Patagonia: Welsh Settlers

Argentine Mirage: Flying with Huge Fuel Tanks

 🇦🇷🇦🇷🇦🇷 Flying a "Gaucho Mrage" 🇦🇷🇦🇷🇦🇷

With two subsonic drop tanks of 1,700 liters each (limited to Mach 0.93) under its wings, the Mirage IIIE can carry up to 6,270 liters of JP1 or aviation-grade kerosene—2,970 liters internally plus the fuel in those two massive tanks.

Using this fuel setup, it can fly nonstop from Ezeiza IAP to Río Gallegos AFB, with Río Grande as an alternate airport, about 3,000 km away, cruising at an altitude of 12,000 meters.

But when these giant tanks are full, this wild stallion loses all agility—both on the ground and in the air.

On the ground, extra care must be taken with the landing gear. Taxiing must be slow and steady, with wide turns and minimal braking. Takeoff roll is much longer, consuming nearly the entire length of the runway.

At rotation, the control stick must be pulled back progressively, not abruptly, to avoid overloading the gear structure.

Once airborne, the climbout is shallow and close to the ground, aiming to build speed more quickly by keeping a lower angle of attack relative to the wind—or "airflow" for those unfamiliar with pilot lingo.

In flight, as long as the tanks are full, everything must be done smoothly.

Luis Briatore (c)

Argentine Air Force: The Eternal Legacy of the Mirage Series

The 43 years of the Mirages in the Argentine Air Force

From the birth of a legend to its retirement without replacement

In the mid-1960s, the Argentine Air Force (FAA) operated subsonic Gloster Meteor F.Mk-IV fighters and transonic North American F-86F Sabres, along with the veteran Avro Lancaster and Avro Lincoln bombers. Aware of the need to modernize its fleet, the FAA evaluated several options, including the supersonic Mirage III fighter from the French company Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation (AMD-BA), and the subsonic American Douglas A-4B Skyhawk fighter-bomber.

The A-4B Skyhawk was ultimately selected to replace the Lancaster and Lincoln bombers, with an order of 49 units. As for the fighters, the licensed production of 100 supersonic interceptors was considered, but due to budget constraints, the project was abandoned in 1967 and negotiations began with AMD-BA for the acquisition of Mirage IIIE/D aircraft. However, the lack of funding also prevented this initial purchase.

At that time, the FAA operated around 20 Gloster Meteors in Morón and 25 F-86F Sabres in Mendoza, without missiles or onboard radar, relying instead on ground-based radars from the Grupo I de Vigilancia Aérea Escuela (GIVAE). Faced with the urgent need to replace the Meteors, several alternatives were considered, including the F-100 Super Sabre, the F-104 Starfighter, the English Electric Lightning, the Saab J-35 Draken, the F-5A Freedom Fighter, the McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom II, and the Mirage IIIE. Ultimately, the Mirage IIIE stood out as the best option due to its performance, availability, and operating cost.

The arrival of the Mirage IIIEA and the consolidation of supersonic power

In April 1965, a French delegation arrived in Buenos Aires with a formal proposal. In Latin America, countries such as Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, and Brazil were also interested in the Mirage. The decisive performance of the Israeli Mirage IIIC during the Six-Day War in 1967 ultimately tipped the balance in its favor.

In 1968, under the presidency of General Juan Carlos Onganía, negotiations began with Dassault. On July 14, 1970, the government of General Roberto Levingston signed contract M-III/70, approved by Decree 1710/70, for the purchase of 12 Mirage IIIEA (single-seat) and 2 Mirage IIIDA (two-seat) aircraft, at a total cost of 28 million dollars. An additional 21 million dollars was allocated for infrastructure and logistics.


The showgirl Isabel Martínez, President Perón, and nearby the despicable minister López Rega.

Training and Delivery

The first group of Argentine pilots was sent to France in 1971, where they trained at the Dijon/Longvic Air Base, flying French Mirage IIIBE aircraft. At the same time, a delegation traveled to Israel to study the combat use of the Mirage IIIC in the Heyl Ha'Avir (Israeli Air Force).

On January 10, 1973, test pilot Gérald Resal carried out the first flight of an Argentine Mirage III. On January 17, Vice Commodore Alcides Giosa became the first Argentine pilot to fly a Mirage solo, accompanied by Captain Enrique Román in a two-seat Mirage IIIDA.

The delivery of the aircraft was carried out in stages, transported by C-130 Hercules planes and assembled in Argentina with the assistance of French technicians. On May 31, 1973, a Mirage III squadron flew over the I Air Brigade in El Palomar, officially marking their entry into service.

In 1974, the FAA intensified its flights and developed advanced air-to-air combat tactics. The high level of training was demonstrated in 1975, when the unit received the "Flight Safety" award granted by the U.S. Air Force.

