Argentine Weapons: CITEFA MP1000 Martín Pescador ASM

ASM CITEFA MP1000 Martín Pescador

Martín Pescador was an anti-ship missile developed by CITEFA (the Scientific and Technical Research Institute of the Argentine Armed Forces) since the early 1970s.



The first evaluations were carried out in 1983 from T-28 Trojan aircraft, and the first shot was carried out by Captain Castro Fox in an aircraft of that type modified to be able to operate the missile. 
This is a remote-controlled air-to-surface missile. After visually identifying its target, the pilot activates a control in his cockpit, with which he must radio-control the missile during its flight. To assist him in seeing the missile, it has two coloured flares at the rear. The pilot must control the missile visually and compensate for any deviation that may occur until reaching its target.



This guidance system has similar characteristics to the American Martin AGM-7 Bullpup missile.
Despite the training required to operate the missile and the aircraft at the same time, the guidance system is really simple and can be mounted on a wide variety of aircraft. It has been successfully used on the T-28 Trojan and the Aermacchi MB-326 of the Argentine Navy, and on the I.A. 58 Pucará of the Argentine Air Force. It can also be used from helicopters in hovering flight, for which a wire-guided version was developed.


 

After being withdrawn from service in the late 1990s, the missiles were transferred back to CITEFA to contribute to the development of the improved CITEFA AS-25K.





Type Air-to-surface guided anti-ship missile
Service history
In service 1983 to 1990
Production history
Manufacturer CITEFA

Specifications

Weight 140 kg
Length 295 cm
Diameter 22 cm
Effective range 19 km (11 mi)
Wingspan 75 cm
Guidance system Radio




Wikipedia

Malvinas: A Study Case (2/3)

Malvinas: A Study Case
Comes from Part 1 - follows with Part 3
Part 2/3
By
Harry Train,
Admiral USN 

Critical analysis of the Malvinas Conflict. It covers chronologically from the previous incidents to the end of the battle for Puerto Argentino. Strategically, it includes the levels of general, military and operational strategy. The analysis considers the concepts of the operation from the perspective of each side.

Argentine Directives for Action

The Argentine directives for action stemmed from the Junta's erroneous hope of achieving a diplomatic solution. The directive for the recapture of the Malvinas on April 2 established, "do not spill British blood or damage British property." Between April 2 and April 30, the directives were "fire only if attacked." When operational commanders were observed by the Junta for issuing orders that violated this directive, such orders were annulled. One example was the Junta's revocation of the naval operations commander’s order for the ARA Drummond and ARA Granville to intercept the Endurance if it evacuated workers from South Georgia. Another example was the withdrawal of authorization for the ARA San Luis submarine to use its weapons when ordered to enter the exclusion zone. The ARA San Luis patrolled the exclusion zone from April 20 to April 30 without authorization to use its weapons.

The authorization to use weapons was granted to Argentine forces on April 30. At that time, Argentine forces were informed that any ship in the exclusion zone should be considered British. This order did not account for the fact that Russian fishing vessels were present in the exclusion zone. Decision-making authority over directives for action was as tightly held at the highest political levels in Argentina as it was in the United Kingdom.

British Directives for Action - Political Structure in London

The War Cabinet created a Directives Committee comprised of officers tasked with making forecasts and providing commanders with the directives they needed, in a manner that could be perfectly understood. This committee met daily at 1800 hours and addressed questions such as what authorizations were to be granted when the Task Force crossed the equator or what prior approval long-range maritime patrol aircraft required if encountering Argentine forces. The committee’s decisions were always approved because they anticipated events.

The maritime exclusion zone defined an area where British ship commanders and pilots could attack. It was an area where the Argentine command knew their units would be attacked. This zone was intended, or so it was thought, to provide British commanders with a sufficiently deep buffer area to avoid tactical surprises for the Task Force ships, which lacked tactical reconnaissance aircraft and high-performance planes.

The next step in the evolution of directives for action and the maritime exclusion zone was the declaration of a Total Exclusion Zone on April 30. A complication arose on April 23 when the order for free use of weapons was issued. This applied everywhere, against any force deemed a threat. A warning that this order had been issued was broadcast at the time. The maritime exclusion zone remained unchanged.

In the conflict theater, British directives for action contained a numbered list of rules covering foreseeable situations, target descriptions, and the zones where the rules applied. These rules—of which there were many—were implemented selectively in time and place according to political and military advice. The fundamental purpose of the directives for action was to provide political and military information to commanders in the theater of operations, with established rules when a policy of maintaining the status quo, de-escalation, or escalation was required. The numbered directives still carried ambiguities and frequently required interpretation via satellite communications. The definition of "hostile intent," given the existence of weapons requiring rapid reaction—such as the Exocet—created problems ultimately resolved by defining "hostile intent" as the mere physical presence of an Argentine platform.

The British also amended directives for action to authorize attacks on any unconfirmed submarine contact operating near their own forces. Crucial to the structure and execution of directives for action were the 200-nautical-mile exclusion zones declared by the British around the Malvinas, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands. Within these zones, there were very few restrictions. Structuring and altering directives for action were tightly and centrally controlled from Whitehall. Changes normally required coordination between land, sea, and air forces and ministerial approval. However, expedited procedures were in place for urgent changes, such as the one that allowed the attack on the ARA Belgrano outside the exclusion zone.

