Malvinas: Operation Georgias

Operation Georgias 

Satellite Image of South Georgia Islands Taken by NASA

Date: 3 April 1982
Location: Grytviken, South Georgia Islands
Outcome: Argentina takes control of Leith Harbour and Grytviken

Belligerents:
Argentina vs. United Kingdom

Commanders:
Captain Carlos Trombetta vs. Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills

Forces Engaged:
Argentina: 40 marines and the destroyer ARA Guerrico
United Kingdom: 22 Royal Marines and HMS Endurance

Casualties:
Argentina: 3 killed, 9 wounded, 1 corvette damaged, 1 helicopter shot down
United Kingdom: 1 wounded, 22 taken prisoner

Operation Georgias was the codename used by the Argentine Armed Forces for the operation to occupy the South Georgia Islands at the start of the Malvinas/Falklands War in 1982.
The invasion of South Georgia took place on 3 April 1982, when Argentine naval forces took control of South Georgia Island (renamed Isla San Pedro) after forcing the surrender of a small contingent of British Royal Marines in Grytviken. The Argentine intervention began on 19 March 1982, when a group of civilian workers arrived at Leith Harbour aboard the transport vessel ARA Bahía Buen Suceso (B-4), raising the Argentine flag. Some Argentine marines had infiltrated the group, posing as civilian scientists.

Polar Ship HMS Endurance in Mar del Plata, February 1982, shortly before its involvement in South Georgia

Argentine Workers in South Georgia

The Davidoff Contracts

In September 1979, Argentine businessman Constantino Davidoff, director of the company Georgia del Sur S.A. and a scrap metal dealer, signed a contract with the Edinburgh-based firm Christian Salvesen Co. The agreement granted him the right to remove the remains of the abandoned whaling stations at Leith, Stromness, and Husvik on the South Georgia Islands.
Davidoff approached the British Embassy in Buenos Aires requesting the use of the polar ship HMS Endurance to transport personnel and equipment necessary for dismantling the facilities. When the British authorities refused permission to use HMS Endurance, in August 1981 Davidoff sought approval from the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Navy to book passage aboard Antarctic transport vessels.
Aware of the British government's decision to withdraw HMS Endurance from service in the South Atlantic and anticipating a possible evacuation of Grytviken, the Argentine Navy signed an agreement with Davidoff that allowed him to travel to the islands at least twice a year.

Project and Operation Alfa

In September 1981, the Argentine Navy developed a plan to use Davidoff's salvage operations in South Georgia as a cover for establishing a covert base in the disputed territory. This initiative was given the codename Project Alfa. The plan involved infiltrating military personnel among the workers, posing as scientists. Once HMS Endurance had left the South Atlantic (from April onwards), they would be joined by 14 marines aboard a ship assigned to Antarctic base support, who would then establish a permanent military outpost on South Georgia. The base would benefit from the onset of winter, which would hinder any British attempt to remove it.

Parallel to this project, in October 1981, the commander of Antarctic naval operations received an order from the Chief of Operations of the Navy General Staff to study the possibility of establishing a scientific base on one of the disputed islands with the United Kingdom. It was expected that the base would be set up during the 1981–1982 Antarctic campaign. This operation was designated Operation Alfa.
In early December, a decision was made that the base would be manned by military personnel rather than civilians, due to the need for secrecy. The Amphibious Commando Group was ordered to assign 1 officer and 6 NCOs. The same instruction applied to an equal number of tactical divers.

On 29 January 1981, training began for the selected commandos and divers, under the command of Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz. The team included Lieutenant Carrilaff, 1 diver NCO, 1 medic NCO, 5 diver corporals, and 5 amphibious commando corporals. On 28 February, they boarded the Antarctic campaign vessel ARA Bahía Paraíso in Ushuaia.
To avoid interfering with planned operations in the Malvinas, the Military Committee cancelled Operation Alfa on 16 March. However, the commandos remained onboard as a precaution and departed on 18 March towards the South Orkney Islands, accompanying the vessel’s Antarctic campaign.

ARA Almirante Irízar

Davidoff’s Journeys

The Argentine businessman informed the British Embassy of his trip but did not request permission to travel aboard the icebreaker. On 16 December 1981, he set sail for South Georgia aboard the icebreaker ARA Almirante Irízar (Q-5) to carry out an inventory of the facilities to be dismantled at Stromness Bay. He arrived there on the 21st and departed a few days later.
On 23 December, the British magistrate in South Georgia discovered evidence of Argentine presence at Leith Harbour and reported it to Rex Hunt, Governor of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, who relayed the information to London on 31 December. The British government instructed its embassy to issue a formal note of protest against the unauthorised landing, considered a breach of sovereignty. However, Argentina’s Foreign Minister claimed ignorance of the incident. A second formal protest was issued on 9 February but was rejected by the Argentine Foreign Ministry on 18 February.

Another Argentine trip to the islands occurred in February 1982, when a commercial rival of Davidoff, bank employee Adrián Marchessi, made an unplanned visit to Leith Harbour. Marchessi arrived at the site aboard the Caimán, a yacht registered in Panama, having sailed from Mar del Plata. He reported in at Grytviken, claiming to be part of Davidoff’s team, and provided the local British authorities with details of Davidoff’s December inspection as well as information on previous Argentine visits to the area during the 1970s.

