Malvinas: The attack on Ross Road Manor

The surgical strike that caused the only Kelper casualties.

June 11, 1982. Puerto Argentino. A British missile hit the first floor of the Ross Road mansion, where the intelligence detachment was located. (Photo from Nicolás Kasanzew's personal camera)

The British, through signals intelligence, deduced that that house was where General Menéndez stayed and had his headquarters. For this mission they sent a Wessex Helicopter armed with AS 12 guided missiles. In the darkness under naval bombardment cover, the Wessex approached the coast at low altitude and the weapons officer fired and guided the missile with night vision devices to the target. An Argentine Intelligence section was sleeping at the impact site.

Battle of the Vuelta de Obligado

The Obligado Cannon

Obligado's cannon responded to such insolent provocations.
His roar resonated in my heart.
Artillery Colonel Martiniano Chilavert.

Battle of the Vuelta de Obligado.

On November 20, 1845, on the banks of the Paraná, in a bend of the river called Vuelta de Obligado, near San Pedro; The memorable artillery battle took place between the troops of the Argentine Confederation and the naval fleets of England and France.
The two main world powers had become accustomed to imposing their commercial interests from the mouth of the guns of their powerful naval fleets. Egypt and China had already suffered its firepower, leaving Hong Kong as a trophy of savage imperialism, and later its victims would be Mexico and Venezuela. Old history that would be repeated in this century with the sole variation in the caliber of weapons.
In the Río de la Plata they counted as allies a group of ambitious politicians who had fled Buenos Aires to escape punishment for their crimes and others who put their ideology above their homeland.
The intervening fleet had blockaded the port of Buenos Aires, captured the island of Martín García and also the small Argentine naval fleet. They demanded, with no other right than the arrogance of their cannons, the free navigation of the interior rivers of the Republic. The obedience and cowardice of the exiles in Montevideo made them assume that they were facing another easily dominated republic.
But the habit, which they still maintain, of achieving easy triumphs through diplomatic pressure or the threat of force, collided with the iron stance of a ruler who was neither pusillanimous nor corrupt. General Juan Manuel de Rosas fought them on all fronts. In the diplomat with his skillful management of the enemy's weaknesses and with the invaluable collaboration of General San Martín; in the financial sector, causing heavy losses and a conflict on their internal front; and in the military, giving them a battle that caused the admiration of the aggressors themselves.
On the morning of November 20, the ships of the fleet took position in front of the batteries that General Lucio Norberto Mansilla, a veteran of Chacabuco and Maipú, had hastily ordered to be built. The design of the batteries was in charge of the hero of that day, Colonel Juan Bautista Thorne. The entire width of the river was crossed by three lines of chains placed on barges and dismantled boats, which were tied at one end to three anchors and at the other to the brig “Republicano”, under the command of Captain Tomás Craig, an Irishman who had arrived in Buenos Aires. Aires with the English invasion of 1806 and after becoming a Creole he fought in the Northern Army under the orders of Belgrano, and carried out the Peruvian campaign with San Martín.
They managed to build four of the seven batteries that were planned. These were: the “Restaurador” battery with 6 pieces under the command of Senior Adjutant Alvaro de Alzogaray; the “General Brown” battery with 8 pieces under the command of Lieutenant. Eduardo Brown, son of the Admiral; the “General Mansilla” with 8 pieces, commanded by Lieutenant. of artillery Felipe Palacios and, beyond the chains that closed the passage of the river, the “Manuelita” battery with 7 pieces (two flying trains) under the command of Colonel Juan B. Thorne. Most Argentine cannons were 10-pounders and only a few were 24-pounders.
To the right of the batteries, in a forest, the troops of the Buenos Aires Patricios Regiment and its military band were stationed, under the orders of Colonel Ramón Rodriguez. Behind the “Restaurador” battery there was a rural body of 100 men under the command of Lt. Juan Gainza, followed by the militiamen of San Nicolás under the command of Cte. Barreda and another rural corps under the command of Colonel Manuel Virto.
The reserve was commanded by Colonel José M. Cortina and included two cavalry squadrons under the orders of Aide Julián del Río and Lt. Facundo Quiroga, son of the Tigre de los Llanos. Behind the reserve were about 300 neighbors, including women, from San Pedro, Baradero and San Antonio de Areco, who gathered at the last minute, armed with what they could bring.
The fleet was made up of eleven ships with a total of 99 guns, most of them 32-pounders, some 80-pounders and others with the Paixhans fuze-based bullet system whose explosives wreaked havoc on the defense.
At 9 in the morning the English ship Philomel launched the first cannon shot, the Patricios Regiment band broke into the chords of the National Anthem and the Argentine batteries began to respond with cheers to the country.
In a few minutes, the quiet banks of the Paraná became an imitation of hell. About forty projectiles per minute were launched from both sides, causing widespread casualties among the Confederate troops. At eleven o'clock a group of French infantry tried to disembark and was attacked by Virto's troops, most of them perishing under the Argentine sabers or drowning while fleeing.


