutenant Colonel Cruz Cañete’s death in the capital on July 28, 1868, at 53.

On January 18, 1858, he married Rosario Rodríguez, a widow from Buenos Aires, daughter of Colonel Ramón Rodríguez and Concepción Lahite. She passed away in 1894.

Sources

Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado.

www.revisionistas.com.ar

Yaben, Jacinto R. – Biografías argentinas y sudamericanas – Buenos Aires (1938).

The 1965 Lago del Desierto Incident

The 1981 SK-105 Deal: How Argentina Outmaneuvered Chile

Malvinas: Why Didn’t the Bombs Explode? (2/8)

Why Didn’t the Bombs Explode?

Part 1 || Part 2 || Part 3 || Part 4 || Part 5 || Part 6 || Part 7 || Part 8

Guilherme Poggio || Poder Aereo




 

 
Thirty-five years ago, Argentines and Britons clashed in the frigid waters of the South Atlantic, fighting over the possession of the Malvinas Islands (Falklands, as the British call them). It was during this conflict that the Argentine Air Force (FAA – Fuerza Aérea Argentina) entered combat for the first time against an external enemy. The baptism of fire took place on May 1, 1982. The Air Power blog publishes an exclusive article in parts, covering the vectors, weapons, and tactics used by the FAA to attack and destroy the ships of the British Task Force. To read the previous parts, click the links below.

Vectors and Armaments

Faced with the challenge of confronting one of the best-equipped and prepared navies in the world, the FAA had limited options. The most suitable vectors for the mission were the IAI Dagger, an Israeli version of the Mirage 5, and the McDonnell Douglas A-4B/C Skyhawk. The latter were very similar to the A-4Q model of the Argentine Naval Aviation, which was also used in naval attacks against the British.
Dagger M-5 C-401 stationed at Río Grande configured for an attack mission, where two Spanish BR-250 bombs can be seen in the central hangar (“Nafgan”) and two 1700-liter fuel tanks (in “Hotel” configuration). This aircraft was used in the mission on June 8. The attack ultimately damaged the HMS Plymouth frigate.FOTO: Museo de Aviación Naval

The issue of armaments was more delicate. The only guided weapon available was the Martín Pescador air-to-surface missile. This missile, still not fully operational at the time, was tested by the FAA in April 1982, using an IA-58 Pucará aircraft as the vector. Due to its radio guidance system and the firing distance, the aircraft was too exposed to anti-aircraft fire. For these reasons, the possibility of using this missile in the war was abandoned.

Lacking guided weapons, the FAA evaluated the use of free-fall bombs. The FAA had essentially four types of general-purpose free-fall bombs available for combat. The first were 454 kg (1000 lb) bombs of British origin. The Argentines called these bombs MK-17. Although they were identical to those used by the British, the latter referred to them as MK 13/15. These were high-resistance bombs that could be equipped with either a smooth tail or a parachute brake. The MK-17 bombs had been acquired by the Argentines 12 years before the conflict as part of the weapons package for their English Electric Canberra B.62/T.64 bombers.


A British-made MK-17 bomb next to an FAA Canberra bomber. These bombs were acquired along with the bomber 12 years before the 1982 conflict. FOTO: FAA

Newer than the MK-17 bombs were the Spanish bombs produced by Expal (Explosivos Alaveses SA). These were low-drag bombs based on the American MK 80 series. There were two models: one weighing 250 kg and another weighing 125 kg. The 250 kg model could be fitted with either a smooth tail or a parachute-brake tail, while the 125 kg bombs only had a smooth tail. They were acquired in 1978 due to the threat of a border conflict with Chile. There is information that high-drag 500 kg Spanish bombs were also part of the FAA’s inventory in 1982.

 
The FAA A-4B with registration C-235 was already in the final stages of the conflict. In the foreground, three Spanish BP-250 smooth-tail bombs are arranged in a single cluster. They were loaded onto the central pylon, beneath the fuselage (station 3).FOTO: FAA
Malvinas 35 Years: Why Didn’t the Bombs Explode?