On January 5, 1976, the strategic importance of the Mirage led to the creation of the VIII Air Brigade in José C. Paz. In 1977, Argentina acquired 7 additional Mirage IIIEA aircraft, which were delivered between December 1979 and July 1980. In 1981, 2 Mirage IIIDA aircraft formerly operated by the Armée de l'Air were added to the fleet, arriving in 1982.

Malvinas War: Baptism by Fire

On April 2, 1982, the FAA had 17 Mirage IIIEA/DA aircraft and 36 Daggers (the Israeli version of the Mirage 5). The Mirage IIIEAs were deployed to Río Gallegos and Comodoro Rivadavia, where they faced British Sea Harrier FRS.1 jets.

On May 1, the Mirage aircraft carried out escort and combat missions. In an air duel, Captain García Cuerva (I-019) and First Lieutenant Perona (I-015) were attacked by AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles. Perona managed to eject, but García Cuerva attempted to land in Puerto Argentino and was shot down by friendly fire.

Throughout the war, the Mirage aircraft carried out 47 escort missions and 9 diversion missions. Lacking in-flight refueling capability, their time over the battlefield was very limited. Despite this, they contributed to the FAA's overall success by supporting A-4B Skyhawk and Canberra attacks against the British fleet.

The Post-Malvinas Era and Modernization

After the conflict, the FAA acquired 22 Israeli Mirage IIICJ/BJ aircraft in 1982, which entered service in 1984. In 1989, the Peruvian Mirage 5P aircraft were upgraded to the "Mara" standard, featuring improvements in radar and electronic defense systems.

On March 7, 1988, the VIII Air Brigade was disbanded, and the Mirage III aircraft were transferred to the VI Air Brigade in Tandil, operating alongside the Dagger/Finger jets in Fighter Group 6. They took part in joint exercises with the U.S. Air Force and in operations such as "Fortín," which focused on defending the airspace over northern Argentina.

The End of an Era

By 2015, only 7 Mirage aircraft remained operational. On November 29, the FAA officially retired the Mirage weapons system, leaving the country without supersonic fighters for the first time in its history.

In total, the FAA operated 94 Mirage aircraft:

• 19 Mirage IIIEA
• 4 Mirage IIIDA/BE
• 35 Dagger A
• 4 Dagger B
• 10 Mirage 5P/Mara
• 19 Mirage IIICJ
• 3 Mirage IIIBJ

Over 43 years of service, the Mirage fleet logged 131,000 flight hours, with 13 combat losses and 28 accidents.

Today, Argentina is still awaiting a replacement that meets its air defense needs, while the legacy of the Mirages remains intact in the memory of those who operated them with pride and bravery.

To conclude, and to preempt any controversy, it is worth making a clear clarification regarding the Israeli Mirage IIICJ/BJ aircraft. The transaction was carried out by the FAA through the company Isrex Argentina S.A., and the aircraft were acquired during the war; the payment was made via Credit Suisse to an offshore shell company linked to IAI. However, the aircraft only became available for delivery in November 1982, by which time the war had ended, the FAA command had changed, and the justifications for accepting the aircraft—despite their age and poor condition—were no longer valid.



The entire operation was left in limbo, partly due to non-compliance on the Israeli side, and partly because Argentina no longer wanted the aircraft. Nevertheless, neither Isrex Argentina S.A. nor IAI were willing to return the funds already paid. As a result, the Alfonsín administration inherited the agreement from the military regime and, in 1984, ordered the delivery of the aircraft.



All of the aircraft were delivered to the FAA in 1984 and entered service starting in 1985, as they were gradually refurbished at the Río IV Materiel Area. This refurbishment process is what led to both the Mirage IIIC and B models—known as "Shahak"—receiving the suffix "J" (for Judío, meaning "Jewish") to highlight their origin and modification. Officially, they were reclassified as IIICJ and B models as BJ, a designation the Argentine Air Force never actually used.



This mirrored what happened with the first Skyhawks acquired by Argentina, which were designated A-4P due to the upgrades performed prior to their delivery. However, the FAA continued to refer to them as A-4B. For comparison, the A-4Bs delivered to the Navy were redesignated A-4Q after being refurbished, and unlike the FAA, the Argentine Navy did adopt and use the new designation.

