Wednesday, July 9, 2025

Malvinas: Operation Uka Uka

Operation Uka Uka (ITB)






On 12 June 1982, members of the Argentine Navy installed an Exocet missile in Puerto Argentino, brought in by a C-130 Hercules aircraft of the Argentine Air Force, to be launched from land.
It was an Argentine invention that put a British warship out of action in the final days of the Falklands War.

This “ingenuity under pressure” (as it was described at an international military history congress in Europe) led two civilian Navy technicians and a naval engineer to develop a previously unthinkable land-based Exocet missile launcher. It was successfully used during one of the fiercest battles of the conflict with Britain, on 12 June 1982, at Mount Two Sisters.

They called it the ITB: Instalación de Tiro Berreta (makeshift firing installation).
“Because it was ugly, improvised… a makeshift job,” recalled Antonio Shugt and Luis Torelli, who devised it in just three days, alongside Navy Captain Julio Pérez.
Antonio and Luis were 22 and 24 years old when Captain Pérez, their superior in the Missile Division at Puerto Belgrano Naval Arsenal, assigned them a mission that seemed impossible: to launch an MM38 Exocet anti-ship missile from land to counter the British bombardment of Puerto Argentino’s defences.
“Yes, it can be done,” they replied.
“It’s urgent!” the captain warned them.
Luis had been a civilian employee of the Navy for six years and had worked as an electronics technician in the Missile Division for three. Alongside Pérez and Shugt, he had visited France when Argentina purchased the Exocet missiles, giving him valuable knowledge of the system.
In total secrecy, they locked themselves in the workshop at the beginning of May, sketching ideas, drawing up plans, laying cables...
“There was nothing like it in the Navy or anywhere else,” Luis explained. “The missile alone is useless; it needs a launch system, which consists of a set of equipment that gives the missile launch orders, target data, firing conditions, flight situation... We had to build something like that, but it had to be portable, mobile, and transportable.”



“The captain wanted to design an entirely new circuit, but we didn’t have time. So we thought it more practical to use what already existed: a ship’s fire control system, which is a large room full of equipment that takes a year to install. We used one from an old destroyer. It had to be dismantled and downsized,” said Antonio.
By the third day, they emerged from the workshop with a plan: keep the most vital components and manufacture the rest more simply.
It was a gamble — and it worked. They tested the system with a missile simulator on the destroyer Seguí. A tent was erected on the deck to shield them from enemy satellites, but even with the system and missile, they still needed a launch ramp.
“Someone came up with the idea of putting it on a trailer. So they took the ramps from the ship and mounted them on a cart. The electronics were powered by a portable system from old Marine Infantry arc spotlights. The launcher and a separate control and command unit were interconnected,” Luis recounted.
It was built at top speed, with the entire workshop working two shifts around the clock: 6 a.m. to 7 p.m., and 7 p.m. to 6 a.m. The General Workshops took care of the mechanical parts. And it was ready.
It was all extremely urgent. At 4 p.m. the system was tested, and by 6 p.m. it was loaded onto a Hercules aircraft at Base Espora for deployment to the Malvinas.