The third option was the Brazilian-made low-drag BR-BK 125 kg bombs. These were produced by the Armament Factory in the Argentine city of Córdoba. These bombs were exclusively assigned to the IA-58 Pucará, which operated from the Malvinas (and thus did not participate in naval operations). The reasons why the Argentines chose not to use this bomb in naval attacks will be discussed later.

Another option that was evaluated but not used during the conflict was the Israeli IMI Mod. 4 bomb, weighing 130 kg, which had been acquired along with the IAI Dagger a few years before the conflict (details about this case will also be discussed later).

A pair of Israeli IMI Mod. 4 bombs, weighing 130 kg, mounted on an M-5 Dagger fighter. There are no records of this weapon being used during the 1982 conflict. FOTO: FAA

There are reports that the FAA also possessed some American-made AN-M65A1 1,000-pound bombs at the time of the conflict, which had come with the Avro Lincoln bombers. In statements to “The History Channel,” Brigadier Sergio Mayor (V Air Brigade – A-4B) mentioned that AN-M65A1 bombs were used in Malvinas. However, there are no other documents to confirm this version, and it is possible that the general confused the American bombs with the MK-17 bombs.

Another unconventional possibility was the use of incendiary bombs against the British fleet. According to then Vice Commodore (Lieutenant Colonel) Arturo Pereyra, head of the Operations Department of FAS (Southern Air Force – activated to coordinate resources in combat missions), these were not used for "humanitarian reasons."

The option of using incendiary bombs against Royal Navy ships was dismissed for "humanitarian reasons." However, several Napalm bombs were sent to the Malvinas airfields, where the IA Pucará operated in strictly land-based actions. FOTO: archivo

The use of air-launched torpedoes was also evaluated. Argentina had some units of the old American Mk 13 torpedo, previously used by the PBY Catalina. Shortly after the conflict began, a torpedo testing program was initiated, using a modified IA Pucará as the delivery platform. The final test was scheduled for June 14, but with the end of hostilities, the program was suspended.



A modified Pucará prepared for flight tests, armed with an American Mk-13 torpedo in the central hangar. The tests were conducted shortly before the end of the conflict.. FOTO: FAA

Finally, it is worth noting that the FAA tested 454 kg free-fall bombs of French origin and Soviet cluster bombs, both supplied by the Peruvian Air Force. However, there are no known actual attacks using these devices.

The following table, created exclusively for this article, summarizes the general-purpose bombs available to the FAA at the time of the conflict.

Bombs Available in the FAA Inventory in 1982 for Use Against Royal Navy Ships

Blues and Reds Rebellion: The Attack on Magdalena's Tanks and the Destruction of Punta Indio Airbase

Destroyed F-9 Panther next to a damaged example

The Time when the Punta Indio Base was razed

Punta Indio Web



Magdalena to the North and BAPI to the Southeast.

 

In the troubled 60s, the Punta Indio Base was the protagonist of some unfortunate events

The tumultuous and chaotic 1960s gave rise to two rival factions within the Argentine Armed Forces: the Blues and the Reds. These factions engaged in violent clashes, most notably in 1962 and 1963, leading to significant bloodshed. The final confrontation, which left 24 dead and 87 wounded, erupted when the Colorado faction attempted to overthrow President José María Guido. In just three days, the Blues emerged victorious, resulting in widespread purges within both the Army and Navy.

It was April 2, 1963. The day dawned clear and seemingly perfect for the conspirators' plans. Their goal was to install retired General Benjamín Menéndez, a seasoned plotter, as president. Menéndez had been designated as the "commander in chief of the revolutionary forces of Air, Sea, and Land." Among the conspirators was Admiral Rojas, a key figure.

The Navy, for the most part, supported the uprising. In the Army, those opposing the blue leadership, led by retired General Federico Toranzo Montero, managed to seize control of a few units in the interior. However, in the Air Force, the rebellion was stifled, as Commodore Lentino's minority faction failed to gain the upper hand.

