Welsh Legacy: Tourism in the Patagonian Welsh Towns

Conquest of the Argentine Chaco 

The Argentine Republic at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century carried out the military occupation of the Central and Southern Chaco, which until then had been in the hands of indigenous peoples. The first military expedition took place in 1870 at the end of the War of the Triple Alliance and in 1917 the conquest of the territory was concluded.
The region between the Pilcomayo, Paraguay, Paraná and Salado rivers was inhabited at the end of the 19th century by indigenous peoples:

• Guaycurúes: mocovíes, tobas and pilagáes 
• Mataco-mataguayos: wichís, chorotes and chulupíes 
• Other: vilelas, tonocotés, tapietés, chanés and chiriguanos 

El Chaco

Military expeditions and reconnaissance explorations

On April 16, 1870, Lieutenant Colonel Napoleón Uriburu left Jujuy with 250 men on mules, belonging to a regiment that he had formed with recruits from Salta and Jujuy and destined for the Orán border. He passed through La Cangayé, the old reduction of Nuestra Señora de los Dolores that had been founded in 1781 and abandoned in 1797 near the junction of the Teuco and Bermejo rivers, continued along the Bermejo and then entered the Chaco until reaching the Paraná River opposite Corrientes after 1,250 km traveled in 56 days. He subdued eleven chieftains and thousands of indigenous people who were assigned to the sugar cane harvest and reconnoitered a road to Corrientes. During this campaign, a detachment expelled a Bolivian squadron that was incurring in Argentine territory.
On February 26, 1871, the ship Sol Argentino left Buenos Aires to explore the Bermejo River as far as the province of Salta and then returned to Buenos Aires in February 1872. During this trip, there were numerous clashes with indigenous people.
President Domingo Faustino Sarmiento created the Gran Chaco National Territory with its capital in Villa Occidental (today in Paraguay) on January 31, 1872, with Julio de Vedia as its first governor.
In 1872, Uriburu traveled through the Chaco to assist the steamship Leguizamón that was stranded in the Bermejo.
In 1875, Napoleon Uriburu, already as governor of Chaco, attacked the encampments of the chiefs Noiroidife and Silketroique, defeating them. That year, the American captain Santiago Bigney and six crew members of the barge Río de las Piedras were killed by the Tobas when they were sailing along the Bermejo River and trying to trade with them. To recover the boat and another that had helped it, on December 25, 1876, Navy Captain Federico Spurr entered the Bermejo River with the Viamonte, fighting in several actions against the Tobas, whom he defeated at Cabeza del Toba. The two boats had been sunk by the natives and were recovered by Spurr with part of the cargo, arriving at Corrientes on January 17, 1877.
On July 23, 1875, Commander Luis Jorge Fontana began a reconnaissance of the entrance to the Pilcomayo River, sailing 70 km along the river.

Line Cavalry in the Southern Chaco Campaign, 1885

On April 19, 1878, Uriburu carried out a new punitive expedition.
On August 29, 1879, Colonel Manuel Obligado left Reconquista with 150 men to reconnoiter a road and returned on October 12, after traveling 750 km, without fighting the natives.
On May 4, 1880, by order of President Nicolás Avellaneda, Major Luis Jorge Fontana left Resistencia with 7 officers, 30 soldiers, 8 natives and 2 civilians with the objective of reconnoitring a road that linked Corrientes with Salta. After 104 days he arrived at Colonia Rivadavia in Salta after traveling 520 km along the Bermejo and leaving a trail open. He defeated a group of Tobas who outnumbered him in a battle in which he lost an arm. Text of the telegram sent to Avellaneda: 

I am in Rivadavia. The Chaco has been surveyed. I lost my left arm in a battle with the Indians, but I still have the other one to sign the map of the Chaco that I completed on this excursion.[1] 

On May 20, 1881, Colonel Juan Solá y Chavarría set out from the Dragones fort with 9 officers, 50 troops and 3 volunteers, with the objective of reconnoitering the interior of the area between the Pilcomayo and the Bermejo to the port of Formosa. From Fortín Belgrano he sailed along the Bermejo and, due to his delay in reaching his destination, the governor of Chaco, Colonel Bosch, sent 100 soldiers in his search. On September 3, Solá reached Herradura and from there he traveled by boat to Formosa.
On April 19, 1882, the Tobas murdered the French doctor Jules Crevaux and eleven of his companions near La Horqueta in the Pilcomayo. In mid-1882, Fontana, with the steamer Avellaneda and the launch Laura Leona, explored the Pilcomayo in search of Crevaux's remains, returning on September 18 without managing to find them. To punish the Tobas and Chiriguanos for the murder of Crevaux, Lieutenant Colonel Rudecindo Ibazeta left Dragones on June 11, 1883, leaving Dragones with 135 men. On August 10, they were attacked in the Pilcomayo by 650 partly mounted Indians, ending with the death of 60 of them. They returned on September 10 after having taught the Indians a lesson.
The French explorer Arturo Thouar made four expeditions in the Pilcomayo area in 1883, 1885, 1886 and 1892.

Victorica Campaign

In 1884, the Minister of War and Navy of President Julio Argentino Roca, General Benjamín Victorica, led a military campaign that aimed to extend the border with the indigenous people of Chaco to the Bermejo River, establishing a line of forts that would reach Salta.
Five military columns set out from Córdoba, Resistencia and Formosa with the order to converge on La Cangayé, two squadrons were to go up the Bermejo and Pilcomayo rivers and the reserve was formed by part of the Marine Infantry Regiment at Fort General Belgrano. The campaign took place between October 17 and December 21, achieving its objectives and founding three towns (in El Timbó Puerto Bermejo, Puerto Expedición and Presidencia Roca were founded, and navigation on the Bermejo River was also opened.2
On August 21, 1884, a fleet under the command of Navy Sergeant Major Valentín Feilberg left Formosa, consisting of the Pilcomayo bomber, the Explorador tug, the Atlántico steamboat, the Sara barge and another smaller one. The objective was to explore the Pilcomayo and establish a fort at its mouth. This "Coronel Fotheringham" fort is the current city of Clorinda. They explored several branches of the river up to near Salto Palmar and returned to Buenos Aires on April 14, 1885. The Swedish naturalist and hydrological engineer Olaf J. Storm participated in the expedition.
On June 25, 1885, The steamer Teuco set sail from Buenos Aires under the command of Juan Page to explore the Bermejo, returning to Corrientes on October 3.

Formosa At the End of thr 19th Century

In August 1885 a fleet of three vessels sailed along the Bermejo under the command of Guillermo Aráoz, also exploring the Teuco River. The expedition continued in January 1886 to the San Francisco River under the command of second lieutenants Sáenz Valiente and Zorrilla.
On September 19, 1886, a squadron under the command of Navy Captain Federico Wenceslao Fernández, composed of the steamer Sucre and the barge Susana, set sail from Buenos Aires with the objective of exploring the Aguaray Guazú River and verifying its links with the Pilcomayo.
On March 12, 1890, the ships Bolivia and General Paz began a new exploration of the Pilcomayo under the command of frigate captain Juan Page (who died during the exploration), exploring the Brazo Norte.
On September 1, 1899, General Lorenzo Vintter began a military campaign in the southern Chaco, commanding 1,700 men from the Chaco Operations Division, made up of an infantry battalion, five cavalry regiments, and an artillery regiment. An attempt was made to peacefully convince the indigenous people that they should submit, but several battles took place and the border line was established at the Pilcomayo River. Advanced military posts were created, communicated by telegraph and a road. The campaign concluded with the effective military occupation of the Argentine Chaco, which was carried out with little indigenous resistance.
The Chaco Cavalry Division was dissolved in 1914, leaving only the 9th Cavalry Regiment in the area.
On December 31, 1917, the Conquest of Chaco was declared over, but in March 1919 a group of Paraguayan Indians, presumably Maká,3 attacked the Yunká fort (on the Pilcomayo, in Formosa), killing the entire garrison and the inhabitants who were there, except for a soldier named Barrios who had been evacuated to Formosa, sick with malaria. He lived for many years in Clorinda, where he died in the 1970s. Today the place is called Fortín Sgto. 1º Leyes, in honor of the leader who died in that attack.

