Commandos in Malvinas: Lack of Technique and Doctrine in Reconnaissance Missions

Reconnaissance Patrols Without Technique or Doctrine

Reconnaissance Patrols Without Technique or Doctrine

Excerpt taken from the book "Comandos en Malvinas - The Other Story," chapter "Analysis of Operations." The book is available in print and e-book format on Amazon.

Without a doubt, it can be said that within the Argentine Army (EA), the Argentine Navy (ARA), and the Argentine Air Force (FAA), there was no clear doctrine regarding the use of commando units for reconnaissance tasks. Incredibly, reconnaissance missions were considered secondary and even looked down upon within the different units and in the commando training course itself. In this course, barely any time was devoted to such missions, when, as we all know, any technique is mastered by precisely dedicating time to it and practicing it repeatedly.

The problem in the Argentine case was that many of these techniques were simply unknown. A reflection of the perception of reconnaissance operations within Argentine units can be seen in comments made by Major Rico in several interviews. The commander of the 602 Commando Company stated that his men were wasted on reconnaissance missions when they should have been used for raids against high-value targets. According to Rico's exact words, exploration missions were not worth the effort and could be carried out by other units.

This outdated mindset among the Argentines regarding reconnaissance patrols, along with its resulting consequences, was in complete contrast to the practices followed at the time by units in countries with experience and ongoing conflicts, such as Israel, South Africa, and NATO nations. In these countries, reconnaissance missions occupied a large portion of training hours and unit resources, and they were valued by general headquarters as force multipliers and a high-value resource for the development of subsequent operations.

NATO countries had even established an international training school for deep reconnaissance patrols in 1979 in Weingarten, Germany. This center aimed to improve procedures, standardize protocols, and reduce training costs. The Soviet Union also placed great importance on reconnaissance patrols.

After the Malvinas conflict, the operations carried out by Argentine commandos were studied in many training centers and military schools worldwide, serving as a model of "what not to do." For example, at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) at Fort Bragg, U.S.A., the errors committed by Argentine patrols were part of the curriculum from 1984 until at least 1992. But it was especially at Weingarten, thanks in part to British instructors assigned there, that the serious mistakes of Argentine commando units were widely disseminated and known at the international level. From then on, these errors were used in commando schools and training courses in many countries as examples of the mistakes to avoid.

An old military adage says, "Time spent on reconnaissance is never wasted time," a principle that the Argentine Armed Forces and their commando units did not seem to have internalized — and had to learn the hard way.

Sarmiento and Patagonia

The historian Luciana Sabina analyzes the controversy that involved Domingo Sarmiento regarding the Patagonian lands and Chile’s claims over them.
Luciana Sabina || Memo




Map of the Southern Cone from 1849

Exiled in Chile, Sarmiento paid close attention to the colonizing expedition that the country sent to the Magellan region in 1843, founding Fuerte Bulnes. By 1848, that settlement moved a few kilometers, taking the name Punta Arenas. The occupation was based on the legal principle of res nullius (of no one), universally accepted at that time, according to which any nation could take possession of inhospitable spaces. Like it or not, the entire Patagonian territory was considered an empty space, lands in indigenous hands that had never been conquered by the Spanish, and because of this, they did not belong to the Río de la Plata or to Chile. They would belong to the first to settle there.

It was only five years later that Rosas, through the Foreign Ministry, presented Chile with a formal protest, claiming Argentine rights over the area. As a result, on March 11, 1849, Sarmiento published a first article on the matter in his newspaper La Crónica, titled “The Magellan Question.” There, he defended the Chilean position. Being fair and objective, he pointed out that since 1585 no one had established occupation in the area; that the act of sovereignty by Chile had been repeatedly mentioned in the press and in presidential messages; despite which the Restorer [Rosas] did not express himself. Rosas, remaining silent for years, had consented to the trans-Andean advance and was claiming something without showing titles or precedents of ownership. Furthermore, Sarmiento added, Rosas was concerned with claiming territories abroad while the heart of Argentina was a land of indigenous raids and uprisings. Consequently, he recommended the Restorer take care of populating the Chaco, Río Negro, and interprovincial borders. In other words, he reminded the government of Buenos Aires that it could not handle what it had and wanted more, only to leave it in complete neglect.



At the time, France and England—in the midst of imperialist expansion—saw Hispanic America as a set of young nations suffering the vicissitudes inherent to all infancy, and they attempted to establish themselves in the area. British, French, North American, and German maps of the time show Patagonia as res nullius, with which they could have easily occupied it. It was urgent to establish oneself in the area, and Chile was the only country with some political stability and in conditions to do so. The occupation of the mouth of the strait was surprising to the Europeans and had a deterrent effect. All of Patagonia could have met the same fate as the Falklands.

In response to Sarmiento’s publication, Rosas had a newspaper founded in Mendoza: La Ilustración Argentina. Under the direction of Bernardo de Irigoyen, he was the first to refer to Sarmiento as a “traitor.” Though for the Rosistas, anyone who thought differently was a “traitor to the homeland.”

The Restorer ended up submitting a request to extradite the man from San Juan, stating that Chile could not continue sheltering him because he disturbed the peace between the two nations, thereby violating the right of asylum. The trans-Andean authorities did not entertain the request, arguing that freedom of the press existed there.

Rosas was never able to demonstrate that the area belonged to us because, in fact, it does not belong to us. But the matter did not end there.

Three decades later, during Sarmiento’s presidency, the Chileans experienced a certain imperialist fever and claimed rights based on laughable grounds over Argentine Patagonia. To this end, they cited articles in the Chilean press from the past, in which Don Domingo had spilled his ink and ingenuity. The situation was complex for the man from San Juan: the Paraguayan War had not yet concluded, and the opposition—taking advantage of the moment—sought to tear him apart. The word “traitor” once again lashed at the colossus from Cuyo.

He then sought to demonstrate that he had never written in favor of Chilean sovereignty over our land. For this, he tasked Félix Frías—ambassador in Chile—with carefully reviewing the questioned articles. The seasoned diplomat concluded that, indeed, there was no comment referring to Patagonia. In all of them, Sarmiento referred to Chilean rights over the specific area of the Strait of Magellan. Despite this, many still consider him a traitor who wanted to give away the south.

Beagle Crisis: The Beagle/Cape Horne Air Naval Battle

Beagle Crisis: The Fleets Face Off in the Southern Sea

By Esteban McLaren for FDRA

On December 22, 1978, D-Day, coordinated military actions along the borders with Chile would have commenced as part of Operation Sovereignty. It is difficult to determine with certainty which of the planned actions would have officially initiated the war, but it is clear that a simultaneous assault on at least four fronts would have taken place. The primary front would have been the naval battle and landing in the Beagle Channel, where the Argentine Navy's Marine Corps (IMARA) would have deployed troops to the Lennox, Nueva (already occupied by Chilean Marine Corps, CIM), and Picton Islands.

The purpose of this article is to explore an alternative history scenario. The war never took place, but what would have happened if Argentina had not accepted papal mediation?

In December 1978, tensions between Argentina and Chile over the sovereignty of the Picton, Lennox, and Nueva islands in the Beagle Channel reached a critical point. Diplomacy had failed, and both countries were preparing for armed confrontation. The Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR), with its powerful combination of aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, was preparing to face the Chilean Navy (ACh), a well-equipped force but at a numerical and technological disadvantage. Chilean authors speculate that in terms of infantry, Argentine forces roughly doubled the Chileans in size; in terms of armored vehicles, the ratio was 5:1; for aircraft, 3:1; and in naval strength, Argentina was slightly superior in some aspects (surface combatants), decisively superior in others (submarines operating in the area), and qualitatively unmatched in yet another (aircraft carriers).