Raising of the Argentine Flag

On 18 March 1982, the transport ship ARA Bahía Buen Suceso arrived at Leith Harbour, disembarking Davidoff’s workers and their equipment without first reporting at Grytviken, as required by the British government. At that time, the only British presence at Leith Harbour was a team from the British Antarctic Survey (BAS).
On 19 March, four BAS members en route to Carlita Bay discovered the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso unloading equipment at Leith Harbour, with the Argentine flag flying. Around 100 people had disembarked and occupied a BAS shelter. The BAS team leader, Trevor Edwards, approached Captain Briatore to inform him that their presence was unauthorised and that they were required to report at Grytviken. Edwards then informed the British magistrate at King Edward Point.
The BAS commander in Grytviken, Steve Martin, sent a message to Governor Rex Hunt, who consulted with London. The British authorities demanded the removal of the Argentine flag and the re-embarkation of the workers. Captain Briatore responded that the mission had the approval of the British Embassy in Buenos Aires and ordered the flag lowered, but he still did not comply with the order to report at Grytviken.

On 20 March, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was informed of the events. As the Argentines had failed to follow proper diplomatic procedures, the British government decided to respond with a limited intervention. The Foreign Office ordered HMS Endurance to sail to the area to ensure the removal of the Argentine flag and prevent any further landings. The ship had departed from Port Stanley on 16 March, carrying 22 Royal Marines.
On 21 March, the British Embassy in Buenos Aires issued a diplomatic protest, requesting that the Argentine government withdraw the workers.
Argentina’s Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Méndez, responded by appearing to de-escalate the crisis, assuring that the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso would soon depart the islands and that the incident had no official backing.

On the morning of 22 March, the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso left Leith Harbour. However, later that day, a BAS observation post detected the continued presence of Argentine personnel and relayed the information to London. As a result, the Foreign Office ordered HMS Endurance to evacuate any remaining Argentine personnel in South Georgia.

 

Operation Georgias

On 23 March, the Commander of the Antarctic Naval Group, Captain César Trombetta, aboard ARA Bahía Paraíso (B-1) and stationed in the South Orkney Islands, received orders from the Argentine Naval General Staff to proceed at full speed to the South Georgia Islands. His mission was to prevent HMS Endurance—which had departed from the Malvinas—from removing Davidoff’s Argentine workers from Leith Harbour.

In response to British movements, Argentina deployed several countermeasures. The corvettes ARA Drummond (P-31) and ARA Granville (P-33) were positioned between the Malvinas and South Georgia, ready to intercept HMS Endurance and recover any Argentine personnel on board.

On 24 March, the Argentine government publicly confirmed the presence of the workers on South Georgia. That same day, Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz received orders to “disembark at Leith Harbour at 00:15 on 25 March to protect the Argentine workers.”
That night, ARA Bahía Paraíso arrived at Leith and disembarked 14 armed military personnel (Group Alfa) under Astiz’s command, using weapons supplied by the ship. The vessel remained in the area, patrolling with its helicopters. News from the region reported unusual Argentine naval activity in the South Atlantic.

When HMS Endurance reached Leith Harbour, it found ARA Bahía Paraíso anchored there. The two ships then shadowed each other around the islands until they lost contact on 31 March.

In anticipation of a possible armed clash, the British Foreign Office attempted to negotiate a compromise. Lord Carrington proposed to Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Méndez that the workers at Leith Harbour be granted amnesty and provided with documentation—possibly temporary entry permits instead of passports, a significant concession to the Argentine position.
However, Argentina insisted that the arrival of its nationals in South Georgia should be governed by the 1971 Communications Agreement. Governor Rex Hunt strongly rejected extending that agreement—valid only for the Malvinas—to South Georgia and expressed his concerns to London.

The British plan was that BAS commander Steve Martin would remain in control until Argentine forces displayed hostile intent, at which point Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills would assume command.

On 28 March 1982, at 10:57, the destroyer ARA Santísima Trinidad (D-2) set sail as flagship of Task Force 40, carrying both the Task Force Commander and the Malvinas Theatre Commander, Major General Osvaldo García. This marked the beginning of Operation Rosario, which would lead to the surrender of the British governor in the Malvinas on 2 April.

That same day, 40 marines under Lieutenant Guillermo Luna boarded the corvette ARA Guerrico (P-2, now P-32) at Puerto Belgrano, bound for South Georgia. The journey was harsh and overcrowded, as the vessel was not suited for troop transport and faced poor weather during the four-day voyage.

On 30 March, with the invasion clearly imminent, the British government ordered the destroyer HMS Antrim, followed by two other surface vessels and three nuclear submarines, to proceed to South Georgia to reinforce HMS Endurance. The rest of the Royal Navy was placed on four-hour alert.

On 1 April, the Argentine Naval General Staff issued Operational Order No. 1/82 “S”, instructing forces to “occupy Grytviken and hold Leith to secure control of the South Georgia Islands.”
Missile corvette ARA Guerrico, under Commander Carlos Alfonso, was ordered to rendezvous with ARA Bahía Paraíso, which was equipped with two helicopters (a Puma from the Argentine Army and an Alouette from the Navy Air Command). The 40 marines under Luna’s command joined Astiz’s troops already stationed at Leith.

Up to that date, South Georgia had not been included in the Malvinas Theatre of Operations.

Insignia of Alfredo Astiz at the Imperial War Museum in London

With the available units, Task Group 60.1 was formed under the command of Captain César Trombetta. The group was composed of the following elements:[22]

• 60.1.1. Polar ship ARA Bahía Paraíso, commanded by Frigate Captain Ismael J. García

• 60.1.2. Corvette ARA Guerrico, commanded by Frigate Captain Carlos Alfonso

• 60.1.3. A detachment from Marine Infantry Battalion No. 4 (BIM 4), consisting of 40 marines under the command of Lieutenant Guillermo Luna

• 60.1.4. Two helicopters from the Antarctic Group: one Puma (Argentine Army) and one Alouette (Naval Aviation Command of the Argentine Navy)

• 60.1.5. A group of tactical divers and amphibious commandos (14 men), commanded by Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz

In response to these developments, a series of high-level meetings and diplomatic discussions took place in an attempt to prevent an Argentine invasion. On the night of 1 April, U.S. President Ronald Reagan pledged to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that he would speak directly with the Argentine Junta to avert an attack.