General Lucio N. Mansilla

Towards noon, General Mansilla sent a report to Rosas telling him that he did not know how much longer he could hold off the enemy since his ammunition was running out. However, the fire from the Argentine batteries had managed to knock out the Pandour and Dolphin ships and caused serious damage to other ships; but the cost in lives among the Creole artillerymen was very high. Captain Craig had to sink the brig “Republicano” that was already almost dismantled with cannon fire and reunited with his remaining men in the shore batteries.
At four in the afternoon, the English protected by the ship Fireband managed to cut the chains and surpass the defenses. On the ground, only the Manuelita battery responded, whose leader, Colonel Thorne, caused the admiration of the enemies, giving orders from the top of his position with his entire body exposed to enemy fire. General Mansilla ordered him to cease fire and withdraw, but Thorne rejected the order, responding that his guns demanded that he fire until he won or died. He remained in that position until a cannon shot made him fly through the air, leaving him seriously injured and deaf for life. His soldiers removed him from the field, taking him to the convent of San Lorenzo.
Towards evening, when there were no longer any cannons or artillerymen standing, the invaders landed; Mansilla ordered the enemy to be charged but a shot of shrapnel knocked him down, wounding him in the stomach. Then Colonel Ramón Rodriguez led the attack with the Patricians, giving them a brilliant charge with the bayonet but finally he had to retreat due to the numerical superiority of the enemy.
The Argentine flag that, stained with blood, was taken by the English at the Thorne battery, would be returned 38 years later by Admiral Sullivan (captain of the Philomel) as a sign of his admiration for the head of the Manuelita battery.
In Obligado the interveners had 150 casualties and the Confederation troops had 650 casualties. It was, if you will, an Anglo-French victory. But shortly after, the invaders would understand that the wise words of San Martín, who predicted disaster for them, were a reality. It was impossible to get a foothold and stay in Argentine territory; On the contrary, they were fought throughout the entire length of the Paraná. Quebracho, Ensenada, Acevedo, Tonelero and San Lorenzo marked serious setbacks for the fleet and fundamentally demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining commercial traffic, which was its main objective. The English first and then the French ended up bowing and abiding by the will of the Argentine people.
At this end of the century dominated by the “verse” of globalization, it is good that we remember the examples left by the great men of our history such as Rosas, San Martín and the heroes of Obligado. As the Catalan poet said: “Let the merchant not traffic / with what a people wants to be.”

Oscar Fernando Larrosa (h)

“La Nueva Provincia”, November 20th, 1999, page 7.

Calquin: Flour Bombed at Morón!

A day of glory for the "Royal Eagles"

Ezequiel Martinez illustrates an exercise when the Calquin evaded radar by flying at the height of the treetops and attacked the cradle of the "white glove gods", the Gloster pilots, at the Morón BAM. The bombs were simulated with bags of flour and the surprise was total without the Glosters being able to intercept them.

Operation South Georgias

Operation Georgias

Satellite image of South Georgia Islands taken by NASA

Date April 3, 1982
Place Grytviken , South Georgia Islands
Result Argentina takes control of Port Leith and Grytviken
Belligerents
Argentina vs. United Kingdom
Commanders
Captain Carlos Trombetta vs. Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills
Forces in combat
Argentina: 40 marines and the destroyer ARA Guerrico
UK: 22 Marines and HMS Endurance
Casualties
Argentina: 3 dead, 9 injured, 1 corvette damaged, 1 helicopter shot down
UK: 1 injured, 22 prisoners

Operation Georgias was the code name used by the Argentine Armed Forces to designate the occupation operations of the South Georgia Islands at the beginning of the Falklands War in 1982.
The invasion of South Georgia took place on April 3, 1982, when Argentine naval forces took control of South Georgia Island (renamed San Pedro Island) after surrendering a small group of United Kingdom Marines. in Grytviken. The Argentine intervention began on March 19, 1982 when a group of civilian workers arrived in Port Leith aboard the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso transport (B-4), raising the Argentine flag. Some Argentine marines had infiltrated among the workers, presenting themselves as civilian scientists.


Polar ship HMS Endurance in Mar del Plata in February 1982, shortly before its intervention in the Georgias.

Argentine workers in South Georgia

Davidoff contracts
In September 1979, the Argentine businessman Constantino Davidoff, director of the company Georgia del Sur S.A. and specialized in scrap metal business, signed a contract with the Christian Salvensen Co. of Edinburgh, by which it acquired the right to remove the remains of the old abandoned whaling facilities in the ports: Leith, Stromness and Husvik, on the Georgian islands. from the south.
Davidoff managed the service of the polar ship HMS Endurance at the British embassy in Buenos Aires in order to transport the personnel and equipment necessary to dismantle the facilities to the islands. As the British did not accept the request to use the HMS Endurance, in August 1981 Davidoff requested permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Argentine Navy to hire passage on the Antarctic transport ships. Knowing of the British government's decision to withdraw HMS Endurance from service in the South Atlantic and anticipating the possible evacuation of Grytviken, the Navy signed an agreement with Davidoff that allowed it to arrive at the islands at least twice a year.

Proyecto y Operación Alfa

In September 1981 the Navy conceived a plan to take advantage of Davidoff's business in South Georgia and thus establish a secret base in that disputed territory. This action was code-named Project Alpha.5 The plan consisted of infiltrating the military among the workers, with the excuse that they were scientists. Once HMS Endurance had withdrawn from the South Atlantic, starting in April it would be joined by 14 marines embarked on a ship destined to reestablish Argentine Antarctic bases, which would establish a permanent military base in South Georgia. That base would have the help of winter, which would prevent the measures that the British could take for its removal.
Parallel to the project, in October 1981 the Antarctic naval commander received the order from the chief of operations of the General Staff of the Navy to study a possible establishment of a scientific base on one of the islands in dispute with the United Kingdom. It was expected that the base could be installed in the 1981-1982 Antarctic campaign. That operation was called Operation Alpha. At the beginning of December it was decided that the base would be occupied by the military and not by civilians as had been planned, due to the need to keep it secret. The Amphibious Commando Group was ordered to enlist 1 officer and 6 non-commissioned officers. The same measure was taken with the same number of tactical divers.
On January 29, 1981, the training of the commandos and designated divers began, with Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz as their leader. The rest were Lieutenant Carrilaff, 1 diving non-commissioned officer, 1 nursing non-commissioned officer, 5 diving corporals and 5 amphibious commando corporals. On February 28 they were embarked in Ushuaia on the Antarctic campaign ship ARA Bahía Paraíso. So that it would not interfere with their plans for the Falklands, on March 16 the Military Committee canceled Operation Alpha, but the commandos remained on board preventively and left on March 18 for the South Orkneys accompanying the ship's Antarctic campaign.