The War at Sea

The Malvinas conflict included the first true naval confrontation since the Pacific campaign of World War II. The toll on the Royal Navy inflicted by the Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation during the war at sea included the British destroyers HMS Sheffield and Coventry, the frigates HMS Ardent and Antelope, the landing ship HMS Sir Galahad, and the merchant ship Atlantic Conveyor. Additionally, two British destroyers, fourteen frigates, and two landing ships were damaged during the conflict, primarily by Argentine air attacks using bombs, missiles, rockets, and cannons, except for the destroyer Glamorgan, which was hit by an Exocet missile launched from land. Thirty-seven British aircraft were lost due to various causes.

The fourteen unexploded bombs embedded in British ships' hulls could have easily doubled the losses if their fuzes had been properly calibrated. The British Task Force deployed virtually all existing submarine weapons against false submarine contacts. The Task Force lacked in-depth defense. They did not have the kind of support that the deck of a large aircraft carrier could provide with embarked tactical reconnaissance and early warning aircraft. They were forced to rely on small, inexpensive combat ships whose inferior armament made them more vulnerable than large, well-armored ships, whose only disadvantage was their high cost.

We tend to think of the Malvinas naval campaign only in terms of unit losses and the impact these had on the final outcome. However, for a nation closely observing the facts, there is an additional discussion. The Malvinas naval war also included:

• The first use of modern cruise missiles against ships of a first-rate navy.
• The first sustained aerial attacks against a naval force since World War II.
• The first combat use of nuclear-powered submarines.
• The first known combat use of vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft.
• A small force of Argentine diesel-electric submarines caused enormous concern to British naval authorities and influenced naval operations as much as the air threat, prompting the use of significant amounts of anti-submarine weaponry.
• A similarly small force of British attack nuclear submarines shaped Argentine naval commanders’ decisions and kept Argentine surface units in protected waters. It also influenced some of the first political decisions made at the onset of hostilities.

Selection of the Landing Site

From the departure of the fleet toward the Malvinas, one of the primary decisions faced by planners was determining the location for the initial assault. British thinking on the site and timing of the campaign’s first landing was guided by many considerations. Some of the most important were:

• Political convenience: The British government’s perception of the need to engage with Argentine forces to appease British public opinion eager for action.
• Proximity of the southern hemisphere winter, with its accompanying environmental challenges.
• Effects on morale, training, and the general physical condition of ground forces subjected to prolonged stays ashore in harsh climatic conditions.
• Logistical challenges of maintaining a large ground force in operations for an extended period.
• Transport difficulties in moving a large ground force and its support across the rugged terrain of the Malvinas.
• Lack of intelligence on the morale and training of Argentine soldiers in the Malvinas.
• Lastly, British staff had to choose between two diametrically opposed concepts for the initial assault on the Malvinas: conducting a mass landing through an audacious operation at or near Port Stanley, close enough to immediately target the campaign’s main objective, or conducting a more administrative landing at an undefended site far enough from Port Stanley to make it difficult for Argentine ground forces, mostly concentrated in Port Stanley, to attack the fragile beachhead.

The sites considered by the British as potentially suitable for the initial assault were:

• Stevely Bay, Soledad Island: The farthest from the objective and the least vulnerable to potential Argentine counterattacks by ground forces. At one point, the possibility of constructing an airstrip there to replace the aircraft carriers was analyzed.
• San Carlos, Soledad Island: Closer to the objective and still in a location that made an Argentine counterattack difficult.
• Bluff Cove, Soledad Island: Even closer, but also more vulnerable to an Argentine counterattack.
• Berkeley Sound, Soledad Island: Closer still to Port Stanley, but so close that an Argentine ground counterattack was almost certain.
• Puerto Argentino, Soledad Island: Rejected almost immediately due to the inherent risks.

Initially, it was agreed to conduct the landing at a site where no initial resistance was expected. The plan under Brigadier General Julian Thompson consisted of consolidating the beachhead while awaiting reinforcements arriving from the UK. Once these reinforcements arrived, the command of all land operations would be assumed by Major General Jeremy Moore.

The pros and cons analyzed by planners when selecting San Carlos as the initial landing site included:

• The protection offered by the restricted waters of the anchorage against submarines.
• The natural protection provided by the surrounding high ground for landing ships against air attacks, and its excellent potential for positioning Rapier missile anti-aircraft batteries.
• Intelligence reports indicating the absence of enemy presence in the area, except for infrequent patrols.
• Reports from the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) confirming the absence of mines on the beaches and no evidence of mining activity in the adjacent sea.
• The anticipated delay in an Argentine response due to the distance—approximately fifty miles of rugged terrain—from Port Stanley.
• The distance and rugged terrain between the landing site and the main objective, Port Stanley, which ground forces would have to cross in some manner.
• The proximity of a strong Argentine garrison at Goose Green, thirteen miles south of the site.
• The lack of suitable beaches for landing large numbers of troops and equipment.
• The proximity of high ground in the surrounding area that could be used advantageously by the enemy to repel and dislodge the landing forces.
• Although not verified by SBS patrols, the possibility that the Argentines had mined or intended to mine the maritime approaches to the site, given its obvious suitability for a landing. (At least in the minds of British planners, this was obvious. We now know that Argentine planners, in a pre-conflict study, deemed the site unsuitable for a successful amphibious landing.)
  