To close the matter, here is the official Israeli serial number list of all the aircraft that were later operated by Argentina under its own serial numbers:

•     CJ-2 (the one marked with the "Jew" symbol) = C-701 in FAA
•     CJ-4 = C-702
•     CJ-12 = C-703
•     CJ-14 = C-704
•     CJ-20 = C-705
•     CJ-22 = C-706
•     CJ-29 = C-707
•     CJ-31 = C-708
•     CJ-32 = C-709
•     CJ-33 = C-710
•     CJ-34 = C-711
•     CJ-40 = C-712
•     CJ-42 = C-713
•     CJ-47 = C-714
•     CJ-59 = C-715
•     CJ-64 = C-716
•     CJ-65 = C-717
•     CJ-66 = C-718
•     CJ-67 = C-719
•     BJ-1 = C-720
•     BJ-2 = C-721
•     BJ-4 = C-722

There was one additional aircraft, known as number 23, though it is unclear whether it was a CJ or BJ. Due to its poor condition, only usable parts were salvaged—though it remains uncertain whether this was done in Israel (Palestina) or in Córdoba. The aircraft never entered service and does not appear in the FAA’s official active roster. A similar case applies to the A-4M and TA-4J aircraft acquired by Argentina, which were used as sources of spare parts for operational units or as training material for FAA students.

Lastly, the Mirage IIIC—specifically the CJ, C-713—was sold back to the Israelis for the symbolic price of 1 U.S. dollar. Today, it is preserved in an Israeli museum, restored with its original operational number and prefix: CJ-42, which was its original serial designation.

In total, the Argentine Air Force acquired and operated 94 supersonic delta fighter-bombers, including Mirage IIIEA/DA, Dagger/Finger A/B, Mirage 5P/Mara, and Mirage IIICJ/BJ aircraft. These comprised:

• 83 single-seat aircraft:

  • 19 Mirage IIIEA

  • 35 Dagger A

  • 19 Mirage IIICJ

  • 10 Mirage 5P/Mara

• 11 two-seat aircraft:

  • 2 Mirage IIIDA

  • 2 Mirage IIIBE/DA

  • 4 Dagger B

  • 3 Mirage IIIBJ

At its peak, Argentina operated 77 to 78 supersonic delta aircraft simultaneously, making it the country with the largest and most powerful Mirage fleet in Latin America.

Obtaining a reliable record of Mirage aircraft losses in the Argentine Air Force (FAA) is a difficult task, with gaps and inconsistencies in official information. However, based on available data up to 2007 and later confirmed incidents, a partial but detailed reconstruction is as follows:

Combat Losses (Malvinas/Falklands War – 1982)

• 11 aircraft lost in combat:

  • Dagger A: Majority of losses

  • Mirage IIIEA: Several losses confirmed (e.g., I-019)

Accidents and Decommissioning up to 2007

Mirage IIIEA

• 4 aircraft lost in accidents:
  

  •     I-001
  •     I-009
  •     I-014
  •     I-020

• 2 aircraft decommissioned (not due to accidents):
  

  •     I-012
  •     I-016

IAI Dagger / Finger

• 13 aircraft lost in accidents:
  
  

  •     C-401
  •     C-405
  •     C-406
  •     C-413
  •     C-414
  •     C-418
  •     C-421
  •     C-425
  •     C-427
  •     C-429
  •     C-431
  •     C-434
  •     C-435

Mirage 5P / Mara

• 3 aircraft lost in accidents:

  •     C-604
  •     C-607
  •     C-609

Mirage IIICJ / BJ

• 3 aircraft lost:

  •     C-707
  •     C-720
  •     C-705

Post-2007 Losses

• At least 2 additional Mirage IIIEA aircraft lost in accidents in 2009 and 2013 (registration numbers unknown).

Summary of Known Losses and Final Status

• 13 aircraft lost in combat

• At least 28 aircraft lost in accidents

• 53 aircraft retired/deactivated due to age, obsolescence, or lack of spare parts

• Total: 94 Mirage-family aircraft operated

Operational Status by 2015

By late 2015:

• 25 Mirage fighters remained on the FAA inventory (variants: Mirage IIIEA/DA, Finger A/B, Mara)

• Only 7 aircraft were truly operational

• On November 29, 2015, the Mirage weapon system was officially retired without replacement, marking:

The first time in Argentine history the country was left without a supersonic air defense capability.

This situation remains unchanged as of today, nearly three years later, without any serious political, institutional, or legal accountability. No strategic action has been taken to restore national air defense capability. The four interceptor squadrons that once belonged to the Nation and the Argentine People have been dissolved, with no recovery effort from successive governments.



This represents a critical and unresolved national security failure, leaving Argentina vulnerable and symbolically disarmed in terms of sovereign airspace protection.