ARA Almirante Irízar. 

Davidoff Travels

The businessman informed the British embassy of his trip, without requesting permission to do so on the icebreaker, and on December 16, 1981, he set sail for South Georgia aboard the icebreaker ARA Almirante Irízar (Q-5), to carry out a inventory of facilities to be dismantled in Stromness Bay. He arrived there on the 21st and left a few days later.6 On December 23, the British magistrate of South Georgia discovered traces of the Argentine presence in Port Leith and reported it to the governor of the Falkland Islands Rex Hunt, who relayed it to London. December 31st. The British government ordered its embassy to present a note of protest for the violation of its sovereignty by the unauthorized landing, but the Foreign Minister claimed to be unaware of the incident and on February 9 there was a new formal protest that was rejected by the Argentine Foreign Ministry on the 18th.
Another Argentine trip to the islands occurred in February 1982, when a business rival of Davidoff, bank employee Adrián Marchessi, made an unscheduled visit to Port Leith. Marchessi arrived at the Port Leith facility aboard the Caiman, a Panama-registered yacht, with which he had sailed from Mar del Plata.8 He reported to Grytviken, saying he was part of Davidoff's scheme and gave British authorities local details from the inspection made by Davidoff in December and even from other Argentine trips in the 1970s.

The raising of the Argentine flag

On March 18, 1982, the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso arrived at Port Leith, disembarking Davidoff's workers and his equipment, without passing through Grytviken as required by the British government. On that date, the only British presence in Port Leith was a team from the British Antarctic Survey (BAS). On March 19, 4 members of the BAS heading to Bahía Carlita discovered the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso unloading equipment in Puerto Leith, with the Argentine flag flying. About 100 people were disembarked and had occupied a BAS shelter. The leader of the BAS team, Trevor Edwards, addressed Captain Briatore to inform him that his presence was illegal and that they must pass through Grytviken, then notified the British magistrate at King Edward Point. The senior BAS commander in Grytviken, Steve Martin, sent a message to Governor Hunt, who consulted with London. The commander demanded the removal of the Argentine flag and the reembarkation of the workers. The commander of the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso responded that the mission had the approval of the British embassy in Buenos Aires and ordered the flag to be lowered, but it did not appear in Grytviken as the British demanded.
On March 20, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was informed of what happened. As the Argentines had not complied with the diplomatic formalities, the British government decided to intervene on a small scale and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom (Foreign Office) ordered the sending of the HMS Endurance with the aim of forcing the operators to lower the flag. and prevent the disembarkation of personnel. The ship departed Port Stanley on 16 March with a complement of 22 marines.
On March 21, the British embassy held a diplomatic protest in Buenos Aires, requesting the Argentine government to evict the workers. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Nicanor Costa Méndez, responded by appearing to clear up the crisis, assuring that the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso would soon depart the islands and that the incident had no official consent.
On the morning of March 22, the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso departed from Port Leith. However, in the afternoon, a BAS observation post detected the presence of Argentine personnel and passed the information to London. Consequently, the Foreign Office ordered HMS Endurance to evacuate any Argentine personnel remaining on South Georgia.

Operation Georgias

On March 23, the Commander of the Antarctic Naval Group, 16 Captain César Trombetta, in command of the ARA Bahía Paraíso (B-1) that was in South Orkney, received orders from the General Naval Staff to head to maximum speed to the South Georgia Islands, with the mission of preventing the eviction of Davidoff's group of Argentine workers by the HMS Endurance, left for this purpose from the Malvinas Islands.
The British movements were met with a series of Argentine countermeasures: the corvettes ARA Drummond (P-31) and ARA Granville (P-33) were deployed between the Falklands and South Georgia, being in position to intercept HMS Endurance and rescue any Argentine personnel he had on board.
On March 24, the Argentine government informed the press of the workers' presence in South Georgia, while Astiz received the order to "disembark on March 25 at 00:15 in Port Leith in order to protect Argentine workers. "
The ARA Bahía Paraíso arrived at Port Leith on the night of March 24 and disembarked the group of 14 soldiers commanded by Astiz (Grupo Alfa), with individual weapons belonging to the ship. The ARA Bahía Paraíso remained in the area and patrolled the area with its helicopters during the following hours. News from the south reported an unusual movement of Argentine Navy warships in the South Atlantic Ocean. Upon arriving at Port Leith, HMS Endurance found the ARA Bahía Paraíso anchored, then both ships were chasing each other and hiding around the islands until they lost contact with each other on March 31.
Faced with the prospect of possible military conflict, the Foreign Office sought to achieve some form of compromise. Lord Carrington proposed to his counterpart Costa Méndez that he pardon the workers present at Port Leith and give them the appropriate documentation, which could include the stamping of temporary permits instead of passports, which was a crucial concession for the Argentine position. Argentina's claim, however, was that the arrival of any of its citizens to South Georgia should follow the procedures agreed in the 1971 communications treaty. Governor Rex Hunt strongly rejected this extension of the agreement, valid only for the Falkland Islands, and conveyed his concern to the British government.
The British plan was that BAS commander Martin would be responsible until the Argentine forces demonstrated any hostile intent, if that occurred Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills would take command.
On March 28, 1982, at 10:57, the destroyer ARA Santísima Trinidad (D-2) set sail as the flagship of the commander of Task Force 40, embarking its commander and the commander of the Malvinas Theater of Operations, General of division Osvaldo García, starting Operation Rosario that concluded with the surrender of the British governor of the Malvinas on April 2. That same day, 40 marines under the command of Lieutenant Guillermo Luna were embarked in Puerto Belgrano heading to the South Georgia, in the corvette ARA Guerrico (P-2) (currently P-32), traveling precariously and overcrowded for 4 days as it is not a ship with the capacity to transport troops and due to the weather conditions.
On 30 March, when it became obvious that invasion was imminent, the British government ordered the destroyer HMS Antrim, followed by two other surface ships and three nuclear submarines, to South Georgia to support HMS Endurance. . The rest of the British naval units were placed on four-hour alert.
On April 1, the General Naval Staff received Operations Order No. 1/82 "S" to "occupy Grytviken and hold Leith in order to ensure control of the Georgia Islands", for which it ordered the missile corvette ARA Guerrico , under the command of frigate captain Carlos Alfonso, join the ARA Bahía Paraíso, equipped with two helicopters from the Antarctic Group (1 Puma from the Argentine Army, 1 Alouette (from the Naval Aviation Command of the Argentine Navy) and a group of 40 infantrymen of marines under the command of Lieutenant Guillermo Luna who joined Astiz's forces in Puerto Leith. Until that date, South Georgia had not been included in the Malvinas Theater of Operations.