Order of Battle as of December 20, 1978

Chilean Navy (ACh)

• Main Ships:

  • Tre Kronor-class light cruiser: Almirante Latorre.
  • Brooklyn-class light cruiser: Capitán Prat.
  • Almirante-class destroyers: Almirante Riveros, Blanco Encalada, and Cochrane.
  • Leander-class frigates: Almirante Williams, Almirante Condell, and Almirante Lynch.
  • Fletcher-class destroyers: Blanco Encalada (DD-14) and Cochrane (DD-15).
  • Allen M. Sumner-class destroyer: Ministro Portales.

• Submarines:

  • SS Simpson, the only operational submarine, as the Oberon-class submarines were undergoing major maintenance.

• Naval Aviation:

  • AS-332 Super Puma helicopters.

Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR)

• Main Ships:

  • Aircraft carrier: ARA Veinticinco de Mayo.
  • Brooklyn-class cruiser: ARA General Belgrano.
  • Type 42 destroyer: ARA Hércules.
  • Gearing-class destroyer: ARA Py.
  • Allen M. Sumner-class destroyers: ARA Comodoro Seguí, ARA Bouchard, and ARA Piedrabuena.
  • Fletcher-class destroyers: ARA Rosales (D-22), ARA Almirante Domecq García (D-23), and ARA Almirante Storni (D-24).
  • A69-class corvettes: ARA Drummond and ARA Guerrico.

• Submarines:

  • ARA Santiago del Estero, ARA Salta, ARA San Luis, and ARA Santa Fe.

• Naval Aviation:

  • 8 A-4Q Skyhawk aircraft aboard the carrier, with one on 24/7 interceptor alert on the flight deck. The interceptor on deck intercepted a CASA 212 maritime patrol aircraft stationed at Puerto Williams twice.
  • SH-3 Sea King helicopters.

2. Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Both Fleets

Chilean Navy (ACh)

• Qualitative:

  • High defensive capability with frigates equipped with Exocet missiles.
  • Limited submarine capacity, with only one operational submarine.
  • Good coordination between surface and air units.

• Quantitative:

  • 2 light cruiser
  • 3 frigates
  • 6 destroyers
  • 1 operational submarine

Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR)

• Qualitative:

  • Air superiority with the aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo.
  • Greater submarine capacity with 4 operational submarines.
  • High force projection capability with modern destroyers and frigates.

• Quantitative:

  • 1 air carrier
  • 1 light cruiser
  • 8 destroyers
  • 2 missile corvettes
  • 4 submarines

 

Conflict Escalation

The conflict did not de-escalate; on the contrary, it worsened. The Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR) decided to launch an attack on the Chilean Navy, which quickly set sail from Valparaíso heading south toward the Beagle Channel. The last detected position of FLOMAR was 120 miles (some sources cite 193 miles) southwest of Cape Horn, preparing to support Operation Sovereignty, whose primary objective was the amphibious landing and capture of the Picton, Lennox, and Nueva islands.

 

Capabilities Analysis

Chilean Navy (ACh)
The ACh possessed a light cruiser, destroyers, and frigates, all equipped with anti-air and anti-submarine defense capabilities. However, operational issues with the SS Simpson left the fleet without effective submarine coverage, a critical disadvantage in modern naval warfare.

Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR)
FLOMAR, on the other hand, had the advantage of the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, which provided air superiority with its A-4Q Skyhawks. The modern destroyers and multiple operational submarines gave FLOMAR a robust capacity for both defense and attack.

 

Key Points of Advance and Refuge Locations for the Chilean Navy (ACh)

To reach the Beagle Channel, the Chilean fleet would advance southward from Valparaíso, passing through Puerto Montt, the Chacao Channel, the Gulf of Penas, Bahía Inútil, and the Strait of Magellan, before heading toward the Beagle Channel. If refuge were needed, Chilean fjords such as the Última Esperanza Fjord, Quintupeu Fjord, Aysén Fjord, or Comau Fjord would serve as strategic locations to hide and launch counterattacks.

Quintupeu and Comau Fjords

 
Última Esperanza Fjord or Sound

Final Approach to the Beagle Channel (or Cape Horn)

The upper map shows the route of the Chilean fleet according to official Chilean and Argentine bibliographies.

Note that the Chilean fleet’s course passed over the position of the ARA Santa Fé submarine because it had detected them precisely days before December 21. In other words, the enemy fleet had already been detected and followed by a submarine of the Argentine Submarine Force (CFS). The fleet was heading south of Cape Horn to combat stations, with two ships anchored side by side, awaiting orders to attack. The ships were arranged in this manner to allow for personnel exchange and social interaction while waiting (Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano, 2017). We will return to this point later.

Detection and Engagement Strategies

The Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR) would employ its S-2 Tracker and P-2 Neptune aircraft for reconnaissance missions (as they would successfully do four years later in the Malvinas), and the A-4Q Skyhawks for attacks, while Argentine submarines would ambush Chilean ships at critical points in the Strait of Magellan and the Drake Passage. FLOMAR’s destroyers and frigates would provide fire support and anti-aircraft defense to protect amphibious and heliborne assault operations.

Once again, it is enlightening to refer to the "official" account of the Chilean fleet’s movements (Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano, 2017). In this text, it is detailed how Chilean officers trained on a land-based simulator (this is not a joke) called Redifon, which consisted of interconnected cubicles simulating ships, and practiced maneuvers in the basement of the Tactical Training Center of the Naval War Academy in Valparaíso. Merino and López, practicing on this analog simulator, tried various attack combinations on the FLOMAR and concluded that they had to achieve "control of the sea," aiming for a decisive naval battle in the style of Mahan. The outcome of these exercises determined an optimal attack formation where "all missile-equipped ships would go ahead, with gunnery ships behind" (p. 86). I don’t understand why the Redifon was even required for something that seems like common sense. Or was there perhaps some logic to sending the gunships first (Prat, Latorre) and the missile ships behind (Almirante-class, Leander-class)?

FLOMAR, on the other hand, "lacked" such a simulator simply because the crews spent most of the naval year on board, maneuvering with real ships in real time and facing real problems. Approximately two-thirds of the year, the crews remained on board—a fact anyone with relatives in the Argentine Navy at that time can corroborate. Many sailors during this golden era of the Argentine Navy only met their children when they were 8 or 9 months old, as their life at sea prevented earlier visits. The distance between both fleets, beyond the geographic one, was astronomical.

 

Analysis of the Clash of Forces

Within the framework of the 1978 Beagle Crisis, tensions between Argentina and Chile reached a critical point, bringing both nations to the brink of armed conflict. Operation Sovereignty, planned by Argentina, had as its primary objective the amphibious landing and capture of the Picton, Lennox, and Nueva islands, located in the Beagle Channel. This operation was to be conducted under strong naval and air cover provided by the Argentine Fleet (FLOMAR).

Preparations and Force Composition

By late December 1978, FLOMAR was fully equipped and ready for action. It had at its disposal the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, a crucial asset that carried A-4Q Skyhawks and S-2 Trackers, providing both air interception and maritime patrol capabilities. The fleet also included several modern destroyers, such as the ARA Hércules (the only one equipped with medium range naval SAM like the Sea Dart), as well as frigates like the ARA Piedrabuena and ARA Espora. Additionally, Argentina possessed a significant submarine force with the ARA Santiago del Estero, ARA Salta, ARA Santa Fe, and ARA San Luis submarines.

