
Beagle Crisis: Fleets Face Off in the South Seas
Esteban McLaren
FDRA
"Our country will, I believe, sooner forgive an officer for attacking an enemy than for letting it alone."
Admiral Horatio Nelson
On December 22, 1978—D-Day—various military operations would have been launched in a coordinated manner along the Chilean border as part of Operation Soberanía. It is exceedingly difficult to determine with absolute certainty which of the planned actions would have formally initiated the war; however, it is evident that hostilities would have commenced with a simultaneous assault on at least four fronts. The primary engagement would have been a naval battle and amphibious landing in the Beagle Channel, where the Argentine Navy’s Marine Corps (Infantería de Marina de la Armada de la República Argentina, IMARA) would have deployed troops on Lennox, Nueva, and Picton Islands—the latter already occupied by Chilean Marine Corps (Cuerpo de Infantería de Marina, CIM) forces.
The purpose of this article is to explore an alternative historical scenario. The war never took place, but what might have transpired had Argentina refused papal mediation?

An A-4Q Skyhawk, launched from the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, successfully strikes the Chilean Navy’s APD-29 Uribe.
Planned Argentine Offensive Against Chile (Wikipedia)
The Argentine offensive against Chile was set to unfold in the following sequence:
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20:00 (H-2), December 22, 1978 (D-Day):
- FLOMAR and the Marine Corps (Battalion No. 5) would seize control of Freycinet, Hershell, Wollaston, Deceit, and Hornos Islands (see map below).
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22:00 (H-Hour):
- FLOMAR and Marine Corps Battalions No. 3 and No. 4 would occupy Picton, Nueva, and Lennox Islands, securing full control over the Beagle Channel (see map below).
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24:00 (H+2):
- The land offensive would commence, led by the V Army Corps, advancing from Santa Cruz Province into Chilean Patagonia, with the goal of capturing as much territory as possible.
- Simultaneously, the Argentine Air Force (FAA) would initiate strategic bombing operations.
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06:00 (H+8), December 23, 1978:
- The destruction of the Chilean Air Force (FACh) on the ground would be carried out.
A naval conflict between Argentina and Chile in 1978 would have been a highly complex, multidimensional operation, involving naval, air, and land forces within a challenging geographic environment.
Argentina’s air and submarine superiority would have provided a significant advantage, yet Chile’s coastal defenses and tactical coordination would have posed a formidable resistance.
The outcome would have depended on numerous tactical and strategic factors, as well as the effectiveness with which both nations executed their planned operations.
Airpower Distribution and Tactical Considerations
In this specific scenario, it is important to note that the Argentine Armed Forces had three operational airbases along the front:
- A mobile airbase—the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo.
- Two land-based airbases—Río Grande and Río Gallegos, both of which would later prove highly effective during the Falklands War (1982).
In contrast, Chile relied solely on Chabunco Air Base in Punta Arenas, which would have been responsible for an overwhelming number of missions, including:
- Attempting to halt Argentine amphibious landings.
- Conducting anti-ship strikes against FLOMAR.
- Intercepting air raids from the northeast (Río Gallegos) and east-northeast (Río Grande).
- Planning and executing airbase attack (ABA) operations against Argentine airbases.
Would a single runway have been capable of handling such an extensive combat workload?
Meanwhile, the Argentine Naval Aviation (COAN) would have focused exclusively on anti-ship strikes and close air support (CAS), while the Argentine Air Force (FAA) would have been tasked with:
- Supporting the armored assault on Punta Arenas.
- Executing an ABA operation against Chabunco Air Base.
- Establishing air superiority over Punta Arenas.
- Providing air support to amphibious operations upon request from the Argentine Navy (ARA).
Situation Report
The Chilean Fleet’s Strategy and Its Flaws
Regarding a potential Argentine amphibious landing, the Chilean Navy (ACh) was already deployed in the area under a strategy led by Rear Admiral López Silva. However, this strategy appears questionable, as some sources indicate it was based on sequential engagements in open waters against FLOMAR’s Task Groups (GTs).
This plan unrealistically assumed that each individual attack would be decisive enough to destroy an entire Argentine task group, while the rest of FLOMAR—including the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo—would not retaliate in any meaningful way.
Furthermore, some Chilean officers placed their hopes on bad weather, which could ground COAN’s carrier-based aircraft. Other Chilean analysts have suggested a prolonged, phased naval battle over several days, under the assumption that Argentine sailors would passively watch their fleet being destroyed (Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano, 2017).