🛩️ Mirage IIIDA / IIIBE (two-seat aircraft)

Aircraft	Origin / Notes	Fate
I-001	Built 01-04-1972; arrived 05-09-1972 aboard C-130 TC-63; first flight 10-01-1973	Crashed 30-03-1979 near Derqui during a training flight; both crew members ejected successfully
I-002	Built 01-05-1972; arrived 05-02-1973 aboard C-130 TC-65; first flight 10-01-1973	Crashed in 1991, repaired in 1997
I-020	Ex-French Mirage IIIBE, upgraded to DA; delivered Dec 1982	Destroyed in accident on 06-05-1994
I-021	Ex-French Mirage IIIBE, upgraded to DA; delivered Jan 1983	In service

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🛩️ Mirage IIIEA (single-seat aircraft)

Aircraft	Notes	Fate
I-003	Built 23-09-1972; arrived 23-09-1972 aboard C-130 TC-62; first flight 10-01-1973	In service
I-004	Built 01-11-1972; arrived 01-11-1972 aboard C-130 TC-61	In service
I-005	Built 18-03-1973	In service
I-006	Built 18-03-1973; arrived 18-03-1973 aboard C-130 TC-66	Special paint scheme in 1997 for 25th anniversary
I-007	Built 13-04-1973; arrived 13-04-1973 aboard C-130 TC-63	In service
I-008	Built 05-05-1973; arrived 05-05-1973 aboard C-130 TC-66	In service
I-009	Built 20-05-1973; arrived 20-05-1973 aboard C-130 TC-66	Crashed 23-03-1976; pilot ejected successfully
I-010	Built 29-06-1973; arrived 29-06-1973 aboard C-130 TC-66	In service
I-011	Built 17-07-1973; arrived 17-07-1973 aboard C-130 TC-66	In service
I-012	Built 27-07-1973; arrived 27-07-1973 aboard C-130 TC-65	Later decommissioned
I-013	Built Oct 1979; arrived Nov 1979	Crashed 01-05-1997 during FAA Baptism of Fire celebration; pilot Lt. Marcos Peretti killed
I-014	Built Oct 1979	Crashed 25-08-1987 in Entre Ríos; pilot Capt. Juan Carlos Franchini Allasia killed
I-015	Built Oct 1979	Shot down on 01-05-1982 over Borbón Island by Sea Harrier XZ-452 (Flt Lt Barton); pilot 1st Lt. Perona ejected
I-016	Built Nov 1979	Accident on 08-10-1983 in Río Gallegos; deemed irreparable, used for spares
I-017	Built Dec 1979	Used postwar for AIM-9M Sidewinder missile integration
I-018	Built Jan 1980	In service
I-019	Built Jan 1980	Shot down 01-05-1982 over Borbón Island by Sea Harrier XZ-453 (Lt Thomas); Capt. García Cuerva attempted emergency landing, killed by friendly fire near Puerto Argentino
I-020	Already listed above under IIIDA

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This list illustrates the detailed operational history and fate of each Mirage IIIEA/DA in FAA service, including:

• Combat losses (notably I-015 and I-019 during the Malvinas War)

• Accidents with fatalities (e.g., I-013, I-014)

• Units converted from French Air Force aircraft (e.g., I-020, I-021)

• Unique roles or commemorative paint schemes (e.g., I-006, I-017)

General Characteristics – Mirage IIIEA

Manufacturer: Avions Marcel Dassault
Type: Air Defense Interceptor

Dimensions

• Length: 14.08 meters

• Wingspan: 8.21 meters

• Empty weight: 6,531 kg

• Maximum takeoff weight: 13,510 kg

Propulsion

• Engine: SNECMA Atar 09C-03 turbojet

• Thrust:

  • 4,284 kgf (at sea level, dry)

  • 6,185 kgf (with afterburner)

 Performance

• Maximum speed: 2,217 km/h (Mach 2.1) at 12,200 meters

• Service ceiling: 17,000 meters

• Maximum range: 2,800 km

 Avionics

• Radar: Thompson-CSF Cyrano II bis monopulse radar (200 kW, I/J bands)

• Gunsight: CSF 97

• IFF: LMT 3560J

• Navigation: TACAN system

 Armament

• Fixed guns:

  • 2× DEFA 552A 30 mm cannons

  • 125 rounds per gun

• External hardpoints (5 total):

  • 4 wing-mounted

  • 1 ventral

  • Up to 4,000 kg of stores, including:

    • 1× Matra R530E missile (IR or SARH) on centerline

    • 2× Matra R550 "Magic I" IR-guided missiles on outer wing pylons

    • Drop tanks:

      • RP30 (1,700 liters)

      • RP62 Supersonique (500 liters)

    • Rocket pods: RPK, Madnap

    • Bombs: BK, BR series

Let me know if you’d like technical specs for the Dagger/Finger, Mara, or IIICJ/BJ variants as well.