  

General Argentine Land Strategy

The Argentine land strategy was explained after the conflict by the commander in charge of the Malvinas, stating:

• The first and main military objective was Puerto Argentino. It was the campaign’s linchpin, as it was the seat of political power, home to the majority of the population, and housed the main port and airfield.
• The initial operational concept was to defend Port Stanley from direct attacks using the airfield and aircraft.
• The second phase involved building defenses to repel a direct amphibious assault. Three battalions were deployed to counter attacks from the south and another three to defend the north and west.
• Regarding attacks from the west, the defensive perimeter was determined not only by the terrain but also by the difficulty of maintaining distant troop positions due to limited mobility resources.
• There were high points dominating the inner part of the perimeter that had to be occupied and defended, but there were even better high points further out. However, the ground force commanders judged that they lacked the necessary mobility to occupy and maintain those more distant positions with the personnel and means available.
• This plan probably discouraged the British from attempting a heliborne assault on Port Stanley and may have similarly deterred plans for a direct amphibious assault. This allowed Argentine ground forces to reinforce and adjust their defenses while the British sought another landing site.

The time gained by this arrangement of forces in Port Stanley was not utilized effectively because political leaders in Buenos Aires failed to achieve a political solution to avoid the war. Ground force commanders believed this arrangement gave the political leadership an additional fifteen days to find a diplomatic solution. However, the negative aspect was that the Junta, despite the events involving the ARA Belgrano and HMS Sheffield, continued to focus primarily on a negotiated resolution rather than advancing a military strategy. Military commanders viewed the sinking of the ARA Belgrano and HMS Sheffield as the point of no return for the war, while political leaders saw the "exchange of blood" as an opportunity to reopen negotiations.

The Army believed that this mindset of the Junta restricted action and deprived ground forces of their main weapons, particularly air power. British naval forces surrounded the islands and waged a war of attrition against Argentine ground forces while preparing for their landing. They landed with their landing forces intact. Army commanders believed this occurred because political authorities in Buenos Aires restrained the Air Force and Navy from acting to their full capacity. The Army believed that if the Navy and Air Force had persisted in their attacks on naval transports and aircraft carriers by May 30, the outcome could have been different. However, the attack came far too late. The beachhead had been established, and British troops were advancing freely.

When the British landed, the Army began to consider modifying its defensive positions, reinforcing those protecting Port Stanley from attacks from the west. This realignment of forces began five days late. Western positions were reinforced with weapons, but moving them further west was impossible due to mobility and distance limitations. Efforts were made to cover the distance between Port Stanley and San Carlos with commando patrols, but by the time this decision was made, the British had already occupied the outer high positions. The commandos fought efficiently on several occasions but could not significantly slow the pace of the advance.

The Argentine Sector

The Argentine invasion plan had been entirely conceived as a short and peaceful occupation of the Malvinas by a relatively small force, not as sustained operations by a large force preparing for and ultimately engaging in combat. Operation Rosario was planned and initially executed as a "diplomatic invasion," intended as a nudge to the stalled negotiations with the British over the sovereignty of the islands. The operation was never intended as a combat operation.

The British reaction to the invasion, which consisted of the rapid assembly and deployment of a large naval task force, including amphibious assault units, was initially unforeseen by the Argentines. Argentina’s response to the realization that combat with the British in the Malvinas would be inevitable was a large-scale reinforcement of the islands—an alternative not foreseen in the original plan. This created a logistical nightmare for the Argentine supply system, which likely would have struggled to sustain even the far more limited original operation.

The logistical situation worsened further due to the Military Committee's decision not to use ships for reinforcement or resupply after April 10, following the British declaration of a maritime exclusion zone starting April 12. This decision forced Argentina to rely entirely on air transport and, where possible, fishing vessels.

Border with Chile

Even with the logistical challenges mentioned above, the Argentine force assembled and tasked with the defense of the Malvinas could have been composed of better-trained and equipped troops had Argentina not retained many of its most effective troops on the mainland. This decision was explained as militarily prudent, preserving these forces in reserve against a potential attack by Chile.

The Argentine force assembled under the original plan and used in the initial phase of the conflict was sufficient for a short-term "diplomatic invasion." With no immediate British military threat present in the theater, the basic Argentine concept appeared to be putting enough uniformed bodies on the islands to demonstrate that the territory was under Argentine control, thereby forcing the stalled diplomatic process to resume. Unfortunately for Argentina, when the British threat materialized, their thinking did not adapt, and their efforts to reinforce the islands were simply extensions of the original concept: for example, sending more personnel to reinforce the illusion of control and push for a diplomatic resolution to the situation.

Argentines later admitted that at no point during the planning of the Malvinas retaken did they believe they could win if the British decided to fight for the islands. Unfortunately, this preconception prevailed throughout the conflict, influencing decisions and weakening Argentina’s overall military capability.


Static Defense

The basic Argentine concept for the defense of the Malvinas appears to reflect this preconception. The plan did not foresee an aggressive ground campaign to fight and repel British invasion forces, regardless of where they landed. Instead, Argentina’s defense of the Malvinas relied on a series of static strongpoints around Port Stanley, which were expected to appear so formidable that the British would be deterred from invading. If they did invade, they would supposedly avoid landing near Port Stanley, and if the British landed elsewhere, it was assumed they would opt for a diplomatic resolution before attempting to attack the town.

Following this defensive concept, the Argentines concentrated nearly all their ground forces around Port Stanley throughout the conflict and simply waited for the British attack to arrive. There was never any serious attempt by Argentina to leave their entrenched positions and seize the initiative in the ground war against the enemy.

The Ground War – The British Perspective

The British also faced challenges and made some difficult decisions before the actual Malvinas invasion at San Carlos.