Treaties

During the Spanish colonial period, several treaties were signed with the indigenous people of Chaco:4
1662: Peace treaty between the Tocagües and Vilos Indians and Santa Fe
1710: Treaty between Governor Urizar and the Malbalaes
17??: Treaty between Governor Urizar and the Lules
1774: Treaty between Matorras and Paykin
After 1816 in the Argentine colonial period:
1822: Peace treaty between Corrientes and the Abipones
1824: Perpetual agreement between Corrientes and the Abipones
1825: Treaty between Corrientes and the Chaco Indians
1864: Agreement between the Corrientes governor Ferré and the Chaco chieftains
1872: Peace treaty between the National Government and chieftain Changallo Chico
1875: Peace treaty between the National Government and chieftain Leoncito

References 

[1] LA ARMADA ARGENTINA Y LAS CAMPAÑAS AL GRAN CHACO - 4 
[2] Expediciones y Campañas al Desierto (1820-1917) 
[3] El Río y la Frontera: Movilizaciones. Aborígenes, Obras Públicas y MERCOSUR en el Pilcomayo. Pág. 39. Autores: Gastón Gordillo, Juan Martín Leguizamón. Editor: Editorial Biblos, 2002. ISBN 9507863303, 9789507863301 
[4] Tratados en Argentina 

Wikipedia

English Invasions: Battle of Pedriel

Battle of Perdriel

Lorenzo López Saves the Life of Gral.
Juan Martín de Pueyrredón
in the battle of Perdriel.

The colonel Gillespie not is the only English who praised the benevolence with which the conquerors were treated by the main families of Buenos Aires. And if well the gentlemen showed certain reluctance in political matters, "the ladies –says– us compensated with excess the absence of those matters, with the animated chat, the fascinating sweetness and, by what never fail in their purposes, the desire of pleasing." Ignacio Núñez adds that, except for objections related to points of religion, the English "were particularly distinguished by the main families of the city, and their generals walked arm in arm through the streets, with the Marcos, the Escaladas and Sarrateas." And the lieutenant Linch reassured his mother with a letter in which he said: "Here not me consider as an enemy; the kindnesses of which I am object in all parts and especially those that me dispense the noble families of Lastra, Terrada, Sarratea and Goyena, are very great for attempt to explain them with words."

Be what be about these refinements, and of one that other romance with which Buenos Aires gifted to the English, we know that to many Spaniards and Creoles dominated them the rancor, the indignation, the shame; as was seen in the rudeness of the countryman Guanes, which had to cost him a beating with belts and a night in the stocks, in the pride of a foul-mouthed girl of the inn. "Astonished the people at seeing conquered the city by a handful of men that could undo with stones," soon began to react. "All we fled to hide in the farms and in the fields; but with the purpose of avenging ourselves," tells us José Melián. They had to "combine some plan to shake off the yoke that the English just imposed on them," says Trigo.

With much secrecy, some patriots began to mature the idea of reconquering the country. "I, who desired it with eagerness –would say Zelaya– and who had many friends with whom I met, I resolved immediately to work in this sense."

Indeed: in the 46 days of English domination there were complaisant ones who entertained the invaders with their gatherings, their sweets, and their waltzes. There were helpful spies who, by night, brought them the small snack of their betrayal. "We had in the city some hidden enemies," tells Gillespie. There were others who already practiced the "do not get involved" inside the city or moving away from it with some pretext. But, also, there were those who risked themselves to vindicate the masculinity stained that should have been in half of Buenos Aires: those who would risk their fortunes and their lives to expel the intruders. Among these dissenters was Zelaya. He was then 24 years old.

Various subversive groups intended to harass the English, each one in their own way. Gerardo Esteve Llach, with the help of Pepe "the Blond" (José Alday), wanted "to gather a portion of sailors," to capture with them the English ships that were at anchor and take them to Montevideo. But the young Felipe de Sentenach convinced him that "it would be better if they tried to see if they could achieve the reconquest of this plaza," for which it would be a good strike to install mines beneath the barracks occupied by English detachments.

For his part, Juan Vázquez Feijoo had proposed to Juan Trigo that on a determined day and at an agreed hour, they attack the parade and the detachment of the fort "with knife in hand."

Martín Rodríguez thought that, taking advantage of the habit of Beresford and Pack of going out for horseback rides with two soldiers up to the Paso de Burgos, they could be kidnapped.

Several conspirators who were with Liniers before he went to Montevideo in search of reinforcements, tried to dissuade him, and "they proposed to him several projects for an immediate movement"; but to him, they seemed some absurd and others very dangerous (Nuñez).

With the purpose of "gathering the spirits of the various factions and opinions that there were" and joining their efforts, Sentenach, Llach, Tomás Valencia, Trigo, and Vázquez met on the outer seats of the Plaza de Toros (Retiro) and decided to work together. New meetings were held at the house of the comedian Sinforiano, in the back room of Valencia’s bookstore, and in other homes, with the necessary secrecy, to discuss what should be done.

Don Martín de Alzaga, who was willing to contribute "all the money that was needed," summoned the conspirators for a decisive meeting at his house (today, Bolívar 370). In it, "each of the attendees proposed the idea that in his concept should be adopted"; and, "after having debated various plans to carry out the reconquest," they agreed on a common plan.

This agreement did not entirely conceal, however, the ill-will between the subversive group of "the Catalans," led by Sentenach and financed by Alzaga, with the "party" of Trigo and Vázquez. The resentment of these was particularly directed at Alzaga, whom his followers would come to call "the Father of the Homeland"; and his detractors, "Martincho Robespierre." And it would culminate later when Trigo accused Alzaga and the Catalans of having "ideas of independence" that were heard in the secret councils of the conspirators. More precisely, it was stated that in the back room of Valencia’s bookstore, they had talked about forming an independent republic after the reconquest. And perhaps something of this was overheard by an orphan girl that Valencia had; "because as a girl she sneaked in to hear everything, although sometimes they threw her out of the room, and she would go and come, either out of curiosity or with the purpose of bringing some mates." Such a "horrendous crime" could not be proven, which slander had attached like burrs to the honor of faithful vassals; but it gave them a grievance.

To all this would lead the rivalry of the Catalans with the "dependents" of Trigo, for the moment still united in a common subversive plan.

The Plan in Motion

The plan consisted of recruiting people, stockpiling horses, weapons, and ammunition, and placing explosive mines beneath the barracks where English detachments were stationed.

For the mines, they considered renting the house of Manuel Espinosa, in front of the first bastion of the Fort, towards La Merced; but as they could not, they rented the house next door, which had an entrance through La Alameda and belonged to P. Martiniano Alonso. To disguise it, a supposed carpentry was installed there.

Near the grounds of San Ignacio, on the streets of San Carlos and the Holy Trinity (Alsina and Bolívar), in the building that had belonged to the Procurator’s Office of the Missions, was installed the Fixed Infantry Barracks, commonly called Ranchería Barracks; in it, there was also an English detachment. Therefore, they rented, in its vicinity, the house of José Martínez de Hoz; and there the "miners" Bartolomé Tast and Isidoro Arnau dug the tunnel entrance to place the explosive. An armed group watched from the rooftop of the Café and billiards of José Marco.