Argentina: Gaucho Legacy

Malvinas: GC-83 Río Iguazú, the Cutter that did not Surrender

GC-83 Río Iguazú: The Cutter that did not Surrender

The icy winds of the South Atlantic cut like blades against the skin of those brave sailors aboard the Río Iguazú. They were not on a warship. They had no armor, no firepower comparable to that of a destroyer, no speed to match that of a frigate. They were men of the Argentine Coast Guard, servants of the sea, embarked on a mission that, unbeknownst to them, would turn them into legends.

Since their arrival at Puerto Argentino (previously Stanley) on April 13, 1982, the GC-83 Río Iguazú had eluded the invisible threat of British nuclear submarines. A small, agile vessel designed for coastal patrols, it now sailed defiantly in those hostile waters, ready to fulfill its duty. On May 22, with the war already raging and the blood of battle still fresh on the Malvinas soil, it was given a critical mission: to transport two 105mm Oto Melara howitzers from Puerto Argentino to Darwin. These artillery pieces would be vital for the defense of the Argentine troops who, just days later, would fight bravely in Goose Green.

Under the command of Sub-Prefect Eduardo Adolfo Olmedo, the Río Iguazú set sail in the early hours of that fateful day. Fifteen men on board. Fifteen souls devoted to their country. They knew they were sailing in enemy-controlled waters. War offered no mercy, and neither would their adversaries. At 08:20, the ship’s radio crackled to life, delivering a chilling message: Red Alert!

The attack came instantly. Two British Sea Harrier jets swooped down from the gray sky, their roar shaking the very air. The men on deck barely had time to react before a storm of fire rained down upon them. The 30mm cannons ripped through the ship’s hull, destroying navigation equipment and sowing chaos aboard. In the engine room, Second Corporal José Raúl Ibáñez fought desperately against the flooding that threatened to doom the vessel. But the damage was beyond repair—the water was rising fast.

On deck, resistance had a name and a face. Julio Omar Benítez, the youngest crew member, manned one of the ship’s two 12.7mm machine guns, the only defense against the enemy aircraft circling above like hawks. But fate was merciless. A British volley struck him down where he stood. His body collapsed beside the weapon he had so valiantly fired. Nearby, Juan José Baccaro and Second Corporal Bengochea lay wounded, their blood soaking the deck.

The Río Iguazú was critically damaged, but it would not surrender. Olmedo, his resolve unshaken, ordered a desperate maneuver—set course for the nearest islet, zigzagging to evade another deadly pass from the Harriers. Every second counted.

And then, Ibáñez, his heart pounding with rage and grief, made a decision that would change everything. Leaving the flooded engine room, he climbed to the deck and rushed toward the unmanned machine gun. With swift hands, he pulled his fallen comrade’s body aside and gripped the weapon. His eyes locked onto the sky.

A Harrier was lining up for the final strike. Ibáñez held his breath. He squeezed the trigger. A hail of bullets erupted, tracing a path of fire through the air. The aircraft, caught in the storm of gunfire, began spewing thick black smoke. For a brief, eternal moment, it seemed to hover in midair, before gravity took its toll—it plunged into the sea, vanishing beneath the icy waves.

The surviving Harrier pilot, seeing the fate of his wingman, turned away and disappeared over the horizon.

The battle was over. The humble patrol boat had struck down a titan.

Severely damaged, the Río Iguazú was deliberately beached on a nearby islet to save the remaining crew. The survivors were later rescued and taken to Darwin, where, on May 24, with full military honors, Julio Omar Benítez was laid to rest. His sacrifice had not been in vain. The artillery pieces that the Río Iguazú had been transporting were salvaged and flown to Darwin, where they would play a crucial role in the upcoming battle.

Thus ended the journey of the patrol boat that dared to defy the impossible. It was not a warship. It was not a heavily armed frigate. But it was Argentine. And that was enough to carve its name into history.

Counterinsurgency War: The Attempted Attack on the ARA "Santiago del Estero" Submarine

In 1971, the Argentine flag was hoisted for the first time on the Guppy IA-class submarine USS "Chivo" as it was renamed ARA "Santiago del Estero" for the Argentine Navy.

Operation Corina: The Attempted Sinking of ARA Santiago del Estero.

On March 4, 1973, in a key operation for national security, the Buenos Aires Provincial Police foiled one of the most dangerous subversive conspiracies of the time: the so-called "Operation Corina." The objective of this extremist group, belonging to the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), was to sink the submarine ARA Santiago del Estero at the Mar del Plata Naval Base and carry out coordinated attacks on various strategic points in the city. This attack was part of a broader plan to sow chaos in the country in the days leading up to the general elections on March 11, 1973. However, a meticulous investigation and swift police action dismantled the terrorist cell before it could execute its plan.