However, Reagan's phone conversation with Leopoldo Galtieri proved unsuccessful.[23]

British Resistance

Cumberland Bay, including King Edward Cove and the Grytviken Peninsula

2 April

On 2 April, Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz informed the Argentine personnel at Leith Harbour that Argentina had recovered the Malvinas, and he received the order to execute Operational Order No. 1/82 “S”.

Upon learning of the fall of Puerto Argentino (Port Stanley), British Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills acted quickly. His men fortified the beach at King Edward Point, near the entrance to the bay, using barbed wire and landmines, and set up defensive positions around the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) buildings. HMS Endurance, positioned a few miles offshore, maintained communications between the small British detachment and London. Mills was authorised to open fire in self-defence after issuing a warning. A subsequent statement from the British government instructed the Royal Marines “not to resist beyond the point where lives would be needlessly lost.”[24]

Due to severe weather, the ARA Guerrico only entered Cumberland Bay at 17:00 on 2 April. As a result, Argentina’s planned operations in South Georgia had to be postponed by Commander César Trombetta to the following day. The original plan had called for Astiz’s special forces to land at Hope Point, near Grytviken, to secure the arrival zone for the main ground troops, who would be flown in by helicopter. ARA Guerrico was to provide naval gunfire support from outside the bay, but her delayed arrival due to the storm forced a revised plan for 3 April.

Under the new plan:

• The first landing would be carried out by an Alouette helicopter from ARA Guerrico.

• This would be followed by three waves of marine infantry aboard a Puma helicopter from ARA Bahía Paraíso.

• A radio message demanding British surrender would be sent before any landing.

• After the warning, ARA Guerrico would move toward Caleta Capitán Vago (where Grytviken’s port is located), opposite King Edward Point.

The corvette was only authorised to fire upon request from the ground forces. Astiz’s troops were to remain in reserve aboard Bahía Paraíso, and all units were instructed to avoid enemy casualties as long as possible.[25]

Historian Lawrence Freedman believes that Trombetta’s assumption of minimal resistance was based on the belief that only BAS personnel were present. This was apparently due to the absence of HMS Endurance, which led Trombetta to underestimate the British military presence.
Trombetta ordered ARA Guerrico to approach the shore, dispatch the Alouette for reconnaissance, and use the Puma to transport the first marine detachment.[26]

During the night, both Argentine ships made contact and remained in nearby waters, with ARA Guerrico anchored in Stromness Bay.

3 April

At 05:00 on 3 April, Lieutenant Guillermo Luna received a naval message indicating that HMS Endurance was in Grytviken with 22 Royal Marines. However, Commander Trombetta believed that the landing zone would be clear, with any British personnel remaining aboard the polar ship.

At 07:35, with improved weather, ARA Guerrico arrived at Leith Harbour, where it transferred the marines to ARA Bahía Paraíso. Astiz’s commandos were re-embarked, and the workers left ashore under protection of forces from Bahía Paraíso, led by Lieutenant Cortez.

At 11:10, a surrender demand was transmitted from ARA Bahía Paraíso in English, and repeated three minutes later. The message falsely claimed that Governor Rex Hunt had surrendered not only in the Malvinas but also in all dependencies, including South Georgia.[13]
Lieutenant Mills received the message and relayed it to HMS Endurance to buy time. He also advised BAS personnel to take shelter in the local church. The British soldiers refused to surrender.

Meanwhile, the Alouette helicopter was flying over Grytviken, reporting no signs of visible resistance. ARA Guerrico began entering the inlet.
According to Argentine Admiral Rubén Oscar Mayorga, the corvette’s commander, Captain Carlos Alfonso, hesitated to bring the ship into such confined waters. Mayorga supports Freedman’s view that Trombetta’s assumptions about British military presence were incorrect. He cites an official report indicating that Trombetta underestimated the situation, also expressing concerns about ARA Guerrico’s readiness for combat.[28] The ship had only recently returned to active service after being in dry dock until just days before departing from Puerto Belgrano.[29]

 

Wreckage of the Argentine Puma Helicopter

Helicopter Downing

At 11:25, the Argentine command ordered the personnel at Grytviken to move into the open, announcing that a landing by marine infantry would take place. Ten minutes later, the ARA Guerrico reported the presence of armed personnel on the ground.

At 11:41, the first wave of 15 Argentine marines, including Lieutenant Luna, was deployed by a Puma helicopter at King Edward Point, opposite Shackleton House, where the British Royal Marines were entrenched. By then, the crew aboard Guerrico had confirmed that the British were positioned along the northern shore of the inlet.

A second wave of marines departed ARA Bahía Paraíso at 11:47, on the Puma, carrying Lieutenant Giusti, 14 marines, and a machine gun. However, Lieutenant Luna, already on the ground, had requested via Guerrico—as he had no direct communication with Bahía Paraíso—that the second wave be delayed and replaced with a third group carrying 60mm mortars. But the second wave was already airborne.

The landing took place east of Luna's position and in full view of the British defenders. The Puma came within effective range of British automatic weapons. It was immediately hit by heavy fire, but the pilot managed to cross the bay and conduct an emergency landing on the southern shore, opposite King Edward Point (known in Argentina as Punta Coronel Zelaya).

