Consolidation of the British Beachhead at San Carlos
Following the successful attacks carried out by the Argentine Air Force (Fuerza Aérea Argentina, FAA) on the afternoon of 21 May, during the night of 21–22 May, the enemy undertook an intense effort to land the bulk of its forces and deploy security elements to the high ground surrounding the beachhead. All available helicopters were used successively for that purpose.
On the same afternoon of 21 May, numerous troop movements were observed, transporting personnel, heavy weapons, and air defence systems to the northwest of Cerro Alberdi, as well as to the heights southeast of San Carlos settlement and Montevideo Hill.
By the afternoon of 22 May, when the FAA resumed its attacks, the enemy had succeeded in consolidating its landing, with an effective ground-based air defence network already established around the beachhead.
On 21 May, the Joint Command Malvinas requested continuation of aerial bombing, which was carried out as mentioned above, although the results could not be assessed. Requests for aerial photography could not be fulfilled due to active enemy air defences.
On 22 May, since the heavy mortars of Regiment 12 (RI 12) had not yet arrived at Puerto Argentino, orders were issued to embark two artillery pieces from the 4th Airborne Artillery Group (GA Aerot 4) with their crews aboard an Argentine Coast Guard vessel. This ship departed for Darwin at first light on 23 May. Near the entrance to Choiseul Bay, the vessel was attacked by British Harrier aircraft, which inflicted severe damage, forcing the ship to run aground on the northern shore.
A fire broke out onboard. The crew managed to disembark and take cover under makeshift shelters along the beach. Later, they were able to recover equipment and supplies from the ship, including materials for treating the wounded. On 24 May, during a risky helicopter operation, the personnel were evacuated, along with the artillery pieces and ammunition, which were transported to Darwin, where they were immediately assigned to defensive positions. The operation was secured by a patrol under the command of an officer dispatched from Darwin. Once the mission was completed, the patrol had to withdraw on foot due to the unavailability of helicopters. Only one of the rescued artillery pieces could be brought back into service; the second had been damaged in the bombing and could not be repaired.
On the morning of 23 May, British aircraft attacked south of Howard a formation of Army helicopters that had departed Puerto Argentino en route to that location. The helicopters were carrying supplies and heavy mortars for RI 12 (received on that date), conducting reconnaissance south of San Carlos, and attempting to extract personnel from 601 Commando Company, who were operating in the area of RI 5 on a previously assigned mission.
In this attack, two Puma helicopters and one Augusta A-209 helicopter were destroyed. A second Puma, piloted by First Lieutenant Hugo Alberto Pérez Cometo, managed to evade the enemy strike, returned to the area, and rescued the crews of the downed helicopters — risking a second enemy attack to save his comrades. Subsequently, patrols from RI 5 recovered the heavy weapons and part of the ammunition.
On the same day, 23 May, following intense air attacks, the British seriously damaged the Carcarañá vessel, which was anchored in San Carlos Strait near Soledad Island Bay. Another British air attack hit the Bahía Buen Suceso, anchored in Fox Bay, causing damage. The vessel was later repaired and restored to sailing condition.
On 24 May at 21:00, the Commander of the Coastal Group issued the Commander of Task Force Mercedes (RI 12) the defence operations order, which was received on 25 May at 18:00, followed by an order for a disruption attack, received on 26 May at 08:30.
On 26 May, two 105 mm howitzers from GA Aerot 4, along with their crews, were airlifted to Darwin by Army helicopters to reinforce the guns received the day before. They were assigned fire missions against Cerro Alberdi and Monte Osborne. As previously mentioned, only three artillery pieces were operational.
Operations of Task Force Mercedes from 1 May to 27 May (Darwin Position)
By 30 April, RI 12 had completed the concentration of its forces, except for Company B (still at Monte Challenger under orders of the Joint Command Malvinas), the Signals Section and part of the Service Company in Puerto Argentino, and the Heavy Mortar Section, which had not yet been transported from the mainland. The Commando Company and the remaining elements of the Service Company completed their movement to Darwin on 22 May.
In the afternoon, the RI 12 Commander attended a briefing by the Commander of RI 25 on the situation and deployment of his unit. He also met with the Commander of the Vicecommodore Pedrozo Military Air Base, who briefed him on the deployment of available resources and the measures taken with the local population. Reconnaissance was carried out alongside company commanders and members of the Logistics Planning Team (PL My).
It continued to rain, as it had in previous days. Since arriving in Malvinas, troops and officers had been operating with damp clothing. Nevertheless, overall health conditions remained acceptable, although several cases of frostbite in the lower limbs were reported. The unit was bivouacked near the airstrip.