The GUPPY IA-class submarine S-22 ARA Santiago del Estero, formerly USS Chivo (SS-341), underway. The ARA Santiago del Estero was incorporated into the Argentine Navy and decommissioned in 1981. Nevertheless, it served a wartime role in 1982 during the South Atlantic Conflict, being used as a decoy when it was secretly towed out of the Mar del Plata Naval Base and hidden to create confusion among the enemy, making them believe the submarine was operating in the open sea.

The raid that dismantled the operation took place in a chalet at the corner of Matías Strobel and Blas Parera, in the heart of Parque Luro. There, officers from Regional Unit IV arrested eight FAR members, a group that, despite portraying itself as a defender of the proletariat, was mostly composed of individuals from wealthy families, with university backgrounds and no real connection to the working class. Among the detainees were Jesús María Aguinagale, Daniel Roque Armengol, Osvaldo Alfredo Lenti, María Cristina Bonfiglio de Armengol, and Beatriz Mariana Quiroga de Porfirio, among others. A significant arsenal was seized at the scene, including UZI submachine guns, Browning pistols, Rubí .32 caliber revolvers, sawed-off shotguns, and large quantities of ammunition and explosives. Many of these weapons had been stolen in previous bank robberies and attacks on police facilities, demonstrating the high level of organization within the group.

But the most revealing discovery was the documentation found inside the chalet. Sketches, maps, and blueprints detailed the operation’s targets with precision, including the Mar del Plata Naval Base, the port, and YPF’s fuel depots. Other secondary targets were also identified, such as the 1st Police Station of Necochea, which they planned to seize to obtain police weaponry. The plan was to carry out these attacks simultaneously on March 11, coinciding with the national elections, with the aim of triggering a security crisis and undermining the country’s stability.

In today’s Argentina, the same terrorists whom the government, the judiciary, and the media have turned into "victims," honoring them with monuments and official recognition, were responsible for the murder of Dora Elcira Cucco de Araya. Her only "crime" was being at her newspaper stand working that morning of April 10, 1974, in Rosario. On that busy street, she became the victim of a terrorist ambush aimed at assassinating two Argentine Army officers. While her killers were granted compensation, tributes, and state honors, Elcira and her family were condemned to oblivion, ignored to this day.

On April 10, 1972, in Rosario, a group of approximately 15 FAR extremists ambushed and murdered Major General Juan Carlos Sánchez, head of the Argentine Army’s II Army Corps. That same day, the subversive forces also executed Oberdán Sallustro. Among the attackers were some of the militants who, a year later, would be captured in Mar del Plata on March 4, 1973, while planning to attack the Naval Base and sink the S-22 ARA Santa Fe submarine. During the attack on General Sánchez, Army Sergeant Berneche, who was driving the official vehicle, was seriously wounded, and Dora Elcira Cucco de Araya, an innocent civilian who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, was killed.

The attack on ARA Santiago del Estero was the central objective of the operation. Acquired by the Argentine Navy in 1971, the submarine was a Balao-class vessel, modernized with Guppy IA technology to enhance its combat capabilities. Its destruction would have been a devastating blow to the operational capacity of the Argentine fleet in the context of the Cold War, where the country’s Armed Forces played a key role in the hemisphere’s strategic balance. According to the intelligence gathered, three members of the group had received specialized diving training and were planning to place an explosive charge beneath the submarine’s hull. For months, they had conducted night drills in nearby waters, practicing approach maneuvers with inflatable boats and studying the naval guards’ movements.

The police operation led to the arrest of one of the divers involved in the incursion, Alfredo Ruscio, who confessed that the cell was fully prepared to act and was merely awaiting orders from their superiors. This statement triggered an emergency protocol in Mar del Plata. Security was reinforced at the Naval Base, the port, police stations, and other strategic locations, including the Mar del Plata Golf Club, which had been identified in the seized documents as a potential secondary target. Authorities intensified controls throughout the city, aware that part of the group remained at large and could attempt further attacks.

Thanks to these preventive measures, the attack was completely thwarted. The capture of the group and the confiscation of their weapons and explosives prevented the operation from proceeding, averting what could have been one of the most devastating assaults on the country's military infrastructure. However, the story did not end there.

Just months later, in a decision that exposed the weakness of the state in the face of the terrorist threat, the detainees were released by the government of Héctor Cámpora. This mass pardon, which included hundreds of imprisoned subversive militants, allowed many of them to return to clandestine operations and resume their criminal activities. Several of those involved in “Operation Corina” later participated in further attacks, proving that Argentina’s fight against terrorism was far from over.

The once-glorious Buenos Aires Provincial Police, relentless against the Castro-Guevarist terrorist enemy of the Argentine Nation, has since been corrupted, degraded, disarmed, dismantled, and undermined by Argentine politicians from 1983 to the present through their ideological revenge. It has been reduced to a lifeless security agency, barely capable of serving political demagoguery. However, this does not apply to the vast majority of its members, who still stand strong in defense of the nation, putting their lives on the line against crime every day.