Two Argentine conscripts, Mario Almonacid and Jorge Néstor Águila, were killed. Four others were wounded, and the rest were left disorganised and out of combat position. Despite the setback, the marines opened fire with their machine gun on the hospital building, wounding one British marine in the arm.

At the same time, Luna’s troops began to advance toward Shackleton House, but after the Puma was downed, the British responded with heavy fire.[13] In response, Luna requested fire support from ARA Guerrico.

Attack on ARA Guerrico

At 11:55, Guerrico began its second approach to the inlet and opened fire. However, her 20mm guns jammed after the first shot. The 40mm cannons managed only six bursts, and the 100mm main gun became inoperable after a single round. Now fully exposed, the corvette had no choice but to turn within the cove and fire with weapons mounted on the opposite side.

At 11:59, British forces opened fire on the ship. The corvette was struck by small arms and a Carl Gustav 84mm anti-tank rocket launcher.[31] According to Mills, his men fired from a distance of approximately 550 metres.

The attack killed Petty Officer Patricio Guanca, wounded five sailors, and damaged multiple systems: electrical cables, one 40mm gun, an Exocet missile launcher, and the 100mm turret mount. As Guerrico passed again in front of the British position to retreat, she was hit by another intense wave of fire.
Argentine sources acknowledged that the vessel sustained over 200 hits during the engagement.[32]

Meanwhile, the Alouette helicopter—a reconnaissance aircraft—was used to transport the remaining 10 marines, landing them outside the range of British weapons.[13]

As the damaged Guerrico withdrew from the bay, the Argentine ground troops resumed small arms exchanges with Mills’ Royal Marines.[13] Once beyond the range of British weapons—near Hobart Rock—Guerrico resumed firing with her repaired 40mm guns.[33] This convinced Lieutenant Mills that the situation was untenable. He ordered his men to cease fire at 12:48, according to Admiral Mayorga.[33]

At 13:00, Mills approached the Argentine lines waving a white flag and surrendered. He was instructed to have his men surrender one by one. Mills and his marines were taken into custody by Astiz’s group, which had remained in reserve during the battle.[13]
At 13:35, the British flag was reported lowered.

HMS Endurance dispatched one of its Wasp helicopters to Cumberland Bay. The aircraft detected the Argentine corvette and the transport vessel in the cove but observed no signs of combat. HMS Endurance remained in South Georgia waters until 5 April.[34]

That afternoon, 13 BAS civilian personnel who had been scattered in the surrounding area were captured. At 23:00, Group Alfa replaced Lieutenant Cortez and his men in securing the workers at Leith Harbour.

ARA Guerrico

Consequences

Following the engagement at Grytviken, the corvette ARA Guerrico, which had lost approximately 50% of its firepower due to battle damage, departed Grytviken alongside ARA Bahía Paraíso at 03:15 on 4 April, bound for Río Grande.[35]

The ARA Bahía Paraíso transported the captured British Royal Marines to Río Grande, from where they were flown to Montevideo. They returned to the United Kingdom on 20 April.[13]

The Argentine forces chose not to attack the BAS station on Bird Island, where 15 British BAS personnel remained out of Argentine control. These individuals also remained active in other areas such as Schlieper Bay, the Lyell Glacier, and Saint Andrews Bay, avoiding capture until the islands were retaken by British forces.

The Argentine Navy left behind a garrison of 55 marines on the islands, along with 39 civilian scrap workers who remained stationed at Leith Harbour.[34]

The South Georgia Islands were retaken by British forces on 25 April 1982 during Operation Paraquat.[36]

Medals

• Lieutenant Keith Paul Mills was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC).

• Captain Nick Barker of HMS Endurance received the title of Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE).[13]

• Chief Gunner Francisco Solano Páez was awarded the Argentine Medal for Valour in Combat (La Nación Argentina al Valor en Combate).[37]

Bibliography

-Freedman, Lawrence: The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: The origins of the Falklands war. Routledge, 2005. ISBN 0-7146-5206-7 
-Freedman, Lawrence and Gamba, Virginia: Señales de Guerra. Javier Vergara Editor, 1992. ISBN 950-15-1112-X 
-Insight Team Sunday Times (1982). War in the Falklands: the Full Story. The Sunday Times. 
-Contraalmirante Horacio A. Mayorga: No Vencidos. Ed. Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1998. ISBN 950-742-976-X 
-The Argentine Invasion of South Georgias 