Recruiting people carried the risk of being discovered by an informant. To avoid greater harm in this case, they adopted a cell system, the only contact being 5 volunteers; and each captain would be the head and only contact of 5 corporals.

In this they set out to see a subject who had told me he had 80 men ready –tells us Domingo Matheu–; but that they had to be given 4 reales daily until the reconquest." There was no issue: Alzaga had assured that they had "a great fund at disposal"; and he was not the only one contributing money.

The 27 of June at night, instructed to Cornelio Zelaya, who in little time recruited 72 countrymen. Each one received daily, at the prayer, their four reales (Honor for Hipólito Castañer, a modest laborer “who wanted nothing”). The canary Zerpa recruited 50 men. Others stockpiled white weapons and firearms. In some secret place, howitzers were being mounted. The conspirators did not rest.

Another relevant “leader” was Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, who had arrived from Montevideo with Manuel Arroyo to recruit countrymen and prepare provisioning, in support of the expedition of Liniers. “Pueyrredón passed us the word, that instantly found echo in all our friends” – tells us Melián. “We enlisted more than 300, who should meet armed on a given day in the Chacarita of the Colegiales,” adds Martín Rodríguez.

It had been arranged that the volunteers were concentrated and prepared outside the city. For that, the called “Chacra of Perdriel” was rented, a property situated 4 leagues from Buenos Aires (Villa Ballester, Street Roca 1860, 200 meters from kilometer 18 of Route 8), not far from the farm of Diego Cassero. It had taken the name of its former owner, the Frenchman Julián Perdriel, and later belonged to Domingo Belgrano. It was enclosed with thorny trees that bordered a ditch and had a building of two bodies and a terrace, whose rooms faced a central patio, closed with a gate.

In the night of the 26 of July, Trigo and Vázquez went with some 200 men towards the farm of Perdriel and installed the camp there. There are those who say that the objective was to call the attention of the enemy “and distract it from what was being executed in the city,” where “there was already enough scandal or murmur” about the conspiracy.

Certainly, “the enemies did not lack news about these movements” (Núñez), due to “their informers, of whom they had many” (Beruti).

One day (27 of July), while Zelaya was at his house with his friend Antonio Villalta, discussing details of the subversive plan, a constable of the Cabildo, nicknamed Petaca, came to look for him and said:

• “Are you Mister Cornelio Zelaya?”

• “Yes, sir, I am.”

• “By order of His Excellency the Governor, you must present yourself immediately in the chapter hall, where His Excellency awaits you.”

• “Very well. Tell His Excellency that I will go at once.”

Zelaya entered, meditating on a well-founded suspicion, and told Villalta:

• “Friend, they have discovered me! Beresford is calling for me, and it can only be to hang me. While I go to the billiard hall to see if I can find Palomares to arrange something, do me the favor of saddling my horse. As soon as I return, I will mount and ride to the countryside before they capture me. And you will lead the people to Perdriel.”

Indeed, Palomares was in the billiard hall, and upon learning that Beresford had found the end of the thread, he fled along with Zelaya, fearing being turned in “by so many informers.”

Both went to the farm of Francisco Orma, in Barracas, where they met with Diego Baragaña, Manuel Arroyo, José Pueyrredón, and other patriots who had gathered to go together to Luján, where they would join the forces of Juan Martín de Pueyrredón.

They left at dusk in the direction of the newly founded parish of San José, in the lands of Ramón Flores (today the neighborhood of Flores). From there, they took the road to Córdoba (today Gaona), which crossed the ravine of Morón by the north of Nuestra Señora del Camino (Morón), and at midnight, they reached the bridge of Pedro Márquez, from where they would continue to Luján.

Pueyrredón had gathered the contingent of countrymen summoned in the Chacarita of the Colegiales and in the Holy Places of Jerusalem (today San Martín), along with the dragoons that Commander Antonio Olavarría had collected on the frontier. Together, they returned towards the farm of Perdriel.

For their part, the Catalans had dispatched, on the 30 of July, a body of 50 riflemen and 4 howitzers under the command of Esquiaga and Anzoátegui, with the secret intent of replacing Trigo and Vázquez, either peacefully or forcibly, in the command of the camp. But they had not yet mounted the howitzers when they encountered an unexpected surprise.

Battleground Today

Time To Fight

Informed Beresford of that concentration of forces and that they had few weapons, he decided to strike. At dawn on August 1st, a division of 500 infantry with two cannons, commanded by Colonel Pack and guided by the disgraced mayor Francisco González, left the city stealthily.

At 7 in the morning, they fell by surprise upon the farm of Perdriel and, in one swift blow, dismantled that camp of inexperienced men where, with little fortune, the homeland was beginning to be foreseen.

Although Beruti strives to prove that "the victory was ours" due to the stubborn resistance against the enemy, let us accept that, when the English deployed in battle line and opened fire at will, "the rout was total, without a single man remaining in the field," as Martín Rodríguez states. "Ours defended themselves bravely," affirms Sagui, "but could not avoid retreating with some losses." This is corroborated by the author of Diary of a Soldier, admitting that the patriots "fought like lions, but there was no other choice but to flee each as best they could."

With greater detail, Núñez tells us that the patriots insisted on fighting, despite the disadvantage of their weapons, forgetting that the main objective was to prepare to operate with the expedition that was expected to arrive at any moment. “The result was as it had to be: the supporters could not withstand the enemy’s volleys and fled in disorder, despite the heroic efforts of Citizen Pueyrredón and the brave volunteers who accompanied him.”

Yes, the confrontation was unequal. The determined effort of a hundred armed countrymen, the cries of Viva Santiago Apóstol! and Death to the heretics! were not enough to hold back that barrage for long. Olavarría retreated with his blandengues. The howitzers were abandoned. Confusion and panic spread. Suddenly, Pueyrredón and twelve horsemen appeared, launching a fierce charge against the enemy artillery, seizing a cart of ammunition. A bullet struck down Pueyrredón’s horse, but a comrade saved him. The English were victorious but stunned by the audacity of Pueyrredón’s men, among whom was Cornelio Zelaya. He was “one of the few intrepid ones who charged the enemy at my side,” Pueyrredón himself would later say. Palomares confirmed that Zelaya had been “one of those who helped seize the ammunition cart taken from the enemy.”

Pueyrredón, Zelaya, Francisco Orma, Francisco Trelles, José Bernaldez, and Miguel Mejía Mármol headed to San Isidro, where they boarded a boat that took them to Colonia, from where they would return with Liniers’ expedition.

Meanwhile, the scattered men from Perdriel regrouped at the Chacra de los Márquez (Boulogne, Thames Street, between Fondo de la Legua and the Panamericana), where they would meet the expeditionary forces.

When the time came for accusations and justifications, the Catalans blamed the failure at Perdriel on Trigo’s incompetence: “he is a thief who has squandered all the money for the reconquest” and, on the eve of battle, allowed gambling, drunkenness, and the constant presence of “women for dancing and jokes” in the camp. No less scathing were the accusations against Vázquez, who, coming into the city every night, “would speak at gatherings about everything that was being planned” with reckless carelessness. Sentenach added that, while the battle was raging, Vázquez appeared at Fornaguera’s house “dressed in an old poncho, a polished felt cap, and some sandals tied with leather strips”; and to avoid danger, he disguised himself as a friar and disappeared until after the reconquest when he reappeared in uniform once more.

Without adding or removing anything, we suppose that these disputes were influenced by the rivalry between the Catalans and the followers of Pueyrredón. This rivalry had a colorful outburst once in the hallway of Llach’s house when he, unwilling to send his men to San Isidro under Liniers’ command, lost his temper at a pestering interlocutor and responded, “flipping his fingers under his chin” three times: “Do you know what I will give Señor Liniers? A garlic!” (we record the euphemism as it appears in a famous lawsuit later aired publicly). “I do not work for others to take the glory!”