To understand this conflict, we must go back to 1955 and the so-called Liberating Revolution or 1955 Revolution, which had ousted Perón and banned his movement. In 1958, Arturo Frondizi secured the presidency through a pact, winning the election with votes from Perón’s exiled supporters. This betrayal was unforgivable to the military, especially after Frondizi’s secret meeting with Che Guevara in August 1961. Eight months later, Frondizi was overthrown, and Senator Guido assumed the presidency, though under the heavy influence of the "Military Party."

Anti-Peronist, anti-communist, and driven by a handful of ambitious conspirators, the "Military Party" quickly fractured upon exposure to political power. In true Argentine fashion, it split into two factions: the Blues and the Reds. Rogelio García Lupo, a journalist of the time, described the division as inevitable.

Though both factions were anti-Peronist, they differed in their reasons. The Reds saw Peronism as a violent and sectarian movement that paved the way for communism. The Blues, on the other hand, believed that despite its excesses, Peronism had saved the working class from communism and subversion, presenting itself as a Christian and national force.

The Blues, referring to themselves as "own forces" in military parlance, first emerged in September 1962, branding their adversaries as "Reds" (or "enemies"). Through psychological operations and Communiqué 150, drafted by Mariano Grondona, the Blues presented themselves as "legalists." After four days of skirmishes, they elevated Juan Carlos Onganía to the head of the Army.

Supported by the Blue faction, Guido’s government began to explore ways of reintegrating Peronism into the political sphere—albeit without Perón himself. Meanwhile, the Colorados awaited their moment to seize power.

That moment came on April 2. The most intense battle of the uprising occurred between the 8th Tank Regiment in Magdalena and the nearby Naval Aviation Base at Punta Indio. The commander of Punta Indio, Captain Santiago Sabarots, urged Colonel Alcides López Aufranc, leader of the tank regiment, to join the revolt, but to no avail. Leaflets dropped from a small plane gave a 20-minute warning before the attack commenced. "The barracks were a hive of activity, and the order was given to evacuate," recalls conscript Hermindo Belastegui, from class 42. At 12:30, the barracks were hit by Panther and Corsair planes firing shrapnel, incendiary bombs, and destructive explosives. Belastegui, deeply marked by the experience, later captured these memories in El C-8 no se rinde, a book published only two months ago. In it, he recounts how the regiment endured a relentless assault that lasted all day, with over 100 bombs dropped, including napalm. The attack left 9 soldiers dead and 22 wounded.

 

"At 12:30, Panther and Corsair planes began the attack with shrapnel fire, incendiary bombs, and destructive explosives," recalls Hermindo Belastegui, a conscript from the class of '42. Deeply impacted by that experience for years, this former metalworker captured his memories in *El C-8 no se rinde*, a book he managed to publish just two months ago. The book recounts how they were relentlessly attacked throughout the day, with more than a hundred bombs, including napalm. The assault left 9 soldiers dead and 22 wounded.

The next day, the "loyal" Air Force launched a counterattack on Punta Indio. By the time the 8th Tank Regiment's armored vehicles entered the base, the damage was done: 24 naval aircraft had been destroyed, 5 marines were dead, and Captain Santiago Sabarots had fled to Uruguay. Alcides López Aufranc, nicknamed "the fox of Magdalena" in a local version of Erwin Rommel, "the desert fox," sought revenge and wanted to level Punta Indio. However, he was dissuaded by Juan Carlos Onganía and the rising Colonel Alejandro Agustín Lanusse, preventing an even bloodier outcome.



After the events of April 2-3, 1963, the Punta Indio base was occupied and once again ransacked by troops from the 8th and 10th Motorized Cavalry Regiments. The destruction of aircraft on the ground, along with the damage to maintenance workshops, was significant. The cause of this devastation was, yet again, the senseless political conflicts that led to Argentinians fighting and killing each other. In this particular case, aircraft from Punta Indio launched an attack on the 8th Regiment in Magdalena, as shown in the photos below, with a T-6 Texan firing rockets at the regiment, leaving its facilities in ruins and causing casualties. In response, the 8th and 10th Regiments launched a counterattack, seizing the Punta Indio base and destroying its aircraft and infrastructure.