Referencias

1. "They infiltrated aboard, posing as scientists, but were in fact members of an Argentine naval special forces unit". Nick van der Bijl, Nine Battles to Stanley, London, Leo Cooper P.8 as reported in Lawrence Freemdman, The Official History of the Falklands Camapign: Vol I The Origins of the Falklands War
2. "Bahia Buen Suceso set sail for South Georgia on 11 March carrying Argentine Marines" Rowland White, Vulcan 607, London, Bantam Press, p30.
3. Freedman-Gamba, p. 74.
4. El Proyecto Alfa
5. Freedman-Gamba, p. 75
6. Freedman-Gamba, p. 76
7. The first visit of Davidoff
8. Insight Team Sunday Times, p. 67
9. Freedman, p. 172
10. Freedman-Gamba, p. 81
11. Segunda visita de Davidoff
12. Freedman-Gamba, p. 85
13. Britain Small Wars
14. Freedman-Gamba, p. 86
15. Freedman-Gamba, pp. 87-88
16. At that time, the Antarctic Naval Group was concluding the 1981/1982 summer campaign. By the second half of March 1982, the icebreaker ARA Almirante Irízar had returned to its home port at the Naval Station of Buenos Aires (Apostadero Naval de Buenos Aires). Meanwhile, the polar transport ship ARA Bahía Paraíso (B-1), under the command of Frigate Captain Ismael J. García, departed from the Naval Base Ushuaia bound for Base Esperanza in Antarctica, transporting the families who would be overwintering there. Following this mission, the ship continued to the South Orkney Islands, where it embarked the personnel of the Naval Construction Battalion, who had just completed construction of a new building for the local Antarctic detachment.
17. La perla austral, cronología
18. Freedman, pp. 183 and 184
19. Freedman-Gamba, pp. 98-99
20. Freedman, p.187
21. Héroes Salteños Caidos en la Guerra de las Malvinas
22. Mayorga, p. 94
23. Cf. Jonh O'Sullivan, op. cit., págs. 229-230.
24. Freedman, pp. 11-13
25. Mayorga, p. 97
26. Freedman, p. 13
27. Freedman, pp. 13-14
28. Mayorga, p. 98
29. Mayorga, p. 48
30. Mayorga, pp. 99-100
31. Mayorga, p. 100
32. Malvinas: Georgias del Sur
33. Mayorga, p. 101
34. Freedman, p. 14
35. Mayorga, p. 102
36. Freedman, p. 222
37. www.armada.mil.ar


Wikipedia.es

Malvinas: Cover Operation on Cow Beach, 1966

Secret Landing at Cow Bay/Playa Vaca

Operation Cow Beach was conceived in the shadows of a turbulent era—an epic chapter in the history of the Argentine Navy, where determination and stealth combined to confront a challenge that had lingered for over a century. The year was 1966, and Argentina, ruled by a military junta following the overthrow of President Arturo Illia, was growing weary of its diplomatic claims over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. The shadow of British incursion, cast over the islands since 1833, loomed heavily in the minds of naval strategists.




The incident involving Aerolíneas Argentinas Flight 648, hijacked by a group of extremists and diverted to the archipelago, had stirred already turbulent waters. It was a stark reminder that the situation in the Falklands could escalate without warning, and that Argentina needed to be prepared for a confrontation scenario. Thus, in the shadowy offices of Buenos Aires, a plan was drawn up involving one of the fleet’s most veteran submarines—the ARA Santiago del Estero, a former USS Lamprey from the Second World War, repurposed as the guardian of a secret mission.



Aerolíneas Argentinas Flight 648 was hijacked by Argentine extremists on 28 September 1966 and diverted to the Falklands, where they meekly surrendered to the British colonial authorities.


On 28 October 1966, with its diesel engines roaring beneath the waves, the ARA Santiago del Estero silently navigated the frigid waters of the South Atlantic. Under the command of Frigate Captain Horacio González Llanos and Corvette Captain Juan José Lombardo, the submarine stealthily approached the coast of East Falkland, just 40 kilometres from Port Stanley, the capital of the British colony. On board, twelve Navy men—including Sub-Lieutenant Oscar Héctor García Rabini—waited tensely for the moment to act.


Diagram of the Navigation Route Taken by Submarine S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero of the Argentine Navy During Operation "Cow Beach", Late October 1966




Cow Bay, Soledad Island/East Falkland (Argentine Republic)

The plan was clear: they were to land on a remote beach, just a few kilometres north of the British position, to gather vital intelligence for future landings. The beach had to be thoroughly surveyed—its gradient, potential underwater obstacles, approach routes—everything needed to be charted without leaving a trace. In the dimness of night, the men assembled their kayaks on the deck of the barely surfaced submarine, and the silence was broken only by the gentle lapping of the waves.


Crew and Command Staff of Submarine S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero – Argentine Navy.

Arrival of S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero (SS-372 USS Lamprey) at Mar del Plata Naval Base from the United States, 1960
(Photograph by Enrique Mario Palacio)


The two Balao-class submarines, S-11 ARA Santa Fe and S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero, which served in the Argentine Navy between 1960 and 1971, should not be confused with the later submarines of the same class modernised to GUPPY IA standard—S-21 and S-22—which replaced them from 1971 onwards and carried the same names. In this image, the veteran S-11 and S-12 can be seen at the end of their service life at the Mar del Plata Naval Base, while in the background lies the new S-22 ARA Santiago del Estero, their replacement, ready to take on the duties left behind by its predecessors. The S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero was retired after a decade of service, having taken part in important missions such as Operation Cow Beach, which became a notable chapter in the history of the Argentine Navy.



S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero Moored at its Home Pier, Mar del Plata Naval Base.

The First Incursion and an Unexpected Encounter

The first incursion was a success. The men landed and explored the coastline, mapping every detail. However, the second night brought an unexpected twist. In the darkness, García Rabini spotted a kelper—a local island settler—watching them from atop a cliff. They knew that being discovered could spark an unprecedented diplomatic crisis. Acting swiftly, they captured the islander and tied him up as they debated their next move. Killing him was not an option—the mission was one of intelligence gathering, not combat. But they also couldn’t risk the man alerting the British authorities.

Then, an idea emerged—both bold and unusual. Some crew members returned to the submarine to fetch a bottle of whisky from the captain’s cabin. They went back to the cliff and forced the kelper to drink until he was semi-conscious, leaving him behind at the very spot where they had found him. With the mission aborted to avoid further complications, the group returned to the submarine, carrying with them the valuable intelligence they had collected.