The Chilean Navy (ACh), although smaller in number, maintained a robust defensive force. Its primary asset was the light cruiser CL-02 Capitán Prat and the still formidable Almirante Latorre, accompanied by frigates and destroyers equipped with MM-38 Exocet missiles. The Chilean fleet also included the submarine SS-21 Simpson, the only operational submarine at the time, as the other Oberon-class submarines were undergoing major maintenance.

 

Operation Development

The landing operation planned by Argentina focused on Isla Nueva, where it was known that around 150 Chilean marines were entrenched. The Argentine strategy was to land on the southern coast of the island, avoiding Chilean defenses in the north. To execute this, the amphibious transport ARA Cabo San Antonio would be employed, escorted by destroyers and frigates providing fire support and protection.

The Chileans anticipated a conventional landing on the islands, when in fact, the most likely scenario was that the occupation would be carried out via vertical assault using helicopters.

The final phase of FLOMAR’s approach was established with the Argentine fleet advancing from its last detected position, 120 miles south of Cape Horn, moving eastward toward the Beagle Channel. Meanwhile, the Chilean Navy (ACh) mobilized from Puerto Williams, heading toward the channel to intercept the Argentine forces. Here, two simultaneous courses of action can be evaluated: first, the main fleet moved toward the Drake Passage to engage FLOMAR in open waters; second, the smaller torpedo boats (Quidora, Fresia, Tegualda, and Guacolda) would confront the landing force.

Submarine Warfare

The book La Escuadra en Acción by Arancibia Clavel and Bulnes Serrano recounts the military and political activity during the conflict, with a focus on the Chilean Navy. Although the text is not highly technical regarding the means employed, it provides an interesting general description of the operations of the Chilean fleet in the south.

In this account, it is mentioned that the Chilean Submarine Force was composed of the Balao-class submarine Simpson (SS-21) and the modern, for the time, British Oberon-class submarines named Hyatt (SS-23) and O'Brien (SS-22).

According to this source, the O'Brien was in dry dock during the conflict, and the Hyatt had to interrupt its transit south and return to its base in Talcahuano due to a mechanical failure. The other Balao-class submarine, the Thomson (SS-20), is not even mentioned, possibly because it had already been decommissioned due to its age. In fact, both Brazil and Argentina had retired their submarines of this class in the early 1970s, after receiving the Guppy class.

Although the Simpson was technologically outdated for the circumstances, it managed to fulfill its mission. The old submarine had to surface frequently to recharge its batteries, dangerously exposing itself to Argentine radars and periscopes. It was photographed at least twice by Argentine submarines while on the surface. Due to its wear, it is not surprising that this operation had to be performed more frequently than usual. The Simpson was detected twice by Argentine submarines, which chose not to fire their torpedoes. Nonetheless, it is possible that its commander, Rubén Scheihing, attempted to attack despite his technological disadvantage.

Patrol Areas Assigned to the Argentine Submarines

Although the exact dates cannot be confirmed, the Guppy-class submarines were very close to engaging in combat, although fortunately, their commanders interpreted their orders with sound judgment. In mid-December, the Santa Fe submarine was patrolling the entrance to Bahía Cook at a depth of 50 meters. The sonar operators detected the sound of approaching warship propellers. The commander of the S-21 raised the combat alarm, the crew took their positions, and all torpedo tubes were prepared for launch. The propeller sounds grew in number, eventually forming what appeared to be "a fleet." The Chilean squadron sailed above the S-21, heading into the open waters of the South Pacific.

The sonar operators counted three, four, six... up to 13 ships. Some had "heavy" propellers, like cruisers, while most had "light" propellers, similar to those of destroyers.

However, the Chilean fleet was sailing without emitting signals, meaning they were not using active sonar on the escort ships. A fleet commander's decision to sail without emitting can have several justifications, such as not actively searching for submarines or preferring to be more discreet, as sonar emissions propagate over great distances and can be detected by submarine countermeasure equipment, revealing their course or trajectory.

It is not difficult to imagine the immense tension experienced by the crew of the Santa Fe. Suspended in silence dozens of meters below the Pacific, they awaited the Chilean fleet's actions, with weapons ready to launch if the right moment came to strike from a tactically advantageous position.

Ultimately, the Chilean fleet entered open waters, moving away from the S-21. Following his orders, the commander of the Santa Fe did not interpret the Chilean fleet's maneuver as a hostile act, especially at a time when there was no formal declaration of war.

This situation clearly shows that the ARA Santa Fe was aware of the Chilean fleet's position and, in the event of war, it would have been the first to launch torpedoes against the Chilean fleet.

Meeting and Engagement Point

The meeting point of the fleets would be near the Beagle Channel. FLOMAR had to face the threat of the ACh's MM-38 Exocet missiles, with a range of 35-40 km. There is a recurring narrative in dialogues, discussions, and exchanges with trans-Andean experts and novices alike that suggests a certain accounting of Exocets, leading to the assumption that a potential naval battle would "clearly" tip in favor of the ACh. At that time, Chile was thought to have 4 to 8 more missile launchers than the ARA. This is the denial of the evident Argentine advantage, as these opinion shapers tend to overlook the key assets of the ARA: its aircraft carrier and its four operational submarines. For greater clarity, the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo provided Argentina with a significant advantage, enabling attacks from distances of over 200 miles (370 km). Another key factor, when compared with the experience in the Malvinas, is that the Argentine Naval Aviation had full experience in anti-ship attacks, and the bomb fuses would have been correctly adjusted to detonate on impact with the ships. Once the Chilean fleet was detected by the S-2 Tracker and P-3 Neptune aircraft, its position would be relayed to FAA airbases and the CFS submarines, and it would only be a matter of time to see who would arrive first to the hunt.

Landing and Engagement Scenarios

1. Chilean Fleet’s Approach to Stop the Landing
   The Chilean Navy (ACh) would rapidly advance from Puerto Williams toward the Beagle Channel, deploying its frigates and destroyers to intercept and attack the Argentine landing forces. Fast attack craft would also be used to disrupt the landings and support vessels. The Chileans would launch Exocet missiles and use naval artillery to harass the landing craft. Additionally, they would coordinate air strikes from Punta Arenas using Hawker Hunter and A-37 Dragonfly aircraft. Entering the Beagle Channel is a losing strategy for either fleet due to restricted movement, sensor disruption caused by terrain clutter, and the consequent degradation in weapon performance.

2. FLOMAR’s Response to This Movement
   In response to the Chilean approach, FLOMAR would deploy its A-4Q Skyhawks and S-2 Trackers from the aircraft carrier to conduct preemptive strikes against ACh units. Argentine submarines would patrol strategic areas to intercept Chilean ships. FLOMAR would use its air defense systems to intercept approaching aircraft and launch its own anti-ship missiles to neutralize key threats. Unlike the Chilean fleet, the Argentine Navy had an external attack element in the form of carrier-based aviation. The confined space of the channel would facilitate an air-naval attack and would have been ideal for a sequence of attacks followed by rearming to restart the cycle.

3. ACh Focuses on Seeking Out FLOMAR for Direct Defeat
   Based on the cited literature, this was the path chosen by the Chilean Navy. If the ACh had decided to seek out and directly confront FLOMAR, they would have circled Navarino Island or approached via the Drake Passage toward Cape Horn (southeast route). They would coordinate with the Simpson submarine and aerial patrols to locate the Argentine fleet, launching missiles and naval artillery strikes as soon as they detected it. According to the same literature, the ARA Santa Fe was positioned beneath the fleet when it entered open waters, meaning the target was detected first. Again, in this scenario, the Argentine naval aviation would have encountered them halfway, in any case, forcing them to endure several waves of A-4Q Skyhawk attacks. What remained of these waves would be what could confront an intact FLOMAR. Checkmate.