This borderline magical realism suggests a lack of rigorous military planning—one wonders if basic calculations were ever conducted to test the feasibility of such assumptions.
Deceptive Task Force Composition: Was an Amphibious Landing the True Plan?
At first glance, FLOMAR’s division into three task groups seemed to indicate a coordinated amphibious assault. However, this may not have been the actual plan.
The assault on the Cape Horn islands was designed to be executed via heliborne operations. Only one section of Marine Battalion No. 4 (BIM4) was embarked on the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, while the amphibious transports Cándido de Lasala and Cabo San Antonio were reportedly empty.
Thus, dividing FLOMAR into three groups made little strategic sense—unless it was intended as a feint to lure the Chilean Squadron into expending its MM-38 Exocet missiles prematurely.
Even this hypothesis, however, seems improbable, as the Argentine Navy (ARA) was unlikely to sacrifice ships and crews in the manner that the ACh was seemingly willing to do with its "Acero" and "Bronce" formations (a contradiction present in Arancibia Clavel & Bulnes Serrano book).
FLOMAR’s Likely Strategy: Naval Combat Superiority
A far more plausible scenario is that, by December 22, FLOMAR was organized into an optimal formation for naval-air warfare, with the primary objective of neutralizing the Chilean Squadron in open waters.
The Argentine plan likely involved:
- Luring the Chilean Squadron into revealing all its ships.
- Launching persistent aerial attacks from 200–350 nautical miles away to weaken or destroy Chilean vessels.
- Engaging in a decisive surface battle once Chile’s fleet had been degraded.
This theory is reinforced by the positioning of Argentine submarines at the exits of Chilean fjords, suggesting they were tasked with tracking the Chilean Squadron’s movements—which, in fact, they successfully accomplished. These submarines would then attack any surviving Chilean vessels during their retreat.
The Argentine strategy was logically sound, given that Chilean forces had anticipated a direct attack on Picton, Lennox, and Nueva Islands. As a result, Chile had concentrated significant manpower and equipment on these islands, immobilizing these units and leaving them vulnerable to aerial strikes before an actual amphibious assault took place.
Additionally, these troops were unable to defend Tierra del Fuego, where four Argentine Marine battalions were scheduled to land.
This approach aimed to maximize the operational effectiveness of Argentine forces while gradually eroding Chilean defensive positions.
Challenges of Carrier Operations: Why Was FLOMAR Divided?
The Argentine Navy (ARA) could not operate as a single formation due to the design limitations of the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, which cruised at 20 knots and needed to stay at a safe distance from missile and artillery engagements.
Once the carrier launched its A-4 Skyhawks, whether for naval strikes or to neutralize Chilean maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), it remained vulnerable until their return.
Out of eight available A-4Q Skyhawks:
- Two were configured for interception.
- Three were designated for naval strikes.
- Three were assigned to logistical support, with one acting as a tanker (all of which could be quickly converted into attack aircraft if necessary).
Additionally, the carrier’s speed limitations—with a maximum of 28 knots for short bursts but an operational cruising speed of 20 knots—necessitated the division of FLOMAR into three operational groups.
Operational Constraints and Strategic Fleet Distribution
FLOMAR was traditionally trained to operate in two groups but was not accustomed to maneuvering as three separate forces. The shortage of modern warships had been partially mitigated by the acquisition of two A-69 frigates in 1978, which arrived in August and October of that year.
The fleet was structured as follows:
- The carrier battle group (PAL) was centered around ARA Veinticinco de Mayo and included the Type 42 destroyer ARA Hércules.
- One task group was designed to simulate an amphibious force, luring the Chilean Squadron into a direct engagement, drawing it away from the carrier.
- The third group, composed of destroyers, functioned as a blockade force, positioned to intercept any Chilean fleet movements toward the carrier battle group. If Chile’s fleet failed to split its forces, this group was prepared to maneuver and attack from the flank.
This strategy maximized Argentine naval effectiveness while protecting high-value assets like the carrier and its air wing in a high-risk combat environment.
Speed Considerations and Closing Rates
It is important to note that FLOMAR was a 20-knot fleet, but so was the Chilean Navy, given that its two cruisers were also limited to 20 knots.