As events accelerated, the Catalans hurried to gather their men in Plaza Nueva (on today’s Carlos Pellegrini Street, between Cangallo and Sarmiento) and sent them to Retiro under Liniers’ command.

August 12

The hour of the reconquest had arrived. On one side were the victors: some disinterested, others ambitious, some opportunists, others dead. On the other side were “the heretics” and the traitors. Núñez recounts that gangs mercilessly targeted those “who had acted as informers” or aided the enemy with “other vile tasks,” dragging them out to be prosecuted, stripping them of everything—“even the iron bars from their houses.”

In that world of joy and tears, of shouts and silences, like a reawakening of the old virreinal Buenos Aires, stood, proud, that reckless young man whom Liniers had praised so highly for being “one of the citizens of this capital who fought most fervently from the beginning to free it from enemy rule.”

Thus had Cornelio Zelaya begun his service to his homeland. He would continue for many years, selflessly. At the end of them, he found himself alone with his memories, in poverty and obscurity. “Even the gold medals with which my homeland decorated me—I had to sell them for trinkets to feed my family…”

 

Source

Barrionuevo Imposti, Victor – Un combatiente de Perdriel.
Efemérides – Patricios de Vuelta de Obligado.
Todo es Historia – Año XV, Nº 178, marzo de 1982.
www.revisionistas.com.ar

Se permite la reproducción citando la fuente: www.revisionistas.com.ar

Video: Skyhawk Crashed in the Salar of Tolillar

FAA Skyhawk Crashed in 1996

On June 23, 1994, during a training flight, the Argentine Air Force A-4B Skyhawk, registered as C-209, suffered an engine failure while flying over the mountainous region of the Salar de Tolillar in the province of Salta. The pilot, then-Captain Oscar Charadía, attempted to restart the engine without success. When the ejection system failed, he managed to execute an emergency landing in the salar, surviving the incident.

Over the years, the aircraft's remains have remained at the crash site. In 2019, a group of motorcyclists, accompanied by now-Brigadier Major Oscar Charadía, traveled to the site to pay tribute and place a new Argentine flag on the wreckage.

Although no specific videos of the aircraft in the Salar de Tolillar have been found, images and testimonies document the current state of the wreckage and the visits made to the site.

Conquest of the Desert: The Alsina Trench

The Alsina Trench






When the forts along the line corresponding to the Northern Frontier were completed and occupied by different detachments, the rest of the troops of the Division began executing the third phase of Minister Alsina’s plan: the construction of an obstacle to discourage indigenous raids—a trench with a parapet.

The project aimed to defend the occupied area, and approximately 650 kilometers of trench were planned, stretching from Fort Cuatreros in Bahía Blanca to Laguna La Amarga in Córdoba.

Alsina’s concept was to gain land through successive advances and to hold onto the conquered territory with a system of fortifications. Despite strong criticism from Buenos Aires newspapers and the opinions of influential figures knowledgeable about the indigenous issue, nothing could stop Alsina’s project. Once the forts were completed, work began on the trench.

The trench, as planned, was to be 3 meters wide and 2 meters deep (these measurements varied according to the terrain), with a parapet 1 meter high built on an embankment facing east, which had a base width of 4.50 meters.

The Northern Division was assigned to complete this work over a stretch of 30 leagues. Colonel Villegas began the construction with dedication and completed the assigned work in a short time.

Soldiers and hired civilians worked on the trench, receiving a payment of 12 strong pesos per meter of trench built. The work was overseen by the French civil engineer Alfredo Ebelot (1), while the efforts of the Northern Division were led by its undisputed commander, Colonel Conrado E. Villegas. They completed 152 kilometers and 200 meters of the planned trench, securing a conquered area of 127,472 square kilometers—the largest territorial gain of the entire advance. This achievement elicited expressions of satisfaction from Minister Alsina when he visited the Trenque Lauquen camp in January 1877.


Profile of the Alsina Trench

The originally projected 600 kilometers were never fully realized, with only about 325 kilometers being built.

To monitor it, 109 forts were established—small, circular structures just over twenty meters in diameter, featuring an adobe hut and a watchtower at the center, surrounded by a ditch and a stockade of pointed wooden stakes to reinforce their defense. Each fort housed between seven and ten soldiers specifically chosen for this assignment, who were required to conduct daily patrols along the line to scout enemy activity. The distance between forts was short, allowing for rapid communication in case of raids or other incidents.

The command post was a fort like the others but with higher status, as it managed the supply of horses and centralized all information from nearby forts. Additionally, soldiers’ families lived there, providing support and companionship, which helped reduce desertion rates.

Reference

(1) Alfred Ebelot, engineer, journalist, and writer, was born in Saint-Gaudens in 1837 and completed his professional studies in Paris. Due to his republican ideals, which opposed the rule of Emperor Napoleon III, he refused to pursue a career as a government official. This defiance led him to work as an editorial secretary for Revue des Deux Mondes, a highly respected publication among Europe’s and America’s intellectual circles.

In 1870, when the French Empire seemed stronger than ever and the impending catastrophe was not yet foreseen, he decided to try his luck in Argentina. He arrived in 1871, during a period of transition. Buenos Aires was still "the great village," and the term "the desert" was used to refer to the vast region about 300 kilometers from the capital that remained outside the authority of the national government.

At the time, Argentina’s total population was 1,819,000, with the French community, numbering 32,000, being the third-largest foreign group. It included professionals, industrialists, merchants, landowners, artists, and craftsmen.

In 1870, news of the Franco-Prussian War, which led to the fall of the Empire and the creation of the Third Republic, kept both the French community and the broader public on edge. Upon arriving in Buenos Aires, Ebelot founded a politically charged newspaper, Le Républicain, aimed at defending republican ideals and promoting the actions of Léon Gambetta, whom he knew and admired.

However, the newspaper was abruptly discontinued due to the yellow fever epidemic, which coincided with the dramatic days of the Paris Commune. Seeking new opportunities, Ebelot was hired by the Argentine government to conduct frontier studies. After overseeing the construction of the "Alsina Trench," he accompanied General Julio A. Roca in the Conquest of the Desert.

He passed away in Toulouse in 1920..

Source

• Mayo, José F. – Un titán del desierto, Gral. Conrado E. Villegas – Trenque Lauquen
• Sáenz Quesada, María – Argentina, Historia del país y de su gente – Ed. Sudamericana
• Colaboration: Patricia Cabeza Miró – Trenque Lauquen.

Malvinas: A Daring Rescue at Calderón Naval Air Station

The Longest Day: A Daring Rescue at Calderón Naval Air Station

On May 15, a British commando raid, supported by naval gunfire from a frigate, left the T-34 Mentor, IA-58 Pucará, and Skyvan aircraft stationed at Calderón Naval Air Station on Borbón Island completely inoperable. With no possibility of repair, the Naval Aviation personnel integrated with Marine Infantry units, assuming new roles in ground defense, combat air patrol (PAC) observation, naval and meteorological reconnaissance, and pilot rescue operations.


The Two Sea Kings on Malvinas soil, in the photo From left to right: SI Montani, TF Brandenburg, TN Iglesias Osvaldo, CC Barro, TN Iglesias Guillermo and SI Giqueaux

The Sea Kings on Malvinas

The British landing at San Carlos forced the Command of Naval Aviation to reassess the situation of the ten aviation personnel stranded on the island, weighing the possibility of their evacuation.