Although the deterioration of the South Atlantic situation had been closely monitored by the British, the Argentine invasion of the Malvinas came as a genuine surprise. There is no doubt, however, that the British demonstrated great ingenuity and determination by assembling a task force of thirty-six ships and setting sail for the Malvinas just two days after the invasion. However, due to the hasty departure, the ships of the landing force were not tactically loaded in the UK, meaning that the equipment and supplies could not be unloaded in the order required by the landing force once they were ashore. This situation was partially rectified during the delay at Ascension Island, where additional equipment was loaded, and an inventory of existing stores was conducted. This period was also used to reorganize cargo holds to facilitate unloading in the combat area. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the unloading of the ships delayed the supply of equipment to the San Carlos landing area.

The Landing at San Carlos

Despite all the doubts about the choice of landing site and concerns over the multitude of things that could go wrong, the British landing at San Carlos was completely uneventful in terms of troop transport ashore. The British amphibious task force approached and arrived at the target area undetected, aided by the cover of darkness, poor weather conditions, and diversionary operations conducted at Goose Green, Fanning Head, and other locations on East Falkland.

British troops landed in the early hours of May 21, encountered no resistance from Argentine ground forces, and moved quickly to their planned defensive positions around the area. As time passed, the anticipated Argentine threat to the landing failed to materialize. The military battle fought at San Carlos became one between the Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation and the ships of the British amphibious task force.

To their frustration, British ground forces found themselves relegated to the role of spectators in these actions while waiting for orders to advance. Meanwhile, the primary challenges faced by the ground assault forces were the environment, poor logistical support, and boredom.

Although not directly involved in the air-sea battle taking place at San Carlos, the ground forces were nonetheless affected by the outcome of this action.

On the first day of the assault on San Carlos, the British lost a frigate and sustained damage to four others due to Argentine air attacks. In the days following the landing, British naval losses continued at an alarming rate. Confronted with the Argentine air threat, the British were forced to alter their Basic Logistical Plan for supporting the ground forces, shifting from a concept based on afloat depots to one focused on the massive offloading of equipment onto land.

This change in plans was tied to the necessity of restricting ship movements to nighttime and a significant miscalculation regarding the number of helicopters needed to transport equipment, resulting in painfully slow logistical growth on land. A near-fatal setback for the progress of the ground campaign occurred on May 25 with the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor, which had been carrying three Chinook helicopters whose high load capacity was vital for the timely execution of logistical and operational plans. This loss placed an even heavier burden on the remaining helicopters, which were subsequently almost entirely dedicated to equipment transport for the remainder of the conflict.

British Maneuver Plan

Notably absent in the planning for the San Carlos landing was consideration or discussion of what the ground force should do once ashore.

The operation was a landing plan, not a ground campaign. As someone humorously remarked, it was assumed that, once on land, the forces would simply advance and win.

Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the British, either consciously or unconsciously, expected the Argentines to quickly react and oppose the landing with ground forces. In this scenario, the use of British ground forces would, to some extent, be guided—at least in the short term—by the actions and defensive reactions required during this confrontation.

When the anticipated Argentine opposition to the landing failed to materialize, the British found themselves somewhat at a loss regarding what to do with their ground forces.

Boletin del Centro Naval 748 (1987)

Malvinas: Owen Crippa Attacked the Fleet All Alone

Argentine Army: Roca's Pardon for Soldier Evaristo Sosa

The day Roca saved a man sentenced to death half an hour before the execution

The general was president and granted a pardon to a soldier imprisoned for attacking a superior who had mistreated him. The details of the decision.

By Luciana Sabina || Infobae



Evaristo Sosa, the soldier “saved” by Julio A. Roca

In January 1902, the country was on edge for days following the death sentence of soldier Evaristo Sosa, a humble-born serviceman who, after being subjected to mistreatment, attempted to take the life of a superior. The press captured the social outrage sparked by the sentence, whose outcome was worthy of a suspense novel.

On January 3, 1902, Sosa, a volunteer soldier with six years of service in the national army, was arrested drunk in a store, an act that, according to reports of the time, "caused disturbances." He was immediately taken to Campo de Mayo (Argentine Army Headquarters). There, he was placed under the charge of Second Lieutenant Ramírez, whose first name, curiously, was not mentioned in the accounts of those years. As punishment, Sosa was sentenced to a “plantón” — the military obligation to stand guard without relief — for six hours, although he only completed three.

The "Sosa Case" caused a great stir in its time

After serving his punishment and being released, the condemned Sosa became enraged. He then took his regulation weapon and, in the early hours of January 4, went to the room of the second lieutenant, who was dozing in a rocking chair. With almost no words exchanged, he fired his Mauser carbine at him, destroying part of the officer's face. Sosa was imprisoned without resistance and stated that he attacked the officer because he had punished him in a "demeaning manner." Ramírez, meanwhile, was transferred to the Military Hospital, where he managed to recover. For this attack, the assailant ended up shackled and brought before a military tribunal, which sentenced him to death.

The sentence was handed down on January 17 and was to be carried out the following day. Soon, society mobilized to prevent it, aware that Sosa's reaction was the result of the well-known mistreatment inflicted on lower-ranking members of the Army. A group of Buenos Aires women even went to request a pardon from then-President Julio Argentino Roca. However, they received no response.

Meanwhile, the press denounced the situation nationwide, highlighting how abhorrent it was. While the death penalty was legal in the country, it caused immense social rejection.