The RI 12 Commander ordered that the companies bivouacked near the airstrip immediately relocate to the positions reconnoitred the previous afternoon by Company A. By 06:00, the movement was completed, and the elements were positioned 4 km from their original location.
At 08:30, the anticipated British air attack on Darwin began. Four Sea Harrier aircraft struck the area around the airstrip. A Pucará aircraft, with engines running, took an almost direct hit. Two more bombs fell on the runway, and a fourth landed near a Jeep carrying personnel.
At Fanning Head, the SBS accepted the surrender of Argentine soldiers — marking the first encounter between the two infantry forces.
Deployment and Combat Readiness in the Darwin–Goose Green Area
The unit takes up its assigned positions. All light and heavy weapons, ammunition, supplies, and the large field gear bags —impractical for troops in operations— must be transported manually and across open terrain. The transport means belonging to the Military Air Base (helicopters, jeeps, and tractors) cannot be used, as they are reserved for exclusive use by the Air Force.
Digging of positions begins using short-handled shovels — the only available entrenching tools, which are in limited supply. Improvised tools are also used. Only by nightfall are troops able to have a hot meal. Since arrival, it has rained almost constantly.
As of 2 May, Argentine forces deployed in Darwin–Goose Green number 642 men, with 202 from the Air Force (FAA).
On 3 May, reports from the BAM Commander suggest that the 1 May Harrier attack on the airstrip may have been guided from the ground, allegedly with assistance from a local resident. Control measures are adopted over the civilian population, also intended to protect them from renewed British air and naval strikes. The population is gathered inside the local church. This decision provokes significant complaints from the Kelpers.
On 4 May, at first light, a Chinook helicopter from the FAA transports the Deputy Commander of RI 12, one officer, and 18 soldiers from the Commando Company still stationed in the Monte Challenger area to Darwin, along with a food resupply.
Shortly after, a British air raid targets the airstrip from east to west. A Sea Harrier is shot down; the pilot ejects but is found dead, only 20 metres from the runway threshold. He is identified as Lieutenant Nicholas Taylor. The wreckage and body show numerous small-calibre bullet impacts, indicating that concentrated light weapons fire can be effective against low-flying aircraft.
During this action, the courageous conduct of Military Chaplain Santiago Mora is noteworthy, as he moves among positions under enemy fire, providing spiritual support to the troops.
Personnel continue to improve their positions and lay mines and obstacles. At 17:30, a formation is held and honours rendered to Lt. Nicholas Taylor, followed by the burial of his remains.
Due to food shortages, sheep begin to be requisitioned for troop rations. The situation is reported by radio to higher command. On 9 May, the food supply situation becomes critical and is reiterated to command. A shipment of provisions for 10 days is arranged and begins arriving on 10 May.
On 11 May, a helicopter delivers food for 7 days. At 23:30, the ship Montsunen arrives carrying 100 drums of JP-1 fuel (helicopter fuel), 97 drums of petrol, and 100 crates of 105 mm ammunition.
On 13 May, the Commander of the Coastal Task Group issues an operations order to detach a reduced-strength company-sized element to occupy the San Carlos area. Urgent allocation of support weapons is requested for this.
On 17 May at 09:00, two air attacks strike anti-air and heavy weapons positions near the airstrip and within the C Company / RI 12 sector. Numerous Beluga-type bomblets are scattered across the terrain. This is the first air raid since 4 May. That night, starting at 23:00, British helicopters once again overfly the area.
On 18 May, the BAM and TF Mercedes Commanders conduct a joint inspection of positions to coordinate use of FAA and Army resources. It is agreed to employ 500 lb bombs as interceptive fire. A request is made to Coastal Task Command for anti-personnel mines and detonators.
Rotationally, troops use designated barns to dry clothing and conduct physical recovery — a system in place since 5 May, yielding satisfactory results despite tactical constraints.
On 19 May, the Signals Section finally arrives from Puerto Argentino, though without its equipment, which remains in Comodoro Rivadavia, awaiting transport. First Lieutenant Ernesto Kishimoto, the Section Commander, reorganises the existing system. Civilian radio equipment is requisitioned for wireless communication, both with higher command and between company and platoon commanders. These sets are mounted on jeeps due to their battery requirements. Company leaders lack both wired and wireless communication with their sections, and sections have no comms with their squads. A wired network is improvised using discarded materials sourced from the local population.