Since Marine Infantry units were also still stationed there, coordination was sought with the Marine component commander to evacuate all personnel to Puerto Howard on Gran Malvina (West Falkland), where they could regroup with the Argentine Army detachment stationed there.

The only way to accomplish this was to cross the three-mile-wide strait between the islands using two outboard motor boats. However, the Marine Infantry commander decided his troops would remain at Calderón, leading the Naval Aviation commander to opt for an aerial extraction of his men.

Mission Orders: A High-Risk Operation

The Commander of Naval Aviation immediately issued orders to:

• Captain Rivero, Commander of Naval Air Force No. 2, to prepare SH-3D “Sea King” helicopters and the necessary support personnel for the mission from Río Grande.
• Captain Martini, Commander of Task Group 80.1, to provide coordination, control, communications, and search-and-rescue support.

The Second Naval Helicopter Squadron, then deployed in Viedma, conducting anti-submarine operations in the Gulf of San Matías, received what was effectively a suicide mission: an extraction operation in British-controlled airspace.

On the night of May 28, all planned flights were canceled, and the squadron began preparing the only three available SH-3D Sea Kings (2-H-231, 2-H-233, and 2-H-234).

The rescue zone was dangerously close to enemy lines at San Carlos, where the Royal Navy’s Harrier jets maintained total air superiority. The helicopters would operate with complete vulnerability, lacking any weapons, sensors, or countermeasures, and being easily detectable due to their large radar cross-section and the unmistakable roar of their engines.

Mission Challenges: A Deadly Gauntlet

From the outset, planners identified critical risks:

• Extreme vulnerability: The helicopters were easy prey for any enemy interceptor.
• Zero defensive capability: They carried no weapons to counter aerial threats.
• High detectability:
  • Radar signature: The large rotor provided an excellent reflective surface, ensuring detection.
  • Acoustic signature: The Sea King’s powerful engines could be heard from miles away.
• Limited speed for evasion: Factory-restricted top speed of 120 knots.

.

Sea King painted by Arsenal Aeronaval N° 2 for the rescue mission on Isla Borbón (photo: Frigate Lieutenant Antonio Urbano -in the photo- via Claudio Meunier).

• Operational range exceeded: The extraction point was far beyond their maximum combat radius.
• Return flight under extreme conditions:
  • Night operations at low altitude, navigating through mountainous terrain.
  • Possible need for instrument flying due to deteriorating weather.
• Icing hazard: The Sea King was not certified for flight in icing conditions.
• Navigation accuracy issues:
  • Unreliable equipment for long-range overwater flight.
  • Potential errors of 10-15 nautical miles per hour.
  • High failure rate of onboard systems.
• Lack of radar: No meteorological or navigation radar available.
• No electronic countermeasures (ECM): The helicopters had no means of jamming or evading enemy radar or missiles.
• Evacuation from a highly contested zone: The North San Carlos Strait, a key area occupied by British forces, was dangerously close to the extraction site.

A Desperate Gamble in Enemy Territory

To enhance their chances of survival, one Sea King was repainted by Naval Arsenal No. 2 specifically for this mission, applying camouflage modifications to reduce visibility.

The pilots and crew fully understood the odds were against them—they would be flying directly into the jaws of the British forces, with little hope of returning unscathed. However, the Argentine Navy was not willing to abandon its men.

With courage as their only advantage, the Sea King crews prepared to embark on one of the most perilous rescue operations of the Malvinas War.

Would they succeed, or were they flying to certain death?

 

 

Original sketch published in the book History of Argentine Naval Aviation Volume III – Héctor A. Martini.

The Longest Day: The Countdown to a Daring Rescue

With orders to exhaust every resource to ensure the mission’s success, it was deemed essential to deploy two helicopters for mutual support. Operating in pairs provided greater payload capacity, improved navigation accuracy, and redundancy in case of failure. Additionally, at least one of the helicopters needed to be equipped with a VLF OMEGA navigation system to compensate for severe navigational limitations, preventing an inaccurate landfall on the islands—or worse, an unintended and disastrous descent into enemy territory.

Critical Mission Requirements

To mitigate the extreme risks, the following were requested:

• Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) to detect enemy presence, particularly in concealed inlets where British forces might be stationed.
• Meteorological or navigation radar to improve flight precision and safety.
• Intelligence on enemy activity in the operating area.
• Communications support for coordination and potential emergency responses.
• Confirmation of fuel availability at Borbón and its operational condition.
• Weather updates for both the target area and flight route.
• Night vision goggles to facilitate the low-altitude nocturnal approach.
• Camouflage paint to reduce visual detection—however, due to time constraints, only one helicopter could be repainted.

Mission Preparations: Engineering a Survival Plan

At dawn on May 29, with weight calculations adjusted to the last possible pound, logistical work began to modify the helicopters to match the planned configurations. All anti-submarine warfare (ASW) equipment and non-essential components were systematically removed to maximize fuel and payload capacity.

Among the first items discarded were the seats, followed by the bomb racks, which each saved 14 pounds. This seemingly minor adjustment underscored the desperate need to maximize available load capacity, primarily for carrying 200-liter fuel drums—a crucial move to extend the operational range as far as possible.

Since in-flight refueling was impossible, the fuel transfer solution was brutally simple yet effective: the floor panel above the main fuel tank was removed, and a manual clock-style pump was used to transfer fuel from the drums as the internal tanks emptied.

A final operational check revealed that the Sea Kings’ flight envelope had to be pushed beyond its limits. Torque limits were reassessed, allowing for a maximum speed of 135 knots—15 knots above the factory limit, a dangerous increase that risked blade detachment but was necessary to improve survivability.

Final Modifications and Crew Deployments

On May 30, the Sea King 2-H-234 (crew: Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Iglesias, Lieutenant Ricardo Rey, and Petty Officer Second Class Beltrán Giqueaux) was deployed to Comandante Espora Naval Air Base (BACE) for the installation, testing, and calibration of the VLF OMEGA navigation system.

By May 31, the calibration was completed, but the crew had just two hours of training to operate the system before taking off. That night, 2-H-234 (now crewed by Commander Raúl Lorenzo, Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Iglesias, Lieutenant Ricardo Rey, and Chief Petty Officer Roberto Montani) departed BACE for Río Grande, arriving at 23:45 hours.

Meanwhile, the two other helicopters, which had remained in Viedma for final preparations, departed for Río Grande on June 1, arriving at 17:00 hours:

• 2-H-231 (Commander Norberto Barro, Lieutenant Antonio Urbano, and Petty Officer Second Class Henrique Beltrán Giqueaux).
• 2-H-233 (Lieutenant Commander **Osvaldo Iglesias, Lieutenant Oscar Brandeburgo, and Chief Petty Officer Hernán Verdugo).

That night, with all three helicopters and their crews finally assembled in Río Grande, the final mission details were reviewed. Takeoff was scheduled for 14:00 hours the next day, ensuring arrival at Borbón by twilight to reduce exposure to enemy detection and interception.

Mission Greenlight: Last-Minute Adjustments

Upon arrival in Río Grande, the following mission-critical elements were confirmed:

✔ Fuel at Borbón: The exact quantity remained uncertain, but estimations suggested a sufficient margin to complete the mission. However, its condition was unknown.
✔ Night Vision Goggles: Secured and distributed among the crew.
✔ Camouflage Painting: The crew managed to paint only one helicopter overnight due to time constraints.
✔ Aerial Reconnaissance Request: Task Group 80.1 formally requested that Task Force 80 conduct a scouting flight along the planned route to detect potential threats and assess enemy activity.

With all available resources exhausted, three unarmed Sea Kings, pushing beyond their operational limits, prepared to fly directly into one of the most hostile airspaces in the South Atlantic.

The clock was ticking.