4. FLOMAR Focuses on Seeking Out ACh for Direct Defeat
   If FLOMAR decided to seek out and directly confront ACh, it would advance from its position south of Cape Horn toward the northeast. They would use their carrier-based aircraft for reconnaissance and attack, first launching repeated air strikes to sink or disable the main surface assets, followed by attacks to sink or damage various ships. They would then move closer to launch anti-ship missiles from their destroyers and frigates, coordinating strikes with their submarines.

   Here we recall the ACh's "combat station" formation: the ships were anchored side by side to share the wait with social interaction and the exchange of supplies. If the ARA had launched its A-4Q Skyhawks while this formation was still in place, it would have greatly facilitated the effectiveness of the bombs. A single bombing run by three aircraft with three 450-kilogram bombs could have impacted two ships at a time, doubling their efficiency. Checkmate.

Roles of Naval and Military Aviation

• Argentine Carrier-Based Naval Aviation:

  • A-4Q Skyhawk: These aircraft would conduct interception and air superiority missions, as well as attacks on enemy ships to protect the landing forces. A total of 8 units were carrier-based.
  • S-2 Tracker: These aircraft would perform maritime patrols, submarine detection, and coordination of anti-submarine and anti-ship attacks. 2 units were carrier-based.
  • P-3 Neptune: Operating from land bases, these long-range aircraft had highly trained crews who conducted year-round missions in the Argentine Sea.

• Naval Aviation Based in Río Grande:

  • T-28 Fennec: These aircraft would perform close air support missions and ground attacks to cover the landing forces (deployed in Río Grande and Estancia La Sara). A total of 19 units.
  • MB-326 Aermacchi: These aircraft would carry out interdiction and ground attack missions to support amphibious and land operations (Río Grande). The exact number of units is undetermined.
  • T-34C Turbo Mentor: These aircraft would undertake light attack missions, logistical support, and supply transport. More than 12 units.

• Chilean Military Aviation in Chabunco:

  • Hawker Hunter: These aircraft would perform interception and air combat, ship attacks, and provide support to ground forces (6 units).
  • A-37 Dragonfly: These aircraft would conduct ground attacks, close support, interdiction, and harassment of Argentine landing forces (12 units).

• Argentine Military Aviation in Río Gallegos:

  • A-4B/C/P Skyhawk: These aircraft would carry out attacks on ships and provide support to ground forces, as well as interception and air combat when necessary (12 units).
  • Mirage IIIEA/Mirage 5 Dagger/IAI Nesher: More than 30 units of the three models combined.
  • F-86 Sabre: These were pure interception fighters, deployed to engage the Hawker Hunters due to experience gained during the Indo-Pakistani wars. The exact number is unclear, but pilot reports suggest there were more than 4 units and less than 14.
  • Their objectives were first to initiate bombings against military targets in the cities of Punta Arenas (Chabunco airbase) and Puerto Williams (Zañartú airfield) and to destroy the Chilean Air Force, using a technique very similar to that employed by Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967. The same approach would be implemented across all active fronts.

 

A-4Q Launched from the Aircraft Carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo Strikes the ACh APD-29 Uribe

 

The offensive against Chile would follow the following sequence: (Wikipedia):

• Starting at 20:00 hours (H-2) on D-Day, December 22, 1978, FLOMAR and the Marine Infantry — Battalion No. 5 — would occupy the Freycinet, Hershell, Wollaston, Deceit, and Hornos islands (see map below).
• At 22:00 hours, the designated H-Hour, FLOMAR and marines — Battalions No. 3 and No. 4 — would occupy the Picton, Nueva, and Lennox islands, also gaining control of the Beagle Channel (see map below).
• The ground offensive would begin at 24:00 hours (H+2). The V Army Corps would launch an attack from the Santa Cruz area, aiming to conquer as much Chilean territory as possible in the Patagonian region. Simultaneously, the Argentine Air Force would begin strategic bombings.
• At 06:00 hours (H+8) on December 23, 1978 (23.06:00.DEC.978), the destruction of the Chilean Air Force on the ground would commence.

 

The naval confrontation between Argentina and Chile in 1978 would have been a complex, multidimensional operation, involving naval, air, and ground forces in a challenging geographical environment. Argentina's air and submarine superiority gave it a significant advantage, though Chile's coastal defenses and tactical coordination offered formidable resistance. The outcome would have depended on numerous tactical and strategic factors, as well as the effectiveness in executing the planned operations by both nations.

In this specific scenario, it should be noted that the Argentine armed forces had three air bases on the front: one mobile (the ARA Veinticinco de Mayo) and two air bases in Río Grande and Río Gallegos, which would prove to be highly operational four years later in the Malvinas. In contrast, only the Chabunco air base in Punta Arenas would bear the burden of attempting to stop the landing operations, conduct anti-ship missions against FLOMAR, combat air attacks from the northeast (Río Gallegos air base) and from the east-northeast (Río Grande naval air base), and then plan ABA (Airbase Attack) operations against these same bases. Is that not too many objectives for a single runway?

For its part, the Argentine Naval Aviation (COAN) would focus exclusively on anti-ship strikes or very close air support, while the Argentine Air Force (FAA) would support the advance of the armored assault on Punta Arenas, conduct an ABA against the Chabunco air base, and ensure air superiority over Punta Arenas. Additionally, at the request of the Argentine Navy (ARA), the FAA would provide air support to the landing operations.

Probabilities of Success

Argentine Forces: With air superiority provided by the aircraft carrier and a modern surface fleet and submarines, Argentine forces had a significant advantage. The joint air-sea-submarine operations of FLOMAR would increase their chances of success.

Comparative Strength Between ACh (Left) and FLOMAR (Right)

The pink bands indicate the range of their main weapons (MM38 Exocet, 20 miles or 35-42 km). The aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo is represented by an A-4Q fully loaded with bombs and fuel, with a range of 350 km. These are the vital areas to cover before considering a real threat to the adversary. As an analyst, I find it difficult to even see a glimpse of equality between both forces.

Before analyzing the Chilean case, let us review the probability the Chilean Squadron had of repelling an air attack, which would have been the primary weapon of the Argentine Navy (ARA). Some Chilean destroyers (Almirante-class) were equipped with the British Short Seacat system. This is a small subsonic missile, powered by a two-stage solid-fuel rocket motor. In flight, it is guided by four cruciform wings and stabilized by four small tail fins. It is guided by command line-of-sight (CLOS) through a radio link, meaning flight commands are transmitted by a remote operator with both the missile and target in sight. The same system was installed on the Argentine carrier Veinticinco de Mayo and, in its land-based version (Tigercat), was deployed in Tierra del Fuego (IMARA) and Río Gallegos (Army). The missile proved highly inaccurate in the Malvinas conflict due to its lack of autonomy and reliance on the operator’s coordination of pulse and vision, with the inherent human eye difficulties in accurately perceiving depth and distance in space. Therefore, perhaps the best-equipped Chilean ship for self-defense against air attacks was likely the cruiser Almirante Latorre or Prat, with up to 14 Bofors 40mm pom-pom guns. These would have been the most difficult targets to approach and attack, and, if communications had allowed, the task might have been delegated to submarines.