Born on 19 March 1927 in Salto, Buenos Aires Province, Juan José Lombardo was a key figure in the history of the Argentine Navy. As a Sub-Lieutenant, he served as Second-in-Command aboard submarine S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero during the successful Operation Cow Beach in the Falkland Islands on 28 October 1966—a mission that would become a landmark in Argentina's intelligence operations in the South Atlantic. On 15 December 1981, by then holding the rank of Vice Admiral, he was summoned by the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya, to receive a mission that would alter the course of Argentine history: the Falklands.

The Return to Mar del Plata
The journey back to Mar del Plata was as silent as the outbound voyage. Upon arrival, absolute silence was ordered regarding the events that had taken place. None of the participants—not even to their families—were to speak of what had happened in the frigid waters of the South Atlantic. Despite the unforeseen developments, the mission was deemed a success. The data gathered was handed over to the Navy General Staff—a strategic asset that could have proved critical had diplomatic negotiations failed.


The two Balao-class submarines, S-11 ARA Santa Fe and S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero, which served in the Argentine Navy from 1960 to 1971, should not be confused with later submarines of the same class—modernised to GUPPY IA standard—S-21 and S-22, which replaced them from 1971 and bore the same names. In this image, one of the original submarines is seen underway shortly after its arrival in Argentina, already without the forward gun that had been removed as part of its adaptation and modernisation for new missions in the South Atlantic.

Legacy of a Silent Mission
Years later, Commander García Rabini would recall those days with quiet pride, fully aware of the significance of the mission. Although the Cow Beach operation report was not directly used during the 1982 Falklands conflict, it stood as a testament to the commitment and audacity of those sailors who defied history to keep the flame of Argentine sovereignty alive.

The Story of Operation Cow Beach

Interwoven with both legend and fact, the story of Operation Cow Beach remains a hidden episode within the broader struggle over the Falklands—a moment when a small group of men faced the sea, the darkness, and the looming shadows of a war that, though not yet begun, echoed with the weight of the inevitable. It stands as a reminder that the fight for sovereignty is not waged solely on battlefields, but also in silences, in the waves, and in the whisper of the wind on a lonely South Atlantic beach.


Commander Oscar Héctor García Rabini. Now aged 83, retired Commander Oscar Héctor García Rabini is the Argentine naval officer who, in 1966 as a Sub-Lieutenant, led one of the most daring missions in the history of the Argentine Navy. At the head of a special forces incursion, he landed on the shores of East Falkland on 28 October of that year, during the secret Operation Cow Beach. Launched from the depths of the ocean by the submarine S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero, the mission was cloaked in silence and darkness, aimed at collecting vital intelligence to support Argentina’s sovereignty claims over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.


Cow Beach/Playa Vaca, Southern Tip – Photograph Taken from ARA Santiago del Estero by Miguel Salvatierra, 28/10/1966


Balao-Class Submarine S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero. The Balao-class submarine, formerly the US Navy’s SS-372 USS Lamprey, served the United States from 1944 until 1960, when it was transferred to the Argentine Navy and renamed S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero. In the photograph, the submarine is seen departing from the Mar del Plata Naval Base, home to Argentina’s Submarine Force Command. It operated from this base until 1971, when it was replaced by the S-22 ARA Santiago del Estero—a submarine of the same class but modernised to the GUPPY IA standard. The arrival of this updated vessel marked the end of an era for the veteran S-12, which had taken part in key operations such as Cow Beach, demonstrating the Navy’s steadfast commitment to national sovereignty.


ASW Frigate P-36 ARA Piedrabuena in the Periscope Crosshairs of ARA Santiago del Estero During Combat Exercises


Cargo Transfer Between Submarine ARA Santiago del Estero and Destroyer D-10 ARA San Luis


Surface Navigation of S-12 ARA Santiago del Estero en Route to Its Objective. As a Balao-class submarine that had not undergone the GUPPY IA modernisation, the vessel lacked a snorkel and high-capacity batteries. Consequently, it still had to operate like a Second World War-era submarine—navigating mostly on the surface, at least at night and in low-risk areas.

Goose Green: The 2 Para Clash and Flesh

Darwin-Goose Green: The Corporal Ramírez (12 IR) Experience

Account of Corporal "EC" Ramírez, RI-12

Malvinas 1982


 

Warrant Officer Ramírez was born in the city of Río Cuarto, Córdoba Province. His decision to enter the "General Lemos" School was made from an early age. "I joined the Army out of vocation. In primary school, I already had admiration for the military, the soldier, and national holidays. As I grew up, I got closer to the Army because I had a distant uncle who was a non-commissioned officer. We would sometimes visit him in Córdoba, and I’d see the soldiers and their uniforms. From the age of 8 or 9, I wanted to be a soldier. After finishing my fourth year of secondary school, I joined the Lemos School."

Ramírez described the life of a cadet as a tough stage: "As a cadet, it was a difficult period because I went from the comfort of home to the harsh discipline of the school – it was a big change. Still, I had strong family support. It was hard at first, but I never doubted my decision; I knew exactly what I wanted. I felt proud to belong to the Force and I truly enjoyed it." In early 1982, the second year of his training was going normally, and that week was meant to be leave for Easter to spend time with family. That changed abruptly when they learned they would be promoted to NCOs – corporals of the Argentine Army. 