Captain Pérez travelled to the islands. He was to operate the ITB with Lieutenant Commanders Edgardo Rodríguez and Mario Abadal. Luis and Antonio, being civilians, were not deployed.
The ITB reached the Falklands on 31 May, after several radar-evading flights.
Each of the two trailers weighed 5,000 kg. Moving them around the islands was extremely difficult. They could only be transported via the road to the airport, as they would sink in the tundra.
A site was designated 300 metres from the sea, facing the airport at Puerto Argentino, in the southern part of the archipelago (see map). The components were dispersed, with the launcher positioned separately to avoid detection. They would begin setup around 6 p.m. when darkness fell. It took two hours to install the ITB, and they remained in position until 3 or 4 a.m. In daylight, the system was dismantled to avoid satellite detection. For 12 days they repeated this cycle, waiting for the ideal moment.
Using an Army radar operated by retired officer Carlos Ríes Centeno —who had travelled as a documentarian— ship movements were tracked. It was an anti-personnel radar, requiring data conversion to be useful to the Exocet’s systems. Combined with input from another surveillance radar, they identified the route taken by British ships each night.
One early morning, Captain Pérez and his team attempted the first launch, but a connection issue prevented the missile from firing.
“The only British component in the ITB failed: a worthless diode. Luckily, the Marine Infantry’s Anti-Air Artillery had the exact one we needed,” Captain Pérez recounted.
A second attempt the next day failed due to a human error in radar data calculations.
By the third or fourth night, British ships had stopped passing. The radars showed nothing nearby.
“It was almost dawn when one of the lieutenants suggested doing something they used to do during training — dancing around a tree like natives to summon rain. ‘Shall we try a spin?’ he asked. Imagine two lieutenants and a captain doing that. If anyone had seen us…” Pérez laughed.
But at one point, Pérez said: “Now, while no one’s watching.” And in the dark, they danced twice around the trailer, chanting like indigenous warriors. Believe it or not, half an hour later, they were informed that a British warship had appeared in the area.
They readied the system and fired. Third time lucky — the Exocet hit its target.

The Attack
12 June 1982. British artillery was bombarding the Argentine defences at Puerto Argentino, and that same early morning, Argentina fired an Exocet missile from land at a warship — a global first. Argentine ingenuity, devised by two civilian technicians from Punta Alta in Puerto Belgrano, was now playing its part in the heat of battle on the islands.



At 3:30 a.m., HMS Glamorgan, supporting the British advance on Mount Two Sisters from offshore, had already fired nearly four tonnes of explosives. The Royal Marines welcomed the support. But as the destroyer shifted to a new position, it entered the ITB radar’s range.
“Our radar only reached 30,000 metres,” Captain Pérez explained. “We had very little time to input the data and fire. But we managed it!”
A flash in the early morning, followed by a snaking trail and the sound of a turbine disappearing into the dark horizon.
That brilliant light approaching caught the attention of everyone on the Glamorgan’s bridge. It was also seen from the coast.



It was 3:36 a.m., and it took no time for Glamorgan’s radar operators to realise they were under Exocet attack. Their evasive manoeuvres came too late — the missile struck the stern.
“3:37 — Boom! The ship jolted as if hitting a dock. We lost all power. It was chaos,” said a crew member.
The MM38 Exocet, launched via the ITB, had hit its mark.

Gaceta Marinera

Sunday, July 6, 2025

Malvinas: The Gurkha Myth

The Gurkha Myth





Beyond certain particular traits, the Gurkhas are nothing more than a regular unit of the British Army. There was a British psychological operations campaign during the war which, aided by local dissemination, reached extraordinary levels.

They were neither mercenaries nor throat-slitting machines—nothing of the sort. Yet many believed it; even Gabo García Márquez bought into the story and helped to spread it. The press also contributed, whether through the information it published or the manner in which it did so. 

It’s hard to accept that a myth was swallowed whole, but that’s exactly what happened. Even Carlos Robacio commented on them — they were a misrepresentation of the Gurkhas. They fought very little and stopped almost as soon as they began.

We must stop spreading claims about the war that never actually occurred. Don’t you agree?



Imagen: Infobae.

Thursday, July 3, 2025

Independence War: The Last Day of Güemes

The Last Day of Güemes Among Us





On the night of June 7, 1821, at the corner of Belgrano and Balcarce streets in the city of Salta, Martín Miguel de Güemes was wounded and fled with his gauchos in search of shelter. Despite his injury, the hero did not fall from his saddle and, mounted on his horse, crossed the Campo de la Cruz. Entering the Chachapoya ravine, he headed east to a post located about 8 km from the city of Salta, in La Lagunilla, known as the house of Doña Pancha Luna.