Another intellectual exercise that no one has conducted, to my knowledge, is the following:

Chilean ships would approach at 21/28 knots (cruising speed/full speed) towards the Argentine naval forces (assuming that the CASA-212 aircraft correctly located them, as Chile had no other "eyes" available; there is a myth about electronic interception that is mentioned below). The distance to be covered was estimated to be between 140/193 miles according to various Chilean reports. This would take the Chilean fleet just over 5/8 hours of sailing to get within 20 miles of the Argentine ships (20 miles being the first point where they could attempt to strike the fleet, as that was the range of the MM38 Exocet missile, Chile’s only decisive weapon).

During those 5/8 hours, the ships would not be able to fire or damage the enemy. Meanwhile, during this period, the aircraft carrier ARA 25 de Mayo could launch and recover 3 to 5 combat sorties from its air group. Assuming each attack group flew at 400 knots round trip, landed, and took 25 minutes to reload bombs and refuel before taking off again, each A-4Q Skyhawk would take off with 3 bombs of 450kg on the central pylon, equipped with fuzes adapted to hit ships.

In the first pass alone, 24 bombs would be dropped on the "Squadron". Assuming no losses for the Argentine planes, by the fourth or fifth pass, between 96 and 120 bombs would have been dropped on the ships. Even if an Argentine plane was shot down in each pass, resulting in up to 4 losses, the worst-case scenario would still see up to 36 bombs launched against the "Squadron". In other words, before the Chilean fleet could close the gap between them and the enemy, they would have been hit by between 36 and 120 bombs (see the table below).

All of this would happen before any Chilean combat station operator could even press the launch button for a single Exocet missile. Do you understand how serious this plan was for the Chilean command? What were they thinking? Perhaps the worst part is that at the end of this death corridor, a fleet almost identical to the Chilean one in terms of surface combatants and Exocet launch capability, but completely intact, was waiting for them. Those who managed to survive would be met by a volley of French missiles.

Approximation times to 20 miles, passes, and number of bombs considering losses

Chilean Forces: The Chilean fleet in open waters was at the mercy of naval aviation first, and Argentine submarines later. As mentioned above, the distance between both fleets worked in favor of the FLOMAR. If the Chilean Navy had been detected at 190 miles, the bomb runs carried out by the Skyhawks would have left little afloat, even considering shoot-downs. It is almost sad to imagine a fleet speeding up to strike the enemy while being progressively bombarded over and over again with absolutely no help. Possibility of success: Zero.

Jorge Martínez Bush, a Chilean officer, stated the following in the book Soldados de Mar en Acción (Sánchez Urra, 2020), a compilation of the activities of the CIM.

"From what could have been the 'Naval Battle of Drake', then-Commander Jorge Martínez Bush, the second-in-command of the cruiser 'Prat', points out that 'we were about to enter combat, and we were prepared. In naval tactics, the position was in our favor because the sea and the wind worked for us, putting the Argentinians in a very complicated position' (p. 196)."

This officer accuses Vice Admiral López Silva of trusting the sea and the wind to defeat Argentine naval aviation. Did he take a pencil and paper and make a basic diagram to see if his statements had any foundation? What does Martínez Bush think about the air group (GAE) of the 25 de Mayo? Or did it not exist? If he is reading this, he could clarify this matter to the Chilean public. By the way, Sánchez Urra's account of the FLOMAR is suspiciously incomplete (he omits 2 Argentine submarines and speaks of "Chilean submarines" in the plural, portraying the Simpson as fully operational, on par with the Argentinians), which casts doubt on many other descriptions and lists presented throughout his work.

The other alternative was to hide in the fjords, which would have offered better chances of survival. However, with more than 100 enemy planes flying over their position and planning an attack, it was only a matter of time. The Chilean Navy was a serious opponent but completely lacked decisive weapons: neither aviation to disturb the two-dimensional plane nor operational submarines to attack from the complete stealth of the depths. Had the situation dragged on for only a week, it’s not unreasonable to think that the entire Chilean fleet would have ended up sunk or, for all practical purposes, out of combat. Possibility of success: Zero.

Defeat Scenario and Seeking Refuge in the Chilean Fjords

If the ACh suffered a defeat, a likely outcome would have involved the sinking or disabling of its main assets. In terms of naval target value, without a doubt, the Leander-class frigates would have been the primary focus of the attack, followed by the light cruisers Prat and Latorre, given their gunfire capability to affect landing operations. The remaining targets would have been defined by circumstance.

It’s worth adding here a piece of information that Admiral López Silva (theoretically the most prepared in naval-air warfare) of the ACh did not possess: Four years later, Argentine aircraft demonstrated that a fleet confined in a channel (like the San Carlos Strait) or very close to the coast (such as the southern islands of Cape Horn) was a perfectly reachable target for low-flying jet aircraft. The Royal Navy, equipped with much better air defense missiles than the ACh, only achieved a few isolated shootdowns, and only the failure of the fuses on bombs dropped by the FAA prevented its complete neutralization as a surface combat force before the end of the conflict. The attackers of the ACh would have been A-4 Skyhawks, both in their B and P variants, and Israeli Mirage fighters of the FAA, as well as the well-known A-4Qs of the COAN—all of which proved to be lethal in attacking a fleet. Did the Chilean fleet really expect a different outcome in their case?

If the ACh were to pass through the channel, it would ensure its demise. The fleet would be trapped in the Beagle Channel or advancing close to the southern coast of the islands, facilitating the approach of aircraft outside radar detection. The attack, as would later happen in the Malvinas, would take full advantage of the geography, just as it was in the San Carlos Strait. We now know that the likelihood of the main ACh units escaping an air attack was almost nil. Once the main units were disabled, the rest of the Chilean fleet would be attacked by Argentine destroyers and corvettes with their Exocets. This would not be the defeat chosen, according to the book by Arancibia Clavel and Serrano Bulnes.

The ACh would be forced to rely on air support from the Chilean Air Force (FACh), based at Chabunco airbase. At 6 AM on December 21, this base would be the primary target of a preemptive strike from all air assets stationed at BAM Río Gallegos. To make matters worse, if the Chilean fighters managed to take off, the COAN was lying in wait less than 200 km from Chabunco with a dozen T-28 Fennecs, ready to attack the Chilean fighters with machine guns and rockets as they landed.

Even so, if we consider that some units remained afloat after a defeat in the Fuegian channels, they would retreat to fjords such as Última Esperanza, Quintupeu, or Comau. With Argentine air superiority, Chilean forces would have little chance of success, as FLOMAR could carry out precise and sustained attacks. Without air superiority, Chilean forces would have a better chance of defending themselves, but they would still face a significant threat due to FLOMAR’s ability to coordinate attacks from both air and sea.

I want to add two final details before the conclusions. First, Chilean literature, whether academic or journalistic, as well as television media reports, engage in a repeated act of pretending ignorance. It is almost impossible to find books endorsed by the Chilean Navy (ACh) or other military forces, let alone by journalistic outlets, that mention the key word "A-4Q Skyhawk." Apparently, this weapon never existed in the theater of operations. And if it did, it was never a threat. In fact, they probably didn’t even fly. Oh, and the Argentine sailors got seasick due to rough seas. The books from the CIM or the “Squadron” pretend ignorance, as they reflect at all times, and absolutely without deviation, that what was going to take place was a naval battle, in the style of Jutland/Latakia. Two large fleets, now without cannons but with missiles, would come into firing range, each firing their volleys, and the better one would win. It almost seems as if the Argentine aircraft carrier was going to stay in the rear watching the scene, like a spectator in the stands.