Thus, the approach speed was:
- 20 knots for both the Chilean fleet and the Argentine amphibious groups (ARA General Belgrano) and the PAL (carrier battle group).
- The central destroyer group, however, could exceed 20 knots, giving it a maneuverability advantage.
Probability of Success
Argentine Forces
With air superiority provided by the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, as well as a modern surface fleet and an operational submarine force, Argentina held a significant advantage.
The joint air-sea-submarine operations conducted by FLOMAR would have further increased the likelihood of success, enabling:
- Preemptive aerial strikes against Chilean naval assets.
- Coordinated submarine ambushes at key maritime chokepoints.
- Surface fleet maneuvers to exploit vulnerabilities in Chile’s defensive positioning.
The comparison between the Chilean Navy (ACh) and FLOMAR highlights a clear asymmetry in capabilities. The pink bands represent the effective range of primary weapons, specifically the MM38 Exocet missiles (35–42 km range). The ARA Veinticinco de Mayo is depicted with an A-4Q Skyhawk fully loaded with bombs and fuel, capable of executing a low-altitude (Lo-Lo) flight profile with a strike radius of 350 km—a tactic designed to evade radar detection during approach. These zones define the critical areas that each fleet needed to control before posing a legitimate threat to its adversary. From an analytical perspective, it is difficult to see even a semblance of parity between the two forces. Argentina’s carrier-based aviation and submarine warfare capabilities provided a substantial strategic advantage, making a balanced engagement highly unlikely.
Before analyzing Chile’s overall position, it is crucial to assess the Chilean Navy’s (ACh) ability to repel an aerial attack, which was expected to be the primary offensive strategy of the Argentine Navy (ARA). Some Chilean Almirante-class destroyers were equipped with the British Short Sea Cat SAM system. This was a small, subsonic missile, powered by a solid-fuel, two-stage rocket motor. It featured a cruciform wing structure for in-flight stability and was command-line-of-sight (CLOS) guided via a radio link. This meant that a remote operator manually directed the missile while keeping both the missile and the target within their field of vision. The same system was mounted on the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano and, in its land-based Tigercat version, was deployed by the Argentine Marine Corps (IMARA) in Tierra del Fuego and the Army (EA) in Río Gallegos.
Short Sea Cat’s Effectiveness in Combat
During the Malvinas War (1982), the Sea Cat proved highly inaccurate, primarily due to its lack of autonomous guidance. Its effectiveness was limited by the human operator’s ability to track a fast-moving target, a task complicated by:
- Depth perception issues at long range.
- Difficulties in accurately judging distances and spatial positioning.
As a result, the estimated probability of a successful interception with the Sea Cat was only 10%.
Best-Defended Chilean Naval Units
The most capable Chilean warships for anti-aircraft self-defense were likely the light cruisers Almirante Latorre and Capitán Prat, each equipped with up to 14 Bofors 40mm pom-pom installations. These cruisers would have been the most challenging targets to approach and attack. However, if communications and targeting coordination had allowed it, the task of neutralizing these ships may have been delegated to Argentine submarines rather than aircraft.
Critical Strategic Analysis: The Chilean Fleet’s Fatal Vulnerability
The most crucial intellectual exercise, which no previous analysis has seemingly considered, is the following:
Chilean Approach Timeline and Limitations
The Chilean fleet would advance toward FLOMAR at a speed of 21–28 knots, assuming that its CASA C-212 maritime patrol aircraft successfully located the Argentine fleet (as Chile had no other reconnaissance assets). According to Chilean sources, the distance to be covered was between 120 and 193 nautical miles. This means that the Chilean fleet would take between 5 and 8 hours to reach within 20 miles of the Argentine fleet—the minimum range required to launch an MM38 Exocet missile, Chile’s only decisive naval weapon. For 5 to 8 hours, the Chilean fleet would be completely unable to fire upon or damage the enemy.
Argentine Air Superiority: FLOMAR’s Window of Opportunity
During this 5 to 8-hour approach period, the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo could launch and recover 3 to 5 full combat sorties of its Carrier Air Group (GAE).
Assuming:
- Each strike package flew at 400 knots round-trip.
- Aircraft were refueled and rearmed in 25 minutes between missions.
Each A-4Q Skyhawk would be armed with three 458 kg (1,000 lb) bombs, equipped with naval impact fuzes. Thus, in the first strike alone, the Argentine aircraft would drop 24 bombs on the Chilean Squadron (Escuadra). However, the A-4Q could also be configured to carry six 227 kg (500 lb) bombs, effectively doubling the number of bombs per sortie.