Colonel Eusebio Mollinedo, who was with him that fateful day, wrote in his accounts:

“...Seriously wounded in the spine by a gunshot from an enemy patrol, and after enduring excruciating pain with the fortitude forged by the hardships of war, we reached the post at La Lagunilla... There he was assisted and could rest.”


From that location, a message was sent to Commander Ríos, who was waiting with the rest of the escort at Tincunaco, to inform the troops encamped at Campo de Velarde about the situation and join the group. Additionally, Father Francisco Fernández was notified of the general’s condition.

Commander Ríos and his soldiers, along with Father Fernández, improvised a stretcher to carry the wounded Güemes and continued the journey toward the “Las Higuerillas” estate. The path included only a few mild hills that were easily crossed, followed by flat terrain leading to the estate house.

They arrived without major issues and waited for a large contingent of patriot troops and the party led by Captain Cabral, who was bringing the physician Dr. Antonio Castellanos. There, General Güemes received initial medical attention.

Dr. Castellanos diagnosed the severity of the wound and began to suspect a very poor prognosis.

With better organization and supplies, those present realized the need to protect the wounded General from enemy forces, so they resumed the march through the "Cañada de la Higuera", heading toward the "Higuera" outpost.

“...At the spot known as La Higuera, four leagues southeast of the starting point, he was extremely weak due to blood loss...”


This outpost’s location was highly secure and strategic, as it was close to the estates La Cruz and La Quesera, where Güemes had burial grounds for his gauchos.

However, in his critical condition, the hero could go no further. Under the shade of a cebil tree, he awaited his inevitable fate with the dignity of one who gives his life for the Fatherland.
Thus, the martyr of our Nation began his journey toward immortality.

Source: Illustrated Güemesian Ephemerides and Others
Image: Güemes wounded.

Monday, June 30, 2025

Malvinas: Superb Deception

Malvinas – The Grand Narrative

Sources and Rumours in War Reporting

(An intriguing analysis of how British communication was managed in support of military operations)





"On 31 March, two days before Argentine forces landed in Malvinas, the Argentine newspaper Clarín published a report, which appeared to originate from London, claiming that the British had deployed the nuclear submarine Superb to Argentine waters. The Foreign Office had no comment to offer on that 'version', and the Argentine press concluded that this was a leak of highly classified military information.

On 1 April, as Argentine troops were preparing for the landing in Malvinas, Clarín reported that the Superb displaced 45,000 tonnes and had a crew of 97 men trained in anti-submarine warfare.

By 4 April, the submarine had allegedly been sighted off the Argentine coast. British military sources responded that they had no intention of disclosing the location of their submarines.

On 18 April, a Brazilian pilot reported having seen the Superb near Santa Catarina and even claimed to have photographed it; unfortunately, the image was nearly unreadable due to fog.

Then, when the British expeditionary force was genuinely just eighty kilometres from the war zone, with real warships and actual submarines, the Superb vanished. On 22 April, Clarín reported that the submarine had supposedly returned to Scotland. The next day, 23 April, the Scottish newspaper Daily Record revealed that, in fact, the Superb had remained anchored at its Scottish base the entire time.

What interests me most is how the story grew—from a vague rumour—into a full-fledged submarine narrative, thanks to the collective efforts of many. It became a 'character' in its own right."

Tuesday, June 24, 2025

Malvinas: The Murrell Bridge Counter-Ambuscade and the Communications

 

Communications and a Pivotal Engagement on the Darkest Day of the Fleet


(From my interview with Captain (Ret.) VGM Eduardo Cerruti, Section Leader in Communications Company 3):

In the Malvinas, the most secure means of communication were wired systems. However, the signals personnel had to work tirelessly to repair lines that were frequently cut—either by shrapnel from bombardments, by sheep chewing through the cables, or, at times, by soldiers who used the wire to secure items while constructing their positions.