This scenario is a complete disrespect to the informed reader. It is truly shameful that professional Chilean naval officers avoid addressing the clear impending air-naval battle and lie to their public by speaking of courage and patriotism to cover up what was entirely and fundamentally a technical issue. Sadly, Chilean "technical" literature is filled with this appeal to bravery rather than focusing on tools or tactics.

Finally, that same literature claims a level of information about Argentine forces' movements that surpasses what would be available today, even with two British AWACS donated as part of the collaboration during the Falklands War. Apparently, they had information on troop movements, aircraft movements, the position of the Argentine fleet, the order of operations of various units, and who knows what else. Moreover, this information was updated hourly. Not even with their own satellites would they have had such an instantaneous real-time picture. Apparently, Argentine communications had been "decoded," similar to Japan’s Purple Code. This is mentioned by anonymous authors using the mysterious term "electronic interception or tracking." Well, that was not the case. Argentine encrypted communications were not decoded. What naval intelligence actually did was maintain open channels to broadcast the information they wanted to be accessible to Chilean listening posts (counterintelligence). Argentine communications were indeed intercepted, but that happened in 1982, by NATO intelligence agencies, specifically from a station in Norway. But let’s never confuse NATO with Chile under any circumstances. In the previous statement, Martínez Smith himself comments that the Argentine fleet was an hour's sailing distance from the Chilean border, knowing this only through intercepted communications. Dear reader, in air-naval warfare, one does not order an attack on a fleet whose location has not been confirmed by one’s own sensors (an observer or radar providing the position). If FLOMAR was going to be attacked based on "intercepted" information, it was probably an ambush planned by the Argentine naval command.

The TransAndean Squadron, such as it was detected by the ARA Santa Fe submarine
 

In summary, the technological and operational superiority of FLOMAR granted the Argentine forces a considerable advantage in a direct confrontation with the ACh. The geography of the Chilean fjords would provide a natural refuge, but Chilean forces would still face significant challenges without the ability to counter Argentine air and naval superiority.

Retreat to the Fjords, Perhaps the Best Outcome for the ACh...

This report does not diminish the performance or the planning executed by the ACh. They did the best they could with what they had. That said, it wasn’t enough. The stars aligned to leave them without sufficient submarine capability (the SS-21 Simpson was detected and photographed twice before December 21, while their best submarines were undergoing major maintenance). Air support was going to be limited because they lacked a naval attack aviation force, and the FACh's air assets were going to receive their baptism of fire that same morning, meaning they would be fighting for their own survival. According to the plan, by the afternoon of December 21, Chabunco was expected to be inoperable—whether by FAA A-4 and Mirage strikes in the early morning or by T-28 Fennec/MB326 attacks throughout the rest of the day.

A criticism that can be leveled against López Silva’s plan is that he adhered to a Mahanian philosophy of seeking a decisive large-scale naval battle. He was committing the entire fleet ("all-in") in a maneuver where it would suffer many losses before even seeing the enemy on their radar screens. Once the events were set in motion, the fate of the Chilean fleet would be sealed for the rest of the conflict. This invites reflection on alternatives: when a smaller fleet faces a larger one, it should better rely on naval guerrilla tactics or small attrition battles. The Argentine Navy was born this way—facing much larger fleets, such as the Spanish and the Brazilian Imperial Navy, dragging them into small battles that favored minor but exhausting victories against the enemy. The fjords are an ideal setting for such a task: hiding ships to later conduct coordinated attacks. Even with enemy air superiority, this tactic can still be effective, as the Germans demonstrated during WWII by sheltering ships in protected fjords with dense layers of air defense and achieving success. This alternative would likely be more reasonable than facing a fully equipped aircraft carrier in open waters, without air superiority, and with an impaired submarine force. And here, the term "larger fleet" is more qualitative than quantitative—the Chilean "squadron" was going solo, with very little support from the depths and no air support, against naval pilots who trained intensively every year on how to sink ships and were highly skilled.

Did López Silva think that the ARA would bring its main naval assets within the range of Chilean Exocets for a gentleman’s duel? Was López Silva expecting a Jutland or a Latakia while heading into a Midway? Could it be that the Chilean naval command believed that the ARA would not exploit its submarine and naval air superiority by deploying its submarines and carrier-based fighters before they could even detect FLOMAR on their radars? Did López Silva think the A-4Q Skyhawks would not be launched against his ships? Long before a Chilean sailor would get the chance to press the launch button on an Exocet, the Chilean fleet would encounter the COAN and the CFS—either sequentially or simultaneously.

Sources

• Arancibia Clavel, Patricia y Bulnes Serrano, Francisco. La escuadra en acción. 1978: el conflicto Chile-Argentina visto a través de sus protagonistas, Santiago, Chile: Catalonia, 2017 (ISBN: 978-956-324-298-0)
• Burzaco, Ricardo. La Fuerza de Submarinos de la Armada Argentina en la crisis de 1978. DeySeg
  

Biography: Captain Héctor Sánchez, the destroyer of Bahía Agradable

Captain Hector “Pipi” Sanchez (AAF)

By Hernan Longoni in Historia de Aviones

1) When did he graduate from the EAM (Military Aviation School)?
December 1975.

2) What reasons led him to join the Aviation School?
He had no idea that the EAM existed, nor what the Air Force was. When my desk mate in 5th year at the Urquiza National School in San Nicolás told me that he was going to join the EAM, I asked him to explain everything related to the Air Force. Since there was the possibility of becoming a military aviator, that fact led me to decide to register to join the Institution. I made this decision almost at the end of the year, so I had to make a great effort to prepare myself to take the exams, with the help of my friend, who had already been preparing for quite some time. Later, Orlando Pons and I would graduate as Ensigns, being classmates of Class XVI.

3) What did you feel when you graduated from it?
Primarily great emotion and relief for the effort that my parents had to make to finance my studies. From that moment on, I had a salary that allowed me to support myself by my own means, without being a burden on my family. Regarding the future, everything was uncertainty and big questions. Would I be able to meet the expectations that the organization placed on me? Would I be able to fulfill my dream/vocation of becoming a military pilot? Would I be able to fly combat aircraft after achieving the goal of overcoming the demands of basic training as an aviator? I was always very aware that, above all, one was a soldier first, and then came the next goal of becoming a Military Aviator. But what decision would I have made if I had not become a pilot, and above all, a fighter pilot?

4) What rank and age did you have when the Malvinas Conflict broke out?
In 1982, I was a 1st Lieutenant in the second year (it takes 4 years in the rank to be promoted to Captain), and I was 28 years old.

5) What position and role did you have?
When the recovery of the Islands occurred, I was undergoing the adaptation course to fly Mirage III aircraft at the VIII Air Brigade. I had not completed more than 5 flights in two-seater aircraft, so I was not qualified to intervene in the conflict with these aircraft. Thanks to Captain Varela, one of the Flight Leaders of the A4-B Squadrons, and at my request, I was called to join as an attaché to the II Air Squadron to fly in the Weapons System.