Assuming:
- No Argentine aircraft losses, 96–120 bombs would be dropped on the Chilean fleet by the fourth or fifth wave.
- Even in a worst-case scenario, where up to four Argentine aircraft were shot down per sortie, the Chilean fleet would still be hit by a minimum of 36 bombs before it could launch a single Exocet missile.
Chilean High Command’s Critical Miscalculation
This means that, before any Chilean combat operator could press the launch button of a single Exocet, their fleet would have already been subjected to between 36 and 120 bomb strikes. Does this fundamental flaw in Chile’s battle plan become clear? Was Formation "Acero" truly as "armored" as its name suggested? What exactly was the Chilean command thinking? Rear Admiral Humberto Barbuzzi, commanding FLOMAR, would not have believed his luck.
Approach Time to 20 Nautical Miles, Number of Attack Waves, and Bombs Delivered (Including Losses)

Desperation Breeds Creativity: The Chilean "Decoy Helicopters"
As the saying goes, necessity is the mother of invention, though in this case, it appears more like desperation disguised as innovation.
Rear Admiral López Silva, seemingly convinced that FLOMAR’s greatest threat was its MM-38 Exocet anti-ship missiles, devised a rather unconventional countermeasure. In what can only be described as a bold act of ingenuity, he ordered Chilean technicians to modify their SA-316B Alouette helicopters, which were embarked on their Leander-class frigates.
The "Floating Decoy Fleet" Plan
- What modifications were made?
- Large steel cages (3x3x3 meters) were suspended beneath the helicopters’ fuselages.
- What was the goal?
- These helicopters would take off from their motherships and fly parallel to them at 20–25 knots, aiming to simulate additional ships on radar.
- The hope was that Argentine Exocets would lock onto these "phantom ships" instead of actual Chilean vessels, wasting valuable Argentine missiles.
While this approach deserves credit for creativity, it raises three serious questions:
1. What if an Exocet Actually Hit One of These Helicopter Decoys?
If an Exocet locked onto one of these "floating decoys", the resulting explosion would have been nothing short of spectacular. A 1,100 kg missile striking a lightweight helicopter would have created an aerial fireball unlike anything seen in naval warfare.
2. What if These Helicopters Encountered an A-4Q Skyhawk at 300 Knots?
A more probable and horrifying scenario:
- If one of these low-speed helicopters encountered an A-4Q Skyhawk screaming in at 300 knots, its crew wouldn’t have a chance to react.
- At best, the Skyhawk’s twin 20mm Colt Mk 12 cannons would shred the helicopter to pieces.
- At worst, the Skyhawk could fire an AIM-9B Sidewinder, ensuring an even more catastrophic end.
3. López Silva’s Flawed Assumption: A "Missile-Only" Naval Battle
This entire strategy further confirms that López Silva expected a naval battle akin to the 1973 Battle of Latakia—where two opposing fleets engaged each other exclusively with long-range missiles. His reliance on bad weather as his only real air defense, much like Hitler’s dependence on winter storms during the Ardennes Offensive, highlights the lack of a viable anti-air strategy. "Sail south and win the war..." Admiral Merino had told López Silva, in what now seems like an attempt to manufacture a legendary naval hero for Chilean morale. Instead, López Silva sailed south armed with nothing but a wish, a prayer, and a squadron of "decoy helicopters."

The Chilean Squadron’s "Trump Card": Alouette Helicopters with Radar-Reflecting "Chicken Coops"
Chilean Forces: A Doomed Fleet at the Mercy of FLOMAR
Once the Chilean fleet entered open waters, it would have been at the complete mercy of:
- Argentine Naval Aviation (COAN), initially.
- Argentine submarines, subsequently.
As previously analyzed, distance overwhelmingly favored FLOMAR.
- If the Chilean fleet were detected at 190 miles, successive bombing waves from A-4Q Skyhawks would have inflicted devastating damage, even when factoring in potential aircraft losses.
- It is almost tragic to imagine a fleet accelerating to engage the enemy, only to be progressively bombed over and over again—with no support from the air or from below the surface.
Furthermore, if the Chilean Squadron attempted to close the distance, FLOMAR would:
- Detect it first (via S-2 Tracker and P-3 Neptune aircraft, followed later by shipborne radar).