As the hours passed, the impotence of many grew. That night, Evaristo Sosa did not sleep. At 5 a.m., they came for him to begin the routine ordeal to which prisoners were subjected before being executed. His composure did not falter, despite the terrible night he had spent under the weight of his sentence.

He was placed "en capilla" under a tent, a concept that warrants explanation. The term refers to the space occupied by any condemned prisoner while awaiting execution. As historian Carlos Riviera points out, it originates "from a tradition at the ancient University of Salamanca [Spain], where doctoral candidates, the day before defending their thesis before the tribunal, had to confine themselves for an entire day in the chapel of Saint Barbara in the old cathedral of Salamanca to seek enlightenment from the Holy Spirit. There, they had to prepare in complete solitude, as even their meals were passed to them through a small window."

Sosa was placed “en capilla” during the night he awaited execution

Returning to Sosa, half an hour after being "placed en capilla," he was visited by a priest who held Mass near the tent. The soldier, deeply moved, took Communion, impressing the few witnesses present with his demeanor. Shortly after, he received visits from some comrades to bid farewell and find comfort in the face of his imminent end. One of them strummed a melancholic tune on a guitar and sang its verses, further unsettling the condemned man.

As emotion overtook the small group of soldiers, moving everyone to tears, the surroundings were filled with noise and activity. The magazine Caras y Caretas covered the event in detail. Among other things, it reported that Commander Rostagno, the military secretary to the President of the Republic, arrived "carrying a note for the senior commander of the forces."

"‘The pardon!’ murmured most, as the rumor spread throughout the camp, even though preparations for the execution continued, keeping Sosa isolated," the magazine recounted.

They were not mistaken. At the very last moment, Julio Argentino Roca decided to grant the longed-for pardon. However, the soldier misunderstood the situation and cried out in despair: "I have half an hour to live!"

Roca decided to pardon the prisoner

But the panic lasted only a few minutes, and Sosa regained his composure upon seeing a group of commanders and officers arrive at his tent. Caras y Caretas reported: "They were the bearers of the good news, who at first merely hinted at a glimmer of hope to avoid what was feared (...) They allowed Lieutenant García to notify the prisoner of the commutation—as he had informed him of the sentence the day before. The poor soldier collapsed onto a bench, seized by a terrible nervous breakdown that alarmed the doctors, making them fear a cardiac syncope. He registered 120 beats per minute initially, which then dropped so quickly that ether inhalations had to be applied to help him recover."

"The tent was then cleared, and Sosa asked to be left alone for a moment. Shortly after, he fell into a heavy, leaden sleep. Meanwhile, the entire camp showed visible signs of relief, with the good news spreading among commanders, officers, and soldiers alike. More than 500 people from the capital and nearby towns had come to Campo de Mayo, and all of them carried away the joyful impression of the atmosphere that, just moments earlier, had been prepared for a grim execution," the publication detailed.

Evaristo, a native of the province of Mendoza, was married to Teresa Espíndola and had a young son, nine years old. It is easy to imagine the happiness of them all.

Undoubtedly, the person most surprised by the news of the commutation of the sentence was the condemned man himself, who experienced an episode of mental disarray just a few hours later.

The entire country had anticipated Roca's intervention. While Sosa's actions were undeniably criminal, many regarded them as a natural reaction to the mistreatment soldiers faced at the time. Furthermore, the Supreme Military Council that issued the sentence disregarded the involvement of the Ministry of War, stating it was beyond its jurisdiction. This was seen as a significant affront to the Executive Branch.

Despite receiving the news with relief, public opinion criticized Roca for waiting until the last moment instead of acting sooner.

"It would have been more humane to act earlier," Caras y Caretas remarked at the time, "since the prisoner, as we said from the start, worn down by so many emotions and convinced that his offense would not be met with mercy, has experienced a significant physical and moral decline. Clear signs of mental distress had been evident for days, and on Friday morning, after learning of the commutation, it was necessary to transfer him to the Military Hospital."

Indeed, under such extreme suffering, Sosa lost his sanity and spent months hospitalized. He deluded himself into thinking he had bullets in his chest, believing he had been executed by firing squad.

Once he recovered, he was imprisoned again. In 1909, he was transferred to the military prison in Ushuaia, where he worked as a muleteer. From that point on, his name faded into the pages of oblivion.

But this was not the only person from Mendoza whom Roca pardoned in 1902. Another singular episode occurred in July of that year.

In Mendoza, Juan Rodríguez was imprisoned for murdering a pregnant woman and her husband to steal a meager sum of money. The crime, which took place in the department of Rivadavia, caused great public outcry. From the presidency, a telegram arrived approving the execution of the accused, with the support of the governor and the Mendoza judiciary. The shock in Mendoza and the rest of the nation was indescribable when, through another communication, General Roca himself declared the initial telegram to be fraudulent.

It was later revealed that the author of the telegram was none other than his own son and personal secretary, Dr. Julio A. Roca. The improper and informal nature of this procedure put both the president and the Mendoza governor under scrutiny. As a result, Rodríguez’s life was spared.

Beyond these particular cases, it is important to highlight the strong societal rejection of the death penalty. At the beginning of the 20th century, the liberal press referred to it as "an act of barbarity, far removed from the civilized society we aspire to be." Years later, socialists, particularly Alfredo Palacios, joined the fight for its abolition.

Finally, in 1922, with the reform of the Penal Code, the death penalty was abolished in Argentina.

1955 Revolution: Aftermath

The people of Bahía Blanca take to the streets to celebrate the triumph of the Revolution.