That evening, from 21:00, British helicopters again overfly the area but withdraw under fire.
On 20 May, the health of the troops begins to deteriorate. Officers and soldiers suffer from harsh weather conditions (constant humidity and cold, especially at night) and insufficient food. Measures are taken to prioritise care for the worst affected. Some officers and NCOs, despite illness, refuse to abandon their posts. Twelve soldiers are hospitalised in an improvised infirmary, nine of them due to malnutrition.
On 21 May at 09:00, a 120 mm mortar section (one piece) arrives under an officer. From 09:00 to 11:00, intense naval gunfire is received from the northwest, directed by a British helicopter. Fire is accurate and targets anti-aircraft and heavy weapons positions. One FAA 20 mm cannon is knocked out, though no casualties occur. Between 11:00 and 12:00, enemy aircraft conduct two simulated attack runs.
On 22 May at 09:30, two air strikes target the runway. One enemy aircraft appears damaged and is seen heading out to sea.
Night Attacks, Artillery Movements and Contact with the Enemy
On 24 May, 30 troops previously attacked by Harriers and helicopters 17 km from Goose Green, are airlifted to the position from the Iguazú Coast Guard ship. Patrols are dispatched to recover two 105 mm artillery pieces and ammunition. That night, the enemy launches illumination rounds and conducts naval fire against the position.
During the morning of 26 May, four air raid alerts are issued. Between 04:20 and 12:30, heavy naval shelling hits the position. A Company, ordered to relocate to new frontline positions at the isthmus entrance, becomes pinned down in open terrain.
At 08:30, an order for a disruption attack is received from the Coastal Task Commander. It includes:
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Confirm the current defence order.
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Conduct a night attack (26/27 May) with one infantry company against potential enemy concentrations south and southwest of Cerro Alberdi, supported by reconnaissance elements in Sussex.
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Based on outcomes, launch a second similar attack the following night (27/28 May).
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All operations must be conducted at night; other units are to continue improving defences.
Between 12:30 and 13:00, four air attacks are launched from east–west and north–south approaches. One enemy aircraft is shot down.
During the afternoon, reconnaissance of the new position is carried out. Artillery pieces are manually moved due to the Land Rovers being unfit for towing. Fire missions are calculated and executed that night on hills to the north and northeast, using 30% of available ammunition.
A Company advances north of the isthmus, preceded by Reconnaissance Section patrols. The advance is made in wedge formation, with the 1st Section deployed. With extreme effort, they reach the vicinity of Camilla Creek, without encountering enemy forces. From that line, the company commander reports back and is ordered to return. The troops are exhausted.
The rest of the unit continues intense work, constructing new positions and moving equipment and supplies.
At 23:00, a patrol 20 km southeast of the position reports a large vessel sailing in Darwin Bay. One artillery piece is repositioned and opens long-range fire toward the presumed enemy ship. The South Sector Commander is ordered to deploy patrols to the beach to monitor for possible landings.
At 04:00, Coastal Task Command orders the deployment of a reduced section to Saladero (18 km northwest of Goose Green) to verify possible presence of the British ship Uganda and determine its mission.
A patrol under Sergeant First Class Berdugo is launched but subsequently loses all contact. Transported by FAA helicopter, they cannot be retrieved due to lack of air assets. Later, it is learned that after repeatedly evading British forces, the patrol was captured on 7 June following a brief engagement.
Operational Development
General Situation as of 27 May
The Reconnaissance Section, the Combat Advance, and A Company, as well as one section of the Commando Company deployed west of Darwin, have not yet managed to establish their positions or transport their logistical supplies. Notably, A Company and the Reconnaissance Section are exhausted due to the operation carried out during the night of 26/27 May, combined with the hardships, physical strain, and tension of the preceding days.
On the high ground to the north-northeast and east of Boca House, the RI 8 Section (under Second Lieutenant Aliaga) has been positioned, along with a group of service personnel equivalent to two understrength sections. To equip the latter with FAL rifles, it was necessary to withdraw such weapons from the personnel of 4th Airborne Artillery Group and the Section of the 601st Air Defence Artillery Group, who were instead issued 11.25 mm pistols.
To the north of Salinas Beach, one section of the Argentine Air Force is operating independently, under the direct command of the BAM Commander (totaling 202 personnel).
The forces of Task Force Mercedes, with the exception of the central sector between Goose Green and the airstrip (where small FAA elements operate independently), are cut off from one another. This situation forces the Regiment Commander to deploy service personnel with limited training in frontline positions. Communications between the Task Force Commander and company commanders, and between them and subordinate levels, are entirely inadequate due to the unit never having received its communications equipment.