- Simply sail in the opposite direction, extending the engagement further into the Argentine Sea—a fundamental matter of physics and naval maneuvering.
The "Pursuit" Scenario: A Tactical Absurdity
If we remove the slow-moving "Acero" formation and only consider the faster "Hierro" formation (capable of 28 knots), the following scenario unfolds:
- If a CASA C-212 patrol aircraft successfully located FLOMAR at 190 miles, the Chilean fleet would begin pursuit.
- FLOMAR, restricted to 20 knots due to ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, would continue maneuvering.
- Time required for the Chilean fleet to close to 20 miles (Exocet firing range): 21 hours and several minutes—covering nearly 600 nautical miles.
- This hypothetical pursuit would place both fleets north of the Malvinas Islands—a completely ridiculous outcome.
Conclusion: There was no realistic scenario in which Chilean warships could approach within Exocet range of the Argentine fleet.
Probability of success: Zero.
Alternative Strategy: Luring FLOMAR into the Fjords
The alternative strategy that Rear Admiral López Silva failed to consider was:
- Abandoning the defense of the islands, instead retreating into Chile’s interior fjords and channels.
This option had serious political consequences, as Admiral Merino would never have forgiven him for "ceding" the islands. However, it would have significantly increased the Chilean fleet’s chances of survival.
Even so, this approach had severe limitations:
- With over 50 Argentine naval aviation aircraft patrolling the area, a successful anti-ship strike on FLOMAR was only a matter of time.
- While this plan prioritized the survival of the Chilean fleet, it failed to prevent the Argentine amphibious landings—which was its primary mission.
The Harsh Reality: The Chilean Navy Lacked "Decisive Weapons"
The Chilean Navy (ACh) was a serious opponent but entirely lacked definitive offensive weapons:
- No combat aviation to challenge the enemy in the third dimension (altitude).
- No operational submarines to strike from below with full stealth.
Had the war lasted just one week, it is not unreasonable to assume that the entire Chilean fleet would have been sunk—or, for all practical purposes, rendered combat ineffective.
Probability of success: Zero.

Defeat Scenario: The Inevitable Fate of the Chilean Navy (ACh)
Had the Chilean Navy (ACh) suffered defeat, the most likely outcome would have been the sinking or neutralization of its primary combat assets.
Priority Targets:
- First priority: The Leander-class and Almirante-class frigates, given their modern capabilities and strategic value.
- Second priority: The light cruisers Capitán Prat and Almirante Latorre, as their naval artillery posed a direct threat to Argentine amphibious operations.
- Other targets would have been engaged as tactical circumstances dictated.
López Silva’s Blind Spot: The Malvinas War as a Case Study
Rear Admiral López Silva, supposedly the ACh’s leading expert in naval-air warfare, failed to recognize a fundamental reality—one that became undeniable just four years later.
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In 1982, the Argentine Air Force (FAA) proved that a fleet confined to a narrow waterway (such as the San Carlos Strait) or operating close to the coast (as the southern Cape Horn islands would have forced the Chilean fleet to do) was highly vulnerable to low-altitude jet attacks.
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The Royal Navy, which possessed far superior air-defense missile systems compared to the Chilean fleet, only managed limited aerial kills.
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The only reason the Royal Navy’s surface fleet was not crippled was due to faulty bomb fuzes on Argentine ordnance, which often failed to detonate upon impact.
Could Chile Have Fared Any Better?
The Chilean fleet would have faced sustained attacks from:
- A-4 Skyhawks (FAA - B/P variants & COAN - Q variant).
- Israeli-built Mirage variants (FAA - Dagger/Nesher).
These aircraft had proven devastatingly effective in anti-ship operations, even against a technologically superior fleet like the Royal Navy.
Did the Chilean high command truly believe they would achieve a different outcome?
Was this an operational miscalculation or sheer wishful thinking?
ACh in the Beagle Channel: A Guaranteed Defeat
If the Chilean Navy (ACh) attempted to maneuver through the Beagle Channel, its destruction would have been assured.
- The fleet would be trapped in confined waters or forced to sail close to the southern coast of the islands, which would severely limit maneuverability and provide no escape routes.
- This positioning would have made it significantly easier for Argentine aircraft to approach undetected by flying below radar coverage, using terrain masking—exactly as was done in the San Carlos Strait during the Falklands War.