Aftermath



Joy and happiness in the crowd after Perón resignation

Thus concluded the first Argentine armed conflict of the 20th century, which, in just seven days of fighting, claimed the lives of nearly a thousand people. The casualties included civilians and soldiers—men, women, children, and the elderly. The majority of the deaths occurred on June 16 during the bombing of Buenos Aires, when 229 victims were identified in hospitals, clinics, and public aid facilities. However, the true death toll was far higher, as Dr. Francisco Barbagallo notes in Daniel Cichero's Bombs Over Buenos Aires. The chaos was so overwhelming that tracking the countless bodies transported by ambulances and trucks became impossible.

To grasp the scale of the attack, it is worth noting that 14,000 kilograms (14 tons) of explosives were dropped that day—half the amount used in the bombing of Guernica—yet the death toll was nearly equivalent to that of the Spanish city.

On that day, 43 rebel aircraft carried out the assault: twenty North American AT-6s, five Beechcraft AT-11s, three Catalinas, one Fiat G-55A Centauro reconnaissance aircraft dispatched to Rosario to contact General Bengoa, and ten rebel Gloster Meteors. Additionally, four aircraft initially refused to counter the attack but later joined the rebellion. Including loyalist aircraft, the total number of planes involved exceeded fifty.


Celebrations in Bahía Blanca

On June 16, 1955, the Air Force and Naval Aviation took their first baptisms of fire; the first two shoot-downs in the national aeronautical history occurred when the AT-6s of midshipmen Arnaldo Román and Eduardo Bisso were hit by the enemy, the first by shrapnel from the Gloster Meteor of Lieutenant Ernesto Adradas over the Río de la Plata and the second by anti-aircraft guns from the 3rd Regiment of La Tablada in the town of Tristán Suárez, Buenos Aires, not counting the Gloster that, due to lack of fuel, crashed into the waters of the Plata, between Carmelo and Colonia. That day also saw the first shoot-down carried out by a jet on the American continent (that of midshipman Romás by Lieutenant Adradas) and the entry into action of the tanks when a Sherman of the Motorized Regiment “Buenos Aires” fired on the Ministry of the Navy.


Victorious leaders. From left to right: CN Arturo Rial, Dr. Clemente Villada Achaval, General Julio A. Lagos, General Eduardo Lonardi, General Dalmiro Videla Balaguer and Commodore Julio César Krausse

Buenos Aires became the first (and so far, only) capital in South America to endure a large-scale aerial bombardment, joining the ranks of only a few cities worldwide to have suffered such an attack. It shares this tragic distinction with Gibara in Cuba, bombed by President Machado's air force in 1931, and Puerto Casado in Paraguay, targeted by the Bolivian Air Force in 1933. However, both of these events pale in comparison to the scale of the bombardment in Buenos Aires.

During the attacks, numerous locations in the city were hit, with the main targets including the Government House, Plaza de Mayo, the National Mortgage Bank, the Ministry of Finance, the Army Ministry (Libertador Building), Hotel Mayo, the Central Police Department, the CGT headquarters, the Ministry of Public Works, the Patagonia Import and Export Company, various buildings along Av. Paseo Colón, the service station of the Argentine Automobile Club, and the presidential residence at Unzué Palace.

Additionally, La Tablada suffered heavy damage as the 3rd Infantry Regiment was strafed and bombed on Av. Crovara and Av. San Martín while marching toward the city center. The Ministry of the Navy was also struck during an attack by Army units, and the Banco Nación was hit as revolutionary civilian commandos took refuge on its rooftop.

On September 16, Argentina witnessed its first air-naval battle when the Peronist Air Force engaged the Ríos Squadron. Mar del Plata was also bombed, initially by a lone naval aircraft and later by Navy ships targeting large coastal oil deposits, the Submarine Base, Army positions on a nearby golf course, and the Camet Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment.

Three days later, the submarine Santiago del Estero entered combat for the first time, using its 40 mm Bofors cannon to fire on unidentified aircraft near Montevideo. The towns of Saavedra and Río Colorado also fell victim to aerial bombardments during this period.


The Plaza de Mayo is packed, cheering on the Revolution that overthrew the tyrannical president

In that revolution, the greatness and miseries of war were fully exposed: acts of heroism and resolve, reckless actions, brutal deeds, weaknesses, and betrayals.

On June 16, it became evident that a significant portion of the population was willing to fight for Perón to the death. That day, thousands of workers took to the streets to arm themselves and fight for their leader. Dozens died in combat, most during the attack on the Ministry of the Navy. Similarly, on September 21, an unidentified number of fervent members of the Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista perished during revolutionary troops' assault on their headquarters.

There were soldiers who fulfilled their mission according to the training they had received, such as the much-criticized Lieutenant Adradas, who simply did his duty, or Vice-Commodore Síster, steadfast in his determination to defend the Peronist regime. Others failed to rise to the occasion. Some military figures upheld their honor, like Admiral Benjamín Gargiulo, who, like ancient Roman generals, chose to take his own life rather than face disgrace. There were officers willing to die rather than surrender, including General Lonardi, Colonel Arturo Ossorio Arana, Captains Perren and Rial, Commodore Krausse, Majors Montiel Forzano and Juan Francisco Guevara, Colonel Arias Duval, Captain Ramón Eduardo Molina, and the somewhat reckless Dalmiro Videla Balaguer, all on the rebel side. Others fell in combat, such as Brigadier General Tomás Vergara Ruzo and numerous aviators, soldiers, and sailors who fought valiantly on both sides.