6) What were the most pressing needs during the conflict from the perspective of your position?
Having accurate information on the position of naval targets, ensuring that all aircraft had the OMEGA navigation system, having the appropriate weaponry to attack naval targets, obtaining proper intelligence information on the positions of British troops after the landing, having a landing strip in the Malvinas suitable for our aircraft, and being allowed to operate from Puerto Argentino despite the risks involved, etc.
It is important to note that the primary responsibility of the Air Force is to train and equip (including weaponry) for air and air-land battles. On the other hand, the primary responsibility of the Navy is to be prepared for air-naval battles, which is why they had weaponry suited to the conflict they faced. For the above reasons, all Air Force Squadrons during the conflict had to adapt to a battle that was not their primary responsibility. The most important thing to keep in mind is that they had never trained in tactics to attack naval targets (ships), nor did they have the appropriate weaponry to attack those targets. All knowledge had to be acquired during the conflict, based on the experiences learned from each mission that was carried out.

7) Who or what was your source of confidence during the conflict?
The training and preparation I had flying the A4s, our Flight Leaders (Tony Zelaya and Trucha Varela, two idols), my Squadron Leaders, those of us who formed a combat formation every time we flew a real mission, the camaraderie and companionship that developed within the group, the Argentine people who supported the conflict to recover our Islands, and, of course, everything was ultimately in the hands of God, for the fate of my life during my engagement with the British.

8) What did your loved ones say regarding the risk?
At that time, there were no cell phones, emails, or the means of communication we have today. Everything was done by telephone, and even that was limited to those who had a phone line installed in their homes. My mother always believed I was in Buenos Aires during the development of the conflict, thanks to the collaboration of the rest of the family who maintained my deception to avoid causing her distress (my father had passed away in 1976). My family was far away and had no military background, so for them, the concept of the risk associated with military activity was difficult to grasp.

9) What do you feel about the performance of your weapons system during the conflict?
I feel proud to have been able to participate in the conflict with such an incredible human group that came together. Everyone was included: the "Gordo" Romero (the Group's doctor), pilots, technical support staff, logistics personnel, etc. Everyone was part of a perfectly functioning team where each specialty contributed its grain of sand to ensure we could fulfill the assigned missions.
In particular, the air squadrons were very united; we knew the risks we were taking and enjoyed every minute we had available when we were not engaged in aerial operations. Each of us contributed goodwill and a sense of humor to always keep the group's spirit high.
When it was time for aerial missions, we always volunteered to go on them. With my dear friend Tucu Cervera, we even argued at times to be part of certain missions.
The Air Squadrons were a perfect combat machine that, despite the old nature of the aircraft, demonstrated to the world what can be achieved with training, ingenuity, effort, sacrifice, and a will to fight.

10) Is there a specific aircraft you flew during the conflict that holds a special memory for you?
Fundamentally, the A4-B with registration number C-231, as it was the aircraft that brought me back on June 8th after surviving the attack of two Sea Harriers in Bahia Agradable.

11) Before or after the conflict, did you ever fly a mission that pushed the limits of your aircraft's capabilities?
During our preparation and training in peacetime, we always conducted long-duration navigation flights. This is part of the training for combat pilots in the Air Force, as our potential targets to attack are always located in the heart of enemy territory (runways, command and control centers, enemy power centers, logistics bases, etc.).
I have several examples of these training flights we carried out (some of them with training ammunition, as we ended the navigation flights with shooting practice in designated areas).
One of the flights I remember was from Villa Reynolds (the natural base for A4-Bs in San Luis) to the Iguazú Falls, air refueling with the C-130s, and returning via a different route to the 5th Air Brigade (Villa Reynolds).
On another occasion, we took off at night with Tucu Cervera (before dawn) from Río Gallegos (where we were deployed to train for operations in the southern part of the national territory), flew at low altitude during the night, carried out a simulated night attack on the Comodoro Rivadavia Air Base, and returned to Río Gallegos. The entire final phase of the approach and attack on Comodoro Rivadavia was carried out with the aircraft's external lights turned off.

12) Did you ever have a mission where you couldn't reach the target? What did you feel?
On June 7, 1982, we set out on a mission to attack naval targets southeast of Gran Malvina Island with Danilo Bolzan as the leader, "Conejo" Dubourg (our Squadron Leader) as Number 2, and myself as Number 3. Unfortunately, despite flying over the area, we were unable to locate any ships, so we had to return to Río Gallegos. The feeling is mixed; on one hand, there is the risk and fear that comes with the aerial formation remaining in the combat zone searching for the enemy (due to the possibility of being detected and intercepted by Sea Harriers). On the other hand, there is the frustration of not being able to locate the targets to neutralize them. Every target that was not attacked or found at the time represented an enormous risk for future attack formations heading into the conflict zone.

13) What is your relationship with your veteran comrades today?
There is a great friendship reflected in the permanent gatherings we organize to share a meal and remember the harrowing days we lived through during the conflict. Of course, our fallen friends and comrades are always present with us, remembered with affection and especially for the human qualities that characterized them. What always stands out during our gatherings is maintaining the same spirit we had during the conflict. Through jokes, songs, and good humor, we avoid dwelling on the risks we faced during those days.

14) When — if it is the case — did the war end for you?
The war still hasn't ended for me; we only lost a battle. None of the members of our group ever surrendered — we were simply ordered to suspend aerial operations. We still had the equipment and crew members to continue fighting despite the losses we had suffered up to that point (9 pilots). Today, the war must continue, even if it is through other means (for example, diplomacy or politics). The strategic objective must never be abandoned.

15) Did you have a mission assigned to be carried out after June 14, 1982, and were you surprised by the surrender?
Aerial missions were suspended on June 14. The surrender in the Islands did not personally surprise me; after the British landing at San Carlos Bay and their advance toward Puerto Argentino, without facing resistance with the available means, the outcome that occurred was foreseeable. Airpower alone is insufficient to stop a landing or the advance of ground forces.

16) Did the war end for you?
The conflict did not end, and it remains a part of my life that has not been fully closed. What's more, even today, we must fight against the forgetfulness of our blessed people regarding the noble cause that was undertaken to recover our Malvinas. I don't want to be simplistic or generalize, as there are always exceptions to the rule. It is sad to see today how divided we are in every area we observe: those who fought and those who did not; the professionals versus the conscripts; those who receive a pension and those who do not. It is truly painful to see the neglect of the effort made by those who gave their lives in combat. At the time, everyone volunteered to fight for their country, without expecting any medals, recognition, or economic compensation. It seems that today, our leaders "buy" or satisfy us with handouts, whether we are poor, war veterans (VGM), or friends of those in power. An example to follow is the one being set by the Japanese people in the face of the difficult times they are going through after the natural disasters they have had to endure. Only national unity will eventually allow us to achieve our strategic objectives, be it the Malvinas, progress and growth, stability, etc. But for that to happen, our people (including their leaders) must set aside personal and sectoral interests.

 

17) Did you go to the islands (landing) during the conflict? Under what circumstances?
No.

18) Did you go to the islands after the conflict? Why? (in case of a yes or no answer)
I haven't gone yet, but I plan to visit at some point. I would like to visit the places where I fought alongside my comrades during the conflict. Stepping on the soil of the Malvinas, even if it is not under our administration, might allow me to shed the "backpack" I have been carrying on my shoulders since the end of the conflict.

Relatos Históricos de la Guerra de Malvinas

San Martín: Tactical Genius in Crossing the Mountain Range

San Martin's genius in facing the mountain range

Revista Cumbres
Special collaboration: Esteban Ocampo


On the bicentennial of the impressive crossing of the Andes led by the great American strategist, a review of the planning and logistics devised to overcome the great obstacle.

 

The immensity of the mountain range was the obstacle to overcome.

Last February marked the 200th anniversary of the Crossing of the Andes, which General José de San Martín de Mendoza led to Chile in 1817 with the Liberation Army, in order to fight the royalists in their search for continental independence as part of his Strategic Plan.