With regard to the personnel and materiel situation within Task Force Mercedes, it is important to note that most of the heavy equipment embarked on the ship Córdoba never arrived. The unit has the following support weapons in service:
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Two 81 mm mortars, each with 126 rounds of standard and high-capacity ammunition
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One 120 mm mortar, used with limitations, as its base plate had been welded to the tube
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Two additional 120 mm mortars, left on the mainland, arrived at Puerto Argentino on the night of 27 May, and were redirected to Darwin on the afternoon of 28 May, by which time the battle was essentially over and they did not take part in it
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One 105 mm recoilless rifle, without a sighting device
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Ten MAG general-purpose machine guns
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One 12.7 mm machine gun, mounted on a requisitioned jeep
B Company, detached and deployed to the Monte Kent area under the command of the Joint Command Malvinas, arrived in the combat zone —minus one section that remained in Puerto Argentino— at nightfall on 28 May 1982. It was airlanded 4 km south of Goose Green, at a point when the situation had already become critical.
C Company, formed from a redistribution of NCOs and conscripted soldiers, is organised into two rifle sections, each with four squads. Its only support weapon is a single MAG machine gun. Of the company's 22 NCOs, 16 are acting corporals from the Sergeant Cabral NCO School.
The Service Company has only part of its personnel present, since most members of the Intendance and Ordnance Sections remain in Puerto Deseado (loading and unloading the Córdoba) and in Comodoro Rivadavia (airlifting equipment and supplies), and have not yet arrived in the theatre of operations.
Pucara's Rocket Launcher TransportationsFormation and Composition of Ec Güemes (San Carlos Area)
To form Ec Güemes —operating in the San Carlos area— the following elements have been employed: the Company Commander, the Company Command Group, and 1st Section of C Company / RI 25; along with the Support Section of RI 12, composed of two 81 mm mortars (out of the four available to the unit) and two 105 mm recoilless rifles (out of three available).
As a result, the remaining support weapons available for combat are one 105 mm recoilless rifle, which lacks a sighting device, and two 81 mm mortars.
The A Battery of the 4th Airborne Artillery Group (GA Aerot 4) is composed of three howitzers, a third of their ammunition having been expended in fire missions between 26 and 27 May. An additional cannon, recovered following the attack on GC Iguazú, could not be repaired and remains out of use.
3rd Battery, 601st Air Defence Artillery Group (3/B GADA 601) is equipped with two 35 mm anti-aircraft guns, integrated into the air defence system established by the Condor Military Air Base (J BAM Cóndor).
Argentine Air Force (FAA) personnel assigned to the BAM are deployed in air defence roles around the runway, in securing installations and deployed equipment, and in forming a section-level defensive position northwest of the airstrip.
The unified command structure under the Task Force Commander —intended to coordinate ground defensive operations— was not ultimately established.
Pucará rocket launcher installed on top of a tin shedCompany Leadership and Logistical Situation – Task Force Mercedes
The company commanders of RI 12 assigned to lead these detachments are not the unit’s original organic officers, as they were replaced in order to complete the organisational structure. The appointed commanders are senior in rank to the original company commanders, who now remain with their respective elements as executive officers.
Logistical Situation of Task Force Mercedes
Rations:
Since 15 May, food has been reduced to one ration per day due to the shortage of supplies. Distribution has been severely hampered by the lack of transport, thermal containers, and the long distances involved. At the start of the British ground assault, the force had autonomy for 3 to 5 days.
Although airdrops of food supplies were carried out on 25 and 26 May to extend this autonomy, part of the cargo was lost, and another portion was retained by the FAA detachment for its own needs. As a result, only a limited amount of provisions reached Task Force Mercedes.
Personnel have, in general, lost a significant amount of weight due to the imposed restrictions since 1 May, compounded by prior shortages since the unit left its home garrison. This situation, combined with accumulated physical strain, has had a clear impact on morale.
Equipment and Materials:
No spare parts, replacement materials, or equipment are available. Of particular concern is the lack of cleaning equipment for weapons, which has had a very negative impact on their performance — especially under the prevailing climatic conditions.
Ammunition:
The ammunition allocation for personal weapons is sufficient for 3 to 5 days of combat. The quantity of available rounds for 81 mm and 120 mm mortars is very limited. Ammunition stocks for the 105 mm guns are satisfactory (3 to 5 days of combat). The FAA garrison maintains its own supply depots.
Argentine soldiers surrender at Goose Green
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