Badges of Alfredo Astiz at the Imperial War Museum in London.

With the available units, Task Group 60.1 was formed, with César Trombetta as commander, made up of the units:
60.1.1. Polar ship ARA Bahía Paraíso, commanded by frigate captain Ismael J. García.
60.1.2. ARA Guerrico corvette, commanded by frigate captain Carlos Alfonso.
60.1.3. Fraction of the Marine Infantry Battalion No. 4 (BIM 4) with 40 men, commanded by Lieutenant Guillermo Luna.
60.1.4. Two helicopters from the Antarctic Group: 1 Puma from the Army and 1 Alouette from the Navy's Naval Aviation Command.
60.1.5. Group of tactical divers and amphibious commandos (14 men), under the command of Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz.

As a consequence of the above, a series of high-level meetings and conversations took place in order to prevent the Argentine invasion. On the night of April 1, the president of the United States, Ronald Reagan, promised Thatcher to speak with the military junta to prevent the attack. However, his telephone conversation with Leopoldo Galtieri was fruitless.

British resistance

Cumberland Bay with King Edward Peninsula and Inlet and Grytviken.

The 2nd of April

On April 2, Astiz announced to the Argentines who were in Port Leith that his country had recovered the Malvinas.[13] Receiving the order to execute Operations Order No. 1/82 "S".
After learning of the fall of Port Stanley, Mills took urgent action: his men fortified the beach at King Edward Point, near the entrance to the bay, with wire and landmines and prepared defenses around the BAS buildings. HMS Endurance, which was a few miles offshore, provided communication between the small British detachment and London. Mills was authorized to open fire in self-defense after issuing a warning. A later statement from the British government instructed the marines "not to resist beyond the point where lives might be needlessly lost."
Due to inclement weather, the ARA Guerrico only entered Cumberland Bay at 17:00 on April 2, so the plans of the Argentine forces for that day in South Georgia were frustrated and Trombetta postponed them until on April 3. These plans consisted of the landing of Astiz's special forces at Hope Point, near Grytviken, to ensure the arrival of the ground forces teams, transported by helicopter. The ARA Guerrico was to provide naval fire outside the bay, but the corvette's arrival was delayed by a storm, so a new course of action was decided for the next day. According to the new plan, the first landing was to be made by the Alouette helicopter from the ARA Guerrico, followed by three waves of marines in the Puma from the ARA Bahía Paraíso. After sending a radio message demanding the surrender of the British, Trombetta had to order the ARA Guerrico to make an advance on the Capitán Vago cove where the port of Grytviken is located, just opposite King Edward Point. The corvette was only authorized to use its firearms at the request of ground forces. Astiz's men had to remain in the rearguard aboard the ARA Bahía Paraíso. All forces involved had to avoid enemy deaths for as long as possible. Freedman believes Trombetta made those provisions thinking he would meet only the BAS team. Apparently, the oversight at that point was due to the absence of HMS Endurance, which made him think that he would only deal with the BAS people, Trombetta ordered the corvette ARA Guerrico to approach the coast, send the Alouette helicopter on reconnaissance, and transport the first group of Marines in the other helicopter, a Puma.
During the night, the two Argentine ships established contact and remained in nearby waters, with the corvette in Stromness Bay.

April 3

On April 3 at 5:00 Luna received a naval message stating that HMS Endurance was in Grytviken with 22 marines. However, Trombetta thought that the landing area would be free of enemies, which they would find on the polar ship. At 7:35, with better weather conditions, the corvette arrived at Puerto Leith and transferred the marines to the ARA Bahía Paraíso, while the Astiz commandos were reembarked, leaving the workers protected on land by men from the ARA Bahía Paraíso under the orders of Lieutenant Cortez.
At 11:10 from the ARA Bahía Paraíso the surrender of Grytviken was demanded with a message in English, repeated 3 minutes later. The message stated that Rex Hunt had surrendered, not only in the Falklands, but also in his quarters, which was false.13 Lieutenant Mills received and then relayed the message to HMS Endurance, with the intention of buying time. . At the same time, he invited the BAS personnel to take cover inside the church premises. The British soldiers did not accept the surrender. By then, the Alouette was flying over Grytviken reporting that no possible resistance was observed and the ARA Guerrico made its first entry into the inlet. According to Mayorga, Captain Carlos Alfonso, commander of the corvette, was hesitant to expose it to such narrow waters. Mayorga also validates Freedman's speculation about Trombetta's incorrect assumptions regarding British military presence around the port, citing an official report. Trombetta also had some reservations about the corvette's adequate combat readiness, since she had been in dry dock until just a few days before leaving her home base in Puerto Belgrano.


Remains of the Argentine Puma helicopter.