 

Inevitably, due to the use of HF communications on the islands, basic encryption and decryption systems had to be employed—elementary, to use the word loosely—since the type of cipher used had been originally developed by the British and American armies and was widely known across the world’s militaries. It was based on a five-digit code, and the British, though able to intercept Argentine communications, were not immune from making serious errors themselves.

To illustrate this, Captain (Ret.) Eduardo Cerruti refers to a specific engagement between a detachment of the British 3rd Parachute Battalion and a group of Argentine special forces from the 601 Commando Company. This occurred at the Murrell River bridge, during the night of 6 June and the early hours of 7 June 1982. In their retreat, the British abandoned not only their tents and various field supplies, but also their radio equipment. Most crucially, their radio operator left behind a communications pack containing documents listing frequencies, call signs, and network identifiers (e.g., alarm network, fire support network, logistics network, etc.).

For the Argentine communications personnel—who were trained under the doctrine that a message must be swallowed, destroyed, or burned before falling into enemy hands—this captured material was known as the Instructions for the Use and Operation of Communications (IEFC).

With the British documents now in Argentine hands, each time they tuned into a frequency, they heard voices speaking in English. They tried various channels repeatedly, and each time an English voice came through. Still, there was hesitation: given the professionalism of the British forces, they suspected that their enemies were already aware that the IEFC had been lost and that this could be a case of what is known in electronic warfare as simulative deception.

They continued monitoring the British using a Thompson field radio, which was not designed for electronic warfare. To aid in translation, they requested assistance from Communications Company 10 and were sent two soldiers who spoke English.

Meanwhile, Major Rábago reported the situation to General Menéndez, who authorised the purchase of a radio cassette recorder and several TDK tapes (60- and 90-minute lengths) from Port Stanley. Sergeant Edgardo Dalurzo, a field radio technician, successfully adapted the Thompson radio to the cassette recorder, enabling the team to record British transmissions.

On the morning of 7 June, one of the English-speaking soldiers informed Second Lieutenant Cerruti and other communications officers that the enemy was planning a landing at Bluff Cove (Bahía Agradable) the following day. This information was later confirmed by the second translator, who had received the tape and, after listening to it, corroborated the landing plan—and even added the names Bluff Cove/Fitz Roy.

It is worth emphasising that, using only a standard-issue Thompson field radio, which lacked any specialised electronic warfare capability, and thanks to the intel seized during the Murrell River bridge engagement, Communications Company 3 managed to conduct improvised electronic warfare. The report compiled by its personnel directly supported the Argentine Air Force in planning the successful strike carried out on 8 June 1982, during the British landing at Bluff Cove.

An extraordinary achievement.


Saturday, June 21, 2025

Malvinas: The Actions of BIM 5 Obra Company



Account of a Naval Infantry Petty Officer – OBRA Company – BIM 5 Ec (Part 2)

Change of Mission

On 5 June, the company received orders from the Commander of BIM 5 Ec to occupy a Forward Combat Post in the Pony's Pass area. Commander Robacio had long requested that the High Command cover the approach to Port Stanley via the only road connecting Fitz Roy to the town. Without a response from his superiors, he ultimately decided to assign OBRA Company to this mission. This decision impacted the battalion during the Tumbledown engagement, as it lacked a reserve force for a swift counterattack.

We were to position ourselves in the Pony's Pass area. Initially, a reconnaissance was conducted, and the findings were reported to Commander Robacio. He realised that Pony's Pass was not ideal for a Forward Combat Post due to its small hillock surrounded by lagoons and semi-permanent watercourses, all easily fordable by foot troops. Consequently, Lieutenant Miño (of the Amphibious Engineers) was ordered to install a minefield ahead of the future positions, and Sub-Lieutenant Quiroga was instructed to move after reconnaissance and to bring the troops as late as possible, as we were certain the enemy was observing us, and the position needed to remain concealed.

During the night of 11 to 12 June, from OBRA Company's positions, we observed the battles for Mount Harriet. The marines watching the combat could do little, as the British attacks occurred beyond the range of their weapons, 2000 to 3000 metres away, except for an enemy unit attempting a rear assault on Harriet, which came within 800 to 1000 metres of OBRA's weapons.