Tactical Breakdown of the Attack on ACh
- Argentine airstrikes would systematically neutralize the ACh’s main warships.
- Once these primary targets were out of action, Argentine destroyers and missile corvettes would finish off the remaining vessels using Exocet missiles.
However, this was not the scenario the Chilean Navy envisioned, according to the account provided by Arancibia Clavel and Serrano Bulnes.
FACh: The Last Hope That Would Never Arrive
With no viable naval escape, the ACh would have been forced to rely on air support from the Chilean Air Force (FACh), operating from Chabunco Air Base.
Unfortunately for Chile:
- At 06:00 AM on December 23, Chabunco was scheduled to be the primary target of a massive preemptive strike by all combat aircraft from BAM Río Gallegos.
- Even if Chilean fighters managed to take off, their situation would be even worse upon their return:
- The Argentine Naval Aviation (COAN) had a dozen T-28 Fennecs stationed just under 200 km from Chabunco, waiting to ambush landing Chilean fighters with machine-gun and rocket attacks.
The result? Any remaining Chilean air assets would be decimated before they could rearm and refuel.
The Last Resort: A Retreat to the Fjords
If any remnants of the Chilean fleet survived the battle in the Fuegian channels, they would have been forced to retreat to fjords such as Última Esperanza, Quintupeu, or Comau.
- If Argentina retained air superiority, the Chilean forces would have no realistic chance of survival, as FLOMAR could conduct continuous, precision airstrikes against the trapped fleet.
- If Chile somehow managed to contest air superiority, the fleet might have had a better chance of defending itself, but it would still face overwhelming Argentine naval and air attacks.
Final Assessment: The Chilean fleet, whether trapped in the Beagle Channel or forced into the fjords, was ultimately doomed to destruction or irrelevance.
The Ship "Avoided" in the Chilean Narrative: The Best Aircraft Carrier in Latin American History—ARA Veinticinco de Mayo
Summary: FLOMAR’s Overwhelming Technological and Operational Superiority
The technological and operational superiority of FLOMAR granted Argentina a decisive advantage in any direct engagement with the Chilean Navy (ACh). Carrier-based air power, modern submarines, and advanced reconnaissance capabilities ensured that FLOMAR would dictate the terms of battle. The Chilean fjords could serve as a natural refuge, but they would not change the fundamental strategic imbalance.
Without the means to counter Argentina’s air and naval dominance, Chilean forces would have faced insurmountable challenges—ultimately leading to a one-sided defeat.
Runawat to the Fjords, perhaps the best end for the ACh...Final Assessment: ACh’s Best Efforts Were Simply Not Enough
This analysis does not seek to discredit the efforts or planning of the Chilean Navy (ACh). They did the best they could with the resources available. Or did they?
That said, it simply wasn’t enough. Submarine operations were doomed from the start:
- The SS-21 Simpson was detected and photographed twice before December 21, while Chile’s more capable Oberon-class submarines were undergoing major maintenance.
- Even if all Chilean submarines had been operational, Argentina had more than a dozen NATO-trained ASW aircraft, meaning the outcome would not have changed.
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Air support was non-existent:
- Chile lacked a dedicated naval strike aviation force.
- FACh’s air assets would have been targeted before they could contribute.
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Chabunco Air Base was a lost cause:
- By the early morning of December 23, Chabunco would have been rendered inoperative, either by:
- Pre-dawn strikes from A-4 Skyhawks and Mirage jets of the FAA.
- Sustained attacks throughout the day from T-28 Fennecs and MB-326s.
- By the early morning of December 23, Chabunco would have been rendered inoperative, either by:
In the end, no amount of strategic improvisation could compensate for the overwhelming material and operational disadvantage Chile faced.

Strategic Critique: López Silva’s Flawed Mahanian Gamble
One of the most significant flaws in López Silva’s planning was his insistence on seeking a decisive fleet engagement—a Mahanian naval battle—despite leading a force that was crippled both strategically and tactically.
He committed his entire fleet (all-in) to an engagement where it would suffer heavy losses long before even detecting the enemy on radar—if it ever did at all.
Once the Chilean fleet revealed itself, its fate was sealed for the remainder of the conflict. López Silva’s plan essentially gifted the precise location of his forces to FLOMAR, allowing Argentina to dictate the battle on its own terms.