The context in which this terrorist plot was conceived cannot be understood without analyzing the global landscape of the time. During the 1970s, Argentina became a key battleground in the Cold War, with revolutionary groups supported by communist powers and a state that often wavered between repression and permissiveness. Declassified documents years later confirmed that organizations such as FAR and Montoneros operated with funding and training from Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. Their goal was not merely to fight the government in power but to establish a revolutionary regime through violence and the destruction of republican institutions.

Operation Manuel in the Czechoslovak Service

Copy of the March 1967 report from StB Intelligence (Státní bezpečnost: State Security) of Czechoslovakia A-00921/10-67, written three years after the launch of "Operation Manuel" as an assessment by the First Administration, with a copy sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Eighth Department. The report details the objectives and scope of the operation, including the destruction of all nationalist and democratic movements in Latin America through institutional destabilization, particularly targeting the Armed Forces and Security Forces. It also outlines the recruitment, training, and equipping of subversive agents, their command structure, and financial support.

Additionally, more than 10,000 similar documents have been declassified by the Czech Republic, which acted as an operational intermediary between the USSR and Cuba, from where terrorist operations in Argentina were coordinated. These documents undeniably prove that Argentina was subversively and genocidally attacked by agents of a global superpower and several other nations.

Transcription in Czech

Zpráva 27.10.1966

Akce MANUEL – perspektiva.

V průběhu svého pobytu v Francii SVISTO hovořil v tom smyslu, že nadále bude při vysílání lidí do LA dbát především na kvalitu. Z jeho vysvětlení vyplývá, že ztráta osob, vyslaných v rámci akce MANUEL, bude klesat a navrhl, že v současné a další práci (vyladit po sřízení technické součásti) na přípravu tematické zprávy slova smyslu.

Pokud se týká akce MANUEL, chceme tuto i nadále realizovat co nejlépe v souladu s připomínkami (k časovým) k technice hlášení přechodů a ke kategorii „Mastníků akce“, která se mění na rezidenturu krátkého setonu telegramem č. …, což bylo rozváděné s kádrem jednajícím RICHARD, jenž projevil pro tyto přecházející plně pochopení. Jako pochopitelně všem těm, dočasně termíny hlášení přechodu, za níž se mají i lo. odbor, že v rámci sotva politicky dojdete. Byl v řádu byl dobré vztah ze strany rezidentury na dodržování těchto termínů alespoň u těch nejdůležitějších případů, kteří jsou z hlediska majitelůvání technické dokumentace a tím v Maďarsku poměrně komplikovanější než je normální přechod.

Souvislosti se skora uvedeným prohlášením JURA 1 v souvislosti – podobnými zprávami z rezidentury na další perspektivu hlášení přechodu, které jsme formě pochopitelně, že hlášení přechodu vůbec důležitá násobně přihlášeného počtu osob, které snad obětují několik půl roku nebo 1 roku přejdou Francii a jejich zprávy bude třeba zajistit vratné jako u jako deset.

Závěrem, bude tuto otázku při nejbližší vhodné příležitosti zjemnit, bude o tom především informován, a to hlásit hlavní závady plánů i potřeb technického zabezpečení a pak hlásit na příslušnou akci v centrále a v určitka orgánech.

Translation to English:

Report 27.10.1966

Operation MANUEL – Perspective.

During his stay in France, SVISTO stated that, in the future, when sending people to LA (Latin America), special attention would be given to quality. From his explanation, it follows that the loss of individuals sent under Operation MANUEL will decrease, and he proposed that, in both current and future work (after fine-tuning the technical component), a thematic report be prepared for this purpose.

Regarding Operation MANUEL, we intend to continue executing it in the best possible way, in accordance with the comments on the timing and technique of crossing reports, as well as with the category of "Operation Mastníků," which is being modified in the residency through a short telegram No. …, a matter that was discussed with agent RICHARD, who expressed full understanding for these crossings. As is clear to all involved, the temporary crossing reporting deadlines must be coordinated with the relevant department, as political conditions will barely allow for any progress. There was good cooperation from the residency in adhering to these deadlines, at least in the most crucial cases, which, from the perspective of technical documentation management in Hungary, are considerably more complicated than a normal crossing.

In connection with the recent declaration by JURA 1 and similar reports from the residency on the future perspective of crossing reports, it is evident that the importance of these reports increases proportionally with the number of registered individuals. It is estimated that some of these individuals will be able to cross into France within a period of six months to a year, and it will be necessary to ensure their reporting in a manner similar to previous cases.