Petty Officer Tejerina recounts: "On the night of 11 June, after intense naval and land artillery fire, between approximately 2200 and 2300 hours, the enemy launched an assault on the positions at Harriet with machine guns, rocket launchers, and artillery. British artillery fell immediately in front of the first assault line. We saw this clearly from our position, as the tracer rounds from the machine guns indicated the attackers' positions, and occasional flares lit up the area. It was a cold, clear night with a full moon that rose before the attack (21:25). The Company Commander continuously reported the situation to BIM 5 Ec Command. We were ordered to prepare for a potential counterattack. At 0100, combat intensified at the top of Harriet. By 0145, the fighting subsided, with only sporadic machine-gun fire heard. At that time, we recovered two conscripts from the RI 4 Service Section (Conscripts Ibañez and Vallejos), provided them with dry clothing, weapons, ammunition, and Charlie rations; they joined the Company and remained with us until the end of the fighting. Our artillery targeted the attackers; the fire was directed by TCIM Quiroga and GUIM Bianchi of the 1st Section of BIM 5 Ec stationed at William, even firing upon RI 4's own positions east of the mountain. Our commander continuously reported enemy troop movements in the Port Harriet area and their manoeuvre northward towards Mount Harriet. He was particularly concerned about an enemy unit moving northwest."

Petty Officer Tejerina continues: "At dawn on 12 June, enemy troops were seen assembling prisoners on the southern slope of Harriet, then marching them westward. Helicopters were also observed evacuating the wounded. For the rest of the day, we had to remain in our positions to avoid detection. At 1400, enemy artillery shelled our positions with timed ammunition for 30 minutes. (Note: Timed ammunition explodes before hitting the ground, causing a shower of shrapnel.) In this bombardment, a fragment slightly wounded Dragoneante Orlando Garcia, the Rifle Platoon Leader, in the back; he was treated by Second Corporal Medic Angelossi. Dragoneante Garcia refused to leave his position and be evacuated. At 1830, enemy artillery again shelled our area for 30 minutes. I was caught inspecting positions and had to make several dashes to reach the rocket launcher position. Accompanying me was Dragoneante Ariel Bustamante (rocket launcher loader); during one of the bursts, I was hit by the blast wave of a grenade and fell stunned into a water-filled hole, from which Dragoneante Bustamante rescued me instead of seeking cover; he had a habit of accompanying me on my rounds, even under fire."

On 13 June, we detected movements ahead of us, approximately a company of Welsh troops approaching. Artillery fire was requested but fell short; Lieutenant Quiroga made corrections, and then it hit the Welsh troops. We heard screams as they tried to retreat, but the artillery continued to inflict casualties. After a while, they were subjected to heavy fire until Lieutenant Quiroga suspended the fire due to the lack of standing enemy soldiers. I was impressed by the efficiency of the British medical personnel. They wore a type of short white poncho with a red cross on the back, tied at the waist. Some wounded had inflatable splints applied to their limbs, possibly to stop bleeding or fractures. The medics marked the location of the wounded, and then helicopters evacuated them.

Lieutenant Quiroga's Injury

Between 1815 and 1900 hours, while moving between positions, the Company Commander stepped into a hole approximately 20 centimetres in diameter and 50 centimetres deep while taking cover from a nearby grenade explosion, dislocating his ankle. The intense pain immobilised Lieutenant Quiroga, who was quickly attended to by SSIM Orosco and CSEN Angelossi. The latter bandaged Lieutenant Quiroga but suspected a fracture due to rapid swelling and advised him to seek further medical attention at the BIM 5 Ec Aid Post for proper treatment.