A North American T-6 firing rockets over Magdalena.

 

The 8th Regiment of Magdalena shows the aftermath of the attack.

Location of the 8th Armored Cavalry Regiment of Magdalena.

 
Army forces prepare to attack Punta Indio.

 
Part of the runway with damaged aircraft.

 
The tank regiment poses on the tarmac at Punta Indio.

Location of the Punta Indio Naval Air Base (BAPI).

More photos of the damage caused. Whether in Punta Indio or Magdalena, it is difficult to comprehend today, in the 21st century, that this was not an external attack but a fratricidal war. How many poor conscripts, non-commissioned officers, and officers must have died in these senseless wars?

 

 

 


Damaged Corsair aircraft.


 


 


A destroyed DC-3


 

 

 


A damaged DC-3 and the remains of another burned aircraft.


 



 
Daños en tres Trackers

 

 

 
Damaged or destroyed Panthers.
 
Only the turbine of this Panther remained.

The Artillery Group on the runway at BAPI.

Argentine Army: 11th Armored Artillery Group

Grupo de Artillería Blindado 11 "Coronel Juan Bautista Thorne"

11th Armored Artillery Group "Colonel Juan Bautista Thorne"

VCA Palmaria conducting maneuvers during training.

It belongs to the 9th Mechanized Infantry Brigade 'Colonel Luis Jorge Fontana' of Comodoro Rivadavia - Province of CHUBUT.

'THE YOUNGEST, SOUTHERNMOST, AND MOST MODERN UNIT OF THE ARTILLERY BRANCH. "

 

Biografía del Coronel D Juan Bautista THORNE 
 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE 11th ARMORED ARTILLERY GROUP

The creation of the southernmost unit of the branch, the 11th Armored Artillery Group, dates back to November 29, 1979.

The Artillery Group was initially established as a core unit in the town of Comandante Luis Piedra Buena on February 23, 1980, under the organic command of the 11th Mechanized Brigade. Its first Commander was Major Héctor Obeid.

On June 20, 1981, its barracks were inaugurated, along with the current 11th Engineers Battalion.


Iveco Transport Vehicle

During the South Atlantic Conflict, the unit carried out various activities, among which the fulfillment of Strategic Operational Security missions stood out, occupying positions in Puerto San Julián and Güer Aike, and then returning to its peacetime station once the conflict ended.

On December 20 of that same year, its designation was changed to the 11th Artillery Group, with its main equipment being the 155mm towed Schneider gun.

In 1984, it modernized its equipment with 18 155mm towed SOFMA Argentine Model guns, thereby increasing its range and firepower.

Firing of a VCA Palmaria piece from the 11th Armored Artillery Group in the town of Azul.

In 1992, the unit's personnel began participating in Peacekeeping Operations in Croatia, Cyprus, Kuwait, and Haiti.

In 1997, with the arrival of the first domestically produced 155mm Palmaria Self-Propelled Artillery Vehicles, the unit began its transformation into an armored unit, changing its designation to the 11th Armored Artillery Group on May 16, thereby increasing its maneuverability, mobility, and firepower.

Maintenance Activities

On November 20, 2007, the Argentine Army bestowed the unit with the historic name of Colonel Juan Bautista Thorne, in honor of the man who explored Southern Patagonia and participated, among other actions, in the Desert Campaign, the Battle of Vuelta de Obligado, and the defense of Martín Garcia Island.

The 11th Armored Artillery Group, the southernmost, youngest, and most modern unit of the Artillery, continues to carry out its activities in fulfillment of its assigned missions, developing and enhancing an unparalleled esprit de corps that characterizes it, and demonstrating its professionalism in war preparation, in the support provided to the community, and in the participation of its personnel in Peacekeeping Missions.

 

 
 
Unit Commander and Gun Crew Personnel.
 
Gun Crew and Mechanics and Engineers Personnel.

 
 
 
 
A few more of the VCA vehicles from the 11th Armored Artillery Group.




 

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