In conclusion, this issue will be clarified at the earliest appropriate opportunity. The main objective will be to report on the major planning issues and technical support needs and subsequently report the corresponding action to headquarters and the responsible authorities.

Operation Corina

The case of Operation Corina is merely a reflection of the undeclared war that was being waged in Argentina at the time. The struggle between state forces and armed organizations intensified over time, leading to a spiral of violence that left thousands dead and disappeared. The release of those responsible for this failed attack was not only an act of impunity but also set a dangerous precedent that weakened the country's ability to confront the terrorist threat.

At Dock No. 2 of the Puerto Belgrano Naval Arsenal—the largest dry dock in all of Latin America—we observed the presence of the Argentine Navy’s Guppy-class submarines, ARA *Santiago del Estero* and ARA *Santa Fe*, both undergoing maintenance.  

As the 1970s progressed, attacks on military and civilian targets became increasingly frequent. Kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings dominated the country’s agenda, creating a climate of insecurity that led to stricter security policies and open confrontation between the State and insurgent organizations. By 1976, Argentina would enter a new phase, where the fight against subversion would be led by the Armed Forces in a conflict that would forever change the country's history.

Today, the failed attempt to sink the ARA Santiago del Estero remains a symbol of a time when the nation was torn between order and chaos, between democracy and political violence. The story of Operation Corina is not only a reminder of the danger posed by these extremist groups but also a warning about the consequences of impunity and the lack of a clear policy to combat terrorism.

The submarine Santiago del Estero enters the Naval Base. In the background, the facilities of the Mar del Plata Golf Club can be seen—both were targets of the genocidal Castro-Guevarist organization FAR (Revolutionary Armed Forces) in March 1973. (Photo from La Nación newspaper.)

Many questions remain unanswered. To what extent did the political decisions of that era contribute to prolonging the conflict? What role did foreign interests play in the radicalization of armed groups? Has Argentina learned from its past, or is it still repeating the same mistakes?

What is certain is that, five decades later, the scars of that struggle remain in the country's memory. Operation Corina was just one of many episodes in an internal war that left an indelible mark on Argentine history, a legacy that continues to spark debate today.

The Attack on ARA Santísima Trinidad

The ARA Santiago del Estero submarine was the first strategic target of extremist forces, preceding the ARA Santísima Trinidad destroyer. However, in 1973, the Buenos Aires Provincial Police successfully prevented that attack. The destroyer D-2 ARA Santísima Trinidad, commissioned in 1969 by the Argentine Navy and AFNE for construction in Argentina, was the most advanced warship of its kind at the time. At a moment when few believed Argentina could achieve such a technological leap, the country became the first in Latin America to build a missile-launching, helicopter-carrying warship.



Built between 1972 and 1977, the ship's completion was delayed by a Castro-Guevarist terrorist attack. While it was in its final assembly stages, a sabotage operation severely damaged it and partially sank it in 1975. On August 22, 1975, Montonero terrorists attempted to destroy the ARA Santísima Trinidad. Although they failed to do so by force at the time, they ultimately succeeded 28 years later by infiltrating Argentina's political sphere under the guise of Peronism. Additionally, an Argentine Navy officer involved in the project, Commander Bigliardi, was assassinated by the same extremist organization that sought to prevent the project from ever coming to fruition.



Despite these setbacks, the destroyer officially entered service in 1977, just in time to participate in naval operations during the near-war conflict with Chile in 1978. In 1982, the ARA Santísima Trinidad served as the flagship of the Argentine Navy during "Operation Rosario," the mission to reclaim the Malvinas Islands. Throughout the conflict, it also acted as an escort vessel for the ARA 25 de Mayo aircraft carrier, which, on May 1–2, 1982, pursued the British Task Force, forcing it to evade combat. The destroyer continued patrolling the Argentine Sea throughout the war, prepared for a planned Argentine naval counteroffensive in late June or early July—an operation that never materialized due to the fall of Puerto Argentino and the subsequent overthrow of President Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri.



The vessel remained operational until 1987, when maintenance difficulties arose due to its British origin and the arms embargo imposed on Argentina. As a result, some of its components were cannibalized to provide spare parts for its sister ship, the ARA Hércules. Decommissioned and placed in reserve, the destroyer awaited a modernization and reactivation that never came.

Ironically, in the early 2000s, when members of the same Castro-Guevarist terrorist organization that had tried and failed to destroy the ship in the 1970s gained control of the Ministry of Defense, they finally succeeded—not through sabotage, but through deliberate political neglect. The destroyer, which neither Cold War subversion nor one of the world’s most powerful navies could sink in open war, was ultimately destroyed by Argentine politicians—former members of the very terrorist group that had once fought against it.