Warrant Officer Ramírez continued: “I was fortunate to be assigned to Infantry Regiment 12, which was then based in Mercedes, Corrientes, under the III Infantry Brigade. We were assigned to the Command and Services Company. At first, we were packing combat rations, but soon the whole brigade was mobilised south, leaving only a detachment behind. We were among the first to arrive in the islands, along with the medical section. That was a proud moment for me as an Argentine soldier. Once everyone arrived, the regiment began to be airlifted to Darwin. By 25 May, we could no longer be transported due to the presence of British commandos. That day we celebrated the national holiday by marching from our position in Challenger to Puerto Argentino – a 20 km walk. We were preparing to move to Darwin when soldiers from our regiment who had already seen combat in San Carlos arrived after retreating. We all boarded an Air Force helicopter, standing, in tense silence. The door gunner was alert, as British aircraft were nearby, and the pilot flew low, hugging the terrain to avoid detection. We landed in Darwin and Goose Green – the helicopter touched down in the village to avoid being spotted. As we disembarked, the siren sounded – red alert – and we scrambled to find defensive positions.

That night, combat began with British field artillery and naval fire, as we were in the Darwin isthmus, the land bridge connecting the north and south of East Falkland. The enemy advanced from the north, and we could see the artillery flashes and combat. The most striking moment was the final enemy assault – watching tracer rounds approaching until they reached our position. We fought until past noon the next day. Second Lieutenant Peluffo took command of our sector. We had no communication or chance to retreat. Our section surrendered, and the fighting stopped. There was a terrible, indescribable silence. When things calmed down, I left my position and saw the whole scene – smoke, and British troops already present. I approached them, saw the surrender flag, returned, and left my rifle, which was already out of ammunition. The British weren’t hostile. I asked them to assist a wounded soldier beside me. We were taken to another part of the island as prisoners – those uninjured stayed two or three days, while the wounded were flown out. We were later moved to San Carlos, where the rest of the regiment was held. We were captured on 28 May. 29 May was Army Day. A few days later, the ship moved, and we realised we were headed somewhere else.

On 13 June, we were dropped off in Montevideo. We were among the first to be captured and ended up in a neutral country. After disembarking, we passed through Red Cross tents for registration and boarded Argentine ships to return to the mainland. The next day, Puerto Argentino surrendered. That return was painful. I felt I hadn’t given everything – because I was still whole, uninjured. To me, giving everything meant dying or being unable to continue fighting. Afterwards, there was much uncertainty. We were taken by bus to ESPAC. We all returned to the same unit. I remained four more years at Infantry Regiment 12 – the most cherished posting of my career. I retired in Campo de Mayo, at the Army Aviation Directorate.

Nacar Section: A Story of a Marine

 

A Story of a Marine Infantryman

Account taken from the Gaceta Malvinense

My name is Fernando Claudio Martín. I was CC/61 (I joined with the class of ’62 due to a study deferment). I belonged to BIM 5, Company “Nácar”, 3rd Section, under the command of Sub-Lieutenant Jorge “Pechito” Lucero.

As I begin to write these lines, I can’t help but feel a touch of nostalgia. I’ve heard countless stories about the Malvinas campaign — thanks to my friend, veteran Pascual Distefano, I’ve had the privilege for several years to take part in his radio programme “Malvinas Hoy… Historia de una Guerra”. That’s why telling my own story feels harder — I’m far more comfortable listening than speaking.

I joined the Naval Infantry Service on 1 April 1981. After completing my first training period at the Naval Infantry Training Centre (CIFIM), I was posted to BIM No. 5, based in Río Grande (Tierra del Fuego). I arrived at the end of May 1981, and from then began an intense but essential period of formation and training as a Marine infantryman.

Time would prove our commander right in pushing us to the limit — our performance in Malvinas would later justify his demands. On 2 April 1982, we were already in the field when we heard on the radio about the recovery of our Malvinas Islands. We were overjoyed, without imagining what was to come next. Everything happened so fast that, if memory serves, by 8 April we were already flying to the islands aboard a Navy aircraft.

Upon arrival, we were first stationed near the airfield, and later transferred to our final defensive position on Mount Tumbledown. I was in the 3rd Section of Company Nácar, and our position was established on the northern slope of the mountain.

Life in the islands became increasingly difficult. The weather grew harsher and the terrain more hostile, but we managed to endure thanks to constant work improving our defences and training. Generally, we didn’t suffer much from shortages — food wasn’t abundant, but it was sufficient, and our equipment was in good condition and suited to the environment (we came from a region with similar conditions).

I’d like to recall a small anecdote about two remarkable conscripts from my section, Miguel Fernández and Jorge Ponce. Every time they went down to the settlement, they came back well supplied — drinks and chocolate mostly — which we’d later trade for yerba, flour, and other goods.

Days passed until 1 May, when the first British attack took place. From that day onwards, everything became much tougher. The fighting had begun, and with it, the uncertainty of what would happen to us, and how we’d respond under such pressure. We learnt to live with bombardments, watched from afar the attacks on the airfield, witnessed the battles of Longdon, Two Sisters, and Wireless Ridge, and awaited with determination the British assault on our positions.

In the final days of the battle, we came under a devastating artillery barrage that wounded my comrade Vicente Zurzolo in the back. In my desperation to get him out of our partially collapsed shelter, I didn’t realise that I, too, had been wounded. I carried him as best I could to the aid post near the service area, where both of us received medical attention.

Now, so many years later, with the experience and perspective that time brings, I sometimes think I might have handled things differently. Not out of regret, but simply as a reflection on the choices one has in those moments.

By the end of the war, I was in the hospital at Port Stanley. Watching the British troops enter the town was deeply painful. The war was over — but I could never have imagined that the post-war period would prove even harder than the conflict itself.

I can’t finish this account without expressing my thanks — first, to all the conscripts of BIM 5, especially those of Company Nácar; to Captain (Ret.) Carlos H. Robacio, our guide and mentor who taught us to be good soldiers and honourable men; to Sub-Lieutenant Jorge Lucero, our section commander; to all the officers and NCOs who trained us throughout our service in the Marine Infantry; to Commander (Ret.) Guillermo Botto for his friendship and wise advice; and to my family, for their patience and love.