Original sketch of the base in Malvinas published in the book History of the Argentine Naval Aviation Volume III – Héctor A. Martini

The Longest Day: Into the Storm

Green Light for the Mission

On June 1, reconnaissance aircraft reported the area was clear of enemy forces—the green light was given.

The helicopter commanders conducted a final weather check, but poor visibility over the target area delayed takeoff. A second report from the Meteorological Center confirmed low cloud ceilings at the objective but also assured clear conditions at Río Grande for the return. This finalized the decision to return to Río Grande instead of San Julián, which had also been considered as an alternative.

That morning, preflight checks were completed, and the crews gathered one last time before heading to the aircraft platform, where their helicopters stood ready. Around them, pilots and personnel from various squadrons operating out of Río Grande wished them good luck. The final piece of advice was clear: fly low and be extremely cautious when transitioning from land to sea, as enemy naval units were known to hide in inlets and along irregular coastlines.

Mission Crew Assignments

• 2-H-233: Lieutenant Commander Osvaldo Iglesias, Lieutenant Oscar Brandeburgo, and Chief Petty Officer Roberto Montani.
• 2-H-234: Commander Norberto Barro, Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Iglesias, and Petty Officer Second Class Henrique Beltrán Giqueaux.

At 14:17 hours, the two SH-3D Sea Kings lifted off, joined by a Super Puma from the Naval Prefecture. Ten minutes later, the third Sea King (2-H-231) departed for Río Gallegos, where it would remain on standby as a search-and-rescue asset.

• 2-H-231 Crew: Lieutenant Antonio Urbano, Lieutenant Ricardo Rey, and Petty Officer Second Class José Ponce.

The Super Puma PA-13 had a critical role:

• Verifying the functionality of the only VLF OMEGA navigation system installed.
• Guiding the SH-3Ds to their pre-designated release point, 120 nautical miles from Río Grande.

Everything proceeded as planned—low altitude, smooth conditions, and maximum cruising speed maintained.

A Critical Malfunction and Freezing Conditions

Shortly into the flight, a strong fuel odor flooded the cabin of 2-H-234. The crew immediately opened the forward windows and partially unlatched the cargo door to allow airflow to clear the vapors. The risk of fire or explosion now became a constant concern. From that moment on, they were forced to fly with the heating system turned off, enduring freezing temperatures for the remainder of the flight.

At 15:24 hours, a Beechcraft B-200 (4-G-44), piloted by Commander Santiago Barrios, took off from Río Grande to provide communications support. Since the helicopters were flying low, radio transmissions were deliberately minimized to avoid enemy detection. The 4-G-44 maintained an orbit at mid-distance between the departure point and the objective, acting as a relay while using deception techniques to mask transmissions.

Despite the extreme conditions, the helicopters pressed forward, flying at 5 meters (16 feet) above the ocean, pushing their airframes beyond their operational limits.

A Dangerous Approach to Malvinas

As they neared the islands, the weather deteriorated—low cloud ceilings, rain, and reduced visibility made navigation more difficult. However, as they closed in, the rain ceased, and the cloud cover began to lift, revealing clear skies and bright sunlight—a disastrous development for a mission dependent on darkness for concealment.

The initial landfall occurred exactly as planned, between San José and San Rafael Islands, southwest of West Malvina. From there, the final approach to the objective began, flying along the terrain contours or skimming the water’s surface to avoid detection.

With visibility still low, the helicopters inadvertently passed over a house, increasing concerns about compromising the mission. They pressed on, crossing San Francisco de Paula Bay, then over the Trinidad, Vigía, and Borbón Islands, finally reaching the Elephant Seal Bay Isthmus, where Naval Aviation units had previously operated.

At 17:25 hours, both SH-3Ds touched down in the middle of the settlement. To avoid the catastrophic risk of engine failure, they kept the rotors turning rather than shutting down completely—especially given the lack of maintenance tools, which could complicate any restart attempt.

Unexpected Delays: A New Threat Emerges

A new problem arose immediately: the officer in charge of the stranded personnel was only expecting one helicopter. This miscommunication delayed refueling operations, a setback further aggravated by the sudden failure of the VLF OMEGA system—the only reliable navigation aid for the return flight.

Without it, the extraction became far more dangerous, particularly during the low-altitude, nighttime departure through a maze of islands and enemy-controlled waters.

The Extraction and a New Crisis

At 18:35 hours, the two Sea Kings lifted off, carrying:

• Lieutenant Marcelo Félix Batllori
• Chief Petty Officer José Sabat
• Chief Petty Officer Rubén Laureiro
• Petty Officer Second Class César Bogado
• Petty Officer Second Class Federico Leus
• Petty Officer Second Class Pablo Chiodini
• Petty Officer Second Class Osvaldo Gutiérrez
• Petty Officer Second Class Héctor Gauna
• Petty Officer Second Class Ricardo Telaina
• Corporal First Class Nelson Talone
• Corporal Second Class Marcelo Iturbe

Heading northwest, the pilots carefully navigated a pre-planned return route designed to avoid detection and natural obstacles.

However, a catastrophic failure in one of the night vision goggles forced one helicopter to ascend to 300 meters (984 feet) for safety—exposing them to enemy radar detection.

Nearing Isla Blanca, west of Borbón, the worsening weather forced them into instrument flight conditions. Torrential rain lashed against the windshields, while salt deposits from the ocean spray completely obscured visibility. The pilots, unable to rely on their instruments, were forced to lean out of the side windows, using their night vision goggles to navigate through the storm.

Meanwhile, the control aircraft continued attempting radio contact. Unable to break radio silence, the helicopters maintained strict radio discipline, refusing to respond.

After a sufficiently long silence to ensure they were clear, they clicked their microphones once—a signal confirming to Task Group 80.1 that they had successfully lifted off.

Out of the Fire—But Not Yet Home

The most dangerous part of the mission was still ahead. The storm, failing equipment, and exposure to British radar meant their return to Río Grande was anything but certain.

Would they make it back?

Helicóptero Sikorsky S-61D4 Sea King 0678/2-H-234 participante del rescate. (Foto: Archivo MUAN)

The Longest Day: Against All Odds

A Final, Deadly Challenge

As the two Sea Kings made their way back, both helicopters experienced a critical fuel system warning—the fuel filter obstruction alarm lit up, signaling a high risk of imminent engine shutdown. The crews knew they were flying on borrowed time.

British Response: The Enemy Was Watching

Just thirty minutes after takeoff, reports came in from the Marine Infantry personnel who had remained behind on the island:

A section of British Sea Harriers had swept over the extraction site, illuminating the area with flares.

This confirmed the crew’s suspicions—British forces had eyes on them the entire time. There were enemy observers nearby, and the helicopters had narrowly escaped detection.

Navigating Through a Frozen Hell

The return flight was a battle for survival:

• Unreliable instruments that malfunctioned intermittently.
• Windshields obstructed by frozen salt deposits, forcing the pilots to lean out of the side windows to see.
• Icing conditions worsening, despite the Sea Kings not being certified for such environments.

At Río Grande, the Second-in-Command of the Squadron anxiously followed the mission’s progress. A new crisis emerged—dense fog had unexpectedly formed over the airbase.

For a moment, a diversion to Río Gallegos was considered. But the crews pressed on, determined to complete their journey.

Mission Accomplished—But Barely

When the two helicopters finally reached Río Grande at 21:55 hours, they were barely holding together:
✔ No heating—crews frozen to the bone.
✔ No functioning navigation system—they had flown entirely on skill and instinct.
✔ Landing gear malfunctions—risking a dangerous touchdown.
✔ Contaminated fuel—threatening engine shutdown at any moment.

Yet, despite every obstacle, they had done it.