The campaign has been highlighted on numerous occasions as one of the most intrepid, bold and strategically brilliant feats of all time.

Aside from the strictly military aspect and its political connotations of the time, it is worth highlighting logistical and planning aspects, strategies that San Martín devised to first battle the immense mountain range in the real conditions of 2 centuries ago.

“Much emphasis is placed on the crossing and the end with the battle of Chacabuco, but we must speak of the crossing as a military campaign, something specifically prepared whose consequence was the liberation of Chile. "Only in this way can the genius of a certain José de San Martín be contemplated" explains historian Esteban Ocampo, one of the members of the campaign who recreated the crossing this year, faithfully respecting the conditions of the time. (See separate)

Six columns

San Martín designed the campaign dividing the Army into six columns on a front of 800 km from the south of La Rioja to the south of Mendoza, where the southernmost group crossed.

Two of these passes were main ones through which the bulk of the Army of 2,500 men circulated. The other passes were auxiliary ones with columns that were not very numerous and with the intention of distracting and dispersing the enemy forces in specific missions -already in Chile- so that they would not have all their power at their disposal in the battle of Chacabuco.

A main column advanced along the Uspallata route under the orders of Colonel Gregorio de Las Heras together with the artillery under the command of Fray Luis Beltrán. The pass, accessible and low, was very used for trade at the time.

The other important column went through San Juan, the Los Patos route through Valle Hermoso which was divided into Ojo de Agua and Paso de Ortiz, where part of the advance party passed, and the Yaretas pass, where San Martín actually crossed.

The secondary routes were Comecaballos in La Rioja with Lt. Col. Zelada; Guana, north of San Juan under orders of Lt. Col. Cabot; Portillo-Piuquenes, through the Tunuyán valley from the Fort of San Carlos under the orders of Captain Lemos; and Planchón, south of Mendoza through the area of ​​the Peteroa volcano in charge of Lt. Col. Freyre.

 

One of the many rivers they had to wade through in the Andean campaign.

Clothing

The traditional uniforms were made of a very particular cotton cloth, a type of fabric that was thermal enough to not be too hot in summer but was warm enough in winter. Under the jacket they wore a high-necked shirt and the officers also wore a vest.

In the case of the Grenadier Regiment they received short red jackets made of sheepskin called “pellizas” that they wore as a coat over the jacket. They also wore black cloth trousers with leather reinforcement. Most of the soldiers wore Cuyo ponchos and cloth cloaks with a warm inner lining.

The trousers had a leather reinforcement to prevent wear from rubbing against the saddle in the case of the riders and on the cuff to protect the clothing from damage from the stirrups.

To keep their feet warm, each soldier used “tamangos,” a kind of sheepskin covering that was placed over their shoes, which were usually made of leather with buckles. In the case of the Infantry, they called a boot a short, mid-calf or even knee-high gaiter that went over the shoes.

For their hands they wore cloth gloves, for their heads they covered the back of their necks and ears with scarves, and on top of that they wore a “head cover,” a cap or hat, a kind of beret that they wore during training in the barracks. In other units they wore caps with sleeves that fell to one of the shoulders.

The regiments wore three uniforms: the barracks uniform, the campaign or combat uniform, and the parade or gala uniform, the latter being the most striking. The one used for crossing was the combat uniform.

At night, very simple reinforced cloth tents were set up in less than 3 minutes. They had four poles and two guy lines, one in front and one behind. Each tent accommodated 2 to 3 soldiers and they used individual saddles, fleeces and blankets as beds, and even the saddle served as a pillow. They covered themselves with the same coat as each other.

 
San Martín's first great challenge was to overcome nature.

Food

As the main food to face the crossing of the high peaks, each soldier carried a piece of charqui that they ground and cooked quickly in a kind of Valdivian broth with lots of onion and garlic for altitude sickness. They were meals in the style of carbonada or succulent stew that provided a significant amount of protein with the simplicity of preparing it in a few minutes to immediately recover strength.

The Army also carried 700 cattle on the hoof that they slaughtered as the columns advanced. Thus, fresh meat was available as a roast or stew.

Bread, flour biscuits, vegetables, nuts and a daily ration of liquor completed the diet to avoid the effects of altitude and cold, since that was what the campaign's food plan was about, which also resulted in simple and quick food to prepare.

Logistics

Each column on its march itinerary had a detailed description of each day: the points they had to join, the length in leagues, the availability of water, grass and firewood, the type of terrain and forest. This information was useful for the guides to regulate the march and thus reach the planned points.

The instructions began with the following text: “You will advance according to prudence, your experience and the intelligence you have to comply with these orders.”

Communications through messengers were also very important. It is known that San Martín sent constant messages to Las Heras to speed up or slow down the march depending on the tactics. In the diary of Bernardo O’Higgins, the vanguard of the Los Patos route, these communications are recorded, which he sent to San Martín in the rearguard.

The central concept of the plan to cross the Andes was to minimize any problem, error or imponderable when facing the mountain. In 1816, the Great General confessed in a letter to Tomás Guido that what kept him awake at night was not the opposition, what the enemy might be preparing on the other side, but being able to cross this mountain range with 5,000 men and then give battle.

The precise and coordinated arrival of the columns on February 8, 1817, to Santa Rosa de los Andes was the result of precision in communications and efficiency in planning. This made the achievement possible and led to the military triumph of Chacabuco. Crossing the mountain range having fulfilled the objectives designed was half the battle won.

 

The group that designed and carried out a historical recreation of the San Martin crossing.

A faithful recreation

A group of people who make up the Historical Cavalry Squadron crossed the Andes last February, emulating and paying homage to the liberating feat and in exactly the same conditions as the Army formed and led by General José de San Martín in 1817 did 200 years ago.

Without any technological aid, dressed in the same clothing and sleeping in period tents, on February 3, 2017 (what a date) six “reenactors,” a cameraman, and three guides who traveled through the Argentine side took the initial step from the San Juan town of Tamberías to realize a dream and a feat that they have been planning since the end of 2015.

The preparation included a lot of personal training, constant medical checkups, horseback riding practice, all to be able to face eight to ten hours of mounted marching every day at altitudes above 3,500 meters.

They used clothes made with the same fabrics used in the San Martin Army, the same tents, blankets, utensils such as lanterns, candles, sabers, all derived from a deep historical investigation to reproduce the feat faithfully.

The saddles served as beds at night, and the same poncho as a coat was a blanket to try to sleep in the middle of the relentless cold of the mountain range.

Pablo Zamprogno, Esteban Ocampo and his son Martín (10), Javier Madariaga, Guadalupe Strada and Daniel Gwaszdac are the members of the Reenactors Group of the Historical Cavalry Squadron. The itinerary was approximately the one taken by the column led by Lt. Col. Juan Manuel Cabot in 1817, through the North of the province of San Juan known as Guana Pass. After six days of travel through La Vega Grande, Los Azules, Los Esteros de la Mula and La Cuesta, they arrived at “Paso del Gordito” where Chilean authorities from Monte Patria and Ovalle welcomed them to cross the border. Then came Las Ramadas, Tulahuen, Huana, Monte Patria, Ovalle, Barraza and finally Coquimbo and La Serena, the final objective of the great enterprise, always received by the towns with great joy and emotional recognition.

The objective of the initiative was to experience the crossing of the Andes as San Martin's soldiers experienced it 200 years ago. The result, in the evaluation made by its protagonists, was highly satisfactory and a reason for greater admiration for those men who accompanied the Liberator in 1817.