Helicopter shoot down

At 11:25 Grytviken was ordered for the base personnel to go out to a visible place, warning that there would be a marine infantry landing and 10 minutes later from the corvette they noticed the presence of armed personnel.
The Puma grounded the first group of 15 Argentine marines (including Lt. Luna) with a machine gun at 11:41 at King Edward Point, opposite Shackleton House, where the Royal Marines were entrenched. . By then, the corvette knew that the Marines' deployment area was on the north shore of the mouth of the inlet. The second wave of marines left from the ARA Bahía Paraíso aboard the Puma at 11:47, formed by Lieutenant Giusti with 14 other marines and a machine gun. The commander of the Argentine group already on the ground, Lieutenant Luna, requested via the ARA Guerrico - he did not have direct communication with the ARA Bahía Paraíso - that the second wave be the one that should arrive third equipped with 60 mm mortars, but the Marines were already in flight. The landing took place to the east of Luna's position, well within sight of the British detachment.30 The helicopter was within gun range of Mills and his men at that time. The aircraft was hailed by intense fire from automatic weapons, but the pilot was able to cross the bay and made an emergency landing on the southern coast of the bay, on the shore opposite King Edward Point (or Punta Coronel Zelaya). The conscripts Mario Almonacid and Jorge Néstor Águila died and four others were wounded, the rest were out of combat position, but machine gun fire was opened on the hospital, wounding a marine in the arm. At the same time, Luna's troops began their march towards the Shackleton house, but once the helicopter was shot down, the British fired heavy fire on them. In view of that, Luna requested fire support from the ARA Guerrico.

Attack on the ARA Guerrico

The corvette then made its second advance on the inlet and at 11:55 opened fire. To his commander's disappointment, the 20mm guns jammed after his first shot, and with the 40mm he could only fire six volleys. The 100 mm cannon was disabled after the first shot. Completely exposed, the ship had no other option but to move away and turned into the cove, opening fire with its weapons located on the other side of it. The British directed their fire on the ship at 11:59. The corvette was hit by small arms fire and by a Carl Gustav 84 mm anti-tank rocket launcher. According to Mills, his men opened fire from a distance of 550 m. The attack killed Lance Corporal Patricio Guanca and wounded five other sailors, damaging power lines, a 40 mm cannon, an Exocet rocket launcher, and the 100 mm gun mount. When the corvette passed in front of the enemy position again to move away, it again received intense fire. Argentine sources acknowledge that more than 200 projectiles hit the corvette.
Meanwhile, the Alouette had been transporting the other 10 marines, out of range of British guns, even though it was a reconnaissance helicopter and not a troop transport.13 As the damaged ARA Guerrico headed out of the bay , the Argentine troops resumed the exchange of fire with Mills' marines. Once out of range of the British guns, from the vicinity of Hobart Rock, the corvette resumed fire with its 40-millimeter guns, repaired and back in service.33 This convinced Mills that everything was finished and ordered his marines to cease fire. This happened at 12:48, according to Mayorga. At 1:00 p.m. Mills approached the Argentine positions waving a white cape and surrendered, receiving the order to have his subordinates leave individually. Mills and his men were taken into custody by Astiz's group, who had remained in reserve during the battle. At 1:35 p.m. it was reported that the British flag had been lowered. HMS Endurance dispatched one of her Wasp helicopters to Cumberland Bay. The helicopter landed there and detected the Argentine corvette and the transport ship in the inlet, but found no signs of combat. HMS Endurance remained in the waters off South Georgia until 5 April. In the afternoon, 13 BAS civilians who were scattered in the vicinity were arrested. At 11 p.m., Grupo Alfa replaced Lieutenant Cortez and his men in protecting the workers in Port Leith.


ARA Guerrico.

Consequences

The corvette ARA Guerrico, with a loss of 50% of its firepower due to combat, departed Grytviken together with the ARA Bahía Paraíso at 3:15 on April 4, heading for Río Grande.35 The latter transported British marines to Río Grande, from where they were sent by plane to Montevideo,13 arriving in the United Kingdom on April 20. The Argentine forces desisted from attacking the BAS base on Bird Island, remaining there and in Schlieper Bay, Lyell Glacier and Saint Andrews Bay, 15 British BAS who remained outside Argentine control until the British recovery of the islands. . The Argentine Navy left a detachment of 55 marines on the islands, along with the 39 scrap metal dismantling workers who remained in Port Leith.34 South Georgia was retaken by British forces on April 25, 1982, in the course of Operation Paraquat.

Awards

• Lieutenant Mills received the Distinguished Service Cross.
• Captain Nick Barker of HMS Endurance was awarded the Order of the British Empire in the rank of Commander.
• The main artillery corporal Francisco Solano Páez was awarded the Argentine Nation medal for Valor in Combat.
  

Bibliography

-Freedman, Lawrence: The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: The origins of the Falklands war. Routledge, 2005. ISBN 0-7146-5206-7 
-Freedman, Lawrence and Gamba, Virginia: Señales de Guerra. Javier Vergara Editor, 1992. ISBN 950-15-1112-X 
-Insight Team Sunday Times (1982). War in the Falklands: the Full Story. The Sunday Times. 
-Contraalmirante Horacio A. Mayorga: No Vencidos. Ed. Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1998. ISBN 950-742-976-X 
-The Argentine Invasion of South Georgias 

 

Wikipedia.es

Biography: Commodore (Malvinas War Veteran) Guillermo Dellepiane (Argentina)

Honor Brotherhood

The spectacular adventure of Guillermo Dellepiane, a pilot who attacked the English camp in the Malvinas, dropped bombs on Jeremy Moore and when he escaped he lived a movie odyssey. A man whom the British recognize and the Argentines ignore
Jorge Fernández Díaz



He was twenty-four years old, flying low over the sea, and was about to bomb a destroyer and a missile frigate.

They called him Piano because his name was Guillermo Dellepiane, and he was a second lieutenant in a force that had no heroes or heroes because he had never gone into combat. It was the first mission of his life and he had just taken off from Río Gallegos. His father had died without being able to fulfill his dream of realizing in reality what he had pretended to do throughout his entire career: air warfare.