After over seven hours of flying in marginal conditions, they had rescued ten men and lived to tell the tale.

The Impossible Victory

When the war ended, a detailed analysis was conducted at the Naval Air Force No. 2 Training Center, reviewing all operations conducted by the Second Naval Helicopter Squadron—including the Isla Borbón rescue.

The statistical probability of success?

🔴 Only 8% in their favor—92% against.

And yet, they made it home.

The Heroes of the Mission

Sea King 2-H-234

• Pilot: Commander Norberto Ignacio Ramón Barro (Squadron Commander)
• Co-Pilot: Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Oscar Iglesias
• Mechanic: Petty Officer Second Class Beltrán Giqueaux

Sea King 2-H-233

• Pilot: Lieutenant Commander Osvaldo Iglesias (Deputy Squadron Commander)
• Co-Pilot: Lieutenant Osvaldo Brandeburgo
• Mechanic: Chief Petty Officer Roberto Montani

The Legacy of the Longest Day

They returned cold, battered, and exhausted, but with an unbreakable conviction:

💬 They would do it again—if duty called.

🔻 End of Mission.

Malvinas: The Odysee of the 5th Infantry Regiment at Puerto Howard

Malvinas: The Dramatic Story of the Regiment That Withstood Brutal Isolation and the Dangerous Mission to Resupply Them

They were stationed at Puerto Howard, on West Falkland Island. Resupplying them was an almost impossible task. The soldiers of the 5th Infantry Regiment (RI5) wrote one of the most grueling chapters of the Malvinas/Falklands War. Infobae Docs gathered three veterans who revealed their fierce and uneven battle against an implacable enemy—isolation.
By Adrián Pignatelli || Infobae


The Sea Harrier Shot Down with a 1936-Made Machine Gun. The captured pilot could not believe that he had been downed by such an outdated weapon.

Located on Gran Malvina (West Falkland), Howard was, in 1982, a small port on the San Carlos Strait. A cove provided shelter and allowed ships to dock. The local population was small and primarily engaged in sheep farming and wool shearing, with the final product shipped to Great Britain. The islanders had limited opportunities for development, as the economy assigned married residents a fixed number of sheep, and a single official acted as both the local administrator and the manager of the wool trading company.

It was an extremely remote location where residents stayed informed solely through British radio relays. There was no television, primary school, or secondary school.

This was the site selected for the 5th Infantry Regiment (RI5) to counter a potential enemy landing. This regiment would go down in history as the unit that endured the longest period of isolation during the Malvinas/Falklands War.

On April 25, upon arrival at Port Stanley, RI5 was airlifted to Puerto Howard in three helicopter waves, except for 108 men from Company B, who traveled by ship transporting rations, ammunition, and anti-personnel mines.

Howard was renamed Puerto Yapeyú, as in peacetime, Company C of this regiment was based in the town where General José de San Martín was born.

 
RI5 Soldiers Boarding in Comodoro Rivadavia for the Airlift to the Malvinas

The soldiers carried a single ration of food. It was imperative to supply them with the necessary provisions, along with heavy weapons and ammunition, to endure the harsh weeks of isolation ahead.

They were still unaware that the resupply would never arrive.

The following day, in Howard, two and a half lambs were purchased from the locals to supplement the soldiers' rations. Meanwhile, in Puerto Argentino, the Monsunen, a 30-meter vessel confiscated from the Falkland Company, set sail at night. It was loaded with ten days' worth of supplies, weapons, and ammunition.

The plan was to skirt the island northward and enter the San Carlos Strait. However, strong winds and tides made this route impossible. The only alternative was the longer and far more dangerous southern route—navigating around the island while avoiding mines laid by the Argentine Navy and knowing that, in broad daylight, they would be completely exposed to enemy aircraft. The mission had to succeed, as on the 27th, food rationing had already begun in Puerto Yapeyú.

That night, the Monsunen was forced to take shelter in a small bay after the radar detected what was possibly a submarine. The ship’s only defenses were two MAG machine guns and two rocket launchers. By midday the next day, the vessel finally managed to dock at the pier in Puerto Yapeyú.

 
Alberto Miñones Carrión: Severely Wounded in Malvinas, Lost a Leg—“It Is a Special Honor to Have Been Part of This Campaign” (Santiago Saferstein)

At the time, Alberto Miñones Carrión was a young second lieutenant. He was in charge of the Support Section of Company A, RI5, and his unit was reinforced with two Colt 12.7 mm machine guns. He recalled, “From the moment we arrived, we knew resupply would be difficult—to the point that the provisions we expected the next day never arrived. As the days went by, the situation worsened, and with the arrival of more personnel, it became truly critical.”

The occupation of the area was gradual. Initially, a 130-man company was deployed. Later, the regiment’s other two infantry companies, along with two engineer sections and medical personnel, arrived—bringing the total to nearly 800 men.

 
The Isla de los Estados: Attacked While Carrying Supplies for the Troops—Only Two of 25 Crew Members Survived

On the night of May 10, the frigate HMS Alacrity attacked the transport ship Isla de los Estados in the middle of the San Carlos Strait, as it was en route to Puerto Yapeyú carrying supplies and weapons.

Of the 25 crew members, only two survived.

Hours later, Argentine troops discovered squash floating near the shore—part of the ship’s lost cargo. These were mashed and added to the regiment’s already scarce rations.

 
Hugo Gargano, Quartermaster Second Lieutenant During the War: “We Had Only Two Field Kitchens for 150 Men” (Santiago Saferstein)

"Cooking a lamb was a challenge since we had to use peat as fuel, which has very low caloric value. On top of that, we only had two field kitchens for 150 men. But the ingenuity and skill of the quartermaster personnel led us to clean out 200-liter fuel drums, and that’s how we ended up eating lamb stew with a hint of fuel taste. Heating those drums was extremely difficult, and fires had to remain extinguished for most of the day," explained Hugo Gargano, Quartermaster Second Lieutenant of Regiment 5, the unit’s only officer in that specialty.

When supply issues worsened, Gargano was in Puerto Argentino, trying to find a way to reach Gran Malvina. The RI5 commander, Colonel Juan Ramón Mabragaña, persistently requested a Quartermaster officer from the III Infantry Brigade’s commander.

"I asked every day to go to Howard," Gargano told Infobae. "On the 21st, I ran into a major who told me, ‘You have no idea how much your regiment commander is asking for you,’ but we couldn’t coordinate my transport."

 

 
Today, Juan Ramón Mabragaña, Surrounded by His Soldiers, Who Recognize “A Leader Who Cared for His Men”

"The next day, they came to pick me up in a vehicle. 'You have 15 minutes to be at Moody Brook and board a helicopter heading to Howard with supplies, weapons, and ammunition,' they told me." Hugo Gargano reported to Major Roberto Yanzi from Army Aviation.

At that moment, he had no idea he was about to embark on a journey he would never forget.

Flying to Howard

Major Roberto Yanzi was the second-in-command of the 601st Combat Aviation Battalion. He had arrived in the islands on April 7. He explained, “We had to make the most of the flight. We loaded ammunition, mortars, and medical supplies. We also took two soldiers from Regiment 5. Three Puma helicopters would fly, with an Augusta in the rear for escort, armed for protection.”

Before takeoff, Yanzi gathered the crews and briefed them on the mission. “I listened as they spoke—we were about to embark on a high-risk flight, as the day before, the British had landed at San Carlos. The 7 or 8 minutes it would take to cross the strait would be crucial.”

The mission launched on May 22.

A stopover was always made at Goose Green, where Task Force Mercedes had a garrison. However, upon arrival, the helicopters were forced to remain grounded—Sea Harriers were constantly patrolling overhead.