After evacuating Lieutenant Quiroga, command was assumed by Lieutenant Calmels. Fog began to form gradually. During twilight, via radio, Petty Officer Tejerina repeatedly instructed his men on the retreat procedure, which theoretically consisted of:

  1. Movement: Withdrawal of Corporal Agüero's group (the most forward) through the bunker, then past the Company CP to a rear assembly point. There, the two groups would occupy positions to cover the retreat of the rest.

  2. Movement: Withdrawal of the 1st Group.

  3. Movement: Withdrawal of the 2nd Group.

Final Movement: Machine guns and 60 mm mortars.

Lieutenant Calmels assumed command around 2200 hours, about fifteen minutes before the attack began. The attack caught him by surprise; he was unaware of the exact situation of his Company. The night, the fog that had begun to lift, enemy fire, and conflicting reports from Group Leaders painted a grave picture; he knew the British were numerous, everywhere, and advancing almost openly, shouting. In reality, the enemy unexpectedly encountered OBRA positions, not anticipating resistance there due to the marines' effective concealment. However, for the Argentinians, the British appeared suddenly, as the fog and artillery noise prevented detection. Combat began when the enemy engaged Corporal Agüero's group, which, as mentioned, was slightly forward, practically on the road, 150 metres from the CP. It's evident that the enemy vanguard was moving along the road, as the group was attacked from the front and right flank (north), threatening its rear. From that moment, combat became generalised. The machine gun left by Corporal Alvarez to Corporal Agüero, previously moved to the northern flank, opened fire. Even from the Company CP, Lieutenant Calmels, Petty Officer Tejerina, Corporal Carrasco, and the Company Platoon Conscripts fired their rifles at the enemy to the north of the position. Grenade explosions were heard. The other two Rifle Groups (1 and 2) prepared for combat, but the British attack did not press on them, receiving only sporadic fire. At that time, it was snowing. The British advanced, supported by a high rate of machine-gun fire—about six or seven—clearly located by their tracer rounds. The enemy gained ground, nearly two companies against a reinforced section.

The Retreat

The retreat could not be executed as planned. In reality, Groups 1 and 2, along with Petty Officer Tejerina, moved towards the Quarry. When the retreat was ordered, the Group Leaders began the movement, but Agüero, who was to initiate it, reported he couldn't move. At that point, the Company Commander ordered his 60 mm mortars to fire on the White Points ahead of the 3rd Group. Some conscripts from this group were seen retreating, but Agüero no longer responded on the radio. By 2300 hours, with the movement underway, Groups 1 and 2 fought their way past the immediate depression behind them and then marched towards the Quarry. Subsequently, the Company Commander withdrew with the Company Platoon and mortar personnel. Petty Officer Orosco remained at the rear, covering the retreat with a machine gun. Briefly illuminated by three flares (two and one), they were forced to "hit the deck." In reality, the illumination was over William. The rest of the Company's retreat occurred in darkness. At 0100 hours, they reached the Quarry, where the Company regrouped. The Company Commander had a mission to fulfil as the Battalion Reserve and immediately marched north towards the Subunit's previous position near the BIM 5 Ec CP. Due to poor terrain information, Lieutenant Calmels expected to find Company RI 3 immediately east of the Quarry, but Captain EA Varela's Company was actually further northeast of William, leaving a gap between Sapper Hill and William.

We returned to our old positions south of the BIM 5 Ec CP. Around 0900 hours, Lieutenant Calmels received orders to retreat to Sapper Hill, where the Battalion was to concentrate for continued combat from that area. Once the Battalion regrouped at Sapper Hill, at 1115 hours, it received orders to retreat to the town. From that moment, the Company joined the rest of the Unit, packed their equipment, and entered Port Stanley. By 1430 hours, the Battalion was already assembled near the Naval Station, and at 1900 hours, OBRA Company, with the bulk of the Battalion, settled in the Naval Station's Carpentry, remaining there until the morning of 16 June when they received orders to move to the Concentration Camp being set up on the airport peninsula. Before entering the area, they had to pass through British control posts, where their weapons were finally confiscated.