Alternative Strategies: What Chile Could Have Done Differently
When a smaller fleet faces a larger, more capable one, it should avoid direct confrontation and instead rely on naval guerrilla tactics or attritional skirmishes.
Historical Precedents:
- Argentina’s naval history was built on using smaller forces to wear down much larger enemies—whether Spanish fleets or the Brazilian Imperial Navy.
- The Norwegian fjords in World War II provided the perfect defensive environment for hit-and-run naval operations, proving that well-positioned warships could survive under enemy air superiority if protected by layered defenses.
Instead of rushing into open waters to engage an aircraft carrier battle group without air cover and with only one compromised submarine, Chile’s best option would have been:
- Using the fjords as defensive strongholds for ambush attacks.
- Preserving naval assets for prolonged resistance rather than immediate destruction.
- Exploiting geographic cover to increase survivability and counterattack opportunistically.
López Silva’s Misjudgment: Quality Over Quantity
In this conflict, the "larger fleet" wasn’t determined solely by numbers but by combat capability.
- FLOMAR wasn’t just bigger—it was exponentially more effective.
- The Chilean fleet had almost no air support and was operating with minimal submarine capability.
- Argentine naval aviators were elite pilots trained annually in ship-killing tactics, with world-class proficiency in anti-ship strikes.
Sending the Chilean fleet "solo" into battle, without meaningful support from submarines or airpower, was not just a strategic oversight—it was a catastrophic miscalculation.

Did López Silva truly believe that the Argentine Navy (ARA) would willingly bring its key naval assets within Exocet range, allowing for some chivalrous missile duel? Did he expect a Jutland-style battleship engagement or perhaps a 1973 Latakia-like missile exchange, all while unknowingly sailing into a Midway-style ambush? Did the Chilean naval command seriously assume that the ARA would not exploit its overwhelming air and submarine advantage by deploying its carrier-based fighters and submarines before the Chilean fleet even detected FLOMAR on radar?
Did López Silva think the A-4Q Skyhawks wouldn’t be used against his ships?
Long before a Chilean officer could press the launch button on an MM-38 Exocet, the Chilean fleet would have already been under attack—
- First by COAN (Argentine Naval Aviation)
- Then by CFS (Argentine Submarine Force)
- Potentially by both at the same time
History never placed López Silva’s reckless plan to the test, but in retrospect, he sold a purely suicidal strategy as if it were a winning battle plan.
Across the Andes, some Chilean perspectives claim that the Chilean Navy’s presence "forced" FLOMAR to retreat. According to this version, López Silva and Admiral Merino’s decisions "deterred" Argentina, as FLOMAR chose not to engage, supposedly out of fear.
However, a more logical perspective emerges:
- Who says FLOMAR’s withdrawal wasn’t part of its assigned mission?
- With all available evidence, how could FLOMAR possibly feel inferior to the Chilean Navy?
- Why would FLOMAR engage in an unnecessary battle when it had already achieved its strategic objectives?
Chile had already taken on the massive diplomatic cost of rejecting an arbitration ruling (a blunder originally committed by the Lanusse government) and then accepting Vatican mediation under pressure. Would Chile have agreed to this had Argentina not placed a knife to its throat militarily? Probably not (Madrid Murúa, 2003). Yet, Argentina’s passivity in 1978 continues to have geopolitical consequences today.
Just like in May 1982, when FLOMAR had the opportunity to strike HMS Invincible undetected but failed to act (García Enciso & Rótolo, 2021), a similar opportunity was lost four years earlier—the chance to destroy the Chilean fleet when it was fully exposed.
That is why this article begins with a quote from Nelson—because in both 1978 and 1982, Argentina failed to act at the decisive moment. And that hesitation still carries geopolitical weight today.
Sources
- Arancibia Clavel, Patricia y Bulnes Serrano, Francisco. La escuadra en acción. 1978: el conflicto Chile-Argentina visto a través de sus protagonistas, Santiago, Chile: Catalonia, 2017 (ISBN: 978-956-324-298-0)
- Burzaco, Ricardo. La Fuerza de Submarinos de la Armada Argentina en la crisis de 1978. DeySeg
- García Enciso, José y Rotolo, Benito (2021), Malvinas: Cinco días decisivos, Editorial SB, ISBN: 09789878384535.
- Madrid Murúa, Ruben (2003), "La estrategia nacional y militar que planificó Argentina, en el merco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile, año 1978", Memorial del Ejército de Chile 471: 50-70.