It must be as disturbing as going into battle to dedicate one's life to an event that will not happen. Warriors of theory and training, many hunters receive, develop and retire without ever having hunted real prey. Piano's father, close to retirement, had died two years ago in an absurd accident, when a wing of the Cóndor building collapsed. Flying towards the target in an A-4B Skyhawk, the son now came to fulfill the desired scene concocted by the ghost of his father.

It was May 12, 1982 and a squadron of eight Argentine planes was advancing in radio silence towards two British ships. The first four were ahead and would shoot first. The four falcons behind, at a safe distance, would have a second chance or would come in to finish them off.

For Piano, it was an initiatory mission, the last lesson of a war professional: war itself. Until then everything had been learning and testing. Ensign is the first rank of officers, and Dellepiane had not even experienced in-flight refueling, a complex operation that in this case consisted of flying close to a Hercules, fitting the A-4B's nose lance into the fuel basket and load tanks to continue the journey. Many failed in this attempt: they became nervous and could not put the spear in. "Look if I can't, it's a shame," he said to himself. He was more worried about that embarrassment than about death. But when he had the Hercules face to face he did not fail, and he quickly joined his boss, a first lieutenant, who ordered them to go down to less than fifteen meters from the waves and advance at full speed. They flew so low that they left trails in the sea.

Evading missiles

With their souls in suspense they heard that, five minutes before reaching the target, the first four planes attacked. There was nothing visible on the horizon, but Piano quickly realized that his companions had not fared very well. Within two minutes they learned that three planes had been hit by anti-aircraft artillery and had been shot down amid mushrooms of fire and booms of water. The fourth plane was returning on its own. The sun made a black day splendid. Very black. Piano suddenly saw the enemy ships. There were actually two of them and they were shooting at them. At that moment he did not think about the country or God, he only watched that fantastic Technicolor movie with a certain disbelief. He saw her as if he were not a part of her. It was a short and amazing show but without noise, because you couldn't hear anything in the cabin. They were fractions of seconds: Piano held his breath, checking the speed and height, and at the exact moment in which he passed over one of the two ships, while receiving and evading shots of all kinds, he pressed the button and released a bomb. of a thousand pounds.

 
From the left, Ensign Vázquez (died in combat), Ensign Dellepiane (today Commodore), Vice Commodore Douburg, Lieutenant Arraráz (died in combat) and Captain Zelaya.
 
From the left, Ensign Dellepiane (now Commodore), Doubourg and Zelaya

The bombs hit the destroyer, tearing horrible, final holes in it. She was out of commission, but Piano learned that much later because at that moment the only thing he could do was get out of the mousetrap quickly, evading missiles and fleeing at full speed. When a squadron fires, the planes disperse and each one returns as best they can. The young ensign felt alone for a few minutes but suddenly he spotted his boss's ship and caught up with her. They could not speak to each other, because the air navigations were silent, but they flew together, like brothers, at a distance of two hundred meters from each other, with hell behind and the continent in front. They had fulfilled and returned with glory; It was a strange and pleasant feeling.

Until suddenly a low projectile emerging from the fog hit an aileron of the first lieutenant's plane. It was a fatal blow at infinite speed that made him flip, hit the surface of the ocean and explode into a thousand pieces. All in the blink of an eye. Piano saw it without believing it but without stopping to press the accelerator. He descended even further and practically plowed the sea with a metallic taste in his mouth. He was emotionally dependent on his boss. He had let his guard down for a moment, thinking "he's going to take me home," but now he was alone and desperate. Now he depended solely on his own expertise, or his luck.

He flew for a while that way, fleeing from the devil, and then, when he was sure that they were not following him, he notified the Hercules C-130, which the hunters call "La Chancha", and began the ascent. "La Chancha" placed the basket and without losing his pulse the young ensign pushed the lance and reloaded fuel. Then he flew the last leg almost blind: the sea had formed a thick layer of salt on the plane's windshield.

The salt air of desolation clouded Piano's eyes. The hardest thing was to enter the room of a dead comrade, gather his clothes, pack his suitcase and leave it in the lobby of the hotel where his squad was staying the night. That ritual awaited him in Río Gallegos at the end of that day in which he had finally had his baptism of fire in the South Atlantic. The gods, as the old Greek saying said, punish men by fulfilling their dreams.

In the following years he would only remember that first mission. And the last one. In the middle there were only reconnaissance flights, raids in the Fitz Roy area, terrible nerves and more falls and duels. Also the spirit of the mechanics, who always said goodbye to the fighter pilots with flags and cheers, and the return from the base to the hotel that, with success or without success, with or without deaths, they did in a jeep or a truck. Ford F100 singing songs against the English.

They had, of course, no idea how the war was going. And when they were transferred to San Julián they suffered a certain sadness: they occupied an inn and walked around that small city in a state of total alert.

They were not very superstitious, but they had cabals and in fact they did not take photos of each other because they instinctively believed that eternalizing themselves in those images meant a direct passage to misfortune.

They thought nothing, however, of that mission on the 13th: it was cloudy and cold, and Piano and his companions were ordered to leave for the islands. They said that the English had landed and that they were fighting hand to hand on land. The A-4Bs carried bombs, rockets and cannons. Piano was, as always, anxious. Although that anxiety usually ended when they tied him up in the cabin and had to go out into the ring. The nerves then disappeared, like the bullfighter who feels a knot in his stomach until he goes down to the arena and faces the bull with his cape.

But takeoff was not so easy. Some hydraulic fluid pipes broke and a twin plane had to be searched 1,500 meters away. The ensign was desperate that his squadron would leave without him, so he got into the other A-4B and began taxiing without loading the Omega system, which allowed for precise coordination and flight. Piano did not want to stay in San Julián, and since his people had already left, he called the leader of the second squadron and asked permission to join his group. They gave him the go-ahead and he took off without having the plane properly configured. He ascended and searched the clouds for direction, and in a moment found the Hercules, which was carrying twelve men and had orders not to enter the battle zone or remain within range of enemy missiles for any reason.