All that remains for me to say is that, as an Argentine, I am proud to have defended the sovereignty of our Malvinas Islands, and I will always continue to uphold the honour of our fallen heroes and the justice of our national cause.

VGM Fernando Claudio Martín

 

Malvinas: NCO in Combat

In Front of my Group of Twelve Soldiers

Malvinas: Historias de Coraje

Account of Second Corporal of the Marine Infantry "VGM" Conrado Augusto Olmos Matar


 


Since I was a young boy, I felt a calling to pursue a career in the armed forces — I wanted to become a policeman or a soldier. While I was in secondary school, a friend from my neighbourhood, Petty Officer Carlos Sequeira of the Navy, encouraged me to continue my studies in the Naval Forces. Some time later, personnel from the institution came to the province to promote the enrolment of people from Santiago into the Force. I didn’t let the opportunity pass and quickly submitted my application. After meeting the entry requirements, I joined the School for Marine Infantry Non-Commissioned Officers located in Punta Mogotes.

The first months were tough — like many from Santiago, I missed home, its customs, my loved ones and friends. Everything was new, everything was different. I felt alone among so many recruits from different parts of the country.



The training was so demanding that many of my comrades requested discharge; out of the initial group, only seventy-four of us graduated. More than once, I was on the verge of quitting, but thanks to the encouragement and support of a lieutenant named Alemán, I managed to persevere and graduated as a Second Corporal in 1980.

My first posting was to the 1st Marine Infantry Battalion in Puerto Belgrano, where I was welcomed by the Second-in-Command, Captain Giachino, and the Company Commander, Lieutenant Damore. From that point on, I began my first steps as an NCO, which mainly involved instructing a group of soldiers while continuing to develop my professional knowledge.

In 1981, I was placed in charge of preparing the Rocket Launcher Group, which consisted of twelve soldiers, including two from Santiago — Coronel and Gutiérrez. At the beginning of 1982, my group was assigned to Company "C" (Charlie), under a Non-Commissioned Officer named Gigena. I clearly remember being struck by the fact that, by that time of the year, the conscripts from the 1962 class had not yet been discharged and that training and exercises were still ongoing. Normally, during that period, operational activities decrease and are replaced by maintenance tasks.

On a warm morning in March, all staff NCOs were gathered on the unit’s parade ground, where Captain Giachino informed us that we were to prepare for embarkation in order to head to some islands to recover an Argentine vessel that had been seized by the British. All I could think was: we’re going to war. One joins the armed forces, and perhaps never gets called to fight — but for us, it was happening. I mentally reviewed all I had learned.



From that moment, we began our preparatory tasks, which mainly involved resupplying, organising field equipment, and stocking ammunition. We also practised shooting at the range daily and carried out final checks on our weapons. This preparation continued until we, the roughly one thousand men of the Marine Infantry Brigade, boarded the vessel Comandante Trizar.

Although we had all necessary comforts, the first few days were difficult due to the rough seas — even with our prior sailing experience, nearly all on board suffered the effects of seasickness.

Once we were at sea, all officers and NCOs were assembled to receive the operational orders. In general terms, our mission was to land and take the Falkland Islands, with the main objective of subduing the forces defending the Governor’s residence and removing its authorities. This mission would be carried out by the amphibious commandos, with support from us, the Marine Infantry. It was no easy task — we knew we would be facing professional soldiers with war experience from a global power. But the hardest part was the requirement to overcome the enemy without causing casualties — a very difficult objective, but one which, in the end, was achieved.

During the night of 1–2 April, we completed our final preparations, readying personnel and equipment for the landing. At that moment, I didn’t reflect on the historic significance of the mission we were about to carry out — my focus was solely on leading my men. I was absorbed by thoughts of how the operation would unfold, how I would respond to different scenarios, how my subordinates would react… So many questions, all waiting for the decisive moment of battle.

At first light, the operation began with an airborne landing via helicopters. My group’s objective was to head directly to the airport, participate in the assault, and then move towards Government House. We went in with clenched jaws, ready to fight.

When we arrived, there was no resistance — some British personnel had already been captured by forces that had landed before us. Although the situation in that area was under control, we still had to be extremely cautious due to the large number of mines and booby traps laid by the enemy.

While we waited at the airport for the rest of the battalion, we heard bursts of machine gun fire and explosions across different parts of the island. It was then I fully realised that the operation was underway and that we were in the midst of a serious armed conflict.

I remember, with great sadness, that while we were at the airport awaiting orders, a helicopter approached carrying the body of our Second-in-Command, Captain Giachino. He had fought heroically at the head of his troops during the most significant action on the island so far. The news deeply saddened us, but also filled us with fury — an Argentine had been killed, and it was someone from our own battalion.

Once our forces were fully assembled, we advanced on Government House to support the Amphibious Commandos. We surrounded the area to ensure none of the enemy — who had surrendered — could escape.



My next mission was to guard and later transport the prisoners back to the mainland, alongside my group and other personnel.

Back in Argentina, we began preparations for a new mission — reinforcing the defences in Tierra del Fuego. I was deployed there with other military units and remained until the war ended.

Although I spent only a short time in the Falklands, I feel immense pride at having participated in the recovery operations, leading a group of twelve soldiers, including my fellow countrymen Coronel and Gutiérrez, with whom I still share a warm friendship.

"As a Non-Commissioned Officer of the Navy, I had the honour of serving in the 1st Marine Infantry Battalion and being under the command of Captain Giachino — a true example of military virtue."