Yanzi knew that flying under those conditions meant taking an extreme risk.

 
Roberto Yanzi, Army Aviation: “When We Reached Howard, We Celebrated Because We Were All Still Alive” (Santiago Saferstein)

"The memory of the downing of AE 505 on May 9 was still fresh, when First Lieutenants Roberto Fiorito and Juan Carlos Buschiazzo, along with Sergeant Raúl Dimotta, lost their lives. Additionally, Army Aviation faced a serious limitation: fuel shortages," recalled Major Roberto Yanzi.

The weather conditions were also poor, with constant fog and mist. “At 10:30 on the 23rd, we took off, flying just one meter above the ground to avoid detection by enemy radar and maintaining radio silence. When we reached the strait, we saw the Río Carcarañá billowing smoke” (the vessel had been disabled by two Sea Harriers on May 16).

“It’s an Honor to Die with You”

As they were about to finish crossing the strait, the armed escort helicopter issued a warning:

• “Aircraft! Aircraft! Hit the deck!”

Two Sea Harriers were approaching. The first helicopter was piloted by First Lieutenant Hugo Pérez Cometto, the second by First Lieutenant Enrique Magnaghi, and the third by Major Roberto Yanzi, who later recounted to Infobae:

 

The Arrival of the Río Carcarañá Crew

"Pérez Cometto, in an outstanding maneuver, managed to evade the enemy aircraft, while Magnaghi and I crossed the channel and landed. Almost immediately, I saw a fireball coming from Magnaghi’s helicopter, which had flipped over—he had lost control as the aircraft spun on its axis. At the same time, the Sea Harriers opened fire on me with their 30mm cannons, hitting the tail of my helicopter, which still had its rotors spinning. That’s when I ordered Gargano to disembark as fast as possible."

"It was a moment of intense adrenaline. I opened the hatch, jumped out first… we ran and threw ourselves flat on the ground as the Sea Harriers strafed us," recalled Gargano.

The three of them lay prone as enemy rounds impacted all around them. At that moment, Yanzi spoke:

• "Take my hand, don’t look back—it’s an honor to die in war with you."

"That’s when I fully realized the situation we were in. Once the aircraft had passed, we ran and moved away from the helicopter," the officer recounted.

Yanzi had no idea what had happened to the rest of the crews until he heard the distinctive whistle of Private Elvio Nis, a skilled tracker from Paso de los Libres, which helped reunite the personnel.

"You can imagine our joy when we realized that not a single crew member had died. Magnaghi had a fractured clavicle, and Godino, one of the mechanics, had suffered a severe head injury," Yanzi explained.

"We Were All Alive"

Determined to complete the mission, Yanzi burned his Puma AE 500 to prevent it from falling into British hands, salvaging only the machine gun. The remaining crews and part of the cargo were loaded onto the only operational helicopter—Pérez Cometto’s Puma.

They took off, hoping to avoid enemy aircraft en route to Howard, as Radio Colonia had reported that three helicopters had already been shot down by Harriers.

Yanzi recalled, "When we arrived, it was an overwhelming joy. We hugged each other—we were all alive."

On the morning of May 26, the helicopter crews embarked on the risky return flight to Puerto Argentino, departing at 0500 hours. They transported members of Compañía Comando and a captain who had ejected from his aircraft.

"It was a gamble," admitted Yanzi. "We were packed in tight. We flew at extremely low altitude and managed to land. Without realizing it, we had just completed the last flight to Gran Malvina."

Years later, Gargano connected via social media with one of the Sea Harrier pilots, David Morgan, who had long wondered about the fate of the Puma crews. "He felt great relief upon learning that we had survived," Gargano shared.

Fighting in Howard

Now retired Lieutenant Colonel Miñones described the precarious situation the regiment faced in the event of a British attack:

"The heavy equipment couldn’t be transported. We lacked artillery pieces. When we crossed, I managed to bring short-range 81mm mortars, which served as our heavy weaponry for a long time. That’s why we kept requesting 120mm mortars. The 4th Artillery Battery never arrived."

RI5 Soldiers in a Trench at Puerto Howard

They had to fight with whatever was available.

Using Colt 12.7mm machine guns manufactured in 1936, they managed to shoot down a Sea Harrier and repel an attack from a Sea King helicopter. Miñones recalled, "When we captured the pilot, he told us he felt a rain of bullets striking the fuselage; he couldn’t believe we had taken him down with that machine gun."

Gravely Wounded

On the night of May 27, Miñones was severely wounded. He survived to tell the story.

*"A shell from a frigate conducting exploratory fire hit me while I was at the bottom of a trench. I was between First Lieutenant Daniel Stella and Orderly Soldier Felipe Fernández. The blast threw me 20 meters, flipping me in the air before I landed on my back, arms crossed over my chest. I entrusted myself to the Virgin Mary and prayed an Ave María, thinking I was dying.

In the darkness, I reached for my right leg—it was still there. When I checked the left, I felt a bare bone. I felt no pain. That’s when I realized I was alive and had another chance."*

During that same attack, soldiers Fernando Damián Francolino, Francisco Manuel Machado, and Ricardo Manuel Herrera were also wounded.

 

The Rescue of British Lieutenant Jeff Glover After Ejecting

"I was evacuated to a very rudimentary field hospital, run by Major Dr. Reale, a brilliant trauma surgeon. In addition to my leg wound, I had a puncture in my hip and another in my chest. With the limited supplies he had, he operated on me and sutured my femoral artery."

Given the severity of his injuries, a rapid evacuation would have been the norm, but Miñones recounted:

"For ten days, I lay on a wooden door propped up on two apple crates. There were no painkillers, no plaster, yet the doctors managed to make do."

 

Jeff Glover’s Arrival at Puerto Howard

On May 29, it snowed for the first time in Puerto Yapeyú. The temperature dropped to -18°C, and the overall condition of the troops was critical.

"Those days were terrible. The wounded were housed in a wooden shack that shook with every bombardment. I felt completely exposed since I couldn't move. As shrapnel pierced the wooden walls—on one occasion, two fragments passed right by my head—I asked my comrade, Eduardo Gassino, for a helmet."

But Miñones’ hardships didn’t end there.

"Food was extremely scarce, and due to my condition, I couldn’t eat lamb. It was Eduardo Gassino who, every day, brought me a sort of broth with bustard meat—a local bird—using an empty soda can."

Finally, on June 6, he was evacuated to the Bahía Paraíso, which had been converted into a hospital ship. Also evacuated were soldiers Exequiel Vargas, Eduardo Rubiolo, Mariano Leiva, and Fernando Francolino.

 

 

The Hospital Ship Bahía Paraíso

"When I arrived on the mainland, I weighed 42 kilos, down from my normal 68. I hadn’t even realized how much weight I had lost. I needed to recover before undergoing a major surgery. For two months, my prognosis was poor due to an infection in my leg, but I was given another chance—and I survived."

Both Gargano and Miñones hold Colonel Juan Ramón Mabragaña, their regimental commander, in the highest regard.

"He stood out for his humility and prudence, for the precision of his decisions. Beyond the war, he was a model soldier and a remarkable person. He took veterans’ needs seriously—securing jobs, medicine, and even medical evacuations, often out of his own pocket. He reaped what he sowed."

The three veterans also paid tribute to the 23 crew members of the Isla de los Estados, who died while attempting to deliver supplies.

What Does Malvinas Mean?

For Yanzi: “A feeling and a great pride to have been part of it.”

For Gargano: “It remains a daily battle—to ensure recognition for the veterans who fought there.”

For Miñones: “It is a very special honor to have participated in this campaign and to have lost a leg. It helps me emotionally. What I carry deep inside—and hope to pass on to my children—is something that changed my life for the better.”