He refueled and followed his guide through the north of the Falkland Islands, then headed east at low altitude and towards the south under showers. And he was surprised to hear the islands' radar operator ask if there were planes in flight. The head of the formation responded with a request, to provide them with the positions of the Sea Harrier patrols.

When the verbal report arrived, the Argentine pilots felt a chill. There were four patrols in the air and a fifth north of the San Carlos Strait. The sky was infested with English planes. It was a death trap, and logic dictated returning immediately to the mainland.

But they were already five minutes from the objective and the day had cleared, and then the guide made the decision to continue. Later they would discover that they were attacking a huge bivouac set up by the English in Monte Dos Hermanas. More than two blocks with tents, containers and helicopters, a camp from where General Jeremy Moore directed the war.

Everything happened within minutes. The A-4Bs were traveling at eight hundred kilometers per hour and twenty meters apart. The pilots feared that a missile frigate would cut them off before reaching the target. They did not carry weapons to attack a ship; the bombs had fuzes for ground targets. Due to the large mobilization of helicopters in that area, the generals of Puerto Argentino had surmised that the very center of British operations could be there. And they were not wrong.

The flight charts said that the attack should be made at 12:15. And there were two minutes left. The hunters passed over San Luis Bay and the Malvinas radar operator warned them that the Harriers had detected them and were already converging on them. With one minute and twenty seconds left, the squad almost upset an English soldier who was climbing a hill. Now the planes, in the final run, flew close to the ground. Beyond the rise the camp appeared. And Jeremy Moore evacuated his tent a minute before the shells fell on him.

Dellepiane launched his three 250-kilo bombs, causing destruction, and realized that they were throwing everything they had at them. From missiles and anti-aircraft artillery to hand weapons. It was a fireworks festival. And almost all the pilots detached themselves from the reserve tanks and missile carriers and made a curve to return through the North, each one left to his intelligence.

Piano flew doing evasion and acrobatic maneuvers, and felt impacts to the fuselage. It was again an incredible and terrifying sight. At the height of Mount Kent he encountered a Sea King helicopter in mid-flight and shot it. Two projectiles came out and the barrel jammed, but a bullet hit the blades and forced the English pilot to make an emergency landing.

Immediately, on the left, he saw two fireballs passing by that were going directly towards his lieutenant's plane, so he shouted into the radio "Close to the right" and continued turning until he saw that the missiles were passing by and were lost. Later he ran into another Sea King and tried to shoot it again, but it was also in vain: the barrel would not unlock. So at the last moment he raised the Skyhawk and passed within centimeters of the helicopter's blades to prevent the pilot in the green helmet from killing him with his trigger.

It was more or less at that moment that he realized that something unexpected was happening: he was running out of fuel. A shell had pierced his tank, and he was only 2,000 pounds. He needed more than twice as much to reach the position of "La Chancha." But he was not thinking at that crucial moment about getting anywhere but about escaping the harassment of the Harriers. He then detached himself from the missile carriers and continued flying for a distance asking the Malvinas radar to tell him, without technicalities and with precision, where his executioners were. The Harriers were flying at a considerable distance, so already over the north of the San Carlos Strait he doubted whether he should eject on the island or try to reach the Hercules. His teachers, in theory lessons, had always recommended that in a similar situation he try to return. Ejecting meant missing the plane and being taken prisoner. Crossing meant facing the risk of not making it and ending up in the sea. If he fell he could not survive more than fifteen minutes in the icy waters, and there was no operational chance that any ship could rescue him in time.

His companions, on the radio, tried to give him advice and get him out of the dilemma. But his boss thundered: "Let Piano decide." And then Piano decided. He went out to sea, put himself on the Hercules' frequency and began talking to the pilot who commanded it. That day, two men ignored the orders of the high command: the pilot of "La Chancha" left his protective position, entered the danger zone and advanced at full speed to meet Piano's A-4B, and An officer from San Julián had an outburst, got on a helicopter and went two hundred miles into the sea to look for him, a completely irregular and risky flight that did not help but showed the suicidal courage of the pilot and the desperation with which he continued in earth the fate of that fuel-injured hunter who was trying to return home.

The ensign heard "Let's go look for you" and tried to remain optimistic, but the liquidometer kept telling him that he would not make it out of that last trip alive. "How far away are they?" he asked every three minutes. "How far away are they?" The radio was filled with voices: "Go ahead, asshole, with faith, with faith you will arrive." The ensign was calculating the amount of fuel, which was dramatically extinguished, and predicted that it would collapse. And his listeners redoubled their cries of encouragement: "Calm down, kid, that's enough for you!" He knew they were lying to him. When he reached 200 pounds he gave up. At any moment the engine would stall and go directly into the sea. Fish food. When he reached 150 pounds he remembered that it was equivalent, more or less, to two minutes of flying. "Don't abandon me!" -He cursed at them, because there was silence on the line-. Suddenly the pilot of the Hercules C-130 thought he saw him, but he was a companion. Piano went from euphoria to depression in fifteen seconds.

He did not pray in those instances, only flashes of memory of his father came to him. The ghost was inside that cabin, stuck in his headphones. "Give me a hand, old man," he asked him gutturally, with his vocal cords and with the ventricles of his heart.

The liquidometer then read zero, and suddenly Piano heard that he had been spotted and finally saw "La Chancha." He saw her crossing the sky, to the right and far below. He asked the pilot to get into position and dived without forcing the engines, gliding towards the rescue basket. When he had it in front of him he gave it maximum power with a drop of fuel in the tank and when he got within range he pressed the flight brake and inserted the spear. Everyone thundered with joy on the radio and hugged each other on the ground. Piano was also shouting, but he wanted to resupply quickly, regain control and return to San Julián at his own expense. They soon discovered that this was not possible. All the fuel that entered went into the tank and fell through the hole. "Stay hooked," the Hercules pilot told him. They had no alternative. They flew coupled the rest of the way, losing fuel and risking an explosion or not arriving in time.