On the loyalist side, the resolve and professionalism of generals like Franklin Lucero, Miguel Ángel Iñíguez, and José María Sosa Molina, Lieutenant Colonel César Camilo Arrechea, Captain Hugo Crexell, and many others stood out, honoring their respective branches of service. The Argentine honor also shone aboard the destroyers La Rioja and Cervantes, and in the steadfastness of the personnel in Bahía Blanca and Punta Alta, who held firm in their posts against powerful advancing forces.

However, there were also ambiguous and wavering actions, such as those of Admiral Olivieri, Generals Bengoa, Lagos, and even Aramburu. Lieutenant Colonel Barto displayed indecision and despair during the regiments’ advance toward southern Buenos Aires. Similarly, First Lieutenant Rogelio Balado, one of the regime’s iconic pilots, switched sides and, during combat, refused to fire on an enemy Avro Lincoln that had just strafed loyalist positions at the Pajas Blancas airfield. Captain Bernardo Benesch did the same when ordered to attack targets in Mar del Plata on June 19. (Before setting sail, he had offered dissenting officers and sailors the opportunity to leave the ship and return to shore, though he himself did not follow through.) Captain Edgardo Andrew also hesitated, asking Captain Rial to revoke the order to bomb the 5th Infantry Regiment in Bahía Blanca, which was refusing to surrender.

During the second phase of the revolution, over 70 combat and patrol sorties were conducted, and the main regiments and military units from Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Mendoza, San Luis, and Patagonia were mobilized.

Rear Admiral Toranzo Calderón upon arriving at the Municipality of Bahia Blanca

On September 21, 1955, as the final acts of the conflict concluded, an atmosphere of anticipation lingered across the country. While government emissaries and representatives of the rebel forces engaged in negotiations, combat units in Córdoba began their gradual return to base.

That same day, news of the revolutionary forces’ victory spread, prompting the people of Córdoba to flood the streets in celebration of the regime’s fall. Crowds gathered at Plaza San Martín, in front of the ruined Cabildo building, adorned with three Argentine flags, cheering for the leading figures of the rebellion. Thousands of men and women entered the adjacent Cathedral to give thanks to the Lord and the Holy Mother for the end of the conflict. Meanwhile, a jubilant procession of cars, motorcycles, trucks, buses, and pedestrians filled the streets, chanting in support of the revolution, its leaders, and the nation’s heroes.

Two days earlier, Bahía Blanca had erupted in similar enthusiasm. Residents filled the streets, cheering, singing, and waving flags while wearing sky-blue and white ribbons and rosettes. Portraits of San Martín, Belgrano, and Our Lord Jesus Christ were prominently displayed. Outside the CGT building, crowds sang the National Anthem, symbolizing the defiance of the fallen regime, and applauded Admirals Toranzo Calderón and Olivieri as they arrived at Bahía Blanca’s municipal headquarters after their release from detention in La Pampa. In front of the burned-out offices of the Democracia newspaper and the Bernardino Rivadavia Public Library, the crowd shouted, “Death to Perón!” and “Long live the Fatherland and Liberty!”

Toranzo Calderon in the Municipality of Bahia Blanca

On September 21, back in their respective units and after a refreshing hot bath, cadets and conscripts from the Military Aviation and Airborne Troops schools in Córdoba were informed that the next day they were going to participate in the parades that had been held to commemorate the victory.
On the 22nd, very early in the morning, the soldiers formed up in the courtyards of both schools to head into the city to parade with the Army troops and civilian commandos who had taken part in the battle. The Cadet's Diary is graphic in recounting the events.

"The unit remains in the same condition as always... All the officers gathered with General Lonardi at the Cadet Casino, which is why we couldn’t contact F... to request a replacement. When we finally managed to, he told us there was only one tent left with a cadet and 16 soldiers. We worked like mad to take down the tents and move them to the Squadron. Once we finished everything, we went to the unit, and there, among the three group leaders, the 'exciting' draw took place to decide who would stay... If it had been me, I would have had to muster a great deal of willpower to remain, but luck was on my side; of course, it fell to the 'Turk.' Poor guy, he won’t be any better off than I am."

Rear Admiral Samuel Toranzo Calderon arrives in Bahia Blanca

Thus, the troops boarded military trucks and buses and headed toward the provincial capital where, upon reaching Av. Vélez Sarsfield, they dismounted to begin the parade. They did so after a long wait, in front of the population who cheered them and threw flowers at them while a shower of papers fell from nearby buildings to the cry of “Freedom! Freedom!” which could be heard everywhere.
After the parade, the troops returned to the barracks to continue their activities during peacetime, unaware that the following day would claim the life of another comrade.
During a patrol and observation flight, the Calquin I.Ae-24 of the 2nd Attack Group, piloted by Second Lieutenant Edgardo Tercillo Panizza, crashed on the outskirts of the city due to mechanical problems.


Officers welcome their boss after his release

Once they had heard of this, cadets and officers headed towards the site, first crossing the Aeronautical District, with the intention of seeing the remains of the aircraft that was still smoking on the field. Once there, they came across the remains, observing them in silence while meditating on the events that had taken place in the previous days and the course that history would take from that moment on.
Mar del Plata also joined in the celebrations with long human columns parading through its streets to the City Hall, to sing the National Anthem and wave flags.
On September 23, the fronts of the city woke up decorated with the colors blue and white; around 10:00 there was a new march to the government palace where rosettes, ribbons and flowers were distributed as in the days of May and the celebrations continued in different places until late at night.
Argentina was beginning a new path; An era had ended and another had begun, but the disagreement between brothers was not going to end there. The country would never find its way again and society would continue to crumble to unsuspected limits.