It was another dramatic race until they saw the gulf and then the base. Then the A-4B broke away and, dripping with lethal liquid, searched for the runway. Piano tried to lower the landing gear but the nose wheel resisted. There was all the personnel from the San Julián base waiting, and he was running around, leaving trails of jet fuel and trying to get that damn wheel to come down. He finally came down, and the ensign landed, untied himself quickly, took off his helmet, jumped onto the asphalt and ran away from the enormous lake of fuel that was forming at the feet of the A-4B.

Medal for valor

There was partying until late and unbridled happiness in San Julián. Since Piano considered himself alive by a miracle, he had many drinks and they had to accompany him to his room: he fell asleep with a smile and woke up very late. It was June 14, 1982 and his colleagues informed him that Argentina had surrendered.

Thanks to a providential license, two days later he was already in Buenos Aires. The city remained mired in anger and depression. And also in indifference. Anyone who crossed paths with Piano approached him cautiously and after a while asked him to tell everything he had experienced. But Piano didn't feel like saying anything. For years he dreamed of those deadly pirouettes, those low flights, those deaths: persistent insomnia and frightening specters that pursued him like merciless Sea Harriers.

They gave him the Medal for Valor in Combat, and he remained in the Air Force, pursuing a quiet career with an impeccable record and a lot of professional training. Two years ago he was sent as an aeronautical attaché to London. The English received him as a great warrior. In the same tradition of Wellington and Napoleon, European armies still practice honor for their ancient and respectable enemies.

The pierced blades of the Sea King that Piano had shot down at Mount Kent are in the Royal Navy Museum, and the helicopter pilot who was driving that day is alive but retired. Piano got his phone and chatted affectionately with him. "I'm glad I didn't kill him," he said to himself.

The English veterans who fought in the South Atlantic have enormous respect for the Argentine aviators. And they are nostalgic for those times: "It was the last conventional war," they say. "Some against each other over a specific territory. Today everything is done at a distance, in terrains without defined borders and for blurred causes, with atomized terrorism and combatants." eternal religious. With those enemies in the end we cannot get together to have a beer."

That ensign, turned commodore, was invited one afternoon to present an award at the RAF aviation school. At night, the newly received war pilots and their officers dined in a majestic hall with very long tables. Piano occupied a privileged place, and the school director asked for silence and spoke about the Argentine pilot. She knew his war resume by heart and in his speech he showed his pride in having that night a man who had truly fought against them.

Last Thursday Guillermo Dellepiane took over as director of the Air War School in Buenos Aires. He occupies an office in the Cóndor Building, where his father died. Piano is now a short, chubby fifty-year-old. His hair fell out, he is extremely cordial and has modern thinking, and of course no one recognizes him on the street. Nobody knows that he is part of the brotherhood of honor, and that he is an indelible hero of a cursed war.

© LA NACION

Argentina: UNIDEF 2012 Drills

UNIDEF 2012 Drills

More than 3,900 personnel from the Army, Navy and Air Force participated, who contributed materials such as planes, helicopters, warships, tanks and armored vehicles.

From October 21 to 26, the Argentine Air Force (FAA) participated together with the Army and Navy in the training exercise called UNIDEF (United for Defense), carried out at the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base, near the city of Bahía Blanca.

At UNIDEF 2012, the operational doctrine used was applied to combat situations in air, sea and land. Its objective was to evaluate the level of joint training and improve the operational capabilities of the Armed Forces for the execution of maneuvers within the framework of territorial defense.



The purpose of the maneuver was to carry out an amphibious incursion to conquer terrain and block the advance of the enemy who had invaded their own terrain, until the arrival of the land component that allowed the counterattack.

For this, procedures such as disembarkations and reembarkations were carried out; refueling of aircraft in flight; infiltrating and exfiltrating of divers; naval, air and ground fire; heliborne operations; parachute drops and armored counterattacks.

Weapon systems and deployed assets

To participate, the Air Force provided IA-58 Pucará aircraft from the III Reconquista Air Brigade; A-4AR fighter-bombers of the V Villa Reynolds San Luis Air Brigade; Mirage III aircraft of the VI Tandil Air Brigade; an MI 17 helicopter and a Bell 212; a TPS 43 radar and an Aerospace Operations Center.



The following tasks were executed such as: air superiority offensive, close air fire support, active direct aerospace defense,
attack on naval targets, special operations, search and rescue, air assault, surveillance and control of airspace.

The purpose of UNIDEF was to evaluate the level of joint training, particularly in those activities that involved the execution of different tactical procedures, and to increase joint operational capabilities for the execution of operations within the framework of the dynamics of a territorial defense.

The final stage

On the last day of operations, UNIDEF was observed by the Secretary of Strategy and Military Affairs, Oscar Cuattromo; the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, Brigadier General Jorge Chevalier and the operational commander of the Armed Forces, Brigadier Major Humberto Trisano. In addition, the head of the Army, Lieutenant General Luis Pozzi, the head of the Air Force, Brigadier General Normando Costantino, the deputy head of the Navy, Rear Admiral Gastón Erice, and national legislators belonging to the Defense Commission of the National Congress were present.



The delegation was able to learn about the activities planned for that day. The Air Force, to close the exercise, participated with simulated attacks on vessels with the IA-58 Pucará, Mirage III and V, and shooting practice with the A-4 AR.















Fuerza Aérea Argentina

Argentine Army: XI Mechanized Brigade in Patagonia in 2012

Drills at the end of 2012

Patagonical Guardians