Notes

[1] Gargiulo was the creator of IMARA (Argentine Marines), infusing the spirit of the US Marines into their training and enlistment..

Photos: Miguel Ángel Cavallo, Puerto Belgrano. Hora Cero. la Marina se subleva

1955 Guerra Civil. La Revolucion Libertadora y la caída de Perón

Malvinas: The Counter Attack of the "3 de Oro" at Wireless Ridge

The Counterattack of the "3 de Oro" (Golden 3) (Part 1)

By Lt. Col. (R) (Malvinas War Veteran) Víctor Hugo Rodríguez

The author served in the Malvinas as a First Lieutenant, Chief of the 1st Section of Company "A" of the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Regiment "Gral. Belgrano," nicknamed "3 de Oro" (Golden 3) during the Triple Alliance War, due to the yellow breastplate that adorned their blue jackets.





June 13, 1982, 22:00 hours — Tumbledown Hill, overlooking Moody Brook Valley. To the left was Longdon; in front, the 7th Infantry Regiment of La Plata was enduring relentless fire for two days, June 11th and 12th. It was hell. Positioned 100 meters above them and 5 kilometers away, we witnessed how the British enemy left no centimeter unscathed by naval, artillery, and mortar fire. It was clear they were preparing an assault on the regiment's heights. Occasionally, they turned their attention to us, a forewarning of their advance towards Tumbledown.

Below Longdon, Captain Soloaga—a war hero who carried his Sanmartinian values into peace—"clung like an oyster" to the rocks. His men were already fighting, enduring an infernal bombardment day and night. From our vantage point, we watched, both awestruck and helpless, as their resilience unfolded. Occasionally, patrols emerged—but only to retrieve their fallen and place them in an abandoned ambulance stuck in the valley's mud before returning to combat. Watching them march back into that artillery barrage was profoundly moving.
At 22:00 hours on June 13th, Captain Zunino, commander of Company A "Tacuarí" of the "3 de Oro," summoned us. A remarkable officer for wartime, Zunino convened 2nd Lt. Dobrovevic (support group leader), 2nd Lt. Mones Ruiz (2nd rifle section), Sub-Lt. Aristegui (3rd section leader), and me (1st section leader).

“We need to support the 7th Regiment, which is under attack on those heights,” he said.”. 

We knew the terrain only by sight—no reconnaissance had been done. The day before, we had deployed to Tumbledown, abandoning previous positions. Defending our spot against the expected assault the next day was our sole focus. Our positions consisted of low rocks; our aluminum screw-shovel “Tempex” tools had broken within a week, unable to withstand the greda soil. Digging foxholes was impossible. Equipment? Just a blanket, a shared tent cloth, and only five magazines per soldier. Night vision? Only the captain had one. Radios? None. Batteries were dead, leaving us with no communication within or outside the company. To supplement ammo, I ordered rounds carried in socks tied around our necks.



Aristegui, a 4th-year cadet serving as a "commissioned sub-lieutenant" in the Malvinas, was barely older than his soldiers. Yet, he was an example of leadership. I said,

“Aristegui, form up. You take the right, and I'll take the left. Let's cross the valley quickly and head for the heights.”. 

The battlefield was chaos—roaring, blazing, hellish. Longdon, the valley, Wireless Ridge where the 7th Regiment was positioned, Port Argentino, Mount Williams—all were alight with tracer rounds and rocket fire. It was full-on war, the final assault. We waded through a freezing brook, soaked to the waist. Snow fell. The cold? I can’t remember. The adrenaline heated our bodies.

From the valley, we realized the heights, where the 7th Regiment was supposed to meet us, were instead occupied by British forces, firing rifles and rockets at the abandoned Royal Marines barracks. Without communication, we had to resolve it on our own. I turned to Aristegui:

“The enemy’s up there. Let’s surprise them. Don’t advance straight—move to the right, gain the height advantage.”

Moments later, I heard, 

“The sub-lieutenant’s been hit in the neck!” 

I ran to him, blood pouring from his neck, when one of his men, slapping his cheek, shouted:

"You’ve been good to us, kid. We’ll get you out of here."

They carried him back to safety. Today, Aristegui, nicknamed “Nono,” is an exemplary Malvinas officer, earning the respect of his soldiers at just 19 years old. The bullet had pierced his neck, narrowly missing his spine..

Still in the valley, the enemy illuminated us with flares. Forty of Aristegui’s men and forty of mine were exposed. Knowing artillery fire was imminent, I ordered an assault on their positions, 100 meters above us on Wireless Ridge’s heights. Seconds later, an artillery barrage rained down where we had stood moments earlier. The shells exploded 50 meters overhead, showering us with lethal fragments.

“Charge!” I yelled. There was no other option to reach the heights and support the 7th Regiment. What a sight—my soldiers and Aristegui’s, running uphill, driven by sheer determination. “Cata” Carballo, my speedy aide; “Mono” Paz, my radioman without a radio; Aumasane, Izaguirre, “Bombón” Díaz, Juan Fernández—young men from Buenos Aires, cold, hungry, yet filled with love for their country, surging from the valley to claim that piece of Malvinas soil.

They were just 18 years old. They had little food, no communications, yet an unyielding spirit. To think the tabloids later dismissed them as mere “boys of war”...

Argentine Air Force: IA-58 Pucará, the Indigenous COIN Aircraft